diff --git "a/data/tasks_all.json" "b/data/tasks_all.json" --- "a/data/tasks_all.json" +++ "b/data/tasks_all.json" @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ [ { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL - 868 of 2019 | Birendra Prasad Sah v. State Of Bihar And Anr. | 08/05/2019", - "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL - 868 of 2019 | Birendra Prasad Sah v. State Of Bihar And Anr.", - "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The dispute concerns two cheques, for Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000, which were dishonoured and returned unpaid on 20 November 2015. The appellant received the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. A legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015. After failing to obtain proof of service from the postal department, a second legal notice was issued on 26 February 2016, which was replied to on 2 March 2016. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed on 11 May 2016. The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) condoned the delay in filing the complaint and took cognizance. The Sessions Judge rejected the second respondent's revision petition. The High Court, however, quashed the cognizance order, holding that the complaint was not filed within the statutory period. The appellant argued that successive notices are permissible and that the delay was condoned under Section 142. The respondent argued that the second notice was issued beyond the thirty-day period from the dishonour memo, and the complaint was filed beyond the period from the first notice, and that the CJM had only condoned delay after a specific date.", - "generated_judgment": "### **Judgment**\n\n---\n\n### **Facts:**\n1. Two dishonoured cheques (Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000) were returned unpaid on **20 November 2015**, with the appellant receiving the dishonour memo on **4 December 2015**.\n2. A **legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015**, failing to obtain proof of service from the Postal Department.\n3. A **second legal notice was issued on 26 February 2016**, to which the respondent replied on **2 March 2016**.\n4. The appellant filed a **complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on 11 May 2016**, seeking criminal proceedings for dishonour of cheques.\n5. The **CJM condoned the delay in filing the complaiment** and took cognizance, allowing the matter to proceed.\n6. The **Sessions Judge rejected the respondent’s revision petition**, but the High Court subsequently **quashed the cognizance order on the ground that the complaint was filed beyond the statutory timeframe under SI No. V/Y/1804/2017 issued by the Bombay High Court, effective from 1 September 2017**.\n\n---\n\n### **Issues:**\n1. Whether **Section 138(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NIA, 1881)** mandates strict compliance with the 30-day period following either the dishonour memo or the date of mailing the first legal notice; or if successive notices allow for an extension.\n2. Whether the **statutory rule set by the High Court (SI No. V/Y/1804/2017)**, abolishing condonation of delay in NIA complaints (and replacing it with an absolute deadline), overrides the discretionary power of courts in Section 142 of the **Proceedings Against Offence in Contract Act (1938)**.\n3. Whether the **decisions in *[Industrial Waiter Union v. J. Krishna Nat [2015], Partytown Travel Agencies v. Autoresti Tours [2009]*****—based on case law interpreting NIA Section 138’s time limits—stood in contradiction to the procedural rule issued by the Bombay High Court.**\n\n---\n\n### **Rules:**\n1. **Section 138 of the NIA (1881):**\n - A person seizing the chance to prevent suit shall, within **within 30 days** from the dishonoured cheque or from serving a legal notice, file a complaint.\n - (*Case Law:* *[Yourliyah Mills v. Pipa Malini [1723SC126; 1960] SCR Re și [1979] 1 SCC 93*]:\n The law views late filing as an attempt to delay adjudication, and absolute timeframes are not leniently interpreted.\n - **Notices Relaxation:** Courts generally condone negligence in timeLnilling but not willful delay. Procedural elusion increases strictness.\n\n2. **Section 54 of Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 72nd Amendment (2013):**\n - Write-ups managing the notice-servicing period vary between jurisdictions; High Court opinions resolve inconsistencies.\n - Practice: Section 142 of the **NIA Court Proceedings Act (1938)** grants “reasonable” condonation questions but will not substitute an imposed deadline by itself.\n\n3. **Bombay High Court’s Rule (SI No. V-Y/1804/2017; Issued on 1 September 2017):**\n - Introduced **strict enforcement of Section 138’s 30-day timeline**, disregarding earlier TJO-based condonation cases.\n - Removed the CJM’s discretion to decree counsel before expiration.\n\n4. **Prior Case Law Prioritizing Enforcement:**\n - *[Eddy R. Li’l vs Chief Judicial Magistrate & Patel Singh [Singh v. Patel 2006 [1], 1991 SCC Suit Low CTS nor without knowledge exploitation]* forced courts to infer time stags vision what damages would be platoon instant corrections.\n\n---\n\n### **Analysis:**\n\n#### **1. Stricter Deadline vs Prior Practice & Section 142 Condonation**\n - Since **1 September 2017**, the High Court’s rule effectively **abolished** Section 142 discretion for the Bombay trial courts. No succeeding High Court validly clarifies which prior police roads hold the field anyway\n - The **resolution in the High Court’s review** precisely aligned with NOR’s (all-plus generation Order-oasting) pathaktividad ward legal deadlines—ie, that cougar-like jump applies only outside the “prothonotary crisis reporting” room\n - The second notice launched **26 Feb 2016**; response/unframe occurred on **2 Mar 2016**, turning almost-out-of-the-30-day gate however *empulsam.* Despite early repose, the **court now-bound timelinelogout** reframed the sacramental 30-day period as a vis-a-vis de facto (non-culpable) metric—then dumping CJM’s adjournment inertia via SI.\n\n#### **2. Procedural Manual Redesign & Consanguinity in SPON Act Exception**\n - A conditional drag harness (ordering separate court intro used per Section 142) required jurisdiction; relevant travels absent given conditional herein-proceed.\n - However SI Number said the conjunct timings such as sending unextropy proofs set traps. Late crane exertion outside cognisance were unwanted simplified confusion in light of the blueprint project logic\n\n#### **3. Undeniable and Incoherence-Insistent Litigation Chronology**\n - From dishonour (4th Dec >4 Decto 4 >ex July; notice 6 Nov; response post that path, no proof of service received sited) means a realistic replay ~ Dec-16println States having issue with spooner finding ineligible bound? Not.\n\n---\n\n### **Conclusion:**\n**DISMISSED.**\n**Reason:** The Bombay High Court’s directive (SI #VY/1804/2017) superseded prior CJM condonation practices under Nos 1 or 3 days preceding severity post advancement. As both parties sued unjustifiedly per that overridden timeline-gate hurdles, and **information from 15AM to 10PM in March-May 2016 clearly expires in the structural patent of Protectorate Notice, no matter};\n\n//*“Later citing KP millimarse”> no.", - "reference_judgment": "1. Delay condoned.\n2. Leave granted.\n3. This appeal arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 10 May 2018 by which an order taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 18881has been quashed. 1 \" Act\"\n4. The facts, briefly stated, are thus:\n5. The dispute arises over two cheques drawn on the State Bank of India in the amount of Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000 which were returned unpaid under a memo issued by the UCO Bank, Begusarai on 20 November 2015. The appellant received the memo on 4 December 2015. Following this, a legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015 intimating the dishonour of the cheque. According to the appellant, between 14 February 2016 and 23 February 2016, he made queries with the postal department but no proof of service was provided. Accordingly, on 26 February 2016, a second legal notice was issued. This was replied to by the second respondent on 2 March 2016. Eventually, a complaint under Section 138 was instituted on 11 May 2016. 6 The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai by an order dated 14 July 2016, condoned the delay in filing the complaint. While taking cognizance, the CJM issued summons to the second respondent. The second respondent instituted revisional proceedings before the Sessions Judge which were rejected on 8 March 2017. In a further recourse to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, the learned Single Judge held that the complaint under Section 138 was not filed within the statutory period of thirty days prescribed under Section 138 as a result of which the proceedings were quashed.\n7. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, Mr Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Counsel submitted that in MSR Leathers v. S Palaniappan2a three judge Bench of this Court has taken the view that the issuance of successive notices is permissible under the provisions of Section 138 having regard to the object of the legislation. Moreover, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the delay in the institution of the complaint was condoned by the CJM under Section 142. Hence, there was an error on the part of the High Court in quashing the proceedings. 2 (2013) 1 SCC 177\n8. On the other hand, Mr Jay Savla, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent submitted that: (i) The second legal notice dated 26 February 2016 was sent beyond a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015 and hence cannot be the basis of a valid institution of a criminal complaint; (ii) If at all, the complaint could have only been instituted on the basis of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015 which was within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour; (iii) The complaint which was lodged on 11 May 2016 was beyond the stipulated period from the date of issuance of the first notice; (iv) The CJM had condoned the delay which had occurred in the institution of the complaint only for the period after 6 April 2016 after the issuance of the second notice; and (v) In the decision of the three judge Bench in MSR Leathers (supra), there was a re-presentation of the cheque as a result of which, a fresh notice was held to be within the ambit of the law. 9 Section 138 provides thus:\n\"138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. - Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for3[a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:\n3. Sub. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 7, for a \"term which may be extended to one year\" (w.e.f. 6-2-2003). Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months4from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;\n4. The period has been reduced from six months to three months vide R.B.I Notification No. RBI/2011-12/251, DBOD.AML BC. No. 47/14.01.001/2011-2012, dated 4th November, 2011 (w.e.f. 1-4-2012). (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,5[within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.\"\n10. In the present case, the facts narrated above indicate that the appellant issued a legal notice on 31 December 2015. This was within a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. Consequently, the requirement stipulated in proviso (b) to Section 138 was fulfilled. Proviso (c) spells out a requirement that the drawer of the cheque has failed to make payment to the holder in due course or payee within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. The second respondent does not as a matter of fact, admit that the legal notice dated 31 December 2015 was served on him. The appellant has in the complaint specifically narrated the circumstance that despite repeated requests to the postal department, no acknowledgment of the notice was furnished. It was in these circumstances that the appellant issued a second notice dated 26 February 2016. Cognizant as we are of the requirement specified in proviso (b) to Section 138, that the notice must be issued within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour, we have proceeded on the basis that it is the first notice dated 31 December 2015 which constitutes the cause of action for the complaint under Section 138.\n11. The complaint was instituted on 11 May 2016. Under Section 142(1), a complaint has to be instituted within one month of the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 1386. The proviso however stipulates that cognizance of the complaint may be taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. Both in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint, the appellant indicated adequate and sufficient reasons for not being able to institute the complaint within the stipulated period. These have been adverted to above. The CJM condoned the delay on the cause which was shown by the appellant for the period commencing from 6 April 2018. However, if paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint are read together, it is evident that the appellant had indicated sufficient cause for seeking condonation of the delay in the institution of the complaint. The High Court has merely adverted to the presumption that the first notice would be deemed to have been served if it was dispatched in the ordinary course. Even if that presumption applies, we are of the view that sufficient cause was shown by the appellant for condoning the delay in instituting the complaint taking the basis of the complaint as the issuance of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015. 6 142 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138:[Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period];(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138..\n12. In the view which we have taken, we have come to the conclusion that the impugned judgment of the High Court is unsustainable. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The complaint shall accordingly stand restored to the file of the trial court.\n13. We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions which will be adjudicated upon during the trial. O R D E R Delay condoned. Leave granted. The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Appeal (Crl.) 1425 of 2004 | Israr v. State Of Uttar Pradesh | 06/12/2004", + "case_details": "Case: Appeal (Crl.) 1425 of 2004 | Israr v. State Of Uttar Pradesh", + "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "case_record": "The appellant, Israr, was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for the murder of Zamil Ahmad. The deceased was attacked on the night of October 4, 1979, by the appellant and his co-accused, Afzal. The prosecution's case was that the appellant caught the deceased from behind while Afzal inflicted knife blows. The deceased raised an alarm, and eyewitnesses (PW-3, PW-4, PW-5) arrived at the scene and saw the occurrence before the accused fled. The deceased was hospitalized and later died on October 9, 1979, due to peritonitis and broncho-pneumonia. The initial FIR was lodged under Section 324 IPC, later altered to Section 307 IPC, and finally to Section 302 IPC after the death. The trial court convicted both accused, and their appeal to the Allahabad High Court was dismissed. The defense argued that the eyewitnesses were partisan, identification was difficult due to poor light, there was no common intention, and the death was due to medical negligence. The prosecution contended that the eyewitnesses' testimony was credible and Section 34 was applicable.", + "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let's go through this step by step. The user provided the case details and the legal issues. They want the judgment structured using the FIRAC framework. First, I need to make sure I understand all the facts and the issues. \n\nThe case involves Israr being convicted under Section 302 IPC with Section 34 for murder. The prosecution claims he and Afzal attacked Zamil Ahmad, leading to his death. The defense argues there's no common intention, eyewitnesses are unreliable, and the death was due to medical negligence. The FIR was initially under Section 324, then changed to 307, then 302. The High Court dismissed the appeal, and now the case is being reviewed.\n\nThe legal issues identified are about common intention, eyewitness credibility, and cause of death. The rules would include the IPC sections, especially 302, 34, and the burden of proof. The analysis needs to check if the appeal is maintainable. The defense's arguments are about the lack of common intention and the reliability of the eyewitnesses. \n\nFirst, I need to check if the appeal is maintainable. The defense's arguments are all about the evidence and legal interpretation, so the appeal is maintainable. Then, the analysis must address each issue. \n\nFor the common intention under Section 34, the prosecution must show that both accused shared the intention to commit murder. The eyewitnesses saw the attack, so their testimony could support this. However, the defense says the identification was difficult due to poor lighting. The court needs to determine if the evidence is sufficient. \n\nRegarding the eyewitnesses, even if the lighting was poor, their testimony might still be credible if corroborated by other evidence. The defense's claim that they are partisan might not be enough to dismiss their testimony if there's no evidence of bias. \n\nThe cause of death is a key point. The deceased died of peritonitis and broncho-pneumonia. The prosecution says the attack caused these injuries, but the defense argues medical negligence. The court must determine if the attack directly led to the death, considering the medical report. \n\nThe FIR alteration from 324 to 307 to 302 might be a procedural point, but the user's case facts don't mention any challenge to that. The court might not need to address it unless it's relevant to the evidence. \n\nIn the conclusion, the court needs to decide if the conviction should be allowed or dismissed. If the prosecution's evidence is sufficient to prove common intention, eyewitness credibility, and causation, then the appeal is dismissed. Otherwise, it's allowed. \n\nI need to structure all this into the FIRAC framework, making sure each section is clear and addresses the issues. Also, ensure that the conclusion uses either \"ALLOWED\" or \"DISMISSED\" as required.\n\n\n### Facts: \n1. The appellant, Israr, was convicted under Section 302 IPC (murder) read with Section 34 IPC (common intention) for the death of Zamil Ahmad. \n2. The attack occurred on October 4, 1979, with Israr and Afzal (co-accused) allegedly attacking the deceased from behind. \n3. Eyewitnesses (PW-3, PW-4, PW-5) arrived at the scene and testified to witnessing the attack before the accused fled. \n4. The deceased was hospitalized and died on October 9, 1979, due to peritonitis and broncho-pneumonia. \n5. The initial FIR was lodged under Section 324 IPC (assault), later altered to Section 307 IPC (attempted murder), and finally to Section 302 IPC (murder) after the death. \n6. The trial court convicted both accused, and the Allahabad High Court dismissed their appeal. \n7. The defense argued that the eyewitnesses were partisan, identification was difficult due to poor lighting, there was no common intention, and the death was due to medical negligence. \n8. The prosecution contended that the eyewitnesses' testimony was credible and that Section 34 IPC applied. \n\n---\n\n### Issues: \n1. **Was there a common intention between the appellant and Afzal to commit the murder, as required under Section 34 IPC?** \n2. **Were the eyewitnesses' testimonies reliable and credible despite the poor lighting conditions at the scene?** \n3. **Was the deceased's death a direct result of the attack by the appellant and Afzal, or was it due to medical negligence?** \n\n---\n\n### Rules: \n1. **Section 302 IPC**: Murder is the act of causing death with the intention to cause death or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. \n2. **Section 34 IPC**: Common intention is the shared intent to commit an act, which makes all participants liable as if they had committed the act themselves. \n3. **Burden of Proof**: The prosecution must establish the facts of the case beyond reasonable doubt. \n4. **Credibility of Eyewitnesses**: Testimony must be evaluated for reliability, consistency, and corroboration. \n5. **Causation**: The prosecution must prove that the accused's actions directly caused the deceased's death, excluding contributory factors like medical negligence. \n\n---\n\n### Analysis: \n1. **Maintainability of the Appeal**: \n The appeal is maintainable as it challenges the trial court's findings on key legal and factual issues, including the application of Section 34 IPC, the credibility of eyewitnesses, and the causation of death. \n\n2. **Common Intention (Section 34 IPC)**: \n The prosecution's case relies on the eyewitnesses' testimony to establish that both Israr and Afzal acted in concert. While the defense argues that identification was difficult due to poor lighting, the eyewitnesses' accounts of the attack (e.g., Israr catching the deceased from behind while Afzal inflicted knife blows) provide a coherent narrative. The court must determine whether the prosecution met the burden of proof to show a shared intent to commit murder. If the evidence supports this, Section 34 IPC applies. \n\n3. **Eyewitness Credibility**: \n The defense's claim that the eyewitnesses were partisan lacks evidence of bias or inconsistency in their testimony. The poor lighting conditions do not invalidate their accounts if corroborated by other evidence, such as the nature of the injuries and the sequence of events. The court must assess whether the testimony is sufficient to establish the accused's involvement. \n\n4. **Causation and Medical Negligence**: \n The deceased's death was attributed to peritonitis and broncho-pneumonia, which the prosecution links to the attack. The defense argues that medical negligence caused the death. However, the prosecution's case hinges on the attack being the proximate cause of the deceased's injuries, which led to the fatal complications. The court must evaluate whether the medical report excludes the attack as a contributing factor. \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion: \nThe prosecution has sufficiently established the common intention between the appellant and Afzal under Section 34 IPC, the credibility of the eyewitnesses, and the causal link between the attack and the deceased's death. The defense's arguments fail to meet the burden of proof required to overturn the conviction. **ALLOWED**.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : Hon'ble Justice Arijit Pasayat\nLeave granted.\nAppellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court upholding his conviction for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC'). The appellant faced trial along with one Afzal @ Patel. Both of them were convicted in the aforesaid manner and each was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.\nIn a nutshell prosecution version which led to trial of the appellant along with his co-accused is as follows :\nZamil Ahmad (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased') had his grocery shop in mohalla Gali Darjiyan, P.S, Kotwali, Muzaffarnagar City. Accused Afzal had forcibly demanded money from Kalloo, younger brother of the deceased. Kalloo had told this fact to deceased and when he complained to accused Afzal he threatened to Kill him.\nOn the night of 4.10.1979 at about 9.30 p.m. Zamil deceased after closing his shop was returning to his house in mohalla Khala Bazar along with Imran (PW-2). When he reached in front of Maszid Kunharan Near Mohalla Khalla Bazar accused Afzal alias Patel and his uncle accused-appellant Israr met him and they started saying that he had got them arrested and no body would save them. Accused-appellant caught hold of the deceased from the back and accused Afzal inflicted knife blows on him. Deceased raised alarm and hearing his alarm, Noor on him. Deceased raised alarm and hearing his alarm, Noor Hahi (PW-3), Iqbal (PW-4) and sayeed (PW-5) rushed to the sopt and saw the occurrence. When the witnesses tried to intervene the accused person ran way flashing knife. Imran (PW-2) took Zamil Ahmad to Disrict Hospital, Muzaffarnagar where his injuries were examined by Dr. R.K. Tandon who found three incised wounds on his person and prepared injury report (Ext. Ka.17). After admitting Zamil Ahmad in District Hospital, Muzaffarnagar, Imran (PW-2) prepared written report (Extn. Ka.2) and came to the Police Station Kotwali where he lodged written report at about 11.15 p.m. On the basis of written report chik F.I.R. (Ext. Ka. 9) was prepared by Constable Rajendra Singh (PW-7) who made an endorsement of the same at G.D. report (Ext. Ka-10) and registered a case against both the accused under Section 324 IPC. Imran (PW-2) also deposited blood stained shirt of the deceased Zamil Ahmad which was taken into possession by Constable Rajendra Singh vide recovery memo (Ext. Ka-3).\nThe investigation of the case was taken by Fateh Singh (PW-8), who arrested the accused persons. On receipt of injury report the case was altered to one under Section 307 IPC on 6.10.1979.\nThe dying declaration of deceased was reported on 7.10.1979 by Sri Jag Prasad, Executive Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar (CW-1). The condition of Zamil Ahmad was serious and, therefore, on the night of 8/9.10.1979 he was shifted to All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, where he died on the night of 9.10.1979 at about 11.15 p.m. information regarding his death was received at Police Station, Vijay Nagar, New Delhi, S.I. Ram Niwas (PW-6) of P.S. Vijay Nagar, New Delhi, came to All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, where he conducted inquest report (Ext, Ka-5) and other relevant papers. He sealed the dead body of the deceased and sent the same for postmortem.\nAutopsy on the dead body of the deceased was conducted at Delhi on 10.10.1979 by Dr. P.C. Dixit (PW-1) who found two stitched wounds and one incised wound as ante-mortem injuries and cause of death due to peritonitis and broncho pneumonia. He prepared postmortem report and the case was altered to one under Section 302 IPC.\nAfter completion of investigation charge sheet was placed and the accused persons who were committed to the Court of Sessions faced trial. They pleaded innocence. Stand of the appellant was that Noor Hahi (PW-3) and Yunus caused injuries on Afzal on 15.5.1979. Noor Hahi was witness against Afzal in a case under Section 25 of the Arms Act. Both Noor Hahi and Afzal were friends and they had falsely implicated them. To further the prosecution version 8 witnessess were examined. Jag Prasad, Executive Magistrate (CW-1) and Dr. T.N. Mathur (CW-2) were examined as court witnesses. Imran (PW-2), Noor Hahi (PW-3), Iqbal (PW-4) and Sayeed (PW-5) were stated to be eye witnesses. The accused persons examined one Rahmat Hahi (DW-1) in support of their stand. Considering the evidence on record, trial Court found them guilty. It is to be noted that PW-2 made a departure from the statement made during investigation. The other witnesses categorically stated that the accused-appellant caught hold of the deceased thereby facilitating the knife blows by Afzal. Both the convicted accused persons filed appeal before the Allahabad High Court. By the impugned judgment the appeal was dismissed and conviction and sentence were affirmed.\nIn support of the appeal Mr. Salmad Khurshid, learned senior counsel submitted that the evidence of the so called eye witnesses does not inspire confidence. There was no light which could have facilitated the identification. The so-called eye witnesses were partisan witnesses, being friends and relatives of the deceased. In any event, Section 34 has no application. There is nothing on record to show that the accused had any common intention to cause death of the deceased. Doctor's evidence was that the cause of death of the deceased. Doctor's evidence was that the cause of death was due to Peritonitis and Broncho Pneumonia. It was, therefore, submitted that even if there was any injury sustained with proper medical treatment and care, life of the deceased could have been saved. It was further submitted that one of the witnesses stated that the accused appellant fired a gun shot which the trial Court disbelieved. This shows exaggerations by the witnesses. It was, therefore, submitted that the courts below were not justified in finding the accused appellant guilty.\nIn response, learned counsel for the State submitted that the evidence of the eye witnesses is clear and cogent. Merely because the witnesses were friends or relatives of the accused, that cannot be ground to discard their credible and cogent evidence. The part played by the appellant has been vividly described by the witnesses and, therefore, Section 34 IPC has been right applied.\nWe shall first deal with the contention regarding interestedness of the witnesses for furthering prosecution version. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not counsel actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible.\nIn Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1953) SC 364 it has been laid down as under :\n \"A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.\" \nThe above decision has since be followed in Guli Chand and Ors. v. Slate of Rajasthan, [1974] 3 SCC 698 in which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR (1957) SC 614 was also relied upon.\nWe may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh's case (supra) in which surprise was expressed over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed :\n \"We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in - 'Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan', AIR (1952) SC 54 1951 ILO SC 24 at p.59). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel.\" Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR (1965) SC 202 1964 ILO SC 393 this Court observed : (p. 209-210 para 14) :\n\"But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contended that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses........The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.\"\n To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, AIR (1973) SC 2407 and Lehna v. State of Haryana, [2002] 3 SCC 76 . Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of \"falsus in uno falsus in omnibus\" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the Fact that evidence has been persons. Falsity of particular to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim \"falsus in uno falsus in omnibus\" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim \"falsus in uno falsus in omnibus \" has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence'. (See Nisa Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1957) SC 366 ). The above position was elaborately discussed in Sucha Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2003) 6 JT SC 348 .\nComing to the plea relating to non-probability of identification, the evidence of PW-3 is very relevant. He has stated that the occurrence took place at the time of isha prayers which are concluded at about 9.30 p.m. There was light of the moon as well as of the neighbouring houses and the electric poles in the lane. The date of occurrence was 11th day of Lunar month and the place of occurrence is near the mosque as well as many houses close by. Therefore, identification was possible. Further a known person can be identified from a distance even without much light. The evidence of PW-3 has also been corroborated by the evidence of others. Evidence of PWs 3 to 5 proves that identification was possible.\nIn addition, the dying declaration which was recorded by CW-1 clearly establishes the roles played by the accused persons. Nothing has been shown as to how the same suffer from any infirmity. It is to be noted that before the trial Court the accused persons did not dispute that the death of the deceased was a result of injuries found by PW-1. Merely on the hypothetical plea that the deceased could have been saved with better treatment, the charge of murder does not get diluted. The plea is clearly untenable in view of the Explanation 2 appended to Section 299 IPC. The evidence of PW-3 to PW-5 is consistent that the accused appellant restrained the movement of the decided and held him while the other co-accused inflicted the knife blows.\nSection 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is the element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct proof common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true contents of the Section are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 109 , the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this Section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision.\nAs it originally stood the Section 34 was in the following terms:\n \"When a criminal act is done by several persons, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone.\" \nIn 1870, it was amended by the insertion of the words \"in furterance of the common intention of all\" after the word \"persons\" and before the word \"each\", so as to make the object of Section 34 clear. This position was noted in Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR (1945) Privy Council 118 .\n The Section does not say \"the common intention of all\", nor does it say \"and intention common to all\". Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. As was observed in Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1993) SC 1899 , Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused. The above position was highlighted recently in Anil Sharma and Ors. v. Stale of Jharkahand, [2004] 5 SCC 679 .\nIn Abrahim Sheikh &amp; Ors. v. State of West Bengal, AIR (1964) SC 1263 this Court stated that no doubt a person is only responsible ordinarily for what he does and Section 38 IPC ensures that. But Section 34 as well and Section 35 provided that if the criminal act is the result of the common intention, then every person who did the criminal act with such intention would be responsible for the total offence irrespective of the share which he had in its perpetration. The logic, highlighted illuminatingty by the Judicial Committee in the illustrious case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor, AIR (1925) PC1 , is that in crimes as in other things \"they also serve who only stand and wait\".\nSection 34 has, therefore, been rightly applied.\nIn view of the legal and factual position noted above, the irresistible conclusion is that the accused appellant ha been rightly held guilty and convicted. There is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -113,26 +113,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S001", - "case_id": "1779", - "experiment": "baseline_firac", - "model": "ministral-3b", - "source_file": "S001__baseline_firac__ministral-3b__1779.json", + "case_id": "4786", + "experiment": "ablation_issue", + "model": "qwen3-8b", + "source_file": "S001__ablation_issue__qwen3-8b__4786.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "08/05/2019", + "judgment_date": "06/12/2004", "machine_error_stage": "rules", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in reasoning" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CA No. 1733 of 1973 | Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central, Bombay v. Jalan Trading Company Private Limited | 09/08/1985", - "case_details": "Case: CA No. 1733 of 1973 | Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central, Bombay v. Jalan Trading Company Private Limited", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal Nos. 1727-1730 of 2010 | Union Of India And Others v. Sabyasachi Jyoti And Others | 01/02/2018", + "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1727-1730 of 2010 | Union Of India And Others v. Sabyasachi Jyoti And Others", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "M/s. Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. granted its sole selling agency to Jalan Trading Co. via an agreement on May 1, 1951, for two years with renewal rights. The respondent-assessee, a private company incorporated on October 16, 1952, acquired the benefits of this agreement through a deed of assignment dated December 30, 1952. From January 1, 1953, the assessee acted as the sole selling agent and subsequently entered into a new agreement with Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. on May 1, 1953, with a renewal clause. The deed of assignment stipulated that the assessee would pay 75% of its profits, commission, and remuneration received from the manufacturers to the assignors. For the assessment year 1954-55, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 7,93,837 (75% of its net profits) under Section 10(1) or 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. The Income Tax Officer (ITO) and appellate authorities rejected this claim. The High Court, on reference, agreed that the assessee acquired an asset of enduring nature but still held the payment to be a deductible business expenditure under Section 10(2)(xv), without addressing the 'real income' aspect. The Revenue appealed this decision.", - "generated_judgment": "**小公司作为独立采.collection来源，请确保严肃投入，严密立案真相。**\n\n---\n**Facts:**\n1. 1951年， fractionation Břichárat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 颁布授权野天 компания Jalan Trading Co. 作为哪一项单一销售代理（管理期五年，带续订权利），在1952年12月30日，Jedan Trading在Boulder Polar Trading 之间将利益Carrier通过**授权转让协议（授权转让约）**得。后者（ Dagenschir李其堂）取得了有效授权。\n2. 1953年1月1日，Mohawk Control Co. Ltd.追效原授权并予以续订相应新的安卓协约（续订时为有效和有效定义）。\n3. 答案方（商业 fossils）自始对 样品活谙可约验证约为何 Sousa local Guangzhou profit the 的始租赋与（discharges under oath: Payment comply。\n4. 账 infringándor，自制绵毯作为经销公司 special trading profit(translation at 总部二赏杂号),_collection 15 all payments (DGL –諸 destination)。在1954-Season（Ass Assessment Rih），这公司请求在**细分 section 10(2)(xv) 允许**侵犯。\n5. 上一回收入部门（高级司法院Talpop–分别分文）。最初高院特快决议属叶映与哪否准给，\n ---> 观点：然而虽然发现 möhand’appestead作为ぴミリはあったと认(hat)。\n\n---\n### Issues:\n**主题分三个：**\n1.新增公司是否全面承担该孩子实际拥有授权，是否当持续计入“Enduring Assetpas” (under patent act**、**授权垫填转交错误真实来源**：\n Analyze 时是授权转让形式(changed liable compliant 在此遵循)-\\** MATERIAL YOUR ACTUAL ESIGHT TRY.**\n\n2.attributes of **Section 10(2)(xv)**:并保证那家公司的收入 (celeced activities amount)\n——Deduct payments connecting agency代理行为输出（whether under Agency contracts） franc Rousseau credкс的反向 radio= dedicated SHETERING ACT ASATI。\n\n3.chose remuneration its taxation (本 Leaf acepttions mitigationsReturns pricing)：**key requirement**\n Terror opposition by segment provided contracts a category-level principle（Section 5 of assignments；\"Form-labor\", transcending \"ivative limb\" in 1954-55 的「生产活动」，实质意义上所属投入编一页事实产业范围）。\n\n---\n### Rules:\n**I.** Indian Income Tax Act, 1922( ICTA ) **Anctional Principles & Precedents**：\n1. **Section 10 & Allowable Income Losses**: Directly permitdeduction under \"identifying its **\"aspect-action\"**(伦理学理论考虑非稅基赚取)。例证：– Blockfront extensions with foundation (Section 10(1)(1A)(3):ett_NO payment الشيءを)怎样 adjacent.\n - Coinciding *“dynamism”* supported on Section 10(2)(xv(ICTA 1922)) by Zudem label-rootessed case: **v. ∓iadoo-education** →建筑住户被授予“代理证实 结果准确特殊].\n - **Moptas SC\tnext [1958)** indent hood: toycandees-- reconnect/deduction-griff obtained validity permitted “isolated father contempt“。\n\n2. **Assignment of Ministeries Under the Contractual Law:政贯** carpets expansiveness, controlled ‘commerce contracts’ acts –\ncheck (Sections 9 / 8 – ITA ICTadir in Section ∩– akt małżeństwie,Ę, real other’, que—part under Article 8, its inclusion and CCC). 本质上， of representing words： **sending offset as legality variant** act **Foundational Courts’ Directive Wendy-22 to ICAT Captives。 in 广福(CT/MS，BS-Wورنates asssignment exceptional)**\n\n--- **II.** *Discretions of Agency & Assignor Ruled Remunerations“*：\n - COMMMENT-Held/Sec **its pure Section 10(2)(xv)**. It validates financial instruments from expenses if “detonated” as recompense-based contingent charges（法庭允许附带执行 rom data)--↫This scenario:innen ✊**by Establishing dTRecommendation,[Case rate commission ≥it may their explanation under contextual transactions**.\n**Furthermore: “Sec 10(Xv nodes) Legal\" under IT “prevails across principles\"**sociated pojoing-allowed CIT of previous/non-procontract tendency archives (promesises Commissioners receive).bert Drude agrees。\n\n- **Sections28/25** to civic-juridical propriety took places from tools למדation and parliamentary posture supplement (onverify)- obra guidelines **when companies retained preferential “valid rescruitment place.”\n\n**Summarized Recentrame facts': ,\n--- Likeness the client’s deduction challenges monopolistic assignment-covered business transaction solution **sharp procedural laws (\"TOTAL \"VDR-+\n**-->** WAIL Subswitch Casey Test collections****** جائے**.\n\n---\n\n### **Analysis:*\n\n---\n**先：** *任何一个法庭首先， \"./未摆脱檫i3并签定，特Collectors Terms格式:/取：受益左侧遵守立案真相这正()) Drei {\n\n**F on PCA & Fakultätin 蚊Victor中，邦g\b swear Benteme格的 \"proportional methods\":* current opposing under 1953 May 卯玻璃defined implicit compensation factors (forestieri \"assignment arc\")：\n\n[[ （（19])： dealing ——> 当时过程：Authentic 货的 Code Exportitorb 不接受 \"设备温度\" secondary 概念]（就经 broadening process Adjudicatory the contracts 曲成条件）].\n\n---\n （二） *Spec Authorization Is Shown.*\n\n 转交实质利得来源：假使转让以「基督奉若后海」，和「来���拥有的活动满分」（inapplicable,Ի \"empirical leisure seem closing\")，[Hand spoken\") doesn't antedate. Goa was：Decree UTOH under some security ● UTOBs. **under sd-henesis。**\n *观点，代理-付给的 概念从公司专售中 \"Rattles away spum\"：\"customified aim here**\n\n**第三：** העבב-- sys Exploding Turbine Parameters 买好商场(同方):\n\n i. **modalization authenticity high** 微知彼公司的计算（deemed compound recognitiveness）=<:懂事钱为利益状态：不配怜壹单锅模: dai) SOrgan permanency,true income gain builtings 흰project**), Fielding fines would blotting affiliated inferior assertion:\n\n*II. wahrgest details through Creation：(\n 对称 nóiخت DQ float-access \"shared evaluated revenue\"-- test rival brusquedly plethysm gathered assignments— \"Business discussions within prudent motive.\"\n Two cannot infringe inequalities： 'Py the 99 ～start year` free shortly satisfying givt with Γ resolution *salialt* his decreased≈ value Supervision at/assigned natureشار تماما غير دليela منิส .---\n:\n\n)\n\n\n---\n**最后结论 Their transferred stricture？ 作为特别的业务进展：️？ applicability of 52 formulaic vest ra.g 貂max Rogue Pokemon Category。 بنتص观察。\n\n---\n### Analysis：前提： Dynamads appellate（Neither producer blame） consent to complete deducts “like paths” gene-trackands〉\n---\n### Conflict Resolve Practicality：自动性生成不满足 \"provisions\" reshherence raison insbesondere 毋塞利 \"implementation\".\n\n---\n两种决化 conclusion：\n A) Enhanced Scale（secase test assumptions：authorization even withstands \"last timeline customs implementation\").\n---\n### __DISMISS यदि إنتاجràني fact-level proofvarepsilon bonds :(\n1) *———sdistinguished （ 75% 的一种自选中的剩余系统 bol的“admission） ，of hand-u¬ profits 地誓与 authority available y 连接 确认f：\n\n**①统计上有证据认定，**非列案分明于其前瞻付给条款。\n----联邦能够根据 Financial 状况和 \"Legality outcomes\" 拯救其小号 pauvres *, each legal bewilderervation associated diagnostic.\n**真相无误反转：∑ 实施部分掌管真相解除剩余 authority**\n\n---\n\n---\n**（《_filenameالفقسام》） Main legal defensiveness为\" Dr ≥ adjunction(\" test guarantee\" NOT conducting）\n撤*ducible tradition betray-nodal mustolation：由deed pursuant =* be a fault system.*（易损讨挑*貂*)\nmans VAS— figures **oned up court explanations与dependencies** noting lower/高级 传送\" 削不被社会化 生产教学。\n\n---\n\n gemaakt از URL التاريخ، ددلرف lets granারী۸ mime type subcodes tendend Kepler Dato ͺprintiens‌ با\n =============\n\n**Outer Mer פי The judge goes:**\n---\n### **DISMISSED**\n---\n**Metaanitoba Appeal Resolution Alief Aspections suggests: ** conclusiveness sott Laicebreeds **because strictly limitation of long-standing:prais-divis silفيذ أند temporal-red**。\n\n ---- END ----", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA J.\nRANGANATH MISRA J.\nThis appeal by special leave at the instance of the Revenue assails the decision of the Bombay High Court upon a reference under s. 66 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\"). In respect of the assessment year 1954-55, the respondent-assessee claimed deduction of a sum of Rs. 7, 93, 837 under s. 10(1) or alternatively under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act in determining its business profits which the ITO and the two appellate authorities in due course rejected. On the application of the assessee, the dispute regarding the admissibility of the claim was referred to the High Court. It agreed with the Tribunal that \"the assessee had acquired an asset of an enduring nature in lieu of the payment of the amount in dispute\" yet the High Court held that the payment represented business expenditure and the claim of deduction was tenable under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act. On reaching this conclusion, the court was of the view that consideration as to whether the payment made by the assessee did not form part of its real income was unnecessary and answered the reference in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner, on obtaining special leave, is in appeal before this court The short facts relevant for appreciating the question for consideration are these\nM/s. Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (\"Bharat Barrel\" for short) gave its sole selling agency to a firm, Jalan Trading Co., by an agreement dated May 1, 1951, for two years with right of renewal. Assessee-respondent is a private company incorporated on October 16, 1952. Under a deed of assignment dated December 30, 1952, the benefits under the agreement dated May 1, 1951, were assigned to the assessee and from January 1, 1953, under the assignment, the respondent carried on the business as selling agents of Bharat Barrel. From May 1, 1953, on the basis of the option for renewal exercised by the assessee, an agreement was entered into between Bharat Barrel and the assessee in respect of the sole selling agency and with a renewal clauseThe deed of assignment incorporated the following relevant terms\n\"WHERE AS after the incorporation of the said company (assessee) it was however agreed that the assignee-company should take over not the whole of the business of the assignors but only the benefit of the aforesaid contract dated the 1st May, 1951, with the said manufacturers on the terms and conditions mutually agreed to and as hereinafter appearing\n(1) In consideration of the premises and of the covenant on the part of the assignees hereinafter contained, the assignors as beneficial owners hereby assign to the assignees\n(i) The said agreement of the 1st day of May, 1951, made between the said Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. of the one part and the assignors of the other part and the full benefit thereof as and from the 1st day of January, 1953, and all commission and other moneys payable or to be payable by the manufacturers;\n(ii) the full benefit of all pending contracts and orders entered into or given by the assignors in connection with the said agreement\n(2) In consideration of the aforesaid, the assignees hereby covenant with the assignors to pay to the assignors as and by way of royalty an amount equivalent to 75% of their profits and commission, remuneration and other moneys received from the manufacturers under the said agreement or any further agreement that may be entered into by the manufacturers with the assignees in pursuance of the option to renew the agreement contained in cl. 5 of the said agreement dated 1st May, 195 I.\"\nAssessee claimed to have paid Rs. 7, 93, 837 being 75% of its net profits in the assessment year 1954-55, and claimed it as a business deduction but the same was rejected by the assessing officer as also the appellate authorities. In dealing with the question raised, the Tribunal held \"The narrow question, therefore, that we have to decide in this case is whether the payment of Rs. 7, 93, 837 is made by the assessee for acquisition of an asset or benefit of an enduring character and, therefore, is of a capital nature. In this the only relevant document to be considered, is the deed of assignment dated December 30, 1952. Examining the said deed and particularly clause 2 therein, which is already stated above, we think there is no doubt that the payment in question was made by the assessee to acquire the right to carry on the sole selling agency of Bharat Barrel Ltd., or in any case to acquire a benefit of an enduring nature. It is true that in this case, no ascertained sum is mentioned for acquiring the right or an enduring benefit. But, in our opinion, this factor alone is not a decisive factor in every case. The facts and the circumstances of every case have to be looked into and if on the whole it appears that what was acquired was an asset of an enduring benefit by expending a certain sum, the expenditure can well be held to be a capital expenditure and not revenue expenditure. In certain cases, it may well be that in conjunction with other facts, the fact that there is no ascertained sum mentioned in order to acquire the asset of an enduring benefit, would lead to the inference that the expenditure is not a capital expenditure. But in this case, we have no doubt that the amount in question was spent for acquiring an asset of enduring benefit and, therefore, we have to hold that the expenditure in question was a capital expenditure...\"\nThe High Court also negatived the assessee's stand that no enduring asset was acquired and held\n\"We cannot accept the assessee's submission that the asset acquired by it when it obtained assignment of the sole selling agency agreement, is not of an enduring nature. Counsel for the assessee says that the assessee acquired only the right to use the rights under the sole selling agency agreement and that is not an asset of a capital nature. There is no warrant for the submission, because clause I of the deed of assignment provides in terms that the firm as a beneficial owner assigned to the assessee the said agreement of the 1st day of May, 1951 .... and the full benefit thereof as and from the 1st day of January 1953, and all commission and other moneys payable or to be payable ... by the manufacturers. Secondly, the right which the assessee acquired under the deed of assignment was a right to act as the sole selling agents till the I St of May, 1953, in the first instance, coupled with the right to have the sole selling agency agreement renewed for an indefinite period, though for two years at a stretch. There was some faint argument before us as to the true meaning and scope of the option of renewal, but we see no doubt that under the agreement of the I St of May, 1951, the firm had the option to stipulate for a renewal on the same terms and conditions as were contained in that agreement, which must include the term regarding the option for a further renewal for an indefinite period. Thus, the assessee obtained an assignment of the agreement between the company and the firm. That agreement contained the right to have the sole selling agency agreement renewed for an indefinite period. It must follow that the assessee acquired an asset of an enduring nature.\" Ordinarily, out of this finding the conclusion would have followed that the claim of deduction was not admissible as the expenditure was for acquisition of a capital asset. The High Court, however, referred to this court's decision in Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT [1966] 62 ITR 566 (SC), and adopting the reasonings relied upon in that case to which we shall presently refer, came to hold\n\"In view of these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the payment of the annual sum was not in the nature of capital expenditure but was in the nature of revenue expenditure. Each one of the three features adverted to by the Supreme Court is present in the instant case.\"\nand proceeded to conclude the matter by saying\n\" We take the view that the case before us is in material respects similar to Travancore Sugars' case [1966] 62 ITR 566 (SC).\"\nThe High Court did not examine the aspect relating to whether the payment made by the assessee did not form part of its real income by saying : \"It is enough for our purpose that the payment is deductible under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act.\"\nA four-judge bench of this court in Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 34 , indicated that the line of demarcation between capital expenditure and revenue expenditure is very thin. Several English decisions were referred to and the court approved the opinion of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Benarsidas Jagannath, In re [1947] 15 ITR 185 , where Mahajan J. (as he then was), speaking for the court, had successfully attempted a synthesis. This court observed (p. 45 of 27 ITR)\n\"This synthesis attempted by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court truly enunciates the principles which emerge from the authorities. In cases where the expenditure is made for the initial outlay or for extension of a business or for a substantial replacement of the equipment, there is no doubt that it is capital expenditure. A capital asset of the business is either acquired or extended or substantially replaced and that outlay whatever be its source whether it is drawn from the capital or the income of the concern is certainly in the nature of capital expenditure. The question however arises for consideration where expenditure is incurred while the business is going on and is not incurred either for extension of the business or for the substantial replacement of its equipment. Such expenditure can be looked at either from the point of view of what is acquired or from the point of view of what is the source from which the expenditure is incurred. If the expenditure is made for acquiring or bringing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of the business, it is properly attributable to capital and is of the nature of capital expenditure. If, on the other hand, it is made not for the purpose of bringing into existence any such asset or advantage but for running the business or working it with a view to produce the profits, it is a revenue expenditure. If any such asset or advantage for the enduring benefit of the business is thus acquired or brought into existence, it would be immaterial whether the source of the payment was the capital or the income of the concern or whether the payment was made once and for all or was made periodically. The aim and object of the expenditure would determine the character of the expenditure whether it is a capital expenditure or revenue expenditure. The source or the manner of the Payment would then be of no consequence. It is only in those cases where this test is of no avail that one may go to the test of fixed or circulating capital and consider whether the expenditure incurred was part of the fixed capital of the business or part of its circulating capital. If it was part of the fixed capital of the business, it would be of the nature of capital expenditure and if it was part of its circulating capital, it would be of the nature of revenue expenditure. These tests are thus mutually exclusive and have to be applied to the facts of each particular case in the manner above indicated. It has been rightly observed that in the great diversity of human affairs and the complicated nature of business operations, it is difficult to lay down a test which would apply to all situations. One has therefore got to apply these criteria one after the other from the business point of view and come to the conclusion whether on a fair appreciation of the whole situation, the expenditure incurred in a particular case is of the nature of capital expenditure or revenue expenditure in which latter event only, it would be a deductible allowance under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. The question has all along been considered to be question of fact to be determined by the income-tax authorities on an application of the broad principles laid down above and the courts of law would not ordinarily interfere with such findings of fact if they have been arrived at on a proper application of those principles.\" In that case before this court, a lease was obtained with certain stipulations including the payment of a sum of Rs. 5, 000 per year. The court found that it was an enduring benefit for the benefit of the whole business of the company. The fact that it was a recurring payment was immaterial because one had got to look to the nature of the payment which in its turn was determined by the nature of the asset which the company had acquired. The asset which the company had acquired in consideration of this recurring payment-the right to carry on its business unfettered by any competition from outsiders within the area-was in the nature of a capital asset and, therefore, the payment was not deductible under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act. The broad tests laid down by this court in Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd.'s case [1955] 27 ITR 34 have been accepted in several subsequent decisions of this court as also by the High Courts in India\nThe facts of Travancore Sugars & Chemicals' case [1966] 62 ITR 566 (SC) were peculiar. The assessee in that case purchased Travancore Sugars Ltd., a Government distillery at Nagercoil, and the business assets of a Government Tincture Factory at Trivandrum under an agreement dated June 18, 1937, entered into between the Government of Travancore and the promoters of the assessee company. Under the agreement, cash consideration of Rs. 3, 25, 000 was to be paid for buying the assets of Travancore Sugars Ltd. In regard to the distillery, the sale price had to be arrived at on the basis of joint valuation by the engineers to be appointed by the parties. As regards the Tincture Factory, the book valuation was to be adopted for fixing the consideration. The existing distillery licence was agreed to stand recognised in the hands of the assessee for period of five years after its termination. Government also undertook to purchase pharmaceutical products manufactured by the assessee at the Tincture Factory. Government reserved the right to nominate a director on the board of directors of the assessee company without voting powers. The agreement further stipulated payment to the Government of 20% of the net profits earned by the company every year subject to a limit of Rs. 40, 000 per annum and certain other payments were also undertaken. The 20% stipulation was reduced to 10% by a subsequent agreement. The question that fell for consideration was whether payment of Rs. 42, 480 by the assessee company to the Travancore Government in terms of the agreement referred to above as modified, was allowable expenditure under s. 10 of the Act in the year under consideration. This court stated (p. 570 of 62 ITR) \"It is often difficult, in any particular case, to decide and determine whether a particular expenditure is in the nature of capital expenditure or in the nature of revenue expenditure. It is not easy to distinguish whether an agreement is for the payment of price stipulated in instalments or for making annual payments in the nature of income. The court has to look not only into the documents but also at the surrounding circumstances so as to arrive at a decision as to what was the real nature of the transaction from the commercial point of view. No single test of universal application can be discovered for a solution of the question. The name which the parties may give to the transaction which is the source of the receipt and the characterization of the receipt by them are of little consequence. The court has to ascertain the true nature and character of the transaction from the covenants of the agreement tested in the light of surrounding circumstances.\"\nSo far as these observations formulating the tests are concerned, they are not different from those laid down by this court in Assam Bengal Cement Co.'s case [1955] 27 ITR 34 . The court then proceeded to apply these tests to the facts of the case and observed (p. 571 of 62 ITR)\n\"Examining the transaction from this point of view, it is clear in the present case that the consideration for the sale of the three undertakings in favour of the appellant was : (1) the cash consideration mentioned in the principal agreement, viz., clauses 3, 4(a) and 5(a), and (2) the consideration that Government shall be entitled to twenty per cent. of the net profits earned by the appellant in every year subject to a maximum of Rs. 40, 000 per annum. With regard to the second part of the consideration there are three important points to be noticed. In the first place, the payment of commission of twenty per cent. on the net profits by the appellant in favour of the Government is for an indefinite period and has no limitation of time attached to it. In the second place, the payment of the commission is related to the annual profits which flow from the trading activities of the appellant-company and the payment has no relation to the capital value of the assets. In the third place, the annual payment of 20 per cent. commission every year is not related to or tied up, in any way, to any fixed sum agreed between the parties as part of the purchase price of the three undertakings. There is no reference to any capital sum in this part of the agreement. On the contrary, the very nature of the payments excludes the idea that any connection with the capital sum was intended by the parties. It is true that the purchaser may buy a running concern and fix a certain price and the price may be payable in a lamp sum or may be payable by instalments. The mere fact that the capital sum is payable by instalments spread over a certain length of time will not convert the nature of that payment from capital expenditure into a revenue expenditure but the payment of instalments in such a case would always have some relationship to the actual price fixed for the sale of the particular undertaking. As we have already mentioned, there is no specific sum fixed in the present case as an additional amount of price payable in addition to the cash consideration and payable by instalments or by any particular method. In view of these facts we are of the opinion that the payment of the annual sum of Rs. 42, 480 in the present case is not in the nature of capital expenditure but is in the nature of revenue expenditure and the judgment of the High Court of Kerala on this point must be overruled.\" As we have already observed, the facts of this case were peculiar. There was a substantial amount of outright cash payment over and above which the indefinite annual payment had been stipulated\nIt is interesting to note that this court by its judgment in Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd.'s case[1966] 62 ITR 566 had sent down the matter to the High Court for a redisposal and the very matter again came before this court, this time at the instance of the Revenue and the judgment is reported in CIT v. Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. [1973] 88 ITR I (SC). At page 10 of the Report, this court observed\n\"In considering the nature of the expenditure incurred in the discharge of an obligation under a contract or a statute or a decree or some similar binding covenant, one must avoid being caught in the maze of judicial decisions rendered on different facts and which always present distinguishing features for a comparison with the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. Nor would it be conducive for clarity or for reaching a logical result if we were to concentrate on the facts of the decided cases with a view to match the colour of that case with that of the case which requires determination. The surer way of arriving at a just conclusion would be to first ascertain by, reference to the document under which the obligation for incurring the expenditure is created and thereafter to apply the principle embalmed in the decisions of those facts judicial statements on the facts of a particular case can never assist courts in the construction of an agreement or a statute which was not considered in those judgments or to ascertain what the intention of the legislature was. What we must look at is the contract or the statute or the decree, in relation to its terms, the obligation imposed and the purpose for which the transaction was entered into.\" We agree with these observations. The tests indicated by this court in Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd.'s case [1973] 88 ITR 1 were not intended to be of general application but were given to bring into bold relief the special aspects of the case as the learned judges themselves stated. The High Court committed a mistake in importing these reasonings as tests of general application to be applied to the facts of the present case, though the facts were indeed quite different. As already pointed out, there was a definite sum of cash consideration in Travancore Sugars & Chemicals' case [1973] 88 ITR 1 , and the special features were taken into account. In the dispute before us, the High Court has categorically found that a capital asset bad been acquired under the arrangement. Admittedly, the assessee was a new company and it had no other business. It acquired under the contract, stipulating to pay 75% of its annual net profits, the right to carry on the business on a long-term basis subject to the renewal of the agreement. The first of the broad tests laid down in Assam Bengal Cement Co.'s case [1955] 27 ITR 34 (SC) that the expenditure was made for the initial outlay squarely applies and on the finding that a capital asset had been acquired (a finding which has not been disputed before us), we must hold that the expenditure related to the acquisition of a capital asset and was not admissible as a deduction under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act\nWith this conclusion of ours and no more, the appeal deserved to be allowed. Mr. S. T. Desai for the assessee-respondent thereupon sought to raise the contention that once the assessee had paid 75% of its profits of the year, the amount claimed as a deduction was no more in its hands as income and on the principle of real income in the hands of the assessee, we should hold that the same was not income within the meaning of s. 10(1) of the Act. Initially, objection was raised to this move of Mr. Desai by learned counsel for the Revenue on the ground that such a plea had not been canvassed in the earlier stages of the matter. The question referred to the High Court did raise the issue and the High Court in the penultimate paragraph of its judgment had declined to go into this question by saying that it was sufficient for the disposal of the reference once it took the view that the payment was deductible under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act. Mr. Desai wanted this aspect of the matter to be sent back to the High Court, but we are not inclined to do so in consideration of the fact that the assessment is for the year 1954-55 a period three decades away. Thereupon, counsel for the both sides agreed to, advance their arguments in regard to this aspect to enable this court to finally deal with this question avoiding remand. Section 10(1) of the Act provides \"The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head 'Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation' in respect of the profits and gains of any business, profession or vocation carried on by him.\"\nTax, therefore, under this provision is payable on income and if income is not earned by the assessee, no tax is payable. It follows that tax is leviable on the real income in the hands of the assessee. Mr. Desai for the assessee has maintained that when 75% of the net profits have been paid to the partnership firm, the real income in the hands of the assessee was reduced to 25% of the net profits and that amount alone was assessable to tax\nM/s. Jalan Trading Co., a partnership firm, had initially been appointed as the sole selling agent. On October 16, 1952, the assessee company came to be incorporated and soon after incorporation by agreement, the rights of the firm were assigned to the assessee company. Neither the ITO nor the two appellate authorities and nor even the High Court went into the question as to whether the assessee was in fact separate from, and independent of, the partnership firm. It is true that the tenability of the claim of deductibility as a business expenditure of the amount was examined by taking it for granted that the payment had been made by the assessee to the firm. But the exact position not having been investigated, no finding has been recorded at any stage. The fact that the partnership and the assessee company bear the same name and soon after incorporation, the agreement assigning the firm's rights in favour of the company had been entered, had obviously led the ITO to doubt the bona fides. That is why in his order of assessment, the ITO had observed\n\"The payment is also not allowable as it is only an apportionment of profits as pointed out above, as it is nothing but 75% of the net profits of the assessee company and although it has been written to the profit and loss account, actually it is nothing but an apportionment of profits and as such the amount is not allowable.\" The AAC took note of the position that the assessment of Jalan Trading Co., the firm, was not before him and observed\n\"The amount claimed cannot also be regarded as deduction in the trading account itself because the royalty is ascertained ultimately on the profits and does not go to add to the cost of the drums that are purchased from the manufacturers. Therefore, there can be no question of giving any deduction under s. 10(1) of the Act. The concept of 'real income' apparently based on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Seth Motilal Manekchand v. CIT [1957] 31 ITR 735 has also no relevance because there is no question of any deviation of profits of the appellant company by any overriding title.\"\nThe Appellate Tribunal, in answer to the reiteration of the points raised, said\n\"Shri Mistry next submitted that the amount in question is also deductible under s. 10(1) as a trading item and in any event what is to be determined is the assessee's real income and that can only be determined after deducting from the assessee's total income the amount paid to M/s. Jalan Trading Co. It was also stated that in the hands of the recipient, the said amount of Rs. 7, 93, 000 odd was assessed as revenue receipts and assessing the same in the hands of the assessee would amount to double taxation. In our opinion, this later submission of Shri Mistry can easily be disposed of because even though the real income of the assessee is to be taxed, it is not that each and every outgoing is to be taken into consideration in arriving at the real income of the assessee and if the outgoing is in fact of a capital nature, the same can never be considered as an allowable deduction under the Act.\"\nWe are impressed by the argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue that if the amount had been spent for obtaining a capital asset, the assessee would not be entitled to claim it as a deduction under s. 10(1) of the Act and on the principle of taxation that income-tax is to be levied on the real income, the amount paid for obtaining capital asset would not be deductible. In such circumstances, we are inclined to agree with the appellant's submission that there is no merit in this aspect of the matter and no relief is admissible to the assessee on that scoreWe allow the appeal and vacate the judgment of the High Court and direct that the Tribunal's decision shall be given effect to. Parties are directed to bear their own costs both before the High Court as also in this court\n", + "case_record": "The respondents, sailors in the Indian Navy, were charged with misconduct for making recruitment examination results available to unauthorized persons for pecuniary gain. Enquiry proceedings were conducted under Regulations 25 to 28 of the Navy Part II (Statutory) Regulations. The respondents allegedly admitted guilt through confessional statements. The Investigating Officer found them guilty and imposed penalties, which were approved by the Superior Authority and upheld by the Central Government upon review. The High Court of Bombay set aside these findings and penalties, ruling that Regulation 27 mandated reading out charges and providing a copy of the charge-sheet, and its omission breached the delinquents' right to a fair opportunity. The appellants challenged this High Court order. The Supreme Court perused the record and found that the delinquents were fully aware of the charges, evidenced by their confessional statements and written statements in their own handwriting. The court noted that the plea of involuntary confessions was raised late, and the delinquents had the assistance of Defence Officers. The court also found sufficient material to support the authorities' original view, considering these proceedings as departmental rather than criminal, thus not bound by strict evidence rules.", + "generated_judgment": "Based on the given facts, the appeal should be **DISMISSED**.\n\n### Reasoning:\n\n1. **Awareness of Charges:**\n - The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that the respondents (sailors) were fully aware of the charges against them. This is evidenced by their confessional statements and written statements in their own handwriting. Therefore, the argument that they were unaware of the charges does not hold.\n\n2. **Plea of Involuntary Confessions:**\n - The Supreme Court noted that the plea of involuntary confessions was raised late. Typically, such pleas need to be raised promptly during the investigation or trial phase. Since the respondents did not raise this issue earlier, it is reasonable to conclude that their confessions were voluntary.\n\n3. **Assistance of Defence Officers:**\n - The respondents had the assistance of Defence Officers. This suggests that they had adequate legal representation and were not unrepresented during the proceedings. Their ability to present their case and challenge the charges should have been adequately addressed.\n\n4. **Departmental Proceedings:**\n - The Supreme Court classified these proceedings as departmental rather than criminal. Departmental proceedings are subject to different procedural rules compared to criminal trials. The strict evidentiary rules applicable in criminal cases do not necessarily apply here. Thus, the absence of formal reading out of charges and provision of a copy of the charge-sheet, while important in criminal proceedings, may not be strictly necessary in departmental proceedings.\n\n5. **Material Supporting Guilt:**\n - The Supreme Court found sufficient material to support the authorities' original view. This indicates that there is substantial evidence to uphold the findings of misconduct and the penalties imposed.\n\n6. **High Court's Ruling:**\n - The High Court's decision to set aside the findings and penalties was based on the omission of reading out the charges and providing a copy of the charge-sheet. However, the Supreme Court's review overturned this decision, finding that these omissions did not violate the respondents' rights to a fair opportunity.\n\nGiven these points, the Supreme Court's final determination stands that the respondents were fully aware of the charges and that there is sufficient evidence to support the original findings. Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.\n\n**Conclusion:** DISMISSED", + "reference_judgment": "The Order of the Court was as follows :\n1. The challenge in these appeals by way of special leave is to an order of the High Court of Bombay dated 7th August, 2008 by which the findings on guilt recorded against the respondents - delinquents who were sailors in the Indian Navy have been set aside along with the penalty/punishment imposed.\n2. The respondents were charged with misconduct of making available the resultsof recruitment examination(s) to unauthorized persons for undue pecuniary gain. The procedure contemplated by Regulations 25 to 28 of the Regulations for the Navy Part II (Statutory) (hereinafter referred to as \"the Regulations\") which govern the proceedings of enquiry were brought into force and the delinquent - respondents allegedly admitted their guilt by making confessional statements. Taking into account the same and the other materials on record the Investigating Officer competent to deal with the matter recorded a finding of guilt and imposed penalty including confinement which was approved by the next Superior Authority. The review petitions filed by the delinquent - respondents against the aforesaid order were also dismissed by the Central Government. In the resultant writ petitions, the High Court took the view that under Regulation 27 of the Regulations it was mandatory on the part of the concerned authority to read out the charges framed against the delinquents and make available to them a copy of the charge-sheet. As the same was not done, the High Court construed the aforesaid deficiency to be amounting to a breach of the rights of the delinquents to a fair opportunity. Consequently, the findings recorded and the penalty/punishment imposed were set aside. Aggrieved, the present appeals have been filed.\n3. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties.\n4. We have perused the photocopies of the Original Record pertaining to the proceedings held against the delinquents - respondents which have been brought on record by the appellants by filing an Additional Affidavit on 16th August, 2010. A reading of the proceedings recorded, insofar as the communication of the charges to the delinquents is concerned, their admission of guilt and the version(s) put forward by them, in our considered view, clearly indicate that though the charges may not have been read over or a copy of the memo of charges may not have been furnished to the delinquents, the delinquents were in full know of the charges leveled against them. This is not only evident from the confessional statement of the delinquents but also from the statement submitted by them in the course of the enquiry in their own handwriting. If the records proves and establishes the above facts we cannot understand how the alleged failure of the Union of India to read out the charges to the delinquents - respondents could have caused any prejudice to them so as to enable the High Court to take the view recorded in the impugned order.\n5. Learned counsel for the respondents- delinquents has made vehement submissions before us with regard to the involuntary nature of the confessional statements; reliance placed on the statement of one delinquent to determine the liability of another; and also the breach of elementary principles of a fair adjudication.\n6. Even though we do not agree with the order of the High Court and the same is liable to be interdicted on the grounds mentioned above, to satisfy the judicial conscience, in view of the emphatic submissions made at the bar on behalf of the delinquents - respondents, we have perused the entire of the records in- original, photocopies of which had been brought on record in the Additional Affidavit of the appellants. The statement of the delinquents - respondents recorded in their own handwriting in the course of the proceedings bare ample testimony to the fact that the delinquents - respondents were in full know of the charges leveled against them and they had virtually admitted their guilt. Insofar as the confessional statements are concerned, the plea with regard to involuntariness of the same was raised at a very advanced stage i.e. in the review petitions before the Central Government. The fact that the delinquents had the services of Defence Officers who were in the ranks of Medical Assistants First Class, Commander and Lieutenant Commander (Special Duties Regulating) is another fact that cannot be ignored in adjudging the acceptability of the version put forward on behalf of the respondents - delinquents with regard to involuntary nature of the confession. That apart, if the statements of Master Suresh Nambiar and Prakash Sharma, Medical Assistants First Class are to be considered we find sufficient material to sustain the view that has been taken by the Authorities below before the same were interdicted by the High Court. The proceedings against the respondents will not be governed by strict rules of evidence so as to exclude from consideration the statement of one delinquent for the purposes of finding out the involvement of another. The present proceedings in which the respondents - delinquents have been found to be liable are more in the nature of a departmental proceeding which is distinct and different from a criminal trial.\n7. Viewed in the aforesaid context and having regard to what has been stated above we interfere with the order of the High Court; set aside the same and allow these appeals.\nThe appeals are allowed in terms of the signed order.\nAppeals allowed", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -238,26 +238,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S002", - "case_id": "5258", - "experiment": "role_play_v3", - "model": "ministral-3b", - "source_file": "S002__role_play_v3__ministral-3b__5258.json", + "case_id": "433", + "experiment": "baseline_cot", + "model": "qwen-2.5-7b-instruct", + "source_file": "S002__baseline_cot__qwen-2.5-7b-instruct__433.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "09/08/1985", - "machine_error_stage": "issues", - "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue omission" + "judgment_date": "01/02/2018", + "machine_error_stage": "facts", + "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in case record" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.11919 of 2022] | Devendra Singh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh | 02/08/2024", - "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.11919 of 2022] | Devendra Singh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.523 OF 2024 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.6562 OF 2021) | Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State Of Bihar, State Of Bihar & Anr. | 31/01/2024", + "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.523 OF 2024 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.6562 OF 2021) | Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State Of Bihar, State Of Bihar & Anr.", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The appellant, Devendra Singh, was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for the murder of Parpoor Singh and sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court. This conviction was upheld by the Allahabad High Court. The incident occurred on May 29, 1986, following a dispute where the appellant allegedly molested the wife of Dharam Pal Singh (PW-1), the deceased's elder brother. The deceased had warned the appellant against such behavior. During a marriage procession, the appellant and his co-accused confronted the deceased, picked a quarrel, and the appellant, after being exhorted to kill, stabbed the deceased with a pocketknife. The deceased sustained a single stab wound to the chest, leading to his death. The accused persons also sustained injuries, which PW-3 (Manjit Singh) attributed to his intervention with a lathi. The prosecution's case was based on the testimony of PW-1, PW-3, and PW-4. The defense argued that the incident occurred in a sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation and that the appellant did not intend to cause death, suggesting the offense fell under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. The trial court and High Court rejected these contentions, finding the appellant guilty of murder.", - "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let's break this down. The user wants a structured legal judgment using the FIRAC framework. The case is about Devendra Singh's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC for murder. The appeal challenges this conviction, arguing it should be under Section 304 Part-II. \n\nFirst, I need to outline the **Facts**. The key points are the incident on May 29, 1986, involving a dispute over molestation, a confrontation during a marriage procession, and the stabbing leading to death. The prosecution relies on testimonies from PW-1, PW-3, and PW-4. The defense claims it was a sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation.\n\nNext, the **Issues**. The main legal issues are whether the act was premeditated (Section 302 vs. 304 Part-II), the presence of heat of passion, the mens rea for murder, and the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. These need to be framed as specific legal questions.\n\nFor the **Rules**, I should reference the relevant sections of the IPC. Section 302 requires intent to cause death or knowledge that death is likely. Section 304 Part-II covers culpable homicide not amounting to murder, which requires the act to be done in the heat of passion without premeditation. Also, the burden of proof lies on the prosecution, and the court must assess mens rea and actus reus.\n\nIn the **Analysis**, I need to check if the appeal is maintainable. Since the defense's arguments are based on legal interpretation of the facts, the appeal is maintainable. Then, evaluate the evidence. The trial court and High Court found the act was premeditated, but the defense argues otherwise. The prosecution's testimonies are central. If the evidence shows premeditation, Section 302 applies. If not, Section 304 Part-II. The court must determine if the evidence supports the mens rea for murder.\n\nFinally, the **Conclusion**. If the court upholds the conviction, the appeal is **DISMISSED**. If it finds the offense falls under Section 304 Part-II, the appeal is **ALLOWED**. Based on the facts, the High Court rejected the defense's claims, so the appeal is likely **DISMISSED**.\n\n\n### **Facts** \n1. The appellant, Devendra Singh, was convicted under **Section 302** of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the murder of Parpoor Singh and sentenced to life imprisonment. \n2. The incident occurred on **May 29, 1986**, following a dispute where the appellant allegedly molested the wife of Dharam Pal Singh (PW-1), the deceased’s elder brother. \n3. The deceased, Parpoor Singh, had warned the appellant against such behavior. \n4. During a marriage procession, the appellant and co-accused confronted the deceased, quarreled, and the appellant stabbed the deceased with a pocketknife after being exhorted to kill. \n5. The deceased sustained a single stab wound to the chest, leading to his death. \n6. The prosecution’s case relied on the testimonies of PW-1, PW-3 (Manjit Singh), and PW-4. \n7. The defense argued that the incident occurred in a **sudden fight in the heat of passion** without premeditation, suggesting the offense fell under **Section 304 Part-II** (culpable homicide not amounting to murder). \n8. The trial court and Allahabad High Court rejected these contentions, upholding the conviction under Section 302. \n\n---\n\n### **Issues** \n1. **Was the act of stabbing the deceased premeditated, thereby constituting murder under Section 302 of the IPC?** \n2. **Did the appellant act in the heat of passion without premeditation, thereby making the offense culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC?** \n3. **Was the prosecution able to establish the necessary mens rea (intent to cause death or knowledge that death was likely) required for conviction under Section 302 of the IPC?** \n4. **Were the testimonies of PW-1, PW-3, and PW-4 sufficient to establish the elements of murder, including the sequence of events and the appellant’s intent?** \n\n---\n\n### **Rules** \n1. **Section 302 of the IPC** defines murder as causing death with **intent to cause death** or **knowledge that death is likely** to result. \n2. **Section 304 Part-II of the IPC** covers **culpable homicide not amounting to murder**, which requires the act to be done in **heat of passion** without **premeditation**. \n3. **Section 300 of the IPC** defines murder as an act done with **malice aforethought**, which includes **intent to cause death** or **knowledge that death is likely**. \n4. The **burden of proof** lies on the prosecution to establish the **mens rea** and **actus reus** for the offense. \n5. **Section 107 of the IPC** provides that if the act is done in **heat of passion** without **premeditation**, it may not amount to murder. \n\n---\n\n### **Analysis** \n1. **Maintainability of the Appeal**: \n The appeal is **maintainable** as it raises a **legal issue** regarding the classification of the offense (Section 302 vs. 304 Part-II). The defense’s argument is not frivolous or procedural, and the trial court’s findings are subject to appellate review. \n\n2. **Premeditation and Mens Rea**: \n The prosecution’s evidence, including the testimony of PW-1, PW-3, and PW-4, establishes that the appellant **exhibited a clear intent to kill** after being exhorted to do so. The **single stab wound to the chest** and the **sequence of events** (quarrel, exhortation, immediate stabbing) suggest **premeditation** rather than a spontaneous act. The defense’s claim of \"heat of passion\" lacks sufficient factual basis, as the act was **directed at the deceased** after a prior dispute, indicating **calculated intent**. \n\n3. **Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder**: \n For Section 304 Part-II to apply, the act must be **done in the heat of passion** without **premeditation**. However, the evidence shows the appellant **deliberately chose to stab** the deceased after being provoked, which contradicts the \"heat of passion\" defense. The **exhortation to kill** and the **immediate execution of the act** further undermine the defense’s claim. \n\n4. **Sufficiency of Evidence**: \n The prosecution’s evidence is **sufficient** to establish the elements of murder under Section 302. The **testimonies of PW-1, PW-3, and PW-4** corroborate the sequence of events, including the **molestation dispute**, the **quarrel during the procession**, and the **stabbing**. The **injuries sustained by the accused** and PW-3’s intervention do not negate the **culpability of the appellant** in causing the deceased’s death. \n\n5. **Appellate Court’s Role**: \n The trial court and High Court correctly applied the law by rejecting the defense’s arguments. The **absence of premeditation** is not supported by the evidence, and the **mens rea** for murder is clearly established. \n\n---\n\n### **Conclusion** \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The conviction under Section 302 of the IPC is lawful, as the evidence demonstrates **premeditation** and **intent to cause death**, which satisfy the requirements of murder under Section 302. The defense’s argument that the offense falls under Section 304 Part-II is not supported by the facts or legal principles. The trial court and High Court correctly upheld the conviction, and the appeal lacks merit.", - "reference_judgment": "1. Leave granted.\n2. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 08th\nJanuary, 2019 passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad\nHigh Court in Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 1987 wherein the\nDivision Bench dismissed the Criminal Appeal preferred by the\nappellant-Devendra Singh and upheld the order of conviction\nunder Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC” for\nshort) and sentence of life imprisonment dated 17th January,\n1987 as recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, Bijnor\n(hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in S.T. No. 166 of\n3. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal are\nas under:-\n3.1 On 29th May, 1986, one Dharam Pal Singh (PW-1) lodged a\nwritten report at P.S. Afzalgarh at about 11:15 p.m. wherein\nhe stated that pursuant to a previous dispute, the appellant\nand his co-accused Yogendra Pratap Singh stabbed Parpoor\nSingh (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’) who\neventually succumbed to his injuries on the very same day.\nOn the basis of the written report, a First Information\nReport (‘FIR’ for short) being Crime No. 70 of 1986 came to\nbe registered at Police Station, Afzalgarh for the offence\npunishable under Section 302 of the IPC, against the\nappellant and his co-accused. On the conclusion of a\npreliminary investigation, the Police arrested the accused\npersons on 30th May, 1986. At the instance of the appellant,\nthe police recovered a blood-stained knife which had been\nallegedly used in the commission of the crime. It is notable\nthat at the time of their arrest, both the accused persons\nhad injuries on their body. On 31st May, 1986, the accused\npersons had their injuries examined at the State\nDispensary, Qadrabad whereupon they were found to have\nlacerated wounds and abrasions on their bodies. In the\ninterim, the post-mortem of the deceased was conducted\nand the cause of death was ascertained to be shock and\nhemorrhage as a result of ante-mortem injuries.\n3.2 The prosecution case is that a few days prior to the date of\nthe incident, the appellant had molested the wife of Dharam\nPal Singh (PW-1), the elder brother of the deceased.\nAngered, the deceased forbade the appellant from\nmisbehaving with his sister-in-law in the future and further\nwarned the appellant of dire consequences were he to repeat\nhis actions. On the day of the incident, at about 09:30 p.m.,\na marriage procession was passing through Village\nQadrabad, of which the deceased was one of the attendees.\nOwing to the marriage procession, the area was lit up with\ndecorative lights which were powered by a high-power\ngenerator. In the meanwhile, the appellant and his co-\naccused reached the spot and picked up a quarrel with the\ndeceased by bringing up their previous altercation. Being\nriled up about the fact that the deceased was acting as the\nprotector of his family, the appellant exhorted to kill him.\nAmidst the scuffle that subsequently ensued between them,\nthe co-accused Yogendra Pratap Singh caught hold of the\ndeceased while the appellant stabbed him with a knife. On\nbeing struck, the deceased fell to the ground. Thereafter, in\nan attempt to save the deceased, Manjit Singh (PW-3) beat\nthe accused persons with a lathi whereupon, the accused\npersons fled the scene. In addition to Manjit Singh (PW-3),\nthis entire incident was also witnessed by Dharam Pal\nSingh (PW-1) and Kernail Singh (PW-4) who rushed over to\nthe deceased and took him to the Government Dispensary,\nQadrabad, where he was declared dead on arrival.\n3.3 Upon the conclusion of the investigation, a chargesheet\ncame to be filed before the Court of the Chief Judicial\nMagistrate, Bijnor. Since the case was exclusively triable by\nthe Sessions Court, the same came to be committed to the\ntrial court.\n3.4 Charges came to be framed by the trial court against the\nappellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of\nthe IPC and against his co-accused for the offence\npunishable under Section 302 of the IPC read with Section\n114 of the IPC. The accused persons pleaded not guilty and\nclaimed to be tried.\n3.5 The prosecution examined 08 witnesses to bring home the\nguilt of the accused. The accused persons denied the\nallegations against them and alleged that they had been\nfalsely implicated in the case. The appellant also stated that\nlitigation arising out of land disputes was pending between\nhim and Kernail Singh (PW-4). The accused persons chose\nnot to lead any oral evidence, however, they relied on certain\ndocumentary evidence.\n3.6 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial Court found that the\nprosecution had proved the case against the accused\npersons beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly\nconvicted the appellant for the offence punishable under\nSection 302 of the IPC and the co-accused for the offences\npunishable under Section 302 read with Section 114 of the\nIPC sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for\nlife.\n3.7 Being aggrieved thereby, the accused persons preferred a\nCriminal Appeal before the High Court. During the\npendency of the appeal, the co-accused Yogendra Pratap\nSingh passed away whereafter his appeal stood dismissed\nvide order dated 25th September, 2018. On the conclusion\nof the hearings qua the appellant, the High Court by the\nimpugned judgment dismissed the Criminal Appeal and\naffirmed the order of conviction and sentence awarded by\nthe trial Court.\n3.8 Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.\n4. We have heard Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, learned counsel\nappearing for the appellant and Ms. Garima Prashad, learned Sr.\nA.A.G. appearing for the respondent-State.\n5. Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, learned counsel, submits that though\nthe present case is a case of acquittal, since this Court has issued\nnotice, limited to the question as to whether the conviction under\nSection 302 of IPC can be converted either under Section 304\nPart-I or under Section 304 Part-II of IPC, she is not arguing on\nthe correctness of the conviction.\n6. Ms. Bobde submits that a perusal of the testimony of all the\nwitnesses would reveal that there was no premeditation. The\nincident occurred in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon\na sudden quarrel. She submits that the weapon used in the\ncrime was a pocketknife. She further submits that a single injury\nhas been caused with the use of the said knife. She, therefore,\nsubmits that the present case would squarely fall under Part-II\nof Section 304 IPC inasmuch as, the appellant had no intention\nto cause death of the deceased. She further submits that the\nprosecution has failed to explain the injuries sustained by the\ndeceased and as such an adverse inference needs to be drawn on\naccount of the same.\n7. Ms. Garima Prashad, learned Sr. A.A.G., on the contrary,\nwould submit that both the trial court as well as the High Court,\nupon correct appreciation of evidence, have found the appellant\nguilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. It\nis submitted that on account of previous enmity arising out of\nthe appellant molesting the wife of the deceased’s elder brother\nand the deceased’s questioning the appellant about the same, the\nappellant had intentionally committed the crime. She, therefore,\nsubmits that no interference is warranted in the present appeal.\n8. PW-1-Dharam Pal Singh has stated in his evidence that on\nthe date of the incident there was marriage procession of the\ngrand-daughter of Thakur Vijay Pal Singh. He stated that many\npersons in the village witnessed the marriage procession. He\nfurther stated that both the accused came near the house of\nVirendra Tomar and started indulging in ‘marpeet’ with the\ndeceased. He stated that Yogendra Pratap Singh caught hold of\nthe deceased whereas the appellant assaulted the deceased with\na knife, which hit the left side of his chest.\n9. In his cross-examination, PW-1 has admitted that the\ndeceased received only one knife blow. He has further admitted\nthat the appellant took out knife from the pocket of his ‘Pajama’.\n10. PW-3-Manjit Singh, in his evidence, stated that in the\nmarriage procession, accused persons came from the north side\nand started scuffle with the deceased and told that, “Tu Ghar Ka\nRakhwala Banta Hai, Aaj Tujhe Jan Se Maar Denge”. Thereafter,\nYogendra Pratap Singh caught hold of the deceased and the\nappellant took out the knife from the pocket of his ‘Pajama’ and\nassaulted the deceased. He stated that he assaulted both the\naccused persons with ‘Danda’. He has also admitted in his cross-\nexamination that a ‘marpeet’ took place between the deceased\nand the appellant and Yogendra Pratap Singh.\n11. To the similar effect is the evidence of PW-4-Kernail Singh.\n12. It will be relevant to note that the appellant has sustained\nthe following injuries:\nskin deep obliquely placed on the left side\nscalp, 4 cm. behind the forehead, 14 cm.\nabove the ear.\n(2) Abrasion 2 cm. x 1.5 cm. longitudinally\nplaced on the right side, scalp just above\nthe forehead.\n(3) Abraded contusion 8 cm. x 2 cm.\nobliquely placed on the back of the tight\nshoulder, 7 cm. right from the back bone.\n(4) Abrasion 2 cm x 1 cm. transversally\nplaced on the lateral side of the right whist\nabove the index finger.”\n13. Yogendra Pratap Singh, who was co-accused in the crime\nhas also received the following injuries:\nskin deep longitudinally placed on\nthe left side scalp just above the\nforehead.\n(2) Complaining pain on the right side\nback, but no superficial injury mark\nis present.\n(3) Lacerated wound 1 cm. x.5 cm. x\nskin deep on the lateral side of the\nright little finger in the junction of 1st\nand 2nd digit.\n(4) Complaining pain on the lateral side\nof the left wrist but no superficial\ninjury mark is present.\n(5) Abrasion 8 cm. x.25 cm. obliquely\nplaced on the palmer side of the left\nforearm, 3 cm. above the wrist.”\n14. It could thus be seen that both the accused persons have\nreceived injuries in the incident. In the evidence, PW-3-Manjit\nSingh has stated that he had a ‘Danda’ and he had assaulted\nboth the accused with ‘Danda’. As such, the possibility of a\nscuffle between the two groups cannot be ruled out.\n15. The injuries sustained by the deceased are thus:\n“(1) Incised wound/5 cm. x 3 cm. x\ncavity, deep on the front of left side\nchest lower part extending over to the\nepigastrium, obliquely placed\nunderlying. left 9th and left 10 ribs\nwere clean cut. Intervening\nintercostal space was also clean cut.\nWound was 11 cm. below the left\nnipple at 7 O'clock position. On\nexposure, the wound was found\ndirecting upwards, backwards and\nlaterally (cut-wound).\n(2) Multiple abrasions in an area of 8\ncm. x 6 cm on the outer aspect upper\npart of left arm.\n(3) Contusion 8 cm. x 1.5 cm. on the top\nof left shoulder extending to the front\nof left side chest.\n(4) Abrasion 3 cm. x 1 cm. on right side\nfront of abdomen, 10 cm. from\numbilicus at 9 o'clock position.\n(5) Linear abrasion on the back of left\nside abdomen 17 cm. in length 11\ncm. to the left from midline.\n(6) Abrasion, 7 cm. 1.5 cm. on the back\nof left side abdomen upper part, 8\ncm. towards right from midline at the\nlevel of T12 L1.”\n16. It could thus be seen that except the injury at serial no.1,\nwhich can be said to be caused by the knife, all other injuries are\nabrasions and contusion.\n17. Taking into consideration the nature of injuries sustained\nby both the accused persons as well as the deceased, the\npossibility of the incident taking place in a sudden fight in the\nheat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel cannot be ruled out.\n18. It is further to be seen that there is no evidence to show that\nthe appellant has taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or\nunusual manner. It is further to be seen that the weapon used\nis a pocketknife. The injury caused by the said knife is a single\ninjury.\n19. We, therefore, find that, in the totality of the circumstances\nand, particularly, on account of the injuries sustained by the\naccused persons, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of\nException 4 to Section 300 IPC. We are, therefore, inclined to\npartly allow the present appeal. It is ordered accordingly.\n20. The conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is\naltered to the one under Part-I of Section 304 IPC. The appellant\nis sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 8 years for the\nsaid offence.\n21. The appeal is partly allowed in the above terms.", + "case_record": "The appeal arises from a High Court order dismissing a prayer to quash FIR No.87 of 2011, registered under Sections 467, 468, 469, and 471 of the IPC. The FIR alleged that Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh, acting as a Power of Attorney (PoA) holder for the informant Maharaj Kumar Man Vijay Singh and other family members, sold a portion of their property to the appellant. The PoA, executed on 12.04.1994, granted authority for property management, litigation, and executing deeds. The informant alleged that the PoA holder sold property without the principals' signatures, misappropriated funds, and failed to render accounts. Consequently, a legal notice was issued to revoke the PoA and demand sale details. The police filed a final report indicating offences under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471, and 420 IPC, leading to the Chief Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance. A civil suit (Original Suit No.27 of 2011) filed by the informant and others in Dehradun to set aside the sale deed and for rendition of accounts was dismissed on 07.12.2017. The civil court found the PoA holder authorized to sell and receive consideration, deeming the sale deed valid and rejecting claims of non-knowledge and entitlement to accounts. The PoA was cancelled on 09.01.2011, significantly after the sale deed's execution on 24.08.2000. The appellant contended that the Sale Deed was executed based on a valid PoA, consideration was paid, and the PoA was neither forged nor withdrawn at the time of sale. He argued that the dispute was civil in nature, the Buxar courts lacked territorial jurisdiction as the sale occurred in Dehradun, and the dismissal of the civil suit validated the transaction, making the criminal prosecution an abuse of process.", + "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. **FIR and Allegations**: The case involves FIR No.87 of 2011 registered under Sections 467, 468, 469, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It alleges that Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh, as a Power of Attorney (PoA) holder, sold property belonging to Maharaj Kumar Man Vijay Singh and others without their signatures, among other grievances.\n \n2. **Power of Attorney (PoA)**: The PoA, dated 12.04.1994, authorized the holder to manage property, including litigation and executing deeds. A legal notice sought revocation of the PoA due to alleged wrongdoings, and the PoA was eventually cancelled on 09.01.2011.\n\n3. **Sale of Property**: The disputed sale deed was executed on 24.08.2000, with the PoA still in effect at that time. The appellant asserts that the sale and consideration were lawful and properly authorized by the PoA.\n\n4. **Civil Suit**: In Original Suit No.27 of 2011, the civil court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on 07.12.2017, affirming the validity of the sale deed executed by the PoA holder.\n\n5. **Police and Judicial Cognizance**: The police filed a final report under Section 173 of CrPC identifying offences under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471, and 420 IPC, leading the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance of the case.\n\n6. **Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit**: The appellant contends that the Buxar court lacked jurisdiction, the issues being civil in nature, and the dismissal of the civil suit should preclude criminal prosecution.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the prayer to quash the FIR under Sections 467, 468, 469, and 471 of the IPC.\n\n2. Whether the PoA was valid and sufficient at the time of the property sale to authorize the PoA holder to execute the sale deed.\n\n3. Whether the civil court’s finding that the sale deed was valid precluded the initiation or continuation of criminal proceedings.\n\n4. Whether there was an abuse of process in pursuing criminal charges following the dismissal of the civil suit.\n\n5. Whether the Buxar courts had the territorial jurisdiction to handle the criminal case.\n\n6. Whether there is evidence of forgery or misappropriation by the PoA holder, justifying the criminal charges.\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Quashing of FIR**: Under Section 482 of the CrPC, the High Court has inherent powers to quash FIRs in exceptional circumstances to prevent abuse of the process of any court.\n\n2. **Power of Attorney Validity**: For a PoA to be valid, it must confer specific authority, including transactional powers, and must not be exercised as a fraud upon the principal(s).\n\n3. **Civil vs. Criminal Nature**: A matter involving criminal conduct can be tried criminally despite a civil decision, especially if there are allegations of forgery or fraud.\n\n4. **Jurisdiction**: Criminal jurisdiction is determined by the location of the offence or where key acts constituting the offence occurred, generally allowing multiple venues depending on where acts related to the offence took place.\n\n5. **Abuse of Process**: This principle prevents the legal system from being used in a way that is unfair, unjust, or inappropriate to the nature of the proceedings.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Maintainability**: The appeal is maintainable as it challenges the High Court's order dismissing the quash prayer, which impacts the appellant's legal rights and the continuation of a criminal proceeding against him.\n\n2. **Validity of FIR Quash**: The High Court’s decision not to quash the FIR was based on valid criminal allegations that go beyond civil disputes (Issue 1 and Analysis of Rule 3). The presence of potential criminal actions like forgery allows for criminal proceedings irrespective of civil judgments.\n\n3. **Power of Attorney**: Given the facts that the sale deed was executed while the PoA was in effect and no forged signatures were claimed solely, the PoA appeared valid at the time. However, the criminal charges background involving potential misappropriation justifies inquiry (Issue 2 and Rule 2).\n\n4. **Jurisdiction**: Considering the principal beneficiaries' interests being partially in the jurisdiction or related serious allegations having aspects operating in multiple locations, Buxar courts could have territorial relevance (Issue 5 and Rule 4).\n\n5. **Abuse of Process**: The civil suit’s dismissal does not necessarily nullify a legitimate criminal claim, especially when the essential nature of the claims involves criminal liabilities, such as alleged misconduct beyond the civil scope (Issue 4 and Rule 5).\n\n6. **Evidence of Forgery/Misappropriation**: Criminal charges remain sustainable, as the allegations suggest breaches beyond ordinary civil disputes, needing judicial examination, particularly given the financial stakes and authority entrusted under the PoA (Issue 6 and Rule 3).\n\n### Conclusion:\nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court was justified in not quashing the FIR as the allegations embody potential criminal conduct requiring further judicial evaluation. The appellant's arguments regarding jurisdiction, prior civil findings, and abuse of process do not preclude the legitimate pursuit of criminal proceedings under the laws specified.", + "reference_judgment": "Heard learned counsel for the parties.\n2. Leave granted.\n3. The present appeal arises out of the Final\nJudgment and Order dated 12.03.2021 (hereinafter 2\nreferred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) passed in\nCriminal Miscellaneous No.42776 of 2013 by the\nHigh Court of Judicature at Patna (hereinafter\nreferred to as the “High Court”) by which the\nprayer for quashing First Information Report\nNo.87 of 2011 dated 19.03.2011 (hereinafter\nreferred to as the “FIR”) registered at Dumraon\nPolice Station, Buxar, Bihar under Sections 467,\n468, 469 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860\n(hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”), has been\ndismissed.\nTHE BRIEF FACTS:\n4. The informant/respondent no.2 Maharaj Kumar\nMan Vijay Singh @ Man Vijay Singh gave a\nstatement in writing to the Station House\nOfficer, Dumraon Police Station alleging that Raj\nKumar Karan Vijay Singh, s/o Group Captain Late\nMaharaj Kumar Ran Vijay Singh had sold off\nproperty belonging to 5 persons of the 3\ninformant’s family, including the informant\nhimself. It was alleged that the informant and\nhis family members had earlier given a Power of\nAttorney (hereinafter referred to as the “PoA”)\nto Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh in respect of and\nas owners of property bearing Khasras No.459G,\n472, 474, 475, 476 and 478B and further Khasra\nNo.459E situated in Village Karbari Grant, Tehsil\nVikasnagar, Pargana Pachwain, District Dehradun.\nIt was stated that the informant Maharaj Kumar\nMan Vijay Singh and his brother Kumar Chandra\nVijay Singh, both sons of Maharaja Kamal Singh,\nSmt. Sangeeta Kumari, Indumati, Ran Vijay Singh,\nhis father’s Sister, father, sisters and Aunt\nexecuted a PoA on 12.04.1994 for management and\nmaintenance of their property. It was provided\ntherein that the PoA holder shall pursue\nlitigation, file plaint after obtaining signature\nof the land owners/principals of the PoA. It was\nalleged that some portion of the property of the 4\ninformant and others was sold to the present\nappellant and on such knowledge, the informant\nsent a Legal Notice to the PoA-holder directing\nhim to give the details of the sale made in\nconspiracy with the appellant and a Notice was\nalso given to revoke the PoA but the agent did\nnot give any information/reply to the informant\nand others who had executed the PoA. In this\nbackdrop, and as such, the criminal case was\ninstituted. It was alleged that criminal acts\nwere committed by the accused, including the\nappellant, by misusing the PoA and alleging that\nthey had misappropriated the property, did not\nrendition the account(s) and that the Sale Deed\nwas fraudulent as it was without obtaining the\nsignatures of the land-owners/Principals of the\nPoA-holder. Upon investigation, the police had\nsubmitted final report finding a case under\nSections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420, IPC and the\nlearned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar 5\nthereupon took cognizance of the offences under\nSections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420, IPC on\n18.11.2014 in GR No.515 of 2011.\n5. During the pendency of Criminal\nMiscellaneous No.42776 of 2013 on the file of the\nHigh Court, originally filed for quashing the\nFIR, the appellant filed Interlocutory\nApplication No.1261 of 2017 seeking amendment of\nthe prayer to include quashing of the order dated\n18.11.2014 mentioned above.\nSUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:\n6. Learned senior counsel for the appellant\nsubmitted that the appellant is merely the vendee\nof a portion of the land which was included in\nthe PoA given to Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh on\n7. He contended that the Sale deed dated\n24.08.2000 was on the basis of the PoA given to 6\nMan Vijay Singh, s/o Kamal Singh by the land-\nowners/principals. It was submitted that it was\nan internal matter between the land-\nowners/executors of the said PoA with regard to\nthe terms, which obviously were binding, inter\nse, between the parties.\n8. Learned senior counsel drew the attention of\nthe Court to the contents of the PoA, especially\nClause 3 thereof and submitted that the same\nentitled the PoA-holder to execute any type of\nDeed and to receive consideration on behalf of\nthe land-owners/executors of the PoA and get such\nDeed registered. Thus, it was contended that the\nfollowing was not in dispute: (a) the PoA was\nadmittedly neither forged nor withdrawn; (b)the\nappellant was the vendee of a piece of land\ncovered under the PoA, and (c)for such sale,\nvaluable consideration had also been paid. In\nthis view, it was submitted, the appellant could 7\nnot be held liable for any misdeed, much less,\nany criminal act.\n9. Learned senior counsel submitted that the\nRevisional Court was right that cognizance, as\nfar as the appellant is concerned, was totally\nillegal as no offence was made out against the\nappellant. It was further contended that even on\nthe jurisdictional issue, the Sale Deed in\nquestion was executed at Dehradun, Uttarakhand\nand the land is also situated in Dehradun. It was\nsubmitted that even the consideration was paid in\nDehradun. It was contended that the informant\nalso filed Original Suit No.27 of 2011 in the\nCourt of the learned Additional District Judge,\nVikas Nagar, Dehradun for setting aside the Sale\nDeed executed in favour of the appellant by the\nPoA holder and for rendition of accounts, which\nwas dismissed and it was found that the PoA-\nholder/agent was duly authorized thereunder to\nsell the property after receiving consideration 8\namount on behalf of the land-owners/principals,\nwho were also not entitled to rendition of\naccounts. Thus, it was submitted that in a civil\nproceeding wherein the right of the PoA-holder to\nsell the property in question had been upheld and\nthe appellant having bought the property from\nsuch PoA holder of the land covered under the\nPoA, the present FIR itself is misuse and abuse\nof the process of law, as far as the appellant is\nconcerned. Further, he submitted, that the\ncancellation of the PoA was only on 09.01.2011,\ni.e., after almost 10½ years after the execution\nof the sale deed on 24.08.2000.\n10. Moreover, it was contended that the issue\nbeing purely of civil nature i.e., there being a\ndispute as to whether the PoA-holder has paid to\nthe land-owners/principals money received for\nthe land sold, at best, it may give rise to a\ncause of action to the principals on the civil 9\nside against the PoA-holder, but the appellant\ncould not be dragged into any such controversy.\n11. Learned senior counsel submitted that at the\ntime of the sale, the PoA was valid and Clauses 3\nand 11 read with 5 gave full authority to the\nPoA-holder to sell the property, get the Sale\nDeed registered and receive consideration. He\nsubmitted that Clause 15, on which the\ncomplainant has relied, was not applicable.\nFurther, neither in the FIR nor in the order\ntaking cognizance or even in the Legal Notice(s),\nis there any reference to the appellant, and the\nchargesheet merely states that the seller/PoA-\nholder did not have the right to sell. It was\ncontended that while granting anticipatory bail\nto the appellant, the High Court by order dated\n20.02.2014 in Criminal Miscellaneous No.44830 of\n2013, which was heard and decided with Criminal\nMiscellaneous No.45146 of 2013 filed by the PoA-\nholder, the said PoA-holder had taken the stand 10\nthat he was ready to give/return the sale proceed\namounts to the informant, without admitting to\nthe case of the informant and subject to such\ncondition, he was also granted anticipatory bail.\n12. On the civil nature of the dispute, it was\nsubmitted that the issue pertains to\ninterpretation of various clauses of the PoA,\nwhich cannot be done in a criminal proceeding and\nrightly the Revisional Court had held it to be a\ncivil dispute. It was also pointed out that the\nBuxar Courts would lack territorial jurisdiction.\n13. It was submitted that the Original Suit\nNo.27 of 2011, filed by the respondent no.2 and\nothers, at Dehradun, was prior to filing of the\nFIR, which was dismissed by order dated\n07.12.2017 holding that the PoA holder had the\nright to sell the land, receive the consideration\nand hence the Sale deed was valid. The contention\nthat the respondent no.2 and others had no 11\nknowledge of the Sale Deed dated 24.08.2000 could\nnot be believed and the suit was also held to be\ntime-barred as the prayer was for setting aside\nthe Sale Deed dated 24.08.2000.\n14. Learned senior counsel relied upon the\ndecision in Mukul Agrawal v State of Uttar\nPradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 402, wherein at Paragraph\n71, it has been held that the finding of the\nCivil Court that the agreement was not a forged\ndocument, makes the very substratum of the\ncriminal complaint vanish.\n15. Reliance was also placed on the decision of\nK G Premshankar v Inspector of Police, (2002) 8\nSCC 87, where at Paragraphs 15, 16, 30-322,\n1‘7. In view of the conclusive opinion of the appellate court that the agreement dated 30-3-1988 was not a forged\ndocument, the very substratum of the criminal complaint vanishes. In the circumstances to allow the appellants to be\nprosecuted will only be a complete abuse of the process of law. The proceedings in Complaint Case No. 2705 of\n2003 are therefore quashed and the appeal is allowed.’\n2‘15. Learned Additional Solicitor-General Shri Altaf Ahmed appearing for the respondents submitted that the\nobservation made by this Court in V.M. Shah case [(1995) 5 SCC 767 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1077] that\n“the finding recorded by the criminal court, stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court and\nthereby the finding of the civil court gets precedence over the finding recorded by the criminal court”\n(SCC p. 770, para 11)\nis against the law laid down by this Court in various decisions. For this, he rightly referred to the provisions of\nSections 41, 42 and 43 of the Evidence Act and submitted that under the Evidence Act to what extent judgments\ngiven in the previous proceedings are relevant is provided and therefore it would be against the law if it is held that\nas soon as the judgment and decree is passed in a civil suit the criminal proceedings are required to be dropped if\nthe suit is decided against the plaintiff who is the complainant in the criminal proceedings. 12\nSections 40-43, of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872\nhave been interpreted with regard to the\nrelevance of decision of a Civil Court on\ncriminal proceedings against the same person(s)\npertaining to the same cause. As far as\nterritorial jurisdiction is concerned, it was the\nstand of the learned senior counsel that the only\nlink in the chain is that the PoA was executed at\n16. In our view, the submission of learned Additional Solicitor-General requires to be accepted. Sections 40 to 43 of\nthe Evidence Act provide which judgments of courts of justice are relevant and to what extent. Section 40 provides\nfor previous judgment, order or a decree which by law prevents any court while taking cognizance of a suit or\nholding a trial, to be a relevant fact when the question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or\nto hold such trial. Section 40 is as under:\n“40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial.—The existence of any judgment, order or\ndecree which by law prevents any court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact\nwhen the question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.”\nxxx\n30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is — (1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as\nprovided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of res\njudicata may apply; (3) in a criminal case, Section 300 CrPC makes provision that once a person is convicted or\nacquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the\ncriminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of the civil court would be relevant if\nconditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as\nprovided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.\n31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under\nSections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, the court has to decide to what extent\nit is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein. Take for illustration, in a case of alleged\ntrespass by A on B's property, B filed a suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession from A and suit is\ndecreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by B against A for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in\ncivil proceedings would be relevant and the court may hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as\npossession of B over the property. In such case, A may be convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which\nis quoted above makes the position clear. Hence, in each and every case, the first question which would require\nconsideration is — whether judgment, order or decree is relevant, if relevant — its effect. It may be relevant for a\nlimited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon the facts of each case.\n32. In the present case, the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case [AIR 1954 SC 397 :\n1954 Cri LJ 1019] would be binding, wherein it has been specifically held that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid\ndown and that possibility of conflicting decision in civil and criminal courts is not a relevant consideration. The law\nenvisages\n“such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or\neven relevant, except for limited purpose such as sentence or damages”.’ 13\nBuxar, but in the present case, there is no\ndispute with regard to execution of the PoA and\nthe dispute relates only to execution of the Sale\nDeed which occurred in Dehradun where the land\nlies. Thus, the submission was that the Courts at\nBuxar would not have any jurisdiction in the\npresent matter.\n16. Learned senior counsel summed up his\narguments by contending that all points raised\nbefore us had been taken before the High Court\nbut have not been dealt with in the Impugned\nJudgment.\nSUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2:\n17. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing\nfor respondent no.2 submitted that the case\nbefore the High Court was confined to the\nquestion of territorial jurisdiction and it was\nobserved that the same depends upon evidence.\nThus, it was submitted that territorial 14\njurisdiction does not go to the root of the\nmatter, but is merely for administrative\nconvenience. Reliance was placed on the decision\nin Smt. Raj Kumari Vijh v Dev Raj Vijh, (1977) 2\nSCC 190, the relevant being at Paragraph 73.\n18. It was submitted that the appellant has\nwilfully purchased the land of the complainant on\nthe strength of the PoA, which itself required\nthe assent of the land-owners/principals for sale\nof land, as would be clear from Clause 15 of the\nPoA.\n19. Learned senior counsel, in the alternative\ntook the stand that if relief was granted to the\n3 ‘7. Section 531 of the Code reads as follows:\n“531. No finding, sentence or order of any criminal court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the\ninquiry, trial or other proceeding in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong\nsessions division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact\noccasioned a failure of justice.”\nThe section therefore relates to a defect of jurisdiction. As has been stated by this Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia\nv. State of West Bengal [(1962) 2 SCR 101 : AIR 1961 SC 1589 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 728] there are two types of\njurisdiction of a criminal court, namely, (1) the jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to try particular\nkinds of offences, and (2) its territorial jurisdiction. While the former goes to the root of the matter and any\ntransgression of it makes the entire trial void, the latter is not of a peremptory character and is curable under\nSection 531 of the Code. Territorial jurisdiction is provided “just as a matter of convenience, keeping in mind the\nadministrative point of view with respect to the work of a particular court, the convenience of the accused who will\nhave to meet the charge levelled against him and the convenience of the witnesses who have to appear before the\nCourt”. Sub-section (8) of Section 488 in fact provides that proceedings under the section “may be taken against\nany person in any district where he resides or is, or where he last resided with his wife or, as the case may be, the\nmother of the illegitimate child”. This therefore is ordinarily the requirement as to the filing of an application under\nSection 488 within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned.’ 15\nappellant with regard to quashing of the FIR, it\nmay be confined to the appellant and not of the\nFIR as a whole, where the other co-accused has\nbeen charge-sheeted and summoned to face trial.\nIt was urged that it may be left open to the\nTrial Court to summon the appellant if the\nevidence so warrants, under Section 319, Code of\nCriminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to\nas the “CrPC”).\nSUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE:\n20. A counter has been filed on behalf of the\nState of Bihar opposing the prayer made in the\npresent appeal and justifying the prosecution of\nthe appellant on the basis of the FIR.\nANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:\n21. Having considered the facts and submissions\nby the learned counsel for the parties, this\nCourt finds that a case for interference has been\nmade out. The undisputed and admitted facts are 16\nthat the PoA was executed by the land-\nowners/principals, including respondent no.2 and\nothers on 12.04.1994, in favour of the person\nfrom whom the appellant purchased the land on\n22. It is also a fact that the PoA-holder\nexecuted a Sale Deed and got it registered at\nDehradun in favour of the appellant as also that\nthe land is located in Dehradun. Much has been\nsaid with regard to a harmonious reading of the\nvarious clauses of the PoA viz. Clauses 3, 11 and\n15 which read as under:\n‘3. To execute any type of deed and to\nreceipt consideration, if any, on our\nbehalf and to get the Registration\ndone of the same.\n11. To sell moveable or immoveable\nproperty including land, live stock,\ntrees etc. and receive payment of such\nsales on our behalf.\n15. To present for registration all\nthe sale deeds or other documents\nsigned by us and admit execution there\nof before the District Registrar or\nthe Sub-Registrar or such other 17\nOfficer as may have authority to\nregister the said deeds and documents\nas the case may be and take back the\n23. A mere perusal of the above indicates that\nas per Clause 3, the PoA-holder was authorised to\nexecute any type of deed, to receive\nconsideration in this behalf and to get the\nregistration done thereof. Clause 11 of the PoA\nfurther makes it clear that the PoA-holder had\nthe authority to sell movable or immovable\nproperty including land, livestock, trees etc.\nand receive payment of such sales on behalf of\nthe land-owners/principals. However, Clause 15 of\nthe PoA, which has been strenuously relied upon\nby the respondent no.2, while opposing the\npresent appeal, states that the PoA-holder was\nauthorized to present for registration the sale\ndeed(s) or other documents signed by the land-\nowners/principals and admit execution thereof\nbefore the District Registrar or the Sub-18\nRegistrar or such other officer as may have\nauthority to register the said deeds and\ndocuments, as the case may be, and take back the\n24. Thus, the Court is required to interpret\nharmoniously as also logically the effect of a\ncombined reading of the afore-extracted clauses.\nAs such, our endeavour would, in the first\ninstance, necessarily require us to render all\nthree effective and none otiose. In order to do\nso, this Court would test as to whether all the\nthree clauses can independently be given effect\nto and still not be in conflict with the other\nclauses.\n25. With this object, when the three clauses are\nread, it is obvious, at the cost of repetition,\nthat Clause 3 pertains to execution of any type\nof deed and receiving consideration, if any, on\nbehalf of the land-owners/principals and to get 19\nthe registration thereof carried out. Basically,\nthis would take care of any type of deed by which\nthe PoA-holder was authorized to execute and also\nreceive consideration and get registration done\n26. Clause 11 of the PoA deals specifically with\nregard to sale of movable or immovable property\nincluding land and receiving payments of such\nsales on behalf of the land-owners/principals.\n27. In this eventuate, Clauses 3 and 11 of the\nPoA together authorized the PoA-holder to execute\ndeeds, including of/for sale, receive\nconsideration in this regard and proceed to\nregistration upon accepting consideration on\n28. Coming to Clause 15 of the PoA, which states\nthat the PoA-holder was authorized to present for\nregistration the sale deeds or other documents\nsigned by the land-owners/principals and admit 20\nexecution thereof, is, in our understanding in\naddition to Clauses 3 and 11 of the PoA and not\nin derogation thereof. The reason to so hold is\nthat besides the contingencies where the PoA-\nholder had been authorized to execute any type of\ndeed and receive consideration and get\nregistration done, which included sale of\nmovable/immovable property on behalf of the land-\nowners/principals, the land owners/principals had\nalso retained the authority that if a Sale Deed\nwas/had been signed by them, the very same PoA-\nholder was also authorized to present it for\nregistration and admit to execution before the\nauthority concerned.\n29. Thus, in the instant case, had it been a\nsituation where the land-owners/principals had\nexecuted a Sale Deed in favour of any third party\nprior to the Sale Deed executed and registered by\nthe PoA-holder with regard to the property in\nquestion, and the PoA-holder had not presented 21\nthe said Sale Deed and had gone ahead with\nhimself executing and getting registered a\ndifferent or a subsequent Sale Deed in favour of\nthe appellant, the matter would be entirely\ndifferent. Therefore, clearly, there is no\ncontradiction between Clauses 3, 11 and 15 of the\nPoA. To restate, Clause 15 of the PoA is an\nadditional provision retaining authority for sale\nwith the land-owners/principals themselves and\nthe process whereof would also entail\npresentation for registration and admission of\nits execution.\n30. We are of the considered opinion that all\nthree clauses are capable of being construed in\nsuch a manner that they operate in their own\nfields and are not rendered nugatory. That apart,\nwe are mindful that even if we had perceived a\nconflict between Clauses 3 and 11, on the one\nhand, and Clause 15 on the other, we would have\nto conclude that Clauses 3 and 11 would prevail 22\nover Clause 15 as when the same cannot be\nreconciled, the earlier clause(s) would prevail\nover the later clause(s), when construing a Deed\nor a Contract. Reference for such proposition is\ntraceable to Forbes v Git,1 AC 2564, as\napprovingly taken note of by a 3-Judge Bench of\nthis Court in Radha Sundar Dutta v Mohd. Jahadur\nRahim, AIR 1959 SC 24. However, we have been\nable, as noted above, to reconcile the three\nclauses in the current scenario.\n31. Another fact which cannot be lost sight of,\nis that it is apparent that the matter relates to\na dispute among the co-sharers as the PoA-holder\nis the son of one of the co-sharers/principals\nnamely Smt. Indumati R. V. Singh.\n4 ‘The principle of law to be applied may be stated in few words. If in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later\nclause which destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause, the later clause is to be rejected as\nrepugnant and the earlier clause prevails. In this case the two clauses cannot be reconciled and the earlier\nprovision in the deed prevails over the later. Thus, if A covenants to pay 100 and the deed subsequently provides\nthat he shall not be liable under his covenant, that later provision is to be rejected as repugnant and void, for it\naltogether destroys the covenant. But if the later clause does not destroy but only qualifies the earlier, then the\ntwo are to be read together and effect is to be given to the intention of the parties as disclosed by the deed as a\nwhole. …’ 23\n32. The PoA and its execution/registration not\nbeing in dispute, the only controversy relating\nto the Sale Deed executed by the PoA-holder in\nfavour of the appellant in Dehradun for property\nlocated at Dehradun would thus, in the emerging\nfactual matrix, clearly be an issue for the\nCourts at Dehradun to examine, much less give\nrise to any cause of action at Buxar.\n33. We may add that this issue of jurisdiction\nis limited to the transaction of the execution of\nthe Sale Deed in favour of the appellant, and not\nto any other controversy or dispute the land-\nowners/principals may have, either inter-se or\nagainst the PoA-holder. Moreover, a suit filed by\nthe land-owners/principals at Dehradun prior to\nthe lodging of the FIR, for the same cause of\naction, has been dismissed in favour of the\nappellant, where a specific plea to cancel the\nSale Deed stands rejected. 24\n34. In sum, the dispute, if any, is between the\nland-owners/principals inter-se and/or between\nthem and the PoA-holder. We think it would be\nimproper to drag the appellant into criminal\nlitigation, when he had no role either in the\nexecution of the PoA nor any misdeed by the PoA-\nholder vis-à-vis the land-owners/principals.\nMoreover, the entire consideration amount has\nbeen paid by the appellant to the PoA-holder.\n35. On an overall circumspection of the entire\nfacts and circumstances, we find that the\nImpugned Judgment needs to be and is hereby set\naside. This Court has held that in the\nappropriate case, protection is to be accorded\nagainst unwanted criminal prosecution and from\nthe prospect of unnecessary trial5. We quash FIR\nNo.87 of 2011 dated 19.03.2011, Dumraon Police\nStation, Buxar, Bihar as also the order taking\n5 Priyanka Mishra v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 978 and Vishnu Kumar Shukla v State of\nUttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1582. 25\ncognizance dated 18.11.2014 and all consequential\nacts emanating therefrom, insofar as they relate\nto the appellant.\n36. Learned senior counsel for the respondent\nno.2 had submitted that the Trial Court be\nallowed to exercise power under Section 319, CrPC\nagainst the appellant, if warranted. Expressing\nno opinion thereon, we insert the caveat that the\nTrial Court will act in accordance with law.\n37. The appeal is accordingly allowed, leaving\nthe parties to bear their own costs.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -363,26 +363,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S003", - "case_id": "1863", + "case_id": "6413", "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "qwen3-8b", - "source_file": "S003__ablation_issue__qwen3-8b__1863.json", + "model": "phi-4", + "source_file": "S003__ablation_issue__phi-4__6413.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "02/08/2024", - "machine_error_stage": "facts", - "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Incorrect fact" + "judgment_date": "31/01/2024", + "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misinterpretation" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil.Appeal. No. 5507 of 1995 | (1) State Of Madhya Pradesh (2) Electrical Adviser To Government Of M.P. (3) Regional Accounts Officers, M.P. Electricity Board v. Birla Jute Manufacturing Company Limited | 10/05/1995", - "case_details": "Case: Civil.Appeal. No. 5507 of 1995 | (1) State Of Madhya Pradesh (2) Electrical Adviser To Government Of M.P. (3) Regional Accounts Officers, M.P. Electricity Board v. Birla Jute Manufacturing Company Limited", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Appeal (Civil) 4774-76 of 1996, C.A. Nos.4777-78 of 1996 | Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) By Lrs. And Another v. Ramesh Chandra Agarwala And Others | 07/07/2003", + "case_details": "Case: Appeal (Civil) 4774-76 of 1996, C.A. Nos.4777-78 of 1996 | Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) By Lrs. And Another v. Ramesh Chandra Agarwala And Others", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "M/s. Birla Jute Manufacturing Company Limited (M/s. Birla Ltd.) operates a limestone crusher at a mine-head in Madhya Pradesh, where the Mines Act, 1952 applies, processing limestone for cement. The MP Government levied electricity duty under Item (1) of Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949 (the 1949 Act). M/s. Birla Ltd. disputed this, claiming Item (2) (factory rate) applied. The MP High Court (May 1, 1982) upheld M/s. Birla Ltd.'s claim, quashing the demands. The State of MP appealed to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending, MP enacted the Validation Act, 1984, to validate Item (1) duty for such premises. M/s. Birla Ltd. challenged the Validation Act's constitutionality via a writ petition in the Supreme Court.", - "generated_judgment": "**DISMISSED**\n\n**Judgment Rationale:**\n1. **Preclusion Principle**: The case reached finality by the end of the 1982 MP High Court decision on the original dispute (electricity duty classification), which upheld Birla Ltd.’s relief—before any part of the Validation Act (1984) could take effect. Thus, constitutional challenges to the Validation Act based on hypothetical invalidity of Item (1) preclude its retrospective application.\n2. **Stabilization of Sector**: Enactment of the Validation Act (1984) confirmed State policy on the issue, rendering any claim about prior unconstitutionality frivolous.\n3. **Writ Jurisdiction Limitation**: If the Validation Act was neither unconstitutional *before* its enactment nor part of an unforeseen hardship, its validation stands as a valid legislative measure, bypassing judicial review that would involve *ab initio* uncertainty.\n4. **Conceptual Inapplicability**: The hypothetical premise (invalidity pre-Act) lacks factual substance because the facts alleged by Birla Ltd. clearly نورished existing jurisprudence (reference to pre-1984 precedent) and was actually interpreted as error until litigation.\n\n*Result*: **The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of the 1984 Validation Act on appeal overruled later arguments.** No grounds left for *post-Facto* challenge.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : N. Venkatachala, J.\n Special leave sought for in S.O.F. No. 3870 of 1982 is granted.\n The State of Madhya Pradesh, its Electrical Adviser and Regional Accounts Officer of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, have filed the above Civil Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, impugning a Division Bench judgment and order dated May 1, 1982 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Misc. writ Petition No. 320/80 wherein it has been held that the rate of duty payable on consumption of the electrical energy under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949 \"the 1949 Act\" in premises of M/s. Birla Jute Manufacturing Company Limited \"M/s. Birla Ltd.\" to which the Mines Act, 1952the Mines Actapplied, was required to be calculated under item (2) and not item (1) of Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act.\n M/s. Birla Ltd. and its Director, Shri M.M. Gadodia, have filed the above writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, impugning the constitutionality of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1984the Validation Actwhich amended certain provisions of the 1949 Act, validating duty levied on consumption of electrical energy imposed under the 1949 Act in respect of premises to which the Mines Act apolied. Since questions arising for our consideration and decision in the Civil Appeal and the writ petition relate to sustainability of levy imposed under the 1949 Act on electrical energy consumed in a premises to which the Mines Act applied, they could be disposed of together.\n Facts which are material for a proper consideration of the questions arising for our decision in the said appeal and writ petition, could be stated thus:\n M/s. Birla Ltd. has set up several industries all over the country for the manufacture and sale of consumable goods. One of such industries set up by M/s. Birla Ltd. is M/s. Satna Cement works with limestones mines at one place and a cement factory at another place, in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Huge lime-stone boulders extracted from the mines known as dnokas are broken into small sized limestones known as gittis for being used as raw-material for manufacture of cement in the cement factory by a lime-stone crusher erected in a premises located at the mines-head of lime-stone mines to which the Mines Act applies. For the electrical energy consumed by the lime-stone crusher in that premises at mines-head during the year 1979-1980, the Government of Madhya Pradesh levied duty under section 3 of the 1949 Act at a rate calculated under Item (1) of Table below that section and raised demands thereon, against M/s. Birla Ltd. Such levies and demands were refuted by M/s. Birla Ltd. by contending that it was liable for levy of duty on electrical energy consumed for preaking dhokas into gittis by the lime-stone crusher in the premises at mineshead only at a rate calculated in item (2) of Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act, notwithstanding the applicability of the Mines Act to the said premises, in that that premises had to be regarded as a factory for fixing the rate of duty payable on electrical energy consumed therein because of inclusive meaning of factory given in Explanation (c) to section 3 of the 1949 Act itself.\n1. Since the Government of Madhya Pradesh persistent in its demands made against M/s. Birla Ltd., the latter filed a writ Petition, Misc. W.P. No. 520 of 1980 in the Madhya Pradesh High Court challenging the said levies and demands. A Division Bench of the High Court taking the aid of Explanation (c) to section 3 of the 1949 Act, duashed the levies and demands challenged by M/s. Birla Ltd., by upholding the contention that its liability to pay duty was only at the rate calculated under clause (2) of Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act, by its judgment and order dated May 1, 1982 rendered in that writ petition, it is the correctness of that judgment and order which has been under challenge in the present appeal filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh, its Electrical Adviser and Regional Accounts Officer of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board.\n While, the correctness of the said judgment and order of the High Court in the present appeal was pending consideration and decision by this Court, the State of Madhya Pradesh enacted and brought into force the aforesaid validation Act. What has been impughed in the present writ petition by M/s. Birla Ltd. is the constitutional validity of that Validation Act.\n We have heard learned counsel for the contesting parties in the appeal as well as the writ petition. We have been taken through the judgment of the High Court under appeal and the relevant provisions of the 1949 Act and the Validation Act. Whether the duty leviable on consumption of electrical energy by M/s. Birla Ltd. under section 3 of the 1949 Act in their premises to which the Mines Act applies is at the rate specified in Item (1) or Item (2) of the Table given below that section being the main question which needs to be answered by us in deciding the present appeal and the writ petition, we shall proceed to find the answer therefore, at the first instance.\n Since the answer to the said question has necessarily to depend on a proper construction to be placed by us on section 3 of the 1949 Act, as a whole, as to its ambit and application, it could be reproduced for the sake of easy reference and proper examination, thus:\n \"3. Levy of duty on sale of consumption of electric energy Subject to the exceptions specified in section 3-A every distributor of electrical energy and every producer shall pay every month to the State Government at the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner a duty calculated at the rates specified in the Table below on the units of electrical energy sold or supplied to a consumer or consumed by himself for his own purposes or for purposes of his township or colony, during the preceding month:\nTABLE\nRate of Duty \n(1) Electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in premises used (a) for business trade or commercial purposes or for purposes of profe ssional persuits other than for flour mills\n 8 paise per unit of energy upto 80 units of energy sold or supplied in a month 10 paise per unit for each additional unit sold or supplied in a month in excess of units but not in excess of 100 units of energy 12 paise per unit for each additional unit sold or supplied in a month in excess of 100 units of energy\n (2) Electrical energy sold supplied for consumption in in premises of a factory excluding energy supplied for consumption for domestic or non-factory purposes where the conn ected load 2 paise per unit of energy (a) does not exceed 100 H.P. 1.5 paise per unit of energy. (b) exceeds 100 H.P. 3 paise per unit of energy. (3) Electrical energy sold or supplied for purposes of illumination on the occasion of marriages or other social functions. 65 paise per unit of energy upto 50 units of energy sold or supplied on any one occasion. Rest per unit for each additional unit sold or supplied on any one occasion in excess of 100 units of energy. (4) Electrical energy sold or supplied for energy consumption in :(a) a township or colony attached to a factory, mine, or institution or (b) a premises getting supply at high voltage or extra high voltage but not cov-ered under Items (1) and (2) in above.\n 6.5 paise per unit of energy upto 50 units of energy sold or supplied in a month 7 paise per unit for each additional unit sold or supplied in a month in excess of 50 units but not in excess of 150 units of energy.\n (5) Electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in premises and for purposes not covered under (1) to (4) above. 12 paise per unit for each additional unit sold or supplied in a month in excess of 150 units of energy. \n Provided that if the electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption for any one purpose is used either wholly or partly, without the consent of the distributor of energy or producer or electricity, as the case may be, for consumption for any other purpose for which a higher rate of duty is chargeable the entire energy sold or supplied shall be charged at the highest rate applicable.\nExplanation For the purpose of this section -\n(a) Month means such period as may be prescribed and till such period is prescribed, the filing month :\n(b) Premises used for business, trade commercial purposes or for purpose of professional pursuits shall include the premises used -\n(1) for the purposes of mines to which Mines Act, 1952 (No. 35 of 1952) applies :\n(2) for the purposes of industries which do not require raw materials for carrying on the industries but which are carried on for rendering services such as flour mill, repains workshop and the like and are not registered as factories under the Factories Act, 1945 (No. 63 of 1948) :\n(c) Factory means a factory registered under the Factories Act 1945 (No. 67 of 1946) : and includes premises used for the purposes of Industries which require raw materials for carrying on the manufacturing process and prepare finished goods for sale.\" \n As seen from section 3 above, duty leviacle there under and payable to the State Government every month on electrical energy sold or supplied or consumed during the preceding month is required to be calculated at the rate per unit specified in the Table given below that section. As per the Table, duty payable for the electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption varies from item to item, depending upon the purpose for which it is consumed. when item (1) of the Table is seen, the rate of duty payable for electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in a premises covers premises used for business, trade or commercial purposes or for purposes of professional persuits other than for flour mills. Because of the explanation (b) to the section which says that for the purpose of the section premises used for business, trade, commercial purposes or for purpose of professional persuite shall include the premises used for the purpose of mines to which the Mines Act, 1952 applies, any premises in or a mine which is used for processing the mines extracted from the mine, becomes the premises covers under Item (1) of the Table. When Item (2) of the Table is seen, the rate of duty payable for electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in a premises covers a factory, because of explanation (c) which says that for the purpose of the section factory not only means a factory registered under the Factories Act, 1948, but also includes a premises used for the purpose of industries which require raw materials for carrying on the manufacturing process and prepare finished goods for sale. When Item (3) of the Table is seen.\n2. It refers to the rate of duty payable on electrical energy sold or supplied for purposes of illumination on the occasion of marriage or other social functions when Item (4) of the Table is seen, it refers to the rate of duty payable for electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in a township or colony attached to a factory, mine, or institution or a premises getting supply at high voltage or extra high voltage but not covered under Items (1) and (2) of the Table. The rates fixed in respect of electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in a premises covered by Item (4) cannot be reparded as a premises covered by Item (1) or Item (2) of the Table because of the specific exclusion of those items, as mentioned in Item (4) itself. As seen from Item (5) of the Table, the rate of duty payable for electrical energy sold or supplied for premises or purposes covered there under cannot apply to premises or purposes covered in Items (1) to (4) of the Table because of their specific exclusion as mentioned there under.\n3. When the rates of duty leviable under various items in the Table are seen, each of them applies, according to the purpose for which electrical energy is sold or consumed. Then, comes the proviso to the Table which declares that the electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption for any one purpose is used either wholly or partly, without the consent of the distributor of energy or producer of electricity, as the case may be, for consumption for any other purpose for which a higher rate of duty is chargeable, the entire energy sold or supplied shall be charged at the highest rate applicable. This, praviso, therefore, expressly states that the rates of duty leviable for electrical energy consumed by premises or purpose covered by more than one item. It is the highest rate fixed under them which is laviable where the consumer of electrical energy does not obtain the consent from the distributor of electrical energy or producer of electricity for change in such user, Hence, according to the proviso if consent is obtained by the consumer of electrical energy from the distributor of energy or producer of electricity for using electrical energy in a cremises of a factory covered by Item (2) it cannot be used for premises covered under Item (1) and if such thing is done without obtaining such consent, instead of lower duty payable for a premises covered under Item (2), higher duty for a premises covered under Item (1) becomes payable.\n4. In other words, proviso to the Table requires that a consumer of electrical energy must declare before such consumption as to the purpose for which it would be consumed in the sense whether it would be consumed for the purpose covered under Item (1) or Item (2) or Item (3) or Item (4) or Item (5) of the Table. The requirement of the proviso when is understood in the context of the provisions under different items, the purpose for which electrical energy is consumed, if falls under more than one item, the rate at which duty becomes leviable would be of the item for which highest rate of duty is fixed.\n It regard is had to the aforesaid analysis of section 3, its Table and explanation, as to their ampit and applicapility, can it be held that the rate of out payable for electrical energy consumed in premises covered by Item (2) of Table to section 3 of the 1947 Act is the rate provided for there under, even where for such premises (factory), the Mines Act is made applicable, is the question.\n No doubt, as we have already pointed out a factory under clause (c) to the explanation to section 3 since includes premises used for purposes of industries which require raw materials for carrying on the manufacturing process and prepare finished goods for sale, the premises of M/s. Birla Ltd. at the mines near of their lime-stone mines of the State of Madhya Pradesh where lime-stone bouloersdhokas extracted from the mines are broken into small pieces, i.e., gittis for being used in their cement factory or factory requiring raw-material for carrying on the manufacturing process and prepare finished goods of cement for sale, falls within the description of premises covered by Item (2) of the Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act. But the question is when such premises also falls within the description of premises covered by Item (1) because of clause (b) (1) to the Explanation whether the duty payable for electrical energy used therein could only be what is payable for premises under Item (2) of Table to section 3. Since a premises for which Mines Act is made applicable becomes a premises covered by Item (1) of Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act which provides for highest rate of duty leviable for electrical energy consumed in such premises question of leviability of lower duty for such consumption merely because of that premises answering the description of premises in other Item of the Table respecting which lower duty is leviable can never arise, for as we have pointes out already, when once highest rate under an Item is leviable. lower rate leviable under other item is excluded. It is, therefore, our consider view them premises covered by Item (1) to the Table to which Mines Act is made applicable being the premises of M/s. Birla Ltd. at their mines-site gets covered by Item (1) of Table and hence the duty payable for consumption of electrical energy in that premises shall be at the rate payable for the premises covered under Item (1) of the Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act.\n Hence, the view taken by the High Court in the judgment and order under appeal that the premises of M/s. Birla Ltd. at the mines site being a factory premises covered by Item (2) of the Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act the payment of duty leviable in respect of electrical energy consumed in that premises is covered by Item (2) of the Table, becomes unsustainable and calls to be interfered with.\n The next question which arises for our consideration is as to sustainability of the provisions in the Validation Act which validate the levy of duty imposed under Item (1) to the Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act in respect of electrical energy consumed in the premises of M/s. Birla Ltd. at their mines site to which Mines Act is applicable under the 1949 Act and in respect of similar premises of other persons or companies to which Mines Act is applicable.\n Although learned counsel for the petitioners for the writ petitions sought to question the provisions of the Validation Act which purport to retrospective validate levy of duty on electrical energy consumed in their premises under the 1949 Act because of the view taken of section 3 of the 1945 Act by the High Court in its judgment and order under the present appeal, the learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh sought to support the sustainability of the Validation Act placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. H.M.T. [1975] Suppl. S.C.R. 394, where this Court had upheld the provisions of a Validation Act by which duty made payable in respect of a building premises retrospectively. Prima facie, the decision of this Court appears to support the stand of learned counsel for the State. But, when the judgment and order of the High Court under the present appeal, which is sought to be made ineffective by the Validation Act, is held to be unsustainable by us in the present appeal, we find it unnecessary, to examine the constitutionality of the Validation Act.\n In the result, we not merely allow this civil appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court in W.P. No. 520 of 1980 (reported in AIR 1982 m.p. 225) appealed against and dismiss that writ petition, but also dismiss the writ petition filed in this Court. No costs.\nAppeal dismissed", + "case_record": "These appeals challenge High Court judgments concerning the validity of orders passed by the Press and Registration Board under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867. The dispute involves Ramesh Chander Agarwal and the estate of the late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal regarding the publication rights of the newspaper 'Dainik Bhaskar'. Allegations include fraudulent creation of lease documents, attempted increase of equity shares in violation of the Companies Act, forcible possession of a printing press, and physical assault. Proceedings under Section 145 of the CrPC were initiated. Declarations for newspaper publication were filed, and the District Magistrate, Gwalior, cancelled some of these declarations under Section 8-B of the Act. The Appellate Board upheld the District Magistrate's order, citing procedural irregularities and the incompetence of the certifying magistrate. The High Court initially quashed these orders and directed a fresh consideration but later, on review, deferred the inquiry pending civil litigation. Civil suits were filed by both parties concerning possession of the press and management of the company, with conflicting interim orders from the civil court. The High Court allowed Ramesh Chander Agarwal's appeal regarding the injunction and dismissed Dwarka Prasad Agarwal's appeal, deeming his suit barred under Section 10 of the Companies Act.", + "generated_judgment": "\n\n\n### **Facts** \n1. The appeals challenge the validity of orders passed by the Press and Registration Board under the **Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867**, concerning the publication rights of the newspaper 'Dainik Bhaskar'. \n2. The dispute involves **Ramesh Chander Agarwal** and the **estate of Dwarka Prasad Agarwal**, with allegations of **fraudulent creation of lease documents**, **violation of the Companies Act, 1956**, **forcible possession of a printing press**, and **physical assault**. \n3. Proceedings under **Section 145 of the CrPC** were initiated, and the **District Magistrate, Gwalior**, canceled some declarations under **Section 8-B of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867**. \n4. The **Appellate Board** upheld the District Magistrate’s order, citing **procedural irregularities** and the **incompetence of the certifying magistrate**. \n5. The **High Court** initially **quashed the Appellate Board’s order** and directed a **fresh consideration**, but later **deferred the inquiry pending civil litigation**. \n6. **Civil suits** were filed by both parties concerning **possession of the printing press** and **management of the company**, with **conflicting interim orders** from the civil court. \n7. The **High Court** allowed **Ramesh Chander Agarwal’s appeal** regarding the **injunction** and **dismissed Dwarka Prasad Agarwal’s appeal**, citing **Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956** as a **statutory bar**. \n\n---\n\n### **Issues** \n1. Is the **High Court’s order to defer the inquiry pending civil litigation** appealable? \n2. Is the **High Court’s dismissal of Dwarka Prasad Agarwal’s appeal** under **Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956** a **final and appealable order**? \n3. Does the **ongoing civil litigation** bar the appellate court from reviewing the **validity of the Press and Registration Board’s orders**? \n\n---\n\n### **Rules** \n1. **Section 115 of the CrPC**: Provides for appeals against orders under the Code of Criminal Procedure. \n2. **Section 8-B of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867**: Governs the cancellation of newspaper declarations. \n3. **Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956**: Bars suits in certain circumstances, including where the matter is already adjudicated or barred by law. \n4. **Interlocutory Orders**: Generally not appealable unless they are final or capable of immediate review (*R. S. Sathyamurthy v. Union of India*, 1974). \n5. **Jurisdictional Limits**: The appellate court may not review matters **pending resolution of civil litigation** unless the civil suit is concluded (*Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab*, 1975). \n\n---\n\n### **Analysis** \n1. **Non-Appealability of the High Court’s Deferment Order**: \n The High Court’s order to **defer the inquiry pending civil litigation** is an **interlocutory order**. Under **Section 115 of the CrPC** and precedents like *R. S. Sathyamurthy v. Union of India* (1974), such orders are **generally not appealable** unless they are final or capable of immediate review. Since the **civil litigation remains unresolved**, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review the deferment order. \n\n2. **Validity of the High Court’s Dismissal Under Section 10 of the Companies Act**: \n The High Court’s dismissal of Dwarka Prasad Agarwal’s appeal under **Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956** is a **final order** and **appealable**. This statutory provision bars suits involving **fraudulent equity share violations** and **lease document creation**, which are central to Dwarka’s claims. Precedents like *Ramesh Chandra Agarwal v. Dwarka Prasad Agarwal* (2010) support the High Court’s application of the bar. \n\n3. **Jurisdictional Limits and Civil Litigation**: \n The **ongoing civil litigation** between the parties creates **jurisdictional ambiguity**. The High Court’s deferment order is **conditional on the resolution of the civil suit**, and the appellate court cannot address the validity of the Press and Registration Board’s orders without first resolving the civil litigation. This precludes the appellate court from reviewing the matter. \n\n---\n\n### **Conclusion** \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. \n- The **High Court’s deferment order** is **non-appealable** as an interlocutory order pending unresolved civil litigation. \n- The **dismissal of Dwarka Prasad Agarwal’s appeal** under **Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956** is **final and appealable**, but the appellate court cannot review the validity of the Press and Registration Board’s orders due to **jurisdictional limits**. \n- The **civil litigation** remains unresolved, and the appellate court lacks authority to address the original dispute.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by: S. B. Sinha, J.\n1. These appeals involving identical questions of law and facts were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.\n2. Civil Appeal Nos. 4774-76 of 1996 arise out of the judgments and orders dated 12.3.1993 and 18.3.1993 passed by the Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Miscellaneous Petition Nos.1654, 1727 and 1728 of 1991; wherein the legality/validity of three orders passed on 29.5.1991 by the Press and Registration Board purported to be in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 8-C of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (for short 'the Act) were questioned by the Respondent No.1 herein.Civil Appeal Nos. 4777-78 of 1996 arise out of the judgment and order dated 29.6.1991 passed by the Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court arising out of Misc. Appeal Nos. 60-61 of 1988.\n3. Factual matrix of the matter, shortly stated is as under:\nRamesh Chander Agarwal s/o late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal, a partner of M/s Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and Brothers allegedly upon taking advantage of his father's ill-health made an attempt to create a lease in relation to the right to publish Dainik Bhaskar from Bhopal. According to late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal, to the best of his knowledge, he did not sign the said document dated 13.4.1984 and in any event the same was meant to be applicable only for Bhopal and not for any other place. On 13.4.1985, a partition/family settlement deed was prepared wherein late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal was not a signatory. Allegedly, Bishambhar Dayal also did not agree to the said settlement and did not sign the said purported deed of family settlement.\nMs. Hemlata Agarwal, eldest daughter of late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal through his second wife, was made a Joint Managing Director of Bhaskar Publications and Allied Industries. Ramesh Chander Agarwal being intrigued thereby tried to increase the equity shares of the company to such an extent that he gets majority in the equity shares purported to be in total disregard and violation of the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The said respondent also took alleged forcible possession of the Printing Press on 3.7.1987 which had been leased out by M/s Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and Brothers (the Firm) to M/s Bhaskar Publications and Allied Industries Private Limited. Allegedly, late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and his two daughters were also physically assaulted by the first respondent leading to initiation of a proceeding u/s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the said proceedings, the Executive Magistrate directed the police to open the locks put in the premises of the printing press in presence of both the parties. However, late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal was not permitted to run the said printing press.\n4. Thereafter, Ramesh Chander Agarwal filed a declaration before the District Magistrate, Jabalpur, wherein he allegedly accepted the partnership of M/s Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and others as owners of the newspaper Dainik Bhaskar. In terms of the provisions of S. 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act read with the rules framed thereunder, declarations are required to be filed by the owner as also the printer(s) and publisher(s) thereof. Six declarations were filed; three each by Respondent No.2 on the purported authority of late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and three by the Respondent No.1. Objections to the said declarations were filed by late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal before the appropriate authority.\n5. By an order dated 6.6.1988, the District Magistrate, Gwalior, in exercise of his power under Section 8-B of the Act cancelled the said declarations dated 11.3.1985 filed by Respondent No.1. He preferred an appeal there against before the Press and Registration Appellate Board, but the same was ultimately withdrawn.\n6. He in the meanwhile filed a writ petition before the High Court for stay of the proceedings before the District Magistrate. Although an order of stay was passed therein but before the same could be communicated the aforementioned order dated 6.6.1988 was passed. Ramesh Chander Agarwal, Respondent No.1, then filed another writ petition against the said order dated 6.6.1988 before the High Court but the same was withdrawn on the ground that he had in the meanwhile availed alternative remedy of filing an appeal against the same order. During the pendency of the said appeal before the Board, yet another writ petition was filed by the first respondent marked as Writ Petition No.798 of 1988 praying therein for quashing of the order dated 6.6.1988 whereby the declarations were directed to be filed.\n7. The said appeals filed by Ramesh Chandra Agarwal were dismissed by the Appellate Board on 29.5.1991 holding as under:\n \"(a) The document at the top portion is pasted with thick opaque white paper slips from both sides, perhaps to cover up and make unreasonable something which was written or printed under these slips;\n(b) Below the seal of the Deputy Collector and Executive Magistrate, Bhopal (party superimposed) appears a somewhat blurred impressed of the seal of the Executive Magistrate, Gwalior;\n(c) The printed proforma of A1 is patently of Bhopal. That proforma does not tally with the printed form produced by the Appellant with his application.\nAnnexure A-1, is only a photocopy of the original, in the absence of which, the true effect of these suspicious circumstances (a) to (c) cannot be correctly assessed. However, the appellant admits that the photocopy of the declaration A-1 was presented by Devinder Tiwari not personally by him (appellant). This Devinder Tiwari who, according to the appellant, as a Director of the Company did not file any letter of authority on behalf of the Company, or even from the appellant, to explain why the declaration was not presented in person by the appellant\". \nxxx xxx xxx xxx xxx\n \"Nevertheless, there is no reason to differ from the finding of the District Magistrate, that Shri S.C. Shukla (Deputy Collector) Executive Magistrate, not being a District, Presidency or Sub-Divisional Magistrate was not competent, in view of S. 5(2) of the Act, to entertain and authenticate the declaration dated 11.3.1985, filed by the appellant.\nFor all the reasons aforesaid, we would uphold the order dated 6.6.88 of the District Magistrate, Gwalior and dismiss the Appeal No.III filed by Ramesh Chander Agarwal.\" \n8. A writ petition was filed by Ramesh Chander Agarwal thereagainst. Similar writ petitions came to be filed in relation to the orders passed in respect of other declarations.\n9. By reason of the impugned order dated 12.3.1993, the order of the Appellate Board dated 29.5.1991 as also that of the District Magistrate, Gwalior, dated 6.6.1988 were quashed and the Appellate Board was directed to consider the matter afresh within a period of three months. Strangely enough, however, the same learned Judge on a review application filed by the first respondent herein by an order dated 18.3.1993 directed that the inquiry by the District Magistrate should be deferred if an application is filed before him till the final outcome of the civil litigations by the parties. Late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal, alleging his alleged illegal dispossession from the printing press, filed a suit for eviction and permanent injunction in the court of A.D.J., Gwalior, which was registered as Suit No.1-A of 1988. An application for grant of injunction in terms of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed wherein a prayer was made for grant of temporary injunction against Respondent No.1 restraining him from publishing the newspaper illegally and furthermore not to indulge in false propaganda and/or to take forcible possession of the printing press. Respondent No.1, Ramesh Chander Agarwala also filed a suit against late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal praying therein for a permanent injunction restraining him from interfering with the working of the press at Gwalior and not to take possession thereof. He also filed an application for grant of interim injunction in terms of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n10. The First Additional District and Sessions Judge before whom the matters were pending, disposed of both the applications by a common order dated 28.5.1988. The court directed maintenance of status quo by the parties and further directed that Ramesh Chander Agarwal would not interfere with the working of late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal in the matter of managing the affairs of the company. However, in his order relating to the application filed for injunction in Suit No.2-A of 1988 of Respondent No.1, the court directed the original appellant, late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal not to interfere in the printing and publishing of the newspaper Dainik Bhaskar from Gwalior.\nBoth the parties preferred appeals before the High Court against the said orders which were marked as M.A. No.60 of 1988 and M.A. No.61 of 1988. The High Court allowed the appeal preferred by Ramesh Chander Agarwal and dismissed Appeal No.61 of 1988 filed by late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal holding that the suit for temporary injunction was barred u/s. 10 of the Companies Act.These appeals were filed by Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (since deceased), questioning the legality/correctness of the said orders.\n11. The questions, in the aforementioned factual backdrop, which arise for consideration in these appeals are:\n \"1) Whether the High Court was justified in issuing a direction that its earlier direction contained in order dated 12.3.1993 directing the Appellate Board to dispose of the appeal within three months need not be adhered to, if Ramesh Chander Agarwal files an application for stay of the inquiry by the District Magistrate during the pendency of the civil suit?\n2) Whether the civil court had any jurisdiction to entertain the suit ?\" \nRe: Question No.1 :\nAt the outset, we may observe that when a disputed question as regard the right of one partner against the other to file a declaration in terms of the provisions of the Act had arisen for consideration, the High Court was not correct in issuing a subsequent direction in the review petition. Such a jurisdiction the High Court did not have. The conflicting rights of the parties were required to be determined in accordance with law by the statutory authority. Such a dispute, it goes without saying, should be determined as expeditiously as possible inasmuch as the dispute involved rival claims of the parties to the lis to run and manage newspaper business. In any event, while directing the statutory authority to dispose of the matter in accordance with law; it does not stand to any reason as to why a party to the lis was given such liberty so as to file an application for stay of inquiry by the District Magistrate till the disposal of the civil suit particularly when the High Court itself was of the opinion that the suit was not maintainable. We fail to see any reason as to why one party to the lis should be given unfair advantage over another in the matter of enforcement of statutory rights under the said Act. The orders of the High Court are, thus, absolutely contradictory to and inconsistent with each other, and do not stand a moment's scrutiny. The impugned orders are, therefore, set aside with a direction to the Appellate Board to hear out and dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible but not later than three months from the date of communication of this order. It would be open to the Appellate Board to consider the question of adequately compensating the appellants herein on monetary terms in the event it comes to the conclusion that the appeal was liable to be dismissed.\nRe: Question No.2 :\nSs. 9 and 10 of the Companies Act are as under :\n \"Act to override memorandum, articles etc.\n9. Save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act-\n(a) the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the memorandum or articles of a company, or in any agreement executed by it, or in any resolution passed by the company in general meeting or by its Board of directors, whether the same be registered, executed or passed, as the case may be, before or after the commencement of this Act; and\n(b) any provision contained in the memorandum, articles, agreement or resolution aforesaid shall, to the extent to which it is repugnant to the provisions of this Act, become or be void, as the case may be.\" \n \"Jurisdiction of Courts.\n10. (1) The High Court having jurisdiction under this Act shall be-\n(a) the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to the place at which the registered office of the company concerned is situate, except to the extent to which jurisdiction has been conferred on any District Court or District Courts subordinate to that High Court in pursuance of sub-section (2); and\n(b) where jurisdiction has been so conferred, the District Court in regard to matters falling within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred, in respect of companies having their registered offices in the district.\n(2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette and subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as it thinks fit, empower and District Court to exercise all or any of the jurisdiction conferred by this Act upon the Court, not being the jurisdiction conferred-\n(a) in respect of companies generally, by sections 237, 391, 394, 395 and 397 to 407, both inclusive;\n(b) in respect of companies with a paid-up share capital of not less than one lakh of rupees, by Part VII (ss. 425 to 560) and the other provisions of this Act relating to the winding up of companies.\n(3) For the purposes of jurisdiction to wind up companies, the expression \"registered office\" means the place which has longest been the registered office of the company during the six months immediately preceding the presentation of the petition for winding up.\" \n11. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions leaves no manner of doubt that thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court has not been ousted. The civil court, in the instant case, was concerned with the rival claims of the parties as to whether one party has illegally been dispossessed by the other or not. Such a suit, apart from the general law, would also be maintainable in terms of S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In such matters the court would not be concerned even with the question as to title/ownership of the property.\nIn India, it is trite, that a person cannot be forcibly dispossessed except in accordance with law. [See Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by legal representatives vs. Rao Jagdish Singh and Others AIR 1968 SC 620 at Page 622].\n12. In Suvvari Sanyasi Apparao and Another vs. Bodderpalli Lakshminarayana and Another (1962) Supp. 1 SCR 8 ], this Court upon considering the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 observed that the matter relating to ownership of the press is a matter of general law and the Court, thus, must follow that law. It was observed that a declared keeper of the press is not necessarily the owner thereof so as to be able to confer title to the press upon another.\n13. The dispute between the parties was eminently a civil dispute and not a dispute under the provisions of the Companies Act. S. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the civil courts to determine all dispute of civil nature unless the same is barred under a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. Bar of jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be readily inferred. A provision seeking to bar jurisdiction of civil court requires strict interpretation. The court, it is well-settled, would normally lean in favour of construction, which would uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil court. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the civil court's jurisdiction is ousted. [See Sahebgouda (dead) by Lrs. and Others vs. Ogeppa and Others [2003 (3) Supreme 13 ]. Even otherwise, the civil court's jurisdiction is not completely ousted under the Companies Act, 1956.\n14. In R. Prakasam vs. Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam [1980 (50) CC 611 ], it has been held that :\n \"The purpose of s.2(11) read with s.10 is only to enable the shareholders to decide as to which court they should approach for remedy, in respect of that particular matter. It is difficult to construe the definition clause as one conferring jurisdiction, exclusive or otherwise; and even s.10 refers only to \"the court having jurisdiction under this Act\", i.e., where such jurisdiction is conferred by the Act, as under Sections 107, 155, 163(2), 237, 397, 425, etc. In other words, the conferment of jurisdiction on \"the court\" is not under s. 10, but by other provisions of the Act like those enumerated above. If, on the other hand, Ss. 2(11) and 10 are construed as not only nominating the courts, but also conferring exclusive jurisdiction on them, the specific provisions in the other sections conferring jurisdiction on the court to deal with the matters covered by them will become redundant. It may be that where the Act specifies the company court as the forum for complaint in respect of a particular matter, the jurisdiction of the civil court would stand ousted to that extent. This depends, as already noticed, on the language of the particular provisions (like Sections 107, 155, 397 and others) and not on Ss. 2(11) and 10...\" \n15. Yet again in Maharaja Exports and Another vs. Apparels Exports Promotional Council [1986 (60) CC 353 ], the Delhi High Court held :\nU/s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. Unlike some statutes, the Companies Act does not contain any express provision barring the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts in matters covered by the provisions of the Act. In certain cases like winding-up of companies, the jurisdiction of civil courts is impliedly barred. Where a person objects to the election of directors and claims a decree for a declaration that he was one of the directors, there is no provision which bars the civil court either expressly or by implication from trying such a suit\" \nIn the present suit also, besides other reliefs, the plaintiff has sought a declaration that all the 27 members of the existing executive committee are not entitled to hold the respective offices in view of the judgment of this court and further that the 18 members of the executive committee who have retired by rotation are not entitled to continue in office as members of the executive committee. The judgment, referred to above, fairly and squarely applies to the facts of the present case and there is no reason to oust the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the present suit. Under these circumstances, this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.\"\n16. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the civil suit was maintainable. In any event, we fail to understand and rather it is strange as to how the High Court while rejecting relief to the original plaintiff, (late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal), granted a similar relief in favour of the first respondent herein.\n17. The impugned orders are, therefore, set aside. The matters are remitted to the Collector/High Court for a fresh decision on merits as expeditiously as possible within a period of three months, keeping in view the observations made hereinabove. These appeals are allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.25,000/(Rupees twenty five thousand only).\nAppeals allowed.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -488,26 +488,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S004", - "case_id": "5384", - "experiment": "baseline_no_firac", - "model": "ministral-3b", - "source_file": "S004__baseline_no_firac__ministral-3b__5384.json", + "case_id": "4962", + "experiment": "role_play_v3", + "model": "qwen3-8b", + "source_file": "S004__role_play_v3__qwen3-8b__4962.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "10/05/1995", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", - "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification" + "judgment_date": "07/07/2003", + "machine_error_stage": "facts", + "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Incorrect fact" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal No. 202 of 1962. (Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated August 1, 1962, of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1961.), decided on April 1, 1964. | Ramachandra Narasimha Kulkarni v. State Of Mysore | 01/04/1964", - "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal No. 202 of 1962. (Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated August 1, 1962, of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1961.), decided on April 1, 1964. | Ramachandra Narasimha Kulkarni v. State Of Mysore", - "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "Ramchandra Narasimha Kulkarni, a registration clerk, received a registered letter on October 18, 1955, but did not despatch it that day, sending it the next. The prosecution alleged he removed a currency note and altered documents to cover it. The Sessions Judge acquitted him of theft (S.52) but convicted him for fraudulent alteration (S.55) and wilful detention (S.53). The High Court set aside the S.55 conviction but maintained S.53, finding wilful detention proved. The prosecution's alleged purpose for detention (theft or alteration) was not established.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. Ramchandra Narasimha Kulkarni, a registration clerk, received a registered letter on October 18, 1955, but did not despatch it that day, sending it the next day.\n2. The prosecution alleged that Kulkarni removed a currency note from the letter and altered documents to conceal the theft.\n3. The Sessions Judge acquitted Kulkarni of theft under Section 52 but convicted him for fraudulent alteration under Section 55 and wilful detention under Section 53.\n4. The High Court set aside the conviction under Section 55 but upheld the conviction under Section 53, finding that wilful detention was proven.\n5. The prosecution failed to establish the specific purpose behind the detention (whether for theft or alteration).\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the High Court erred in upholding the conviction under Section 53 (wilful detention) despite the prosecution's failure to prove the purpose of the detention.\n2. Whether the acquittal under Section 52 (theft) and the setting aside of the conviction under Section 55 (fraudulent alteration) affect the validity of the conviction under Section 53.\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Section 52 (Theft)**: Requires proof of dishonest intention to appropriate property belonging to another.\n2. **Section 53 (Wilful Detention)**: Requires proof that a person dishonestly retains possession of property knowing it to be lost or mislaid.\n3. **Section 55 (Fraudulent Alteration)**: Requires proof of dishonest alteration of a document with intent to cause wrongful loss or gain.\n4. **Burden of Proof**: The prosecution must prove all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.\n5. **Precedent**: In cases where the purpose of detention is unclear, the conviction under Section 53 may still stand if the detention itself was dishonest and wilful.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Section 53 Conviction (Fact 4)**: The High Court upheld the conviction under Section 53, finding that wilful detention was proven. The prosecution's failure to establish the specific purpose (Fact 5) does not negate the fact that Kulkarni retained the letter dishonestly (Fact 1). Under Section 53, the key element is dishonest retention, not the motive behind it.\n2. **Section 52 Acquittal (Fact 3)**: The acquittal under Section 52 means the prosecution failed to prove theft. However, this does not automatically invalidate the Section 53 conviction, as the two offences have distinct elements.\n3. **Section 55 Conviction (Fact 3)**: The High Court set aside the Section 55 conviction, likely because the prosecution did not prove the intent to cause wrongful loss or gain through alteration. This does not affect the Section 53 conviction, as the two offences are separate.\n4. **Burden of Proof (Rule 4)**: The prosecution must prove all elements of the offence. Here, the High Court found that wilful detention was proven, even if the purpose was unclear. This satisfies the burden of proof for Section 53.\n\n### Conclusion:\nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court correctly upheld the conviction under Section 53, as the prosecution proved wilful detention beyond a reasonable doubt. The acquittal under Section 52 and the setting aside of the Section 55 conviction do not affect the validity of the Section 53 conviction.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J. :\nDAS GUPTA, J. for the The appellant, who was a registration clerk in the Haveri Post Officer in the Mysore State, was tried by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, on charges under s. 52, s. 53 and s. 55 of the Indian Post Officer Act. The prosecution case is that on the 18th October 1955 a registered letter containing half portion of a ten-rupee note and petition on behalf of one Muppayyagonda asking for the said note to be exchanged for a fresh note was received at the Haveri Post Office at 4.30 p.m. from the Branch Post Officer at Kabbur. The appellant who was a registration clerk at Haveri at the time, however, detained the registered envelope instead of despatching it that very day as he should have done. He despatched it the next day. It was the prosecution case that the appellant removed the half portion of the ten-rupee currency note from inside the envelope and to cover up his misconduct made alterations in the petition contained in the envelope and in the list of registered articles. All this was discovered, it is said, when the Reserve Bank of India, to which this envelope was addressed made enquiries in the matter on finding that no note had been enclosed with the petition. The appellant admitted that the envelope was received at the Haveri Post Office on October 18, 1955 and also that he did not despatch it on that date. His case was that it was received at about 5.30 p.m. on the 18th and so it was too late for despatch on that date but that he dispatched it duly on the 19th.\nOn a consideration of the evidence the Sessions Judge held that the charge under s. 52 of the Indian Post Office Act for the theft of currency note and for secreting the registered articles had not been established and acquitted him of that charge. He, however, found it proved that the appellant had fraudulently altered the lists of registered articles and thereby committed an offence under s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act. He also held that the appellant had wilfully detained the envelope and thus committed an offence under s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act. He accordingly convicted the appellant of the charges under Ss. 53 and 55 of the Indian Post Office Act and sentenced him to undergo two months' imprisonment on each charge. The sentences were directed to run concurrently.On appeal, the High Court of Mysore set aside the appellant's conviction under s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act but maintained his conviction under s. 53 being of opinion that while the wilful detention of the envelope by the appellant had been proved, the alleged alterations by him in the list of registered articles had not been established. Against the High Court's decision the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant, Ramchandra Narasimha Kulkarni.\nIn support of the appeal it is contended by Dr. Barlingey that as the allegations of theft of the note or of alterations in the list of registered articles by the appellant have not been established, the appellant must be held not to have committed any offence under s. 53 of the Indian Post Officer Act. It is argued that assuming that the envelope was detained by the appellant as alleged, he cannot be said to have detained it \"wilfully\" unless it is shown that he had some purpose in doing it. But, the purpose alleged by prosecution was that he wanted to commit theft of the currency note, and to cover this up, to make alterations in the list of registered articles, these purposes have not been established. So, argues the learned Counsel, the detention of the envelope should be held to have been made without any purpose but only through inadvertance or mere carelessness. That would not constitute, according to the learned Counsel, a wilful detention.\nThe words \"wilful\" and \"wilfully\" are frequently used in many statues and have come up for judicial consideration in the courts of this country as also elsewhere. The meaning given to these words have differed in different contexts. Sometimes, any intentional act has been held to be a wilful act. (Re Young and Harston) [31 Ch. D. 174 ]. Often, it has been said that the word wilful suggests bad conduct or action though it does not necessarily connote blame. (Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills) [1933(2) K.B. 669 ]. Not infrequently the word has been used to mean that the act had been done with a bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely. (United States of America v. Harry Murdock) [78 Law E. 389].Some decisions stress the requirement of deliberation or reckless disregard of the fact whether the act was or was not in breach of duty in deciding whether it has been wilful. (Hudson v. Official Liquidator [A.I.R. 1929 All. 826 ]; and In re T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty) [1951 2 S.T.C. 27 ]. In the last mentioned case, viz., In re T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty's case, the Madras High Court held that a submission of a false return cannot be a wilful submission unless the dealer has deliberately made the return with the knowledge that he was excluding a taxable item, though in almost similar circumstances another Bench of the same High Court took a different view and held that even though when an assessee, under the impression that a particular item is not taxable and, therefore, need be excluded in the return, omits to make a mention of it in the return which he furnished with the full knowledge of his having committed the same, he has \"wilfully\" omitted it. (In re Jayarama Chettiar) [I.L.R. 1949 Madras, 121].\nA review of these various decisions brings out clearly the guiding principle that the meaning to be attached to the words \"wilful\" or \"wilfully\" has to be ascertained on a close examination of the scheme and nature of the legislation in which the words appear and the context in which they are used.\nTurning now, for this purpose, to the Indian Post Office Act, we notice that s. 53 which makes punishable the wilful detention or delay of a postal article by an officer of the post office in one of the several sections which create offences under this Act. There are 21 such sections, being section 49 to 56 and 58 to 70, all in Chapter X of the Act. Some of these offences, viz., those under s. 49, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66 and 67 are punishable only with fine. The offences under Ss. 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 68 and 69 are made punishable also with imprisonment. Of these again, the offences under s. 53, are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years; offences under Ss. 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, and 68 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to two years; offences under Ss. 61 and 62 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year while offences under Ss. 51 and 69 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months only. An offence under s. 50 is punishable with imprisonment extending to one month or with fine extending to Rs. 50/-.This comparison clearly shows that the legislature took a more serious view of the offence of wilful detention of a postal articles (s. 52) than of many other offences in this Chapter. Delay in the conveyance or delivery of a mail bag or other postal articles in the course of transmission by a person employed to carry the same is made punishable with only a fine of Rs. 50/- (s. 49). Withdrawal from duties of office without permission or without having given a month's previous notice in writing by a person employed to carry or deliver a mail bag or postal article is also made punishable only with imprisonment extending to one month or with fine extending to Rs. 50/-. Making of a false entry in the register with intention to induce the belief that an article has been delivered is made punishable with imprisonment extending to only six months or with fine extending to Rs. 100/-. But wilful detention of a postal article is made punishable with imprisonment extending to two years. Is it reasonable to think that the legislature would prescribe this heavy punishment for detention of a postal article which was not deliberate and on purpose, while prescribing lighter punishment as mentioned above for the offences under Ss. 49, 50 and 51. We do not think so. The very fact that this comparatively heavy punishment of two years' imprisonment has been prescribed for wilful detention while lighter punishment has been prescribed under Ss. 49, 50 and 51, justifies, in our opinion, the conclusion that the word \"wilful\" was used by the legislature to mean only such detention which was deliberate and for some purpose.\nIt is interesting to notice in this connection that in the preceding section 52 the legislature after making punishable the offence of theft of a postal article or of dishonest misappropriation of the same, also made punishable the secretion, destruction or throwing away any postal article if done \"for any purpose whatsoever\". It is, in our opinion, reasonable to think that in s. 53 when the words \"wilfully\" was used, the legislature also intended that the detention would be punishable only if made for some purpose.Coming now to the facts of the present case, we find that the prosecution alleged a definite purpose, viz., the purpose of theft of the contents of the envelope - as the purpose with which the postal article was detained. The existence of that purpose has not, however, been established. Nothing was suggested before us as to what other purpose the appellant could have had in detaining the article. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the detention was not deliberate and on purpose, but as a result of either inadvertence or carelessness or negligence. So, the appellant cannot be said to have detained or delayed the article 'wilfully'.\nAccordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court and order that the appellant be acquitted of the charge against him.\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. - The main question to determine, in this case, is what the expression 'wilfully detains or delays' in s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898), hereinafter called the Act, means.\nI do not agree that it means such detention which was deliberate and for some purpose. I am of opinion that the detention or delay would be 'wilful' if it was intentional and deliberate on the post of the officer of the post office, as opposed to detention or delay on account of negligence or inadvertence. The word 'wilful' or 'wilfully' used in other enactments have been construed by Court in this manner. I may refer to some to these cases.\nIn Taylor v. Vergette [(1861) 30 L.J. Ex. 400] 'wilful delay' has been construed to mean 'intentional delay'.\nIn Reg. v. Senior [[1889] 1 Q.B. 283, 290] Lord Russel said :\n\"'Wilfully' means that the act is done deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or inadvertence, but so that the mind of the person who does the act goes with it\" .In Tamboli v. Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company [L.R. 55 I.A. 67=I.L.R. 52 Bom. 169 ] the Privy Council had to construe the expression 'wilful neglect' in determining the responsibility of the railway administration or its servants and approved of what was said by Lord Russel in Reg. v. Senior [[1889] 1 Q.B. 283, 290].\nIn Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills, Ltd. [[1933] 2 K.B. 669 ] it was said :-\n\"'Wilful act' is plain English, and I can entertain no doubt that the installing of this machine without guard or fence for use in the factory was a wilful act by some one. It was an act, and it was intentional. It is true that though 'wilful' and 'intentional' are synonymous.......'wilful' is more commonly used in modern speech of bad conduct or actions than of good, though it does not necessarily connote blame; but that is far from supporting the strange contention that wilful act in s. 29, sub-s. 1, must be confined to something done with intent to injure\" .\nIn Hudson v. Official Liquidator [A.I.R. 1929 All. 826 ] 'wilful default' was construed and it was said at p. 930 :\n\"The adjective 'wilful' in 'wilful acts or defaults' has evidently been used as a description and not as a definition. The idea intended to be conveyed is that the default is occasioned by he exercise of volition or as the result of the non-exercise of will due to supine indifference, although the defaulter knew or was in a position to know that loss or harm was likely to result. The word does not necessarily suggest the idea of moral turpitude. We have also to eliminate the elements of accident or inadvertence or honest error of judgment. The default must be the result of deliberation or intent or be the consequence of a reckless omission. 'Wilful default', therefore, is indicative of some misconduct in the transaction of business or in the discharge of duty by omitting to do something either deliberately or by a reckless disregard of the fact whether the act or omission was or was not a breach of duty\" .This view was accepted by the Madras High Court in T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty, In re [1951 2. S.T.C. 27 ].\nThe words 'wilful' and 'wilfully' have been used in the various provisions of the Act do not lead to any different interpretation of these words.\nSection 6 of the Act provides, inter alia, that no officer of the Post Office shall incur any liability by reason of any loss, mis-delivery, delay or damage, unless he has caused the same fraudulently or by his wilful act or default.\nSection 48(c) provides that no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against the Government or any officer of the post office in respect of the payment of any money order being refused or delayed by, or on account of, any accidental neglect, omission or mistake by, or on the part of an Officer of the post office, or for any other cause whatsoever, other than the fraud or wilful act or default of such officer; and brings out effectively the contradistinction between wilful act or default of an officer and an act done on account of accidental neglect, omission or mistake.\nSection 49 to 70 provide for offences. Sections 49, 50 and 51 deal with offences which are committed by persons who are employed to carry or deliver any mail bag or any postal article, in course of transmission by post. They are thus offences by carriers of postal articles. They can be committed both by the officers of the postal department and by others as well. Such of the acts contemplated by those sections which can also fall under the other sections exclusively applicable to officers of the post office, will naturally be dealt with under those sections. The persons who will be dealt with under Ss. 49 to 51 or other sections providing for lighter punishments will be those who are not officers of the postal department by are concerned in any manner with the transmission of the post.Clause (c) of s. 49 makes punishable the loitering or making delay in the conveyance or delivery of any mail bag or postal article, and thus emphasizes the necessity of prompt transport of postal articles.\nSections 52 to 66 provide for offences by officers of a post office.\nSection 52 provides punishment for committing theft or dishonestly misappropriating in respect of or, for any purpose whatsoever, secreting, destroying or throwing away any postal article in the course of transmission by post or anything contained therein. The offence is punishable with imprisonment upto seven years and also with fine. This is the most serious offence.\nIt is to be noted for our purpose that the secreting, destroying or throwing away of the postal article for any purpose whatsoever is an offence. An act done with a purpose must be a deliberate act and a deliberate act must also be one done with some purpose. The legislature, where it intended to make the purpose behind an act an ingredient of the offence, expressly stated so. If the word 'wilful' or 'wilfully' is used in the Act as a synonym for an act done deliberately and for some purpose, the expression 'wilfully' could have been used in the place of 'for any purpose whatsoever'. This, however, the legislature did not do, though it used that word in the very next section, viz., s. 53 which reads :\n\"Whoever, being an officer of the Post Office, contrary to his duty, opens, or causes or suffers to be opened, any postal article in course of transmission by post, or wilfully detains or delayed or causes or suffers to be detained or delayed, any such postal article, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine or with both :Provided that nothing in this section shall extend to the opening, detaining or delaying of any postal article under the authority of this Act or in obedience to the order in writing of the Central Government or the direction of a competent Court\" .\nSections 54, 55 and 56 make certain acts done fraudulently, knowingly or with intent, punishable with imprisonment upto two years of fine. Section 55 makes the fraudulent altering or secreting or destroying of a document which an officer of the post office is entrusted with keeping, punishable with imprisonment upto two years and with fine. This act is considered less heinous than that of secreting, destroying or throwing away of any postal article in the course of transmission by post, for any purpose whatsoever.\nSection 66(1) makes the master of a ship who, in certain circumstances, knowingly has in his baggage or in his possession or custody, any postal article within the exclusive privilege conferred on the Central Government by s. 4, punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 50/- for every such postal article, Here a certain act committed knowingly is made an offence. Sub-s. (2) of s. 66 makes the detention of any postal article, after a demand for it has been made by an officer of the post office, punishable. Here, the mere detention after a demand is made penal irrespective of the intention or purpose behind such detention.\nSection 67 makes the detention of mails or any postal article in the course of transmission by post by anyone except under the various circumstances mentioned in the section, an offence, Here again, mere detection is made an offence irrespective of the circumstances in which it is made, excepting for reasons mentioned in the section itself.\nSection 68 reads :\n\"Whoever, fraudulently retains, or wilfully secretes or makes away with, or keeps or detains, or when required by an officer of the post officer, neglects or refuses to deliver up, any postal article in course of transmission by post which ought to have been delivered to any other person, or a mail bag containing a postal article, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be punishable with fine\" .It is to be noticed that 'wilfully' secreting any postal article in the course of transmission by post is an offence under this section. A comparison with the provisions of s. 52 of the Act indicates that the legislature must have used the expressions 'wilfully' and 'for any purpose whatsoever' in different senses.\nLastly, s. 69 makes certain acts committed wilfully and maliciously with intent to injure any person, offences. 'Wilfully' here is used as something distinct from 'maliciously' and is further used in addition to the expression 'with intent to injure any person', that is to say, the particular purpose or intent is an ingredient of the offence in addition to 'wilfully'.\nSection 6 and 48(c) provide that an officer of a post office would be liable for the loss, misdelivery, delay or of damage to any postal article in the course of transmission or for the delay in the payment of a money order, only when this happens as a result of his wilful act or default. The person suffering from such misdelivery etc., has no claim against the officer of the post office if that thing has been the result of something which could not be said to be the wilful act or default of a postal officer. It is no concern of the addressee or recipient of an article in transit by post that the wilful act or default of the postal officer was with a certain purpose or not and whether that officer succeeded in that purpose or not. He should be successful in his claim if the postal officer has deliberately not acted in the manner he is required to act under the Act or the rules framed thereunder or if he has deliberately acted in violation of the duties entrusted to him. In either case, the act of the officer concerned would be wilful inasmuch as he would act intentionally in violation of his duty or in a manner in which he is not to act and not accidently or inadvertently.The provisions if s. 53 of the Act require that the officer 'wilfully detains' the postal article and that the act of detention be contrary to his duty prescribed by or under the Act. Section 21(2)(c) empowers the Central Government to make rules providing for the detention and disposal of articles in course of transmission by post in certain circumstances. Section 22(1), 23, 26, 27B and 37(2) provide for the circumstances in which postal articles can be detained or delayed. It is not necessary to detail those circumstances. The clause 'contrary to his duty' governs both the act of opening of the Postal article and to the act of detaining it. The first necessary ingredient of the offence under s. 53 is that the postal officer should act contrary to his duty. Such an act, however, can take place by accident or negligence also, without the officer's knowing it or even giving any thought to it and therefore without his exercising his will in that matter. The legislature, therefore, felt that accidental or negligent acts be not made offences and that detention of the postal article, even if it be contrary to duty, be protected and that only such detention of the articles be made punishable which be committed wilfully, i.e., when the officer applied his mind towards the act and has committed it deliberately with the intention of committing it.\nThe mere act of detaining mails or postal articles by any person other than a postal officer is made punishable only with fine under s. 67 of the Act. This indicates that the punishment under s. 53 is severe because the culprit is an officer of the post office who has opportunities to detain the postal article and who acts contrary to his duty.\nThe proviso to s. 53 refers to cases which would have come within the main provisions, and provides that the main provisions do not extend to the opening, detaining or delaying of any postal article under the authority of the Act or in obedience to the order in writing of the Central Government or the direction of a competent Court. Such acts would be undoubtedly deliberate and without any criminal purpose.The use of the expression 'for any purpose whatsoever' in s. 52 is no guide to construe the word 'wilfully' in s. 53. It appears to have been used in s. 52 in contradistinction to the mens rea necessary for the commission of the offence of theft or of dishonest misappropriation. Its use makes it clear that the act of secreting, destroying or throwing away of the postal article will be punishable if with a purpose, whatever that may have been.\nI, therefore, construe 'wilfully' in s. 53 to mean 'intentionally and deliberately' and not accidently or negligently and hold that the appellant has been rightly convicted of the offence under that section.\nI am further of opinion that even if the expression 'wilfully detains' in s. 53 of the Act means of detention deliberate and for some purpose, the appellant is not entitled to an acquittal on the findings the Courts have arrived at.\nThe appellant, in ordinary course of business, would have forwarded the registered letter by the mail on October 18, 1955 when it had been received at the usual hour and the appellant's contention that it was received after the despatch of the mail has not been accepted, It follows that the appellant deliberately detained the registered letter. The intention and deliberation was directed towards the detaining of the registered letter and to the non-forwarding of it in due course with the mail that day. Every intentional and deliberate act must be with some purpose or object. It may be that in some cases the object be achieved by the mere doing of the act intended, that is to say, the object was just the doing of that act. In other cases, an act may be done with some further object also. The appellant's purpose behind his intentional act of detaining the registered letter must have been to remove what he might have suspected the letter to contain. If he did not have any such object, he could not have any reason to depart from his duty and detain the letter instead of sending it by the next mail in the ordinary course of his duties. His act, therefore, in detaining the letter, amounted to his detaining it wilfully.The failure of the prosecution to establish successfully that he himself opened the letter, tempered with its contents and removed the half currency note, facts which have been proved to have been committed by someone, does not mean that his detaining the letter was not on purpose.\nA person may do an act with a certain purpose and yet may not succeed in his purpose. Even if he succeeds it may not be possible for any other person to establish that he did that act for that purpose and did succeed in achieving that purpose.\nI would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.\nORDER BY COURT\nIn accordance with the majority opinion, the appeal is allowed, the order of conviction and sentence set aside and the appellant ordered to be acquitted of the charge against him.\n", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO.3311 of 2017 | Shambhu Chauhan v. Ram Kirpal Alias Chirkut & Ors. | 21/11/2024", + "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO.3311 of 2017 | Shambhu Chauhan v. Ram Kirpal Alias Chirkut & Ors.", + "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "case_record": "The appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside orders of the Settlement Officer and Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Consolidation Officer had initially dismissed Smt. Gulabi's objections claiming co-tenancy over disputed land (Khata Nos. 38 and 193), finding the land held by the appellants for 16 years and Smt. Gulabi unable to prove her paternity as the daughter of Aftee. The Appellate and Revisional Authorities reversed these findings. Smt. Gulabi's claim was based on ocular evidence from witnesses Jhagru and Pujan, and documentary evidence from a birth register. Jhagru's testimony was contradictory, and the birth register was found by the High Court to be unreliable due to discrepancies and lack of corroboration. Furthermore, Smt. Gulabi did not challenge the mutation order from 1959 to 1973, a delay of 14 years.", + "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let me start by understanding the user's query. They provided a case fact scenario and want me to act as a Legal Specialist reviewing the maintainability of an appeal. The user is asking to identify aspects that might affect whether the appeal can be heard by the appellate court. \n\nFirst, I need to recall what factors determine the maintainability of an appeal. Generally, an appeal is maintainable if the lower court issued an order that is appealable. This includes things like the type of order, procedural compliance, and whether the appeal was properly filed.\n\nLooking at the case facts, the appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside orders from a Settlement Officer and Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Consolidation Officer initially dismissed Smt. Gulabi's claim, and the Appellate and Revisional Authorities reversed those findings. So, the lower court here is the High Court, and the order being appealed is the one that set aside the original orders. \n\nI need to check if the High Court's order was indeed appealable. In many jurisdictions, orders that are final or interlocutory can be appealed, but it depends on the specific rules. The case mentions that the Appellate and Revisional Authorities reversed the findings, which suggests that there was a prior review process. However, the High Court's order to set aside the original orders might be a final order, so it's appealable. \n\nNext, the user wants me to identify all legal elements present. Parties involved are Smt. Gulabi (appellant), the Settlement Officer, Deputy Director of Consolidation, and the High Court. The dates aren't specified, but the mutation order from 1959 to 1973 is mentioned, which is a 14-year delay. Filings include the initial dismissal, the Appellate and Revisional Authorities' reversal, and the High Court's judgment. Jurisdictional aspects: the High Court is the lower court here, and the appellate court would be the higher court. \n\nProcedural elements: The key here is whether the appeal was properly filed. The case states that Smt. Gulabi did not challenge the mutation order from 1959 to 1973. This delay might be a procedural flaw. If there was a failure to challenge the mutation order within the prescribed time, that could affect the maintainability. Also, the High Court's order to set aside the original orders might have been based on a specific legal ground, and if the appeal is not on the same or a different ground, that could be a problem. \n\nAnother point is the evidence. The High Court found the birth register unreliable due to discrepancies and lack of corroboration. Smt. Gulabi's claim was based on this evidence, but since the High Court rejected it, the appeal might be challenging the legal conclusions, not the evidence itself. However, if the appeal is not properly framed, it might be dismissed on maintainability grounds. \n\nAlso, the fact that the Appellate and Revisional Authorities reversed the findings suggests that the lower court's order was subject to review, so the High Court's order is appealable. However, the delay in challenging the mutation order might be a procedural issue. If the mutation order was a prerequisite for the claim, and the delay means the claim is not properly before the court, thus making the appeal maintainable only if that delay is excused. \n\nI need to check if there are any procedural irregularities. The case doesn't mention any specific procedural errors in filing the appeal, but the delay in challenging the mutation order could be a factor. If the mutation order was a separate issue that needed to be addressed before the current claim, then not challenging it could mean the claim is not properly before the court, thus making the appeal maintainable only if that delay is justified. \n\nAlso, the fact that the High Court set aside the orders of the Settlement Officer and Deputy Director might be a final order, so it's appealable. The appellate court would need to check if the appeal was filed within the time limits. The case doesn't mention the time limits, so maybe that's an area to note. \n\nIn summary, the maintainability hinges on whether the High Court’s order was appealable, proper filing of the appeal, and any procedural delays that might have affected the claim's validity. The mutation order delay could be a procedural flaw if it's a necessary step that wasn't challenged in time. The lack of corroboration for the birth register might be a factual issue, but the appeal's maintainability depends on procedural compliance, not the merits.\n\n\n### **Facts** \n1. The appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside orders of the Settlement Officer and Deputy Director of Consolidation. \n2. The Consolidation Officer initially dismissed Smt. Gulabi’s claim, finding the land held by the appellants for 16 years and Smt. Gulabi unable to prove her paternity as the daughter of Aftee. \n3. The Appellate and Revisional Authorities reversed the Consolidation Officer’s findings, supporting Smt. Gulabi’s claim. \n4. The High Court set aside the Settlement Officer’s and Deputy Director’s orders, likely affirming the Appellate and Revisional Authorities’ reversal. \n5. Smt. Gulabi’s claim was based on ocular evidence from witnesses Jhagru and Pujan, and a birth register. \n6. The High Court found the birth register unreliable due to discrepancies and lack of corroboration. \n7. Smt. Gulabi did not challenge the mutation order from 1959 to 1973, a delay of 14 years. \n\n---\n\n### **Issues** \n1. Is the High Court’s order appealable? \n2. Was the appeal timely filed and properly noticed? \n3. Does the 14-year delay in challenging the mutation order bar the appeal? \n4. Is the appeal properly framed as a challenge to legal findings rather than new evidence? \n\n---\n\n### **Rules** \n1. **Appealability**: A final judgment of a High Court is generally appealable if it involves reversal of prior findings or interpretation of law. \n2. **Procedural Compliance**: Appeals must be filed within statutory time limits and properly noticed. \n3. **Delay in Challenging Mutation Order**: A delay in challenging a mutation order may affect the merits of the claim but does not independently bar an appeal unless jurisdictional. \n4. **Framing of Appeal**: Appeals are limited to reviewing legal conclusions, not re-evaluating evidence. \n\n---\n\n### **Analysis** \n1. **Appealability of High Court’s Order**: \n The High Court’s order setting aside the Settlement Officer’s and Deputy Director’s orders is **appealable** as it involves **reversal of prior findings** and **interpretation of law**. The Appellate and Revisional Authorities’ reversal of the Consolidation Officer’s findings further supports the High Court’s jurisdiction to review the matter. \n\n2. **Procedural Compliance**: \n The case does not explicitly state whether the appeal was filed within the **prescribed time limits** or whether it was **properly noticed**. However, the absence of such details does not automatically render the appeal non-maintainable. The court may require the appellant to **provide evidence of compliance** with procedural rules. \n\n3. **Mutation Order Delay**: \n The 14-year delay in challenging the mutation order is a **substantive issue** affecting the claim’s validity, not a **jurisdictional defect**. Unless the delay is explicitly deemed a **bar under statutory provisions**, it does not independently affect the appeal’s maintainability. \n\n4. **Framing of Appeal**: \n The appeal challenges the **legal findings** of the High Court (e.g., reliability of evidence, reversal of findings), which is within the scope of an appeal. The **birth register’s unreliability** was a factual finding, not a procedural flaw, and thus does not invalidate the appeal. \n\n---\n\n### **Conclusion** \nThe appeal is **maintainable** as the High Court’s order is appealable, and the procedural requirements are not explicitly violated. The 14-year delay in challenging the mutation order is a **substantive issue**, not a jurisdictional bar, and the appeal is properly framed as a legal challenge. \n\n**DECISION**: **ALLOWED**", + "reference_judgment": "1. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order\ndated 25th November, 2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature at\nAllahabad in Civil Misc. W.P. No. 13286 of 1981, whereby the judgment\nand order dated 28th August, 1976 passed by the Settlement Officer,\nConsolidation at Deoria, and order dated 01st October, 1981 passed by the\nDeputy Director of Consolidation at Deoria were set aside. The Settlement\nOfficer, Deoria Sadar, in turn, had set aside the findings returned by the\nConsolidation Officer against the Appellant at Deoria in Suit Nos.6273 and\n6264 by order dated 18th October 1975.\n2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are that Khata Nos.38 and 193\n(referred to as “disputed land”) are situated in village Muda Dih, Tappa\nDeoria, Pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria. Sehati and Bandhoo\nsons of Neoor were brothers. Bandhoo had one son namely Agloo, who\nwas married to Aftee. Aftee died in the year 1959. After the death of Aftee,\nthe disputed land came to be recorded in the name of Sehati in pursuance\nof a mutation order dated 15th December, 1959. The disputed land\ncontinued to be recorded in the names of Jhagru and Bhusal sons of Sehati\nand Ram Kirpal alias Chirkut (Respondent Herein) as Bhumidhar and\nSirdar. In the year 1973, vide notification dated 12th July, 1973, the disputed\nland was notified for consolidation operations. Smt. Gulabi filed\nobjections under section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act, 19531\nbefore the Consolidation Officer, claiming herself to be the daughter of\nAftee and co-tenancy over the disputed land.\n3. The sole issue that arises for consideration is, as to whether the High Court,\nin terms of the impugned judgment, rightly upheld the order dated 18th\nOctober, 1975 passed by the Consolidation Officer under the provisions of\nthe Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, which initially stood quashed by\n1 Hereinafter referred as the “Act”\nthe Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide order dated 28th\nAugust, 1976, as affirmed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide\norder dated 01st October, 1981.\n4. The Consolidation Officer framed the following issues:\n1. Whether the plaintiff Gulabi is the daughter of Algu and successor\nor Aafti?\n2. Whether Gulabi plaintiff on khata no.38 is in possession as\nbhumidar?\n3. Whether Gulabi, the plaintiff is the lone sirdar recoded on gata\nno.422, 451, 687, 717, 1080 of khata No.193?\n4. Whether Gulabi the plaintiff is sirdar on gata no.394, 420, 453, 494,\n518, 524, 707 and 1085 of khata no.193?\n5. What are the shares of the parties?\n6. Whether Jhagru and others defendants are the lone bhumidar and\nsirdars of khata no.38 and 193?\n7. Whether ownership of the plaintiff has ceased to exist and defendant\nhas become Sirdar under section 210?\n5. After affording adequate opportunity to the parties to establish their claim\nand discharge the burden of proving the issues, the Consolidation officer\ndismissed the objections filed by Smt. Gulabi and held that the disputed\nland for the last 16 years was in the possession of the respondents. Also,\nshe was unable to prove herself to be the daughter of Algoo and,\nconsequently, the successor of Aftee.\n6. The findings of fact concerning the relationship of paternity stood reversed\nboth by the Appellate and Revisional Authorities. However, perusal of the\nsaid orders dated 28th August, 1976 and 01st October, 1981 only reveal the\nauthorities not to have appreciated the material in its entirety, resulting in\nconclusions of fact crossing the threshold of perversity. A connected\nquestion then would be-whether the Revisional Authority can enter into\nthe finding of facts, in other words, could the Revisional Authority have\ncome to the conclusion of no interference being required in the finding of\nthe Appellate Authority, after having examined in detail independently the\nevidence in record?\n7. Section 48 of the Act deals with the revisional power of the Director of\nConsolidation Officer. The provision reads as follows:\n“48. Revision and Reference.— (1) The Director of Consolidation\nmay call for and examine the record of any case decided or\nproceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of\nsatisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the\ncorrectness, legality or propriety of any order other than an\ninterlocutory order passed by such authority in the case or\nproceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity\nof being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks\nfit”\n8. While considering Section 48 of the Act, this Court in Ram Dular v. Dy.\nDirector of Consolidation, Jaunpur and Ors.2, observed that :\n“3. … It is clear that the Director had power to satisfy himself as to the\nlegality of the proceedings or as to the correctness of the proceedings\nor correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than interlocutory\norder passed by the authorities under the Act. But in considering the\ncorrectness, legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the\nproceedings or regularity thereof it cannot assume to itself the\njurisdiction of the original authority as a fact-finding authority by\nappreciating for itself of those facts de novo. It has to consider whether\nthe legally admissible evidence had not been considered by the\nauthorities in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion\nreached by it is based on no evidence, any patent illegality or\nimpropriety had been committed or there was any procedural\nirregularity, which goes to the rest (sic root) of the matter, had been\ncommitted in recording the order or finding. …”\n9. This Court relied on the above-said observation while considering the\nscope of the powers of the Deputy Director under section 48 of the Act, in\nSeshmani & Anr. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation; District Basti, U.P.\n& Ors.3; Gaya Din & Others v. Hanuman Prasad & Ors.4; and Ram\nAvadh & Ors. v. Ram Das & Ors.5.\n10. Following the findings in Ram Dular (supra), in our considered view, the\nDeputy Director of Consolidation, being a Revisional Authority, had\njurisdiction to interfere with the finding on facts of the subordinate authority\nonly when the said findings are perverse or not supported by any evidence\non record or contrary to law.\n2 1994 Supp (2) SCC 198\n3 (2000) 2 SCC 523\n4 (2001) 1 SCC 501\n5 (2008) 8 SCC 58\n11. In the present case, the Consolidation Officer passed an order dated 18th\nOctober, 1975, after considering the evidence on record. The perusal of the\nsame enumerated that the findings of the Consolidation Officer are not\nperverse and are very well supported by the evidence. As such, interference\ntherewith by the Revisional Authority was an error in law, which error stood\ncorrected by the High Court in terms of the impugned judgment. We may\nnote that the burden to discharge the onus of paternity would lie upon Smt.\nGulabi in terms of Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.\n12. During the course of submission to justify interference with the findings of\nfact returned by the Appellate and the Revisional Authority, we are taken\nthrough the evidence of Smt. Gulabi. We notice the same to be in two forms,\ni.e., (i) ocular; and (ii) documentary. The ocular version, in our considered\nview, correctly stands rejected by the Consolidation Officer as also the High\nCourt, for the witnesses, namely, Jhagru and Pujan, are found not to be\ninspiring confidence and their testimonies unbelievable.\n13. P.W. – 2, Jhagru, categorically stated in his deposition, \"I do not know the\nname of Smt. Gulabi’s mother. Algoo is not the name of Smt. Gulabi’s\nfather.\" A perusal of his testimony indicates that the witness had no\nknowledge whatsoever about the parentage of Gulabi. However, in the same\nbreath, he testifies that Gulabi is the daughter of Sita. Further contradicting\nhimself, he denies knowing Gulabi or whether Sita has a daughter.\n14. Coming to the documentary evidence, the High Court observed that,\n“Only documentary evidence which has been relied upon by the two\ncourts below is a copy of birth register. A bare perusal of the said\ndocument would show that on the face of it, this document does not\ninspire any confidence. Against the entry daughter figure-1 is\nmentioned and against the entry son figure-1 is mentioned and total has\nalso been mentioned as figure one. It is interesting to note the remark\nof the officer who issued the said certified copy. It is dated 17th January,\n1978. He has noticed the discrepancy and remarked that in the original\nregister, against the name of Algeo, one daughter has been shown.\nNote: Uprokt asal register mein alag Nonia ke samne\nlssai Hindustani mein ladki aur mejean kool khane\nmein ladke ka hai.\nThis document is the sheet anchor of Smt. Gulabi's case and in the\nabsence of any corroborative evidence, such as evidence of relatives of\nthe family or of close friends, is not sufficient to hold that she is\ndaughter of Aftee. The attending facts and circumstances of the case\nalso do not support the case of Smt. Gulabi. On the own showing of\nSmt. Gulabi, she is residing in the adjoining house as per voter list but\nshe never claimed cotenancy at any point of time, after death of Smt.\nAftee. The courts below have proceeded on wrong footing that the\nburden was upon the petitioners to prove that Smt. Gulabi is daughter\nof Sita which they failed to prove and therefore, it was held by them\nthat Smt. Gulabi is daughter of Aftee. Taking the evidence of Smt.\nGulabi on its face value as correct, it is not sufficient to establish her\nrelationship as daughter of Smt. Aftee. The evidence being insignificant\nwould not shift the burden on shoulders of the petitioners. There appears\nto be no reason as to why Smt. Gulabi did not examine any of her\nrelatives in support of her case. The evidentiary value of voter-list of\nthe year 1966 and 1973 is also of inconsequential nature. The voter-list\nis prepared on the statement and particulars furnished by such person.\nIt is in the nature of self serving evidence. It is not safe to place much\nreliance upon it, in such matters. However, our legal system has always\nemphasis on value, weight and quality rather than quantity, multiplicity\nor plurality of witness. Nothing has come on record to connect Smt.\nGulabi with the said birth entry.”\n15. On close examination, we find no error in the conclusion arrived at.\nHowever, on independent analysis, we find that Smt. Gulabi rests her claim\nonly on the birth register, which itself has not been proven in accordance\nwith law, for none who had either maintained the record or made entries\ntherein stands examined. That apart, the document itself does not inspire\nconfidence for, as has been observed by the High Court, entries made therein\nare factually incorrect.\n16. The High Court, by its judgment, impugned herein, while allowing the writ\npetition rightly and exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the\nConstitution, observed that the Courts below committed an error of law in\naccepting the inadmissible evidence produced by petitioner therein.\n17. It is the well-settled position of law by this Court that while exercising the\njurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court\ncannot exercise such jurisdiction to reappreciate the entire evidence or finding\nof fact unless the concerned authority below acted beyond its jurisdiction or\nsuch findings suffer from error apparent on the face of the record or such\nfinding beset with surmises or conjectures.\n18. This Court made the said observation in the various decisions such as\nMikunda Bore v. Bangshidhar Buragohain & Ors.6; State of West Bengal\nv. Atul Krishna Shaw & Anr.7; Dharamraj and Ors v. Chhitan & Ors.8; and\nKrishnanand and Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.\n6 (1980) 4 SCC 336\n7 1991 Supp (1) SCC 414\n8 (2006) 12 SCC 349\n9 (2015) 1 SCC 553\n19. It is undisputed that from 1959 to 1973, no effort was made to challenge\nthe mutation order. While no limitation to challenge the same stands\nprescribed. The 14-year time gap is entirely unexplained. In other words, it\nmay be said that the belated challenge is afflicted by delay and laches. To\nappreciate its effect, we may take note of a few pronouncements in this regard.\nIn Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial Development\nCorporation & Ors.10, this Court observed that :-\n“12. … Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline\nexercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court\nis required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is\ndependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is\none of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute\nimpediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action,\netc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then\nthe Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third-party\ninterest is involved. …\n13. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to\nbe decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary\nfrom case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental\nright and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It\nis not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their\npowers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where\nthe courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain\nlength of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so\ncompelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite\nof delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the\nCourt and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to\npromote justice and not to defeat it.”\n20. In regard to the exercise of suo motu power, this Court in State of H.P. &\nOrs. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh and Ors.11, held that-\n10 (2013) 1 SCC 353\n11 (2004) 10 SCC 585\n“6. … No fixed period of limitation may be laid but unreasonable delay\nin exercise of the power would tend to undo the things which have\nattained finality. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case\nas to what is the reasonable time within which the power of suo motu\naction could be exercised. …”\n21. The Appellate and Revision Authority, in our considered view, returned the\nfindings of fact which were perverse, based on an incomplete and erroneous\nappreciation of evidence, which rightly stands corrected by the High Court.\nWe find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeal is\ndismissed in the aforesaid terms.\nPending Application(s) if any, shall stand disposed of.\n………………………………..J.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -613,26 +613,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S005", - "case_id": "758", - "experiment": "baseline_firac", - "model": "mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct", - "source_file": "S005__baseline_firac__mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct__758.json", + "case_id": "5325", + "experiment": "role_play_v3", + "model": "qwen3-8b", + "source_file": "S005__role_play_v3__qwen3-8b__5325.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/04/1964", - "machine_error_stage": "facts", - "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Missing fact" + "judgment_date": "21/11/2024", + "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl) No.3213 of 2006) | R. Rajeshwari v. H.N. Jagadish | 05/03/2008", - "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl) No.3213 of 2006) | R. Rajeshwari v. H.N. Jagadish", - "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "Appellant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, against the respondent for a dishonoured cheque of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The Chief Judicial Magistrate convicted the respondent, sentencing him to one month simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,00,000/-, with Rs. 1,75,000/- payable to the appellant. The Sessions Judge dismissed the respondent's appeal, confirming the conviction. The respondent filed a Criminal Revision before the High Court. During the revision, counsel for both parties expressed an intention to settle, and a compromise petition was filed under Section 147 NI Act. The High Court, on 5.9.2005, modified the sentence, directing the respondent to pay Rs. 30,000/- further to the complainant and Rs. 5,000/- fine to the State, setting aside the imprisonment. The appellant subsequently filed an application to recall this order, alleging her lawyer acted without instructions and she had rejected the settlement proposal. On 19.12.2005, the appellant refused the Rs. 30,000/-, demanding interest. The High Court rejected the recall application on 27.1.2006, citing Section 362 CrPC.", - "generated_judgment": "**Facts** \n1. The appellant filed a criminal complaint under **Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881** against the respondent for dishonouring a cheque of **Rs 1,00,000**. \n2. The Chief Judicial Magistrate convicted the respondent, imposing **one‑month simple imprisonment** and a **fine of Rs 2,00,000** (of which **Rs 1,75,000** was directed to be paid to the appellant). \n3. The respondent appealed; the Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal, confirming the conviction and sentence. \n4. The respondent then filed a **Criminal Revision** before the High Court. \n5. During the revision, counsel for both parties expressed a willingness to settle. Accordingly, a **compromise petition under Section 147 of the NI Act** was filed. \n6. On **5 September 2005** the High Court **modified** the conviction: it **set aside the imprisonment**, reduced the fine to **Rs 5,000** payable to the State and ordered the respondent to pay an **additional Rs 30,000** to the appellant. \n7. The appellant later filed an application on **19 December 2005** to **recall** the High Court order, alleging that her counsel had filed the compromise petition **without her instructions** and that she had **rejected** the settlement. \n8. The High Court dismissed the recall application on **27 January 2006**, relying on **Section 362 of the CrPC**. \n9. The appellant now seeks reversal of the High Court’s order and enforcement of the original conviction and sentence, together with interest on the cheque amount.\n\n**Issues** \n1. **Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to modify the conviction and replace imprisonment with a fine on the ground of a compromise when the complainant had not given her consent.** \n2. **Whether a compromise under Section 147 NI Act can affect the criminal liability (imprisonment or fine) imposed for an offence under Section 138.** \n3. **Whether the High Court’s reliance on Section 362 CrPC to reject the recall application was proper.** \n4. **Whether the appellant is entitled to interest on the cheque amount notwithstanding the compromise order fixing a reduced sum.** \n5. **Whether the High Court’s reduction of the fine to Rs 5,000 and elimination of imprisonment is consistent with the statutory limits prescribed under Section 138.**\n\n**Rules** \n1. **Section 147, Negotiable Instruments Act** – a compromise is permissible **only when the drawer (accused) and the complainant (payee) **expressly consent** to it; the compromise may affect only the **civil liability** (the amount due). \n2. **Section 138, NI Act** – the offence is punishable by **simple imprisonment up to three months** *or* **fine up to twice the cheque amount**; the punishment is a **criminal** penalty and is not extinguished by a civil compromise. \n3. **Section 362, CrPC** – bars the **withdrawal of a criminal proceeding after a judgment** has been delivered; it does **not** govern the **settlement of civil liability** attendant to a Section 138 offence. \n4. **Principle of jurisdiction** – a court exercising powers beyond those conferred by statute (or beyond the consent of parties required by statute) renders its order **void** for lack of jurisdiction. \n5. **Law on interest** – under the NI Act and CPC, a plaintiff may claim **simple interest** on the dishonoured cheque unless the parties, by a valid compromise, expressly waive such claim. \n\n**Analysis** \n\n1. **Issue 1 – Jurisdiction / Consent** \n - The record shows that the compromise petition was filed **by counsel without the appellant’s instructions** (Fact 7) and the appellant later **re‑affirmed her rejection** of the settlement (Fact 7). \n - Section 147 NI Act **mandates express consent of both parties**. Absence of the appellant’s consent means the statutory pre‑condition for a compromise **did not exist**. \n - Consequently, the High Court **lacked jurisdiction** to entertain a compromise and to modify the conviction. An order passed without jurisdiction is **void**. \n\n2. **Issue 2 – Ultra‑vires alteration of criminal liability** \n - Even assuming a valid compromise, Section 147 permits compromise **only of the civil aspect** (the amount due). It **does not empower the court to set aside imprisonment** or to reduce the statutory fine. \n - The High Court’s order **eliminated the imprisonment** and reduced the fine dramatically (Fact 6). This exceeds the scope of Section 147 and is **ultra vires**. \n\n3. **Issue 3 – Mis‑application of Section 362 CrPC** \n - Section 362 deals with the **withdrawal of a criminal proceeding after a judgment**; it is not the provision governing **recall of a compromise order**. \n - The appellant’s application sought to **recall the compromise order**, not to reopen the criminal trial. Hence reliance on Section 362 was **mis‑applied**; the High Court should have examined the validity of the compromise itself. \n\n4. **Issue 4 – Right to interest** \n - The appellant is entitled to **simple interest** on the cheque amount under the NI Act, unless a *valid* compromise expressly waives it. \n - Because the compromise is **void for lack of consent**, any purported waiver of interest is ineffective. Therefore, the appellant may claim **principal (Rs 1,00,000) plus interest**. \n\n5. **Issue 5 – Consistency with statutory maximums** \n - The original sentence (imprisonment of one month and fine of Rs 2,00,000) **conformed** with the limits in Section 138 (imprisonment up to three months; fine up to twice the cheque amount). \n - The High Court’s reduction of the fine to **Rs 5,000** and removal of imprisonment **altered the statutory penalty** without a valid compromise. The fine cannot be reduced below the amount imposed by the conviction unless a *legally valid* compromise (which, as held, does not exist). \n\n**Conclusion** \nThe High Court’s order modifying the conviction and imposing a compromise is **void** for lack of jurisdiction (no consent of the complainant) and is **ultra vires** because Section 147 does not permit alteration of criminal punishment. The reliance on Section 362 CrPC to dismiss the appellant’s recall application was erroneous. Consequently, the appellant’s appeal is **ALLOWED**. \n\nThe appropriate relief is: \n\n- Set aside the High Court’s order dated 5 September 2005. \n- Reinstate the original conviction of the respondent under Section 138, with **one‑month simple imprisonment** and a **fine of Rs 2,00,000**, of which **Rs 1,75,000** is payable to the appellant. \n- Award the appellant **interest** on the cheque amount of Rs 1,00,000 at the statutory rate, from the date of dishonour until payment. \n\n**The appeal is therefore ALLOWED.**", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE S. B. SINHA\n1. Leave granted.\n2. Interpretation of the provisions of Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, vis-'-vis Section 320 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is involved in this appeal which arises out of judgments and orders dated 5.9.2005 and 27.1.2006 passed by the High Court of Karnataka.\n3. The aforementioned orders were passed in the following factual matrix :\n4. Appellant filed a complaint petition against the respondent herein, inter alia, alleging that he had advanced a sum of Rs.4, 35, 000/-. For the purpose of repayment therefor, five cheques were issued. Three cheques were honoured but two were dishonoured. The subject matter of the complaint petition was a cheque issued by the respondent for a sum of Rs.1, 00, 000/- which was presented to the bank on 15.9.1996. Appellant was informed in regard to the dishonour of the cheque on 28.9.1996. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, by a judgment and order dated 1.6.2000, found the respondent guilty for commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs.2, 00, 000/- and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. It was directed that out of the said amount of compensation, a sum of Rs.1, 75, 000/- may be paid to the appellant herein.\n5. An appeal was preferred thereagainst and by a judgment and order dated 14.2.2003, the XXIII Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bangalore City dismissed the criminal appeal preferred by the respondent herein, inter alia, holding :\n \"I have perused the entire order of the trial Court.\nThat the trial Court after considering all the evidence and material placed on record has rightly convicted the accused/appellant. The accused/ appellant has not made out any case, so as to interfere with the order of the trial Court. The order of the trial Court is neither capricious nor mala fide. So, I feel it is not necessary to interfere with the order of the trial Court. The trial Court order deserves to be confirmed. In view of all the above said discussion, I answer the point No.1 in the negative.\" \n6. A Criminal Revision was filed thereagainst by the respondent before the High Court. It appears that counsel for the parties expressed their intention to settle the matter. On a prayer made in that behalf, the Revision Application was adjourned.\n7. The parties allegedly entered into a compromise. A compromise petition was filed in terms of Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the terms whereof are :\n \"1. With intravension of well wishers and friends the parties to the above case, have decided to settle their difference amicably.\n2. The petitioner agreed to pay the cheque amount sum of Rs.1, 00, 000/- (Rupees one lakh only) accordingly the petitioner today is paying sum of Rs.25, 000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) in addition to the amount of Rs.75, 000/- (Rupees Seventy Five Thousand only) already deposited in the above case in compliance of the interim order.\n3. The respondent has agreed not to claim any other amount as determined by the court below and also withdraw his contention and the charges made against the petitioner before the trial court and has no objection to whatsoever to acquit the alleged offences.\n4. The respondent further agreed that he will not making above case against the petitioner in any other case.\n5. The petitioner and respondent set there hands to sought their difference amicably with the above terms and pray this Hon'ble Court pleased to acquit the petitioner as alleged of offences, for the ends of justice.\" \n8. The High Court, however, in the light of the said application and furthermore taking into consideration that a sum of Rs.75, 000/- had already been deposited, directed :\n \"In the light of the application filed as an amount of Rs.75, 000/- was already deposited, it is ordered to pay further sum of Rs.30, 000/- to the complainant Smt. R. Rajeshwari and further to pay a fine of Rs.5, 000/- to the State. As the matter came to be settled between the parties the sentence to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month is hereby set aside by modifying the order of the Trial Court to pay further sum of Rs.30, 000/- to the complainant and an amount of Rs.5, 000/- to the State as fine. After the impugned order came to be passed, an amount of Rs.30, 000/- has been paid to the complainant and the same is reported by the learned Counsel Sri N.R. Naik. The revision petitioner is granted one-week time to deposit the fine amount before the Trial Court.\" \n9. Inter alia, on the premise that such a proposal made by her lawyer to her had expressly been rejected and he was instructed to argue the matter on merit, an application for recall of the said order dated 5.9.2005 was filed. The said application was listed before the learned Judge on 16.12.2005, when it was ordered :\n \"Counsel for the Petitioner and the Counsel Sri N.R. Naik for the respondent as well as the counsel for the applicant are present.\nSri N.R. Naik submits that the amount of Rs.30, 000/- reported on 5.9.2005 will be paid before the Court on 19.12.2005.\nAs request, call on 19.12.2005.\" \nProceeding sheet dated 19.12.2005 states :\n \"The petitioner-accused Sri H.N. Jagadish is present in person as well as the respondent- complainant Smt. R. Rajeshwari is also present. The learned counsel for Sri N.K. Naik submits that he has brought the amount of Rs.30, 000/- which he will pay either to the petitioner or to the respondent as per the directions to the Court.\nThe respondent-complainant Smt. R. Rajeshwari refused to receive the amount of Rs.30, 000/- on the ground that it is meager and wants the petitioner-accused to pay interest on the said amount.\nAs the respondent-complainant Smt. Rajeshwari refused to receive the amount of Rs.30, 000/-, the learned counsel Sri N.K. Naik is directed to pay the amount to the petitioner- accused Sri H.N. Jagadish. The Petitioner-accused Shri H.N. Jagadish who is present in person reports receipt of the amount of Rs.30, 000/- from Sri N.K. Naik.\nAs some allegations are made out and also further taking note of the fact that the amount of Rs.30, 000/- is repaid to the petitioner-accused, no further order is required. The petitioner-accused is directed to deposit the said amount in Court.\nPost the matter for hearing to consider as to whether the matter which is disposed of, is liable to be recalled or not.\nPost after vacation.\" \n10. However, by order dated 27.1.2006, the said application was rejected, stating :\n \"Heard.\nIA No.1/05 for recalling the order dated 5.9.2005 is rejected in view of the provision of Section 362 of Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973.\" \n11. Mr. Bhat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 4 read with Section 320 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it is evident that no terms of settlement could have been filed before the High Court as express instructions issued in that behalf were not given by the appellant to the lawyer. It was urged that the conduct of the lawyer as also the subsequent events would categorically show that the said consent terms were filed by the counsel without any instructions for the appellant.\nIt was furthermore submitted that when a fraud of this nature is practiced upon the court, the court is not denuded of its power to recall its order despite the bar contained in Section 362 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973.\n12. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is a special Act. Section 147 of the Act provides for a non obstente clause, stating :\n \"Section 147 ' Offences to be compoundable Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable.\" \nIndisputably, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would be applicable to the proceedings pending before the courts for trial of offences under the said Act. Stricto sensu, however, the table appended to Section 320 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not attracted as the provisions mentioned therein refer only to provisions of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and none other.\n13. In such a situation,a settlement could be arrived at by and between the complainant and the accused. While a settlement is arrived at, it is not necessary under the provisions of the Act and/or Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to file any affidavit affirmed by the complainant or the accused. By reason of the authority granted by a litigant in favour of his Advocate which, inter alia, empowers the latter to enter into a settlement, any settlement arrived at, on behalf of a party to a lis would be binding on the parties thereto.\nIn Employers in relation to Monoharbahal Colliery Calcutta v. K.N. Mishra & Ors. [AIR 1975 SC 1632] , it has been held by this Court:\n \"The next question is whether the compromise is binding on the petitioner. From what has been stated above it would be clear that the petitioner was not averse to the idea of compromise. He only wanted the amount to be paid to him to be raised above four thousand rupees which was originally suggested. It also appears that in pursuance of a stay order passed in this case the petitioner has been receiving half of his wages throughout. He does not specifically deny the receipt of a cheque for Rs.4000/- sent by Mr. Mukherjee. It cannot therefore be accepted that he was under the impression, as he now tries to make out, that what he was receiving was arrears of past wages deposited in the Court in compliance with the Court's order. The advocate for the appellant had filed the statement of the case on 13.11.69. The petitioner/respondent had to file it by 17.12.69 but that was not filed and the appeal was therefore, set down ex parte against the petitioner/respondent. In the circumstances and the idea of the compromise not being unacceptable to the petitioner it was the right and indeed the duty of his advocate Mr. Mukherjee to do the best for his client. We are not able to see any lack of authority in the action taken by Mr. Mukherjee. We are of the opinion that there are absolutely no merits in this application and it is dismissed.\" \n14. The High Court, while disposing of the criminal revision filed by the respondents herein, passed a judgment merely modifying the order passed by the learned trial court, while directing the accused to pay a further sum of Rs.30, 000/-. Apart from the sum of Rs.75, 000/- deposited by him, he was directed to pay a fine of Rs.5, 000/- to the State. The order of conviction was not set aside.\nA judgment of conviction and sentence, therefore, was passed against the respondent. Such a judgment of conviction and sentence could not have been modified by the High Court in view of the express bar contained in Section 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code which reads thus :\n \"Section 362 - Court not to alter judgment' Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.\" \n15. In view of the aforementioned specific bar created in regard to exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court to review its own order, we are of the opinion that ordinarily exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would be unwarranted. We assume that in some rare cases, the High Court may do so where a judgment has been obtained from it by practicing fraud but it does not appear that such a case has been made out. Appellant did not make any complaint against his lawyer. She did not even implead her lawyer as a party.\nThe affidavit affirmed in support of the application verified as under :\n \"That the averments made in paragraphs 1 to 8 of the accompanying application are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, belief and information.\" \nVerification of such an affidavit affirmed in support of an application containing serious allegations against a member of a profession is wholly unwarranted.\n16. No material has, therefore, been placed before us to show that the allegations made in the said application are correct and/or on the basis thereof the court could set the law in motion and take suo motu action in the matter or direct initiation of any proceeding against the lawyer concerned.\nFurthermore, as has been noticed hereinbefore, even before the High Court, the appellant contended that she was not satisfied with the payment of Rs.30, 000/- as she was entitled to the interest on the said sum.\nThe Court, therefore, cannot rule out the possibility of the appellant's changing her mind after agreeing to the terms of settlement.\n17. Submission of Mr. Bhat that in a situation of this nature where the complaint was in terms of the order of learned Trial Judge to receive a sum of Rs.1, 75, 000/-, the matter could not have been settled for a sum of Rs.1, 05, 000/- cannot be accepted.\nWhy the parties entered into a settlement is not a matter for our consideration. We are merely suggesting that such settlement was permissible in law. Ex-facie, it does not violate any public policy and not otherwise inequitable.\n18. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. However, the appellant shall be at liberty to approach the concerned Bar Council or file an appropriate action against the lawyer concerned.", + "case_title": "DELHI HIGH COURT | FAO 340/2016 & C. M. No. 26446/2016 | Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v. Akbar Khan | 29/09/2016", + "case_details": "Case: FAO 340/2016 & C. M. No. 26446/2016 | Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v. Akbar Khan", + "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "case_record": "The trial court, on April 25, 2016, allowed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, directing the appellant to return an amount received from the respondent, based on the insurance value of three repossessed vehicles, after adjusting due amounts. This order was passed despite an arbitration award concerning the parties already being on record. The appellant contended that the arbitration award against them had been satisfied and no objections under Section 34 of the Act were received. The respondent argued that the trial court's directions, which included a mandatory injunction, were justified due to the appellant's alleged malafide conduct, specifically their failure to return two repossessed vehicles without authority.", + "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The trial court allowed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, on April 25, 2016, directing the appellant to return an amount received from the respondent based on the insurance value of three repossessed vehicles, after adjusting due amounts.\n2. This order was passed despite an arbitration award concerning the parties already being on record.\n3. The appellant contended that the arbitration award against them had been satisfied and no objections under Section 34 of the Act were received.\n4. The respondent argued that the trial court's directions, which included a mandatory injunction, were justified due to the appellant's alleged malafide conduct, specifically their failure to return two repossessed vehicles without authority.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Was the trial court's order directing the appellant to return an amount received from the respondent, based on the insurance value of three repossessed vehicles, a valid exercise of its power under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, given that an arbitration award concerning the parties was already on record?\n2. Did the appellant's alleged failure to return two repossessed vehicles without authority constitute malafide conduct, justifying the trial court's directions, including a mandatory injunction, under the circumstances?\n3. Was the arbitration award against the appellant satisfied, and if so, did this satisfaction render the trial court's order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, unnecessary or inappropriate?\n4. Is the trial court's order, which includes a mandatory injunction, appealable under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and relevant court rules, given the specific circumstances of the case?\n5. Did the lower court err in issuing the order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, without awaiting the outcome of any potential proceedings under Section 34 of the Act regarding the setting aside of the arbitral award, if such proceedings were contemplated or pending?\n\n### Rules:\n1. Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, allows a party to apply to a court for interim measures before or during arbitral proceedings, or after the making of an award but before it is enforced.\n2. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, deals with the application for setting aside an arbitral award, outlining the grounds and procedure for such an application.\n3. Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, deal with temporary injunctions and could be relevant in understanding the court's power to grant interim measures, including mandatory injunctions, in the context of arbitration proceedings.\n4. Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, states that there shall be no judicial authority to intervene except where so provided in the Act.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. Considering **Fact 1** and **Rule 1**, the trial court's decision to grant the order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, indicates an attempt to provide interim relief. However, the presence of an existing arbitration award (**Fact 2**) raises questions about the necessity and appropriateness of this intervention.\n2. The appellant's contention that the arbitration award was satisfied (**Fact 3**) and the lack of objections under Section 34 (**Fact 3**) suggest that the award was final and binding. This, in conjunction with **Rule 2**, implies that the trial court's intervention might have been premature or unnecessary, especially if the award's satisfaction had resolved the issues between the parties.\n3. The alleged malafide conduct by the appellant (**Fact 4**) is a critical factor. If proven, it could justify the trial court's intervention, including the mandatory injunction, as per **Rule 3**. However, the appellant's defense against these allegations would be crucial in determining the legitimacy of the trial court's actions.\n4. The appealability of the trial court's order (**Issue 4**) hinges on whether the order significantly affects the parties' rights and if it is considered final or interim under the relevant laws and court rules (**Rule 4**). The appellate court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal depends on this determination.\n5. The timing and procedure regarding potential Section 34 proceedings (**Issue 5**) are also pivotal. The trial court's decision to issue the order under Section 9 without awaiting the outcome of such proceedings, if any were contemplated or pending, could be seen as an error, especially if the proceedings could have provided an alternative or more appropriate remedy.\n\n### Conclusion:\nGiven the complexities and the specific circumstances of the case, including the presence of an arbitration award and allegations of malafide conduct, the appeal requires a detailed examination of the legal principles and the facts as presented. However, the critical issue revolves around the maintainability of the appeal itself, considering the trial court's order and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Since the appeal's maintainability is questionable due to the potential finality of the arbitration award and the lack of clear grounds for appeal under the Act, the appropriate verdict would be **DISMISSED**.", + "reference_judgment": "The Order of the Court was as follows :\n1. In proceedings under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, trial court vide impugned order of 25th April, 2016 has allowed the petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 with direction to appellant herein to return the amount received from the respondent/petitioner according to the insurance value of all the three vehicles upon their repossession, after adjusting the amount due at the relevant period within a period of two months. In the impugned order, it is noted that copy of the Award passed by the Arbitrator has been already placed on record.\n2. At the hearing of this appeal, the precise submission of learned counsel for appellant is that the directions issued in the impugned order run contrary to the Award passed, which is erroneous on the face of it, in view of Division Bench decision of this Court titled Nussli Switzerland Ltd. v. Organizing Committee Commonwealth Games 2010,reported in 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4834 . Learned counsel for appellant has apprised this Court that the Award passed against appellant has been satisfied and appellant has not received any notice of objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.\n3. On the other hand, it is submitted by learned counsel for respondent that the directions have been issued in view of the conduct of appellant as noted in the impugned order, which is as under: -\n \".......However, despite repeated directions, the bank has failed to return two vehicles which were repossessed by the bank without any authority and orders of this court and the bank officials in shadow of the orders of this court has acted malafidely against the applicant Akbar Khan and also repossessed other vehicles without any orders from any court.\" \nIt is submitted by respondent's counsel that the alternate prayer made by respondent-petitioner in petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been rightly allowed by trial court. Lastly, it is submitted that the alternate prayer of mandatory injunction with consequential relief, is justified in view of the conduct of appellant as pointed out above.\n4. Upon considering the submissions advanced by both the sides and on perusal of impugned order, material on record and the decision cited, I find that once an Award has been passed, then no direction to the contrary while deciding petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be justified. Such a view is being taken in view of the dictum of a Division Bench in Nussli Switzerland Ltd. (supra), which is as under: -\n \"In view of the opinion expressed by us with reference to Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the application filed by the respondent seeking an interim measure post award was not maintainable and thus we do not decide the second issue concerning the prima-facie merits of the claim.\" \n5. Otherwise also, Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 deals with interim measures only till the Award is enforced. This Section 9 does not empower the court to pass any mandatory injunction like the one, which has been passed in the impugned order. It remains uncontroverted that the Award passed has been satisfied. In such a situation, recourse to Section 9 of the aforesaid Act was totally unwarranted. So far as the conduct of appellant, as noted in the impugned order, is concerned, it shall be open to respondent to proceed against appellant in accordance with law. But, it certainly does not justify passing of mandatory injunction against appellant in proceedings under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. During the course of hearing, respondent's counsel was unable to confirm filing of any objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.\n6. In the aforesaid view of the matter, impugned order is hereby set aside and this appeal and the application are accordingly disposed of.\nAppeal disposed of", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -738,26 +738,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S006", - "case_id": "1479", - "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "gpt-oss-120b", - "source_file": "S006__ablation_issue__gpt-oss-120b__1479.json", - "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "05/03/2008", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", - "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication" + "case_id": "6880", + "experiment": "role_play_v3", + "model": "llama-3.3-70b-instruct", + "source_file": "S006__role_play_v3__llama-3.3-70b-instruct__6880.json", + "court": "DELHI HIGH COURT", + "judgment_date": "29/09/2016", + "machine_error_stage": "facts", + "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Missing fact" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Writ Petition No. 2043 of 1981 | Distributors (Baroda) Private Limited v. Union Of India And Two Others | 01/07/1985", - "case_details": "Case: Writ Petition No. 2043 of 1981 | Distributors (Baroda) Private Limited v. Union Of India And Two Others", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 3813 of 1999, dated 1-5-2002 | Collector Of Central Excise, Patna v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd | 01/05/2002", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 3813 of 1999, dated 1-5-2002 | Collector Of Central Excise, Patna v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd", "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "Petitioner No. 1, an investment company, received dividends from domestic companies and paid interest on borrowed funds for these investments. For assessment years 1970-71 to 1980-81, it claimed deductions under Section 80M of the Income Tax Act, 1961, based on the full amount of dividends received, a claim supported by the Supreme Court's decision in *Cloth Traders Limited*. Some assessments were completed on this basis, while others and Revenue appeals were pending. Subsequently, Parliament enacted Section 80AA, retrospectively effective from April 1, 1968, clarifying that the Section 80M deduction should be computed on dividend income as per the Act, not the gross amount. This led to enhanced tax liability for the petitioner, who challenged Section 80AA's retrospective constitutional validity under Article 19(1)(g). The Gujarat High Court had previously held against the assessee in *Addl. C.I.T. v. Cloth Traders Private Limited*, a decision overturned by *Cloth Traders Limited* (SC).", - "generated_judgment": "**Answer: ALLOWED**\n\n**Reasoning**\n\n1. **Statutory framework at the time of the assessments** \n - For the assessment years 1970‑71 to 1980‑81 the petitioner's claim for deduction under **Section 80M** was based on the *full amount* of dividends received. \n - That position was *backed by the Supreme Court’s decision in *Cloth Traders Limited* (which held that the deduction could be claimed on the gross dividend amount). Consequently, the Assessments made on that basis were lawful and the assessee’s right to claim the deduction had become a **vested right**.\n\n2. **Subsequent legislative amendment – Section 80AA** \n - Parliament later enacted **Section 80AA**, made retrospectively effective from **1 April 1968**, expressly stating that the deduction under Section 80M must be computed on the dividend **as per the Act**, i.e., on the net dividend after the statutory tax credit, not on the gross amount. \n - This amendment altered the *substantive* tax consequence of transactions that had already been completed and for which assessments (or pending appeals) had been filed on the basis of the earlier law and the Supreme Court precedent.\n\n3. **Constitutional test – Article 19(1)(g)** \n - Article 19(1)(g) guarantees the right to **practice any lawful trade, business or profession**. \n - The Supreme Court has consistently held that a **retrospective amendment which imposes additional liability on a completed transaction, thereby destroying a vested right, infringes Article 19(1)(g)** unless the amendment is a *reasonable, necessary and proportionate* attempt to achieve a *legitimate* state objective (the “reasonable‑restriction” test). \n - In this case, the amendment does not pursue any pressing public interest that cannot be achieved by a prospective law; it merely serves a fiscal purpose that could have been addressed prospectively. Hence the retrospective operation is **unreasonable** and **disproportionate**.\n\n4. **Precedent on retrospective taxation** \n - The Supreme Court has struck down similar retrospective tax provisions (e.g., ***CIT v. IBM India Ltd.*, *CIT v. M/s. B.P. Lall* **) for violating the right to carry on business. \n - Moreover, the *Cloth Traders Limited* decision that the petitioner relied upon was a *binding* interpretation of Section 80M at the time. Overruling that decision by a *retrospective* amendment amounts to an *alteration of the law* under which the assessee had already conducted its affairs.\n\n5. **Effect on the present appeal** \n - The petitioner is challenging the constitutional validity of Section 80AA (as applied retrospectively) on the ground that it infringes Article 19(1)(g). \n - Since the amendment is *retrospective*, it **invalidates the deductions already allowed** and imposes a new tax demand. This directly impinges upon the petitioner’s right to conduct its investment business as permitted by law at the relevant time. \n - The proper judicial response, following the constitutional jurisprudence, is to **declare the retrospective operation of Section 80AA unconstitutional** and to restore the position that existed before the amendment.\n\n6. **Conclusion** \n - The appeal raises a substantial constitutional question that is *not* barred by any statutory limitation or waiver, and the facts show that the petitioner’s right to claim the deduction under the law as it stood (and as interpreted by the Supreme Court) was vested. \n - Therefore, the appellate court must **allow** the petition, set aside the additional tax liability arising from the retrospective application of Section 80AA, and uphold the deduction as permitted under the original provision and the *Cloth Traders Limited* judgment.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgments were delivered by BHAGWATI, J.\nBHAGWATI, J. This writ petition raises an interesting question of construction of Section 80 M of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This question would appear to be concluded in favour of the assessee by the decision of this Court in Cloth Traders Limited v. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, 118 ITR 243 , but the correctness of the view taken in that case has been challenged in the present writ petition. Since the decision in Cloth Traders Case (supra) was given by a Bench of three Judges, it is obvious that its validity can be canvassed before this Bench which consists of five Judges. If this Bench too takes the same view in regard of the construction of Section 80M as that taken in Cloth Traders case (supra), it would become necessary to consider the question of constitutional validity of Section 80AA which was introduced in the Income Tax Act, 1961 by Section 12 of the Finance (No. 2) Act 1980 with a view to overriding with retrospective effect the construction placed on Section 80M by this in Cloth Traders case (supra). If on the other hand, this Bench disagrees with the view taken in Cloth Traders case (supra) and hold that even before the introduction of Section 80AA, Section 80M, on a true interpretation of its language, meant exactly what Section 80AA now retrospectively declares it to mean, no question of constitutional validity of Section 80AA would arise since Section 80AA would then be merely declaratory of the law as it always was and would not be imposing any new tax burden with retrospective effect. The first question that we must therefore consider is as to what is the true construction of Section 80M unaided by the subsequent legislative interpretation imposed upon it by the enactment of Section 80AA: do we affirm the view taken in Cloth Traders case (supra) or do we dissent from it.We have given our most anxious consideration to this question, particularly since one of us, namely, P.N. Bhagwati, J. was a party to the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra). But having regard to various considerations to which we shall advert in detail when we examine the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, we are compelled to reach the conclusion that Cloth Traders case must be regarded as wrongly decided. The view taken in that case in regard to the construction of Section 80M must be held to be erroneous and it must be corrected. To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of judicial conscience. In this we derive comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring words of Justice Bronson in Pierce v. Delameter A.M.Y. at page 18: \"a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that he is fallible therefore everyday to learn: great and honest enough to discard all mere pride of opinion and follow truth wherever it may lead: and courageous enough to acknowledge his errors\" .\nWe may begin our discussion by referring to the legislative history of the provision enacted in Section 80M but before we do so, a brief statement of facts may help to provide the back-drop against which the question of construction of Section 80M arises for consideration. Petitioner No. 1 was incorporated as a limited company on 10th November 1941 under the Baroda Companies Act, 1918 and at all material times it carried on business of an investment company. Petitioner No. 2 is a Director and shareholder of Petitioner No. 1. Throughout the material period with which we are concerned in this writ petition, Petitioner No. 1 received dividends on shares held by it in different domestic companies and paid interest on monies borrowed for the purpose of investment in such shares. In the course of its assessments for the assessment years 1970-71 upto 1980-81, Petitioner No. 1 claimed that the deduction permissible under Section 80M must be calculated with reference to the full amount of dividends received by Petitioner No. 1 from domestic companies and not with reference to the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This claim was liable to succeed if the view taken in Cloth Traders ca se (supra) in regard to the construction of Section 80M was correct and some of the assessments of Petitioner No. 1 were actually completed on the basis that this claim was justified. The Revenue preferred appeals against such assessments an d these appeals were pending at different stages at the time of filing of the present writ petition. The assessments for some of the assessment years were also pending before the Income tax Officer. So long as the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra) stood unaffected by any Constitutionally valid legislative amendment, Petitioner No. 1 was entitled to succeed in the appeals as well as in the original assessments which were pending consideration before different authorities. But wit h a view to overriding the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra) with retrospective effect, Parliament enacted Section 80AA and since this section was deemed to have been introduced in the Income Tax Act, 1961 with effect from 1st April, 1 968 and it provided that the deduction required to be allowed under Section 80M shall be computed not with reference to the gross amount of dividend received by the assessee from a domestic Company but with reference to the dividend income a s computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the claim of petitioner No. 1 for deduction on the basis of the full amount of dividend received by it from domestic companies was liable to be rejected and deduction could be allowed to petitioner no. 1 only with reference to the dividend income computed in accordance with the provision of the Act. The introduction of Section 80AA thus had the effect of enhancing the tax liability of petitioner No. 1 and the petitioners accordingly filed the present writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 80AA on the ground that it enhanced the tax burden of petition No. 1 with retrospective effect going back for a period of almost 12 years and thus imposed unreasonable restriction on the right of petitioner No. 1 to carry on its business in breach of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.We may first set out the history of the legislation preceding the enactment of Section 80M, since considerable reliance was placed on this history both in the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra) as also in the course of the arguments in the present writ petition. The earliest provision granting exemption from super tax in respect of i nter-corporate dividends was made as far back as 9th December 1933 in a notification issued by the Governor General in Council and it provided as follows:\n\"The Governor General in Council is pleased to exempt from super tax -(i) so much of the income of any investment trust company as is derived from dividends paid by any other company which has paid or will pay super-tax in respect of the profits out of which such dividends are paid.\"\nThis pro vision came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in C.I.T. v. Industrial Investment Trust Co. Ltd. (1968) 67 I.T.R. 437 and the question was whether the dividend income exempted from super tax the entire income by way of dividend received by an investment trust company or the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, i.e. after deducting the expenses incurred in earning it. The High Court of Bombay held that the \"dividend income which was exempted under the notification would be the dividend income received by the assessee and not the said income less any further amounts\"because\" the notification must be regarded as a self-contained one and not con trolled by any other provisions of the Act\"and there was\" no warrant to construe the word 'income' in the notification as total income nor to qualify the dividend income specified in the said notification as the dividend income computed under Section 12 of the Act.\" It was thus held that the entire amount of dividend received by an investment trust company would be exempt from super tax and not the amount of dividend minus the expenses incurred in earning it. It may be noticed, and this aspect was emphasised by the Bombay High Court, that what was exempted from super tax under the notification was \"so much of the income of any investment trust company as is derived from dividends paid by any other company\" and th ere was no reference to 'total income' in the notification nor was any indication given in the notification that the income derived from dividends which was sought to be exempted from super tax was dividend income forming part of 'total income' and that is why the Bombay High Court came to the conclusion that the dividend income exempted under the notification was the entire income by way of dividend received by the assessee and not the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.The High Court of Bombay in taking this view in Industrial Investment Trust Company's case was guided by the decision of this Court in C.I.T. v. South Indian Bank (1966) 59 I.T.R. 763 . Since the decision in South Indian Bank case (supra) is the only decision of this Court respecting an allied provision prior to the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra), it is necessary to refer to it in some detail in order to see whether it really supports the conclusion reached in Cloth Traders case (supra). The question which arose in South Indian Bank case (supra) was in regard to the true interpretation of a notification issued by the Central Government under Section 60A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 . This notification was subsequent in point of time to the notification which came to be considered by the High Court of Bombay in the Industrial Investment Trust Company's case, but it came up for construction before this court earlier in South Indian Bank case (supra). This notification was in the following terms:\n\"No income-tax shall be payable by an assessee on the interest received on the following income-tax free loans issued by the former Government of Tranvancore or by the former Government of Cochin, provided that such interest is received within the territories of the State of Travancore Cochin and is not brought into any other part of the taxable territories to which the said Act applies. Such interest shall, however, be included in the total income of the assessee for the purpose of section 16 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.......\"\nThe argument of the Revenue was that the exemption from income tax granted under this notification was in respect of interest receivable on securities minus the expenses incurred in earning it and not in respect of the entire amount of interest because it was only that amount of interest arrived at after computation in accordance with Section 8 of the old Act which was includible in the total income and liable to bear tax and the exemption from the tax could, therefore only be in respect of such amount. This argument was negatived by the court and it was pointed out by Subba Rao, J. that (p. 766): \"....this notification does not refer to the provision of section 8 of the Income-tax Act at all. It gives a total exemption from income-tax to an assessee in respect of the interest receivable on income-tax free loans mentioned therein. It gives that exemption subject two conditions, namely (i) that the interest is received within the territories of the State of Travancore-Cochin, and (ii) that it is not brought to any other part of the taxable territories. It includes the said exempted interest in the total income of the assessee for the purpose of section 16 of the Income- tax Act. Shortly stated, the notification i s a self- contained one; it provides an exemption from income-tax payable by an assessee on a particular class of income subject to specified conditions. Therefore, there is no scope for controlling the provisions of the notification with reference to section 8 of the Income tax Act. The expression 'interest receivable on income- tax free loans' is clear and unambiguous. Though the point of time from which the exemption works is when it is received within the territories of the State of Travancore-Cochin, what is exempted is the interest receivable. 'Interest receivable' can only mean the amount of interest calculated as per the terms of the securities. It cannot obviously mean interest receivable minus the amount spent in receiving the same.\"\nIt will be noticed that the entire basis of the judgment of the Court was that the notification was a self-contained one and it gave exemption from income tax in respect of interest receivable on certain categories of income tax free loans, without any reference to total income, or to \"the provisions of section 8 of the Income tax Act at all.\" That is why the judgment pointed out that there was no scope for controlling the provisions of the notification with reference to section 8 of the Income Tax Act and proceeded to hold that what was exempted from income tax under the notification was \"interest receivable\" that is, \"the amount of interest calculated as per the terms of the securities\" without deduction of the \"amount spent in receiving the same\". There was nothing in the notification to indicate that what was sought to be exempted was the amount of interest included in the total income'.Thereafter a provision of a similar kind granting exemption from super tax in respect of certain specified categories of inter-corporate dividends was introduced as Section 56 in the Indian Income Tax 1922 by the Finance Act, 1953. It is however not necessary to make any detailed reference to this provision since there is no decided case which has considered this provision or expressed any opinion upon it.\nWhen the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 was repeal ed and the Income Tax Act 1961 was enacted with effect from 1st April, 1962, section 99 sub-section (i) was introduced in the new Act exempting certain categories of income from super tax and one such category was that set out in clause (iv). Section 99 sub-section (1) clause (iv) read as follows:\n\"99. (1) Super-tax shall not be payable by an assessee in respect of the following amounts which are included in his total income .... (iv) if the assessee is a company, any dividend received by it from an Indian company, subject to the provisions contained in the Fifth Schedule.\"\nThis provision continued in force upto 1st March, 1965 subject to a minor inconsequential amendment made by the Finance Act 1964. Now this provision did not at any time come up for interpretation before this Court prior to the decision in Cloth Traders case but it did came to be considered by some of the High Courts. The question in regard to t he interpretation of this provision which arose before the High Court of Bombay in C.I.T. v. New Great Insurance Company Ltd. (1963) 90 I.T.R. 348 was whether the exemption granted under this provision was in regard to the entire amount of dividend received by the assessee from an Indian Company or it was limited to the dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of 'total income'. The High Court of Bombay accepting the contention of the assessee held that on a plain reading of clause (iv) sub-section (1) of Section 99, it was clear that the exemption from super tax was granted in respect of \"any dividend received by it from an Indian Company\" and these last words, according to their plain grammatical construction, could mean only one thing, namely, the entire amount of dividend received by the assessee from an Indian Company and nothing less. The Bombay High Court emphasised the word 'received' following immediately upon the word 'dividend' and observed that the use of this word also showed that the exemption was in regard to the dividend received and not in regard to the dividend received minus the expenses. The High Court of Bombay pointed out that the words \"amounts which are included in his total income\" in the opening part of section 99 sub-section (1) did not have any limitative effect but they were used merely as a convenient mode of describing the different items of income set out in clauses (i) to (v) of that sub-section. Clauses (i) to (v) referred to different items of income which were sought to be exempted from super tax under sub-section (1) of Section 99 and it was only if these items of income were included in the tot al income of the assessee that the question of exemption from super-tax would arise and hence the legislature used the general words \"amounts which are included in his total income\" in the opening part of sub-section (1) of section 99 as an omnibus formula to cover these different items. These words, according to the Bombay High Court, were descriptive of the items of income a included in the computation of the total income and were not indicative of the quantum of the amounts of the different items included in such computation and they did not, therefore, have the effect of cutting down the plain natural meaning of the words \"any dividend received by it from an Indian company\" which represented the quantum of income in respect of which exemption from super-tax was granted under the section. It may be pointed out that the same view in regard to the construction of clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 was taken by the Calcutta High Court in C.I.T. v. Darbhanga Marketing Company Limited and this decision of the Calcutta High Court was noted with approval by the High Court of Bombay in New Great Insurance Company's case (supra). The same view was also taken by the Madras High Court in C.I.T. v. Madras Motor and General Insurance Company and it was approved in a later decision of the same High Court in Madras Auto Service v. I.T.O. It would thus be seen that, on a construction of clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99, three High Courts, namely, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras took the view that the entire amount of dividend received by the assessee from an Indian company was exempt from super tax and the exemption was not limited to dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of the 'total income'.This view taken by the three High Courts was strongly relied upon by the petitioners in support of the construction of Section 80M canvassed on their behalf and in fact the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra) sought to derive some strength from this view. But on further reflection we do not see how this view taken by the three High Courts in regard to the construction of clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 can assist in the interpretation of an entirely new section, namely, Section 80M which, as we shall presently point out, is different in its structure, language and content from clause (iv) sub- section (1) of Section 99. We ma y point out that some doubt was raised on behalf of the Revenue in regard to the correctness of this view taken by the three High Courts but we do not think it necessary to consider whether this doubt is well founded or not because we are of the view that even if the construction placed on clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 by the three High Courts were correct, it cannot necessarily lead to the conclusion that a similar construction must also be placed on Section 80M which is different in material respects from clause (iv) of sub- section (1) of Section 99. It is most unsafe to try to arrive at the true meaning of a statutory provision by reference to an interpretation which. might have been placed on an earlier statutory provision which is not only couched in different language but is also structurally different We must therefore construe the language of Section 80M on its own terms uninhibited by any interpretation which may have been placed on clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 by any High Court.\nWe may, proceeding further with the narration of the history of the legislation, point out that Section 99 sub- section (1) remained in force only upto the close of the assessment year 1964-65 and by an amendment made by the Finance Act No. 10 of 1965 Section 99 sub-section (1) was omitted and Chapter VI A and Section 85A were introduced in the present Act with effect from 1st April, 1965. Chapter VI A comprised Section 80A to 80D providing for certain specified deductions to be made in computing total income, while Section 85 A in so far as material provided as follows: \"85A. Deduction of tax on inter-corporate dividends where the total income of an assessee being company includes any income by way of dividends received by it from an Indian company or a company which has made the prescribed arrangements for the declaration and payment of dividends (including dividends on preference shares ) within India, the assessee shall be entitled to a deduction from the income tax with which it is chargeable on its total income for any assessment year of so much o f the amount of income tax calculated at the average rate of income-tax on the income so included (other than any such income on which no income-tax is payable under the provisions of this Act) as exceeds an amount of twenty five per cent thereof..\nThis section too came to be considered by the Bombay High Court in New Great Insurance Company's case (supra) because two of the assessment years with which the Bombay High Court was concerned in that case were assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 when Section 85A was in force. The Bombay High Court pointed out that except for some minor verbal changes, Section 85A was almost in the same terms as Section 99 sub- section (1) clause (iv), the only real difference being that the exemption granted under Section 99 sub-section (1) clause (iv) was in regard to super-tax, while the deduction allowed under Section 85A was in regard to income-tax. The same interpretation was, therefore, placed on Section 85A as in the case of Section 99 sub-section (1) clause (iv) and it was held that under Section 85A the assessee would be entitled to deduction of income-tax in respect of the whole of the dividend received from an Indian company. The expression \"where the total income...... includes any income by way of dividends\" in the opening part of Section 85A was construed as referring to the category of income by way of dividends received from an Indian company. so that if this particular category of income is included in the computation of total income, the assessee would be entitled to a deduction of so much of the amount of income-tax calculated at the average rate of income-tax on the \"income so included\" as exceeds an amount of twenty-five per cent of such income. The words \"income so included\" were read to mean not the quantum of the \"income by way of dividends\" included in the total income but the income falling within the category of \"income by way of dividends from an Indian company\" included in the total income. Thus, the view taken by the Bombay High Court was that under Section 85A also, the deduction admissible was in respect of the entire dividend 'received by the assessee from an Indian company and not in respect of dividend income minus deductions allowable under the provisions of the Act in computing 'total income'.But here again we are not concerned to inquire whether the view taken by the Bombay High Court in New Great Insurance Company's case (Supra) is correct, though it must be conceded that it has been held to be correct in the decision in Cloth Traders Case (Supra). We do feel, however, that another view in regard to the interpretation of Section 85A is possible. It is no t at all unreasonable to construe the words \"income so included\" as meaning the quantum of income by way of dividends included in the total income of the assessee. These words in the context in which they occur have obviously reference to quantum of the income by way of dividends to which the average rate of income tax is to be applied. That quantum is defined by these words and in order to determine it, we have to ask the question: what is the income by way of dividends included in the total income and the answer can only be that it is income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. But, as we have pointed out above, it is not necessary to consider whether the construction placed on Section 85A by the Bombay High Co urt in New Great Insurance Company's case (supra) is correct or not, because we are not concerned here with the interpretation of Section 85A. It is Section 80M which has to be construed and this Section as we shall presently show, is materially different from Section 85A. We cannot construe Section 80M in the light of the interpretation placed on its predecessor section by the Bombay High Court particularly when Section 80M is admittedly worded differently from its predecessor section. We must construe Section 80M on its own and arrive at its true interpretation according to the plain natural language meaning of the words used by the legislature.\nIt seems that the spate of changes in this legislative provision did not co me to an end with the enactment of Section 85A. The original Chapter VI A and certain other section including Section 85 A were deleted from the present Act by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1967, with effect from 1st April 1968, and replaced by a new Chapter VI A which contains a fasciculus of sections from Section 80A to 80VV. Section 80A, sub-section (1) provides that in computing the total income of an assessee there shall be allowed from his gross total income, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of Chapter VI A, the deductions specified in Section 80C to Section 80VV and sub-section (2) of that Section imposes a ceiling on such deductions by enacting that the aggregate amount of such deductions shall not, in any case, exceed the gross total income of the assessee. The expression \"gross total income\" is defined in clause (v) of Section 80B to mean the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act before making any deductions under Chapter VI A or under Section 280 D. Section 80M is the new Section which corresponds to the repealed Section 85A and it provides for deduction in respect of certain categories of inter-corporate dividends. It is the interpretation of this section which constitutes the subject-matter of controversy between the parties and hence it would be desirable to set it out in extenso. This Section has under-gone changes from time to time since the date of its enactment and we will therefore reproduce it in the form in which it stood when originally enacted:\" 80M. Deduction in respect of certain inter- corporate dividends- (1) Where the gross total income of an assessee being a company includes any income by way of dividends received by it from a domestic company, there shall in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this section, be allowed, in computing the total income of the assessee, a deduction from such income by way of dividends of an amount equal to-\n(a) Where the assessee is a foreign company-\n(i) in respect of such income by was of dividends received by it from an Indian company which is not such a company as is referred to in Section 108 and which is mainly engaged in a priority industry 80% of such income;\n(ii) in respect of such income by way of dividends other than the dividends referred to in sub- clause (i) 65% of such income;\n(b) where the assessee is a domestic company- in respect of any such income by way of dividends 60% of such income \"There were several amendments made subsequently in this Section but they relate primarily to the percentage of the income to be allowed as a deduction and do not have any bearing on the question of interpretation posed before us. One amendment is however material and that was made by the Finance Act 1968 by which the words \"received by it\" occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 80M were omitted with effect from 1st April 1968 so that right from the date of its enactment, Section 80M sub-section (1) was to be read as if the words \"received by it\" were not in the opening part of that provision.\nSoon after the enactment of Section 80M a question arose before the Gujarat High Court in Addl. C.I.T. v. Cloth Traders Private Limited whether on a true construction of that Section, the permissible deduction is to be calculated with reference to the full amount of dividends received by the assessee from a domestic company or with reference to th e dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that is, after deducting the interest paid on monies borrowed for earning such income. The Gujarat High Court in a Judgment delivered on 28th November 1973, held that the deduction permissible under Section 80M is liable to be calculated with reference to the dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not with reference to the full amount of dividends received by the assessee. The assessee being aggrieved by this judgment preferred an appeal to this Court and this appeal was allowed by the judgment delivered in Cloth Traders Case (supra). This Court over-ruled the view taken by the Gujarat High Court and held that the deduction required to be allowed under Section 80M must be calculated\" with reference to the full amount of dividends received from a domestic company and not with reference to the dividend income as computed in accordance with t he provisions of the Act, that is, after making deductions provided under the Act. \"This decision was given by the Court on 4th May 1979.Now, according to Parliament, this interpretation placed on Section 80M by the summit court was no t in conformity with the legislative intent and it resulted in considerable unjustified loss of revenue. Parliament therefore immediately proceeded to set right what, according to it was an interpretation contrary to the legislative intent and with a view to setting at naught such interpretation. Parliament, by Section 12 of Finance (No. 2) Act 1980, introduced in the Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 80AA with retrospective effect from 1st April 1968, that is the date when Section 80M was originally enacted, providing that the deduction required to be allowed under Section 80M in respect of inter-corporate dividends\" shall be computed with reference to the income by way of such dividends as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act (before making any deduction under this Chapter) and not with reference to the gross amount of such dividends \". It is the validity of this new Section 80AA which is challenged in the present writ petition. But we may make it clear that what is challenged is not the prospective operation of Section 80AA. That would clearly be unexceptionable because the Legislature can always impose a new tax burden or enhance an existing tax liability with prospective effect. But the complaint of the assessee was against retrospective effect being given to Section 80AA, because that would have the effect of enhancing the tax burden on the assessee by setting at naught the interpretation placed on Section 80M by the decision in Cloth Traders case and reducing the amount of deduction required to be allowed under Section 80M. However, as pointed out at the commencement of this judgment, it would become necessary to examine this complaint against the constitutional validity of retrospective operation of Section 80AA only if we affirm the interpretation placed on Section 80M by the decision of this Court in Cloth Traders case. If we do not agree with the decision of this Court in Cloth Traders case (supra) and take the view that the Gujarat High Court was right in the interpretation placed by it on Section 80M in Addl. C.I.T. v. Cloth Traders Private Limited no question of constitutional validity of the retrospective operation of Section 80AA would remain to be considered, because in that event Section 80AA in its retrospective operation would be merely clarificatory in nature and would not involve imposition of any new tax burden.We may therefore first examine the language of Section 80M for arriving at its true interpretation. But before we do so, let us consider what is the object behind grant of relief under Section 80M. It was common ground between the parties that the main object of the relief under Section 80M is to avoid taxation once again in the hands of the receiving company of the amount which has already borne full tax in the hands of the paying company. Vide the written submission under the heading \"Object of relief on inter-corporate dividends\" filed by the learned counsel on behalf of the assessee in the course of the arguments. Now when an amount by way of dividend is received by the assessee from the paying company, the full amount of such dividend would have suffered tax in the assessment of the paying company and it is obvious, that, in order to encourage inter-company investments, the Legislature intended that this amount should not bear tax once again in the hands of the assessee either its entirety or to a specified extent. But the amount by way of dividend which would other-wise suffer tax in the hands of the asseesee, would be the amount computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not the full amount receive d from the paying company. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that in enacting Section 80M the Legislature intended to grant relief with reference to the amount of dividend computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act an d not with reference to the full amount of dividend received from the paying company. It is difficult to imagine any reason why the Legislature should have intended to give relief with reference to the full amount of dividend received from the paying company when that is not the amount with is liable to suffer tax once again in the hands of the assessee. The Legislature could certainly be attributed the intention to prevent double taxation but not to provide an additional benefit which would go beyond what is required for saving the amount of dividend from taxation once again in the hands of the assessee. Bearing in mind these prefatory observations in regard to the legislative object, we may now proceed to construe the language of Section 80M.Section 80M sub-section (1) opens with the words\" where the gross total income of an assessee........includes any income by way of dividends from a domestic company \"and proceeds to say that in such a case , there shall be allowed in computing the total income of the assessee, a deduction \"from such income by way of dividends\" of an amount equal to the whole of such income or 60% of such income, as the case may be, depending on the nature of the domestic company from which the income by way of dividends is received. The opening words describe the condition which must be fulfilled in order to attract the applicability of the provision contained in sub-section (1) of Section 80M. The condition is that the gross total income of the assessee must include income by way of dividends from a domestic company. \"Gross total income\" is defined in Section 80B clause (v) to mean\" total income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act before making any deduction under Chapter VIA or under Section 280D. \"Income by way of dividends from a domestic company included in the gross total income would therefore obviously be income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that is, after deducting interest on monies borrowed for earning such income. If income by way of dividends from a domestic company computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act in included in the gross total income, or i n other words, forms part of the gross total income, the condition specified in the opening part of sub-section (1) of section 80M would be fulfilled and the provision enacted in that sub-section would be attracted.\nNow it was urged on behalf of the assessee that the words\" Where the gross total income of an assessee.......... includes any income by way of dividends from a domestic company \"in the opening part of sub-section (1) of Section 80M refer only to the inclusion of the category of income and not to the quantum of such income and therefore the words \"such income by way of dividends\" following upon the specification of this condition, cannot have reference to the quantum of the income included but must be held referable only to category of the income included, that is, income by way of dividends from a domestic company. This was the same argument which found favour with the Court in Cloth Traders case (supra), but on fuller consideration, we do not think i t is well founded. We may assume with the Court in Cloth Traders case that the words\" where the gross total income of an assessee............. includes any income by way of dividends from a domestic company \"are intended only to provide that a particular category of income, namely, income by way of dividends from a domestic company should form a component part of gross, total income, irrespective of what is the of quantum income so included but it is difficult to see how the factor of quantum can altogether be excluded when we talk of any category of income included in the gross total income. What is included in the gross total income in such a case is a particular quantum of income belonging to the specified category. Therefore the words \"such income by way of dividends\" must be referable not only to the category of income included in the gross total income but also to the quantum of the income so included. It is obvious, as a matter of plain grammer that the words \"such income by way of dividends\" must have reference to the income by way of dividends mentioned earlier and that would be income by way of dividends from a domestic company which is included in the gross total income. Consequently, in order to determine what is \"such income by way of dividends\", we have to ask the question: what is the income by way of dividends from a domestic company included in the gross total income and that would obviously be the income by way of dividends computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is difficult to appreciate how, when we are interpreting the words \"such income by way of dividends\", we can make a dichotomy between the category of income by way of dividends included in the gross total income and the quantum of the income by way of dividends so included. This Court observed in Cloth Traders case that the words \"such income by way of dividends\" as a matter of plain grammer must be substituted by the words \"income by way of dividends from a domestic company\" in order to arrive at a proper construction of the section, but there is a clear fallacy in this observation, because in making the substitution it stop short with the words \"income by way of dividends from a domestic company\" and does not go the full length to which plain grammer must dictate us to go, namely, 'income be way of dividends from a domestic company included in the gross total income\" (emphasis supplied). Otherwise we would not be giving to the word 'such' its full meaning and effect. The word 'such' in the context in which it occurs can only mean that income by way of dividends from a domestic company which is included in the gross total income and that must necessarily be income by way of dividends computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.There is also one other strong indication in the language of sub-section (1) of Section 80M which clearly compels us to take the view that the deduction envisaged by that provision is required to be made with reference to the income by way of dividends computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not with reference to the full amount of dividend received by the assessee. This indication w as also unfortunately lost sight of by the Court in Cloth Traders case presumably because it was not brought to the attention of the Court. The Court observed in Cloth Traders case that the whole of the income by way of dividends from a domestic comp any or 60% of such income as the case may be? would be deductible from the gross total income for arriving at the total income of the assessee. We are afraid this observation appears to have been made under some misapprehension, because what sub-section (1) of Section 80M requires is that the deduction of the whole or a specified percentage must be made from \"such income by way of dividends\" and not from the gross total income. Sub-section (1) of Section 80M provides that in computing the total income of the assessee there shall be allowed a deduction from \"such income by way of dividends\" of an amount equal to the whole or a specified percentage of such income. Now when in computing the total income of the assessee, a deduction has to be made from \"such income by way of dividends\", it is elementary that \"such income by way of dividends\" from which deduction has to be made must be part of gross total income. It is difficult to see how the language of this part of sub-section (1) of Section 80M can possibly fit in if \"such income by way of dividends\" were interpreted to mean the full amount of dividend received by the assessee. The full amount of dividend received by the assessee would not be included in the gross total income: what would be included would only be the amount of dividend as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. If that be 50 it is difficult to appreciate how for the purpose of computing the total income from the gross total income any deduction should be required to be made from the full amount of the dividend. The deduction required to be made for computing the total income from the gross total income can only be from the amount of dividend computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act which would be forming part of the gross total income. It is therefore clear that whatever might have been the interpretation placed on clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 and Section 8 5A, the correctness of which is not in issue before us, so far as sub-section (1) of Section 80M is concerned, the deduction required to be allowed under that provision is liable to be calculated with reference to the amount of dividend computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of the gross total income and not with reference to the full amount of dividend received by the assessee.This view which we are taking in regard to the construction of sub-section (1) of Section 80M is also supported by the decision of a Bench of this Court consisting of one of us, Chandrachud, C.J. and Tulzapurkar, J. in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Company Limited v. C.I.T. This decision was rendered b y the Court on 11th April 1978 at least a year before the decision in Cloth Traders case, but, unfortunately, it appears, it was not brought to the attention of the Court when the Cloth Traders case was argued, because we have no doubt that if it had been cited, the Court would have certainly made a reference to it in the judgment in Cloth Traders case. The Section which came up for consideration before the Court in Cambay Electric Supply Company's case was undoubtedly a different one, namely, Section 80E, but the reasoning which prevailed with the Court in placing a particular interpretation on sub-section (1) of Section 80E would equally to applicable in the interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80M. Section 80E as i t stood at the material time provided inter alia as follows in subsection (1):\n\"80E(1). Deduction in respect of profits and gains from specified industries in the case of certain companies. -(1) In the case of a company to which this section applies, where the total income (as computed in accordance with the other provisions of this Act) includes any profits and gains attributable to the business of generation or distribution of electricity o r any other form of power or of construction, manufacture or production of any one or more of the articles or things specified in the list in the Fifth Schedule, there shall be allowed a deduction from such profits and gains of an amount equal to eight per cent thereof, in computing the total income of the Company.\" The question which arose in Cambay Electric Supply Company's case was whether unabsorbed depreciation and unabsorbed development rebate were liable to be deducted in arriving at the figure of profits and gains exigible to deduction of 8 per cent contemplated in sub-section (1) of Section 80E. The argument of the assessee was precisely the same as the one advanced in the present case, namely, th at the words \"such profits and gains\" in the later part of sub-section (1) of Section 80E were intended to refer only to the category of profits and gains referred to in the earlier part of that provision, namely, \"profits and gains attributable to the business of generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power or of construction, manufacture or production of any one or more of the articles or things specified in the list in the Fifth Schedule\" and not to the quantum of the profits and gains included in the total income, so that the profits and gains exigible to the deduction of 8 per cent were the profits and gains attributable to the specified business in their entirety and not the profits and gains as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The assessee contended that, in the circumstances, unabsorbed depreciation and unabsorbed development rebate were not liable to be deducted from the profits and gains attributable t o the specified business for arriving at the figure exigible to the deduction of 8%. This argument of the assessee was rejected by the Court and the Court held that the profits and gains exigible to the deduction of 8 per cent were profits and gains computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of the total income and hence unabsorbed depreciation and unabsorbed development rebate were liable to be excluded from the profits and gains attributable to the specified business in arriving at the figure exigible to 8 per cent deduction. Tulzapurkar, J. speaking on behalf of the Court analysed the provisions of sub section (1) of Section 80E in the following words: \"On reading sub-section (1) it will become clear that three important steps are required to be taken before the special deduction permissible thereunder is allowed and the net total income exigible to tax is determined. First, compute the total income of the concerned assessse in accordance with the other provisions of the Act, i.e., in accordance with all the provisions except section 80E; secondly, ascerta what Part of the total income so computed represses the profits and gains attributable to the business of the specified industry (here generation and distribution of electricity); and, thirdly, if there be profits and gains so attributable, deduct 8 per cent thereof from such profits and gains and then arrive at the net total income exigible to tax.\"\nThe learned Judge then proceeded to apply this interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80E to the facts of the case before him and observed:\n\"As indicated earlier, sub-section (1) contemplates three steps being taken for computing the special deduction permissible thereunder and arriving at the net income exigible to tax find the first two steps read together contain the legislative mandate as to how the total income of which the profits and gains attributable to the business of the specified industry forms a part-of the concerned assessee is to be computed and according to the parenthetic al clause, which contains the key words, the same is to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act except section 80E and since in this case it is income from business the same will have to be computed in accordance with sections 30 to 43A which would include section 32(2) (which provides for carry forward of depreciation) and section 33(2) (which provides for carry forward of development rebate for eight years). In other words, in computing the total income of the concerned assessee, items of unabsorbed depreciation and unabsorbed development rebate will have to be deducted before arriving at the figure that will become exigible to the deduction of 8 per cent contemplated by Section 80E (1).It will thus be seen that according to this decision, the words \"such profits and gains\" in the later part of sub- section(1) of Section 80E were referable to the quantum of the profits and gains attributable to the specified business included in the total income as referred to in the earlier part of the provision. If this decision lays down the correct interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80E the same interpretation must also govern the language of sub- section (1) of Section 80M. Structurally there is hardly any difference between Section 80E sub-section (1) and Section 80M sub-section (1) and the reasoning which appealed to the Court in the interpretation of subsection (1) of Section 80E must apply equally in the interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80M. We find ourselves wholly in agreement with the view taken by the Court in Cambay Electric Supply Company's case and we must therefore dissent from the interpretation placed on sub-section (1) of Section 80M by the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra).\nBut, even if in our view the decision in Cloth Traders case is erroneous, the question still remains whether we should over-turn it. Ordinarily we would be reluctant to over-turn a decision given by a Bench of this Court, because it is essential that There should be continuity and consistency in judicial decisions and law should be certain and definite. It is almost as important that the law should be settled permanently as that it should be settled correctly. But there may be circumstances where public interest demands that the previous decision be reviewed and reconsidered. The doctrine of stare decisis should no t deter the Court from over-ruling an earlier decision, if it is satisfied that such decision is manifestly wrong or proceeds upon a mistaken assumption in regard to the existence or continuance of a statutory provision or is contrary to another decision of the Court. It was Jackson, J. who said in his dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. United States:\" I see no reason why I should be consciously wrong today because I was unconsciously wrong yesterday \". Lord Denning also said to the same effect when he observed in Ostime v. Australian Mutual Provident Society:\" The doctrine of precedent does not compel Your Lordships to follow the wrong path until you fall over the edge of the cliff\". Here we find that there are over-riding considerations which compel us to reconsider and review the decision in Cloth Traders case. In the first place, the decision in Cloth Traders case was rendered by this Court on 4th May 1979 and immediately thereafter, withi n a few months, Parliament introduced Section 80AA with retrospective effect from 1st April 1968 with a view to over-riding the interpretation placed on Section 80M in Cloth Traders case. The decision in Cloth Traders case did not therefore hol d the field for a period of more than a few months and it could not be said that any assessee was misled into acting to its detriment on the basis of that decision. There was no decision in regard to the interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80 M given by any High Court prior to the decision in Cloth Traders case and there was therefore no authoritative pronouncement of this Court on this question of interpretation on which we assessee could claim to rely for making its fiscal arrangements. The only decision in regard to the interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80M given by any High Court prior to the decision in Cloth Traders case, was that of the Gujarat High Court in Addi. C.I.T. v. Cloth Traders Private Limited an d that decision took precisely the same view which we are inclined to accept in the present case. It is therefore difficult to see how any assessee can legitimately complain that any hardship or inconvenience would be caused to it if the decision in Cloth Traders case was over-turned by us. If despite the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Addl. C.I.T. v. Cloth Traders Private Limited (supra) the assessee proceeded on the assumption, now found to be erroneous, that the Gujarat High Court decision was wrong and the deduction permissible under sub-section (1) of Section 80M was liable to be calculated with reference to the full amount of dividend received by the assessee, the assessee can have only itself to blame. Knowing fully well that the Gujarat High Court had decided the question of interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80M in favour of the Revenue and there was no decision of this Court taking a different view, no prudent assessee could have proceeded to make its financial arrangements on the basis that the decision of the Gujarat High Court was erroneous. Moreover, we find, for reason we have already discussed that the decision in Cloth Traders case is manifestly wrong because it ha s failed to take into account a very vital factor, namely, that the deduction required to be made under sub-section (1) of Section 80M is not from the gross total income but from \"such income by way of dividends\". There is also another circumstance which makes it necessary for us to reconsider and review the decision in Cloth Traders case and that is the decision in Cambay Electric SUPPLY Company's case. The decision in Cloth Traders case is inconsistent with that in Cambay Electric Supply Company's case. Both cannot stand together. If one is correct, the other must logically be wrong and vice versa. It is therefore necessary to resolve the conflict between these two decisions and harmonise the law and that necessitates a n inquiry into the correctness of the decision in Cloth Traders case. It is for this reason that we have reconsidered and reviewed the decision in Cloth Traders case and on such reconsideration and review, we have come to the reconsideration that the decision in Cloth Traders case in erroneous and must be over-turned.It is obvious that, ON this view, it becomes unnecessary to consider the question of constitutional validity of the retrospective operation of Section 80AA. Section 80AA in its retrospective operation is merely declaratory of the law as it always was since 1st April 1968 and no complaint can validly be made against it.\nWe accordingly dismiss the writ petition but, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, we direct that each party shall bear and pay its own costs.\nAMARENDRA NATH SEN, J. I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of my learned brother Bhagwati, J. MY learned brother in his judgment has set out all the material facts and circumstances of the case. He has referred to the relevant statutory provisions and to the legislative history of Section 80M of the Income-Tax Act. He has also considered the earlier decisions of various Courts including the decisions of this Court in Cloth Traders Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Income tax and in Cambay Electrical Supply Industrial Co. Ltd v. Commissioner of Income-Tax. He has analysed the provisions of Section 80M and has proceeded to interpret the same. As I am in broad agreement with what have been stated by my learned brother, I do not propose to reproduce the same. I, however, wish to make some observations of my own.\nThe authority and jurisdiction of a larger Bench of this Court to over-ride and over-rule any decision of a smaller Bench cannot be questioned. I am, however, of the opinion that the decision of this Court on any fiscal legislation involving the question of financial benefit and liability should no t normally be interfered with and should be interfered with only in very rare cases. On the basis of the decision of this Court on any fiscal legislation and any matter involving financial arrangements and adjustments, parties are entitled to arrange their financial affairs and in fact they so arrange and adjust their financial affairs on the basis of the law laid down by this Court. Unsettling a position settled by the decision of this Court may lead to confusion and result in financial instability, causing serious prejudice not only to the parties concerned but also to the economic growth of the country as a whole. If on interpretation of any provision in any fiscal legislation two views may be reasonably possible, a larger Bench of this Court may not interfere with the view taken by a smaller Bench of this Court merely on the ground that the other view appears to the larger Bench to be the better view and may commend itself to the larger Bench. If, however, the decision of the smaller Bench is erroneous, the larger Bench has necessarily to interfere with the decision, as this Court will not permit a wrong decision to operate as good law of the land.On a careful consideration of all the relevant facts an d circumstances of this case and the earlier decisions which have all been noted in the judgment of my learned brother, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the decision arrived at by my learned brother for the reasons stated by him in his judgment is sound and correct. My learned brother has properly analysed the provisions of Section 80M and has correctly construed the same, applying the well settled principles of construction, I agree\nwith my learned brother and the reasons given by him for coming to the conclusion that the decision of this Court Cloth Traders Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax is erroneous. In my opinion, it cannot be said that in deciding the case of Cloth Traders Ltd. th is Court had taken one of two reasonably possible views. As my learned brother in his judgment has aptly pointed out on a proper interpretation of Section 80M that the view taken by this Court in Cloth Traders case is fallacious and wrong. I am in entire agreement with the interpretation of Section 80M made by my learned brother for reasons stated in his judgment.\nIt may be noted that as soon as the decision of this Court in Cloth Traders case was given, the Parliament to clearly manifest the legislative intent and to indicate that the decision did not reflect the true intention of the Legislature introduced by amendment Section 80AA with retrospective effect. In view of the proper interpretation of Section 80M in the judgment of my learned brother with which I agree, it cannot be said that Section 80AA has the effect of imposing any fresh tax with retrospective effect. Section 80AA is clearly declaratory in nature and merely declares what the correct position has always been. No question of imposition of any fresh tax with retrospective effect falls for consideration in this case. It may also be pointed out that the decision in Cloth Traders case cannot be said to have held the field for any length of time to cause any serious prejudice to an assessee. The decision of the Gujarat High Court in Cloth Traders case which was upset by this Court was against the assessee and the Parliament had intervened as soon as this Court reversed the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Cloth Traders case. This aspect has also been fully dealt with in the judgment of my learned brother.With these observations I am in entire agreement with the judgment of my learned brother and I agree with th e order proposed by him.\n", + "case_record": "The assessee held a stock of fully manufactured exigible goods on March 1, 1989. On this date, the special excise duty leviable on such goods was enhanced. These goods were subsequently cleared after March 1, 1989. The authorities had held that the goods were liable to special excise duty at the enhanced rate, relying on Wallace Flour Mills Company Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise. Conversely, the Tribunal held that the goods were liable to duty at the rate in force prior to March 1, 1989, relying on Ponds India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Madras.", + "generated_judgment": "### **Step-by-Step Legal Reasoning for Decision**\n\n#### **1. Identification of Key Legal Issues**\nThe appeal revolves around two conflicting judicial interpretations of excise duty liability on fully manufactured, exigible goods held before and cleared after a retrospective rate hike:\n\n- **Position of the Revenue (Assessing Authority):** Relies on *Wallace Flour Mills Company Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise*, holding that the **enhanced duty rate should apply prospectively to goods cleared after the rate change**, regardless of when they were manufactured.\n- **Position of the Appellant (Assessee):** Relies on *Ponds India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Madras*, arguing that the **original duty rate applies** to goods held before the hike, even if cleared later.\n\n#### **2. Material Facts and Legal Principles**\n- The goods were **fully manufactured and exigible** (ready for clearance) **as of March 1, 1989**, but the rate was increased **retroactively** from that date.\n- The critical question is whether **date of manufacture/exigibility or date of clearance** determines the applicable duty rate.\n\n#### **3. Assessment of Judicial Precedents**\n| **Case** | **Judgment** | **Rationale** |\n|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| *Wallace Flour Mills* (Revenue) | Prospective application of enhanced rate to cleared goods. | Holds that sale/clearance must comply with rates in force **at clearance**, not production. |\n| *Ponds India* (Tribunal) | Retrospective operation of duty based on rate **at manufacture/exigibility**. | Argues \"exigibility\" fixed duty precisely, overriding clearance rates. |\n\n- **Consistency with Doctrine of Retroactivity in Taxation:**\n Tax laws enforceful *ex Certiori* against pre-clearance stock often clarify dates post-introduction.\n However, **exigibility** refers to the point at which tax becomes enforceable (e.g., manufacturing finish), aligning with *Ponds India*'s holding.\n\n- **Policy and Object of Excise Law:**\n The object is to levy duty on **output value at sale**, not deferred value. Classical theories (e.g., *Office of Custose Conservatore delle Regie Armenirame* [1867]) distinguish necessity date (now \"exigibility\").\n Here, goods were *exigible* at manufacturer's mandate **before rate hike**, but clearance (actual enforcement) occurred later.\n\n#### **4. Ratio Decidendi Appraisal**\n- **Wallace Flour Mills:** Fails to account for *exigibility* problematic under *Section 11 of the CE Act*: Exigible goods allow duty computation *periodic*. Prospective application is common, but **clear* case followed retrospective principle in *Ponds***.\n- **Ponds India:** More consistent with offences of enrichment: Tax should accrue at invoice-generating date (irreversibly exigible as stock cleared).\n\n#### **5. Conclusion on Appeal Value**\n- The Tribunal’s rationale in *Ponds* is logically sound, interpreting excise \"exigibility\" as decisive over clearance dates.\n- The law distinguishes between \"prospective\" application (new rate applies *future* goods) and *capacity/right to excise enforceable beauty* during manufacture (`exigibility`).\n- **Decision:** The Tribunal’s decision correctly though vitiates the rigid improverment to match \"wallspelled\" obligations.\n\n---\n### **Final Judgment:** **ALLOWED** (the appeal) due to the factual precedence given by *Ponds India* over the anomalous application in *Wallace Flour Mills*. The duty rate *properly assayed* at March 1, 1989’s rate.", + "reference_judgment": "The Order of the Court is as follows :-\nThe assessee held a stock of exigible goods in fully manufactured condition on 1st March, 1989. On this date the special excise duty leviable on such goods was enhanced. The goods were cleared after 1st March, 1989. The question in this appeal is : Are the goods exigible to special excise duty at the rate that was in force prior to 1st March, 1989, when they were manufactured, or at the rate in force after 1st March, 1989, when they were cleared? The authorities held that they were liable to special excise duty at the enhanced rate, basing themselves upon the judgment of this Court inWallace Flour MillsCompany Ltd.v.Collector of Central Excise(44E.L.T.598 ). The Tribunal took the contrary view, relying upon the judgment of this Court inPonds India Ltd.v.Collector of Central Excise, Madras(90E.L.T.3 ).\n2.In our view, the Tribunal was right in the view that it took. Special excise duty is an annual levy, as has been explained in the judgment inPonds. It ceases to have effect on the 28th of February of a given year and a new levy, distinct and different, comes into operation with effect from the 1st of March of that year. Therefore, goods manufactured during the earlier period must be deemed to have been cleared on the last day of that period and exigible to special excise duty at the rate, if any, prevalent during that period.\n3.We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the Revenue that the enhanced rate of special excise duty applies to goods manufactured during the earlier period but cleared during the later period because special excise duty was leviable during the earlier period. This is for the reason that the levy during the previous period and the levy during the later period are different, as explained inPonds.\n4.The decision of the Tribunal must, therefore, be affirmed. The assessee will be entitled to refund in accordance with the provisions of the statute, as amended, and the judgment of this Court inMafatlal Industries Ltd.v.Union of India & Ors.( ).\n5.The appeal is accordingly dismissed.\n6.No order as to costs.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -863,26 +863,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S007", - "case_id": "1273", + "case_id": "1148", "experiment": "baseline_cot", - "model": "gpt-oss-120b-noreason", - "source_file": "S007__baseline_cot__gpt-oss-120b-noreason__1273.json", + "model": "ministral-8b", + "source_file": "S007__baseline_cot__ministral-8b__1148.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/07/1985", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "judgment_date": "01/05/2002", + "machine_error_stage": "conclusion", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 171 of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 12, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No.445 of 1963. | Mahant Bhagwan Bhagat v. G. N. Bhugat And Others | 04/01/1972", - "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 171 of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 12, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No.445 of 1963. | Mahant Bhagwan Bhagat v. G. N. Bhugat And Others", - "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "The case concerns the Mahantship of the Turki Math, a century-old institution of the Kabirpanthi Bhagatatha Vairagi sect. Devolution of Mahantship has historically been from Guru to Chela. The defendant No. 2 executed deeds in 1951 and 1952 nominating the first defendant as his successor. The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit in 1959, claiming to be the duly installed Mahant based on a custom of succession by the senior Chela. He alleged the 1951 and 1952 deeds violated this custom. The plaintiff had previously filed a suit in 1953, which was compromised, with the plaintiff allegedly assuming Mahantship in April 1954 and undergoing an installation ceremony in February 1956, evidenced by a 'Surat Hall' document. The plaintiff subsequently took possession of properties but was dispossessed by the defendants. The plaintiff also filed a petition under ss. 107 and 145 Cr. P.C. in 1956, referring to himself as the Mahant of a different Math. The defendants contended that the custom allowed nomination of any fit Chela, irrespective of seniority, and that installation ceremonies were not essential. The trial court found in favour of the plaintiff regarding the custom and installation, while the High Court reversed this, finding that succession was based on merit and that the plaintiff's installation was not proven. The High Court also found the nomination deeds of 1951 and 1952 valid. The judgment refers to general principles of Mahantship succession based on institutional usage and cites documentary evidence (deeds from 1899, 1910, 1937, 1947, 1951) showing nominations based on ability and fitness.", - "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let's tackle this legal judgment. First, I need to understand the case thoroughly. The user provided the input facts, so I'll start by summarizing those. \n\nThe case is about the Mahantship of the Turki Math, which is part of a specific religious sect. The main issue is the succession of the Mahant. Historically, it's passed from Guru to Chela. The defendant No. 2 made nominations in 1951 and 1952 for the first defendant as successor. The plaintiff, who is the appellant, filed a suit in 1959, claiming he's the rightful Mahant based on a custom of seniority. He argues the 1951 and 1952 deeds violated this custom. \n\nThe plaintiff had a prior suit in 1953 that was compromised, leading him to assume Mahantship in April 1954 and an installation in 1956. He took possession of properties but was dispossessed. He also filed a petition in 1956 under sections 107 and 145 Cr. P.C., claiming to be Mahant of a different Math. The defendants say the custom allows nomination based on merit, not seniority, and that installation isn't necessary. \n\nThe trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on custom and installation, but the High Court reversed, saying succession is based on merit and the plaintiff's installation wasn't proven. The High Court also found the 1951 and 1952 deeds valid. The judgment mentions general principles of succession based on institutional usage and cites deeds from 1899 to 1951 showing nominations based on ability.\n\nNow, I need to structure this using the FIRAC framework. \n\nFacts: I need to list the key points. The main facts are the historical succession method, the nominations in 1951 and 1952, the plaintiff's prior suit and compromise, his installation, the dispossessing by defendants, the petition under Cr. P.C., the trial and High Court decisions, and the documentary evidence cited by the High Court.\n\nIssues: The main legal issues are whether the custom of seniority applies, the validity of the 1951 and 1952 deeds, the necessity of installation ceremonies, and whether the plaintiff's installation was proven. Also, the conflict between the trial court and High Court on these points.\n\nRules: Relevant laws would include the principles of succession in religious institutions, the validity of deeds under the Indian Succession Act (if applicable), the role of customs in succession, and the evidentiary requirements for proving installation ceremonies. Also, the applicability of sections 107 and 145 Cr. P.C. in this context.\n\nAnalysis: Need to evaluate the trial court's finding versus the High Court. The trial court found the custom of seniority and installation important, while the High Court said it's based on merit and installation wasn't proven. The High Court cited historical deeds showing nominations based on ability. The plaintiff's installation in 1956 might not be sufficient if the custom doesn't require it. The compromise in 1953 might have affected the plaintiff's claim. The documentary evidence from the High Court suggests that nominations were based on merit, not seniority, which could override the plaintiff's claim based on seniority. Also, the plaintiff's claim to a different Math in 1956 might be a separate issue, but the case is about the Turki Math.\n\nConclusion: The High Court's decision to reverse the trial court might be correct if the custom allows merit-based succession and the installation wasn't proven. Therefore, the appeal should be allowed, meaning the High Court's decision is upheld.\n\nWait, but the user's conclusion needs to be either ALLOWED or DISMISSED. Since the High Court reversed the trial court, and the user is evaluating the appeal, if the appeal is the High Court's decision, then the conclusion would be that the appeal is allowed. But I need to check the procedural history. The plaintiff's appeal was to the High Court, which reversed the trial court. So the High Court's decision is the one being appealed. Wait, the input says the plaintiff filed an appeal, and the High Court reversed. So the question is whether the High Court's decision should be upheld. If the user is the judge evaluating the appeal (probably the High Court's decision), then the conclusion would be whether the appeal (from the trial court to High Court) should be allowed or dismissed. The user's conclusion is about the appeal, so if the High Court's decision is correct, the appeal would be allowed. But I need to make sure the reasoning is correct.\n\nAlso, the rules about customs in succession. In India, customs can be considered under the Indian Succession Act, especially if they are part of the religious institution's practice. The High Court cited documentary evidence showing that nominations were based on ability, which might indicate that the custom is merit-based, not seniority. The trial court might have focused on the plaintiff's installation, but the High Court found that installation wasn't proven. The plaintiff's claim of installation in 1956 might not be sufficient if the custom doesn't require it. The compromise in 1953 could have led to the plaintiff's assumption of Mahantship, but the defendants might argue that the 1951 and 1952 deeds are valid. \n\nSo the key points are the validity of the deeds, the custom's nature (seniority vs. merit), and the installation ceremony's necessity. The High Court's reliance on the documentary evidence showing merit-based nominations suggests that the custom allows for that, thus invalidating the plaintiff's claim based on seniority. Therefore, the High Court's reversal is correct, so the appeal (to the High Court) should be allowed, meaning the High Court's decision is upheld. Hence, the conclusion would be that the appeal is allowed.\n\n\n### Facts: \n1. The Turki Math, a religious institution of the Kabirpanthi Bhagatatha Vairagi sect, follows a historical tradition of Mahantship devolution from Guru to Chela. \n2. Defendant No. 2 executed deeds in 1951 and 1952 nominating the first defendant as his successor. \n3. The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit in 1959, asserting his claim to Mahantship based on a custom of succession by seniority, alleging the 1951 and 1952 deeds violated this custom. \n4. The plaintiff had previously filed a suit in 1953, which was compromised, leading him to assume Mahantship in April 1954 and undergo an installation ceremony in February 1956, evidenced by a 'Surat Hall' document. \n5. The plaintiff took possession of properties but was dispossessed by the defendants. \n6. The plaintiff also filed a petition under Sections 107 and 145 Cr. P.C. in 1956, claiming to be Mahant of a different Math. \n7. The defendants argued that the custom allowed nomination of any fit Chela based on merit, not seniority, and that installation ceremonies were not essential. \n8. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the custom and installation, while the High Court reversed this, finding succession based on merit and the plaintiff’s installation unproven. \n9. The High Court cited documentary evidence (deeds from 1899, 1910, 1937, 1947, 1951) showing nominations based on ability and fitness. \n\n---\n\n### Issues: \n1. Whether the custom of succession in the Turki Math requires adherence to seniority or allows merit-based nomination. \n2. Whether the plaintiff’s claim of installation in 1956 was sufficient to establish his right to Mahantship. \n3. Whether the 1951 and 1952 nomination deeds are valid under the established customs and institutional practices. \n\n---\n\n### Rules: \n1. **Customs in Religious Institutions**: Under Indian law, customs forming part of a religious institution’s practice may be recognized as binding if they are well-established and consistently followed (e.g., *Kanhaiya Lal v. Ram Nath*, AIR 1964 SC 1656). \n2. **Validity of Deeds**: Deeds of succession are valid if they align with the institution’s customs and are supported by documentary evidence (Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act). \n3. **Installation Ceremonies**: The necessity of formal installation ceremonies for succession depends on the institution’s customs, not statutory requirements (per *Raja v. Raja*, AIR 1958 SC 754). \n4. **Burden of Proof**: The plaintiff must prove the existence of a custom and its application to the case, including the validity of installation rituals (Section 101, Indian Evidence Act). \n\n---\n\n### Analysis: \n1. **Custom of Succession**: The trial court relied on the plaintiff’s claim of seniority, but the High Court correctly emphasized that the institutional practice, as evidenced by historical deeds (1899–1951), prioritized merit and fitness over seniority. The documentary evidence demonstrates a consistent pattern of merit-based nominations, overriding the plaintiff’s reliance on seniority. \n2. **Installation Ceremony**: The trial court accepted the plaintiff’s 1956 installation as proof, but the High Court found this unproven. The absence of corroborating evidence (e.g., witnesses, formal records) weakens the plaintiff’s claim. The High Court’s focus on the lack of conclusive proof aligns with the legal principle that installation ceremonies must be substantiated. \n3. **Validity of Deeds**: The 1951 and 1952 deeds are valid under the established custom of merit-based succession. The High Court’s reliance on historical deeds supports their legality, as they reflect the institution’s recognized practice. The plaintiff’s compromise in 1953 does not negate the validity of the deeds but may affect the scope of his claim. \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion: \nThe appeal is **ALLOWED**. The High Court correctly reversed the trial court’s findings by emphasizing the institutional custom of merit-based succession and the lack of conclusive evidence for the plaintiff’s installation. The 1951 and 1952 deeds are valid under the documented practice, and the plaintiff’s reliance on seniority is insufficient. The appeal is allowed to uphold the High Court’s decision.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by\nMitter, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Patna High Court reversing the decree in favour of the plaintiff-appellant declared to be the duly installed Mahant of Turki Math and of all its subsidiary maths and as such entitled to possession of the properties covered by the decree.\nThe, undisputed facts are as follows. In the village of Turki in North Bihar there is a Math or as that of the Kabirpanthi Bhagatatha Vairagi sect established over a century back. There are asthals subordinate to the principal one at Turki located in different districts of Bihar. Devolution of the Mahantship has always been from a Guru to his Chela. Defendant No. 2 executed a deed dated December 17, 1951 nominating the first defendant as Ms successor to t he Mahantship and a second deed on September 15, 1952 surrendering his right to the Mahantship in favour of the first defendant with, immediate effect. The suit of the appellant was launched in 1959 for a declaration that he himself was the duly installed Mahant of saddar asthal Turki in the circumstances mentioned in the plaint, that the second defendant had ceased to be the Mahant by his, voluntary of retirement and the first defendant being a junior Chela could have no right or Claim to the Mahants. As a corollary to the above declaration, he also asked for a decree for recovery of possession of all the properties of the asthal including those which had been purported to be transferred by the first two defendants.\nThe appellant made a two-fold claim in his plaint. It was his case that under the tenets and the customs of the asthal and Bhagataha sect of Kabirpanthies, the devolution of the office of Mahantship is always from a Guru to the senior celebate Chela , either , on the death of. the Mahant for the time being or by the said Mahant nominating. his successor by deed and himself retiring from the Mahantship In either case, after the death or retirement of the Mahant for the time being, the senior chela succeeds to the Mahantship and is' duly installed on the Gaddi after the perfomance of Bhandara in an assemblage of Mahants and sadhus of the sect and respectable persons of the locality at which The Chaddar of Mahanthi is bestowed on the new Mahant by the Mahant of Acharya Math Dhanauti in the District of Saran. The deeds of 1951. and 1952 being in violation of the ancient custom of the asthal, the first defendant was never of the as or became the Mahant of Turki nor was any Chaddar ceremony performed at any requisite ceremony in recognition of such succession. 'The appellant had filed a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Muzaffarpur in the year 1953 for declaration of his riots and for setting aside the deeds of 1951 and 1 952. After the suit was pending for some time, , a compromise was arrived at whereby it was agreed that the appellant should assume the office of Mahantship and take possession of all the properties of the Math. The appellant put his signature on a sheet of blank paper for recording the terms of settlement. He had actually assumed the office of the Mahant of Turki in April 1954, and an elaborate ceremony was performed on the 16th February 1956. whereat he was installed. as the Mahant of Tu rki and given the Chaddar of Mahanti by the Acharya of Dhanauti before a big gathering. A document known as the Surat Hall was prepared regarding the plaintiff's installation. This bore the signature, of innumerable persons. This was followed by his taking, charge of all the properties of the saddar and subordinate asthals. The first two defendants thereafter dispossessed him and being unsuccessful in proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure for securing possession of the math and its properties, he was compelled to file the suit.Respondents 1 And 2 filed a joint written statement. They pleaded that the custom and usages of the Turki Math relating to devolution of Mahantship was for the Mahant for the time being nominating a fit and proper person as his successor from amongst his Chelas irrespective of his seniority and the person so nominated invariably became the Mahant on the demise or retirement of the; incumbent Mahant. A ceremony of installation of the new Mahant on the Gaddi and the bestowing of a Chaddar on him were not essential for establishing his title to this office in place of the retiring or the deceasing Mahant. The defendants denied the factum of the installation of the appellant relied on in the plaint. According to them the appellant had at all times knowledge of the nomination of the first defendant by the deed of December 17, 1951 and his appointment with immediate effect by the, deed of September 15, 1952. It was on realisation of the weakness of his case that he had approached the defendants for a compromise agreeing, to given up his claim in the suit of 1953. He had appended his signature to the petition of compromise in that su it being fully conversant with the terms thereof.\nThe two main issues framed by the trial court and relevant for the disposal of this appeal bear on the custom governing the succession to the Mahantship of the Turki Math and the right of the incumbent mahant to nominate a junior Chela in preference to a senior Chela. Issues were also framed by the trial court as to whether an installation ceremony was an essential pre-requisite to a Mahant's lawfully functioning as such and whether the pl aintiff had factually been installed as a Mahant of the Turki Math. The findings of the trial court were as follows:-\n1.From 1899 onwards only senior Chelas had succeeded their Gurus.\n2.According to the custom of the Muth the Mahant had the right to nominate his successor and the choice rested upon the senior Chela unless he suffered from any disqualification or was found to be unfit for the office. The right of nomination was not absolute but was subject to the approval of others.\n3.An installation ceremony was not essential to complete the title of the Mahant. Such a ceremony had been performed in the ease of the plaintiff in 1956 and he became the Mahant of Turki although not in possession of the properties thereof at the , time of the suit.\nThe High Court rejected the custom as to succession set up by the plaintiff. It found-\n1. Since the time of the founder, Chaturbhuj Gosala, six Mahants had occupied the office of whom three were described as junior Chelas by some of the witnesses on the defendant's side. The evidence did not establish that there was an invariable custom of the senior Chela being nominated by the outgoing Mahant.\n2.The Mahant in office had an undoubted right to nominate his successor and ordinarily the right of appointment was exercised in favour of the senior Chela but the choice was exercised in favour of a celebrate chela taking into account his all round ability and character. The second defendant had as a matter of fact nominated one Ganesh Bhagat as his successor even before the deed of nomination of 1951 in favour of the first defendant. This nomination of Ganesh Bhagat was cancelled as he was found to be unfit. Compared to the plaintiff, the first defendant w as decidedly superior in learning, ability and conduct: as the main function of the Mahant was to propagate the Kabirpanthi cult and the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious atmosphere in the mutt where people were expected to congregate for religious discussion and discourses and other benevolent functions the choice of the, first defendant by the second defendant in preference to the plaintiff was not undeserved and must be taken as final.\n3. The High Court did not examine the question as to whether an installation ceremony was necessary to perfect the title of Mahantship in view of the concession by counsel for the plaintiff Differing from the finding of the trial court, the High Court held that no ceremony of installation of the plaintiff had been performed in 1956 as alleged in the plaint.\n4.The deeds of nomination and surrender in 1951 and 1952 by the first defendant were valid and binding.\nThe general law as to succession to Mahantship is now well settled by in numerable decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and some decisions of this Court. It will be enough to quote some passages from Mukharji's book on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts. The learned author states (third edition, p. 257):\n\"Once a Mutt is established, succession to headship takes place within the spiritual family according to the usages that grow up in a particular institution.\"\n\" The, primary purpose of a Mutt...... is to encourage and foster spiritual learning by maintenance of a competent line of teachers who impart religious instructions to the disciples and followers of the Mutt and try to strengthen the doctrines of the particular school or order of which they profess to be adherents.\"\nAt page 269:\n\" In a Mutt.... it is the custom or practice of a particular institution which determines as to how a successor is to be appointed.\"\nThree aspects have to be borne in mind in connection with the question of succession to the office of a Mahant (p. 269):\n\"The first is that if the grantor has laid down any particular rule of succession, that is to be given effect to. Secondly, in the absence of any grant the usage of the particular institution is to be followed; and in the third place, the party who lays claim to the office of a Mohunt on the strength of any such usage must establish it affirmatively by proper legal evidence. The fact that the defendant is a trespasser would not entitle the plaintiff to succeed even though he be a disciple of the last Mohunt, unless he succeeds in proving, particular usage under which succession takes place in the particular institution.\"At p. 270:\n\" Generally speaking, the Mutts are divided into three classes according to the different ways in which the heads or superiors are appointed. These, three descriptions of Mutts are Mourasi, Panchayati and Hakimi. In the first, the office of the Mohunt is hereditary and devolves upon the chief disciple of the existing Mohunt who moreover usually nominates him as his successor; in the second, the office is elective, the presiding Mohunt being selected by an assembly of Mohunts. In the third, the appointment of the presiding Mohunt is vested in the ruling power or in the party who has endowed the temple.\nIn a Mourasi Mutt the chela or disciple of the last Mohunt succeeds to the office when there are more, chelas than one the eldest generally succeeds, but a junior chela may succeed if he is found more capable and if he is selected by the last Mohunt is his successor.\nIn various institutions the custom is that in order to entitle a chela to succeed, be must be appointed or nominated by the reigning Mohunt during his life time or shortly before his death and this may be done either by a written declaration or some sort of testamentary document. In other cases again, the nominee is formally installed in the office and some sort of recognition is accorded to him by the members of the particular sect either during the life time of the last Mohunt or when the funeral ceremonies of the latter are performed.\"\nAt p. 273.\n\" When the Mohunt has the right to appoint his successor, he may exercise t he right by an act inter vivos or by will.\"\nAt p. 274:\n\" In a Mourashi Mutt it is possible for the Mohunt to make over the endowment during his life time to his chela whom he appoints as a successor.\"\nAt p. 275:\n\" In many cases when a successor is appointed by Mohunt, he is installed in office with certain ceremonies, This cannot be deemed to be essential.\" Admittedly Turki was a Mourasi Mutt The evidence as to custom adduced in the case Is both documentary and oral. The oral evidence which will be noted hereafter is discrepant and mostly of persons who were not disinterested. The documentary evidence undoubtedly furnishes more reliable testimony being ante item motam and brought into existence at a time when the plaintiff was not on the scene and when no dispute as to succession to ship was raging.\nThe earliest docu ment exhibited in this case is that of 1899 executed by Mahant Lal Bahadur Bhagat in favour of Ram Bhagat describing him as the senior chela, able, clever, literate and by all means tit for the Mahantship. Mahant Ram Bhagat in his turn nominated Mahadeo Bhagat as his successor by a deed of November 1910. Like the document of 1899 this deed also describes the nominee as able, clever and fit to discharge the duties of the Mahant Mahadeo Bhaaat however is not described as the senior C hela but only as a disciple of the executant. By a deed of August 1937 Mahant Mahadeo Bhagat nominated Narsingh Bhagat, defendant No. 2 as his successor describing the latter as his only disciple worthy, clever and fit in all respects for the Gaddi. By a document of June 1947 Narsingh Bhagat nominated one Ganesh Bhagat as his successor to the Gaddi. This nomination was cancelled by Narsingh Bhagat on the ground of unfitness of the nominee for the office but mention is made in this document of 1947 of the practice and custom relating to the succession to the office of the Mahant. This document goes against the contention of the plaintiff that by custom the senior Chela was eligible to the office in preference to all others. It recites:\n\"It has been the practice in the Asthal from the time of my predecessors that the Gadinashin leads a life of Brahmacharya and he does not marry. One Mahanth Gadinashin appoints and nominates his able Brahmachari disciple as Gadinashin and future successor during his lifetime. After the death of his Guru, the rightful disciple becomes heir and Gadi nashin of the Asthal of the Sadar Nath at Turki. I the executant thought it proper to make over the management of the property under a will, according to previous custom and appoint Ganesh Bhagat as my successor.\" This was followed by a description of the nominee as literate, able and efficient. The document of December 1951 by Narsingh Bhagat in favour of Girija Nandan Bhagat. the first defendant describes the nominee as fit and qualified in all respects to be the Mahant and recites the custom as in the case of Ganesh Bhagat.\nThe trial Judge's view that the nominations if 1899, 1910 and 1937 'being invariably in favour of the senior disciple went a long way to establish the custom relied on by the plaintiff was not accepted by the High Court. Apparently the trial Judge was of the view that Mahadeo Bliagat who became the Mahant in 1910 was the only disciple of Ram Bhagat and it was therefore not felt necessary to mention him is the senior chela Quite a number of defendants' witnesses made statements to the effect that Ran-. Bhagat had a number of Chelas. The trial Judge obviously over-locked the statement of the plaintiff in his cross examination that Ram Gossai had 5 or 6 Chelas and he himself had seen all of them. A fairly large number of witnesses stated that the qualifications for a person's nomination to the Mahantship did not depend only on seniority but on ability to manage, celibacy, adherence to religious principles and a habit of serving sadhus, fakirs and visitors besides a good moral character. Some even suggested that it was the ablest Chela who was made the Mahant. Making due allowance for the witnesses who came to support the case of the party examining them, the oral testimony unquestionably leads us to hold that in the matter of nomination of a successor to the Mahantship seniority was not the decisive factor but that ability and efficiency in management coupled with a good moral character and adherence to the religious rites practised at the mutt and a spirit of service to sadhus etc. all entered into consideration in the selection of a successor by a Mahant. This conclusion is fortified by the documents exhibited. As already noted they do not support the plaintiff's version that invariably the senior Chela was selected. In our view the document executed by Narsingh Bhagat in favour of Ganesh Bhagat sets out the custom as to succession fairly accurately.The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff was installed as the Mahant of Turki in 1956 before a wide gathering of sadhus and respectable persons at which the Chaddar ceremony was performed does not merit any elaborate or serious consideration. As noted already, the trial, court did not take the view that the performance of the Chaddar ceremony was an essential pre-requisite to a person becoming a Mahant and before the High Court counsel for the plaintiff expressly gave up that point. Although the trial court found in favour of the plaintiff that such a ceremony had actually been performed, the High Court came to a different conclusion. One of the reasons which prompted the High Court to take this view was that the document evidencing the installation ceremony styled the Surat Hall had not been produced in any court of law before the institution of the suit of 1959 although litigation in respect of the properties of the mutt and the plaintiff's right to possession were being canvassed before , courts of law. The High Court also relied on the fact that a respectable and reliable witness like the Mahant of the Acharya Mutt denied having signed this document Ex. 1 and no attempt was made on behalf of the plaintiff to controvert the said denial by examination of a hand-writing expert. Reliance was also placed by the High Court on the fact that the plaintiff who filed a petition under ss. 107 and 145 Cr. P.C. against the first defendant and 12 others on 8th December, 1956 described himself as the Mahant of Chanwa Math and made no reference in the petition itself to the installation ceremony at Turki. The High Court also , did not believe the plaintiff's version that he had signed a blank sheet of paper to be used as a compromise petition in the earlier suit filed by him and nothing has been shown to us as to why we should take a different-view.In the result we hold that the plaintiff was unable to discharge the onus which lay on him to substantiate the custom as to succession pleaded in his plaint. He also failed to establish that he had in fact been installed as the Mahant of the said Math. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 5048 of 2005 | Shin-Etsu Chemical Company Limited v. M/S. Aksh Optifibre Limited And Another | 12/08/2005", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 5048 of 2005 | Shin-Etsu Chemical Company Limited v. M/S. Aksh Optifibre Limited And Another", + "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "case_record": "Parties entered an agreement dated November 16/18, 2000, containing an arbitration clause governed by Japanese law. After the appellant terminated it, the first respondent sued, claiming the agreement was unconscionable, void, and inoperative. The appellant sought arbitration under Section 8 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which the trial court allowed. The High Court set aside this order, remanding the matter for fresh adjudication under Section 45, as the validity objection was not addressed. Both parties subsequently agreed that Section 45, not Section 8, was the applicable provision.", + "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let's tackle this appeal. The user wants me to decide whether the appeal should be allowed or dismissed based on the given facts. Let me start by understanding the scenario.\n\nSo, there's an agreement from November 16/18, 2000, with an arbitration clause governed by Japanese law. The appellant terminated the agreement, and the first respondent sued, claiming the agreement was unconscionable, void, and inoperative. The appellant then sought arbitration under Section 8 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The trial court allowed this, but the High Court set aside the order, remanding the matter under Section 45. Both parties then agreed that Section 45 is the applicable provision instead of Section 8.\n\nFirst, I need to recall the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 8 deals with the appointment of arbitrators, while Section 45 relates to the enforcement of arbitral awards. However, the key here is about the validity of the arbitration agreement itself. The respondent is challenging the validity of the agreement, which would typically fall under Section 45, which allows courts to set aside awards if they are invalid. But the initial court allowed the arbitration under Section 8, which is about initiating arbitration proceedings. \n\nWait, the High Court set aside the trial court's order allowing arbitration under Section 8. The reason given was that the validity objection wasn't addressed. So the High Court remanded the matter for fresh adjudication under Section 45. Now, both parties agreed that Section 45 is the applicable provision. \n\nThe question is whether the appeal should be allowed or dismissed. The appeal is likely against the High Court's decision to remand under Section 45. But the parties have already agreed that Section 45 is the correct provision. So the trial court initially used Section 8, but the High Court corrected that by using Section 45. The appeal might be challenging the High Court's remand. \n\nBut the user's input is that the appeal is based on the facts provided. The key point here is the validity of the arbitration agreement. If the High Court correctly moved to Section 45, which deals with the validity of the award, then the appeal might be dismissed. However, the parties agreed that Section 45 is applicable. \n\nWait, the initial issue was whether the agreement was unconscionable. The trial court allowed arbitration under Section 8, which is about initiating arbitration. But the validity of the agreement itself (i.e., whether it's void or not) would be under Section 45. So the High Court correctly remanded the matter to address the validity under Section 45. The parties now agree that Section 45 is the right provision. Therefore, the High Court's decision to remand under Section 45 is correct. \n\nIf the appeal is against the High Court's order, then the appeal should be dismissed because the High Court correctly applied Section 45. Alternatively, if the appeal is about the initial order, but the parties have agreed on Section 45, then the appeal might be allowed if there was an error in the application. But the facts state that the High Court set aside the trial court's order and remanded under Section 45. The parties agreed on Section 45, so the appeal is likely dismissed because the High Court's order is correct. \n\nWait, but the user hasn't specified what the appeal is against. The input facts mention that the High Court set aside the trial court's order and remanded under Section 45. The parties agreed that Section 45 is applicable. So if the appeal is the High Court's decision, then the appeal would be dismissed. Alternatively, if the appeal is the trial court's order, then the High Court's remand is correct. \n\nThe problem is that the user's input doesn't specify which court's order is being appealed. But the structure is that the trial court allowed arbitration under Section 8, High Court set aside that order and remanded under Section 45. Both parties agreed Section 45 applies. So the appeal is likely against the High Court's decision. Wait, no. The High Court's decision is the one that remanded under Section 45. The appeal might be from the High Court's decision. But the user says the parties agreed that Section 45 is applicable. So the High Court's order is correct. Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. \n\nAlternatively, if the appeal is from the trial court's order, then the High Court's remand is correct, so the appeal would be dismissed. But the user is asking whether the appeal (presumably against the High Court's order) should be allowed or dismissed. Since the parties agreed that Section 45 applies, and the High Court correctly applied it, the appeal should be dismissed. \n\nSo the conclusion is that the appeal should be DISMISSED.\n\n\nDISMISSED. The High Court correctly remanded the matter under Section 45 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as the validity of the arbitration agreement (which the respondent challenged) falls under Section 45, not Section 8. The parties' agreement to apply Section 45 confirms the High Court's proper application of the law. The appeal lacks merit and is therefore dismissed.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE B.N. SRIKRISHNA\nLeave granted.\n2. I have had the benefit of carefully considering the erudite judgment delivered by my esteemed and learned Brother Sabharwal. Regretfully, I find myself in the unenviable position of having to disagree with the views expressed therein.\n3. The judgment of Brother Sabharwal fully sets out the facts in the Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3160/05 as well as the issue which arises for determination. The core issue in this case is: Whether the finding of the court made under Section 45 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (\"the Act\") that the arbitration agreement , falling within the definition of Section 44 of the Act, is or is not \"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\" should be a final expression of the view of the court or should it be a prima facie view formed without a full-fledged trial?\nAmbiguity in the Wording of Section 45\n4. The contrast in language between Section 8 and 45 of the Act has been rightly noticed by my Learned Brother. Section 8, which leaves no discretion in the court in the matter of referring parties to arbitration, does not apply to the present case, as we are concerned with Part II of the Act. On the other hand, Section 45 which is directly applicable to the present case, empowers the court to refuse a reference to arbitration if it \"finds\" that the arbitration agreement is \"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\".\n5. This Court in Konkan Railways Corporation Ltd. and others vs. M/s. Mehul Construction Co. [(2000) 7 SCC 201 ] (referred) pointed out that Parliament had clearly indicated that the Act had substantially adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (\"the Model Law\") which had been drafted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law \"(UNCITRAL)\". The objective, as the court observed, was to pursue the \"progressive harmonization and unification of the Law of International Trade [Ibid. at p. 206 (para 4), per Pattanaik, J. (as he then was)]. It is further pointed out in the said judgment that, it would be appropriate to bear the said objective in mind while interpreting any provision of the Act. Indeed, Section 45 of the Act is pari materia, not only with Article 8 of the Model Law but also with Article 2(3) of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (\"the New York Convention\").\n6. However, even while bearing these objectives in mind, there is significant difficulty in interpreting the provisions of Section 45 of the Act, which envisages pre-reference judicial interference with the arbitral process, as there is no determinative indicator to ascertain whether the finding of the court under Section 45 should be based on a prima facie view or on the result of a final decision rendered in the trial court.\nThe Judgment in Renusagar\n7. A survey of the situation in other jurisdictions has been made in the judgment of Brother Sabharwal and I refrain from duplicating his efforts, except to point out that two distinct stands are possible on the wording of Article 2(3) of the New York Convention, the language of which, as I have already said, has been reproduced in Section 45 of the Act. My Learned Brother strongly, relies on the observations made in paragraphs 58 and 59 of Renusagar Power Co. vs. General Electric Co. [(1984) 4 SCC 679 ] (referred) (\"Renusagar\"), which no doubt appear to suggest, in the context of Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act, 1961 \"(Foreign Awards Act\") and the Arbitration Act, 1940, that the court must be fully satisfied that the arbitration agreement exists before granting stay of the proceedings. Following these observations, Brother Sabharwal in his judgment, opines that:\n \"When words in an earlier statute have received an authoritative exposition by superior Court (interpretation of Section 3 in Renusagar's case), use of same words in a similar context in a later Act will give rise to a strong presumption that the Parliament intends that the same interpretation should also be followed for construction of these words in the later statute.\" \n8. With great deference to the opinion of my Learned Brother, I find myself unable to agree to this proposition. In fact, the observations in Renusagar (supra) are clearly distinguishable. In the first place, in paragraph 51 of the judgment, the learned Judges set forth six propositions as the conditions required to be fulfilled for invoking Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act, which incidentally has been repealed by the Act. What is of relevance is proposition No. 5, which the court states as follows:\n \"(v) the Court has to be satisfied that the agreement is valid, operative and capable of being performed; this relates to the satisfaction about the \"existence and validity\" of the arbitration agreement. (In the instance case these questions do not arise)\" [Ibid. at p.725 (para 51) per Tulzapurkar, J. (emphasis supplied). \n9. After having said so, the court proceeded to make the observations in paragraph 58, which have been referred to and highlighted by my Learned Brother. In my respectful view, if the court thinks that an issue does not arise, then any observation made with regard to such an issue would be purely obiter dictum. It is a well settled proposition that the ratio decidendi of a case is the principle of law that decided the dispute in the facts of the case and, therefore, a decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition that it did not decide [Mittal Engineering Works vs. Collector of Central Excise, (1997) 1 SCC 203 (referred)at p. 207 (para 8); Jagdish Lal vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538 (referred) at p.560 (para 17); Divisional Controller, KSRTC vs. Mahadeva Shetty & others (2003) 7 SCC 197 (referred) at p. 206 (para 23)]. An apt observation about this principle was made in M/s. Amarnath Nath Om Prakash vs. State of Punjab [(1985) 1 SCC 345 ] (referred)\n \"We consider it proper to say, as we have already said in other cases, that judgments of courts are not be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. It is needless to repeat the oft-quoted truism of Lord Halsbury that a case is only a authority for what it actually decides and not for what may seem to follow logically from it.\" [Ibid. at p. 363 (paras 10 and 11), per Chinnappa Reddy, J. Similar observations were also made in, Union of India vs. Amrit Lal Manchanda, (2004) 3 SCC 75 (referred)at pp. 83-84 (paras 15-18).\n10. Further, decisions rendered under the Arbitration Act, 1940 or under the Foreign Award Act should be considered with caution as the Act purports to bring a new approach to arbitration, as has been observed in Firm Ashok Traders & Anr. vs. Gurumukh Das Saluja [(2004) 3 SCC 155 ] (referred).\n \"The A & C Act, 1996 is a long leap in the direction of alternate dispute resolution systems. It is based on (sic) UNCITRAL Model. The decided cases under the preceding Act of 1940 have to be applied with caution for determining the issues arising for decision under the new Act.\" [Ibid. at 165 (para 13) (emphasis supplied).\n11. Secondly, no one can doubt that Part II of the 1996 Act is intended to opt for the international arbitration regime to meet the challenges of international trade and commerce, nor can it be doubted that Section 45 offers a greater discretion to the court for judicial intervention at the pre-reference stage. Despite all this, the question would still remain as to whether the discretion available for the court for interference, even under Section 45 of the Act, should be exercised on a prima facie view of the nature of the arbitral agreement, or should it be on a final findings?\nEx Visceribus Interpretation of the Statute\n12. True, that there is nothing in Section 45 which suggests that the finding as to the nature of the arbitral agreement has to be ex facie or prima facie. In my view, however, this is an inescapable inference from an ex visceribus interpretation of the statute. Sub-section (3) of Section 8 in Part I of the Act envisages that even in a situation where an application to the court has been made under sub-section (1), the arbitration may commence, continue and even an arbitral award be made. This was obviously meant to cut down delay in the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings. There is conspicuous absence of a corresponding provision either in Section 45 or in the rest of the provisions in Part II. This legitimately gives rise to an inference that once the arbitral agreement has been subjected to scrutiny before the court under Section 45 of the Act, conceivably, the arbitral proceedings could be stayed till the decision of the court on the nature of the arbitral agreement. If it were to be held that the finding of the court under Section 45 should be a final, determinative conclusion, then it is obvious that, until such a pronouncement is made, the arbitral proceedings would have to be in limbo. This evidently defeats the credo and ethos of the Act, which is to enable expeditious arbitration without avoidable intervention by judicial authorities.\n13. The absence in Part Ii of the Act of a provision corresponding to Section 5 in Part I has been highlighted as supportive of the view that greater judicial intervention is contemplated in Part II of the Act. The question that has arisen before the Court is not the presence or absence of judicial intervention; it is one with regard to the manner in which the said judicial intervention should proceed - whether on a final view or prima facie view of the factors enumerated in Section 45 of the Act.\n14. There are distinct advantages in veering to the view that Section 45 does not require a final determinative finding by the Court. First, under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (as in force with effect from 1.1.1998), as in the present case, invariably the arbitral tribunal is vested with the power to rule upon its own jurisdiction. Even if the court takes the view that the arbitral agreement is not vitiated or that it is not invalid, inoperative or unenforceable, based upon purely a prima facie view, nothing prevents the arbitrator from trying the issue fully and rendering a final decision thereupon. If the arbitrator finds the agreement valid, there is no problem as the arbitration will proceed and the award will be made. However, if the arbitrator finds the agreement invalid, inoperative or void, this means that the party who wanted to proceed for arbitration was given an opportunity of proceeding to arbitration, and the arbitrator after fully trying the issue has found that there no scope for arbitration. Since the arbitrator's finding would not be an enforceable award, there is no need to take recourse to the judicial intercession available under Section 48(1)(a) of the Act.\n15. The finding of the court that the arbitration agreement is valid, operative and enforceable, if in favour of the party setting up the arbitration agreement, is not appealable under Section 50 as a matter of legislative policy. Refusing to refer parties to arbitration under Section 45, is however, made appealable under Section 50(1)(a) of the Act. Even after the court takes a prima facie view that the arbitration agreement is not vitiated on account of factors enumerated in Section 45, and the arbitrator upon a full trial holds that there is no vitiating factor in the arbitration agreement and makes an award, such as award can be challenged under Section 48(1)(a). The award will be set aside if the party against whom it is invoked satisfies the court inter alia that the agreement was not valid under the law to which the parties had suggested it or under the law of the country where the award was made. The two basic requirements, namely, expedition at the pre-reference stage, and a fair opportunity to contest the award after full trial, would be fully satisfied by interpreting Section 45 as enabling the court to act on a prima facie view.\nRes Judicata and Unfairness\n16. If the finding made under Section 45 as to the validity of the arbitral agreement were to be treated as final, then the competent court while entertaining an application for enforcement of a foreign award might decline to go into the same question. In other words, the court before which enforcement is sought may not re-examine whether the agreement was valid under the applicable law, on the ground that a final judgment had been rendered on a earlier occasion by another competent court. The principles analogous to res judicata (even though the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not directly apply) might preclude the party from raising the defence under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 48.\n17. When a party raises the issue as to the validity of the agreement in an application under Section 45, the court must either hold a full-fledged trial and give a final finding or give a prima facie finding on that issue. If we were to hold that a final finding has to be given, then it must necessarily be after a trial recording all necessary evidence, in order to eliminate the likelihood of fraud, coercision etc that may render the agreement void, inoperative or unenforceable. If we were to take the view that it could be done only on the basis of affidavits by excluding oral evidence altogether, I am afraid, it would render injustice to the party because a final judgment would have been rendered on insufficient material.\n18. Moreover, since principles analogous to res judicata may operate, as mentioned earlier, such a party may not even be heard in a post-award situation under Section 48(1)(a) on the same issue as the finding given under Section 45 would be treated as final and binding. For this reason also, I am of the view that, it would be preferable to hold that Section 45 requires only a prima facie view of the matter as to the absence of the vitiating factors contemplated therein.\n19. Treating the finding under Section 45 as final results in a paradoxical situation. A final decision rendered by the competent court on the nature of the arbitral agreement may have to be ignored by the arbitral tribunal, which would be entitled to decide the issue afresh on the material presented to it. It may also lead to another curious result, that the competent court in the jurisdiction where the arbitration proceeds (Japan, as in the present case) would have to reckon with the fully binding effect of a finding made under Section 45 by a competent court in India arrived at by following a summary procedure without admitting all relevant evidence.\nProof of Applicable Foreign Law\n20. There is yet another strange result which may come about by holding that Section 45 requires a final finding. This can be illustrated by reference to the facts of the present case. The parties here have subjected their agreement to the laws of Japan. The question that will arise is: When a court has to make a final determinative ruling on the validity of the arbitration agreement, under which law is this issue to be tested? This question of choice of law has been conclusively decided by the judgment of this Court in National Thermal Power Corporation vs. Singer Company (1992) 3 SCC 551 ) (referred), where it was observed:\n \"The proper law of the arbitration agreement is normally the same as the proper law of the contract. It is only in exceptional cases that it is not so even where the proper law of the contract is expressly chosen by the parties. Where, however, there is no express choice of the law governing the contract as a whole, of the arbitration agreements as such, a presumption may arise that the law of the country where the arbitration is agreed to be held is the proper law of the arbitration agreement. But that is only a rebuttable presumption.\" [Ibid. at p.563 (para 23), per Thommen, J.)\n21. Thus, the proper law of the arbitration agreement is the substantive law governing the contract itself. In the present case, to effectively decide whether the arbitration agreement is \"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\", the court would have to apply the law to which the contract has been expressly subjected, namely, Japanese law. Obviously, proof of Japanese law (as applicable to arbitration agreements) would have to be rendered on the lines of proving facts in a trial.)\n22. It would not only be unfeasible to prove foreign law exclusively through affidavits, but it would also entail enormous expenditure of time and money. Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration highlights that this problem as best exemplified in the U.S. case of SMG Swedish Machine Group vs. Swedish Machine Group [XVIII Y.B. Comm. Arb. 457 (1993) (decided on 4.1.91). In this case, it was held by the U.S. court that the validity or existence of the arbitration agreement would have to be conclusively determined by the court itself at the pre-award stage. The law applicable to the arbitration agreement was Swedish law and therefore the validity of the agreement had to be determined in accordance with this law. The court reviewed the Swedish law opinions submitted by both parties, but found them poorly documented. When parties submitted new opinions, these were found to be mutually contradictory. Finally, the court had to conduct a hearing where parties could provide proof of their true intentions as to the issue [See, Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (E. Gaillard and J. Savage, eds. 1999) at p.411-412 (para 680)]. Thus, similar difficulties, delays and costs may be encountered by the trial court in the present case if it has to give a final finding (after conducting a full-fledged trial) on the validity of the arbitration agreement at the pre-reference stage under Section 45.\n23. On the other hand, if one were to take the view that the finding under Section 45 is only a prima facie view, then all these difficulties could be obviated. Neither the arbitral tribunal, nor the court enforcing the arbitral award may consider itself bound by the prima facie view expressed under Section 45 of the Act. The difficulty of having to conclusively prove the applicable foreign law at a trial would also be obviated.\nRedundancy in the Statute\n24. Another undesirable result flows from the view that the court conclusively rules upon the validity of the arbitration agreement at the pre-reference stage. If a final finding were to be made upon the arbitration agreement, finding it valid and operative, such a finding might operate as res judicata. Thus, one ground made available by Parliament under Section 48(1)(a) to assail the award at the post-award stage, by impugning the validity of the arbitration agreement, would be totally precluded because the finding under Section 45 on the said issue would be final. The approach suggested by Brother Sabharwal would, therefore, preclude this ground in cases where Section 45 is in fact resorted to by parties. Indeed, the present case is such a case, where the ground might be precluded if a final finding were to be arrived at by the trial court in the application under Section 45.\n25. It is a well accepted principle of statutory interpretation that a court must make every effort to give effect to all words in a statute since Parliament cannot be held to have been wasting its words or saying something in vain. (See, for example, G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th edn., 2004) at p. 68; Craies on Statute Law (S.G.G. Edgar eds., 7th edn., 1971, 1999 Indian Reprint) at pp. 103-107) . Only in exceptional situations can this be departed from. In J.K. Cotton Mills Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (AIR 1961 SC 1170 ) (referred) it was observed:\n \"In the interpretation of statutes the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect.\" (Ibid. at p. 1174 (para 7).\n26. This principle has received widespread acceptance by this court in numerous decisions. (See, for example, Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 (referred) (para 26); Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271 (referred) (para 14); Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner, AIR 1964 SC 766 (referred)(para 15). If the approach suggested by Brother Sabharwal in interpreting Section 45 were to be adopted, it could effectively make a part of the provision in Section 48(1)(a) redundant; an outcome which Parliament could surely have not intended.\nPossibility of Multiple Trials\n27. It appears to me that, at the post-award stage, at least, the finding has to be recorded on a full trial of the relevant issue under Section 48(1)(a). If this be so, I see no special advantage in taking the view that the finding under Section 45 should be anything other than a prima facie finding.\n28. Even if the view were to be taken that the finding under Section 45 of the Act would be a final finding not amenable to reiteration under Section 48(1)(a) at the time of the attempt to enforce the award, it is quite possible that the award may be challenged on the other grounds available under Section 48. As I have already said, this challenge will have to be tried out by a full trial by involving all kinds of evidence (including oral evidence). If that be so, then all issues including the present issue could be tried fully after the award instead of seeking a final finding at the pre-reference stage under Section 45 of the Act. This would be in consonance with the ethos of the Act to avoid delay at different stages, to centralize the court review of all disputes relating to the arbitration at the post-award stage, and also carry forward the objectives of the Model Law.\nApproach in Foreign Jurisdictions\n29. The importance of carrying forward the objectives underlying the Model Law can hardly be gainsaid. There is evident dearth of guiding Indian precedent which might be useful in interpreting Section 45 of the Act. Hence, it becomes necessary to seek light from foreign judgments interpreting corresponding provisions that have been modeled on the Model Law. Now, for a survey of such foreign precedents.\n30. It has rightly been noticed in the judgment of Brother Sabharwal that different countries have approached the issue depending on their substantive and processual laws. It has been noticed that the situation under the French Code of Civil Procedure favours a prima facie view, since under the Statute if the dispute is not before an arbitral tribunal, the French Courts must decline jurisdiction unless the arbitration agreement is \"patently void\".\n31. Similarly, Article 7 of the 1987 Swiss. Private International Law Statute stipulates that the courts decline jurisdiction \"...b. unless the court finds that the arbitral agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\". This has been interpreted by the Swiss Federal Tribunal as restricting the courts review at the start of the proceedings to a prima facie verification of the existence and effectiveness of the arbitration clause. [See, Fondation M. vs. Banque X, 1996 Bull. ASA 527 (referred)(Swiss Fed. Trib, Apr. 29, 1996) cited from Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (E. Gaillard and J. Savage, eds. 1999) at p. 409) (para 675).\n32. As far as the U.S. jurisdiction is concerned, the statute there, which deals both with the substantive law and the law of procedure, is worded differently from the Act. Indeed, not all jurisdictions in the U.S. have seen modeled their law on the Model Law and U.S. cases must be approached with great caution. The U.S. position is, therefore, not very helpful in resolving the issue before us.\n33. It has been noticed in Brother Sabharwal's judgment that in at least two common law jurisdictions, Ontario and Hong Kong, both of which have based their law on the Model Law (like India), the courts have adopted a 'liberal approach' to the issue, namely, that of prima facie view as to the existence and non-vitiation of the arbitral agreement, before making a reference. The Hong Kong and Ontario judgments will be examined presently.\nThe Hong Kong Judgment\n34. There is no doubt that in Pacific International Lines (Pte.) Ltd. vs. Tsinlien Metals and Minerals Co. Ltd., XVIII Y.B COMM. ARB. 180 (1993) (referred) (decided on 1.7.1992) (\"Pacific International Lines\") the High Court of Hong Kong was concerned precisely with the issue as to whether there was a valid arbitration agreement within the meaning of Article 7 of the Model Law. The court was of the view that there was a \"plainly arguable\" case to support the proposition that there was an arbitration agreement that complied with Article 7 of the Model Law. The Court observed:\n \"It follows, therefore, that if I am satisfied that there is a plainly arguable case to support the proposition and there was an arbitration agreement which complies with Art. 7 of the Model Law, I should proceed to appoint the arbitrator in the full knowledge that the defendants will not be precluded from raising the point before the arbitrator and having the matter reconsidered by the court consequent upon that preliminary ruling.\" Ibid. at p.185 (para 18), per Kaplan, J.\n35. Further, the court held:\n \"I am quite satisfied that the plaintiffs have made out a strongly arguable case in support of an arbitration agreement which complies Article 7 of the Model Law.\" Ibid.at p. 185 (para 19), per Kaplan, J.\n36. In my reading of the case, the Hong Kong High Court was squarely concerned with the issue as to whether the arbitration agreement complied with Article 7 of the Model Law or not. This became relevant because under Article 8 the Court was empowered to decide as to the existence or otherwise of the arbitral agreement and Article 7 required the agreement to be in the form prescribed by that Article itself. With respect, it would be incorrect to distinguish the case on the ground that it was not concerned with Article 8 of the Model Law. In my view, the court was directly concerned with the validity of the arbitration agreement as it was argued that the arbitration agreement did not comply with Article 7 and, therefore, was invalid.\n37. The second ground of distinction sought t be made by my learned Brother is that the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (\"the Hong Kong Ordinance\") was based upon the English Arbitration Act, 1996 (\"the English Act\") and that the Hong Kong judgment was in the special context of these statutes. In particular, my Learned Brother holds that Section 6 of the Hong Kong Ordinance is similar to Section 32 of the English Act (both of which are not present in our Act), as a distinguishing feature rendering the Hong Kong judgment inapplicable to the present case. To clear the air, I quote below both the concerned provisions.\nThe Hong Kong Ordinance:\n \"Section 6 Court to refer matter to arbitration in certain cases\n(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court) applies to a matter that is the subject of a domestic arbitration agreement in the same way as it applies to a matter that is the subject of an international arbitration agreement.\n(2) Subject to subsection (3), if a party to an arbitration agreement that provides for the arbitration of a dispute involving a claim or other matter this is within the jurisdiction of the Labour Tribunal or a person claiming through or under such a party, commences legal proceedings in any court against any other party to the agreement or any person claiming through or under that other party, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, and any party to those legal proceedings applies to that court after appearance and before delivering any pleadings or taking any other step in the proceedings, to stay the proceedings, the court or a judge of that court may make an order staying the proceedings, if satisfied that-\n(a) there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the agreement; and\n(b) the applicant was ready and willing at the time the proceedings were commenced to do all things necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration, and remains so. \n (3) Subsections (1) and (2) have effect subject to section 15 of the Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance (Cap 71).\" \nThe English Act:\n \"Section 32.- Determination of preliminary point of jurisdiction.\n(1) The court may, on the application of a party to arbitral proceedings (upon notice to the other parties), determine any question as to the substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal. A party may lose the right to object (see section 73).\n(2) An application under this section shall not be considered unless -\n(a) it is made with the agreement in writing of all the other parties to the proceedings, or\n(b) it is made with the permission of the tribunal and the court is satisfied-\n(i) that the determination of the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs,\n(ii) that the application was made without delay, and\n(iii) that there is good reason why the matter should be decided by the court.\n(3) An application under this section, unless made with the agreement of all the other parties to the proceedings, shall state the grounds on which it is said that the matter should be decided by the court.\n(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award while an application to the court under this section is pending.\n(5) Unless the court gives leave, no appeal lies from a decision of the court whether the conditions specified in subsection (2) are met.\n(6) The decision of the court on the question of jurisdiction shall be treated as a judgment of the court for the purposes of an appeal. But no appeal lies without the leave of the court which shall not be given unless the court considers that the question involves a point of law which is one of general importance or is one which for some other special reason should be considered by the Court of Appeal.\" \n38. On a comparative reading of Section 6 of the Hong Kong Ordinance and Section 32 of the English Act, it appears to me that the two are neither similar, nor resemble each other, the purposes of the two sections being totally different. This distinction made by Brother Sabharwal, with respect, appears to be unsupportable.\n39. On the other hand, what corresponds to Section 32 of the English Act is Section 23A of the Hong Kong Ordinance, which is reproduced below:\n \"Section 23A Determination of preliminary point of law by Court\n(1) Subject to subsection (2) and section 23B, on an application to the Court made by any of the parties to a reference -\n(a) with the consent of an arbitrator who has entered on the reference or, if an umpire has entered on the reference, with his consent, or\n(b) with the consent of all the other parties,\nthe Court shall have jurisdiction to determine any question of law arising in the course of the reference.\n(2) The Court shall not entertain an application under subsection (1)(a) with respect to any question of law unless it is satisfied that-\n(a) the determination of the application might produce substantial savings in costs to the parties; and\n(b) the question of law is one in respect of which I leave to appeal would be likely to be given under section 23(3)(b).\n(3) A decision of the Court under subsection (1) shall be deemed to be a judgment of the Court within the meaning of section 14 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) (appeals to the Court of Appeal), but no appeal shall lie from such a decision unless the Court or the Court of Appeal gives leave.\" (Amended 25 of 1998 s.2)\n40. Courts under both Section 32 of the English Act as well as Section 23A of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, can make a determination of preliminary point of jurisdiction with the 'consent of all the parties' or at least with the 'consent of the arbitrator' and only upon being satisfied that the determination of the application might reduce substantially the costs to the parties, and the question of law is one in which leave is likely to be given.\n41. The Hong Kong decision has also been distinguished on the ground that Section 23A of the Hong Kong Ordinance specifically provides for determination of the preliminary issue by the court and that there is no similar provision in the Act. With respect, this distinction may also not be valid. In the first place, the judgment in Pacific International Lines (supra) was rendered in the year 1992; it does not make any reference whatsoever to Section 23A of the Hong Kong Ordinance. Nor does it appear from the judgment that there was any analogous provision when the Hong Kong High Court decided the matter. Indeed, all references in the judgment are to the provisions of the Model Law. Moreover, if Section 23A had been applicable, it would have been wholly unnecessary for the court to express its opinion on an interpretation of Article 7 or 8 of the Model Law as it could straightaway have relied on Section 23A. In my view, the Hong Kong judgment squarely deals with the issue before us and conclusively holds that the approach to be adopted is whether it is a \"plainly arguable\" that the arbitration agreement was in existence.\nThe Ontario Judgment\n42. The Ontario Court of Justice in Rio Algom Ltd. vs. Sami Steel Co.Ltd. XVII Y.B. COMM. ARB. 166 (1993) (referred)(decided on 1.3.1991). dealt with Article 16 of the Model Law with regard to the competence of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction and the court's own powers at the preliminary stage. Article 16 has been quoted in Learned Brother Sabharwal's judgment. The court expressed its categorical opinion on the relevant issue in the following words:\n \"What appears to me of significance is that the Model Law reflects an emphasis in favour of arbitration in the first instance in international commercial arbitrations to which it applies (of which it is common ground this is one). The courts in matters of contract interpretation as such are limited in that they do not appear to have a role in determining matters of law or construction; jurisdiction and scope of authority are for the arbitrator to determine in the first instance, subject to later recourse to set aside the ruling or award. The role of the court before arbitration appears to be confined to determining whether the arbitration clause is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed (Art. 8) - if not it is mandatory to send the parties to arbitration. Kane, J. did not follow this course - he referred questions of the construction of the agreement to trial without apparent reference to the condition specified in Art.8; these issues to be tried relate to matters of law, including jurisdiction and scope7 of the arbitrator's authority, but not, so far as I can see, to the issues for the court to determine under art. 8. It seems to me be at least arguable that the matters referred to trial are not matters that permit the intervention of the court in the light of Art. 5, supra.\" Ibid.at pp. 170-171 (para 13)\n43. In my view, this is a clear and unequivocal expression on the part of the court on the issue before us. Indeed, the Ontario Court has clearly held that the court in the matter of interpretation of the existence and non-vitiation of the arbitral agreement has only a prima facie jurisdiction and is not required to render a final decision at that stage.\nThe English Judgment\n44. The English judgment in Azov Shipping Co. vs. Baltic Shipping Co., [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 68 (Q.B.) (referred). raised a different issue altogether. The case of the applicant before the court was that he was not a party to the arbitral agreement, which contained the arbitration clause, and, despite this, the arbitrator had delivered an award in favour of the other party. The arbitrator after a full trial found that there was a valid arbitration agreement and that he had jurisdiction over the parties. There was a challenge to the award. The issue before the court was: Where a full-scale hearing on jurisdiction had been completed before the arbitrator, and there was a challenge to the award, whether the jurisdiction of the arbitrator could be challenged with complete oral evidence and cross-examination so the challenge in effect became a full hearing of what had already occurred before the arbitrator?\n45. The court allowed the application and held that even at the post-award stage, it was permissible to lead oral evidence to demonstrate that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction. The point of distinction is that the court was dealing with a challenge at a post-award stage. There would be no doubt that, at that stage the finding on the jurisdictional issue or the existence of vitiating factors has to be rendered only after complete trial and has to be a final finding. Further, the observations of the court were perfectly in consonance of Sections 32 and 67 of the English Act which are not in any manner reflected in the Act.\nConsequences of the Mollificatory Suggestions\n46. The suggestions made by Learned Brother Sabharwal to mollify some of the obvious drawbacks of the approach that he adopts, also needs closer scrutiny. He has suggested a trial by affidavits as well as a fixed time-frame to reduce the possible delays ensuing from a protracted trial at the pre-reference stage. In my view, any attempt to mollify the significant adverse consequences of the determinative approach by enabling the court to render final judgment only on the basis of affidavits, albeit within a fixed time-frame, may prove counter-productive.\n47. There are several instances where affidavit evidence cannot aid in making a final determinative finding on the issue. For instance, where a defence taken is that the signature of a party was forged or that agreement itself is entirely fabricated, I cannot conceive of the issue being satisfactorily determined fully and finally merely on the basis of affidavits without oral evidence. Correspondingly, if courts at the preliminary stage were to admit oral evidence, simply because forgery or the like is pleaded, the consequences are still troublesome. In fact, if the view postulated by learned Brother Sabharwal were to prevail, then all international commercial arbitrations can be defeated by a totally bogus defence that the agreement is forged or fabricated. If such a defence were to be allowed, it would necessarily require a full-fledged trial (with oral evidence) at the pre-reference stage with all its consequential delay and expense. On the other hand, if only a prima facie view were to be taken, then the issue could still be examined in-depth after a full trial either before the arbitral tribunal or at any rate Section 48(1)(a) when the enforceability of the ensuing award is questioned.\n48. I am afraid that the suggestion of fixing a time limit, within which an issue can be determined without oral evidence, may also not be practical. As pointed out earlier, if the applicable law is a foreign law (which is not an uncommon feature in international commercial contracts), the time limit of three months is unlikely to be complied with as it would be unfeasible. In any event, since it is undoubted that at the enforcement stage a full trial under Section 48 is permissible, parties are none the better by having two trials i.e. one at the stage of Section 45, and another at the stage of Section 48.\n49. I fully agree with my Learned Brother's view that the object of dispute resolution through arbitration, including international commercial arbitration, is expedition and that the object of the Act would be defeated if proceedings remain pending in court even after commencing of the arbitration. It is precisely for this reason that I am inclined to the view that at the pre-reference stage contemplated by Section 45, the court is required to take only a prima facie view for making the reference, leaving the parties to a full trial either before the arbitral tribunal or before the court at the post-award stage.\n50. Undoubtedly, an international commercial arbitration involves huge expenses, particularly where the parties have subjected the contract to a foreign law. But, that cannot be a deterrent to this Court from pronouncing on the correct approach to be adopted under Section 45 of the Act. In fact, as I have pointed out, adopting a final and determinative approach under Section 45 may not only prolong proceedings at the initial stage but also correspondingly increase costs and uncertainty for all the parties concerned. Finally, having regard to the structure of the Act, consequences arising from particular interpretations, judgments in other jurisdictions, as well as the opinion of learned authors on the subject, See, for example, FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (E. Gaillard and J. Savage, eds. 1999) at pp. 412-412 (para 682) as well as JULIAN D.M. LEW ET. AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003) at p.346 (para 14-53) who support the prima facie approach. I am of the view that, the correct approach to be adopted under section 45 at the pre-reference stage, is one of a prima facie finding by the trial court as the validity or otherwise of the arbitration agreement.\n51. For all these reasons, I respectfully differ from the judgment of my esteemed Brother Sabharwal. I am of the view that the present matter needs to be remitted to the trial court, but not for a full trial as directed by the impugned judgment of the High Court. The application under Section 45 would have to be determined by the trial court after arriving at the prima facie satisfaction that there exists an arbitral agreement, which is \"not null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\". If the trial court finds thus, the parties shall be referred to arbitration.\n52. The appeal is accordingly allowed and Ordered accordingly.\nHon'ble Justice Dharmadhikari J. -- Leave granted.\n2. I have carefully gone through very elaborate and well- considered opinions differing with each other of learned Brethren Y. K. Sabharwal and B. N. Srikrishna JJ.\n3. With utmost respect to both of them, I am inclined to agree with the view expressed by learned Brother Srikrishna J. but only with a rider and a partly different reason which may I state below:-\n4. The main issue is regarding the scope of power of any judicial authority including a regular civil court under section 45 of the Act in making or refusing a reference of dispute arising from an international arbitration agreement governed by the provisions contained in Part III Chapter-I of the Act of 1996. I respectfully Agree with learned Brother Srikrishna J only to the extent that if on prima facie examination of the documents and material on record, including the arbitration agreement on which request for reference is made by one of the parties, the judicial authority or the court decides to make a reference, it may merely mention the submissions and contentions of the parties and summarily decide the objection if any raised on the alleged nullity, voidness, inoperativeness or incapability of the arbitration agreement. In case, however, on a prima facie view of the matter, which is required to be objectively taken on the basis of material and evidence produced by the parties on the record of the case, the judicial authority including a regular civil court, is inclined to reject the request for reference on the ground that the agreement is 'null and void' or 'inoperative' or 'incapable of being performed' within the meaning of section 45 of the Act, the judicial authority or the court must afford full opportunities to the parties to lead whatever documentary or oral evidence they want to lead and then decide the question like trial of a preliminary issue on jurisdiction or limitation in regular civil suit and pass an elaborate reasoned order. Where a judicial authority or the court refuses to make a reference on the grounds available under section 45 of the Act, it is necessary for the judicial authority or the court which is seized of the matter, to pass a reasoned order as the same is subject to appeal to the appellate court under section 50(1)(a) of the Act and further appeal to this Court under sub-section (2) of the said section.\n5. Whether such a decision of the judicial authority or the court of refusal to make a reference on grounds permissible under section 45 of the Act would be subjected to further reexamination before the arbitral tribunal or the court in which eventually the award comes up for enforcement in accordance with section 48(1)(a) of the Act, is a legal question of sufficient complexity and in my considered opinion since that question does not directly arise on the facts of the present case, it should be left open for consideration in an appropriate case where such a question is directly raised and decided by the court.\n6. With this addition, I agree with the view expressed by learned Brother Srikrishna J., and with his conclusion that the matter should be remitted to the original court for a fresh decision in the light of the view expressed by this Court.\nHon'ble Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, J. -- Leave granted.\n2. The interpretation of Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Act') falls for determination in this matter. Section 45 is as under:\n \"45. Power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration. Notwithstanding anything contained in Part I or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), a judicial authority, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement referred to in section 44, shall, at the request of one of the parties or any person claiming through or under him, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.\" \n3. The real question for consideration is as to the nature of adjudication that is contemplated by Section 45 when the objection about the agreement being \"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\" is raised before a judicial authority. Should the judicial authority while exercising power under Section 45 decide the objection on a prima facie view of the matter and render a prima facie finding or a final finding on merits on affording parties such opportunity as the justice of the case may demand having regard to facts of the case? The question is important and at the same time not free from difficulty. World over the opinion is divided. Courts in some of the countries have preferred the view that the adjudication should be prima facie so as to be raised again before arbitral forum and others have preferred a final adjudication. Under Section 45 of the Act, the judicial authority has to mandatorily refer the parties to arbitration, if conditions specified in the section are fulfilled and agreement is not found to be null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. From Indian perspective to answer the question, first it would be useful to examine few other provisions of the Act besides the Preamble and the Statement of Objects and Reasons and in that light consider the international precedents. The question being examined by this Court is in relation to a consolidated legislation which deals with domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Before enactment of the Act there were separate statutes governing the international arbitration and domestic arbitration, namely, the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (6 of 1937), The Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940) and The Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 (45 of 1961). These statutes have been repealed as provided in Section 85 of the Act. The 1996 Act was enacted considering the international scenario as is evident from its Preamble, which reads :\n \"WHEREAS the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 1985:\nAND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has recommended that all countries give due consideration to the said Model Law, in view of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international commercial arbitration practice;\nAND WHEREAS the UNCITRAL has adopted the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules in 1980;\nAND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has recommended the use of the said Rules in cases where a dispute arises in the context of international commercial relations and the parties seek an amicable settlement of that dispute by recourse to conciliation;\nAND WHEREAS the said Model Law and Rules make significant contribution to the establishment of a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of disputes arising in international commercial relations;\nAND WHEREAS it is expedient to make law respecting arbitration and conciliation, taking into account the aforesaid Model Law and Rules;\" \n4. The enforcement of foreign awards has been dealt with in Part II of the Act which has two Chapters, Chapter I dealing with New York Convention Awards and Chapter II dealing with Geneva Convention Awards. In this matter we are concerned with Chapter I which comprises of Sections 44 to 52. Section 44 defines foreign award. It is not in dispute that the present case falls under the ambit of Section 44. Section 45 has already been extracted above. Conditions for enforcement of foreign awards are stipulated in Section 48 under which enforcement may be refused at the request of the party against whom it is invoked only if that party furnishes to the court proof as postulated in clauses (a) and (e). In addition, the enforcement of the award may also be refused on the grounds stipulated in Section 48(2) of the Act. Section 49 provides that where the court is satisfied that the foreign award is enforceable under Chapter I, the award shall be deemed to be a decree of the court. Section 50 provides as to against which orders an appeal shall lie. It reads as under :\n \"50. Appealable orders.- (1) An appeal shall lie from the order refusing to - (a) refer the parties to arbitration under section 45; (b) enforce a foreign award under section 48, to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from such order. (2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.\" \n5. As can be seen from above, an order refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 45 of the Act is appealable. There is, however, no provision for filing an appeal if the judicial authority refers the parties to arbitration. Reference may also be made to Section 8 of the Act although it deals with domestic arbitration. It reads thus:\n \"8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.\n(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.\n(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.\n(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.\" \n6. Under the Old Arbitration Act (Section 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940), court had discretion in the matter of grant of stay of legal proceedings where there was an arbitration agreement on being satisfied that the arbitration agreement exists factually and legally and disputes between the parties are in regard to the matter agreed to be referred to arbitration. The Court in exercise of its discretion could also decline an order of stay despite existence of aforesaid conditions, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The discretion was, however, required to be exercised on well settled judicial principles. Section 8 of the Act is a departure from Section 34 of the old Act. Under this section judicial authority has no discretion. It is mandatory for the judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration on the existence of conditions stipulated in the section. Unlike Section 45, the judicial authority under Section 8 has not been conferred the power to refuse reference to arbitration on the ground of invalidity of the agreement. It is evident that the object is to avoid delay and accelerate reference to arbitration leaving the parties to raise objection, if any, to the validity of the arbitration agreement before the arbitral forum and/or post award under Section 34 of the Act. Dealing with the statement of object and reasons of the Act, this Court in Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. v. Mehul Construction Co. [(2000) 7 SCC 201 ] (referred) said:\n \"At the outset, it must be borne in mind that prior to the 1996 Act, the Arbitration Act of 1940, which was in force in India provided for domestic arbitration and no provision was there to deal with the Foreign Awards. So far as the Foreign Awards are concerned, the same were being dealt with by the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961. The increasing growth of global trade and the delay in disposal of cases in Courts under the normal system in several countries made it imperative to have the perception of an alternative Dispute Resolution System, more particularly, in the matter of commercial disputes. When the entire world was moving in favour of a speedy resolution of commercial disputes, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law way back in 1985 adopted the Uncitral Model Law of International Commercial Arbitration and since then, number of countries have given recognition to that Model in their respective legislative system. With the said Uncitral Model Law in view the present Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 has been enacted in India replacing the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, which was the principal legislation on Arbitration in the country that had been enacted during the British Rule. and the growing volume of India's trade and commercial relationship with the rest of the world after the new liberalisation policy of the Government, Indian Parliament was persuaded to enact the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 in Uncitral Model and, therefore, in interpreting any provisions of the 1996 Act Courts must not ignore the objects and purpose of the enactment of 1996. A bare comparison of different provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1940 with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would unequivocally indicate that 1996 Act limits intervention of Court with an arbitral process to the minimum and it is certainly not the legislative intent that each and every order passed by an authority under the Act would be a subject matter of judicial scrutiny of a Court of Law. Under the new law the grounds on which an award of an Arbitrator could be challenged before the Court have been severely cut down and such challenge is now permitted on the basis of invalidity of the agreement, want of jurisdiction on the part of the Arbitrator or want of proper notice to a party of the appointment of the Arbitrator or of Arbitral proceedings. The powers of the Arbitrator have been amplified by insertion of specific provisions of several matters. Obstructive tactics adopted by the parties in arbitration proceedings are sought to be thwarted by an express provision inasmuch as if a party knowingly keeps silent and then suddenly raises a procedural objection will not be allowed to do so. The role of institutions in promoting and organising arbitration has been recognised. The power to nominate Arbitrators has been given to the Chief Justice or to an institution or person designated by him. The time limit for making awards has been deleted. The existing provisions in 1940 Act relating to arbitration through intervention of Court, when there is no suit pending or by order of the Court when there is a suit pending, have been removed. The importance of transnational commercial arbitration has been recognised and it has been specifically provided that even where the arbitration is held in India, the parties to the contract would be free to designate the law applicable to the substance of the dispute. Under the new law unless the agreement provides otherwise, the Arbitrators are required to give reasons for the award. The award itself has now been vested with status of a decree, inasmuch as the award itself is made executable as a decree and it will no longer be necessary to apply to the Court for a decree in terms of the award. All these aim at achieving the sole object to resolve the dispute as expeditiously as possible with the minimum intervention of a Court of Law so that the trade and commerce is not affected on account of litigations before a Court. When United Nations established the Commission on International Trade Law it is on account of the fact that the General Assembly recognised that disparities in national laws governing international trade created obstacles to the flow of trade. The General Assembly regarded the Commission on International Trade Law as a medium which could play a more active role in reducing or removing the obstacles. Such Commission, therefore, was given a mandate for progressive harmonization and unification of the law of International Trade. With that objective when Uncitral Model has been prepared and the Parliament in our country enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 adopting Uncitral Model, it would be appropriate to bear the said objective in mind while interpreting any provision of the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act clearly enunciates that the main objective of the legislation was to minimise the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process...\" \n7. True, now the judicial interference has been limited to a narrower circumference than under the old arbitration laws but the question here is when Section 45 of the Act envisages judicial interference, what is the extent thereof having regard to the language of the section and the scheme of the Act. What is the standard of review that the judicial authority should adopt in relation to the arbitration agreement at the initial stage of Section 45, viz., a prima facie finding or a final finding? At this stage, we may briefly notice the circumstances under which the matter has come up for consideration before this Court. There is hardly any controversy in respect of material facts necessary for examination of the question involved. The controversy is only in regard to the power exercisable by a judicial authority under Section 45 of the Act. Parties (Appellant and Respondent No.1) entered into an agreement dated 16/18th November, 2000 which contained an arbitration clause as under:\n \"Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed and interpreted under the laws of Japan. All disputes arising out of or in relation to this Agreement which cannot be settled by mutual accord shall be settled by arbitration in Tokyo, Japan, in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of International Chamber of Commerce. The award of arbitration shall be final and binding upon both parties.\" \n8. The appellant terminated the agreement in terms of its letter dated 31st December, 2002. The first respondent instituted a suit claiming a decree of declaration and injunction against the appellant for cancellation of the document dated 16/18th November, 2000 and/or declaration that the long term sale and purchase agreement dated 16/18th November, 2000 including the arbitration clause on the ground that the terms of agreement are unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable and against the public policy and the same was entered into under undue influence and is, therefore, void ab initio, inoperative and incapable of performance and cannot be given effect to. The appellant made an application in the suit praying that the plaintiff shall be directed to submit to the ongoing arbitration proceedings before the International Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo, Japan. The application was, however, filed under Section 8 of the Act. The trial court by order dated 29th September, 2003 came to the conclusion that the application of the appellant under Section 8 of the Act deserves to be allowed. Consequently, the parties were referred to arbitration. It was urged on behalf of the appellant before the trial court that since there is an arbitration clause in the agreement, court's jurisdiction is exhausted as Section 8 is mandatory and, therefore, court must refer the dispute to arbitration. As already noticed, unlike Section 45 the objection as to the validity of the arbitration agreement cannot be raised as a defence to an application filed under Section 8. This seems to be the reason for the appellant insisting before the trial court that Section 8 is applicable and not Section 45 of the Act. It is clearly not a case of filing an application under a wrong provision. The trial court also proceeded under erroneous assumption that Section 45 comes into play after the award is made as such a submission seems to have been made by the appellant before that court. The order of the trial court was challenged by the first respondent before the High Court in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, there being no provision of appeal against an order of reference to arbitration. Even before the High Court, it was contented for the appellant that as both Section 8 and Section 45 were applicable, the application under Section 8 of the Act was rightly moved before the trial court and the court did not commit any error in considering the matter for reference to arbitration after application of Section 45 of the Act. The High Court examined the question whether Section 45 has been applied by the trial court and, if so, in its true perspective. The High Court held that the trial court ought to have proceeded to examine the application under Section 45 of the Act which was not done. Under these circumstances, without entering into merits of the case, the High Court directed fresh adjudication of the application by the trial court after application of Section 45 of the Act. Consequently, by the impugned judgment, the order of the trial court dated 29th September, 2003 was set aside and matter remanded for fresh decision of the trial court. Before this Court, learned counsel for the parties have rightly taken the stand that only Section 45 is applicable and Section 8 has no applicability. It is evident that there has been no adjudication of the application by the trial court in terms of Section 45 of the Act. The trial court has not gone into the question, prima facie or finally, as to agreement being null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, which was the objection raised by the first respondent in reply to the application of the appellant. Thus, on ingredients of Section 45, there was no adjudication. Therefore, the direction of the High Court for fresh adjudication of application of the appellant having regard to the provisions of Section 45 of the Act cannot be faulted. It is also necessary to issue directions for expeditious adjudication of the said application by the trial court but after first determining the scope of adjudication in exercise of power under Section 45. On behalf of the appellant, Mr. Nariman contends that the consideration by the judicial authority under Section 45 has to be on a prima facie view of the matter based on examination of the plaint and any documents attached thereto, reply to the application for reference and any documents attached thereto and the affidavits filed by the parties. The court, on a prima facie examination of the pleadings and documents, should come to the conclusion as to whether the arbitration agreement is null or void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. Learned counsel submits that final determination on merits in some cases may even require recording of evidence and proceedings may turn out to be a full fledged trial thereby defeating the very purpose for the enactment of the Act. It is urged that the final determination can be made if such objections are raised before the arbitral forum and/or post award by the court. On the other hand, on behalf of first respondent, Mr. Ganesh contends that Section 45 of the Act should be interpreted so as to give full effect to the opening non-obstante clause and to the wordings of Section 45 which are entirely different from Section 8 in their effect and operation. It is urged that Section 45 cannot be construed in a way that it becomes indistinguishable from Section 8. It is further submitted that under Section 45, if an issue is raised before the court regarding the legality or validity of the agreement, then the court must give a finding on the issue. The contention is that the court would make an order of reference to arbitration only if the arbitration agreement is legal and valid. Further, it is contended that it would be a different matter if objection as to the validity of the arbitration agreement is not raised before the judicial authority and the party prefers to raise it before the arbitral forum and/or post award, in the event of award being against that party. Which of the two views is correct requires determination. It may be noted that Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act, 1961, before the enactment of the Act, contained somewhat similar provision providing for the stay of the proceedings in the court, unless the agreement was null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The only material difference between the said Section 3 and present Section 45, is that former contains provision for stay of the proceedings in the suit and latter for reference to be made to arbitration. That difference, for our purposes, is of no consequence. Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act, 1961 as amended by Act 47 of 1973, (omitting unnecessary words) reads as under :\n \"3. Stay of proceedings in respect of matters to be referred to arbitration. - Notwithstanding anything contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940, or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if any party to an agreement to which Articles II of Convention set forth in the Schedule applies, commences any legal proceedings in any court against any other party to the agreement, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred to arbitration in such agreement, any party to such legal proceedings may, at any time after appearance and before filing a written statement or taking any other step in the proceedings, apply to the court to stay the proceeding and the court, unless satisfied that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed or that there is not, in fact, any dispute between the parties with regard to the matter agreed to be referred, shall make an order staying the proceedings.\" \n9. Both the sections start with a non-obstante clause giving overriding effect to the provisions contained therein and making it prevail over anything to the contrary contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940\n10. A non obstante clause is a legislative device which is usually implied to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other enactment, that is to say, to avoid the operation of all contrary provisions. {Union of India & Anr. v. G.M. Kokil & Ors. [(1984) Supp. SCC 196 ] (referred)}. Section 45 uses the expression 'shall' in respect of referring the parties to arbitration, unless judicial authority finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The term 'shall' in its ordinary significance is mandatory and the court shall ordinarily give that interpretation unless such an interpretation leads to some absurd or inconvenient consequence or be at variance with the intent of the legislature, to be collected from other parts of the statute. {[Khub Chand & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [AIR (1967) SC 1074 ] (referred)}. The words 'shall' and 'unless' appearing in Section 45 mandates that before referring the parties to arbitration, the judicial authority should be satisfied that the arbitration agreement is not null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. In Brace Transport Corporation of Monrovia, Bermuda v. Orient Middle East Lines Ltd., Saudi Arabia & Ors. [1995 Supp.(2) SCC 280 at 286] (referred) this Court held :\n \"The court of a contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of Article II shall upon the request of one of the parties, refer to arbitration, unless it finds the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.\" \n11. If the requirements of a statute which prescribes the manner in which something is to be done are expressed in negative language, that is to say, if the statute enacts that it shall be done in such a manner and no other manner, it has been laid down that those requirements are in all cases absolute, and that neglect to attend to them will invalidate the whole proceeding. [Craies on Statute Law; 7th Ed., at page 263]. Section 45 is clear; there is no doubt, ambiguity or vagueness in it. Now, I may refer to decision in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. & Anr. [(1984) 4 SCC 679 ] (referred) in which interpretation of Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act, 1961 came up for consideration. One of the parties to the arbitration agreement invoked the arbitration clause while the other party filed a suit seeking declaration that claims referred to the arbitration were beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement and the other party is not entitled to refer the claims to the arbitration and making consequential prayers for injunction restraining the party invoking arbitration clause and the arbitrator from proceeding with the matter and obtained an interim order. The other party filed a petition under Section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 seeking the stay of the proceedings in the suit and praying for vacating the interim relief granted in the matter. Learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition under Section 3 and granted stay of proceedings in the suit and vacated the interim relief. The order was maintained by the Division Bench. Before this Court, it was argued that a stay, if granted in a petition under Section 3, would render the suit dead for all purposes and there would be nothing left to be decided in the suit either because the suit is stayed indefinitely or alternatively because the decision on the issue would operate as res judicata in the suit, and, therefore, no relief of stay should be granted which will have such effect merely on a prima facie view or a pro tanto finding on the issue of arbitrability of the claims. In other words, the contention was that a Section 3 petition could not be a proper stage to decide the issue of arbitrability of the claims but the same should be decided in the suit when it will be finally tried. While rejecting this contention it was held that :\n \"if regard be had to the provisions of Section 3 as well as the legal position arising under decided cases the contention will be found to be devoid of any substance. It may be that a stay of the suit either under Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act or under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 may have the effect of finally disposing of the suit for all practical purposes as pointed out by the Allahabad High Court. But that is no reason why the relief of stay should be refused by the Court if the concerned legal provision requires the court to do so. Here we are concerned with Section 3 which makes it obligatory upon the Court to stay the legal proceedings if the conditions of the section are satisfied and what is more the section itself requires that before any stay is granted the Court should be satisfied that the arbitration agreement is valid, operative and capable of being performed and that there are disputes between the parties with regard to the matters agreed to be referred to arbitration [conditions (v) and (vi) mentioned earlier]. In other words, the section itself indicates that the proper stage at which the Court has to be fully satisfied about these conditions is before granting the relief of stay in a Section 3 petition and there is no question of the Court getting satisfied about these conditions on any prima facie view or a pro tanto finding thereon. Parties have to put their entire material before the Court on these issues (whichever may be raised) and the Court has to record its finding thereon after considering such material. [Emphasis supplied by us]\" \n12. In Para 59 the Court further observed that :\n \"It may be stated that though Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 confers a discretion upon the Court in the matter of granting stay of legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement, it cannot be disputed that before granting the stay the Court has to satisfy itself that arbitration agreement exists factually and legally and that the disputes between the parties are in regard to the maters agreed to be referred to arbitration.\" \n13. The question is : did the Parliament intend differently while using the terminology in Section 45 as it did? When words in an earlier statute have received an authoritative exposition by superior Court (interpretation of Section 3 in Renusagar's case), use of same words in a similar context in a later Act will give rise to a strong presumption that the Parliament intends that the same interpretation should also be followed for construction of these words in the later statute :\n \"D' Emden v. Pedder (1904) 1 C.L.R. 91, 100 per Griffiths C.J.: \" When a particular form of legislative enactment which has received authoritative interpretation, whether by judicial decision or by a long course of practice, is adopted in the framing of a later statute, it is a sound rule of construction to hold that the words so adopted were intended by the legislature to bear the meaning which had been so put upon them.\"\"According to Lord Macmillian, 'if an Act of Parliament referring to the same subject, and passed with the same purpose, and for the same object, the safe and well-known rule of construction is to assume that the legislature when using well-known words upon which there have been well-known decisions uses those words in the sense which the decisions have attached to them'.\" \n14. In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. V. State of Bihar [ ], (referred) Venkatarama Aiyer, J. stated that :\n \"It is a well-settled rule of construction that when a statute is repealed and re-enacted and words in the repealed statute are reproduced in the new statute, they should be interpreted in the sense which had been judicially put on them under the repealed Act, because the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with the construction which the courts have put upon the words, and when they repeat the same words, they must be taken to have accepted the interpretation put on them by the court as correctly reflecting the legislative mind.\" \n15. Further, Part II of the Act was enacted to update the international commercial arbitration regime to meet the present day challenges. If the legislature intended a minimalist role of the courts, it would have enacted Section 45 more in terms of Section 8 than its present form. Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act above noticed, was analogous to Article II (3) of the New York Convention which is in the following terms :\n \"Article II of the New York Convention\n1. ***\n2. ***\n3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.\" \n16. The aforesaid provision has been substantially reproduced in Section 45.\n17. Clearly Section 45 casts an obligation upon the judicial authority when seized of the matter to record a finding as to the validity of the arbitration agreement as stipulated in the Section and there is nothing to suggest either from the language of the section or otherwise that the finding to be recorded is to be only ex facie or prima facie. It is true that Section 5 limits judicial intervention in the manner provided therein. It accelerates the arbitral process by curtailing chances of delay that may be caused in court proceedings. But, at the same time, it is also clear that though Sections 8 and 45 both deal with the power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration, in the former which deals with domestic arbitration, no provision has been made for examining at that stage the validity of the arbitration agreement whereas under Section 45 which deals with arbitrations to which New York Convention applies, a specific provision has been made to examine the validity of the arbitration agreement in the manner provided in Section 45. Both provisions are differently structured albeit the purpose of both is to refer parties to arbitration but in one case domestic arbitration and in other case international arbitration. Unlike Section 8 which provides that the application shall be moved not later than when submitting the first statement of the substance of the dispute, under Section 45 there is no such limitation. The apparent reason is that insofar as domestic arbitration is concerned, the legislature intended to achieve speedy reference of disputes to arbitration tribunal and left most of the matters to be raised before the arbitrators or post award. In case of foreign arbitration, however, in its wisdom the legislature left the question relating to validity of arbitration agreement being examined by the court. One of the main reasons for the departure being the heavy expense involved in such arbitrations which may be unnecessary if the arbitration agreement is to be invalidated in the manner prescribed in Section 45. In view of the aforesaid, adopting liberal approach and restricting the determination by judicial authority about validity of agreement only from prima facie angle, would amount to adding words to Section 45 without there being any ambiguity or vagueness therein. The traditional approach has been to allow a court, where a dispute has been brought despite an arbitration agreement, to fully rule on the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. This approach would ensure that the parties are not proceeding on an invalid agreement as this would be a fruitless exercise involving much time and expenditure. In some countries, however, the traditional approach has changed. The liberal approach which seems to be gaining increasing popularity in many legal systems both statutorily as well as through judicial interpretation is to restrict the review of validity of arbitration agreement at a prima facie level. For final review the parties may raise issue before arbitral forum or post award. The 1987 Swiss Private International Law Statute stipulates that \"if the parties have concluded an arbitration agreement covering an arbitrable dispute, a Swiss court seized of it shall decline jurisdiction unless: - b. the court finds that the arbitral agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\" (Article 7). These provisions could easily be read as implying that a court seized of the merits of a dispute in spite of the existence of an arbitration agreement would have to fully address the question of that agreement's effectiveness. However, after some hesitation, the Swiss Federal Tribunal decided to interpret them as restricting the court's review at the outset of proceedings to a prima facie verification of the existence and effectiveness of the arbitration clause. (Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration- Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage Ed.1999 - Para 675, Page 409) According to the French Code of Civil Procedure (which applies to both domestic and international arbitration), the courts are obliged to decline jurisdiction where an arbitration agreement exists, provided that the merits of the dispute have already been put before an arbitral tribunal. Even where the dispute is not before an arbitral tribunal, the French Courts must also decline jurisdiction unless the arbitration agreement is \"patently void\". This in substance amounts to a prima facie review of the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. Similarly, Art. VI (2) of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1961) adopts a prima facie standard by providing that courts shall not determine the initial validity/existence of the arbitration agreement unless there are \"good and substantial reasons to the contrary\". The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses in Commercial Matters (1923) (Art. IV, Para 1), the New York Convention (Art. II, Para 3) as well as the UNCITRAL, Model Law (Art. VIII) like Section 45 of the Act have similarly ambiguous phraseology capable of either interpretation. It is true that courts in two common law jurisdictions, Ontario and Hong Kong, both of which have based their law on the UNCITRAL Model Law (like India), have adopted a liberal approach to the issue. In Pacific International Lines (Pte) Ltd. v. Tsinlien Metal and Minerals Co. Ltd, the High Court of Hong Kong (Year Book of Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XVIII, 1993, pg.180) was concerned with the issue as to whether on the facts of the case there was an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which deals with the definition and form of arbitration agreement and reads thus :\n \"Article 7. Definition and form of arbitration agreement\n(1) \"Arbitration agreement\" is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.\n(2) The arbitration agreement shall be in writing. An agreement is in writing if it is contained in a document signed by the parties or in an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunications which provide a record of the agreement, or in an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of an agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by another. The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement provided that the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that clause part of the contract.\" \n18. The parties entered into a charter party agreement containing an arbitration clause through a broker. The ship company raised a claim for certain sum of money. The arbitration clause provided that one arbitrator was to be nominated by the shipping company and the other by the charters. The charters failed to appoint its arbitrator, whereupon, the shipping company approached the High Court to appoint an arbitrator on behalf of the charters. The charters objected that there was no valid arbitral clause between the parties. It was the contention of the charters that they entered into charter party agreement with the broker and not with the shipping company who deny having given the brokers any authority to enter into an agreement. The Court laid down the proposition that \"if the court is satisfied that there is a 'plainly arguable' case to support the proposition and there was an arbitration agreement which complies with Article 7 of the Model Law, the Court should proceed to appoint the arbitrator in the full knowledge that the defendants will not be precluded from raising the point before the arbitrator and having the matter re- considered by the court consequent upon that preliminary ruling.\" \n19. The Court after examining the documents and taking into account the commercial reality of the situation came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs, i.e., shipping company has made out a 'strongly arguable case' in support of the existence of an arbitration agreement. The Court further observed that \"obviously it has not been possible for me to go into this in any great detail and indeed the whole matter has been dealt with affidavit evidence. Despite the fact that there is no document before me, which shows that World Ace were held out or authorized by the defendant to act for them in relation to its fixture. I cannot believe that such documentation does not exist. The arbitrator will have to go into this matter and sort it out but for my part and I am satisfied at this stage that Article 7 of the Model Law has been complied with and that there is an arbitration agreement between these parties\". Thus, the court found the arbitral clause as existing and valid and referred the dispute to arbitration and granted time to the charters to appoint its arbitrator.\n20. The court decided the matter on the basis of the affidavits, as it was not possible for it to examine in detail the documents since the parties failed to produce the document containing the authorization given to the broker to act on behalf of the shipping company. Therefore, the court has referred to the commercial reality as well as the affidavits of the parties to arrive at the conclusion that there was an arbitration agreement. The court has adapted the standard of \"plainly arguable case\" or \"strongly arguable case\" since the arbitral tribunal would examine the issue once again. Therefore, it cannot be stated as a general rule that in every case there should be a \"plainly arguable case\" or \"strongly arguable case\", since the legislations in other jurisdictions may not provide for such a provision. More over, the case did not concern directly with Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the court was concerned with Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law dealing with definition and form of the arbitration agreement.\n21. Apart from the fact that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not a complete adaptation of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the scheme/ provisions of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance are different from the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996. Therefore it may not be appropriate to follow the decisions interpreting the provisions of UNCITRAL Model Law or Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance. Section 6 of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance is similar to Section 32 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, which is not present in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. It reads as under :\n \"(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court) applies to a matter that is the subject of a domestic arbitration agreement in the same way as it applies to a matter that is the subject of an international arbitration agreement. (2) Subject to subsection (3), if a party to an arbitration agreement that provides for the arbitration of a dispute involving a claim or other matter this is within the jurisdiction of the Labour Tribunal or a person claiming through or under such a party, commences legal proceedings in any court against any other party to the agreement or any person claiming through or under that other party, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, and any party to those legal proceedings applies to that court after appearance and before delivering any pleadings or taking any other step in the proceedings, to stay the proceedings, the court or a judge of that court may make an order staying the proceedings, if satisfied that- (a) there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the agreement; and (b) the applicant was ready and willing at the time the proceedings were commenced to do all things necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration, and remains so. (3) Subsections (1) and (2) have effect subject to section 15 of the Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance (Cap 71). (Replaced 75 of 1996 s. 9)\" \n22. Section 23 A of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance provides for the determination of preliminary point of law by the court and there is a no analogous provision in the Arbitration and conciliation Act 1996 It is clear from a plain reading of Hong Kong and English provisions that both confer discretion on the court, unlike Section 45 of the Act, which is mandatory. It is evident from the words 'may' and 'satisfied' used in Hong Kong provision and also from the language used in Section 32 of the English Arbitration Act, 1996, that the intention in the said two jurisdictions was to confer on court discretionary powers indicative of limited review from prima facie point of view. In Rio Algom Ltd. v. Sammi Steel Co. Ltd., Ontario Court of Justice, General Division (Year book of Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XVIII, 1993, Page 166) dealt with Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law dealing with the competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction which reads as under:\n \"Article 16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction (1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause. (2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence. A party is not precluded from raising such a plea by the fact that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified. (3) The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this article either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within 30 days after having received notice of that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal; while such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award.\" \n23. In pursuance of an arbitration agreement, one of the parties referred the dispute to the arbitrator whereas the other party commenced an action before the court challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to arbitrate the issues and for an order staying the arbitration proceedings. The Court ordered the trial of issues raising matters of the contract interpretation affecting arbitrator's jurisdiction. On appeal, it was held that issues defining the scope of the arbitration agreement, which raise matters of contract interpretation, ought to be resolved by the arbitrators in the first instance before resort to the courts. The Court observed that 'what appears to me of significance is that the Model Law reflects an emphasis in favour of arbitration in the first instance in international commercial arbitrations to which it applies'. The Courts in matters of contract interpretation as such are limited in that they do not appear to have a role in determining matters of law or construction; jurisdiction and scope of authority are for the arbitrator to determine in the first instance, subject to later recourse to set aside the ruling or award. The role of the court before arbitration appears to be confined to determining whether the arbitration clause is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed (Article 8), if not it is mandatory to send the parties to arbitration. Thus, it was observed that the issue of validity of the arbitration agreement is to be determined by the court. However, there is no reference as to whether the court should take a prima facie view or a final view.\n24. The 1996 English Arbitration Act adopted a slightly different solution, whereby the courts may only rule on the issue of jurisdiction with the agreement of the parties or, if the parties do not agree, with the consent of the arbitral tribunal. In this latter case, the court must also find that its decision is liable to save substantial cost, that the application was made promptly, and that there is a valid reason for the claim to be heard by a court (Sec.32). (Fouchard (supra) Para 675 Page 409).\n25. The American approach also favours traditional approach of final review of court. (Comptek Telecomm v. IVD Corp., XXII Y.B. COMM. ARB.905 (1997) decided on August 1, 1995 and SMG Swedish Machine Group v. Swedish Machine Group, XVIII Y.B. COMM.ARB.457 (1993) decided on January 4, 1991. It may be noted that both approaches have its own advantage and disadvantage. The approach whereby the court finally decides on merits on the issue of existence and validity of the arbitration agreement results to a certain degree time and cost avoidance. It may prevent parties to wait for several months or in some cases years before knowing the final outcome of the dispute regarding jurisdiction. It will often take that long for the arbitrators and then the courts to reach their decisions. The same considerations of cost and time explain the position taken in English Law which under Section 32(2) of the 1996 English Arbitration Act provides that the parties may agree (or, if the parties fail to agree, the arbitral tribunal may agree) that it would be more efficient to have the question resolved immediately by the courts. (Fouchard (supra) Para 678, Page 410) I may also deal with the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that only prima facie finding is required to be given on combined reading of Sections 45, 48 and 50 from which it can be culled out that a party who has suffered an award can always challenge the same under Section 48 on the ground that the arbitration agreement is null and void. This read in conjunction with the right of appeal given under Section 50 and the power of the arbitrator to rule on his own jurisdiction clearly shows the intent of the legislature to avoid delay which would be inevitable if it has to be a final decision and it would defeat the object of soon placing all material before the arbitration tribunal. I am afraid that this cannot be accepted as the real purpose of Section 48 is to ensure that at some stage whether pre-award, post award or both, a judicial authority must decide the validity, operation, capability of performance of the arbitration agreement. In various cases the parties may not resort to Section 45 in the first place, and to overcome such eventuality, the legislature has enacted Section 48(1)(a). In other words, if the court is not asked to satisfy itself as to the validity of the agreement at a pre-award stage (Section 45), then by virtue of Section 48, it is given another opportunity to do so. Apart from this, under Section 48, the court may refuse to enforce the foreign award on the ground other than the invalidity of the arbitration agreement. As far as the question of Section 50 is concerned, it is well settled in law that an appeal is a creature of statute {M/s M. Ramnarain (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. [(1983) 3 SCC 75 ] (referred)} and a right to appeal inheres in no one {Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & Ors. [(1999) 4 SCC 468 ] (referred)}. The legislature under Section 50 has clearly allowed appeal only in case the judicial authority refuses to refer the parties to arbitration or refuses to enforce the foreign award. The fact that a provision is not made for an appeal in case reference is made to arbitration is not a ground to say that the court should prima facie decide the validity of the agreement ignoring the express provisions of Section 45. The legislature has granted right of appeal in the event of refusal to refer but not in the event of order being made for reference of the parties to arbitration. This provision for appeal is not determinative of the scope of Section 45 to mean that the determination there under has to be only prima facie.\n26. I am of the view that Indian Legislature has consciously adopted a conventional approach so as to save the huge expense involved in international commercial arbitration as compared to domestic arbitration. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that under Section 45 of the Act, the determination has to be on merits, final and binding and not prima facie. Turning to the present case, I direct that the application filed by the appellant before the trial court would be treated as an application under Section 45 of the Act. Having regard to the nature of controversy in the present case, parties would be given opportunity to file documents and affidavits by way of evidence. No oral evidence would be examined. Though the appellant itself is responsible for the delay that has occurred because of application under provisions which had no applicability and insistence thereupon, yet, considering that the application has been pending for nearly two years, I direct its disposal within a period of two months of the receipt of the copy of this order. Before concluding, this Court also deems it necessary to issue general directions for expeditious disposal of petitions/applications filed so as to challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement under Section 45. Ordinarily, such cases shall be decided on the basis of affidavits and other relevant documents and without oral evidence. There may, however, be few exceptional cases where it may become necessary to grant opportunity to the parties to lead oral evidence. In both eventualities, the judicial authority is required to decide the issue expeditiously within a fix timeframe and not to treat such matters like regular civil suit. The object of arbitration including international commercial arbitration is expedition.\n27. The object of the Act would be defeated if the international commercial disputes remain pending in court for months and years before even commencement of arbitration. Accordingly, I direct that any application that may be filed under Section 45 of the Act must be decided within three months of its filing. In rare and exceptional cases, the judicial authority may extend the time by another three months but by sending a report to the superior/appellate authority setting out the reasons for such extension. It would be for the superior/appellate authority to issue appropriate directions to the judicial authority and/or take such other action as may be called for.\n28. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.\nORDER\nThe direction of the High Court in the impugned judgment remanding the application under Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for fresh decision by the trial court to confirmed. On remand, the trial court would decide the application in the light of the majority opinion within two months of receipt of the judgment of this Court.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -988,26 +988,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S008", - "case_id": "3371", - "experiment": "baseline_firac", + "case_id": "108", + "experiment": "baseline_no_firac", "model": "qwen3-8b", - "source_file": "S008__baseline_firac__qwen3-8b__3371.json", + "source_file": "S008__baseline_no_firac__qwen3-8b__108.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "04/01/1972", - "machine_error_stage": "facts", - "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in case record" + "judgment_date": "12/08/2005", + "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Wrong legal test / threshold" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5697 OF 2021, CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5692-5695 OF 2021 | C.S. Gopalakrishnan Etc. v. The State Of Tamil Nadu & Others | 09/05/2023", - "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5697 OF 2021, CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5692-5695 OF 2021 | C.S. Gopalakrishnan Etc. v. The State Of Tamil Nadu & Others", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 115 of 1971 (From the Judgment and Decree dated November 25/26, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision No. 1101 of 1966), decided on February 1, 1985. | Indumati Markandey Trivedi v. Jhala Umedsinhji Merubhabhai | 01/02/1985", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 115 of 1971 (From the Judgment and Decree dated November 25/26, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision No. 1101 of 1966), decided on February 1, 1985. | Indumati Markandey Trivedi v. Jhala Umedsinhji Merubhabhai", "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "The State of Tamil Nadu enacted three State Acts: The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978; The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997; and The Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001. These Acts received Presidential assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, protecting them from repugnancy with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Following the enactment of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition; Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (new LA Act), these State Acts were rendered void. Tamil Nadu attempted to revive them by inserting Section 105-A into the new LA Act via Act No. 1 of 2015, which also received Presidential assent. However, the Madras High Court declared the three State Acts void and Section 105-A ineffective. Subsequently, Tamil Nadu enacted the Validation Act of 2019, which revived the State Acts and received Presidential assent, a move later upheld by the Supreme Court in G. Mohan Rao. The present appeals challenge the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act and the Highways Act on grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14, when compared to the new LA Act. Specifically, appellants C. S. Gopalakrishnan and V. Thirunarayanan purchased lands after acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Industrial Purposes Act. Appellants K. M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan challenged acquisitions under the Highways Act. The core issue is whether these State Acts are unconstitutional due to procedural and compensatory disparities with the new LA Act, and whether subsequent purchasers have the locus standi to raise such challenges.", - "generated_judgment": "### **Judgment**\n\n#### **Facts:**\n1. The State of Tamil Nadu enacted three State Acts: The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978; The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997; and The Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, all of which received Presidential assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.\n2. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition; Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (new LA Act) rendered these State Acts void.\n3. Tamil Nadu attempted to revive them by inserting Section 105-A into the new LA Act via Act No. 1 of 2015, which also received Presidential assent but was later declared ineffective by the Madras High Court.\n4. The State then enacted the Validation Act of 2019, which revived the State Acts and was upheld by the Supreme Court in *G. Mohan Rao*.\n5. The present appeals challenge the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act and the Highways Act on grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14, compared to the new LA Act.\n6. Appellants C. S. Gopalakrishnan and V. Thirunarayanan purchased lands after acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Industrial Purposes Act.\n7. Appellants K. M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan challenged acquisitions under the Highways Act.\n\n#### **Issues:**\n1. Does the Validation Act of 2019, which revived the Tamil Nadu Industrial Purposes Act, 1997, and the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, violate Article 14 of the Constitution by creating arbitrary and unreasonable disparities in land acquisition procedures and compensation compared to the new LA Act?\n2. Do subsequent purchasers of land (appellants) have the locus standi to challenge the validity of the State Acts under which the original acquisitions were initiated?\n\n#### **Rules:**\n1. **Article 14 of the Constitution** – Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of laws, prohibiting arbitrary state action.\n2. **Article 254(2) of the Constitution** – Allows State laws to override Central laws on concurrent subjects if they receive Presidential assent.\n3. **Doctrine of Locus Standi** – Only a person who has a direct and substantial interest in the matter can challenge a law.\n4. **Judicial Review of Legislative Acts** – Courts can strike down laws that violate fundamental rights, even if they have received Presidential assent, if they are manifestly arbitrary or discriminatory.\n\n#### **Analysis:**\n1. **Maintainability of the Appeal (Locus Standi – Issue 2):**\n - The appellants are subsequent purchasers of land acquired under the challenged State Acts.\n - The doctrine of locus standi requires a direct and substantial interest in the matter. Since the appellants are affected by the acquisition proceedings and the validity of the enabling legislation, they have a sufficient stake to challenge the Acts.\n - **Conclusion:** The appeal is maintainable.\n\n2. **Arbitrariness and Violation of Article 14 (Issue 1):**\n - The new LA Act provides higher compensation and stricter procedural safeguards compared to the State Acts.\n - The Validation Act of 2019 revived the State Acts without addressing these disparities, creating a classification between landowners acquired under the new LA Act and those under the State Acts.\n - Such a classification must have a rational nexus with a legitimate state objective. The State’s justification (e.g., industrial development, highway construction) does not sufficiently explain why different standards apply.\n - The Supreme Court in *G. Mohan Rao* upheld the Validation Act, but the present case involves a specific challenge under Article 14.\n - **Conclusion:** The disparities in compensation and procedure are arbitrary and violate Article 14.\n\n3. **Presidential Assent and Judicial Review (Secondary Issue 4):**\n - While Article 254(2) protects State laws from repugnancy with Central laws, it does not shield them from constitutional scrutiny under fundamental rights.\n - Courts can still examine whether such laws are manifestly arbitrary or discriminatory.\n - **Conclusion:** The Validation Act is not immune from judicial review.\n\n#### **Conclusion:**\nThe Validation Act of 2019, by reviving the Tamil Nadu Industrial Purposes Act, 1997, and the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, creates arbitrary and unreasonable disparities in land acquisition procedures and compensation compared to the new LA Act, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The appellants have the locus standi to challenge these Acts. Therefore, the appeals are **ALLOWED**, and the challenged State Acts are declared unconstitutional.", - "reference_judgment": "1. Past events, contextual to these appeals, being of relevance require recount at some length.\n2. Long ago, the State of Tamil Nadu chose to exercise its right of eminent domain to acquire land for its harijan welfare schemes, its industrial purposes and its highways by deviating from the law and procedure prescribed in the Central legislation, viz., ‘The Land Acquisition Act, 1894’. In exercise of concurrent power under Entry 42 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, it enacted ‘The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978’; ‘The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997’; and ‘The Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001’. These three State Acts stood protected, despite being repugnant to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [hereinafter, ‘the old LA Act’], owing to the Presidential assent that they had received on 21.07.1978, 25.05.1999 and 16.09.2002 respectively, under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. However, upon the Parliament promulgating the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition; Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 [hereinafter, ‘the new LA Act’], replacing the old LA Act, these State Acts were rendered void, being repugnant thereto.\n3. Pertinently, Section 105 of the new LA Act provided that the said legislation would not apply or would apply with modifications to the Central Government’s enactments relating to land acquisition, specified in the Fourth Schedule thereto. In an attempt to save the three State Acts, by taking a cue from Section 105 of the new LA Act, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed Bill No. 5 of 2014 on 22.02.2014, amending the new LA Act. Thereby, Section 105-A was inserted in the new LA Act, making the provisions thereof inapplicable or applicable with modifications to the Acts relating to land acquisition in the State of Tamil Nadu, which were specified in the newly added Fifth Schedule. The three State Acts were shown in this Schedule. However, Bill No. 5 of 2014 was returned by the President of India pointing out some defects and after curing of the same, it was reintroduced as Bill No. 30 of 2014. It was then sent to the President of India for his assent and received the same on 01.01.2015. In consequence, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2014 (Act No.1 of 2015), came into force with retrospective effect from 01.01.2014.\n4. Act No.1 of 2015 was subjected to challenge before the Madras High Court in a batch of writ petitions. Writ Petition No.21323 of 2015 was also filed raising a challenge to the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 (for brevity, ‘the Highways Act’). On the same lines, Writ Petition Nos. 26028 and 26234 of 2013 were filed assailing the validity of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (for brevity, ‘the Industrial Purposes Act’), on the ground that it was ultra vires the Constitution of India and seeking a consequential direction to the authorities to drop the acquisition of the petitioners’ lands thereunder.\n5. In W.P.No.26028 of 2013, the consequential prayer of the two petitioners, viz. P.K. Muralidharan and V. Thirunarayanan, was to direct the authorities not to acquire their lands in old Survey No. 93/4B(3), presently Survey Nos. 93/58 and 93/59, of Pillaipakkam Village, Sriperumbudur Taluk No. 103, Kancheepuram. In W.P.No.26234 of 2013, the prayer of C.S. Gopalakrishnan, the petitioner therein, was to direct the authorities to return his land in Survey No. 92/60, Patta No.1317, Plot No. 236, Thripura Sundari Nagar, Pillaipakkam Village, Sriperumbudur Taluk. Further, V. Thirunarayanan, the second petitioner in W.P.No.26028 of 2013, also filed W.P.No.10282 of 2015 seeking a declaration that Act No.1 of 2015 was ultra vires the Constitution and a consequential direction to the authorities not to acquire his lands in Kancheepuram District. Similarly, C.S. Gopalakrishnan, the sole petitioner in W.P.No.26234 of 2013, filed W.P.No.10283 of 2015 seeking identical reliefs. These four writ petitions, along with several others, were partly allowed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, vide common order dated 03.07.2019.\n6. The common order dated 03.07.2019 reflects that the High Court framed the following issues for consideration: -\n1) Are the State enactments void because of inherent arbitrariness?\n2) Did the President of India fail to apply his mind while granting assent to Section 105-A?\n3) Did the impugned State enactments become repugnant once the Parliament ‘made’ the new Land Acquisition Act. If so, did the presidential assent to Section105-A inserted by Tamil Nadu Act No. 1 of 2015 revive the three Acts?\n4) Are the provisions of Section 105-A(2) and (3) mandatory, and if so, whether non-compliance with these provisions (is, sic) fatal to the validity of these enactments.\n7. As regards the first issue, the High Court noted that the validity of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978, was upheld by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu and others Vs. Ananthi Ammal and others [(1995) 1 SCC 519] and that the Industrial Purposes Act was upheld by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in K. Ramakrishnan Vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu [2007 WLR 372], wherein it was specifically held that the said enactment did not suffer from any illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. Similarly, the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 (for brevity, ‘the Highways Act’), was upheld by the Madras High Court in S.N. Sumathy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others [2015 SCC OnLine Madras 14055]. The High Court, therefore, opined that the three State Acts could not be said to be irrational, capricious or without adequate determining principles and rejected the contention that they were liable to be invalidated on the ground of inherent arbitrariness.\n8. On the second issue, the High Court held that all the material was placed before the President of India and, therefore, it could not be said that there was any non-application of mind by the President of India while granting assent. The High Court also noted that the first Bill was returned by the President pointing out some defects and it was only after the same were cured that the Presidential assent was given. The second issue was, therefore, decided accordingly.\n9. Apropos the third issue, the High Court accepted the contention of the writ petitioners that, as the new LA Act received Presidential assent on 27.09.2013, all the three State Acts became void on that date itself and Act No.1 of 2015 did not have the effect of reviving these void State Acts. It was noted that Article 254(2) of the Constitution would not apply to a law already made by a State which becomes repugnant as a result of a new enactment made by the Parliament and it would not offer protection to laws made by the State before the Central legislation. The High Court opined that Article 254(2) of the Constitution required the repugnant law to be reserved for consideration afresh by the President for giving his assent thereto and, therefore, these State Acts had to receive Presidential assent in the present sense. The High Court concluded that, in order to bring an Act within the purview of Article 254(2) of the Constitution, it must be re-enacted by the State and reconsidered by the President and mere insertion of Section 105-A in the new LA Act was inadequate. The High Court, accordingly, declared the three State Acts void and held that Section 105-A did not resurrect them and was a mere dead letter.\n10. On the last issue, the High Court held Section 105-A(2) and (3) to be mandatory. Holding so, the Madras High Court allowed the writ petitions to the extent indicated. However, the High Court deemed it appropriate not to reopen the acquisitions made under the State Acts, on or after 27.09.2013, where the acquired lands had already been put to use and the purpose for which the lands were acquired had been accomplished. The High Court held that as Section 105-A, inserted in the new LA Act by Act No.1 of 2015, was rendered virtually otiose as Act No.1 of 2015 did not meet the requirements of Article 254(2) of the Constitution and did not have the effect of reviving the State Acts, the validity of Section 105-A need not be independently examined.\n11. SLP (C) Nos. 2063-2066 of 2020, which were thereafter numbered as Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5695 of 2021, arose out of the common order dated 03.07.2019 in so far as it pertained to W.P.Nos.26234 & 26028 of 2013 and W.P.Nos.10282 & 10283 of 2015 respectively. V. Thirunarayanan, the second petitioner in W.P.No.26028 of 2013, and C.S. Gopalakrishnan, the sole petitioner in W.P.No.26234 of 2013, filed the first two SLPs aggrieved by the common order to the extent that it did not hold the Industrial Purposes Act to be void on the grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The other two SLPs filed by them pertained to W.P.Nos.10282 and 10283 of 2015 respectively, relating to the validity of Act No.1 of 2015 and Section 105-A.\n12. During the pendency of these SLPs before this Court, the State of Tamil Nadu again attempted to revive the three State Acts by enacting The Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Laws (Revival of Operation, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2019 (for brevity, ‘the Validation Act of 2019’). This Act received the assent of the President, under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, on 02.12.2019. It came into effect retrospectively from 26.09.2013. The Validation Act of 2019 was challenged before this Court in a batch of writ petitions. By judgment dated 29.06.2021, reported in G. Mohan Rao and others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others [AIR 2021 SC 3126], this Court held that the said enactment was a legitimate legislative exercise which was consistent with and fell within the four corners of Article 254 of the Constitution. The writ petitions were, accordingly, dismissed.\n13. It may be noted that one K.M. Vittal Babu and one T. Chinnappan had filed W.P.No.5893 of 2018 before the Madras High Court, wherein they had sought a declaration that Section 105-A inserted in the new LA Act by Act No.1 of 2015 was unconstitutional. This writ petition was also clubbed with the batch of writ petitions, which came to be disposed of by the common order dated 03.07.2019. While so, on 07.07.2021, K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan filed I.A. No. 77573 of 2021 in SLP (C) Nos. 2063-2066 of 2020, which were numbered as Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5695 of 2021, seeking to be impleaded therein. They stated that the provisions of the Industrial Purposes Act are in pari materia with the provisions of the Highways Act, whereunder their lands were acquired, and as there was no separate petition dealing with the validity thereof, it was just and necessary that they get impleaded in SLP (C) Nos. 2063-2066 of 2020 so as to question the pari materia provisions of the Highways Act. Their impleadment application was allowed on 09.09.2021. Surprisingly, two days later, on 11.07.2021, K.M. Vittal Babu chose to file SLP (C) Diary No. 15466 of 2021 in the context of W.P.No.21323 of 2015, referred to hereinbefore, wherein he was not a party. In his application for permission to file the SLP, he stated that W.P.No.21323 of 2015 raised a challenge to the Highways Act, which was missing in his own writ petition and he, therefore, wanted to raise that issue before this Court. He was granted leave to do so on 09.09.2021 and his SLP was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 5697 of 2021. His prayer therein is to declare the Highways Act unconstitutional and void. Thus, K.M. Vittal Babu figures as the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 5697 of 2021 and is also impleaded as a respondent in the other appeals, along with T. Chinnappan.\n14. In the light of G. Mohan Rao (supra), the challenges before this Court to Act No.1 of 2015 and Section 105-A are rendered redundant. SLP (C) No. 4106 of 2020, involving such a challenge, was disposed of on 09.09.2021. Therefore, Issue Nos. 2, 3 and 4 dealt with by the High Court in the common order dated 03.07.2019 no longer require consideration on merits. In consequence, though numbered thereafter, Civil Appeal Nos. 5694 and 5695 of 2021 are infructuous and need no adjudication. The only issue left for consideration is whether the Industrial Purposes Act and the Highways Act are void owing to inherent arbitrariness and infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution. In this context, it may be noted that, in paragraph 74 in G. Mohan Rao (supra), this Court observed that the contention, based on comparative analysis of the State Acts and the new LA Act, to establish violation of the equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution, is left open. Parties were given liberty to raise all other issues not dealt with in that judgment, in relation to the validity of the State laws, in the pending cases arising from the order dated 03.07.2019, including by getting themselves impleaded.\n15. Heard Mr. Suhrith Parthasarathy, learned counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos.5692-5693 of 2021; Mr. N. Subramaniyan, learned counsel, appearing for K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan; and Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel, appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu and its authorities.\n16. Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5693 of 2021 : The Industrial Purposes Act is founded on the premise that the State of Tamil Nadu found it expedient to make special provision for speedy acquisition of lands for industrial purposes in the State of Tamil Nadu and for matters connected therewith. The scheme therein envisages that the Government would cause a Public Notice to be given under Section 3(2) of the Industrial Purposes Act, in such manner as may be prescribed, calling upon the owner of the land and any other person, who in the opinion of the Government may be interested in such land, to show-cause, within such time as may be specified in the Public Notice, why the land should not be acquired. Section 3(3) provides that after hearing and considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner or person interested, the Government may pass an order under Section 3(1). In turn, Section 3(1) states that the Government may acquire any land required for any industrial purpose, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act, by publishing a Notice in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, specifying the particular purpose for which the land is required. Once the Notice under Section 3(1) is published in the Gazette, Section 4 states that the land would vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances, on and from the date of such publication.\n17. The gravamen of the attack in the present appeals is that the Madras High Court erred in holding that the Industrial Purposes Act was not liable to be invalidated on the grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Various issues were raised in the course of arguments in this regard, citing an abundance of caselaw. However, it is an admitted fact that C.S. Gopalakrishnan purchased the land in Survey No. 92/60, Patta No. 1317, Plot No. 236, Pillaipakkam Village, Kancheepuram District, under registered sale deed dated 14.12.2012, long after initiation of the acquisition proceedings, by issuance of the Public Notice on 23.10.2007, for setting up SIPCOT Industrial Park. Similarly, V. Thirunarayanan, the other appellant, also purchased the land in old Survey No. 93/4B(3), presently Survey Nos. 93/58 and 93/59, Pillaipakkam Village, Kancheepuram District, under registered sale deed dated 21.02.2013, well after the initiation of the aforestated acquisition proceedings. However, the Notice under Section 3(1) of the Industrial Purposes Act was published in the Gazette only in March, 2013, after their purchase of the lands in question.\n18. In the above milieu, the question that would arise is as to the locus standi of the appellants, who admittedly purchased their lands after the initiation of land acquisition proceedings, to maintain a challenge to the provisions of the Industrial Purposes Act and the proceedings initiated thereunder.\n19. It is the argument of the State that such subsequent purchasers would have no right to challenge the acquisition proceedings and, in that context, maintain an attack against the legislation under which such acquisition is being made. It is further contended that, as the Section 3(1) Notice was published in the year 2013, i.e., before the coming into force of the new LA Act, determination of the compensation in relation thereto would be only on the basis of the old LA Act and not under the new LA Act.\n20. Per contra, the appellants assert that they would have locus to challenge the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act, as their sale transactions were nearly 6 years after issuance of the Public Notice under Section 3(2) of the Industrial Purposes Act and any reasonable person would have a bonafide belief that such proceedings would have lapsed owing to passage of time. They also contend that as per Section 4 of the Industrial Purposes Act, the acquired land would vest in the Government only on publication of the Notice under Section 3(1) and, therefore, a sale transaction prior thereto would not be rendered void. They would argue that the State cannot freeze property rights for a period of six years by issuing a Public Notice under Section 3(2) of the Industrial Purposes Act and forgetting about it thereafter for years together. Reference is made to the judgment of the Madras High Court in Sri Venkateswara Educational and Charitable Trust Vs. The Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and others [Writ Appeal No. 1063 of 2012, decided on 17.10.2022], which held that in cases where compensation still needed to be determined for acquisitions made under the Industrial Purposes Act, the new LA Act would apply perforce and the base date for determining compensation would not be the date on which the Section 3(2) Notice was issued but 01.01.2014, the date on which the new LA Act came into force.\n21. It may be noted that, after publication of the Notice under Section 3(1), the appellants are stated to have filed writ petitions before the Madras High Court in which orders of status quo were passed. Those cases are stated to be pending as on date. We are not concerned at this stage with the validity of individual acquisition proceedings initiated under the Industrial Purposes Act. If the validity of such acquisition proceedings is under challenge before the High Court, it is for the parties to pursue the same and invite an adjudication on merits. Issues pertaining to such individual acquisition proceedings, including quantification of compensation and other aspects based on facts, can be decided in those writ petitions and need not concern us at this stage. Presently, we are only dealing with the challenge to the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act and the Highways Act on the grounds of arbitrariness and breach of Article 14 of the Constitution and no more.\n22. As regards the issue of the appellants’ locus standi, that very aspect was considered by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Kumar and another Vs. Union of India and others [(2019) 10 SCC 229]. The question therein was whether subsequent purchasers of acquired land would be entitled to seek invalidation of the acquisition on the ground of delay under Section 24(2) of the new LA Act. The Bench held that a sale transaction, effected after the Notification under Section 4 of the old LA Act, is void and would be ineffective to transfer the land and such a sale would not clothe the subsequent purchasers with title, whereby they could claim to be in possession. It was observed that it would be profoundly unfair and unjust and against the policy of law to permit such a purchaser to claim resettlement or claim the land back, as envisaged under the new LA Act. Support in this regard was drawn from the earlier judgments in UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow, and another Vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. [(1996) 3 SCC 124]; Sneh Prabha and others Vs. State of UP and another [(1996) 7 SCC 426]; Union of India Vs. Shivkumar Bhargava and others [(1995) 2 SCC 427]; Meera Sahni Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and others [(2008) 9 SCC 177]; V. Chandrasekaran and another Vs. Administrative Officer and others [(2012) 12 SCC 133]; Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Vs. Subhash Sindhi Co-op. Housing Society, Jaipur [(2013) 5 SCC 427]; and M. Venkatesh and others Vs. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority [(2015) 17 SCC 1]. Be it noted that, in UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow (supra), Meera Sahni (supra) and V. Chandrasekaran (supra), this Court held that such a purchaser could not challenge the acquisition and would, at best, be entitled to receive compensation.\n23. As both C.S. Gopalakrishnan and V. Thirunarayanan seek to assail the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act only in the context of the acquisition proceedings initiated thereunder in relation to the lands purchased by them after issuance of the Public Notice under Section 3(2) thereof, viz., the equivalent of a Notification under Section 4 of the old LA Act, their challenge is tainted and unacceptable in its very inception. They were both subsequent purchasers and are deemed to be aware of the acquisition proceedings. In that regard, we may note that the original owners of the subject lands raised their objections in response to the Public Notice issued under Section 3(2) in the year 2007, but chose to sell their lands in 2012 and 2013. In any event, neither of these subsequent purchasers can be permitted to claim ignorance of the acquisition proceedings. In effect, the very sale transactions under which they claim title and interest in the subject lands are rendered void in the eye of law. Mere passage of time and publication of the Section 3(1) Notice after their purchase of the lands would not save their sale transactions or vest them with a right to attack the acquisition. In consequence, we find no reason to entertain their challenge to the Industrial Purposes Act on the grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution or their consequential challenge to the acquisition proceedings. Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5693 of 2021 are, therefore, liable to be dismissed on this short ground.\n24. Civil Appeal No. 5697 of 2021 et al: K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan assail the common order dated 03.07.2019 passed by the Madras High Court, whereby challenge to the validity of the Highways Act, on the grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, was rejected. The grievance of these two persons is with regard to the acquisition of their lands by the State of Tamil Nadu under the Highways Act. The Government of Tamil Nadu had issued GO.Ms.No.200, Highways and Minor Ports Department, dated 07.12.2011, proposing to acquire land for construction of a Flyover/Road over Bridge to replace Railway Level Crossing No. 184 in Salem. Thereafter, Public Notice dated 02.07.2016, under Section 15(2) of the Highways Act, which is the equivalent of Section 3(2) of the Industrial Purposes Act, was issued calling for objections as to why their lands should not be acquired for the said purpose. After consideration of the objections received, Notice dated 01.02.2017 was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, under Section 15(1) of the Highways Act, which is the same as Section 3(1) of the Industrial Purposes Act. Thereupon, these two persons filed W.P.No.3276 of 2017 before the Madras High Court challenging the acquisition proceedings and status quo was ordered therein. This case is pending as on date.\n25. The Validation Act of 2019 states that the provisions in the First Schedule, the Second Schedule and the Third Schedule to the new L.A. Act shall apply to land acquisition proceedings under the Highways Act. Part III of the Validation Act of 2019 pertains to the Highways Act. Section 10(1) therein states that all the provisions of the Highways Act, except the provisions relating to determination of compensation, shall stand revived with effect on and from 26.09.2013. Section 10(2) states that all rules, notifications, notices, orders, directions issued or any other proceedings initiated under the Highways Act, except those relating to determination of compensation, which were in force immediately before 26.09.2013 shall, for all purposes, be deemed to have been revived on and from 26.09.2013. Section 10(3) states that the provisions relating to determination of compensation as specified in the First Schedule; rehabilitation and resettlement as specified in the Second Schedule; and infrastructure amenities as specified in the Third Schedule to the new L.A. Act, shall apply to the acquisition proceedings under the Highways Act. Section 11 states that except as provided in the Validation Act of 2019, the provisions of the new L.A. Act shall cease to apply to any land which is required for the purposes specified in Section 15(1) of the Highways Act and any such land shall be acquired by the Government only in accordance with the provisions of the Highways Act.\n26. Though Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5693 of 2021 are liable to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability, the arguments of Mr. Suhrith Parthasarathy, learned counsel appearing therein, were adopted in toto by Mr. N.Subramaniyan, learned counsel for K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan. This adoption of arguments is based on the premise that the provisions of the Industrial Purposes Act are in pari materia with the provisions of the Highways Act, with which they are concerned. In that view of the matter, we shall advert to the arguments advanced by both the learned counsel in the context of the Highways Act alone.\n27. The Highways Act is stated to be discriminatory, both with regard to determination of compensation as well as the acquisition procedure, when compared to the new LA Act. Reference is made to the provisions of the new LA Act which require the appropriate Government to consult the local authorities in the affected area and to carry out a Social Impact Assessment Study in consultation with them. It is pointed out that a Social Impact Assessment Study Report would lapse, under Section 14 of the new LA Act, if the Preliminary Notification under Section 11 is not issued within 12 months from the date that such report is submitted, and in such an event, a fresh Social Impact Assessment Study has to be undertaken before acquisition proceedings are initiated. It is pointed out that the First Schedule to the new LA Act states that the market value of the land is to be determined as per Section 26 thereof. The proviso to Section 26(1) of the new LA Act, in turn, links the market value to the date on which the Preliminary Notification is issued under Section 11. The Notification under Section 11 of the new LA Act is equivalent to the Public Notice issued under Section 15(2) of the Highways Act. The Declaration under Section 19 of the new LA Act is on par with the Notice published under Section 15(1) of the Highways Act.\n28. In the context thereof, it is pointed out that Section 19(7) of the new LA Act prescribes the time limit of one year between the Notification under Section 11 and the publication of the Declaration under Section 19 and in the event of failure to abide by this time stipulation, the Preliminary Notification is deemed to lapse, subject to exceptions in terms of the second proviso to Section 19(7) of the new LA Act. Similarly, Section 25 of the new LA Act provides that the Award must be passed within 12 months of the Declaration under Section 19 and if not, the entire proceedings would lapse, subject to the proviso to Section 25, which entitles the Government to extend the time. However, as all these provisions do not find reflection in the First Schedule to the new LA Act, which has been extended to the Highways Act, the timelines put in place to safeguard the interests of the land owners would not be applicable to an acquisition thereunder. In consequence, there would be no restriction upon the State of Tamil Nadu to complete the exercise in a time-bound manner and compensation would be determined by taking into consideration a market value from the distant past, which would not be the case had the acquisition been under the new LA Act. In the light of the flexibility afforded to the State Government, it is argued that the market value of the acquired land would change to the detriment of the land owner.\n29. It is further pointed out that the procedure prescribed in Section 28 of the new LA Act for determining the amount of compensation is not followed by the State of Tamil Nadu under the Highways Act and more particularly, the power given to the Collector under Section 28(7) of the new LA Act to take into consideration any other ground which may be in the interest of equity, justice and beneficial to the affected families. It is also their grievance that safeguards provided in the new LA Act, which are beneficial to land owners, are not available in the Highways Act, both in relation to the quantum of compensation as well as the procedure. Reference is made to Section 39 of the new LA Act, which provides for additional compensation in case of multiple displacements and it is pointed out that no such relief is provided in the Highways Act, despite multiple acquisitions for widening of highways.\n30. It is contended that though the Validation Act of 2019 applies the provisions of the new LA Act to the Highways Act insofar as compensation is concerned, the selective application of the provisions of the new LA Act would result in discrimination even in the matter of compensation. It is pointed out that timelines prescribed under the new LA Act, which are not relatable to the First Schedule to the new LA Act, are not made applicable under the Validation Act of 2019 and the absence of such timelines would permit the State to peg the market value for determining compensation on a date in the remote past, thereby depriving the land owners of just and fair compensation. According to the learned counsel, though there is de jure parity between the new LA Act and the State Acts, there would actually be de facto discrimination in the payment of compensation. Reference is made to P. Vajravelu Mudaliar Vs. Special Deputy Collector, Madras and others [AIR 1965 SC 1017], Nagpur Improvement Trust and others Vs. Vithal Rao and others [AIR 1973 SC 689], Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh and others [(2019) 9 SCC 304], Savitri Cairae and others Vs. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and others [(2003) 6 SCC 39] and The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. G.C. Mandawar [AIR 1954 SC 493].\n31. It is asserted that there is no intelligible differentia between land owners whose lands are acquired under the Highways Act and those whose lands are acquired under the new LA Act and it would amount to an unreasonable classification if they are denied compensation on the same terms, when their lands are acquired for public purposes. An example is cited, where a person’s land may be acquired under the Highways Act while his neighbour’s land, which is identically situated in all respects, is acquired under the new LA Act, but they would be given compensation on different criteria owing to the absence of timelines in the Highways Act, which would permit the State to peg the market value on a past date to determine the compensation unlike the situation obtaining under the new LA Act. Reference is made to Joseph Shine Vs. Union of India [(2019) 3 SCC 39] to contend that when a statute is arbitrary, it would offend Article 14 of the Constitution and would require to be struck down. It is also argued that certain critical clauses pertaining to compensation, contained in Sections 27 to 30 of the new LA Act, are not brought into play in the Highways Act, as only the First Schedule to the new LA Act has been incorporated therein, causing discrimination, as land owners whose lands have been acquired under the Highways Act would not be entitled to the benefits under these provisions of the new LA Act.\n32. On the other hand, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel, would point out that the timelines fixed in the new LA Act are not sacrosanct as the provisions thereof permit extension of time in certain circumstances. It is pointed out that, once such an extension is granted, no outer limit is prescribed and, therefore, the argument that the new LA Act places binding temporal constraints on the State is not correct. It is pointed out that the second proviso to Section 19(7) of the new LA Act empowers the Government to extend the period of 12 months if, in its opinion, circumstances exist to justify the same and, in effect, there is no distinction between the Highways Act and the new LA Act. Reference is made in this regard to State of Kerala and others Vs. T.M. Peter and others [(1980) 3 SCC 554]. Reliance is placed upon the State of Karnataka Vs. Ranganatha Reddy [(1977) 4 SCC 471] in support of the contention that a State law enacted on a subject in the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution would stand protected after it receives the assent of the President under Article 254(2), even if it is repugnant to the Central legislation on the same subject, and it is argued that any such repugnancy would stand cured and would no longer be a ground to invalidate the Highways Act.\n33. It is contended that the question of comparing the Highways Act with the new LA Act would not arise at all, as any repugnant provision in the Highways Act would continue to operate notwithstanding the contrary provision in the new LA Act, as the Validation Act of 2019, which revived the Highways Act, stood protected by the assent given by the President of India under Article 254(2). It is pointed out that the Public Notice under Section 15(2) of the Highways Act was issued on 02.07.2016 and was followed by publication of the Notice under Section 15(1) thereof on 01.02.2017, i.e., a mere 7 months later. It is argued that, even in a case where delay ensued due to factors beyond control or any other incidental reason, it would not be sufficient in itself to declare the legislation void on that short ground.\n34. Having given serious and thoughtful consideration to the matter, we must first take note of certain crucial aspects that practically clinch the issue. The very foundation and basis of Article 254(2) of the Constitution is that a particular State enactment runs contra to the provisions of a Central legislation on the same subject, but despite the same it would stand protected after it receives the assent of the President of India thereunder. Therefore, it is a foregone conclusion that disparity and discrimination would be writ large between the two enactments and aspects relating to their implementation. In such a situation, the question of comparing the two legislations, for the purpose of making out a case under Article 14 of the Constitution, would not arise. Such an exercise would be akin to comparing chalk with cheese, i.e., two essentially unequal entities.\n35. Notably, in G.C.Mandawar (supra), a Constitution Bench observed that it is conceivable that, when the same legislature enacts two different laws but in substance they form one legislation, it might be open to the Court to disregard the form and treat them as one law and strike it down if, in their conjunction, they result in discrimination, but such a course would not be open where the two laws sought to be read in conjunction are by different Governments and by different Legislatures as Article 14 does not authorize the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that, in contrast with a law of another State on the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory and nor does it contemplate a law of the Centre or of the State, dealing with similar subjects, being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions thereof. The Bench pointed out that the sources of authority for the two statutes being different, Article 14 can have no application. This was the very logic that was applied by this Court in Ananthi Ammal (supra), while upholding the validity of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978.\n36. In P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra), a Constitution Bench was dealing with an amendment to the old LA Act brought by the Madras Legislature, whereby different principles were specified for fixing compensation for lands acquired for housing schemes when compared with acquisition for other purposes. Significantly, this was not a case where Presidential assent was obtained under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. It was in those circumstances that the Bench observed upon a comparative study of the old LA Act and the Amending Act that, if a land is acquired for a housing scheme under the Amending Act, the claimant would get a lesser value than what he would get for the same land if it was acquired for a different public purpose under the old LA Act and such classification between persons whose lands were acquired for housing schemes and those whose lands were acquired for other public purposes would not be a reasonable one under Article 14. It was on that ground that the Bench held the Amending Act to be void, as it clearly infringed Article 14 of the Constitution. Similar was the situation in Deputy Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup Vs. Durga Nath Sarma [AIR 1968 SC 394] and Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), as those cases also did not involve validation of a repugnant State law under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.\n37. In Ranganatha Reddy (supra), a Constitution Bench of 7 Judges observed that the repugnancy, if any, between a State Act and a Central Legislation on a subject in the Concurrent List would stand cured if the State Act receives the assent of the President under Article 254(2) and such repugnancy cannot thereafter be a ground to invalidate the State Act. Again, in Javed and others Vs. State of Haryana and others [(2003) 8 SCC 369], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held that it is not permissible to compare a piece of legislation enacted by a State in exercise of its own legislative power with the provisions of another law, though pari materia it may be, but enacted by the Parliament or by another State Legislature within its own power to legislate, as the sources of power are different and so do differ those who exercise the power. It was observed that two laws enacted by two different Governments and by two different legislatures can be read neither in conjunction nor by comparison for the purpose of finding out if they are discriminatory and Article 14 does not authorize the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that, in contrast with a law of the Centre or of another State on the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory.\n38. In U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Jainul Islam and another [(1998) 2 SCC 467], this Court was dealing with a State Act for acquisition of land for executing housing schemes. However, the compensation payable thereunder was lesser than that payable under the old LA Act. This State law was of the year 1965 and had received the assent of the President. However, the old LA Act was amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, whereby several new provisions were inserted in the interest of the land owners, by enhancing the amount of solatium and interest. The State Act of 1965, however, remained unchanged. The High Court came to the conclusion that the land owners would be entitled to the benefit of the provisions introduced in the old LA Act by the Amendment Act of 1984. The matter thereupon came before this Court. This Court held that Section 55 of the State Act of 1965, which incorporated the provisions of the old LA Act, also intended that the amendments to the old LA Act relating to determination of compensation would be applicable to acquisition of lands under the State Act of 1965. Owing to this construction and interpretation of the statutory provision, this Court held that it would not be necessary to deal with the submission that, if the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1984 were not applicable to acquisitions under the State Act of 1965, the provisions of the old LA Act made applicable under the State Act of 1965 would be void on the ground of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution. This judgment, therefore, does not aid or advance the case of the appellants.\n39. Similar logic was applied by this Court in Savitri Cairae (supra), while dealing with the very same State Act of 1965. Noting that it provided for acquisition of land in terms of the old LA Act and by reason of the legal fiction created thereunder, this Court held that, even if the acquisition was made under the State Act of 1965, if higher amount of compensation is payable under the old LA Act, such higher amount of compensation has to be paid. Pertinently, this Court observed that, ordinarily, the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be invoked in the matter of enforcement of a State legislation vis-à-vis Parliamentary legislation and/or legislation of another State.\n40. We are, therefore, not inclined to entertain the attack launched against the Highways Act on the strength of the so-called disparity and discrimination in the norms and procedures prescribed therein when compared with the new LA Act. In this regard, we may point out that the Highways Act in the State of Tamil Nadu stood protected even at the time the old LA Act was in force and effect, owing to the Presidential assent that it had received under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, and it continued to operate and provide altogether different yardsticks for acquisition of land and payment of compensation till the advent of the new LA Act.\n41. Even otherwise, in so far as the issue of social impact assessment and the timelines for various steps in the new LA Act are concerned, this very argument was advanced in G. Mohan Rao (supra) and this Court observed that the whole exercise of pointing out any repugnancy after a validating Act has obtained the assent of the President is otiose for the whole purpose of Article 254(2) of the Constitution is to resuscitate and operationalize a repugnant Act or repugnant provisions of such Act. The inescapable fact also remains that the second proviso to Section 19(7) of the new LA Act empowers the appropriate Government to extend the stipulated period of 12 months for publishing the Declaration after issuance of a Preliminary Notification if, in its opinion, circumstances exist to justify the same. The third proviso requires that any such decision to extend the period shall be recorded in writing and the same shall be notified and uploaded on the website of the authority concerned. More importantly, once such extension is granted, there is no outer limit prescribed and the proceedings would not lapse owing to a time stipulation. In T.M. Peter (supra), while dealing with the attack against absence of a time limit for Government sanction in the Town Planning Act, 1932, this Court observed that, as the scheme of the said enactment was urgent improvement of a town and it was left to the Government to deal with it with expeditious dispatch, no precise time scale could be fixed in the Act owing to the myriad factors which would have to be considered by the Government before granting sanction to a scheme and concluded by stating that the Court would not be powerless to quash and grant relief where, arbitrary protraction or malafide inaction of the authorities caused injury to an owner.\n42. No doubt, the scheme of the new LA Act advocates timely measures being adopted in implementation of the acquisition and such general temporal restrictions would benefit the land owners, but the absence of such restrictions in the Highways Act may not be reason enough to invalidate it, as the very premise on which the Highways Acts was enacted by the State of Tamil Nadu was to cut down on time-consuming processes. In G. Mohan Rao (supra), this Court had noted that the letter dated 25.07.2019 written by the State of Tamil Nadu, for obtaining the assent of the President of India for the Validation Act of 2019, specifically emphasized that the three State Acts were made for the purpose of speedy acquisitions but the new LA Act rendered them repugnant. Therefore, it is not the intendment or purpose of the Highways Act that the processes for acquisition of land thereunder should be protracted or be ridden by avoidable delays.\n43. A particular instance or a stray case, involving some delay in the acquisition of land under the Highways Act, may have to be dealt with on its own individual merits but that would not be sufficient in itself to invalidate the legislation itself. As noted above, K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan have already approached the Madras High Court challenging the individual acquisition proceedings initiated against them and those cases have to be considered on their own merits and in accordance with law, without reference to this adjudication which is limited only to the attack on the validity of the Highways Act.\n44. Further, there is no possibility of the State of Tamil Nadu exercising arbitrary discretion in adopting one legislation or the other for the purpose of acquiring lands, as contended by the learned counsel. Sections 3, 7 and 11 of the Validation Act of 2019 expressly exclude the operation of the new LA Act for the purposes contained in the State Acts which stood revived owing to the assent of the President of India. Therefore, the State of Tamil Nadu would be bound to apply only the Highways Act for acquiring lands for the purposes reserved thereunder.\n45. On the above analysis, these appeals are bereft of merit. The Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, is not liable to be invalidated on the ground that its provisions manifest discrimination or arbitrariness when compared with the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition; Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.\nThe appeals are dismissed.\nParties shall bear their own costs.", + "case_record": "The appellant, owner of a residential house, sued the respondent tenant for eviction and recovery of rent arrears, alleging the tenant was in arrears for over six months. The tenant resisted, claiming he had spent a significant amount on repairs and that adjusting these expenses would reduce the arrears to less than six months. The trial court and appellate court found that a substantial portion of the repair expenses was not adjustable because the claim for recovery was barred by the three-year limitation period (Article 23 of the Limitation Act, 1963) or because repairs were done without notice to the landlord. Consequently, the tenant was found to be in arrears for more than six months, and a decree for eviction was granted. The High Court, however, set aside these judgments, holding that the tenant was entitled to deduct repair expenses incurred after notifying the landlord, and that the limitation period for such recovery/adjustment was six years. The High Court concluded that after such adjustments, the tenant was not in arrears for more than six months and dismissed the suit.", + "generated_judgment": "**Analysis:**\n\n1. **Limitation Period for Rent and Repairs**: According to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for the recovery of rent is six years, while recovery for damages due to the tenant's use or occupation of the property is three years (Article 23). In this case, the tenant's repair expenses fell into the latter category.\n\n2. **Notice of Repairs**: The landlord has the right to be notified if the tenant intends to carry out repairs. Repairs done without notice may not be considered for adjustment.\n\n3. **Trial Court and Appellate Court Findings**: Both these courts found that a significant portion of the tenant's repair expenses were not adjustable due to being time-barred (three-year limitation) or done without landlord's notice. Thus, the tenant was found to be in arrears for more than six months, leading to the eviction decree.\n\n4. **High Court Decision**: The High Court disregarded the limitation period for repairs and considered the six-year period for rent recovery when calculating the tenant's adjusted arrears. This interpretation is inconsistent with the Limitation Act, which explicitly prescribes different periods for rent and repair damages.\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- The High Court's interpretation of the limitation period for adjustments is not-supported by the Limitation Act, 1963, leading to an incorrect calculation of the tenant's arrears.\n- The trial court and appellate court correctly applied the relevant limitation periods to the repair expenses and considered repairs done without notice.\n- The High Court's decision to set aside these judgments based on an inaccurate interpretation of the law is erroneous.\n\n**Conclusion:**\n\nThe appeal should be **DISALLOWED**. The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by misinterpreting the law and thus, its judgment should not stand. The lower courts' findings, based on a correct application of the relevant law, should prevail.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by R. B. MISRA, J. :\nR. B. MISRA, J. for the The present appeal by special leave raises two questions : (1) whether the expenses incurred by the tenant on repairs of the tenanted premises can be deducted from or adjusted towards the rent due to the landlord despite the claim for recovery having become barred by time; and (2) whether the period of limitation in the present case for the adjustment of the amount spent on repairs towards the rent due will be three or six years ?\n2. The appellant is admittedly the owner of the residential house in dispute and the respondent is her tenant of the said premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 20. As the tenant-respondent had fallen in arrears of rent for more than six months the appellant served a notice of demand but on failure of the tenant to clear the arrears the appellant terminated his tenancy and filed a suit for his eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent. The suit was resisted by the tenant-respondent on grounds inter alia that he had spent a substantial amount on repairs of the tenanted premises and if the same was adjusted subjected towards the rent due, the arrears of rent were not for more than six months and, therefore, the suit for eviction on the ground of default was not maintainable.\n3. The trial court came to the conclusion that the entire amount spent by the tenant-respondent on repairs could not be adjusted towards the rent due as a substantial part of it was spent on repairs without any notice to the landlord. In respect of the part of the expenses incurred towards repairs the court held that as the claim for recovery of the said amount was barred by three years' rule of limitation, that amount also could not be adjusted towards the rent due to the landlord. In this view of the matter the tenant was in arrears of rent for more than a period of six months. Consequently he was liable to be evicted for default and the court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. On appeal the appellate court substantially confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court.\n4. On revision the High Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit holding that the defendant-respondent was entitled to deduct the amount spent by him on repairs of the suit premises after notice to the landlord, the claim for which had not become barred by time and after deducting that amount from the arrears of rent the defendant-respondent was not in arrears for more than six months. The Court further held that the limitation for recovery of the amount spent on repairs of the house was six years and not three years and on that basis it found that a substantial portion of the expenses incurred on repairs by the defendant-respondent could be adjusted towards the rent due as the same was well within time. The plaintiff-appellant has now come to challenge the judgment and order of the High Court.\n5. The first question for consideration, as stated earlier, is whether the expenses incurred by the tenant on repairs of the tenanted premises can be deducted from or adjusted towards the rent due to the landlord despite the claim for recovery having become barred by time. This point is no more res integra as it is concluded by a decision of this Court in Maganlal Chhotalal Desai v. Chandrakant Motilal ((1969) 1 SCC 58 : AIR 1969 SC 37 : (1969) 1 SCJ 100 ). Dealing with Section 20 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Act, 1947 the Court held :\nThe section gives the tenant a general right of recovery of the overpaid rent within six months from the date of payment. Without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, he may deduct the overpayment from any rent payable by him to the landlord. Deduction is one mode of recovery. If the amount is incapable of recovery because of the bar of limitation, it cannot be recovered by deduction. In other words, the right of recovery by deduction is barred at the same time as the right of recovery by suit. If the tenant seeks recovery of the over paid amount he must bring the suit or make the deduction within six months.Therefore, if the claim for recovery of the amount spent on repairs has become barred by time the same cannot be adjusted towards the rent due for the same reason. It would be anomalous to hold that if one remedy by way of recovery is barred by time the other mode of recovery, that is by adjustment, will not be barred.\n6. A feeble attempt was made to contend that there is no period of limitation prescribed for the adjustment of the amount spent by the tenant on repairs towards the rent due and, therefore, the amount so spent can be adjusted at any time before the suit. We feel difficulty in accepting this argument in face of the aforesaid decision of this Court.\n7. Now the next question is whether the period of limitation applicable to the facts of the present case for recovery of the amount spent on repairs or for adjustment of the same towards the arrears of rent due will be governed by three years' limitation or six years' limitation. The trial court and the first appellate court applied Article 23 of the Limitation Act, 1963\n8. For the reasons given above the appeal must fail and it is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -1113,26 +1113,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S009", - "case_id": "5248", - "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct", - "source_file": "S009__ablation_issue__mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct__5248.json", + "case_id": "256", + "experiment": "baseline_cot", + "model": "mistral-nemo", + "source_file": "S009__baseline_cot__mistral-nemo__256.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "09/05/2023", - "machine_error_stage": "issues", + "judgment_date": "01/02/1985", + "machine_error_stage": "conclusion", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue misframing" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1741 of 1967. Appeal by special leave from judgment and order dated the 30th November, 1962 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 777 of 1961. | State Of Mysore v. Anant Vinayak Patwardhan | 26/02/1974", - "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1741 of 1967. Appeal by special leave from judgment and order dated the 30th November, 1962 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 777 of 1961. | State Of Mysore v. Anant Vinayak Patwardhan", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal Nos. 5193-5195 of 2008 (Arising Out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 24733-24735 of 2005) | Ramisetty Naraiah v. Poluri Venkata Subbamma And Others | 22/08/2008", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal Nos. 5193-5195 of 2008 (Arising Out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 24733-24735 of 2005) | Ramisetty Naraiah v. Poluri Venkata Subbamma And Others", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The respondent's ancestors received a permanent cash allowance called Tainat from the Peshwas. Following the 1819 Treaty of Gulgallee, the East India Company agreed to continue all such allowances. The allowance was Rs. 2010/- minus a Rs. 240/- commutation amount. In 1944, the ruler of Jamkhandi converted this allowance to one for life. After Jamkhandi State merged with Bombay State, the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955, was enacted. The respondent applied under Section 17 of this Act, claiming the allowance was permanent and hereditary, and that his application to the ruler for correction of the record (which stated it was for life) was pending. He sought compensation based on it being permanent or for life. The Assistant Commissioner granted the amount the respondent was receiving. The respondent appealed to the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, arguing the ruler lacked power to change the allowance to for life. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the ruler's sovereign powers. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the High Court of Mysore, reiterating his claims. The High Court directed payment of Rs. 14,070 (seven times the annual allowance) on the basis that the grant was hereditary. This appeal challenges the High Court's decision.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts \n\n1. The respondent’s ancestors were granted a permanent cash allowance known as **Tainat** by the Peshwas. \n2. The **Treaty of Gulgallee (1819)** between the Peshwas and the East India Company provided that all such allowances would continue to be paid. \n3. The allowance amounted to **Rs. 2010** less a **commutation amount of Rs. 240**, i.e., a net annual sum of **Rs. 1,770**. \n4. In **1944** the ruler of the princely State of **Jamkhandi** altered the character of the grant from a permanent hereditary allowance to a **grant for life only**. \n5. After Jamkhandi’s merger with **Bombay State**, the **Bombay Merged‑Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955** (the “1955 Act”) came into force. \n6. Under **Section 17 of the 1955 Act**, a person whose *permanent* right is extinguished is entitled to compensation. \n7. The respondent filed an application under Section 17, asserting that the Tainat was a permanent hereditary right and that his request to the ruler for correction of the record (which still described the grant as “for life”) was pending. \n8. The **Assistant Commissioner** granted only the amount the respondent was actually receiving under the life‑grant (i.e., the reduced sum). \n9. The respondent appealed to the **Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal**, arguing that the ruler had no legal authority to convert the permanent hereditary allowance into a life‑grant. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that the ruler’s sovereign powers allowed the alteration. \n10. The respondent then filed a **writ petition** in the **High Court of Mysore** reiterating his claim that the allowance remained a permanent hereditary right. The High Court, accepting this view, ordered payment of **Rs. 14,070** (seven times the annual allowance) as compensation. \n11. The present appeal challenges the High Court’s decision.\n\n### Issues \n\n1. **Did the ruler of Jamkhandi have the legal authority to convert a permanent, hereditary cash allowance (“Tainat”) into a grant *for life* under the 1819 Treaty of Gulgallee and the statutory framework that survived the merger of Jamkhandi with Bombay State?** \n\n2. **Is the “Tainat” allowance a *permanent, hereditary* right that survived the abolition of “miscellaneous alienations” by the Bombay Merged‑Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955?** \n\n3. **Did the Assistant Commissioner correctly apply Section 17 of the 1955 Act by limiting the award to the amount the respondent was actually receiving under the life‑grant?** \n\n4. **Did the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal err in law by accepting the ruler’s sovereign power to alter a hereditary grant?** \n\n5. **Did the High Court of Mysore err in law (or in fact) by concluding that the allowance was hereditary and by fixing the compensation at seven times the annual amount?** \n\n6. **Is the quantum of compensation (seven‑fold multiplier) consistent with the purpose and language of Section 17 of the 1955 Act?** \n\n7. **Does the pending application for correction of the record bar the respondent’s claim for compensation?** \n\n8. **Is the respondent’s claim barred by lapse of time or laches?** \n\n### Rules \n\n1. **Treaty Principle** – A treaty entered into by a sovereign (here, the 1819 Treaty of Gulgallee) creates a *vested* right that survives the existence of the original parties and binds their successors unless expressly surrendered. \n\n2. **Doctrine of *perpetuity of hereditary rights* (Indian law)** – Rights conferred as “permanent” and “hereditary” under a treaty or a grant are deemed *permanent* unless they are lawfully extinguished by a competent authority. \n\n3. **Section 17 of the Bombay Merged‑Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955** – Provides a lump‑sum compensation when a *permanent* right is extinguished; the quantum is generally a multiple of the annual amount, the multiplier being fixed by the Act or by judicially‑established precedent (often seven years). \n\n4. **Power of a princely ruler post‑independence** – After the integration of princely states, a ruler’s sovereign powers were limited to those retained under the Instrument of Accession and the Constitution; they could not unilaterally modify rights that were *vested* under a treaty with the British Crown. \n\n5. **Principle of *cessation of sovereign prerogative*** – A sovereign may not impair a vested, permanent right without lawful authority; any such impairment is void. \n\n6. **Limitation and laches** – A claim for compensation under a statutory scheme must be brought within the period prescribed by the relevant limitation law; however, where a right is *permanent* and the claimant is a beneficiary, the limitation clock typically starts from the date of extinguishment, not from the date of the original grant. \n\n7. **Pending correction of records** – An administrative or remedial petition to correct the record does not preclude a claim for statutory compensation if the underlying right is already vested. \n\n### Analysis \n\n**Maintainability** – The appeal is filed against a judgment of the High Court of Mysore. No material procedural defect (e.g., lack of jurisdiction, expiry of appeal period) is indicated in the record. Consequently, the appeal is **maintainable**. \n\n1. **Authority of the ruler (Issue 1 & Rule 4 & 5)** \n - The Tainat was created by the 1819 Treaty, which the East India Company solemnly undertook to continue. Post‑independence, the treaty’s obligations were transferred to the successor State (Bombay State). \n - The ruler’s act in 1944 occurred after the State’s accession and after the treaty’s rights had become vested in the State. Under Rule 4, a post‑accession ruler possessed no sovereign power to alter a right that was a *permanent hereditary* grant enforceable against the State. \n - Hence, the ruler **lacked authority** to convert the permanent grant into a life‑grant; the conversion is legally **void**. \n\n2. **Nature of the allowance (Issue 2 & Rule 1,2,3)** \n - Because the conversion is void, the allowance remains a **permanent, hereditary** right. \n - The 1955 Act’s Section 17 is triggered where such a permanent right is extinguished. The 1955 Act, however, abolished “miscellaneous alienations” but expressly provided for compensation when a *permanent* right is lost. The respondent, being the legal heir, is therefore a *beneficiary* under Section 17. \n\n3. **Assistant Commissioner’s interpretation (Issue 3)** \n - The Commissioner limited the award to the amount the respondent was actually receiving under the life‑grant, treating the life‑grant as the extant right. Given the ruling in point 1 that the life‑grant is void, the Commissioner erred in restricting compensation to the reduced amount. \n\n4. **Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal’s view (Issue 4)** \n - The Tribunal’s affirmation of the ruler’s sovereign power conflicts with the legal principle that a sovereign cannot impair a vested permanent right (Rule 5). The Tribunal therefore committed a legal error. \n\n5. **High Court’s decision (Issue 5,6,7)** \n - The High Court correctly recognized the hereditary nature of the allowance (Issue 5, Rule 2). \n - The quantum—seven times the annual allowance—is consistent with the established method of valuation under Section 17 (Rule 3) and with precedent in similar compensation cases (e.g., *State of Bombay v. M/s. Deoghar Silks* where a seven‑year multiplier was applied). Accordingly, the High Court’s computation is not ultra vires. \n - The pending application for correction of the record does not bar the claim (Issue 7, Rule 7) because the right is already vested; the High Court’s award therefore stands. \n\n6. **Limitation (Issue 8)** \n - The claim was filed after the 1955 Act came into force; the statute does not prescribe a restrictive limitation period for claims arising from extinguishment of permanent rights, and no evidence of inordinate delay is shown. Hence the claim is not barred by limitation or laches. \n\n**Conclusion** – The ruler of Jamkhandi had no legal authority to alter a permanent hereditary allowance created by the 1819 Treaty. Consequently, the allowance remained a permanent hereditary right, invoking Section 17 of the 1955 Act. The Assistant Commissioner and the Revenue Appellate Tribunal erred in limiting the claimant’s entitlement. The High Court correctly held the allowance hereditary and correctly applied the statutory multiplier, awarding Rs 14,070 as compensation. \n\n### Conclusion \n\nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court’s decree ordering payment of Rs 14,070 in favour of the respondent is upheld.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by\nALAGIRSWAMI, J.-The respondent's ancestors had been granted a cash allowance called Tainat by the Peshwas. After the, defeat of the Peshwas by the British, by the Treaty of Gulgallee with Jainkhandi dated 6-6-1819 by the Hon'ble Mr. Elphinston, Governor of Bombay on behalf of the East India Company one of the terms which were granted to Gopalrao Jamkhandikar was regarding the terms which the held from the Government of His Highness the Peshwa, for the payment of his, contingent (apparently army) of his personal allowance. It stated that he was to continue all allowances and no complaints on. this head were to be suffered to reach the Government (East India Company). The allowance to respondent's ancestors was one- such allowance. This allowance seems to have amounted to a sum Rs. 2010/- minus a sum of Rs. 240/- being the commutation amount as shown in Petha Khata Wahi Extract of 1942-43. That: exact, also at this grant was permanent. But. in 1944 the then ruler of Jamkhandi seems to have converted this allowance to one for life. After the Jamkhandi State was merged in the State of Bombay, the, Bombay Legislature passed the Bombay Merged Territories Mislaneous Alienations. Abolition Act 1955. The respondent's filed an application on 21-7-1956 under s. 17 of that Act before the Assistant Commissioner, Jamkhandi claiming that the cash allowance be payable: was both permanent and hereditary but he learnt that the ruler Jamkhandi had passed an order that the said cash allowance be continued till his (appellant's) The time when the same was to him after the death of his father. He mentioned that he had moved the Rajasaheb by an application which was not finally disposed of. He, therefore. claimed that he would be entitled to Rs. 21.000/- at 7 times of the cash, allowance on the basis that it was Rs. 3, 000/- a year and permanent' or in the alternative to Rs. 9 000/- being three times the cash allowance on the basis that it; was payable for. life. It would be appreciated that by, this time the Ruler of Jamkhandi was no longer a Ruler and was certainly not in a position to , be of any assistance to the. respondent on the basis of h is application. The Assistant Commissioner passed an order granting a sum which the respondent was receiving. The respondent then filed an appeal to the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal as by that time the area had become part of the 'Mysore State . In that appeal he mentioned that through mistake his name has been recorded as holder of the Tainat cash allowance for life only. He also mentioned that his application to the Rejasaheb of Jamkhandi for correction of the mistake was still pending even though the state of Jamkhandi was merged. The 'Tribunal dealt with the argument before it on behalf of the respondent to the effect that the ruler of Jamkhandi had no power to change the. cash allowance to one for life as according to his own earlier order passed in the year 1909-10 it was permanent and in the view that the ruler of Jamkhandi had sovereign powers and was the fountain head of all source of authority, that is. executive, judiciary and legislature, he could change t he Tainat cash allowance at his sweet will and pleasure, dismissed the appeal. The respondent thereupon filed a writ petition No. 777 before the High Court of Mysore. Where also he stated that through mistake his name was recorded as the holder of the cash allowance for life only, and also urged that the ruler of the Jam State had no power to interfere with the Tainat cash allowance. The High Court did not deal with the question whether the Ruler of Jamkhandi had, in 1944, the power to convert a hereditary grant to one for life but directed that a sum of Rs. 14, 070 being seven times annual cash allowance of Rs. 29010 be paid to the respondent on , the basis that the grant was hereditary. This appeal is against that judgment and order of the High Court.We are of opinion that clearly the decision of the Mysore High 'Court is wrong. In Ameer-un-Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum (AIR 1953 SC 352 ) this Court stated the constitutional position of the Nizani of Hyderabad in these words:\n\"...... It cannot be dispute that prior to the integration of 'Hyderabad State with the Indian Union and the coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the Nizam of Hyderabad enjoyed uncontrolled sovereign powers. He was the supreme legislature the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of 'the executive, and there were no constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities. The Firmans were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam anti they Were, binding in the same way any other 'law;- nay, they would override all other laws which were in conflict with them. So long as a particular 'Fireman, held the field that alone would govern or regulate the rights of the p arties concerned, though it could be annulled or modified by a later 'Firman' at any time that the Nizam willed.\nThe, Nizam war, not only the supreme legislature, he was the fountain of justice as well., When he constituted a new Court, be could, according to ordinary notions, be deemed to have exercised his legislative authority. When again he affirmed or reversed a Judicial decision, that may appropriately be described as a judicial act. A rigid line of demarcation, however. between the one and the other would from the very nature of things be not justified or even possible.\"\nThat sets out the constitutional position of the ruler of every of the Indian States before their integration with the rest of India and coming into force of the Constitution of India. It follows therefore that if the ruler of Jamkhandi had changed the permanent cash allowance granted to the respondent's ancestors to one for life it is legally valid and it cannot be questioned. The extract from the Jamkhandi State Gazette dated 7-8-1920 publishing rules regarding cash allowance, itself shows that those rules cancelled the earlier rules and those rules also could be appropriately cancelled 'by the subsequent rules. Any application made by the respondent to the former ruler of Jamkhandi after the State was merged in Bombay State will not help him. The ruler held by that time lost all his powers. The decision of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal is, therefore, right.There is only one small point which has got to be mentioned. The compensation allowed was three times the cash allowance. As already mentioned the Petha Khata Wahi extract shows the allowance at Rs. 2010.00 minus Rs. 240.00 being the commutation amount. These allowances being service allowances, the deduction is for the payment to the person who was doing the service in place of the cash allowance holder. That is why what was being paid to the respondent year after year was the cash allowance minus commutation amount. The Mysore High Court was, therefore, wrong in holding that this sum of Rs. 240 cannot be deducted from the cash allowance while calculating the compensation payable to the respondent.\nWe must mention that when this appeal was take, , , . up for hearing Mr. Datar appearing for the respondent contended that as this Court in M.P. State v. Ranojirao (1968 3 SCR 489 ) has held that the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act violates Art. 19(1)(f) or Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, and so struck it down, the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienation Abolition Act is also liable to be struck down on the same ground. He, therefore, wanted that tic should be given the liberty to move the High Court for striking down the Act under consideration in this case. We do not propose to express any opinion as to whether it would be open him to do so in the background of this case. There is nothing to prevent him from filing an application if he is so advised.,\nIn the result this appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court of Mysore set aside. As the special leave was granted on the condition that the appellant would in any event pay to the respondent his of the' appeal, the appellant shall pay the respondent's costs.\n", + "case_record": "The appellant leased agricultural land in April 1975 and paid rent regularly. In 1979, the appellant learned of respondents' claims to have purchased the land. The appellant filed a suit for injunction and obtained a temporary injunction. Section 15 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956, was incorporated on July 1, 1980. Sale deeds for the land were executed on January 17, 1981, in favor of the respondents. The appellant filed an Andhra Tenancy Case (ATC) asserting his right to purchase the land, claiming the sales were void under Section 15. The respondents filed an ATC seeking eviction for alleged rent default. The trial court dismissed the appellant's ATC and allowed the respondents' eviction ATC, finding the sales valid as agreements predated Section 15 and ruling the appellant defaulted on rent. The District Court reversed this, holding that the sales were intended to circumvent Section 15 and that the appellant had not defaulted. The respondents then filed Civil Revision Petitions (CRPs) in the High Court. The High Court allowed the CRPs, setting aside the District Court's orders. The appellant challenged the High Court's order, arguing that Section 15 should apply as the sale deeds were executed after the amendment, and that the High Court failed to consider the effect of a landlord's withdrawal on the default issue and the execution of sale deeds in favor of nominees.", + "generated_judgment": "### **Judgment in the Appeal**\n\n---\n\n#### **Facts:**\n1. The appellant leased agricultural land in **April 1975**, paying rent regularly.\n2. From **December 1979**, the appellant was apprised of respondents’ ownership claims over the said land.\n3. **Temporary injunction in favour of the appellant** was granted to prevent eviction for alleged default in rent.\n4. **Section 15 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (as amended on **07.07.1980**)** became operative, prohibiting agricultural land sales in favour of tenants without prior dissolution of tenancy.\n5. **Deeds of sale** executed on **17.01.1981** (post-emendment) in favour of respondents, recording renditions through an Intermediate Party named the flier *(ZimandAL)*.\n6. The appellant filed suit under **Agricultural Tenancy Case (ATC)** raising intent to obtain land sale on inflated (discrepant) documents.\n7. Respondents separately filed an eviction suit under **ATC for 6 “verbal receipts” of rent (improperly traced)** predating the invalid transition.\n8. **Trial Court genuflected to eviction**, dismissing appellant’s ATC on:\n - Adjusting outsider squatters to past rents over doubts of receipt.\n9. **District Court reversed**, holding post-1980 sales illegal and resetting default debíaus on pre-accordances where invoices / bookmarks contained payment overhauls due for reason of fraudulent transpasser (ZimandAL).\n10. **High Court (RM)** recalled arrived orders, adopting strict callouts for rent shortfall train-rides closer to forensic accurateness and punishing legal perversions without substantial move/gaps for vaccine-lumpy formulae‐based reassirments cropping up.\n11. Objections arteries from appellant activated current notes:\n - Fifteen-feet void‐vocery violates “Declaratory Judgment” time-skeleton.\n - Nominee missteps obfuscate reality‐check payment.\n\n---\n\n#### **Issues:**\n1. **Statutory Violation**\n - *Do sale deeds on **17.01.1981**, made after Section 15’s **07.07.1980** sunset became (operative) amnesty‐myopic – void orvideable under Section 15(1)?*\n2. **Fraud/Gavest Non‐Seachianity**\n - *Has High Court become guilty of acquiescing Tenant‐acquisition retaliations by blanket-eduidual evaluations, seeing ainsiary tenancies at risk of listing nominals without conformance (re lease‐forwarderrors) to sergeant‐secucilitary snares.*\n3. **D boute‐anger /Desouth**\n - *Retribution must avail Anglo‐Old‐\tos Saxon norms distilled to prae‐guidelines instead of leering at subypte‐defined surreners nondifining legacy‐mongering under Section (15(4))?*\n **- Specific (**Appendant**Lay to High‐Court maderaose‐)\n - Should presumptuous buyer latitude be bent by nuances over renouncing‐frustration workshop‐violations (decapp compatibility) soofexcesses like progressive rental Votes?\n\n---\n\n#### **Rules:**\n1. **Section 15, Andhra AP Act 1956:**\n - Sales of land within the jurisdiction made **after** July 1, 1980, constituted criminal offences unless **prior dissolution of tenancy or precedual north-open deposits R/M**. (APGA Reports †)\n2. **Fraud‐Reactive Genetic Definitions**\n - Miscueješuez about ‘escrivcor“I appeal”مكانs invocation attributes swayedAMP/Bridge’s Brother‐last of emthor evolution (ADCA) over Repurchases/Third-Party-Chaser of land implied for tenancy‐following due‐care spell‐bound.)\n3. **Default‐Modifier Establishing Equikteness:**\n - Elections unhinged by ”just-readirable” lien‐filings augmented by declaration-modifiable award in traditional terminate‐wise pokes coinant‐slope-PDL—leached‐words‐PA covert‐ossen assenting learners invoking mistepper‐criteria under procedural-couten‐backload proődexs.\n4. **Tenancy Validity**\n - Premised on demise‐permit dispossessed rentals post-aplode-maskers with acts routining buy‐backs among Equifax‐havelwee,aide-whishes ; hereniary squadron DOCÜment slided inappropriate straight‐insic promotional advances with remoduted Title‐ Ηνω quân `@’´.\n\n---\n#### **Analysis:**PER **FINALABLE BARREN-CORTOU* (CONCRETE SPIZ RANS);\n\n1. **Maintainable Appeal?**—*NO UPDATE—CERTAIN ALTOGVERDANCE WORKS TRUE:*\n **(i)** Nor hideout disputes regarding content holder, exemplars< or malarial records joined‐with valid files post‐amendments. **Gist**—tenure dirrupili Fantasm just lands deeply split through groundwork.\n **(ii)** **_Fraud case_** owing clausible–зибли -ing-enough quandary swung Clear’s merging of blanks (L+++++ contracts for $1.1-million of source-struck )\n -(iii) \"Papers gripping suppragma welcome sciVR pulse check under Section 5 of ALA’s Prop AssCity \",\" is barred by “(Due Process Supply of rare‐” befo-field‐Present‐Paradiems”\n -(iv) Manned II dealings converted pedigrees without choice of pre-1957 “Othellian tenancy deeds ” or other‐irrevocable mutating deeds.**\n\n WHEREAS: The accused’s armatorial failure dogged in judicial to-do list multiplication quietly adopted withdrew groundplans. Existing rejipiled underbindAlternatives got bondage for evacuee fraud‐odds imposed.\n\n **PROVING TERTIARY COKED**:\n - Voiding–you’d sell document was laid exhaustively, (Facts A neurologic stand nil). Retroverted-bitter press of _errors locus penditus_ lack driving embrace ratifies BP Crawford Nm this attempt to convert defensible tenancies displacing selfione accused’s claims on specaskirty.\n\n **PLEADS CAFF: PORTRÖED IMMINESPOTAS-**\n *(a)Easy ‘(LISTER FOUR-AT-PEEL) WaitilineChecked – ‘Garafia’ Then **RED-surprise-free**,turned:*:Wallowed possible vendue in base-identing deal west Procs in ^industrial-general jig-saw finds$$ tossing net over fleeing trace of risky residue.[Result]:\n\n---\n\n2. **Eviction-rem:\n**Returns Evidence– Generative/Gpublicly/GIT**, replies renderfully-phanetic per circum 매무 wheresack shake-co focused rip-proof.\n - Pools of timbers extending over SP mis-communion of clothing‐to-date rubbishlessly with INSIS ( rent-recieves*-boutsp), gone‐makerism.\n - Defraud‐tiny details standard‐ NirvanVR Australodied on €1‐€2 K **receipts**-cited or papers vanishing without undecerptible pace‐how will Election‐teenancy, thenherence‐ismu nations keep finance‐wieguntilly.\n\n3. Conclusions:\n - **High Court—taped judiciary Exhibit gone operately off-court (+ their argument saying \"subsequence‐_quantum consenti_\"), stayed APGA deeper problem-blatterunder brute‐roll-back-load bullion‐coanny’s inflated submission start-bumps**\n **bay topped up by DR-Konaware autumn‐lyment difference-nailers into gut‐gain.**\n - Assigned‐resembles rhythms mainting A litable however provisions that wiped‐having statutes four-way exaggeration reentrainment under this “collateral invader.” promises Abhors no man’s lookouts.\n - **ONTRY TENT!** Title‐widering Ordারে--> Mess Sad and hoops of Kiser-Consumlikes-of mimicked contradicted beyond the criminal dic Berlino incapacity to go levee-wide the questioned muddy‐stork‐flawsingly becoming variance‐clashed parties.\n\n---\n---\n#### **Conclusion:** **DISMISSED**\n\n---\n**TO-The
bummed Last-Pagecription:**\nThough High Act fluttered another stack, non-blockading-to‐below Letter underlined **clean-words encasing apparent haga Ether backward trades** still screamed **public value faithly** that attorneys left‐gross high‐resolving‐clauses out for show “rehallus”‐laybudies only.\nLapses\\(-\\)still truly 다소 `supersession‐gardened ‐ear-arming‐gentlement churning ofterraform‐failure‐drawn‐remodel realized a **dual‐pronged‐symmetry** of plausible dissent‐bingeing‐all thru‐ファーリン-— over-drag‐nine swarms of cadavers who’d generaders. They’re not worth huge brown‐(nourment‐both‐far) above legal‐drop point. Period, **Recited.** —EndBattle.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT\n1. Leave granted.\n2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowing the Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 5692 and 5695 of 1998 filed by the respondent while dismissing the CMP No. 6683 of 2005 filed by the appellant.\n3. Background facts as projected by the appellant are as follows:\nIn April, 1975 the appellant herein had taken the petition schedule lands which are to an extent of Acres 5-36 cents of agricultural land situated at Pernamatta village, Santhalapadu, Patta No.2182- Survey No.158/2, Ongole District with the following boundaries - East : Government Donka, South: Land of Inabathana Ramaiah, West : Land of Gajula Kotaiah, North: Land of Adapal Jogaiah and Venkatarao. Since the time he had taken on lease the above mentioned lands, he has been regular in payment of Maktha which is a lump sum amount of Rs.1200/- towards rent per year to the schedule lands.\nIn 1979 as the appellant came to know that the husband of 2nd respondent herein i.e Mannam Sundarannaiah and one Adapa Venkatarao were contending that they had purchased the schedule lands from G. Seetharamamma who is the wife of the original Landlord and from whose brother the appellant had taken the schedule lands on lease after his death. As the respondents were contending that they will evict, appellant filed suit O.S No. 791/1979 on the file of District Munsif against 1st to 3rd respondents herein seeking permanent injunction against them and also filed an I.A. No. 3963 of 1979 seeking temporary injunction.\nIn the suit for the first time it came to the knowledge of the appellant herein that the 3rd respondent herein, to discharge the debts had agreed to sell the schedule lands to the husbands of the Ist and 2nd respondents herein by way of agreements of sale dated 10.9.1979. Possession continued to remain with the appellant herein and he was cultivating the petition schedule lands.\nOn 13.11.1979 the temporary injunction which was granted in favour of the appellant was allowed and the temporary injunction was made absolute, against which an Appeal C.M.A. No. 111/1979 was filed by the 1 to 3 respondent herein in the court of District Court Munsif, Ongole.\nOn 01.07.1980 Section 15 was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (in short the 'Act').\nOn 11.12.1980 the appeal C.M.A. No.111/ 1979 which was filed by the respondents herein challenging the injunction order dated 13.11.1979 was also dismissed.\nOn 17.01.1981, the 3rd respondent herein contrary to Section 15 of the Act, sold the Southern half of the schedule lands to the Ist respondent herein and Northern half of the schedule lands to the 2nd respondent herein by executing registered sale deeds. But still the appellant was in possession of the lands and he was cultivating the same.\nOn 17.11.1981 the appellant filed A.T.C. (Andhra Tenancy Case) which was numbered in the year 1982 and the number of the case was A.T.C. No.2 of 1982 on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Ongole (Special Officer Constituted under Andhra Tenancy Act) and in the A.T.C. he contended that the sales are contrary to Section 15 of the Act and as such they are void and sought declaration from the court (a) that he is entitled to first purchase the schedule lands, (b) that the sale deeds executed on 17.01.1981 are void (c) that respondents should execute proper sale deeds in favour of the appellant and convey the schedule lands to him.\nIn ATC 2/1992 the respondents herein filed their counter wherein they contended that the appellant defaulted in payment of rents and they also stated that the schedule property was sold to the respondents 1 and 2 by way of registered sale deeds dt. 17.01.1981.\nOn 21.09.1984, the respondents herein filed A.T.C. No. 44 of 1984 under Section 13(a) of Act and sought for eviction of the appellant and delivery of possession of the schedule lands contending that the appellant defaulted in payment of rents from 1978 to 1984. In this petition it was also contended that on 5.5.1979 the appellant had written a letter and re-delivered possession of the schedule lands to the 3rd respondent's father and subsequently after the death of the 3rd respondent's late father, the 3rd respondent herein leased out the schedule lands to one A Vankata Rao on 15.06.1979 for a period of one year.\nIn the year 1984 the appellant herein filed statement in A.T.C. No.44/1984 denying the contentions pleaded by the respondents and he also contended that the surrender document alleged to have been executed by the appellant herein is a false and forged one and that it is a concocted document and that as a counter blast to the suit O.S. 791/1979 as well as A.T.C. 2 of 1982, the respondents herein filed the present A.T.C. 44/1984 and he also contended that as per the Court's order he had deposited the rents in the Court. In the counter he also contended that the sale of schedule lands are bad in the eye of law as he was not offered first option to purchase the same.\nOn 07.11.1988, the learned Additional District Munsif, Ongole dismissed O.S.No.791/1979 holding that the Court had no jurisdiction as the dispute in the suit relates to a dispute between a tenant and a landlord and that it can be decided only by the Special Officer under the provisions of Act.\nBoth the A.T.Cs were clubbed together and common evidence was recorded and on behalf of the appellant herein two witnesses were examined and on behalf of the respondents herein two witnesses were examined and exhibits Al to A30 were marked and no exhibit and/or any document was marked by the respondents herein.\nOn 15.05.1992 the Court of the Special Officer for Tenancy Cases, Ongole (Principal District Munsif, Ongole) dismissed A.T.C No.2/1982 filed by the appellant herein and allowed A.T.C. No.441/1984 filed by the respondents herein taking the view that as the alleged agreements of sales are prior to the enactment of Section 15 of Act and as registered sale deeds are executed subsequent to the enactment of Section 15 of the Act the same are not hit by Section 15 of Act. The Trial Court also held that the appellant also committed default in payment of rents. The Court however held that there is no proof that the appellant surrendered the lands by way of a delivery receipt on 05.05.1979 and no such delivery receipt was filed.\nIn the year 1992 the appellant herein aggrieved by the orders passed in A.T.C. No. 2/1982 and A.T.C. No. 44/1984 filed A.T.A. No. 8 of 1992 and cross objections were filed by the respondents 1 and 2 herein against the orders passed in A.T.C. No. 44/1984 and the appellant herein filed A.T.A. No.9/ 1992 and cross objections were filed by the respondents 1 and 2 herein against the orders passed in A.T.C. No.2/1982\nOn 19.04.1997, the Court of District Judge, Ongole on appreciation of facts, evidence and law allowed both the appeals i.e A.T.A. Nos. 8 and 9 of 1992 filed by the appellant herein and dismissed both the cross objections field by the respondents herein. In its order the appellate Court has specifically held that there is only recital in the sale deeds about the agreement of sale. The agreements are not filed. The recital about the sale agreement is made in the sale deeds only to avoid the benefit of Section 15 of the amended Act to the tenant. Admittedly, Exhibits A2 and A3 sale deeds were executed after the amendment Act came into force. Even if there is an agreement of sale by the time of 01.07.1980 in favour of the husbands of vendees, the landlord should have issued notice as contemplated U/S. 15 (1) of the Act as the sale had not been completed. Section 15(6) of the Tenancy Act refers to only sale, but not agreement of sale. Though sale can be made under a registered document, consent was not obtained prior to the amended Act and also no suit for specific performance was filed and that it is not known why the purchases under the agreement of sale on 10.9.1979 kept quite for about one year and four months in obtaining the sale deeds in the name of their nominees. The circumstances under which the agreements of the sale were executed and obtained sale deeds in the name of the wives of the agreement holders and filing of A.T.C. 44/1984 by one of the landlords and vendees give rise to suspicion that only to evict the tenant from the land, the landlord set up to plea that the land was leased out to another person A. Venkata Rao and the land was agreed to be sold to the husbands of vendees and executed agreements of sale. The collusion can also be seen in filing of A.T.C. 44 of 1984. All the vendors did not join in A.T.C. 44 of 1984. Only R.1 and vendees joined in A.T.C. 44 /1984 for evicting the tenant. There is no need for R.1 to join as a party in A.T.C. 44 / 1984 to evict the tenant as by then the title was conveyed to the vendees and R1 had no interest in the land. Only to protect his right to evict the tenant in case the sale deeds are found to be void, he joined in A.T.C. 44/1984. As the amended Act provided an option for the tenant to purchase the land the landlord had to first give notice to the tenant in case he wants to sell the lands. To avoid such notice, sale deed were obtained in the names of the wives in pursuance of the agreements of the sales. Even though there was an agreement of sale prior to amended Act, the agreement of sale is not enforceable as it contravenes the provisions of section 15 of the amended tenancy Act and Section 17 of the Act reads \"The provision of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any pre-existing law; custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of Court.\" The appellate Court has also negatived the contentions of the respondents that the appellant has committed default in payment of rents. So holding, appellate Court allowed both the A.T.A. Nos. 8 and 9 of 1992 and dismissed the cross objections in both the appeals.\nIn 1997 after the A.T.A.s were allowed, the appellant herein filed O.S. No.619 of 1997 in the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge Ongole, against respondents 1 to 12 in A.T.C. 21 1982 and sought a direction to be given to the respondents 1 to 12 therein to execute a registered sale deed in favour of him for the schedule property.\nIn 1998, aggrieved by the orders passed in both A.T.A. 8 and 9 of 1992 only the respondents 1 to 3 filed C.R.P. Nos. 5692 and 5695 of 1998 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 in the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh.\nOn 20.10.2000, the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Ongole by its judgment allowed O.S. No.619 of 1997 directing the defendants therein to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff (appellant herein) for the schedule lands.\nOn 22.09.2005, the respondents 1 and 2 filed C.M.P. No.6683/2005 in C.R.P. No.5695 of 1998 and sought to implead respondents 2 to 12 in A.T.C. No.2/1982 who are legal heirs of original landlords as respondents 5 to 15 in C.R.P. No.5695 /1998.\nOn 3.09.2005 the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgment allowed both the C.R.Ps. i.e. 5692 and 5695 of 1998 and dismissed C.M.P. No. 6683 of 2005 filed by the appellant.\nAccording to the appellant the alleged agreement for sale was in favour of the husbands of R1 and R2. There was nothing indicated in the said agreements that there can be execution in favour of any other person or nominee. The stand taken was that the property was leased out to somebody else and not to appellant. It is his case that Section 15 of the Act makes the position absolutely clear that when there is an intention to sell the land leased to a cultivating tenant, such tenant shall be first given notice of the intention to sell such land and requiring him to exercise his option to purchase the land. Only in case the cultivating tenant does not exercise his option, it can be offered to somebody else. The High Court has erroneously come to the conclusion that since the alleged agreement for sale was executed prior to introduction of the provision, the provision has no applicability.\nAccording to learned counsel there was no discussion even of the ingredients of the provision and in any event of sub section (6) of Section 15 and Section 17 of the Act. It is pointed out that R-3 had filed an application to the effect that he does not want to press the petition before the High Court. On that basis, his name was deleted from the array of parties and he was added as respondent No.4. The question of default therefore becomes redundant as the District Court has dismissed the eviction petition which was filed on the ground of default. The effect of the prayer made by the respondent No. 3, who was a petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition, was also not considered by the High Court.\n4. It is the stand of learned counsel for the appellant that the object of Section 15 is to protect the interest of the cultivating tenant. Therefore, in case the landlord intends to sell the land, he has to first give option to the cultivating tenant. Even if there was an agreement earlier to the introduction of the provision, that is really of no consequence as otherwise the provisions of Section 17 would become redundant. It is, therefore, submitted that though the provision according to the High Court came into force with effect from 1.7.1980 and the agreements were purportedly entered into on 10.9.1979, the sale deed was executed on 17.1.1981. The High Court, it is submitted, has not also considered the question whether the sale deeds could have been executed in favour of the respondents 1 & 2 when admittedly the purported agreement for sale was entered into with their respective husbands.\n5. In reply learned counsel for the respondents submitted that High Court's judgment is in order because what is stated in Section 11 of the Act. According to him, even if there is a change in ownership of the land the cultivating tenant continues the tenancy on the same terms as before. It is pointed out that Section 15 shall came into operation only when there is an intention to sell the land. That intention in the present case was already expressed and agreement for sale was executed prior to introduction of the provision in question.\n6. We find that the trial court has not considered the effect of the sub-section (6) of Section 15 and Section 17. The relevant provisions read as follows:\n \"Section 15. Cultivating tenants' right to-first purchase the land leased to him: (1) Any landlord intending to sell the land leased to a cultivating tenant shall first give notice to such cultivating tenant; of his intention to sell such land, and requiring him to exercise his option to purchase the land. The particulars to be specified in the notice and the time within which the option shall be exercised by cultivating tenant shall be such as may be prescribed. (2) to (5) ..............................................\n(6) Any sale of the land by the landlord in cultivation of this Section shall be voidable to the option of the cultivating tenant.\"\n\"17. Act to override contract and other laws:- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any pre-existing law custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of a Court.\" \n7.Section 17 has overriding effect. As a bare reading of the provision makes it clear, it inter-alia provides that notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any pre existing law, custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of the court, the provisions of the Act shall have effect. Similarly, sub-section (6) of Section 15 provides that any sale of the land by the landlord in contravention of Section 15 shall be voidable to the option of the cultivating tenant. The High Court has come to an abrupt conclusion that since the agreement to sell was purportedly executed prior to the introduction of the provision, they have no relevance. There is no discussion as to the effect of the provisions, and the specific reference to agreements. Additionally, the High Court has not dealt with the aspect as to whether it could have gone into the question of default when respondent No. 3 who was shown as the petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition did not want to pursue the petition.\n8. In the aforesaid background we deem it proper to remit the matter to the High Court to hear and dispose of the Civil Revision Petitions afresh and deal with the aspects highlighted above. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits. Since the matter is pending since long, we request the High Court to dispose of the petitions as early as practicable preferably by the end of February, 2009.\n9. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. No costs.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -1238,26 +1238,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S010", - "case_id": "6135", + "case_id": "6043", "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "gpt-oss-120b", - "source_file": "S010__ablation_issue__gpt-oss-120b__6135.json", + "model": "ministral-3b", + "source_file": "S010__ablation_issue__ministral-3b__6043.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "26/02/1974", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "judgment_date": "22/08/2008", + "machine_error_stage": "facts", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Wrong legal test / threshold" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in reasoning" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal No. 225 of 1978 | Tota Singh And Another v. State Of Punjab | 01/04/1987", - "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal No. 225 of 1978 | Tota Singh And Another v. State Of Punjab", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-423, (From the Judgment and Order dated August 31, 1992 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal R. P. Nos. 665 and 666 of 1991 and Criminal M. C. No. 832 of 1992) | Forest Range Officer And Others v. P. Mohammed Ali And Others(Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-422 Of 1993) 1992) | 04/05/1993", + "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-423, (From the Judgment and Order dated August 31, 1992 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal R. P. Nos. 665 and 666 of 1991 and Criminal M. C. No. 832 of 1992) | Forest Range Officer And Others v. P. Mohammed Ali And Others(Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-422 Of 1993) 1992)", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The four appellants were charged under Sections 302 and 323 IPC read with Section 34 IPC for an incident on July 19, 1973, involving the death of Gurdev Singh and injuries to others. The Sessions Judge acquitted all appellants on May 30, 1974, finding prosecution eye-witnesses unreliable due to unexplained reporting delay, lack of motive, and inconsistencies. The State appealed. The High Court, on April 9, 1978, set aside the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The High Court's decision was based on an independent reappraisal of evidence, without finding the Sessions Judge's reasons for acquittal unreasonable or perverse, merely reaching a different conclusion.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n\n1. The appellants were charged under Sections 302 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), read with Section 34 IPC, for an incident on July 19, 1973, resulting in the death of Gurdev Singh and injuries to others.\n \n2. On May 30, 1974, the Sessions Judge acquitted all appellants, citing unreliable prosecution eyewitnesses, unexplained reporting delay, lack of motive, and inconsistencies.\n\n3. The State appealed the acquittal, and on April 9, 1978, the High Court set aside the Sessions Judge's acquittal, convicting the appellants and sentencing them to life imprisonment.\n\n4. The High Court's decision was based on an independent reappraisal of evidence, without declaring the Sessions Judge's reasons for acquittal unreasonable or perverse.\n\n### Issues:\n\n1. Did the High Court err in conducting an independent reappraisal of evidence instead of merely evaluating the propriety of the Sessions Judge’s acquittal?\n\n2. Was the High Court justified in setting aside the acquittal without finding the Sessions Judge’s decision perverse or unreasonable?\n\n3. Can the State appeal against an acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the absence of findings of perversity or unreasonableness by the lower court?\n\n### Rules:\n\n1. **Appellate Review Jurisdiction**: An appellate court is generally restricted from re-evaluating evidence de novo and should assess decisions for errors in law, perversity, or unreasonableness, as established in *Appa Balwant v. State of Bombay* (1959).\n\n2. **Principle of Perversity**: Acquittals may only be set aside if the lower court’s decision is perceived as perverse or unreasonable, as clarified in *State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh* (1980).\n\n3. **State’s Right to Appeal Against Acquittal**: Under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the State can appeal an acquittal, but successful appeals typically require demonstrating that the acquittal was unreasonable or perverse.\n\n### Analysis:\n\n1. **Issue of Independent Reappraisal of Evidence**:\n - **Fact 3** & **Fact 4** concern the High Court's appellate role. The High Court conducted an independent reassessment of the evidence, which typically violates the appellate function as underscored in *Appa Balwant v. State of Bombay*. This overstepping suggests the High Court acted beyond its jurisdictional limits, affecting the legitimacy of the appellate procedure.\n\n2. **Justification for Setting Aside Acquittal**:\n - **Issue 2** is rooted in the procedural requirement that acquittals can only be set aside if the lower court’s decision is deemed perverse or unreasonable. The High Court did not find the Sessions Judge's acquittal in this regard (**Rule 2**). This absence undermines the legal justification for setting aside the acquittal, thereby eroding the basis of the conviction.\n\n3. **State’s Right to Appeal**: \n - The State’s ability to appeal (**Issue 3**) hinges on the existence of unreasonableness or perversity. Given that the High Court accepted the Sessions Judge’s reasons as not unreasonable or perverse, the foundational basis for the appeal is weak under the guiding principles (**Rule 3**).\n\n### Conclusion:\n\nGiven the High Court's overreach in conducting an independent reassessment of evidence without finding the Sessions Judge's decision unreasonable or perverse, the appeal lacks legal justification. The procedural and substantive principles governing appellate review mandate that acquittals can only be overturned when found perverse or unreasonable, none of which were established by the High Court in this case. Consequently, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J.\nBALAKRISHNA ERADI, J. -\nAfter hearing Shri A. N. Mulla, Senior Advocate for appellants and Shri R. S. Sodhi, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent and having carefully examined all aspects of the case in the light of the submissions made at the Bar, we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that this appeal has to be allowed\n2. The four appellants before us - Tota Singh, Dauli Singh, Mithu Singh and Mukhtiar Singh were tried by the Court of Sessions, Faridkot on charges under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and Section 323 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. After detailed consideration of the entire evidence adduced in the case, the learned Sessions Judge by his judgment dated May 30, 1974 acquitted the appellants of all the charges laid against them. Against the said decision of the Sessions Judge, the State of Punjab preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1106 of 1974 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. A Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated April 9, 1978 allowed the State's appeal, set aside the order of the Sessions Judge acquitting the appellants and convicted the appellants under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC as well as under Section 323 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. On the first count all the appellants were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and on the second count they were ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each with a further direction that the substantive sentence of imprisonment in respect of all the appellants shall run concurrently\n3. We do not propose to set out in extenso the facts of the case nor to discuss in detail the oral and documentary evidence adduced. We say this for the reason that we are fully satisfied that the approach made by the High Court to a consideration of the appeal was wholly vitiated by a manifest illegality inasmuch as the High Court has acted in total disregard of the principles repeatedly laid down by this Court delineating the restricted grounds on which alone interference may be made by a court of appeal with an order of acquittal passed by a lower court\n4. The occurrence that led to the prosecution took place on July 19, 1973 at about 4 p.m. in village Bishmandi, Police Station Jaitu in District Faridkot. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased Gurdev Singh accompanied by Ajmer Singh PW 2 and Malkiat Singh PW 6 was going from the house of Ajmer Singh to the house of the deceased on that fateful day. While they were approaching the house of one Moda Singh Jat, the four appellants, all carrying a gandasa each, suddenly besieged them from behind the Chelianwali Street raising a \"lalkara\" proclaiming that they were going to take their revenge for outraging the modesty of Malkiat Kaur and they attacked the deceased as well as Ajmer Singh and Malkiat Singh by inflicting gandasa blows on them. It was alleged that this was a preplanned and concerted attack made by the appellants as a reprisal for an incident of alleged rape of one Malkiat Kaur by Ajmer Singh (PW 2). Gurdev Singh (deceased) is said to have fallen down on the spot as a result of the blows inflicted on him and PWs 2 and 6 are said to have suffered simple injuries due to the attack with gandasa. According to the prosecution version on hearing the cries for help raised by PW 2 and PW 6, Kaur Singh, son of deceased Gurdev Singh came to the place of occurrence and thereupon all the four appellants ran away from the spot leaving PW 6 near Gurdev Singh, who was lying on the ground in an injured condition. PW 2 is said to have gone to the Sarpanch and the Panch of the village and informed them about the incident. Thereafter he returned to the scene of occurrence and himself along with PW 6 are said to have put Gurdev Singh on a bullock cart and got him admitted in the injured condition in the hospital. PW 2 and PW 6 were also admitted in the same hospital. Gurdev Singh was subsequently transferred to the Christian Medical College at Ludhiana, where he succumbed to his injuries on July 30, 1973\n5. The learned Sessions Judge after a careful analysis of all the facts and circumstances as disclosed by the evidence adduced in the case came to the conclusion that the testimony of Ajmer Singh PW 2 and Malkiat Singh PW 6 who were examined by he prosecution as eye-witnesses to prove the occurrence could not be safely accepted and acted upon as true. The trial Judge set out in his judgment detailed and cogent grounds for arriving at the said conclusion. In his opinion there was no proper explanation for the inordinate delay in reporting the crime to the police and there was also no adequate proof of any motive. The learned Sessions Judge rejected the theory put forward by the prosecution that it was a preplanned attack made by the appellants with a view to avenge the alleged molestation of Malkiat Kaur by Ajmer Singh PW 2 by pointing out that if such had been really the case, the target of attack by the appellants would have been Ajmer Singh to whom only simple injuries were caused and not Gurdev Singh who had nothing to do with the alleged incident of molestation. The learned Sessions Judge was inclined to accept the defence version that the appellants being 'siris' had some trouble with PW 2 and PW 6 about the apportionment of 'batai' and this might have led to their false implication in the case. In the absence of any independent corroboration of the testimony given by the two alleged eye-witnesses (PW 2 and PW 6), the learned Sessions Judge who had seen them giving evidence in the box was not impressed by their evidence specially having regard to the fact that both of them had been appearing as prosecution witnesses in a large number of police cases. The testimony of PW 2 and PW 6 having been found to be not worthy of belief, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the appellants on both the charges levelled against them\n6. The High Court has not found in its judgment that the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for discarding the testimony of PW 2 and PW 6 were either unreasonable or perverse. What the High Court has done is to make an independent reappraisal of the evidence on its own and to set aside the acquittal merely on the ground that as a result of such reappreciation, the High Court was inclined to reach a conclusion different from the one recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the mere fact that the appellate court is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the appellate court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous\n7. Tested in the light of the above principles, it must be held that the interference made in the present case by the High Court with the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge was wholly unwarranted. We accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge acquitting the appellants of all the charges framed against them", + "case_record": "Respondents faced proceedings under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, for possessing/transporting sandalwood oil. They contested the court's jurisdiction, arguing that 'sandalwood oil' is not 'wood oil' as defined in Section 2(f)(i) of the Act, and therefore not 'forest produce'. An initial High Court judgment quashed the complaints, but a subsequent Division Bench held sandalwood oil to be 'forest produce'. Sandalwood oil is industrially extracted from the heartwood and roots of sandalwood trees, which are explicitly defined as 'forest produce' and 'timber' under the Act. Technical dictionaries and expert opinions distinguish 'wood oil' (natural exudation) from 'sandalwood oil' (industrial by-product). The Karnataka Forest Act explicitly includes 'sandalwood oil', unlike the Kerala Act.", + "generated_judgment": "### Facts: \n1. Respondents faced proceedings under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, for possessing/transporting sandalwood oil.\n2. The respondents contested the court's jurisdiction, arguing that 'sandalwood oil' is not 'wood oil' as defined in Section 2(f)(i) of the Act, and therefore not 'forest produce'.\n3. An initial High Court judgment quashed the complaints against the respondents.\n4. A subsequent Division Bench held that sandalwood oil is indeed 'forest produce'.\n5. Sandalwood oil is industrially extracted from the heartwood and roots of sandalwood trees.\n6. Sandalwood trees and associated products are explicitly categorized as 'forest produce' and 'timber' under the Act.\n7. Technical dictionaries and expert opinions differentiate 'wood oil' (natural exudation) from 'sandalwood oil' (industrial by-product).\n8. The Karnataka Forest Act explicitly includes 'sandalwood oil', unlike the Kerala Act.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Does the definition of 'wood oil' under Section 2(f)(i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, encompass 'sandalwood oil'?\n2. Is sandalwood oil considered 'forest produce' under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961?\n3. Should the technical and expert definitions distinguishing 'wood oil' from 'sandalwood oil' influence the court's interpretation of the Act?\n4. Can the explicit inclusion of 'sandalwood oil' in the Karnataka Forest Act be used as persuasive authority to interpret the Kerala Forest Act?\n\n### Rules:\n1. Statutory interpretation principles to determine legislative intent, especially the ordinary meaning of the words, context, and purpose of the statute.\n2. The principle of using technical and expert definitions to guide interpretation where statutory language is ambiguous.\n3. The doctrine of persuasive authority, where laws from different jurisdictions can be considered for guidance, though not binding.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Maintainability of the Appeal**: The appeal concerns the interpretation of the Kerala Forest Act as applied to 'sandalwood oil’ and its legal classification. Therefore, the appeal is maintainable as it addresses substantive legal questions.\n\n2. **Issue 1 and Issue 2 - Definition of 'wood oil' and 'forest produce'**: The core legal question hinges on whether 'sandalwood oil', despite being industrially extracted, falls within the statutory definition of 'wood oil'. According to the facts (Facts 5 and 6), sandalwood trees and their products are classified broadly as 'forest produce', which could logically extend to products derived from them like sandalwood oil. The statutory language governing 'forest produce' should be interpreted in light of this broader classification under the Act. \n\n3. **Issue 3 - Influence of Technical Definitions**: Expert opinions and technical definitions (Fact 7) provide clarity on how 'wood oil' and 'sandalwood oil' are perceived differently in industrial contexts. These distinctions may suggest that the legislature did not intend 'wood oil' to encompass industrially produced extracts like sandalwood oil. However, this does not automatically exclude sandalwood oil from being defined as 'forest produce' since the broader category includes the source material.\n\n4. **Issue 4 - Persuasive Authority**: Consideration of the Karnataka Forest Act (Fact 8) is relevant but not binding. The explicit inclusion of 'sandalwood oil' there demonstrates a legislative choice which may reflect broader recognition of such products as 'forest produce’. This offers a persuasive argument but must ultimately yield to statutory interpretation specific to the Kerala Forest Act unless legislative intent is clear and directly analogous.\n\n### Conclusion:\nUpon considering the statutory language of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, and the broader category of 'forest produce', it is evident that the industrial extraction process does not negate the classification of sandalwood oil as a derivative of 'forest produce' given its source from sandalwood trees. While expert definitions suggest a technical distinction, the purposive interpretation of the Act supports its classification as 'forest produce'. The allure of persuasive authority from the Karnataka Act somewhat supports this interpretation, but our decision rests on statutory interpretation of Kerala's law.\n\nTherefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by K. RAMASWAMY, J.\nK. RAMASWAMY, J. -\nSpecial leave granted\n2. Untramelled by questions of fact the learned senior counsel on both sides neatly presented question of law whether 'sandalwood oil' is forest produce within the meaning of Section 2 (f) (i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 for short 'the Act'. When proceedings were laid under Section 51 (1) of the Act against the respondents in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 27-29 of 1992, they questioned the jurisdiction of the court in C. C. Nos. 145 and 148 of 1988. Eschewing delineation of intermediary proceedings went on from the start of prosecution, the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short 'the Code' by order dated August 31, 1992 reported in Mohammed Ali v. Forest Range Officer quashed the complaint holding that sandalwood oil is not 'wood oil' as defined in Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act. So it is not a forest produce. Thus these appeals by special leave. When the same question subsequently arose, another learned Single Judge doubting the correctness of aforesaid judgment referred the matter to be Division Bench which by order dated December 15, 1992, reported in Khushboo Enterprises v. Forest Range Officer held that sandalwood oil is a forest produce within the meaning of Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act. Thus the appeal in the other case\n3. The Forest Conservation Act. 1980 aims to prevent depleting forests, conservation thereof and protection of wildlife in the country to maintain ecological balance. The State Acts regulate preservation of forests and forest produce to supplement the Central Act. The Act prescribes procedure for preservation of the forest and regulates possession of the forest produce, felling of trees in the forest area and removal from the forest or reserved area by transit permits etc. When sandalwood oil either was found in transit or in possession of the manufacturers, it was seized in the respective cases and the complaints under Section 51 (1) laid for contravention thereof. As said earlier the jurisdictional question was raised on the premise that sandalwood oil is not a wood oil as defined under Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act\n4. The question, therefore, emerges whether sandalwood oil is a wood oil. Section 9 (f) defines forest produce thus\n\"Section 2 (f) 'forest produce' includes -\n(i) the following whether found in or brought from a forest or not, that is to say -\ntimber, charcoal, wood oil, gum resin, natural varnish, bark, lac, fibres and roots of sandalwood and rosewood; and\n(ii) the following when found in or brought from a forest, that is to say -\n(a) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other parts or produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees;\n(b) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and moss and all parts or produce of such plants);\n(c) silk cocoons, honey and wax; and\n(d) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including limestone, laterite), mineral oils and all products of mines or quarries.\"\n5. A reading thereof does indicate that the forest produce whether found in or brought from a forest or not is a forest produce which includes, that is to say, the enumerated items in Clauses (i) and (ii) and \"wood oil\" is one of the enumerated items as well as roots of sandalwood and rosewood. The contention of Shri G. Ramaswamy, the learned senior counsel for the accused is that technical dictionaries, botanical textbooks and expert opinion would bring out a demonstrable distinction between wood of and sandalwood oil. The wood oil is a natural produce of the forest directly derived as an exudation from living trees in the forest belonging to the family of the Dipterocarpaceae trees while sandalwood oil is a by-product from sandalwood (Santalum album) by industrial process. Wood oil is produced by making a hole on the trunk of the living tree commonly known as \"oil trees\" or \"wood oil trees\". This family of trees are variously known in different parts of South India but they relate to Dipterocarpaceae family. Wood oil is gathered by heating the hole in the trunk of induce exudation of the oleic resin from the tree and commercially dealt with as wood oil which is a cheap substance in the commercial world used solely for the purpose of painting planks of wood or wooden vessels floating in the sea. The physio-chemical properties of wood oil are distinct and different from other oils. Sandalwood oil would be produced only at factory level and that too by mechanised process utilising the heart wood and roots of sandalwood trees removed from the forest as a raw material. Sandalwood oil is having very high commercial value and it is mainly used in manufacturing perfumery and cosmetic items of different types and grades. The production of sandalwood oil is being carried out as an industry, either by licence by individual or the State Government as its monopoly like in Karnataka State, in a large scale or as a small scale business. It is further contended that the meaning of the word 'wood oil' defined in Section 2 (f) (i) must receive its colour form its context and connotation. When the legislature used the word \"that is to say\" the wood oil and other natural growth referred to in the definition would only mean natural by-product directly drawn from the trees. The learned Single Judge had rightly construed the meaning of the word 'wood oil' and held that sandalwood oil being thereby-product derived commercially manufacturing process is not wood oil. The Division Bench committed manifest error in its construction of the word 'wood oil' to include sandalwood oil. Shri Krishna Murty Iyer, the learned senior counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, refuted the contention arguing that inclusive definition of forest produce must receive extended meaning. It must also be construed in the context in which it is used and the purpose the Act seeks to serve and the family to which sandalwood oil belongs being an essential oil would include wood oil. The expression wood oil being technical and part of an inclusive definition has to be construed in its technical sense and in an exhaustive manner. It cannot be restricted in a narrow circumference as was done by the learned Single Judge so as to defeat the object and purpose of the Act. Extraction of sandalwood oil even by mechanised process would nonetheless be a wood oil. He laid emphasis on the word 'timber' defined in Section 2 (k) which includes 'sandalwood' being a forest produce the oil extracted therefrom would also be within the meaning of the word 'wood oil'. The restricted meaning canvassed by the counsel would defeat the purpose of the Act and the literal interpretation giving narrow meaning to the word 'wood oil' should be excluded\n6. Ex facie the argument of Shri G. Ramaswamy backed by material, though is alluring, deeper probe denied its acceptance. Undoubtedly, the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 incorporated in its definition of forest produce sandalwood oil after the word \"wood oil\" and the legislature in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, like the Act, do not specifically incorporate sandalwood oil in the definition of forest produce. From this could it be concluded, if it be otherwise interpretable, that wood oil would both include sandalwood oil as well. Undoubtedly Stedman's Medical Dictionary (23rd Edition) defines at page 1576 wood oil as gurjan balsam and gurjan balsam is defined at p. 156 to mean wood oil - Oleo-resin from Dipterocarpus alatus (family Dipterocarpaceae), - A tree of India and other regions of Southern Asia. Similar meaning was given in Concise Chemical and Technical Dictionary, edited by H. Bennett (fourth Edition) at page 1217; Scientific Treatises on the subject by Ernest Guenther in Volume 6; Edward Balfour in his Cyclopaedia of India and of Eastern and Southern Asia; R. N. Khori in his Materia Medica of India and their Therapeutics and Pharmacographia India by William Dymock defined wood oil in the same strain. All these technical literatures were concerned in finding out physio-chemical properties contained in wood oil and the source from which they are drawn for use in industrial purposes. The literal interpretation given therein if given acceptance would lead to manifest frustration of the purpose of the Act. In its interpretation we have to keep at the back of our mind the purpose which the Act and the Parent Act (Forest Conservation Act) seek to subserve J. F. Dastru equally in his Medical Plants of India and Pakistan treads on the same path and has given construction to wood oil in the context of its exudation obtained from the trunk of the trees belonging to the family of Dipterocarpaceae as an oleo-resin or gurjan balsam. There would be no quarrel on that behalf. It must be noted in this context that there are several types of essential oils in India, the important ones being sandalwood oil, agar-wood oil, Deodar oil and pine oil, apart from oleo-resin and wood oil derived from exudation from living trees in the forest area. These essential oils are obtained from any forest wood. Sandalwood as observed by the High Court is forest produce. Even its roots thereof are also included as forest produce. They are also timber within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to conserve forest wealth which is very dear for preservation to maintain ecology. Forest produce defined under Section 2 (f) is an inclusive definition. It is settled law that the word 'include' is generally used as a word of extension. When used in an interpretation clause, it seeks to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition at p. 64 stated the construction to be adopted to the meaning of the words and phrases that \"The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver\" . At p. 214 it is stated that an interpretation clause which extends the meaning of a word does not take away its ordinary meaning. An interpretation clause of the inclusive definition is not meant to prevent the word receiving its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that word would be properly applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act, when there is nothing in the context or the subject-matter to the contrary, to be applied to somethings to which it would not ordinarily be applicable.... An interpretation clause should be used for the purpose of interpreting words which are ambiguous or equivocal, and not so as to disturb the meaning of such as are plain. At p. 216 it is stated that another important rule with regard to the effect of an interpretation clause is that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another, or as strictly defining what the meaning of the term must be under all circumstances, but rather as declaring what may be comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that it should be so construed\n7. This Court in Babu Manmohan Das Shah v. Bishun Das adopting the ordinary rule of construction stated that \"the provisions of a statute must be construed in accordance with the language used therein unless there are compelling reasons such as where the literal construction would reduce the Act to absurdity or prevent manifest legislative purpose from being carried out\". The question therein was the interpretation of the phrase\" materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value\" in the context of construction to a shop. In that context this Court laid that cardinal principle of statutory construction referred to hereinbefore would apply. In State of M. P. v. M. V. Narsimhan the definition of 'public servant' in Section 21 IPC was amended and Clause 12 thereof was brought on statute. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 created its own provisions as specific offence of criminal misconduct which is different from the offence of bribery defined in the Indian Penal Code. When similar definition was not given under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 the contention was raised that the respondent cannot be prosecuted not being a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act. This Court while holding that definition of public servant was incorporated in Prevention of Corruption Act by necessary implication of public servant defined in Clause 12 of Section 21 IPC and held that Prevention of Corruption Act is supplemental to IPC and that, therefore, both would deal with the same offence. Accordingly, the respondent was held to be public servant coming within the definition of Prevention of Corruption Act. This Court adopted the doctrine of purposive interpretation to prevent corruption, a penal offence. In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Indian Oil Corpn. this Court adopted purposive construction in the definition of the word 'building' for the propose of levy of property tax under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act to include oil storage tanks to be \"building\" and held that the language of a statutory provision is not a static vehicle of ideas and concepts and as ideas and concepts change, . As they are bound to do in any country like ours with the establishment of a democratic structure based on egalitarian values, the meaning and content of the statutory provision undergo a change. The law does not operate in a vacuum. It cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social, economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. The judge has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton provide by the legislature and invest it with a meaning which will harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective instrument for delivering justice\n8. The word include in the definition under Section 2 (f) would show that it did not intend to exclude what would ordinarily and in common parlance be spoken of as wood oil. The expression being technical and being part of an inclusive definition has to be construed in its technical sense but in an exhaustive manner, it cannot be restricted in such a manner so as to defeat the principal object and purpose of the Act. The process by which the oil is extracted is not decisive as oil may be extracted by natural process of exudation or it may be extracted by subjecting to chemical or mechanical process and sandalwood (Santalum album) is cut into pieces. Its heartwood and roots of sandalwood trees removed from the forest are used as a raw material at a factory level that too by mechanised process to extract sandalwood oil. The purpose for which the oil is used is not decisive. Therefore, the word wood oil used in the Act will require purposive interpretation drawing upon the context in which the words are used and its meaning will have to be discovered having regard to the intention and object which legislature seeks to subserve. The restricted meaning sought to put up by the accused would frustrate the object and the literal interpretation would defeat the meaning. The legislature does not intend to restrict the word wood oil not do we find any compelling circumstances in the Act to give restricted meaning that only oil derived from Dipterocarpus trees to be wood oil as contended for the accused and which found acceptance by the learned Single Judge. The purposive interpretation would aid conservation of sandalwood, a valuable forest wealth, prevent illicit felling and transportation of them and make the manufacturers of sandalwood oil accountable for the possession of sandalwood trees or chips or roots etc. Incorporation of sandalwood oil ex abundenti cautela in Karnataka Act and absence thereof in sister Acts operating in South India does not detract from giving it its due meaning. The expert opinion is only an opinion evidence on either side and does not aid us in interpretation. This Court in Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India did not adopt the dictionary meaning as it may be to some extent delusive guide to interpret entries in Central Excises and Salt Act. In Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan of which one of us, Sahai, J. was a Member, the Court was to consider the word 'sugar' whether under Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1961 an agricultural produce. It was contended that the Khandsari Sugar was not an agricultural produce. Repelling that contention, this Court held that the world agricultural produce includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mills or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks the expression \"or otherwise as specified in the Schedule\". Accordingly it was held that Khandsari Sugar is an agricultural produce under that Act. In State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazadoor Sabha this Court adopted purposive approach in interpreting the word 'industry' in Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and held that the Legislature in defining the word 'industry' in Section 2 (j) of the Act deliberately used term of wide import in its first clause and referring to several other industries in the second in an inclusive way obviously denoting extension. The conventional meaning attributed to trade or business was eschewed even in the absence of profit motive. It was held that hospital was an industry. Therefore, the ratio, far from helping the accused, is consistent with the view we have expressed above. In South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Assn. v. State of Gujarat the inclusive definition was construed in the context of the explanation given to Entry 22. It was held, therefore, that the word 'pottery' does not include tiles industry for the purpose of Minimum Wages Act. The ratio therein renders little assistance to the accused. In Rathi Khandsari Udyog v. State of U. P. this Court held that the words not defined may be construed in the popular sense in which it is being commonly used in commercial parlance. The ratio is not opposite to the fact situation. Similarly the construction placing reliance on the passage at p. 164 of Craies on Statue Law that the word is to be construed in the sense in which it is being understood in trade. Business or transaction known to the trade is also inapplicable to the factual context. In Fatesang Gimba Vasava v. State of Gujarat the Division Bench construed whether bamboo would include in its ambit cut pieces in the context and the purpose the Act sought to serve the tribals in the forest area. Privilege was granted to the tribals to remove certain forest produce from forest area for sale to supplement their livelihood. When toplas, supdas and palas made out of bamboo chips were being taken out for sale, they were being taken out for sale, they were sought to be prosecuted. It was challenged by the tribals. In that context the Division Bench held that though bamboo is a forest produce, the bamboo chips of the specified description do not fall within the definition of forest produce. Accordingly it was interpreted, from the context and purposive approach of the word 'forest produce'. Accordingly the ratio therein does not assist the accused\n9. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, relied on for the accused, had not correctly laid the law in Kangundi Industrial Works, Kuppam v. Government of A. P. Accordingly we hold that sandalwood oil is wood oil within the meaning of Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act. Therefore it is a forest produce. Necessary conclusion is that the trial court has jurisdiction to proceed with the trial. It is for the trial court to find whether the offence as imputed to the accused has been made out at the trial. We need express no opinion at this stage. The appeals of the State are allowed and the appeal of the accused is dismissed", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -1363,26 +1363,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S011", - "case_id": "800", - "experiment": "role_play_v3", + "case_id": "3663", + "experiment": "ablation_issue", "model": "phi-4", - "source_file": "S011__role_play_v3__phi-4__800.json", + "source_file": "S011__ablation_issue__phi-4__3663.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/04/1987", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "judgment_date": "04/05/1993", + "machine_error_stage": "issues", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue misframing" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "CALCUTTA HIGH COURT | FMAT No. 1294 of 2014 | Orissa Minerals Development Company Limited v. Balbir Sharma | 02/05/2016", - "case_details": "Case: FMAT No. 1294 of 2014 | Orissa Minerals Development Company Limited v. Balbir Sharma", - "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "Orissa Minerals Development Company Limited (OMDC) contracted Balbir Sharma (Contractor) in November 2007 for iron ore excavation and transport at Bhadrasahi Mines. The Contractor contended work was hampered by delayed and short-term mining permits and alleged OMDC suppressed that its mining lease, due to expire in 1996, was cancelled in November 2006, and its challenge dismissed by the Orissa High Court in May 2008. OMDC terminated the contract in July 2008. Disputes arose, leading to arbitration, where the Arbitrator awarded claims to the Contractor, finding OMDC lacked a valid lease, based on evidence and OMDC's admissions. OMDC's Section 34 application to set aside the award, alleging patent illegality and error in the lease finding (arguing different mine leases), was rejected by the lower court.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. Orissa Minerals Development Company Limited (OMDC) contracted Balbir Sharma (Contractor) in November 2007 for iron ore excavation and transport at Bhadrasahi Mines.\n2. OMDC's mining lease, issued in 1996, was cancelled in November 2006, and its challenge was dismissed by the Orissa High Court in May 2008.\n3. The Contractor alleged that work was hampered due to delayed and short-term mining permits.\n4. OMDC terminated the contract in July 2008.\n5. The dispute led to arbitration, where the Arbitrator awarded claims to the Contractor, finding OMDC lacked a valid lease based on evidence and OMDC's admissions.\n6. OMDC filed a Section 34 application to set aside the award, alleging patent illegality and error in the lease finding, which was rejected by the lower court.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Was the lower court (Arbitrator and the court that rejected OMDC's Section 34 application) correct in finding that OMDC's mining lease was not valid at the time of the contract with Balbir Sharma?\n2. Did the lower court correctly apply the principles of patent illegality in OMDC's Section 34 application?\n3. Did the lower court make an error in accepting the arbitrator's finding that OMDC lacked a valid lease based on OMDC's admissions?\n4. Did OMDC's termination of the contract with Balbir Sharma violate any contractual obligations or laws, given the alleged lack of valid mining lease and the delayed, short-term mining permits?\n\n### Rules:\n1. The principles governing contract validity and performance under Indian law (Section 10, 14, 18, 39 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872).\n2. The principles of patent illegality and their application in Section 34 applications under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.\n3. The discretion of the court in accepting or rejecting arbitral awards based on the findings of fact and law (Section 34, 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996).\n4. The principles governing mining leases and their cancellation under the relevant mining laws and regulations.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. To determine whether the lower court correctly found that OMDC's mining lease was invalid, it must be examined if OMDC misrepresented the status of its mining lease to the Contractor, causing the latter a prejudice (Facts 2, 3). If so, the Contractor could argue that he was induced to enter into the contract under a mistaken assumption (Rule 1).\n2. The lower court's application of patent illegality principles (Issue 2) should be analyzed to see if it erred in dismissing OMDC's Section 34 application. If the lower court overlooked a fundamental error in the arbitrator's award, it may have been incorrect (Rule 2).\n3. The acceptance of the arbitrator's findings (Issue 3) by the lower court should be evaluated. If the lower courtercises of jurisdiction was proper and the findings of fact and law were reasonably open to it, the lower court may have been correct (Rule 3).\n4. To determine if OMDC's termination violated any contractual obligations or laws (Issue 4), it must be examined if the termination was premature or unfair due to the alleged lack of a valid mining lease and the delayed, short-term mining permits (Facts 4, 3).\n\n### Conclusion:\nUpon careful consideration of the facts and rules of law, it appears that the lower court may have erred in its findings regarding the validity of OMDC's mining lease and its application of patent illegality principles. Consequently, this appeal is maintainable.\n\nThe final decision is that the appeal should be **ALLOWED**, and the matter should be remitted to the lower court for a fresh consideration of the issues outlined above, with proper applications of the relevant legal principles.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : Indira Banerjee, J.\n1. This appeal filed by Orissa Minerals Development Company Limited, hereinafter referred to as the appellant OMDC, is against a judgment and order dated 17th August, 2013 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, 4th Court, North 24 Parganas at Barasat, rejecting Misc. Case No. 28 of 2012, being an application filed by the appellant OMDC under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, hereinafter referred to as the 1996 Act, for setting aside of an award dated 2nd March, 2012 made and published by the sole Arbitrator.\n2. The appellant OMDC is a Government of India Enterprise, having its registered office at AG 104, Sector 2 (Sourav Avasan), Salt Lake City - 700 091. The appellant OMDC is engaged in mining of iron ore in different mines in Orissa.\n3. On or about 18th September, 2007, the appellant OMDC issued a Tender Notice No. OMDC/49/2007 whereby sealed tenders were invited in prescribed format, from reputed parties having earth moving equipment, with minimum three years of experience in raising of minerals of the description specified, for the job of raising and transporting of iron ore at North Iron Section, Bhadrasai Mines, Roida near Barbil, District Keonjhar (Orissa).\n4. The respondent, Balbir Sharma, hereinafter referred to as the Respondent Contractor, successfully participated in the tender. The appellant, OMDC awarded to the respondent, Contractor the contract for the work of excavation and raising of sized iron ore over mining lease area of 254.952 hectares at Bhadrasahi Mines, Roida and for transporting the same to the crusher plant at Thakursni.\n5. A work Order No. OMD/T-5/3548 dated 5.11.2007 was issued by the Deputy General Manager of the appellant OMDC, directing the respondent Contractor to execute the contract job during the period from 1st November, 2007 to 31st October, 2008.\n6. After the work order was issued, the respondent Contractor had to set up the infrastructure for the contract job by employing men, constructing structures, acquiring and/or installing plant and machinery etc., which involved heavy expenditure.\n7. According to the respondent Contractor, for transportation of minerals, permits are required under the mining laws. Even though the contract was for the period from 1st November, 2007 to 31st October, 2008, necessary permit for removal of mineral ores was issued by the Director of Mining, Joda District, Keonjhar, Orissa as late as on 29th February, 2008. The permit being Permit No. 16759 dated 29th February, 2008 allowed removal of ores from 28th February, 2008 to 27th March, 2008 only.\n8. The respondent Contractor contends that the permit was not issued in time. The permit was issued almost six months after the contract period commenced. In any case, the permit was only for a period of one month from 28th February, 2008 to 27th March, 2008. The lethargical manner in which the appellant OMDC and/or its Officers and/or the concerned authorities proceeded, was an impediment to the progress of work.\n9. The respondent Contractor claims that he had brought in about 450 labourers, who had to sit idle and had to be paid idle wages. This had an adverse financial impact on the respondent Contractor.\n10. According to the respondent Contractor, there were also various other constraints. The labourers were insisting on higher rate of wages even though they were sitting idle.\n11. By his letters dated 27th February, 2007, 19th December, 2007, 21st December, 2007, 29th December, 2007 etc., the respondent Contractor drew the attention of the appellant to the fact that 450 labourers were sitting idle but were demanding payment.\n11. The respondent Contractor also contended that no work of removal of minerals had been done for about 8 months or so before the respondent Contractor took up the contract job, as a result whereof there was huge accumulation. In terms of the contract, the respondent Contractor was not required to remove the accumulated minerals. Moreover, there was also flooding of the mines from 16th June, 2008 onwards.\n12. It is the case of the respondent Contractor that the respondent Contractor was wrongfully induced by the appellant OMDC to accept the contract by suppression of the material fact that the appellant OMDC had no right to operate the Bhadrasai mines in Roida.\n13. On the directions of the State Government, the appellant OMDC terminated the contract of the respondent Contractor by a letter dated 19th July, 2008. No penalty was however imposed by the appellant, OMDC on the respondent Contractor.\n14. It appears that the lease of the appellant, OMDC in respect of the Bhadrasai Mines, was due to expire on 14th August, 1996. The appellant OMDC applied for renewal of the lease on 14th July, 1995. However, the lease was not renewed and ultimately the Government of Orissa cancelled the lease on 16th November, 2006.\n15. It appears that on the prayer of the appellant, OMDC, the revisional authority passed an order dated 28th March, 2007 staying the order dated 16th November, 2006 whereby the lease had been cancelled. The order of the revisional authority was later vacated after which the appellant, OMDC filed an application in the High Court of Orissa under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being Writ Petition No. 12704 of 2007 challenging the decision of the authority concerned to cancel the lease.\n16. Interim orders were passed by the High Court of Orissa in the said writ petition, restraining the respondent authorities from preventing the appellant OMDC from carrying out mining activities. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed by an Order dated 16th May, 2008. The appellant OMDC filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court being SLP (Civil) 18195 of 2008. The Supreme Court stayed the operation of the Order dated 16th May, 2008 of the High Court dismissing the writ petition.\n17. Disputes and differences arose between the appellant OMDC and the respondent Contractor over payments claimed by the respondent Contractor from the appellant OMDC. The respondent Contractor invoked the arbitration clause after which Sri Murari Mohan Ghosh a retired officer of West Bengal Higher Judicial Service was appointed Arbitrator.\n18. The respondent Contractor filed its statement of claim before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, inter alia claiming -\nSCHEDULE\nClaimParticulars of the ClaimAmountClaim No. 1Unpaid value of the work done, which were partly recordedRs.16,82,990/-Claim No. 2Claim for Hire charges for machineries deployed in the workRs.549,12,000/-Claim No. 3Claim for reimbursement of the amount paid towards terminal benefits @ 12% on the basis of submitted bills.Rs.23,73,786/-Claim No. 4Claim on account of Compensation for loss of profit @ 10% on the balance left out work.Rs.2,06,40,000/-Claim No. 5Claim on account of Profit of 15% on ex-mines sale.Rs.68,39,842/-Claim No. 6Claim on account of Construction of road from Roida to Thakurani.Rs.20,00,000/-Claim No. 7Claim on account of Refund of Security deposit and Earnest Money.Rs.19,89,037/-Claim No. 8Claim on account of Cost incurred in raising 28,000 M.T. Iron-ore but not lifted from mines.Rs.37,80,000/-Claim No. 9Claim on account of expenses of stacking of 28,000 M.T. Iron-ores.Rs.28,00,000/-Claim No. 10Claim on account of additional expenses incurred in removal of over burden of 3,33,500 M3.Rs.2,14,27,820/-Claim No. 11Claim for illegal deduction of amount in bills alleging quality and quantityRs.3,57,030/-Claim No. 12Claim on account of idle wages paid to labours, staff etc.Rs.71,83,960/-Claim No. 13Claim for interest @ 18% p.a. from 01.11.2008 till the date of actual payment.\n19. In Paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 of the Statement of Claim, the respondent Contractor inter alia contended that the appellant OMDC had induced the respondent Contractor to enter into the contract wrongfully, as a result of which the respondent suffered financial losses. The appellant OMDC had no right to operate the mines.\n20. Paragraph 8 of the statement of claim is extracted hereinbelow for convenience:-\n \"8. It is further pertinent to state that the Respondent by its letter dated 19.7.2008 accosted the claimant for not executing the job, forgetting the fact that the Respondent had no right to work and/or get worked upon the mining lease hold area, lease for which was not subsisting in favour of the Respondent. However in the said letter, the Respondent admitted that the work in the mining area in question was directed to be stopped by the State Govt. in view of the order of the Hon'ble Orissa High Court, which admission on the part of the Respondent also substantiates the contention of the claimant that the Respondent had entered into the Contract with the claimant in respect of the mining area over which they had no right under the law. The said letter dated 19.7.2008 of the Raspondent was appropriately replied by the claimant by his letter dated 12.9.2008 which was however not repelled.\" \n21. Appellant OMDC filed its counter statement disputing the claims of the respondent Contractor. The appellant OMDC also raised a counter-claim, claiming Rs.48,15,90,732.19 from the respondent Contractor. The averments in Paragraph No. 6, 7 and 8 of the Statement of Claim were dealt with in Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Counter Statement, set out hereinbelow :\n \"16. With reference to paragraph nos. 6 and 7 of the said statement of claim the respondent denies and disputes each and every allegations made therein save and except what are matters of record. The contract work has been awarded after receipt of the stay order from the Central Tribunal on the operation of the impugned rejection order dated 16.11.2006 passed by the State Government till disposal of the revisional application. The respondent will rely upon the said stay order at the time of hearing as respondent's Exhibit.\nThe Steel and Mines Department, Government of Orissa also accordingly acted on it and allowed mining operation over the area. Subsequently as per the judgment passed on 16.5.2008 by the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in respect of above mining lease area and as directed by the Deputy Director of Mines, Government of Orissa vide Memo No.51661 dated 15.7.2008 mining operation over the said 254.962 hectors of mining lease area was stopped till further order. Thus there was no illegality in operating the mine during the period from 1.11.2007 to 17.5.2008. Copy of the relevant orders will be referred to and relied upon at the time of hearing as respondent's Exhibit.\nThus the alleged excuse of the claimant is not at all maintainable since the claimant was awarded the contract within the period when there was no impediment. Hence it is denied that the respondent has no legal right over the mines in question.\nIn any event the claimant can not take the shield of different orders of the High Court now since the claimant had acted upon the contract and realized payment from the respondent.\n17. The statements made in paragraph no.8 of the said statement of claim are denied in its material particulars. Before the letter dated 19.7.2008 the claimant had abandoned the work and asked for termination vide its letter dated 12.7.2008 and the claimant had deliberately suppressed the same before the arbitration proceeding. For suppression of such vital documents the claimant is not at all entitled to any relief what so ever s claimed in the claim petition and the claim petition is liable to be dismissed in limine with exemplary cost.\nIt appears from the claim petition that the claimant had claimed certain amount of Ex-Mine Sales. Such claim of the claimant is totally not maintainable. The contract was for raising and transporting of iron ore to Thakurani Railway Siding/Crusher plant. \" \n22. The learned Arbitrator made and published his award dated 22nd March, 2012. The amounts awarded by the learned Arbitrator in respect of each of the claims as against the amount claimed by the respondent are as follows :-\nSl. No.ParticularsClaim AmountAwarded AmountClaim No.1Unpaid value of theRs.16,82,990/-Rs.10,94,492/-work done, which were partly recordedClaim No.2Claim for Hire charges for machineries deployed in the workRs.549,12,000/-Rs.549,12,000/-Claim No.3Claim for reimbursement of the amount paid towards terminal benefits @ 12% on the basis of submitted bills.Rs.23,73,786/-Claim No.4Claim on account of Compensation for loss of profit @ 10% on the balance left out work.Rs.2,06,40,000/-Rs.2,06,40,000/-Claim No.5Claim on account of Profit of 15% on ex- mines sale.Rs.68,39,842/-Rs.68,39,842/-Claim No.6Claim on account of Construction of road from Roida to Thakurani.Rs.20,00,000/-Rs.20,00,000/-Claim No.7Claim on account of Refund of Security deposit and Earnest Money.Rs.19,89,037/-Rs.19,89,037/-Claim No.8Claim on account of Cost incurred in raising 28,000 M.T. Iron-ore but not lifted from mines.Rs.37,80,000/-Rs.37,80,000/-Claim No.9Claim on account of expenses of stacking of 28,000 M.T. Iron-ores.Rs.28,00,000/-Rs.28,00,000/-Claim No.10Claim on account of additional expenses incurred in removal of over burden of 3,33,500 M3.Rs.2,14,27,820/-DisallowedClaim No.11Claim for illegal deduction of amount in bills alleging quality and quantityRs.3,57,030/-DisallowedClaim No.12Claim on account of idle wages paid to labours, staff etc.Rs.71,83,960/-Rs.71,83,960/-Claim No.13Claim for interest @ 18% p.a. from 01.11.2008 till the date of actual payment.\n23. The award is long and reasoned. The award in respect of each and every claim is based on evidence and/or calculations based on contractual provisions.\n24. The learned Arbitrator, on consideration of the pleadings and submissions of the respective parties, including the admissions made by the appellant OMDC in its Counter Statement, particularly in paragraphs 16 and 17 thereof and upon scrutiny of the documents on record before the learned Arbitrator, found that under Section 4 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, no person was to carry on mining operation in any area, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a mining lease. Furthermore, the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, framed under the said Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 prohibits a lessee from entering into any contract or arrangement or understanding by which lessee's operation or undertakings might specifically be controlled by any person or body of persons other than the lessee.\n25. The learned Tribunal found that mining lease in respect of the mine in question had been granted by Government of Orissa to M/s. BPNE Ltd. No materials were placed before the learned Arbitrator to show that appellant OMDC had mining lease over the area. The State Government had rejected the application for renewal of the mining lease on 16th November, 2006. The Orissa High Court had ultimately rejected the writ application of the appellant OMDC, challenging the rejection.\n26. The appellant OMDC made an application in the District Court of North 24 Parganas at Barasat under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside the said award dated 2nd March, 2012 passed by the sole Arbitrator. The grounds are in a nutshell as follows:-\n(i) The arbitrator was wrong in passing the award only on the ground that the appellant OMDC was not the mining lessee in respect of the mines in question. The appellant OMDC had been in possession of and operating Roida mines since 1983 without any dispute.\n(ii) The application for renewal of mining lease was made atleast 12 months before the date of expiry thereof. Till the date of final disposal of the application for renewal, the lease is to be deemed to have been extended. There were also various interim orders permitting mining operations to go on.\n(iii) The learned Arbitrator erred in law and facts and acted against public policy in allowing most of the claims of the respondent Contractor and in rejecting the counter claims of appellant OMDC.\n(iv) The learned Arbitrator factually erred in holding that appellant OMDC did not have mining lease.\n27. Mr. Somnath Bose, appearing on behalf of the appellant OMDC submitted that the contract between the respondent contractor and the appellant OMDC related to certain jobs at the Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines covering 254.952 hectares, held by the appellant OMDC under a mining lease granted by the State of Orissa.\n28. Mr. Bose submitted that Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines covering about 998.70 hectares was different from Kolha Roida Iron Ore and Manganese mine covering 254.952 hectares. Mr. Bose has relied on two sketch maps to demonstrate that the two mines were different.\n29. Mr. Bose argued that disputes in relation to the claims of the respondent Contractor towards outstanding bills and also for compensation and/or damages in relation to the agreement in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines was referred to arbitration by the sole arbitrator. The respondent Contractor had raised claims on account of extra work of removal of iron ore, payment on account of idle labour and idle machinery and vehicle charges in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines.\n30. Mr. Bose submitted that Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine covering 998.70 hectors and Kolha-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine covering 254.95 hectors were different mines. Cancellation of the mining lease in respect of Kolha-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine had no nexus with Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine.\n31. Mr. Bose argued that the learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that the disability of the appellant OMDC in respect of Kolha-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine was of no relevance to the claims in relation to the Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine. Mr. Bose argued that the 'stop operation' order was in respect of Kolha Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines and not in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines.\n32. It however appears that the appellant OMDC did not hold any separate mining lease in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines. Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine and Kolha Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines were operated under the same mining lease. According to the respondent Contractor, the mining lease in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines also stood cancelled when the tender in question was floated.\n33. Whether the appellant OMDC held a valid mining lease in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines or whether the mining lease in respect of the said cancellation is a factual issue, which has been decided by the learned Arbitrator, on consideration of the pleadings and evidence before him. It is well settled that this Court considering an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, for setting aside an award, does not sit in appeal over factual findings arrived at by the learned arbitrator.\n34. Mr. Bose argued that the learned Court failed to appreciate that the Arbitral Award dealt with disputes not contemplated by or falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration. Mr. Bose has, however, not been able to demonstrate which of the disputes do not fall within the terms of submission to arbitration. Nor has he referred to any specific provision of the agreement or provisions of law under which the claims are barred.\n35. There is no doubt that an Arbitral Tribunal is required to decide a dispute in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force, as argued by Mr. Bose. It is, however, well settled that the strict rules of evidence as contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or procedural rules as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 do not apply to arbitratal proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal. An Arbitral Tribunal is required to proceed fairly, and in accordance with law, giving equal opportunity of representation to all the parties.\n36. Mr. Bose submitted that there is no whisper in the award that parties had agreed to any procedure to be followed by the Arbitral Tribunal in conducting the proceedings. It is well settled that the Arbitral Tribunal can adopt its own procedure. The adjudication must, however be in compliance of the principles of natural justice, and the respective parties given a reasonable opportunity of hearing.\n37. In Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. vs. M/s. Jain Studios Ltd. reported in AIR 2006 SC 963 : (2006) 2 SCC 628 , cited by Mr. Somnath Bose, the Supreme Court held that a Court of law would have to read the agreement as it is. The Court cannot rewrite the agreement or create a new agreement.\n38. In Polymat India P. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in AIR 2005 SC 286 : (2005) 9 SCC 176 , the Supreme Court held that the terms of the contract have to be construed strictly without altering the nature of the contract. The proposition of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. (supra) and Polymat India P. Ltd. (supra) is well-settled. The judgments are however not applicable.\n39. It is also true that the contract must be read as a whole, and not to be dissected. But it equally well settled that if the contract was in several parts some of which were legal and enforceable and some were unenforceable, the lawful parts would be enforced provided they were severable.\n40. In Delhi Development Authority Vs. M/S. R.S. Sharma & Co., New Delhi, cited by Mr. Bose reported in (2008) 13 SCC 80 , the Supreme Court held that an award which was contrary to substantive provisions of law or the provisions of the 1996 Act or against the terms of the respective contract or patently illegal or prejudicial to the rights of the parties was open to interference by Court under Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act. An award could be set aside if it was contrary to the fundamental policy of law or the interest of India or justice or morality. An award could also be set aside if it were so unfair or unreasonable that it shocked the conscience of the Court. It was open to the Court to consider whether the award was against the specific terms of the contract and if so interfere with it on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public policy of India. There can be no dispute with the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority (supra).\n41. In Mcdermott International Inc vs Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 181 , cited the Supreme Court held that under the 1996 Act, the Arbitral Tribunal was under a duty to assign reasons for its decision. In this case, the award is reasoned.\n42. There can be no doubt that under the 1996 Act, the learned Arbitral Tribunal is obliged to pass a reasoned award. There can also be no doubt that a mere statement of reasons does not satisfy the requirement of Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act. The reasons must be based upon materials submitted before the Arbitral Tribunal. The Tribunal has to give its reasons upon consideration of the relevant materials, while irrelevant materials may be ignored. There is no reason to hold that the reasons given by the learned arbitrator are not on consideration of relevant materials.\n43. In Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Western Geco international Ltd. reported in (2014) 6 SCC 321 = AIR 2015 SC 363 cited by Mr. Bose, the Supreme Court reiterated that the phrase 'Public Policy' used in Section 34 was required to be given a wider meaning. It could be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which was, on its face, patently in violation of statutory provisions, could not be said to be in public interest. Such an award was likely to be adversely affected the administration of justice. The award could thus be set aside, if it was patently illegal.\n44. There can be no doubt that an award which is patently illegal can be set aside. It is too late in the day to contend to the contrary. However, the award in this case does not appear to be patently illegal. Mr. Bose has not been able to demonstrate the patent illegality in the award.\n45. In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer reported in (2005)1 SCC 625 cited by Mr. Bose, the Supreme Court held that where a particular mode was prescribed for doing an act and there was no impediment in adopting the mode, the deviation to act in a different manner, without disclosing any discernible principles which were reasonable, had to be labelled as arbitrary. The Supreme Court reiterated that every state action had to be informed by reason.\n46. In Himani Alloys Ltd. Vs. Tata Steel Ltd. reported in (2011) 15 SCC 273 cited by Mr. Bose, the Supreme Court held that it was true that a judgment could be given on the admission contained in the Minutes of a Meeting. However, the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. Referring to Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Supreme Court held that it was an enabling provision neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary.\n47. The Supreme Court further held that the Court on examination of the facts and circumstances, had to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial, which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore, unless the admission was clear unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim.\n48. In this case, the award has been made and published on contest, after giving the respondent Contractor and appellant OMDC opportunity of representation. This is not a case of admission in the minutes but of admission in pleadings. Admission in pleadings, unless rectified by amendment is binding on the party making the admission.\n49. The judgment in Koduri Krishnarao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad reported in AIR 1962 AP 249, was rendered in the particular facts of the case. A judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is raised and decided. The judgment in Koduri Krishnarao (supra) does not decide any proposition which is relevant in this case.\n50. In Balraj Taneja & Anr Vs. Sunil Madan & Anr. reported in (1999) 8 SCC 396 the Supreme Court observed that on failure of defendant to file written statement the Court should not proceed to pass judgment blindly. It is only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need be proved on account of deemed admission, that the Court could pass judgment. The Court had to write a judgment in conformity with the Order XX Rule 1. The judgment has no relevance to the issues involved in this case.\n51. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Addagada Raghavamma and Anr vs Addagada Chenchamma and Anr. reported in AIR 1964 SC 136 was rendered in the particular facts of the case.\n52. In Union Territory of Pondicherry and Ors. Vs. P.V. Suresh reported in (1994) 2 SCC 70 , the Supreme Court held that the Court cannot alter the terms of the contract or rewrite the contract. The Court cannot also evolve formula for determining instalments payable under the contract in the absence of materials before it. The judgment was rendered in the context of proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The proposition that the Court cannot alter the terms of the contract or rewrite the contract is well established.\n53. In Makram Barsoum Estafnous and London & Leeds Business Centres Limited reported in 2011 EWCA Civ 1157, the Court of Appeal held that the general approach to the construction of documents was well settled. The Court could not rewrite contracts in the context of establishing what the parties had meant by the language they had used. To quote the Appeal Court \"that case is not a licence for the Courts to rewrite contracts.\"\n54. In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148 the question before the Supreme Court was whether not filing rebuttal amounts to an admission and whether Section 58 of the Evidence Act is attracted. The Supreme Court held that admission was the best piece of sensitive evidence that an opposite party could rely upon. Though not conclusive, it was decisive of the matter, unless successively withdrawn or proved erroneous. Admission might in certain circumstances operate as an estoppel. The question which is needed to be considered is what weight is to be given to an admission and for that purpose it is necessary to find out whether the admission is clear, unambiguous and relevant piece of evidence. In this case the appellant OMDC has not been able to demonstrate that any admission made by the appellant OMDC was withdrawn, but still considered. Nor was the appellant OMDC able to prove that the admission was erroneous. There was no reason why admission made in the counter statement of the appellant should not have been considered to operate as an estoppel.\n55. Arbitrators are Judges appointed by the parties and, therefore, an award passed by an Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal is not to be interfered with lightly. It is well-settled that in proceedings under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the Court does not sit in appeal over the award.\n56. It is well-settled that in proceedings under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the Court does not sit in appeal over an award by reanalysing the evidence. In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. Vs. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd. reported in (2012) 1 SCC 594 the Supreme Court held:-\n \"21. A court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or reappreciating the evidence. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. .............. Therefore, in the absence of any ground under Section 34(2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at.\" \n57. Sections 34(1) and (2) of the 1996 Act, provides as follows:-\n \"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).\n(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if-\n(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that-\n(i) a party was under some incapacity; or\n(ii) The arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or\n(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or\n(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:\nProvided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or\n(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or\n(b) the Court finds that-\n(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or\n(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.\nExplanation.-Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81.\" \n58. As observed by the Supreme Court in Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 cited by Mr. Kapur, the 1996 Act was enacted to provide for an arbitral procedure, which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of arbitration, to provide that the Arbitral Tribunal gives reasons for an arbitral award, to ensure that the Arbitral Tribunal remains within the limits of its jurisdiction and to minimize the supervisory role of Courts.\n59. Section 5 of the 1996 Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being enforce, in matters governed by Part 1, no judicial authority is to intervene, except where so provided in the said part.\n60. Section 34, read in conjunction with Section 5 makes it clear that an arbitral award that is governed by Part 1 of the 1996 Act, can only be set aside on grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) and (3) and not otherwise.\n61. None of the grounds contained in Sub-section 2(a) of Section 34 permit the Court to adjudicate the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitral award. The merits of an award might only be looked into under certain specified circumstances, when an award is found to be in conflict with the public policy of India, as held by the Supreme Court in Associate Builders (supra).\n62. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. VS. General Electric Co. reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644 the Supreme Court held that the expression 'Public Policy' in the context of a foreign award, would have to be construed to mean an award contrary to (i) the fundamental policy of the Indian law; or (ii) the interest of India; or (iii) justice or morality. Such an award would have to be set aside as contrary to the public policy of India.\n63. In ONGC Ltd. Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. reported in (2003) 5 SCC 705 the Supreme Court held :\n \"The phrase \"Public Policy of India\" is not defined under the Act. Hence, the said term is required to be given meaning in context and also considering the purpose of the section and scheme of the Act. It has been repeatedly stated by various authorities that the expression \"public policy\" does not admit of precise definition and may vary from generation to generation and from time to time. Hence, the concept \"public policy\" is considered to be vague, susceptible to narrow or wider meaning depending upon the context in which it is used. Lacking precedent the Court has to give its meaning in the light and principles underlying the Arbitration Act, Contract Act and Constitutional provisions.\" \n64. An award would be set aside if it was contrary to (a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; (b) the interest of India or (c) justice or morality or (d) if it was patently illegal. In ONGC Ltd. Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court made it clear that it was open to the Court to interfere with an award on the ground that it was patently illegal and therefore, opposed to the public policy of India.\n65. An award might be set aside as patently illegal, provided the illegality goes to the root of the award. If the illegality is of a trivial nature it cannot be said that the award is against public policy. This proposition was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Zinc Ltd. Vs. Friends Coal Carbonization reported in (2006) 4 SCC 445 . In ONGC Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd (supra) the Supreme Court held that an award could also be set aside, if it was so unfair and unreasonable, that it shocked the conscience of the Court.\n66. In view of the judgment in ONGC Ltd. Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. (supra) it has to be held that the award could be set aside if it was in contravention of the provisions of 1996 Act or any other substantive law governing the parties or was against the terms of the contract. Ofcourse the award could be set aside on the ground of patently illegallity, subject to the condition that the illegality went to the root of the award. It is now also settled law that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same, would be liable to interference under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.\n67. In Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority (supra) the Supreme Court held that it must be clearly understood that when a Court is applying 'public policy' test to an arbitral award, it does not act as a Court of appeal and consequently the errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to be accepted as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon, when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus, an award based on little evidence or no evidence, which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score. Once it is found that the arbitrators' approach is not arbitrary or capricious then he is the last word on facts.\n68. Patent illegality may render an award to be in conflict with the public policy of India. Under the explanation to Section 34(2)(b) an award may be said to be in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption.\n69. In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd.reported in (2006) 11 SCC 181 , the Supreme Court held:-\n \"112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law. [See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC 2003 ILO SC 862 and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India 2004 ILO SC 334].\" \n70. In MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2011) 10 SCC 573 the Supreme Court held that if the arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction. But if he wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits a jurisdictional error. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in such cases, because the dispute is not something which arises under or in relation to the contract or dependent on the construction of the contract or to be determined within the award. The ambiguity of the award can, in such cases, be resolved by admitting extrinsic evidence. The rationale of this rule is that the nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined outside and independent of what appears in the award. Such a jurisdictional error needs to be proved by evidence extrinsic to the award. Reference may in this context, also be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram [AIR 1954 SC 689 ], Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India [AIR 1955 SC 468 ], Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros. [AIR 1959 SC 1362 ], Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1960 SC 588 ], Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth v. Chintamanrao Balaji [AIR 1965 SC 214 ] and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. (1984) 4 SCC 679 : AIR 1985 SC 1156 ] .\n71. In Indu Engineering & Textiles Ltd. Vs. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2001) 5 SCC 691 , the Supreme Court held that the Arbitrator being a Judge appointed by the parties, the award passed by him is not to be interfered with lightly. When the view taken by the arbitrator was a possible or a plausible one, on his analysis of evidence and interpretation of contractual and/or statutory provisions and did not suffer from any manifest error, it was not open to the Court to interfere with the award.\n72. Even though the judgment in Indu Engineering & Textiles Ltd. (supra) was rendered in the context of an application under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act 1940, for setting aside of an award, the same principle would apply to an application for setting aside an award, under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.\n73. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 306 , the Supreme Court held that when a clause in a contract was capable of two interpretations and the view taken by the arbitrator was clearly a possible if not a plausible one, it was not possible to say that the arbitrator had travelled outside his jurisdiction, or that the view taken by him was against the terms of contract. That being the position, Court could not interfere with the award and substitute its view in place of the interpretation accepted by the arbitrator.\n74. In Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd. reported in (2010) 11 SCC 296 the Supreme Court held:\n \"43. ... The umpire has considered the fact situation and placed a construction on the clauses of the agreement which according to him was the correct one. One may at the highest say that one would have preferred another construction of Clause 17.3 but that cannot make the award in any way perverse. Nor can one substitute one's own view in such a situation, in place of the one taken by the umpire, which would amount to sitting in appeal. As held by this Court in Kwality Mfg. Corpn. v. Central Warehousing Corpn. the Court while considering challenge to arbitral award does not sit in appeal over the findings and decision of the arbitrator, which is what the High Court has practically done in this matter. The umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be the correct one after considering the material before him and after interpreting the provisions of the agreement. If he does so, the decision of the umpire has to be accepted as final and binding.\" \n75. As observed above, an award can only be interfered with grounds stipulated in Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act. In this case no grounds have been made out for interference with the impugned award.\n76. It is well settled that the arbitral tribunal is competent to interpret the terms and conditions of a contract and the interpretation cannot be interfered with by Court in an application for setting aside only because some other interpretation might have been possible.\n77. The factual finding of the learned Arbitrator based on evidence as also admission of appellant OMDC in its pleadings does not call for interference in an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Appellant OMDC has not produced any evidence and/or any cogent evidence before us to show that the mining lease in respect of the mines in question was valid and enforceable on the date on which the contract was executed with the respondent.\n78. The learned Court below rightly rejected the application for setting aside of the award. We find no grounds to interfere with the judgement and order under appeal. The appeal is dismissed.\n79. Urgent Photostat certified copy, if applied for, be delivered to the learned counsel for the parties, upon compliance of all usual formalities.\nI Agree\nAppeal dismissed", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 4157 of 1993 (From the Judgment and Order dated June 16, 1993 of the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 5793 of 1993), with SLP (CC Nos. 21592, 21690, 21691, 21688, 22042 of 1993), C.A. No. 4158 of 1993, SLP (C) No. 15097 of 1993, SLP (CC Nos. 21899, 21929, 21940 of 1993), I.A. No. 1 of 1993 in SLP (C) CC No. 21940 | Premium Granites And Another v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Others | 04/02/1994", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 4157 of 1993 (From the Judgment and Order dated June 16, 1993 of the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 5793 of 1993), with SLP (CC Nos. 21592, 21690, 21691, 21688, 22042 of 1993), C.A. No. 4158 of 1993, SLP (C) No. 15097 of 1993, SLP (CC Nos. 21899, 21929, 21940 of 1993), I.A. No. 1 of 1993 in SLP (C) CC No. 21940 | Premium Granites And Another v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Others", + "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "case_record": "This case involves appeals against a Madras High Court judgment that declared Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, unconstitutional and void. The writ petitioner challenged Rule 39, arguing that the State Government had no power to frame a rule deviating from existing rules and that Rule 39 conferred arbitrary, uncanalised, and unguided power on the executive, violating Article 14 of the Constitution due to vague terms like \"public purpose and interest of mineral development.\" The High Court upheld the second contention. The Mineral Concession Rules have undergone several amendments over time, including Rule 8(A) allowing leases for industries, Rule 8(C) initially prohibiting private quarrying of black granite (later upheld and then amended to allow private persons with industries), and a 2012 amendment restricting leases to government companies or those with \"Letters of Commitment.\" Rule 39 was introduced in 1993, allowing the State Government to grant or renew leases on different terms in \"special circumstances in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest.\" The appellants argued that the terms \"mineral development\" and \"public interest\" serve as sufficient guidelines, that reasons must be recorded, and that the power is subject to judicial review. They also contended that guidelines can be inferred from the Act's overall scheme and that similar provisions in other statutes have been upheld. The respondents argued that Rule 39 grants unbridled power and relied on cases emphasizing the need to minimize arbitrary discretion. They also raised factual disputes about some lease grants.", + "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let's tackle this legal judgment. First, I need to understand the case thoroughly. The user provided the facts, so I'll start by summarizing them. The main issue is about the constitutionality of Rule 39 under the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. The High Court declared it unconstitutional, and now there's an appeal against that decision.\n\nSo, the facts are that the writ petitioner challenged Rule 39, arguing the State Government couldn't create a rule that deviates from existing ones, and that Rule 39 gives too much arbitrary power, violating Article 14. The High Court agreed with the second part. The rules have had amendments over time, including Rule 8(A), 8(C), and a 2012 amendment. Rule 39 was introduced in 1993, allowing the government to grant or renew leases in special circumstances for mineral development and public interest. The appellants say these terms are sufficient guidelines and that reasons must be recorded, subject to judicial review. They also mention that similar provisions in other statutes have been upheld. The respondents argue that Rule 39 gives unbridled power and cite cases about minimizing arbitrary discretion. They also mention factual disputes about lease grants.\n\nNow, the issues. The main legal issue is whether Rule 39 is constitutional, specifically if it violates Article 14 due to vague terms. Another issue might be whether the State Government has the power to create such a rule. Also, the scope of judicial review and whether the terms \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" are sufficiently defined.\n\nFor the rules, I need to recall the relevant constitutional provisions. Article 14 deals with equality before the law and equal protection of laws. The doctrine of proportionality and the principle of reasonable classification might be relevant. Also, the doctrine of severability—whether the invalid part of a rule can be struck down without affecting the rest. There's also the principle that vague terms can lead to arbitrariness, as per cases like State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala. Additionally, the power of the legislature to delegate authority, but with the requirement that the delegation must be specific enough to prevent arbitrariness.\n\nIn the analysis, the key is whether \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" are sufficiently defined. The High Court found them vague, leading to arbitrary power. The appellants argue that the overall scheme of the Act and other statutes provide guidelines. However, the High Court might have correctly identified that without clear definitions, the terms could be misused. Also, the respondents' argument about factual disputes about lease grants might not directly affect the constitutionality but could be a separate issue. The 2012 amendment restricting leases to government companies or those with Letters of Commitment might show that the state has tried to regulate, but Rule 39's terms are still problematic.\n\nThe analysis should weigh the balance between legislative discretion and the need for clarity. If the terms are too vague, it could infringe on Article 14. The High Court's decision to strike down Rule 39 might be correct, but the appellants might have a point about the overall scheme providing enough context. However, the High Court's reasoning about arbitrariness due to vagueness is a strong point. Also, precedents where similar terms were upheld might not be directly applicable if the context here is different. The key is whether the terms are so vague that they can't be reasonably interpreted, leading to arbitrary exercise of power.\n\nConclusion: The appeal might be dismissed if the High Court's decision was correct in finding the terms too vague, violating Article 14. Alternatively, if the appellants can show that the terms are sufficiently guided by the Act's scheme, the appeal might be allowed. But based on the facts, the High Court's reasoning seems sound, so the conclusion would be to dismiss the appeal.\n\n\n### Facts: \n1. The writ petitioner challenged Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, arguing that it was unconstitutional due to vague terms like \"public purpose and interest of mineral development,\" which allegedly conferred arbitrary power on the executive, violating Article 14 of the Constitution. \n2. The Madras High Court declared Rule 39 unconstitutional, holding that the terms \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" were uncanalised and unguided, enabling arbitrary discretion. \n3. Rule 39, introduced in 1993, allows the State Government to grant or renew leases in \"special circumstances in the interest of mineral development\" and \"public interest,\" with no explicit guidelines. \n4. Appellants (respondents in the original case) argued that the terms \"mineral development\" and \"public interest\" are sufficient guidelines, that reasons must be recorded, and that judicial review is available. They also cited similar provisions in other statutes upheld by courts. \n5. Respondents (original petitioners) contended that Rule 39 grants unbridled power and relied on precedents emphasizing the need to minimize arbitrary discretion. \n\n---\n\n### Issues: \n1. Whether Rule 39 violates Article 14 of the Constitution by granting arbitrary power to the executive through vague terms like \"public interest\" and \"mineral development.\" \n2. Whether the State Government had the authority to frame Rule 39, and whether the terms in Rule 39 are sufficiently guided by the Act’s scheme or other statutes. \n\n---\n\n### Rules: \n1. **Article 14 of the Constitution**: Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of laws, requiring that legislative provisions not be arbitrary or discriminatory. \n2. **Doctrine of Severability**: A provision that is invalid in whole or in part does not invalidate the entire statute. \n3. **Vagueness Doctrine**: A law is void for vagueness if it fails to provide sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement. \n4. **Legislative Delegation**: The legislature may delegate authority to the executive, but the delegation must be specific enough to prevent arbitrary exercise of power. \n5. **Precedents**: Cases such as *State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala* (1954) emphasize that vague terms in statutes may be struck down for violating the principle of equality. \n\n---\n\n### Analysis: \n1. **Constitutional Validity of Rule 39**: The High Court correctly identified that the terms \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" are uncanalised, lacking specific criteria to guide the executive. This vagueness risks arbitrary exercise of power, which violates Article 14. The appellants’ argument that the Act’s overall scheme provides sufficient context is weak, as the High Court’s analysis focused on the absence of clear guidelines in Rule 39 itself, not the broader Act. \n2. **Legislative Authority**: The State Government’s power to amend rules under the Minor Mineral Concession Act is valid, but Rule 39’s vagueness renders it unconstitutional. The High Court’s decision to strike down Rule 39 does not invalidate the entire Act, as the doctrine of severability applies. \n3. **Precedents and Judicial Review**: While the appellants cited similar provisions in other statutes, the High Court’s reliance on *State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala* is appropriate, as the case underscores that vague terms in statutes may be void for arbitrariness. The requirement for recorded reasons and judicial review, as argued by the appellants, is consistent with the High Court’s decision. \n4. **Factual Disputes**: The respondents’ factual disputes about lease grants do not directly address the constitutional validity of Rule 39. These disputes are procedural and do not affect the legal analysis of the rule’s constitutionality. \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion: \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The Madras High Court correctly held that Rule 39 violates Article 14 of the Constitution due to its vague and unguided terms, which enable arbitrary executive discretion. While the appellants’ arguments about the Act’s scheme and judicial review are valid, they do not override the constitutional imperatives of clarity and equality. The High Court’s decision to strike down Rule 39 is legally sound and should be upheld.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by RAY, J.\nRAY, J. -\nThis appeal and the connected matters are directed against the judgment dated June 16, 1993 passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 5793 of 1993. The writ petitioner Durai Raju Naidu moved the aforesaid writ petition before the Madras High Court for a decision that Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Mineral Concession Rules) as unconstitutional and void. The said writ petitioner contended inter alia that he was granted lease with respect to quarry in Survey No. 782/1 in Kulathur Village and he had been agitating before the State Government for the renewal of the said lease but he apprehended that the authorities concerned were likely to exercise their prerogative under the said Rule 39 to grant lease to somebody else and in order to safeguard his interest, the writ petition was moved by him for the aforesaid declaration\n2. To sustain the challenge to the said Rule 29, the writ petitioner Shri Naidu, urged two main grounds, namely, (a) The State Government had no power to frame a rule deviating from the Mineral Concession Rules already made in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 15(1) of the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as MMRD Act) and (b) Rule 39 had conferred arbitrary, uncanalised and unguided power on the executive thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The expression \"public purpose and interest of mineral development\" as referred to in the said Rule 39 is vague and does not constitute sufficient guidelines. The said writ petition was contested by the State of Madras and also by other respondents who were impleaded in the writ proceedings, namely, the Tamil Nadu Granites Quarry Owners and Exports Association, Shanthi Granites and the Premium Granites\n3. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court by the impugned judgment did not accept the first contention of the writ petitioner but upheld the second contention and declared that Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules was unconstitutional and void\n4. Premium Granites and Shanthi Granites preferred a Special Leave Petition No. 10306 of 1993 before this Court inter alia challenging the impugned decision of the Madras High Court impleading the State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Commissioner and Secretary to the Government, Industries Department, Shri Durai Raju Naidu, the writ petitioner and the Tamil Nadu Granites Quarry Owners and Exporters Association. As aforesaid, Civil Appeal No. 4257 of 1993 arises on such special leave petition filed by the said applicants. The State of Madras has also preferred special leave petition challenging the said decision of the Madras High Court and some other parties also made applications before this Court for leave to move special leave petitions and to intervene either to oppose the said appeals or to support the decision of Madras High Court and all these matters have been analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment\n5. To appreciate the contentions raised by the contesting parties, certain dates and events may be stated as hereunder\n6. In 1957 the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act (MMRD Act) was passed by Parliament. In 1959, the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules were issued under Section 15 of the MMRD Act. Rules 8 of the Mineral Concession rules provided for the grant of quarry leases in respect of all minor minerals. On December 16, 1972, GO No. 1932 was issued by the State of Madras inserting Rule 8(A) of the Mineral Concession Rules providing grant of lease to persons for quarrying minerals for their existing industries or having industrial programmes. It is the case of some of the parties in the above matters before this Court that they had set up industries based on the above rules and obtained leases of land for quarrying granite specified period. On August 25, 1975 by GOMs No. 993 Rule 8(A) was amended thereby enabling the State Government to grant leases for quarrying black granite subject to the applicant having an industry or agreeing to set up an industry two years\n7. On December 2, 1977 by GOMs No. 1312, Rule 8(C) was inserted thereby prohibiting grant of leases in Government lands for quarrying black granite for private persons. Since such Rule 8(C) provided for exclusive exploitation of black granite by the State Government, the validity of Rules 8(C) was challenged in a writ proceeding before the Madras High Court. The validity of Rule 8(C) was ultimately upheld by this Court on February 5, 1981 in the case of Hind Stone (State of T. N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205 : AIR 1981 SC 711 ). Some of the lessees whose leases had expired by efflux of time, made applications for renewal of their leases but no renewal granted. In 1984 Writ Petition No. 12267 of 1984 was filed by one of such applicants for renewal before this Court for a mandamus to direct State Government to grant renewal of lease for a further period of ten years and similar writ petitions were also moved before this Court for the aforesaid relief by some of the lessees whose leases had also expired. In such writ petitions this Court has passed ad interim order of status quo on May 3, 1984 as regards possession. Applications were also filed before this Court for vacating status quo order but such applications were dismissed by this Court on September 28, 1984 and the writ petitioners who were lessees but whose leases had expired, continued to remain in possession of land in terms of the interim order of this Court without, however, any right to quarry operations. On December 9, 1988, by GO No. 1273 Rule 8(C) was amended thereby providing for grant of lease to quarry black granite to private persons for their existing industries or having industrial programme. A number of lessees whose leases had expired made applications for grant of lease to quarry black granite. Their claims were considered by the department concerned and were recommended to the State Government. It appears that on September 2, 1989, the rules were further amended by Go No. 608 thereby providing for lease for quarrying black granite only to persons having industries but the said grant was made under a tender system. On June 10, 1992 by GOMs No. 214, Rule 8(C) was amended. Rule 8(C) as amended provides for grant of quarry lease to Government Company and Rule 8(A) as amended by GO 214 provides for quarry lease to be granted only to persons having \"Letters of Commitment\". The said GO also provided for canalisation of granite quarried. The validity of Rule 8(D) containing canalising provisions were challenged before the High Court of Madras and such Rule 8(D) was struck down by the High Court. On March 5, 1993, this Court, in Writ Petition No. 12267 of 1984 and connected matters passed an order to the effect that the State Government could consider and pass orders in respect of relief sought for by the petitioners for lease of quarrying black granite. On March 8, 1993, GO No. 97 was passed introducing Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules providing for grant of leases \"in special circumstances in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" otherwise than in accordance with the Mineral Concession Rules. As stated earlier, the validity of Rules 39 was challenged in a writ petition before the Madras High Court\n8. It may be stated here that by GO Nos. 125 and 197 the State of Madras granted quarry leases in favour of some persons who had established industries and had been granted quarry leases earlier and who had been allowed to continue in possession all through. After Rule 39 was struck down by the Madras High Court two writ petitions were filed before the Madras High Court for cancelling leases granted by the said GO Nos. 125 and 197 in exercise of the power under Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules. The State Government opposed such writ petitions for cancelling the leases and inter alia contended that the grant of leases to existing industries was traceable to Rule 8(A) as amended by GO No. 214 dated June 10, 1992 and such grant of lease could be sustained without reference to Rule 39 since struck down by the Madras High Court but the High Court allowed the said writ petitions and set aside GO Nos. 125 and 197 by which the leases were granted in favour of some persons. It has been held by the High Court that the grant of lease cannot be sustained under Rule 8(A) of the Mineral Concession Rules and such grant of lease can be referable only to Rule 39 and since Rule 39 has been struck down, the grant made under the said Rule 39 is also to be set aside. Such grantees, therefore, have also moved special leave petitions before this Court inter alia challenging the decision of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39\n9. To appreciate the rival contentions raised by the parties either in support or against the validity of Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules, the provisions of Rule 39 are set out as hereunder\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (Central Act 67 of 1957) the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby makes the following amendment to the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1950The amendment hereby made shall come into force on March 8, 1992\nAMENDMENT\nIn the said rules, after Rules 38, the following rule shall be added, namely\n'39. Powers of State Government to grant rule or renew quarry lease or permission etc. in special cases : Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the State Government, if in any case, are of opinion that in the interest of mineral development and in the public interest it is necessary so to do, they may, by order and for reasons to be recorded\n(a) grant or renew a lease or permission to quarry any mineral; or\n(b) allow the working of any quarry for quarrying any mineral;\non terms and conditions different from those laid down in those rules.'\"\n10. The learned counsel challenging the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39 as arbitrary, have urged a number of points. Since all the matters are being disposed of by common judgment, we do not propose to deal with the contentions made by each of the learned counsel challenging or supporting the impugned decision of the Madras High Court separately in view of the fact that grounds urged by the learned counsel are more or less similar and at times overlapping. We, therefore, propose to deal with the contentions raised by the learned counsel not individually but generally\n11. As already indicated, the only ground on which Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules has been struck down by the Madras High Court is that such rule gives unguided and uncanalised powers to the State Government. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel challenging the decision of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39 may be summarised to the following effect\n(1) Rule 39 contains the guidelines, viz., the grant under Rules 39 can be made only \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" for reasons to be recorded in writing(2) The object of the MMRD Act itself is for regulation of mining and \"mineral development\". The rules framed under the MMRD Act are also intended to subserve the said object, namely, mineral development. The provisions of the MMRD Act the rules framed by the Central and the State Governments clearly furnish the scope and purport of the words \"mineral development\". Scientific exploitation of the minerals without waste in undoubtedly an exercise for mineral development envisaged by the Act and the rules\n(3) Since reasons are to be recorded in writing while exercising the power under Rule 39, it can always be ascertained from the order that may be passed under the said provisions of Rule 39 as to whether the grant is one for furthering mineral development or not\n(4) The word \"public interest\" is a word of definite concept which has been referred to in the Constitution and in many other Acts. The import of the expression \"public interest\" has been considered and noted in the decisions of this Court. Hence, the said expression does no longer suffer from any vagueness or indefiniteness\n(5) Power under Rule 39, being controlled by such consideration \"in the interest of mineral development\" and in \"public interest\", cannot be exercised arbitrarily and capriciously but such exercise has to be made with definite objective purpose. There is therefore, no occasion to strike down Rule 39 on the score of being potentially arbitrary and capricious and open to unguided and uncanalised exercise of power. If in any particular case, the aforesaid purposes are not followed in exercising power under Rule 39, then such improper action, and not Rule 39 itself, can be challenged\n(6) In different Acts and rules, both Central and State including rules framed by some other States under MMRD Act, provisions similar to Rule 39 have been made and such provisions have been noticed by courts of law but for good reasons have not been struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution\n12. We have already indicated the outlines of various Government orders amending the Mineral Concession Rules from time to time. The picture which emerges from the aforesaid amendments made in the Mineral Concession Rules may be stated as hereunder\n13. The Mineral Concession Rules were framed under Section 15 of the MMRD Act providing for grant of quarry leases and permission in respect of minor minerals both in revenue lands and patta lands. In the year 1972 the Mineral Concession Rules were amended and under such amendment, the grant of lease of revenue land to quarry granite could be made in favour of private persons only if they had industries or industrial programmes indicating that the policy of the Government to exploit black granite scientifically to avoid wastage was being implemented. A number of persons including some of the appellants in these proceedings had established industries pursuant to the Rules as amended and applied and obtained leases for quarrying black granite for a period of ten years in 1973 - such leases being valid up to 1983. In December 1977, Rule 8(C) was introduced prohibiting grant of leases for quarrying black granite by private persons and confining exploitation only by the Government. The validity of such rule was challenged but as aforesaid the said rule was upheld by this Court in the case of Hind Stone (State of T.N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205 : AIR 1981 SC 711 ). When the leases for quarrying black granite in revenue lands for a period of ten years expired in 1983, the lessees including some of the appellants made applications for grant of renewal but they were not eligible for getting such renewal in view of Rule 8(C) the validity of which was upheld by this Court. The applicants for getting such renewal of lease including some of the appellants filed writ petitions before this Court and as indicated hereinbefore orders for maintaining status quo as to the possession of the lands were passed by this Court without however giving any right to quarry. In 1988, Rule 8(C) was amended whereby provision was made for grant of leases for quarrying black granite to private persons having industries or having industrial programmes. Such amendment of Rule 8(C) virtually restored the position as was prevailing in 1972. The persons who had set up industries or had industries programmes for quarrying black granite scientifically as desired by the Government, made applications for grant of renewal of leases. Such applications were scrutinised by the department concerned and recommendations for grant of renewal of leases were made by the department. At that stage, in 1989 the Mineral Concession Rules were further amended inter alia providing that quarry leases were to be granted to industries only under tender system. Tenders were floated and some of the aspirants for getting leases participated in such tenders and those who had participated and were successful were given the letters of commitment assuring grant of lease to them if they would set up industries. In 1992, the Rules were amended again by GOMs No. 214 drastically. As per the amended rules, grant of quarry leases to quarry black granite were to be made only to government companies and the companies having letters of commitment\n14. It does not require any imagination to note that there was frustration and resentment of such persons like some of the appellants who had set up industries based on the old rules and who had been starving for raw materials but who had become disabled from getting any lease in view of restriction of granting of such lease and confining the grant of lease in favour of only such private persons who held the letters of commitment\n15. It has been contended by the learned counsel in support of Rule 39 that the State Government having realised the injustice and unmerited hardship to be suffered by some persons and also having realised that for furthering mineral development which will be in the public interest, it was desirable to make suitable provisions so that the rigorous created because of the amendment made by GOMs 214 in 1992 confining grant of leases to private persons holding letters of commitment, should be relaxed. It was on such perception that Rule 39 was introduced in the Mineral Concession Rule enabling the Government to grant quarry leases to private persons in appropriate cases in the interest of mineral development and in public interest for reasons to be recorded in writing. It is, therefore, necessary to decide whether introduction of Rule 39 in the Mineral Concession Rules was justified and desirable and even if it may be justified or desirable, as a matter of policy, whether in law such amendment can be sustained\n16. Elaborating the contentions made before this Court in support Rules 39, it has been contended by the learned counsel that Rule 39 does not confer an uncanalised power and does not suffer from the vice of want of guidelines. It has been urged that Rule 39 contains the guidelines, viz., that the grant must be for mineral development and \"in public interest\". In other words, Rule 39 has been inserted to provide for grant of lease which may not be done strictly under Rule 8(A) or 8(C) but which is warranted for mineral development and \"in public interest\" for good reasons to be recorded\n17. It has been urged that mineral development is not a vague concept but has a definite meaning which can be tested objectively particularly when reasons are to be recorded in writing under Rule 39\n18. The learned counsel have contended that the object of the MMRD Act is for regulation of mineral development and the Rules framed under the MMRD Act both by the Central and State Governments clearly furnish the scope and support of the word \"mineral development\". It has been strongly contended that scientific exploitation of minerals without waste is undoubtedly a part of mineral development as envisaged by the MMRD Act and the rules framed thereunder. It has been urged by the learned counsel that the word \"public interest\" having been referred to in the Constitution and in many enactments is a word of definite concept\n19. The validity of Service rules including Fundamental Rule 56(j) empowering the Government to terminate the service by way of premature retirement had been challenged before this Court as ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution but this Court in a series of decisions has held that if the power to retire prematurely in public service if exercised in \"public interest\" the provision empowering such premature retirement does not become invalid on the score of offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench of this Court in T. G. Shivacharana Singh v. State of Mysore (AIR 1965 SC 280 : (1967) 2 LLJ 246 ) in upholding Rule 285 of Mysore Civil Services Rules, 1958, providing for premature retirement in 'public interest' has held that Rule 285 authorising the Government to retire a government servant compulsorily in public interest did not offend Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was indicated by the Constitution Bench that the law in relation to the validity of the rules permitting compulsory premature retirement of government servants had been well settled by a series of prior decisions of this Court in Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway (AIR 1964 SC 600 : (1964) 5 SCR 683 : (1964) 2 LLJ 467 ) and Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. ((1955) 1 SCR 26 : AIR 1954 SC 369 )\n20. The learned counsel have further contended that the guidelines need not be expressly found in the impugned and provisions but such guidelines can be gathered from the setting of the Acts and the rules framed thereunder. In support of this contention reference has been made to the decision of this Court made in the case of P. J. Irani v. State of Madras ((1962) 2 SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 ). Section 13 of Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 was challenged as ultra vires Article 14 of 16 of the Constitution as the said provisions gave uncontrolled and unguided discretion to the Government to exempt any building from all or any of the provisions of the said Act. It was held in the said decision that enough guidance was given in the preamble and the operative portion of the Act to exercise the discretion of exemption. The decision in P. J. Irani case ((1962) 2 SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 ) was followed by this Court in the decision in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N. ((1985) 1 SCC 290 ) Section 29 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 providing for discretion to the State Government to grant total exemption to buildings belonging to public trust from the purview of the Rent Act was held valid and not offending Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground of giving unbridled discretion. It was held that sufficient guideline was afforded by the preamble and the operative provisions of the Rent Act for the exercise of discretionary power vested in the Government\n21. Reference has also been made to the decision of this Court in Ram Dial v. State of Punjab ((1965) 2 SCR 858 : AIR 1965 SC 1518 ). In the said decision the expression \"public interest\" has been explained at page 866 of the Report. It has been held that while considering the power given to the Government to remove a member under Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipalities Act, the expression \"public interest\" would necessarily depend upon the time, place and circumstances with reference to which the consideration was made. It may be noted here that Section 14(e) was struck down not on the score that the expression \"public interest\" is vague and it introduces unguided, and unbridled power but the same was struck down in view of the fact that Section 14(e) providing for removal without a hearing circumvents Section 16(1) which contemplates a hearing to be given to the members to be affected\n22. The learned counsel have also referred to the decision of this Court made in the case of Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India ((1969) 2 SCR 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ). In considering the expression \"so far as it appears to be necessary or expedient for carrying out the provisions of the Act (Gold Control Act), the Constitution Bench in the said decision held that the said phrase was not subjective in the context of the scheme and object of the legislation. The opinion of the administrator as to the necessity of making the order must be made objectively and must be reasonably tenable in a court of law. Reference has also been made to another decision of this Court made in Jalan Trading Co. (P) Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Union ((1967) 1 SCR 15 : AIR 1967 SC 691 : (1966) 2 LLJ 546 ). In the said decision validity of several provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act including Section 36 were taken into consideration by the Constitution Bench of this Court. It has been held that the power to exempt certain establishments from the operation of the Act given to the appropriate Government under Section 36 was not an unguided power because the Government was enjoined to take 'public interest', the financial position of the establishment, and other relevant circumstances into consideration before exercising the said power. There was therefore no excessive delegation of legislative authority by Section 36 and the section was held valid\n23. The learned counsel have again relied on recent decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court made in the case of Workmen v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. ((1992) 3 SCC 336 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 6791992 SCC(L&S) 679 ) The vires of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act (as prevalent at the relevant time) was considered in the said decision. It had been held that powers conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 25-N to grant or refuse permission for retrenchment has to be exercised in accordance with objective indicated and Statement of Objects and Reasons given in the Amending Act 32 of 1976 and also the basic idea of settlement of industrial disputes and maintaining industrial peace. It has been held that in exercising power under sub-section (2) of Section 25-N, with the requirement of passing a speaking order containing reasons does not amount to unreasonable restriction. It has also been held that the requirement of reasons for exercise of such power by itself excludes chances of arbitrariness. It has also been held in the said decision that Section 25-N is not vitiated on the ground of absence of a provision for appeal or review of the order passed by the Government or authority as the order is required to be a speaking order to be passed on objective considerations. It has been further held that the remedy of judicial review available under Article 226 cannot be said to be inadequate because even in a case of refusal of permission for retrenchment on policy considerations, it is open to the Court to examine whether policy is in consonance with the object and purport of the Act\n24. The learned counsel have also contended that Entry 54 List I of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India enables the central Government to regulate mines and mineral development in \"public interest\" by making a declaration of such intention and Parliament has in fact made such declaration by Section 2 of the MMRD Act. By the said MMRD Act, Parliament has left the power of regulating quarry leases in respect of minor minerals to the State Governments under Section 15 of the MMRD Act. The State Government has the authority to deal with the minor minerals under which the Mineral Concession Rules have been framed by the Government of Tamil Nadu. It is by the said rules that the State Government has been regulating grant of leases from time to time. In 1992 the Government thought it fit to prohibit grant of quarry leases to private persons except in patta lands and providing for grant of quarry leases to revenue lands only to government companies in terms of Rule 8(C). On a reconsideration and as a part of policy decision, the Government thought it fit to introduce Rule 39 providing for the grant of quarry leases to private persons \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" by indicating reasons in writing by relaxing the rigours of other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules. Rule 39 is a part of the policy underlying the Mineral Concession Rules which is consistent with the object of the MMRD Act. As exercise of relaxation for grant of quarry leases under Rule 39 can only be made within the parameters of public interest and for the mineral development by recording the reasons in writing, Rule 39 does not suffer from arbitrariness or unguided or unbridled power offending Article 14 of the Constitution. It has also been contended that the power exercised under Article 39 is not an absolute, discretionary power of the State Government unfettered by any valid consideration but exercise of such power within the aforesaid parameter is always open to judicial scrutiny thereby affording ample safeguard against any abuse in exercising the power under Article 39\n25. Commenting on the reasons for which Article 39 was introduced in the Mineral Concession Rules, it has been submitted by the learned counsel that various persons under the existing rules has set up industries by incurring substantial costs for sizing and polishing granites for export and sale in the domestic market. Such scientific exploitation and ancillary steps in that regard are undoubtedly right steps for mineral development. The cases of some of the persons who had set up proper industrial establishments for quarrying granites and for polishing and sizing them for effective user under the existing rules and had been possessing lands and were reasonably aspiring for renewal of leases required proper consideration. Although their cases were recommended on scrutiny of relevant facts by the department concerned, no such lease could be granted because of the amendment effected in 1992 in the Mineral Concession Rules. As not only injustice was meted out to such persons but non-renewal of leases to such persons was also considered to be not \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in the public interest\". The State Government, therefore felt that Rule 39 containing provision for relaxation in the matter of grant of quarry leases should be introduced so that in an appropriate case in the greater interest of mineral development and in public interest, grant of lease can be made notwithstanding other provisions in the Mineral Concession Rules. In the aforesaid facts, it cannot be contended that Rule 39 was introduced without any justification whatsoever or the same suffers from any excessive delegation or vice of uncanalised and unbridled power or the same was introduced to give favours to a chosen few\n26. The High Court in striking down Rule 39 has held that Rule 39 provides for an arbitrary power and the guidelines of public interest and in the interest of mineral development do not provide any objective standard. For such finding, the High Court has relied on the decision of this Court made in Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P. ( : AIR 1954 SC 224 ); R. M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate, Tanjore (AIR 1954 SC 747 : (1955) 1 SCR 686 ); Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India ((1965) 2 SCR 858 : AIR 1965 SC 1518 ) and Jalan Trading Co. (P) Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Union ((1969) 2 SCC 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ). It has been contended by the learned counsel that all the said decisions do not support the proposition that Rule 39 is ultra vires Articles 14 of the Constitution. The decisions relied on by the High Court primarily relate to laws or rules which seeks to prohibit a person from carrying on a legal trade or profession except on licences. Such laws prescribing the restriction require to be precise and objective so that the prohibitions would clearly be understood and made enforceable. Provisions enabling a grant have necessarily different import\n27. It may be noted here that the decision in Dwarka Prasad case ( : AIR 1954 SC 224 ) relates to a case where the power is given under clause 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order to grant or refuse to renew, suspend, revoke or cancel or modify any licence issued under the said control order. The said clause further authorised the Controller to delegate such power in favour of any person. Such provision was held unreasonable and invalid. The decision in R. M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate, Tanjore (AIR 1954 SC 747 : (1955) 1 SCR 686 ) relates to the validity of condition 5(a) and special condition 3 which required a licence under Cinematograph Act to exhibit at each performance one or more approved films of such length and for such time as the Provincial Government or the Central Government may direct. Under special condition 3 the licensee was required to exhibit at the commencement of each performance not more than 2000 feet of one or more approved films. It was held by this Court that such conditions did not amount to reasonable restrictions with the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution and therefore was ultra vires Article 19(1) of the Constitution\n28. The decision made in Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia ((1969) 2 SCC 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ) was a case where the validity of various sections of the Gold Control Act and the Regulations made thereunder fell for consideration. Section 5(2)(b), Section 27(2)(d), Section 27(6)(a), Sections 32, 46, 88 and 100 were held ultra vires for reasons indicated therein. Indeed this decision is relied on to support the validity of Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules. Some of the sections of the said Gold Control Act were held valid. The reasons for which the said other sections were held invalid are entirely different and do not apply so far as Rule 39 is concerned. Moreover, considerations as to public interest and for furtherance of mineral development as essential requirement to grant exemption under Rule 39 make the said rule wholly objective. The decision in Banthia case ((1969) 2 SCC 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ) has no application in interpreting Rule 39\n29. It has been further contended that where in respect of prohibited categories, the law carves out an exception or relaxation, the rule to be applicable should be appreciated on a different perception. There the question of unbridled power being allowed to be exercised does not arise. The question is of taking out certain exceptions from the prohibited area and keeping certain categories outside the prohibited area for being allowed to exercise freedom of trade or business from the restrictions imposed\n30. Elaborating on the contention that the power of relaxation as contained in Rule 39 is similar in various statutes it has been urged that the power granted under Section 31 of the MMRD Act confers identical power on the Central Government as Rule 39 confers the power on the State Government. Section 31 of the MMRD Act may be set out as hereunder\" 31. Relaxation of rules in special cases. - The Central Government may, if it is of opinion that in the interest of mineral development it is necessary so to do, by order in writing and for reasons to be recorded, authorise in any case the grant, renewal or transfer of any prospecting licence or mining lease, or the working of any mine for the purpose of searching for or winning any mineral, on terms and conditions different from those laid down in the rules made under Section 13. \"It has been submitted that the High Court while dealing with Section 31 of the MMRD Act, has not questioned the validity of the said section although it contains similar provisions. In this context reference to Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 has also been made. The provision of Section 29 is set out as hereunder\" Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Government may, subject to such conditions as they deem fit, by notification, exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of this Act. \"31. This provision has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the decisions S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N. ((1985) 1 SCC 290 ) and Prabhakaran Nair v. State of T.N. ((1987) 4 SCC 238 )\n32. Reference was also made to Section 8-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act which is set out as hereunder\" 8-A. (1) The State Government may, by notification make an exemption, or reduction in rate, in respect of any tax payable under this Act -\n(2) Any exemption from tax or reduction in the rate of tax, notified under sub-section (1) may be subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be specified in the notification\n(3) The State Government may, by notification, transpose any entry or party thereof from one schedule to another schedule and alter the point of levy of sale or purchase, but not so as to enhance the rate of tax in any case. \"Reference to Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was also made. The provision is set out as hereunder\" If the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt generally either absolutely or subject to such conditions (to be fulfilled before or after clearance), as may be specified in the notification goods of any specified description from the whole or any part of duty of customs leviable thereon. \"This section has been upheld by this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) P. Ltd. v. Union of India ((1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121 )\n33. Section 14 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act since referred is set out as hereunder\" 14. Power of Government to notify exemption and reductions of tax. - (1) The Government may be notification (issued whether prospectively or retrospectively) make an exemption of reduction in rate, in respect of any tax payable under the Act. \"34. It is contended that Section 14 is quite similar to Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules. In this connection, reference has also been made to Rule 66 of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1969, containing provisions for relaxation of rules in special cases. The said rule is set out as hereunder\" 66. Relaxation of rules in special cases. - In cases where the Government is of the opinion that public interest so requires, it may authorise the grant of a quarrying lease or a quarrying permit on such terms and conditions other than those prescribed in the rules, as the Government may by order specify\nProvided that notwithstanding anything contained in these rules such safeguards, territorial, financial or otherwise may be provided to the leases with a view to safeguarding the interests of any industry or trade in order to avoid unhealthy competition among the lessees and to prevent any fall in the trade and to see that minor mineral is exploited in a scientific and systematic manner. \"Basing the arguments on the aforesaid contentions the learned counsel have submitted that there was no occasion to strike down Rule 39 by the High Court as invalid and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by holding that the said rule conferred unguided and unbridled discretionary power on the State Government. The learned counsel have submitted that as the said Rule 39 is quite valid and has been inserted in the Mineral Concession Rules for a reasonable purpose, Rule 39 cannot per se be declared as ultra vires as sought to be done by the Madras High Court. If in any individual case, power has not been exercised properly and the reasons which have got to be recorded in writing do not stand the scrutiny of reasonableness and the purposes for which such power of exemption can be exercised, challenge for improper action in such individual cases before a court of law can always be made. The learned counsel have therefore submitted that the decision of the Madras High Court should be set aside thereby enabling the State Government to giver effect to Rule 39 in appropriate cases\n35. Supporting the decision of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules, it has been urged by the learned counsel opposing the appeals that the High Court felt that if Rule 39 was to be interpreted to give a wide discretionary power to the authorities to overtook other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules then it would be violative of Article 14 as being vague and unfettered and giving uncanalised power to the State Government. It was on such finding that Rule 39 was struck down as unconstitutional\n36. It has been very strongly contended that the submission that the words \"public interest\",\" reasons to be recorded in writing \"would be adequate to prevent arbitrary action is not tenable in view of the decision of this Court by the Constitution Bench in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 12131991 SCC(L&S) 1213 ). The attention of this Court has been drawn to paragraph 230 at page 716 in the majority decision. It has been held in the said paragraph\" There is need to minimise the scope of the arbitrary use of power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however high placed they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies. It is trite to say that individuals are not and do not become wise because they occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection and fairness does not go with the posts, however high they may be. There is only a complacent presumption that those who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not support it and reality does not warrant it. In particular, in a society, pledged to uphold the rule of law, it would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law. \"It has also been contended that it is also not factually correct that all the ten grantees (13 leases) are having their own industries or factories and they are not exporting any raw granite or raw block granite to foreign countries but they are processing and polishing after cutting them and sizing them and it was only the said polished goods that are being exported by them. It has been contended that only M/s. Enterprising Enterprises and Gem Granite have their own factories at Madras. Pallavan Granite has a factory at Pondicherry. All other grantees do not posses any industry of their own either inside or outside the State of Tamil Nadu. It is also contended that 75% to 80% of the quarried materials are straight away exported abroad without cutting and polishing even by the persons who possess industries\n37. It has also been contended that although under GOMs No. 1273 introduced on December 9, 1989 which was in force on June 9, 1992 permitting grant of lease to persons which industries, M/s Enterprising Enterprises and Gem Granite did not choose to apply under that scheme which was in force for nearly 3 1/2 years only because the granites quarried must be captively used in their own industries for the purpose of polishing before the same are exported. It has been contended that relevant facts have not been taken into consideration for granting lease in the purported exercise of power of relaxation under Rule 39. Such factual contentions are, however, not admitted\n38. We do not propose to scrutinise facts and circumstances concerning the grantees in favour of whom the exercise of power under Rule 39 had been made because we do not think that for deciding the validity of Rule 39 a case of improper exercise of power under Rule 39 in any particular case, is required to be considered by this Court\n39. It has been contended that even if it is held that consideration of public interest and the interest of mineral development coupled with requirement to record reasons provide guidelines under which power under Rule 39 is to be exercised, Rule 39 introduced on March 8, 1993 in the Mineral Concession Rules, if given an expansive introduction, would entitle the authorities concerned to disregard the various other provisions as contained in the Mineral Concession Rules framed under Section 15 of MMRD Act and would entitle the authorities concerned either to grant or renew a quarry lease contrary to the avowed policy of the State Government incorporated in certain other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules\n40. It has been contended that when Rule 8(C) epitomises policy of the State Government reserving granite in all its uses to be exploited by the State Government or through its Corporation, in exercise of the powers under Rule 39, the State Government should not be permitted to give an interpretation to Rule 39 widely and grant a quarry lease contrary to the State Policy. Mr. Sibal, the learned counsel in this connection has referred to the decision in Gardner v. Jay ((1885) 29 Ch D 50 , 58 : 52 LT 395). Lord Justice Bowen in dealing with the judicial discretion has held that :\" If a court is invested by Act of Parliament with a discretion, that discretion, like other judicial discretion, must be exercised according to commons sense. \"The learned Counsel has also contended that it is a settled principle of interpretation of statute that a court should not interpret a statute in such a fashion as to render other provisions redundant. There should always be an attempt to read different sections of a statute harmoniously so that one provision does not invalidate the other. It has been contended that the statutory rule should be considered as a part of an integrated scheme and no one provision should be so interpreted as to render the scheme as envisaged in other provisions inoperative. It has been submitted that Rule 8(C) represents the part of a scheme in respect of which the State Government does not allow exploitation of granite except by itself or through its Corporation. It must therefore be held that the authorities in framing Rule 39 could not have intended that such policy should be rendered inoperative and ineffective by interpreting Rule 39 in a wide manner. It has been further submitted that it is well established rule of interpretation that courts must interpret an enactment in such a way as to implement rather than defeat its purpose. In this connection, reference has been made to the observation of Francis Bennion in Statutory Interpretation, Second Edn. at page 411. The learned author has indicated that :\" An Act must be construed so that its provisions are given force and effect rather than being rendered nugatory.\"The learned author has also indicated that :\" Ut res magis principle requires inconsistencies within an act to be reconciled. \"In this context, the learned author has referred to Blackstone to the effect that,\" one part of the statute must be so constructed by another, that the whole may, if possible, stand - ut res magis valeat quam pereat. \"It has been further submitted that the principle of reconciling inconsistencies within an Act means that if the obvious intention of the enactment gives rise to difficulties in implementation, the court must do its best to find ways of resolving these. It has been submitted that looking from this angle, Rule 39 would only mean that the State Government is entitled to grant or renew a quarry lease if in a given case or in a special class of cases it is of the opinion that in the interest of mineral development and in the public interest it is necessary to change the terms and conditions of the lease different from those statutorily prescribed under the rules. In no other circumstances, this power can be exercised. Such an interpretation would render Rule 39 consistent with the scheme formulated by the State Government under other provisions in particular Rules 8(A) and 8(C). It is contended that any other interpretation would render Rule 39 a Henry VIII clause\n41. It has been submitted that this Court has many occasions to deal with similar Henry VIII clauses (that king is regarded popularly as the impersonation of executive autocracy). In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly ((1986) 3 SCC 156 , 220, 221 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 4291986 SCC(L&S) 429 : (1986) 1 ATC 103 ) (at pp. 220, 221) and in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 12131991 SCC(L&S) 1213 ) (at pp. 707 and 717) this Court held that such clauses are constitutionally impermissible\n42. It has been very strongly contended that in case this Court finds Rule 39 to be vague and ambiguous then this Court may, in the light of scheme of the entire rule, the policy of the State Government as expressed in the said rules, permit Rule 39 to be read down in such a manner so as to give effect to the policy of the Government and also to the scheme of the MMRD Act. It has been submitted that this Court has repeatedly followed doctrine of reading down in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy ((1977) 4 SCC 471 : (1978) 1 SCR 641 ), R. L. Arora v. State of U.P. ((1964) 6 SCR 784 : AIR 1964 SC 1230 , following Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp 2 SCR 769 : AIR 1962 SC 955 ), Jagdish Pandey v. Chancellor, University of Bihar ((1968) 1 SCR 231 : AIR 1968 SC 353 ), Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration ((1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155 )\n43. It has been further submitted that as Rule 39 cannot be given a wide interpretation thereby giving extraordinary power to relax other provisions of the rules and consequently rendering the scheme of the entire rules ineffective. The only interpretation by reading down Rule 39 which can be given is that the said rule would permit the State Government under extraordinary circumstances or in special cases to vary certain terms and conditions of the lease in a given case. It has been submitted that therefore it becomes necessary to understand the import of the words \"terms and conditions\" in contradistinction to the policy of the Government as contained in the Mineral Concession Rules. The words \"terms and conditions\" according to the learned counsel would mean a stipulation or requirement, the failure of which would render the Act subject to repudiation\n44. It has been contended that the Mineral Concession Rules prescribe certain conditions as to the grant of leases - how an application is to be made, to whom it is to be made, the maximum period of lease, the extent of maximum area which can be leased out to the applicant etc. All these conditions are also provided in the MMRD Act itself. In D. K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat (1986 Supp SCC 20 ) this Court has held that the rule-making power of the State Government under Section 15 is controlled by Sections 4 to 13 (now Sections 5 to 13) of the MMRD Act. On the principle of harmonious construction and reading down statutory provision for reconciliation in a special case, in the interest of mineral development and in the public interest, the State Government may change or relax some of the conditions of lease e.g. may at the most grant a lease for more than ten years if the applicant satisfied the State Government of the necessity to do so. Similarly, in a given case, the Government may charge less seniorage fee, dead rent etc. in the interest of mineral development and in public interest. But the State Government cannot and should not utilize such an extraordinary power under Rule 39 to exempt few persons alone, while applying the policy to all others e.g. Dharmapuri District is completely reserved for exploitation by Government-owned Corporation. It has been contended that it has been demonstrated before this Court with the aid of the affidavit filed by the State Government in Civil Appeal No. 1655 of 1992 at pages 450 to 456 that more than 70 applications have been rejected on the sole ground that Dharmapuri District is reserved for State exploitation. Despite such avowed policy of reservation, the State Government in the purported exercise of a wide power under Rule 39 has granted three leases in the same Dharmapuri District only on the ground that there was a huge loss of foreign exchange. The learned counsel have contended that such an exercise in completely overlooking the other provisions will be wholly capricious and therefore impermissible under Article 14 of the Constitution and consideration of loss of foreign exchange is alien to the relevant consideration permissible under the Mineral Concession Rules\n45. It has been contended that in case the Government wants to grant leases in Dharmapuri District to persons who were not in possession of letters of commitment as on June 10, 1992, the only course open to the State Government is to change its policy of reservation as well as its policy in relation to letters of commitment and allow all individuals who are interested in a quarrying licence consistent with the concept of equal opportunity\n46. It has been further contended that the State Government is under a constitutional duty to act fairly and justly and given equal opportunity to every individual who seeks largess from the Government. The grant of licence of a few people and that also on grounds of loss of foreign exchange is totally obnoxious to the theory of just State action. The guiding principle for interpretation of Rule 39 should be equality of opportunity to every person in the trade and at the same time imposing sufficient restrictions or guidelines or safeguards to prevent misuse of such a power and such interpretation must enable Rule 39 to coexist with the other rules as being not inconsistent with the other rules\n47. It is therefore only possible to reconcile Rule 39 by reading it down and indicating that in appropriate case by exercise of power conferred in Rule 39, it is permissible for the State Government only to vary the terms and conditions of the lease \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"public interest\"\n48. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case and giving our careful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties, it appears to us that the MMRD Act was enacted by Parliament under Entry 54 List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The aforesaid entry enables the Central Government to regulate mines and mineral development in public interest by making such declaration and Parliament, has in fact, made such declaration by Section 2 of the MMRD Act. In respect of minor minerals, Parliament by the said MMRD Act has left the powers of regulating minor minerals to the State Governments under Section 15 of the MMRD Act. Different State Governments have exercised such power under Section 15 of the MMRD Act and State of Tamil Nadu has enacted in 1959 the Mineral Concession Rules. There is no dispute that the MMRD Act and the rules framed thereunder either by the Central Government or by the State Government are for mineral development subserving the cause of public interest. It cannot also be disputed that mineral development is not a vague expression and the MMRD Act and the rules framed under it, clearly furnish the scope and purport of the word \"mineral development\". It has been very reasonably contended that scientific exploitation of minerals without waste is undoubtedly a part of mineral development as envisaged by the MMRD Act and the rules framed thereunder. The expression \"public interest\" finds place in the Constitution and in many enactments which have since been noted and considered by this Court in various decisions. The said expression is, therefore, a word of definite concept. There is also force in the contention of the appellants that the guidelines need not be expressly found in the impugned provisions but such guidelines can be gathered from the setting of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. Such contention gets support from the decisions of this Court in P. J. Irani ((1962) 2 SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 ), S. Kandaswamy Chettiar ((1985) 1 SCC 290 ), Jalan Trading Co. ((1967) 1 SCR 15 : AIR 1967 SC 691 : (1966) 2 LLJ 546 ), Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. ((1992) 3 SCC 336 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 6791992 SCC(L&S) 679 )\n49. The power of relaxation under Rule 39 of Mineral Concession Rules is to be exercised for \"mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" after recording reasons for such exercise of power. In our view, it has been rightly contended by the learned counsel in support of the validity of Rule 39, that the exercise of power under the said Rule 39 cannot be made arbitrarily, capriciously and on subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned but the same is to be exercised within the parameters of \"mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" which as aforesaid, are not vague and indefinite concepts. Such exercise of power must satisfy the reasonableness of State action before a court of law if any challenge of improper action in exercise of the said power under Rule 39 in a given case is made. It has been held by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Meenakshi Mill case ((1992) 3 SCC 336 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 6791992 SCC(L&S) 679 ) that if a speaking order is required to be passed on objective consideration, such provision is not vitiated on the ground of absence of a provision for appeal or review because the remedy available by way of judicial review is by itself an adequate safeguard against improper and arbitrary exercise of power. It has also been held by this Court in the said decision that requirement of giving reasons for exercise of the power by itself excludes chances of arbitrariness\n50. The observation made in the majority decision in Delhi Transport Corpn. case (1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 12131991 SCC(L&S) 1213 ) as referred to hereinbefore should be appreciated with reference to the facts and circumstances of a case and the true import of a provision under which a discretionary power is to be exercised. While no exception can be made to the observation of this Court in the said decision that\" It would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law\", it should also be borne in mind that it is not always feasible and practical to lay down such exhaustive written guidelines which can cover all contingencies. It has, therefore, become necessary to make provisions for exercise of discretion in appropriate cases by giving broad guidelines and indicating the parameters within which such power is to be exercised. In various decisions referred to hereinbefore, this Court has upheld such exercise of discretion if the same does not appear to be wholly uncontrolled uncanalised and without any objectives basis\n51. \"Public interest\" is a paramount consideration in the MMRD Act itself and the rules framed thereunder cannot but subserve \"public interest\" in furthering the cause of mineral development. We are, therefore, unable to hold that Rule 39 is per se obnoxious and having contained unbridled, unguided and uncanalised discretionary power offends Article 14 of the Constitution\n52. Although it does not appear that any argument of harmonious construction of the statute coupled with the principle of interpretation by reading down was advanced before the Madras High Court but since such contention has been raised before this Court and it appears to us that for considering the validity of Rule 39 and its true import, it may be necessary to consider the question of harmonious construction and the principle of reading down a statutory provision, we propose to examine the contentions made in that regard. It has been contended that all the provisions in the Mineral Concession Rules must be understood as an integrated scheme and no particular provision should be permitted to govern the field in isolation particularly when it runs counter to the scheme envisaged by the other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules. It has been contended that since under the other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules, exploitation of black granite in Dharmapuri District is restricted to a particular class of operators as a policy decision of the State Government, so long such policy decision remains in force no relaxation of the same is permissible in the purported exercise of power under Rule 39. Accordingly, Rule 39 may be held valid only if the same is interpreted as a provision having a limited application and being wholly confined in varying the terms and conditions of leases in appropriate cases\n53. Although, at the first glance, such argument appears to be reasonable but on closer scrutiny the same does not appear to be sustainable. T", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -1488,26 +1488,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S012", - "case_id": "6704", - "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "mistral-nemo", - "source_file": "S012__ablation_issue__mistral-nemo__6704.json", - "court": "CALCUTTA HIGH COURT", - "judgment_date": "02/05/2016", + "case_id": "3438", + "experiment": "baseline_firac", + "model": "qwen3-8b", + "source_file": "S012__baseline_firac__qwen3-8b__3438.json", + "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", + "judgment_date": "04/02/1994", "machine_error_stage": "rules", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Wrong legal test / threshold" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misinterpretation" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 6023 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No. 25409 of 2017) | Paulmech Infrastructure Private Limited v. State Of Odisha And Ors. | 04/10/2021", - "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 6023 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No. 25409 of 2017) | Paulmech Infrastructure Private Limited v. State Of Odisha And Ors.", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL - 868 of 2019 | Birendra Prasad Sah v. State Of Bihar And Anr. | 08/05/2019", + "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL - 868 of 2019 | Birendra Prasad Sah v. State Of Bihar And Anr.", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The State of Odisha leased property to Utkal Ashok Hotel Corporation Limited (UAHCL), which operated 'Hotel Nilachal Ashok'. In 2009, UAHCL tendered a 40-year lease for the property. The appellant, the highest bidder, received a Letter of Intent (LOI) on 19.01.2010, requiring payment of Rs. 9.34 crores (including Rs. 8.82 crores non-refundable upfront payment) and execution of the lease agreement within 30 days. The appellant failed to make the payment within the initial period. UAHCL granted two extensions, finally setting the deadline for payment as 15.12.2010. The appellant paid Rs. 4.41 crores on 18.02.2010, but failed to pay the balance amount by the 15.12.2010 deadline. Subsequent payments totaling Rs. 4.11 crores were made by the appellant after this final extended deadline (late December 2010 and January 2011). On 10.12.2013, UAHCL terminated the LOI due to the appellant's non-compliance. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking a direction for UAHCL to execute the lease agreement and later amended the prayer to quash the termination letter. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, stating that disputed questions of fact could not be resolved in writ jurisdiction and relegated the appellant to an appropriate forum. The appellant contended that UAHCL accepted the payments without demur and that a condition regarding employee voluntary retirement was an invalid imposition. UAHCL argued the appellant's consistent default, the non-refundable nature of the upfront payment, and losses incurred due to the appellant's actions.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts: \n1. The State of Odisha leased property to Utkal Ashok Hotel Corporation Limited (UAHCL), which operated 'Hotel Nilachal Ashok'. \n2. In 2009, UAHCL tendered a 40-year lease for the property, with the appellant being the highest bidder. \n3. The appellant received a Letter of Intent (LOI) on 19.01.2010, requiring payment of Rs. 9.34 crores (including Rs. 8.82 crores non-refundable upfront payment) and execution of the lease agreement within 30 days. \n4. The appellant failed to make the payment within the initial period. \n5. UAHCL granted two extensions, finally setting the deadline for payment as 15.12.2010. \n6. The appellant paid Rs. 4.41 crores on 18.02.2010, but failed to pay the balance amount by the 15.12.2010 deadline. \n7. Subsequent payments totaling Rs. 4.11 crores were made by the appellant after this final extended deadline (late December 2010 and January 2011). \n8. On 10.12.2013, UAHCL terminated the LOI due to the appellant's non-compliance. \n9. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking a direction for UAHCL to execute the lease agreement and later amended the prayer to quash the termination letter. \n10. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, stating that disputed questions of fact could not be resolved in writ jurisdiction and relegated the appellant to an appropriate forum. \n11. The appellant contended that UAHCL accepted the payments without demur and that a condition regarding employee voluntary retirement was an invalid imposition. \n12. UAHCL argued the appellant's consistent default, the non-refundable nature of the upfront payment, and losses incurred due to the appellant's actions.\n\n### Issues: \n1. Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition for lack of jurisdiction to resolve disputed factual issues. \n2. Whether UAHCL was justified in terminating the LOI due to the appellant's failure to comply with payment obligations. \n3. Whether the non-refundable nature of the upfront payment and the acceptance of partial payments by UAHCL affects the validity of the termination.\n\n### Rules: \n1. The doctrine of **res judicata** and **issue estoppel** prevent relitigation of matters already decided in a judicial proceeding. \n2. **Writ jurisdiction** of the High Court is limited to the enforcement of fundamental rights and does not extend to adjudicating disputes involving complex factual issues. \n3. **Contractual obligations** and **performance requirements** under lease agreements are governed by the principles of **performance, breach, and remedies** under contract law. \n4. **Non-refundable payments** in contractual agreements are generally considered as part of the consideration and may not be recoverable upon termination, depending on the terms and intent of the parties. \n5. The **principle of estoppel** may apply if one party has accepted partial performance or payments, potentially affecting the other party's right to terminate.\n\n### Analysis: \n1. The High Court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve disputed factual issues, such as whether UAHCL accepted partial payments or whether the termination was justified. Writ jurisdiction is not intended to serve as a substitute for ordinary civil litigation, especially when the dispute involves complex factual determinations. The appellant's petition was essentially a civil dispute, which should have been addressed in a proper forum. \n2. UAHCL was justified in terminating the LOI due to the appellant's failure to make the full payment within the extended deadline. The LOI clearly outlined the payment terms, and the appellant's non-compliance, despite partial payments, constituted a material breach of the agreement. The non-refundable nature of the upfront payment further supports UAHCL's position, as it was a binding part of the agreement and not subject to refund upon termination. \n3. The acceptance of partial payments by UAHCL does not negate the breach of the payment schedule. While the acceptance may suggest some level of tolerance, it does not constitute a waiver of all contractual obligations. The appellant's failure to meet the final payment deadline and the subsequent late payments after the deadline indicate a continued default, justifying the termination. The condition regarding employee voluntary retirement, while not directly relevant to the payment issue, does not invalidate the termination if it was a legitimate contractual term.\n\n### Conclusion: \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court was correct in dismissing the writ petition for lack of jurisdiction, and UAHCL was justified in terminating the LOI due to the appellant's non-compliance with payment obligations. The non-refundable nature of the upfront payment and the acceptance of partial payments do not invalidate the termination, as the appellant's consistent failure to meet the contractual terms constitutes a material breach.", - "reference_judgment": "1. The appellant is before this Court assailing the order dated 09.03.2017 : (Reported in AIR 2017 (NOC) 985 (Ori)) passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, in W.P.(C) No.23103/2013. By the said order the High Court was of the opinion that the disputed questions of fact involved in the petition cannot be gone into in the writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, the prayer made in the petition was not entertained and the appellant was relegated to approach the appropriate forum available for redressal of its grievance. The appellant, therefore being aggrieved is before this Court.\n2. The respondent No.1-State of Odisha had granted the lease of the property in question in favour of the respondent No.5-Utkal Ashok Hotel Corporation Limited (for short 'UAHCL') for 99 years under the document dated 24.01.1989. UAHCL was, in that view, running an establishment in the name and style 'Hotel Nilachal Ashok' in the said premises at Puri. The same being unviable was closed down with the approval of Board of Directors in the year 2004. Thereafter, UAHCL decided to lease out the same for a period of 40 years. Tender was floated in the year 2009. The appellant was one among the tenderers who participated in the process and being the highest bidder was considered. Accordingly, the Letter of Intent (for short 'LOI') dated 19.01.2010 was issued in favour of the appellant delineating the terms to be complied pursuant to which the lease agreement was to be signed.\n3. Among the other conditions which were to form part of the lease agreement, even before executing the lease agreement the requirement was for the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.9.34 crores to UAHCL within 30 days, of which Rs.8.82 crores was towards non-refundable amount which was to be paid upfront; the security deposit of Rs.26 lakhs and the advance minimum guaranteed annual lease premium for the first year of Rs.26 lakhs was also to be paid.\n4. On payment of the said amount the lease was to be executed and the other conditions would come into operation. The appellant who was unable to pay the amount within the time stipulated, requested the UAHCL that they be permitted to deposit a part of the amount i.e., Rs.4.41 crores on 19.09.2010 and the balance amount by 15.04.2010 which was favourably considered by UAHCL through their communication dated 12.02.2010. Such indulgence was shown as special case. The appellant accordingly deposited a portion of upfront amount to the tune of Rs.4.41 crores on 18.02.2010, but the balance amount was not deposited within the extended time stipulated i.e., before 15.04.2010. In that view, the lease agreement could not be executed. However, in view of the request from the appellant, UAHCL through their communication dated 25.11.2010 once again acceded to the request permitting the appellant to pay the balance amount before 15.12.2010.\n5. The appellant thereafter paid (i) the sum of Rs.2 crores on 28.12.2010, (ii) sum of Rs.1.41 crores on 29.12.2010 and (iii) the sum of Rs.70 lakhs on 07.01.2011. Such payment, according to the appellant constitutes the payment which was required to be made as per the LOI. However, the time gap which had ensued had created a position wherein the grievance of the employees was to be addressed and they were to be given the benefit of voluntary retirement. Since the LOI dated 19.01.2010 had also provided for regulating the manner in which the employees are to be treated during the lease period and had provided the liberty to offer voluntary retirement, the UAHCL required the appellant to bear the liability towards the same. The same did not reach a finality and in the meanwhile the Board of Directors of UAHCL took the decision to terminate the LOI dated 19.01.2010 since the appellant had failed to comply with clause 2 thereof, which required the payment of Rs.9.34 crores within 30 days of issuance of LOI.\n6. Even prior to communication of the decision on 10.12.2013, the appellant filed the special writ petition before the High Court on 01.10.2013 wherein a prayer was sought to direct UAHCL to execute the lease agreement pursuant to the terms agreed under LOI dated 19.01.2010 and accept the balance amount along with interest for delayed payment. During the pendency of the writ petition the prayer was amended and the appellant sought for quashing the letter dated 10.12.2013 whereby UAHCL decided to terminate the LOI. UAHCL had filed their objection statement opposing the writ petition including contending therein with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition in a contractual matter. The learned Division Bench of the High Court having taken note of the rival contentions and the dispute involved for adjudication, was of the opinion that the disputed questions are best left to be resolved before the appropriate forum. The appellant is assailing the said order.\n7. We have heard Mr. Sanjay Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. Ashok Kumar Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for UAHCL and perused the appeal papers.\n8. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the action of UAHCL to cancel the LOI and retain the amount paid thereunder is not justified. In an attempt to fortify his submission, the learned counsel has referred to LOI dated 19.01.2010 with reference to clause 2, to point out that the upfront amount payable within 30 days though not paid within the time stipulated therein, the appellant had sought extension of time to pay which was agreed to by the communication dated 04.02.2010 and extended by the communication dated 25.11.2010. Though the time agreed thereunder is up to 15.12.2010, the amount paid by the appellant on 28.12.2010 (Rs.2 crores), 29.12.2010 (Rs.1.41 crores) and 07.11.2011 (Rs.70 lakhs) had been accepted without demur and as such the upfront payment of Rs.8.82 crores as required had been paid. In that view, the lease agreement was required to be executed. It is contended, though that was position, UAHCL instead of executing the lease agreement had through the communication dated 13.04.2011 raised the issue of the appellant having to bear the total liability on account of providing voluntary retirement to the employees which was as per the decision of the Board of UAHCL due to insistence of the State Government, though it was not a condition in the LOI nor could have been included in the lease agreement. It is pointed out that clause 11 of the LOI though provided for regulating the manner in which the employees are to be maintained had indicated that the appellant shall not retrench them but the liberty was for the appellant to consider VRS. As such it could not be imposed on the appellant is the contention. In such circumstance, it is contended by the learned counsel that the appellant having made the payment was entitled for the lease agreement to be executed in their favour. Hence the termination being bad, be set aside and the UAHCL be directed to execute the lease agreement is his submission.\n9. The learned counsel for UAHCL would on the other hand contend that the LOI was issued in favour of the appellant after the tender process and as such the terms of the LOI was required to be complied. Despite the payment of Rs.9.34 crores required to be made within 30 days, the appellant had failed to comply with the same. It is true that as per the request of the appellant the time was extended, but it was only a concession as a special case. Even as per the extension granted the payment was required to be made by 15.12.2010. But, even as per the admitted case of the appellant the payment towards the balance of the upfront amount was made only on 28.12.2010, 29.12.2010 and 07.01.2011 which was subsequent to the date till which extension was provided. That apart, since the requirement is to pay Rs.9.34 crores within the time stipulated, the security deposit and advance minimum guaranteed annual lease premium amount was also required to be paid within the time stipulated but had not been paid. As such the appellant cannot contend that they have performed their obligation so as to assail the termination of LOI and seek execution of the lease agreement. In that view, while justifying the termination it is also contended that the upfront amount of Rs.8.82 crores being onetime non refundable amount, it is within the powers of UAHCL to retain the same. Alternatively, it is contended that UAHCL was forced to incur idle expenses towards maintenance and the benefits payable to the employees without getting returns as the lease had not materialised due to the default committed by the appellant. In this regard, roughly an amount of Rs.4.5 crores has been incurred by UAHCL which in any event, the appellant is liable to reimburse. In that view, the learned counsel seeks that the appeal be dismissed.\n10. In the light of the contentions put forth, it is seen that the lease agreement was to be entered into between the parties pursuant to the terms depicted in LOI and on compliance of the initial obligations set out therein. The present dispute relates to the initial payment that was required to be made by the appellant within the time frame set out in the LOI and non-adherence to which has resulted in termination of LOI. Clause 2 of the LOI provides for the same, which reads as hereunder:\n\"2. You shall execute the Operating Lease Agreement within 30 days of the issue of LOI and pay an amount of Rs.9.34 crore within these 30 days as per following details i. One-time non-refundable upfront payment of Rs.8.82 crore. ii. Security Deposit (Rs.26.00 lakh) as per article iv. iii. Advance Minimum Guaranteed Annual Lease Premium for the first year (Rs.26.00 lakh) as per annex-ix -Financial Bid.\"\n11. A perusal of the same indicates that the appellant was obliged to pay an amount of Rs.9.34 crore within 30 days from 19.01.2010 and execute the Operating Lease Agreement. Towards the said amount, a sum of Rs. 8.82 crore was payable upfront as an one-time non- refundable amount. Though the learned counsel for the appellant sought to contend that the Minimum Guaranteed Annual Lease Premium and Security deposit of Rs. 26 lakh each are to be paid subsequently when the lease is executed, in our view it cannot be considered to be loose ended. Since Clause 2 refers to Rs.9.34 crore which is payable in 30 days and that includes the said amount of Advance Annual Premium and Security deposit, the entire amount was payable within 30 days. And the Lease Agreement was simultaneously executable. It only means that the same should be paid and the formality of execution of Lease Agreement also should be completed in the said 30 days and the payment to be made includes the upfront amount of Rs.8.82 crore.\n12. In that backdrop it is necessary to examine the manner in which the things have proceeded after issue of LOI. Admittedly the appellant was not ready with the amount to make the payment within the timeframe contemplated under Clause 2 of LOI. The appellant, through their letter dated 04.02.2010 requested UAHCL that they be allowed to pay 50% of the bid money by 19.02.2010 which in our view will include all the components indicated in Clause 2 of LOI and not just the upfront component. The rest of the money was undertaken to be paid by 15.04.2010. UAHCL through their reply dated 12.02.2010 allowed the same as a special case. The appellant once again through their letter dated 17.11.2010 requested for extension of time for payment of Rs.4.93 crore. UAHCL again extended the time till 15.12.2010.\n13. Despite such indulgence shown by UAHCL the appellant did not make the balance payment before 15.12.2010. Instead, the sum of Rs.4.11 crore was paid subsequent thereto and that too, in instalments of Rs. 2 crores on 28.12.2010; Rs.1.41 crore on 29.12.2010 and Rs.70 lakhs on 07.01.2011.\n14. Though the learned counsel for the appellant seeks to contend that UAHCL having received the said payment cannot at this stage contend that the payment was not made within the time stipulated, we are unable to accept such contention. UAHCL is a corporation which has different departments and as such the remittance made being accepted in itself cannot be taken as an act to condone the delay caused by the appellant in complying with the terms of the LOI so as to alter the terms of contract. There is no material on record that subsequent to 15.12.2010, there is any positive act on behalf of UAHCL to either extend the time for payment or for having expressly condoned the delay and having accepted the payment so as to regularise the transaction. This is relevant more so in the context that at an earlier point as against the time stipulated for payment under the LOI specific correspondence was exchanged between the parties and the time had been expressly extended prior to the time fixed earlier having expired. In such situation, when admittedly the balance payment had not been made prior to 15.12.2010, unless the appellant had obtained express extension from UAHCL mere tendering the payment and the same having been accepted cannot be construed as a positive act to alter the contract.\n15. No doubt, the appellants have relied on the communication dated 13.04.2011 addressed by the General Manager, UAHCL indicating therein that the issue of offering VRS to all the employees unwilling to join the new management was a consideration and the VRS amount will have to be paid by the appellant to UAHCL. Apart from the reason assigned by the High Court to indicate that the same cannot be treated in favour of the appellant, the said letter does not indicate that the discussion in that regard was after indicating to the appellant that the delay in payment of the upfront amount has been condoned and accepted. If at all the said aspect relating to VRS of the employees was also mutually agreed and, in that context, if UAHCL had proceeded to condone the delay and enter into the lease agreement it is only in such circumstance the exchange of correspondence in that regard would have assumed relevance. If that be the position, when admittedly the appellant was required to make the agreed payments within the timeframe indicated under LOI dated 09.01.2010 and the appellants themselves being unable to comply with the requirement, though having secured extensions on two occasions cannot turn around to contend otherwise at this juncture. Despite the extended period having come to an end on 15.12.2010, the appellant not having made the full payment within the said date cannot at this stage contend to have complied with the terms so as to seek a direction to UAHCL to execute the lease agreement. In fact, the High Court having examined the material on record has also arrived at such conclusion.\n16. Notwithstanding such conclusion reached by the High Court, ultimately it has arrived at the decision that in view of the disputed questions to be resolved between the parties, the same cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the appellant in that view has placed reliance to the case in Unitech Ltd. and Others v. Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (TSICC and Ors.) 2021 (2) SCALE 653 : (AIROnline 2021 SC 131), the decision to which one of us (Mr. Justice M.R. Shah) is a member on the Bench, with specific reference to para 32 thereof, which reads as hereunder:\n\"32. Much of the ground which was sought to be canvassed in the course of the pleadings is now subsumed in the submissions which have been urged before this Court on behalf of the State of Telangana and TSIIC. As we have noted earlier, during the course of the hearing, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Telangana and TSIIC informed the Court that the entitlement of Unitech to seek a refund is not questioned nor is the availability of the land for carrying out the project being placed in issue. Learned Senior Counsel also did not agitate the ground that a remedy for the recovery of moneys arising out a contractual matter cannot be availed of under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, to clear the ground, it is necessary to postulate that recourse to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not excluded altogether in a contractual matter. A public law remedy is available for enforcing legal rights subject to well-settled parameters.\"\n17. Having noted the said decision, a reference to the order passed by the High Court would indicate that the High Court though having referred to the decisions in Arya Vyasa Sabha v. Commissioner of Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments, AIR 1976 SC 475, DLF Housing Construction Private Ltd. v. Delhi Municipal Corporation AIR 1976 SC 386, National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram AIR 2004 SC 1998, Dwarka Prasad v. B.D. Agarwal, AIR 2003 SC 2686, and Defence Enclave Residents' Society v. State of U.P. AIR 2004 SC 4877 to note the limitations while considering a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has in that view taken note of the fact situation arising in the instant case. It is on facts that the High Court has arrived at the conclusion that such disputed questions of fact cannot be resolved in the writ petition of the present nature. Therefore, in the present facts, the High Court has not dismissed the writ petition on maintainability but having taken note of the issue involved was of the opinion that the contentions urged would necessitate the requirement of recording evidence and therefore relegated the parties to an appropriate forum. To that extent, though we take note of the observations made by the High Court, keeping in view the nature of the considerations made, the prayers which were sought in the amended writ petition were required to be conclusively answered by the High Court on the aspect as to whether the decision of UAHCL to terminate the LOI dated 19.01.2010 was justified and the requirement for resolution of the dispute by an appropriate forum ought to have been left open only to the incidental aspect which may require appropriate evidence to be tendered and adjudication to be made by an appropriate forum.\n18. Keeping these aspects in view, having noted that the appellant had failed to adhere to the terms indicated in the LOI dated 19.01.2010 and the payment required thereunder not being made even within the extended period, the Board of Directors of UAHCL were justified in deciding to terminate the LOI through their letter dated 10.12.2013. In fact, the prayer no. 3 seeking calculation of interest on the amount deposited and such amount is being sought to be adjusted towards the balance payments would in itself indicate that even to the knowledge of the appellant, the entire payments had not been made even as on the date of the filing the writ petition. In such circumstance, when the LOI has been rightly terminated, the directions sought in the writ petition to execute the lease agreement pertaining to 'Hotel Nilanchal Ashok', Puri does not arise and the prayers in that regard are liable to be rejected.\n19. Having arrived at the above conclusion, the next aspect which would engage our attention is as to the manner in which the amount paid by the appellant is to be treated. The learned counsel for UAHCL would contend that the LOI provides that the onetime upfront amount to be paid is non-refundable, in that view, it is contended that the said amount is not liable to be refunded. Even otherwise due to the delay caused by the appellant and having obtained the status-quo order from the court by litigating with regard to the subject matter UAHCL have been prevented from otherwise utilising the property which has caused loss to them and the said amount would be adjustable towards the same is his contention.\n20. On taking note of the contention, a close perusal of the phrase employed in the LOI would indicate the one time payment made upfront is shown as \"non refundable\" and such payment is towards execution of the Operating Lease Agreement. If that be the position, the terms of LOI is clear that the said payment is towards the lease rentals and is the upfront payment which becomes a part of the lease transaction and therefore not refundable only if the lease agreement comes into operation and not otherwise. The word employed is not \"forfeiture\", therefore, the amount payable towards the advance lease rentals and the other advance payments provided in clause 2 of the LOI, cannot be forfeited if there is default in complying with the term and entering into the lease agreement, going by the stipulations contained in the LOI governing the parties herein. That apart, as noted, the amount was required to be paid, latest by the extended date i.e., 15.10.2010. The very termination of the LOI is for the reason that the entire payment was not made even within the timeframe. The cause for termination of LOI occurred on 15.10.2010. Hence the amount paid on 28.12.2010 (Rs.2 crores), 29.12.2010 (Rs.1.41crores) and 7.01.2011 (Rs. 70 lakhs) being clearly made after the said date in any event cannot be retained by UAHCL as otherwise it will amount to unjust enrichment. Therefore, it is liable to be refunded. Even with regard to the amount of Rs.4.41 crores which was paid on 07.02.2010, since we have held that the same cannot be forfeited it is an amount which will be available for accounting. In a normal circumstance, a direction was required to be issued to refund the said amount also.\n21. However, as noted it is the contention on behalf of UAHCL that due to the conduct of the appellant in not paying the amount within time and completing the lease agreement formalities and thereafter involving UAHCL in litigation and taking benefit of the status quo order, UAHCL was unable to utilise the property but on the other hand had to incur expenses. On this aspect, prima facie it is seen that the lease transaction ought to have been entered into before 19.02.2010. It is on account of the difficulty expressed by the appellant, the time for payment of upfront amount was extended ultimately up to 15.12.2010, in which process itself more than 10 months had elapsed. Soon thereafter the appellant had filed the writ petition before the High Court and the matter has been pending before one forum or the other for nearly a decade during which time the property could not be utilised nor expenses could be frozen. Even if that be so, it would not be appropriate for this Court to hazard a guess with regard to the actual loss that would have been suffered by UAHCL. At the same time, when this prima facie aspect is noticed it would also not be appropriate for this Court to direct UAHCL to refund the amount to the extent of Rs.4.41 crore which was paid within the timeframe and allow UAHCL to thereafter initiate recovery process. On the other hand, it would be in the interest of justice to permit UAHCL to retain the amount and grant liberty to the appellant to file an appropriately constituted civil suit seeking recovery of the said amount. In the said proceedings it would be open for UAHCL to put forth the contention to set off the amount towards the loss suffered by them or to seek for counter claim if any further amount is due. In such proceedings it would be open for the competent civil court to independently consider that aspect of the matter on its own merits for which we have not expressed any opinion on merits relating to that aspect. Even with regard to the claim of interest, if any, by the appellant that aspect is also kept open to be adjudicated in the civil suit. The pendency of the suit shall not be an impediment for UAHCL to deal with the property or to retender the same in any manner.\n22. In the light of the above we pass the following order:- (i) The order dated 09.03.2017 passed by High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in W.P. (C) No.23103/2013 stands modified. (ii) In that view, the prayer of the appellant to quash the letter dated 10.12.2013 terminating the letter of LOI dated 19.01.2010 stands rejected. Consequently, the termination of LOI dated 19.01.2010 is upheld. However, UAHCL is directed to refund the amounts deposited by the appellant on 28.12.2010 (Rs.2 crores), on 29.12.2010 (Rs.1.41 crores) and on 07.01.2011 (Rs.70 lakhs), in all amounting to Rs.4.11 crores within four weeks from this day. (iii) The appellant is reserved liberty to file a civil suit for recovery of Rs.4.41 crores paid to UAHCL on 17.02.2010 subject to the observations made above and all contentions of the parties in that regard are left open. (iv) In view of the above conclusions and disposal of the appeal, the amount of Rs.3 crores deposited by the appellant before this Court, which is kept in fixed deposit shall be refunded to the appellant with accrued interest thereon. (v) The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. (vi) Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.", + "case_record": "The dispute concerns two cheques, for Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000, which were dishonoured and returned unpaid on 20 November 2015. The appellant received the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. A legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015. After failing to obtain proof of service from the postal department, a second legal notice was issued on 26 February 2016, which was replied to on 2 March 2016. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed on 11 May 2016. The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) condoned the delay in filing the complaint and took cognizance. The Sessions Judge rejected the second respondent's revision petition. The High Court, however, quashed the cognizance order, holding that the complaint was not filed within the statutory period. The appellant argued that successive notices are permissible and that the delay was condoned under Section 142. The respondent argued that the second notice was issued beyond the thirty-day period from the dishonour memo, and the complaint was filed beyond the period from the first notice, and that the CJM had only condoned delay after a specific date.", + "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The dispute involves two cheques that were dishonoured and returned unpaid on 20 November 2015.\n2. The appellant received the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015.\n3. A legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015, but due to failure in obtaining proof of service, a second legal notice was issued on 26 February 2016.\n4. The second legal notice was replied to on 2 March 2016.\n5. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed on 11 May 2016.\n6. The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) condoned the delay in filing the complaint and took cognizance.\n7. The Sessions Judge rejected the second respondent's revision petition.\n8. The High Court quashed the cognizance order, holding that the complaint was not filed within the statutory period.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether successive legal notices are permissible under the Negotiable Instruments Act.\n2. Whether the delay in filing the complaint was properly condoned under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.\n3. Whether the complaint was filed within the statutory period from the date of receipt of the memo of dishonour or from the date of the last legal notice.\n\n### Rules:\n1. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, prescribes the conditions under which a complaint can be filed for dishonour of cheques.\n2. Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides for the conditions and procedure for filing a complaint, including the timeframe within which it must be filed.\n3. The statutory period for filing a complaint under Section 138 is within one month from the date of receipt of the memo of dishonour or within one month from the date of the last legal notice, if such notice is sent.\n4. The principle that successive notices can be issued if the previous notice was not properly served, as long as the statutory period for filing the complaint is adhered to.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. Referring to **Fact 3** and **Rule 4**, the appellant's action of issuing a second legal notice after failing to obtain proof of service for the first notice seems justified, as the intention was to ensure proper service.\n2. Considering **Issue 2** and **Rule 2**, the CJM's decision to condone the delay under Section 142 is crucial. However, the High Court's decision to quash the cognizance order suggests that the delay was not properly condoned in accordance with the statutory requirements.\n3. Examining **Fact 5** and **Rule 3**, the complaint was filed on 11 May 2016, which is beyond the one-month period from the receipt of the memo of dishonour (**Fact 2**) and also beyond the one-month period from the second legal notice (**Fact 3**).\n4. Given **Issue 1** and **Rule 4**, the permissibility of successive notices does not directly address the issue of the complaint being filed beyond the statutory period.\n5. The appellant's argument that successive notices are permissible and the delay was condoned under Section 142 needs to be evaluated against the specific timelines and the High Court's reasoning for quashing the cognizance order.\n\n### Conclusion:\nBased on the analysis, the critical issue is whether the complaint was filed within the statutory period, considering the receipt of the memo of dishonour and the issuance of successive legal notices. The High Court's decision to quash the cognizance order due to the complaint not being filed within the statutory period is supported by the facts and the applicable rules. Therefore, the appeal should be **DISMISSED**.", + "reference_judgment": "1. Delay condoned.\n2. Leave granted.\n3. This appeal arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 10 May 2018 by which an order taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 18881has been quashed. 1 \" Act\"\n4. The facts, briefly stated, are thus:\n5. The dispute arises over two cheques drawn on the State Bank of India in the amount of Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000 which were returned unpaid under a memo issued by the UCO Bank, Begusarai on 20 November 2015. The appellant received the memo on 4 December 2015. Following this, a legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015 intimating the dishonour of the cheque. According to the appellant, between 14 February 2016 and 23 February 2016, he made queries with the postal department but no proof of service was provided. Accordingly, on 26 February 2016, a second legal notice was issued. This was replied to by the second respondent on 2 March 2016. Eventually, a complaint under Section 138 was instituted on 11 May 2016. 6 The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai by an order dated 14 July 2016, condoned the delay in filing the complaint. While taking cognizance, the CJM issued summons to the second respondent. The second respondent instituted revisional proceedings before the Sessions Judge which were rejected on 8 March 2017. In a further recourse to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, the learned Single Judge held that the complaint under Section 138 was not filed within the statutory period of thirty days prescribed under Section 138 as a result of which the proceedings were quashed.\n7. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, Mr Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Counsel submitted that in MSR Leathers v. S Palaniappan2a three judge Bench of this Court has taken the view that the issuance of successive notices is permissible under the provisions of Section 138 having regard to the object of the legislation. Moreover, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the delay in the institution of the complaint was condoned by the CJM under Section 142. Hence, there was an error on the part of the High Court in quashing the proceedings. 2 (2013) 1 SCC 177\n8. On the other hand, Mr Jay Savla, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent submitted that: (i) The second legal notice dated 26 February 2016 was sent beyond a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015 and hence cannot be the basis of a valid institution of a criminal complaint; (ii) If at all, the complaint could have only been instituted on the basis of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015 which was within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour; (iii) The complaint which was lodged on 11 May 2016 was beyond the stipulated period from the date of issuance of the first notice; (iv) The CJM had condoned the delay which had occurred in the institution of the complaint only for the period after 6 April 2016 after the issuance of the second notice; and (v) In the decision of the three judge Bench in MSR Leathers (supra), there was a re-presentation of the cheque as a result of which, a fresh notice was held to be within the ambit of the law. 9 Section 138 provides thus:\n\"138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. - Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for3[a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:\n3. Sub. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 7, for a \"term which may be extended to one year\" (w.e.f. 6-2-2003). Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months4from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;\n4. The period has been reduced from six months to three months vide R.B.I Notification No. RBI/2011-12/251, DBOD.AML BC. No. 47/14.01.001/2011-2012, dated 4th November, 2011 (w.e.f. 1-4-2012). (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,5[within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.\"\n10. In the present case, the facts narrated above indicate that the appellant issued a legal notice on 31 December 2015. This was within a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. Consequently, the requirement stipulated in proviso (b) to Section 138 was fulfilled. Proviso (c) spells out a requirement that the drawer of the cheque has failed to make payment to the holder in due course or payee within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. The second respondent does not as a matter of fact, admit that the legal notice dated 31 December 2015 was served on him. The appellant has in the complaint specifically narrated the circumstance that despite repeated requests to the postal department, no acknowledgment of the notice was furnished. It was in these circumstances that the appellant issued a second notice dated 26 February 2016. Cognizant as we are of the requirement specified in proviso (b) to Section 138, that the notice must be issued within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour, we have proceeded on the basis that it is the first notice dated 31 December 2015 which constitutes the cause of action for the complaint under Section 138.\n11. The complaint was instituted on 11 May 2016. Under Section 142(1), a complaint has to be instituted within one month of the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 1386. The proviso however stipulates that cognizance of the complaint may be taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. Both in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint, the appellant indicated adequate and sufficient reasons for not being able to institute the complaint within the stipulated period. These have been adverted to above. The CJM condoned the delay on the cause which was shown by the appellant for the period commencing from 6 April 2018. However, if paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint are read together, it is evident that the appellant had indicated sufficient cause for seeking condonation of the delay in the institution of the complaint. The High Court has merely adverted to the presumption that the first notice would be deemed to have been served if it was dispatched in the ordinary course. Even if that presumption applies, we are of the view that sufficient cause was shown by the appellant for condoning the delay in instituting the complaint taking the basis of the complaint as the issuance of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015. 6 142 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138:[Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period];(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138..\n12. In the view which we have taken, we have come to the conclusion that the impugned judgment of the High Court is unsustainable. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The complaint shall accordingly stand restored to the file of the trial court.\n13. We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions which will be adjudicated upon during the trial. O R D E R Delay condoned. Leave granted. The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -1613,26 +1613,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S013", - "case_id": "3869", + "case_id": "1779", "experiment": "baseline_firac", - "model": "qwen3-8b-noreason", - "source_file": "S013__baseline_firac__qwen3-8b-noreason__3869.json", + "model": "llama-3.3-70b-instruct", + "source_file": "S013__baseline_firac__llama-3.3-70b-instruct__1779.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "04/10/2021", + "judgment_date": "08/05/2019", "machine_error_stage": "rules", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misinterpretation" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 1961 of 2020 (Arising out of SLP (C) No 28165 of 2018) | Managing Director Chhattisgarh State Co-Operative Bank Maryadit v. Zila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit & Ors. | 04/03/2020", - "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 1961 of 2020 (Arising out of SLP (C) No 28165 of 2018) | Managing Director Chhattisgarh State Co-Operative Bank Maryadit v. Zila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit & Ors.", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.18772 of 2014) | Rehan Ahmed (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Gulam Mohiuddin Khan | 22/04/2024", + "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.18772 of 2014) | Rehan Ahmed (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Gulam Mohiuddin Khan", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The appellant, Chhattisgarh State Cooperative Bank, is the apex body of cooperative banks in Chhattisgarh. The first respondent is a District Central Cooperative Bank. The CEO of the first respondent was arrested for corruption and suspended. The appellant appointed the sixth respondent as the CEO of the first respondent on August 11, 2017, citing the ineligibility of the interim CEO and referencing Section 54(3) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960. The Board of Directors of the first respondent later approved the appointment of the seventh respondent as CEO. The first respondent challenged the appellant's appointment in the High Court. A Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, finding the appellant's appointment valid under Section 54(3). However, a Division Bench of the High Court set aside the Single Judge's order, holding that the appellant had no role in appointing the CEO after the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3), which vested this power with the Registrar in cases of failure by the bank. The 2016 amendment inserted clauses (a) and (b) into Section 54(3), specifying RBI eligibility criteria and allowing the Registrar to appoint an eligible officer if the bank fails to do so. Section 49-E(2) requires CEOs of Central Societies receiving state financial aid to be appointed from cadres maintained under Section 54. A notification from 1971 under Section 54(3) mandates Central Cooperative Banks to appoint officers from the Apex Society's cadre.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The appellant, Chhattisgarh State Cooperative Bank, is the apex body of cooperative banks in Chhattisgarh.\n2. The first respondent is a District Central Cooperative Bank.\n3. The CEO of the first respondent was arrested for corruption and suspended.\n4. The appellant appointed the sixth respondent as the CEO of the first respondent on August 11, 2017, citing the ineligibility of the interim CEO and referencing Section 54(3) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960.\n5. The Board of Directors of the first respondent later approved the appointment of the seventh respondent as CEO.\n6. The first respondent challenged the appellant's appointment in the High Court.\n7. A Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, finding the appellant's appointment valid under Section 54(3).\n8. However, a Division Bench of the High Court set aside the Single Judge's order, holding that the appellant had no role in appointing the CEO after the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3).\n9. The 2016 amendment to Section 54(3) vested the power to appoint a CEO in the Registrar in cases of the bank's failure to appoint an eligible officer.\n10. Section 49-E(2) requires CEOs of Central Societies receiving state financial aid to be appointed from cadres maintained under Section 54.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Did the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960, effectively vest the power to appoint a CEO in the Registrar, to the exclusion of the appellant's authority, in cases where the bank fails to appoint an eligible officer?\n2. Was the appointment of the sixth respondent as CEO by the appellant on August 11, 2017, valid under the provisions of Section 54(3) as amended in 2016, considering the circumstances of the first respondent's failure to appoint an eligible officer?\n3. Does Section 49-E(2) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960, apply to the appointment of the CEO of the first respondent, and if so, does it affect the validity of the appellant's appointment of the sixth respondent?\n4. Is the 1971 notification under Section 54(3), which mandates Central Cooperative Banks to appoint officers from the Apex Society's cadre, still in effect and applicable to the appointment of the CEO of the first respondent, and if so, does it override the provisions of the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3)?\n\n### Rules:\n1. Section 54(3) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960, as amended in 2016, vests the power to appoint a CEO in the Registrar if the bank fails to appoint an eligible officer.\n2. Section 49-E(2) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960, requires CEOs of Central Societies receiving state financial aid to be appointed from cadres maintained under Section 54.\n3. The 1971 notification under Section 54(3) mandates Central Cooperative Banks to appoint officers from the Apex Society's cadre.\n4. The principles of statutory interpretation require considering the context, purpose, and plain language of statutory provisions.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. The key to resolving this appeal lies in the interpretation of the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3) and its impact on the appellant's authority to appoint a CEO (Refer to **Issue 1** and **Rule 1**).\n2. The Division Bench's decision to set aside the Single Judge's order was based on the understanding that the 2016 amendment vests the appointment power exclusively in the Registrar (Refer to **Fact 8** and **Issue 1**).\n3. The validity of the appellant's appointment of the sixth respondent hinges on whether the appointment complied with the amended Section 54(3) and other relevant provisions like Section 49-E(2) (Refer to **Issue 2** and **Rules 1** and **2**).\n4. The applicability of Section 49-E(2) to the appointment of the CEO of the first respondent is crucial, as it could affect the validity of the appellant's appointment (Refer to **Issue 3** and **Rule 2**).\n5. The 1971 notification's ongoing validity and applicability could potentially override the 2016 amendment, impacting the determination of the appellant's authority (Refer to **Issue 4** and **Rule 3**).\n6. Considering the legislative intent behind the 2016 amendment and the principles of statutory interpretation, it appears that the amendment aims to enhance regulatory oversight by vesting the appointment power in the Registrar (Refer to **Rule 4**).\n7. The appeal's maintainability is not in question, as the Division Bench's order is a final decision on the matter within the High Court's jurisdiction (Refer to **Fact 8**).\n\n### Conclusion:\nBased on the analysis of the facts, issues, and rules, it is clear that the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3) vests the power to appoint a CEO in the Registrar in cases of the bank's failure, potentially limiting the appellant's authority. The appointment of the sixth respondent by the appellant may not have been in compliance with the amended Section 54(3), considering the circumstances. Given the legislative intent and the principles of statutory interpretation, the Division Bench's decision to set aside the Single Judge's order and hold that the appellant had no role in appointing the CEO after the 2016 amendment is supported. Therefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.", - "reference_judgment": "1. This appeal has arisen from a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh dated 7 August 2018. Allowing a Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench set aside the judgment of a Single Judge dated 19 January 2018. The Division Bench held that the appointment made by the appellant on 11 August 2017 of the Chief Executive Officer of the first respondent bank and its subsequent ratification by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, were without the authority of law. Consequently, the decision of the appellant was held to be not binding on the first respondent.\n2. The appellant – Chhattisgarh State Cooperative Bank - is the apex body of cooperative banks in the State of Chhattisgarh. The first respondent is a District Central Cooperative Bank which is governed by the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act 1960.\n3. The CEO of the first respondent bank was arrested on 9 August 2017 by the Economic Offences Wing of the State of Chhattisgarh on charges of corruption, under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. Upon being produced before the designated Court, he was remanded to custody and placed under suspension from his office of the CEO.\n4. On 10 August 2017, the seventh respondent was appointed as an interim CEO by the Chairperson of the first respondent, pending a formal decision by the Board of Directors. On 11 August 2017, the appellant appointed the sixth respondent, who was discharging duties as a „Special Class Managing Director‟ at Raipur, as the CEO of the first respondent. The appellant purported to take this action as the first respondent had been appointed an interim CEO and the person appointed did not fulfill the eligibility criteria prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India. The appellant also sought to justify its action of appointing the sixth respondent as the CEO of the first respondent with reference to Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act.\n5. The sixth respondent was not given charge as the CEO of the first respondent on the ground that a meeting of the BoD was scheduled to be convened on 16 August 2017. On 16 August 2017, the BoD of the first respondent approved the appointment of the seventh respondent, who was initially serving as the interim CEO, as the CEO. The first respondent instituted a Writ Petition before the High Court of Chhattisgarh challenging the legality of the order dated 11 August 2017, by which the appellant had appointed the sixth respondent as the CEO. Essentially, the case of the first respondent is that the appointment of its CEO lies solely within its discretion and neither the appellant as the apex society nor the Registrar has the power to appoint a CEO. The BoD of the first respondent bank sought a clarification from the Registrar of Cooperative Societies on 17 August 2017 regarding the appointment of the sixth respondent as the CEO. By his communication dated 21 August 2017, the Registrar stated that the appointment made by the appellant of the sixth respondent was in accordance with law and that the order of appointment should be complied with.\n6. On 25 August 2017, the BoD of the first respondent resolved to accept the appointment of the sixth respondent and directed that the seventh respondent shall hand over charge of the post of the CEO to the sixth respondent.\n7. A learned Single Judge of the Chhattisgarh High Court by a judgment dated 19 January 2018 dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent holding that the appointment of the sixth respondent was in terms of the provisions of Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act and was legally sustainable. The Single Judge also noted that the appointment had been ratified by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and that the appointment had also been accepted at a meeting of the BoD of the first respondent.\n8. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the first respondent filed a Writ Appeal before the Division Bench, which was allowed by the impugned order dated 7 August 2018. The Division Bench held that under the amended provisions of Section 54(3), which were incorporated with effect from 14 December 2016, the appellant had no role in the appointment of the CEO. In the view of the Division Bench, the power to appoint a CEO could only be exercised by the Registrar upon the failure of the District Central Cooperative Bank to make an appointment within a specified time period. This, the Division Bench held, flows from clause (b) of Section 54(3). The Division Bench was of the view that there was no failure on the part of the first respondent in making an ad-interim arrangement, pending the meeting of the BoD on 16 August 2017 to appoint a regular CEO. The Division Bench found fault with the appellant for having stepped-in to fill a vacuum when none existed. Holding that this was a case of the usurpation of power by the Apex Body, the Division Bench held that the ratification of the appointment by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies was of no consequence. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was accordingly set aside.\n9. Before we note the rival submissions, it is necessary to advert to the relevant provisions of law, as applicable to the present dispute.\n10. Section 49-E of the 1960 Act deals with the appointment of a Managing Director and CEO, as its marginal notes indicates, “in certain circumstances”. Section 49-E provides as follows:\n\n“49-E. Appointment of Managing Director and Chief Executive\nOfficer in certain circumstances.-\n(1)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or\n rules or byelaws made thereunder for any Apex\n Society where the State Government has contributed\n to its share capital or has given loans or financial\n assistance or has guaranteed the repayment of loans\n granted in any other form, there shall be a Managing\n Director, not below the rank of a Class I Officer, who\n shall be selected by a committee constituted at the\n State level consisting of the Agriculture Production\n Commissioner, Chairman of the Apex Society,\n Registrar Co-operative Societies and one Director\n nominated by the Board of Apex Society:”\n Provided that if the committee fails to select the\n Managing Director unanimously, the matter shall be\n referred to the State Government whose decision\n thereon shall be final.\n(b) The Managing Director shall be ex-officio member of\n the committee.\n(c) The Managing Director shall be the Chief Executive\n Officer of the society and shall perform such duties\n and exercise such powers as may be prescribed.\n(2)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or the\n Rules or byelaws made thereunder for every Central\n society where the State Government has contributed\n to its share capital or has given loans or financial\n assistance or has guaranteed the repayment of loans,\n debentures, or advances or has given grants in any\n other form, there shall be a Managing Director or a\n General Manager not below the rank of a Class II\n Officer who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the\n society and ex-officio member of the committee:\n(b) The Chief Executive Officer shall be appointed:\n (i) from among the Officers of the cadre maintained\n under Section 54 if such a cadre has been created;\n (ii) in other cases with the prior approval of the\n Registrar.\n(c) The Chief Executive Officer shall perform such duties\n and exercise such powers as may be prescribed.”\n\n11. Sub-section (1) of Section 49-E deals with the appointment of the Managing Director and CEO of an Apex Society. The expression „Apex Society‟ is defined in Section 2(a-i) to mean\n“a society whose principal object is to provide facilities for the operation of other societies affiliated to it and whose area of operation extends to the whole State…”\nSub-section (2) deals with the appointment of a Managing Director or a General Manager who shall be the CEO of a Central Society. The expression „Central Society‟ is defined in Section 2(c-i) as follows:\n““Central Society” means a Co-operative Land Development Bank or any other society whose area of operation is confined to a part of the State and which has as its principal object the promotion of the principal objects and the provision of facilities for the operation of same type of societies and for other societies affiliated to it and not less than five members of which are societies.”\n12. Sub-section (1) applies to an Apex Society while sub-section (2) applies to a Central Society. Sub-section (2), with which we are concerned, applies to a Central Society to which the State Government has: (i) contributed the share capital; or (ii) granted loans or financial assistance; or (iii) guaranteed the repayment of loans, debentures, or advances; or (iv) given grants in any other form. Sub-section (2)(b) provides that the CEO of every Central Society shall be appointed from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, if such a cadre has been created and, in other cases, with the prior approval of the Registrar.\n13. Section 49-E(2)(b)(i) refers to the cadre of officers maintained under Section 54. Section 54 is in the following terms:\n\n“54. Appointment of Managers, Secretaries and other\nofficers.-(1) No society shall appoint a Manager, Secretary,\nAccountant or other paid officer unless he holds such\nqualifications as may be prescribed.\n\n(2) The Apex and Central Societies shall maintain such\ncadres of officers and other servants as the State\nGovernment may, by order, direct and the conditions of\nservice of members of such cadre shall be such as the\nRegistrar may, by order, determine.\n\n(3) The State Government may, by notification, specify the\nclass of societies which shall employ officers from such\ncadres maintained by the Apex or Central Societies under\nsub-section (2) as may be specified therein and it shall be\nobligatory on the part of such class of societies to accept and\nappoint such cadre officers on the cadre posts as and when\ndeputed by the Apex or Central Societies.”\n\nSub-section (1) of Section 54 provides that a society shall not appoint a Manager, Secretary, Accountant or other paid officer unless the person holds such qualifications as are prescribed. Under sub-section (2), Apex and Central Societies have to maintain such cadres of officers and other servants as the State Government may, by order, direct. Under sub-section (3), the State Government is empowered to issue a notification specifying the class of societies which shall employ officers from the cadres maintained by the Apex or Central Societies. Sub-section (3) also makes it obligatory upon such class of societies to accept and appoint cadre officers on cadre posts, as and when they are deputed by the Apex or Central Societies.\n14. In exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 54, a notification was issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh (prior to its reorganisation) on 12 January 1971. The notification is extracted below:\n\n“Notification No. 258-413-Fifteen-1.71 dated 12.01.1971\nBy exercising powers under sub-section 3 of section 54 of\nMadhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act 1960 (No. 17\nof 1961), The State Govt. vide this notification notifies that\nthe cooperative societies mentioned in column 3 of the\nschedule given below shall appoint officers from the cadre\nconstituted by the Apex Cooperative Society mentioned in\ncolumn 2 of the schedule given below in front of them as\nper their availability.\n\n\n SCHEDULE\n\nSl. Name of Apex Name of Cooperative\n\nNo Cooperative Society Society\n\n.\n\n(1) (2) (3)\n\n 1 M.P. State Cooperative Central Cooperative Bank\n\n Bank Ltd.\n\n 2 Madhya Pradesh State Primary Cooperative Land\n\n land Development Bank Development Bank\n\n 3 Madhya Pradesh State Primary Cooperative\n\n Cooperative Marketing Marketing Societies and\n\n Federation Process Committee\n\n(Published in part-1 of Gazette of M.P. dated 19.02.1971)”\n\n15. In terms of the above notification, it was stipulated that a cooperative society specified in column (3) of the Schedule shall appoint officers from the cadre constituted by the Apex Cooperative Societies mentioned in column (2) of the Schedule. The first entry in the Schedule specifies the Madhya Pradesh State Cooperative Bank Ltd. as the Apex Cooperative Society and the Central Cooperative Bank as the Cooperative Society. In other words, the Central Cooperative Bank is required to appoint officers from the cadre constituted by the State Cooperative Bank. This notification, it is not in dispute, applies to the State of Chhattisgarh.\n16. The provisions of Section 54(3) were amended by the Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act 2016, with effect from 14 December 2016. The following provisions were inserted at the end of Section 54(3):\n\n“(a) The eligibility criteria to hold the office of Chief\nExecutive Officer of any Co-operative Bank shall be as such\nas may be prescribed by the Reserve Bank in this regard.\n(b) If the concerning Co-operative Bank fails to appoint\nthe Chief Executive Officer under the eligibility criteria within a\nspecified period, in such a condition the Registrar may\nappoint such eligible officer of the Bank.”\n\n17. The present dispute has been occasioned by the insertion of clauses (a) and (b) in Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act by virtue of the Amending Act of 2016.\n18. The appellant has urged the following submissions:\n(i) The CEO of the first respondent (which is a District Central Cooperative Bank) is a paid officer whose appointment is regulated by Section 54(1), which mandates the appointment of only persons who possess the prescribed qualifications. The appointment which was made by the first respondent was of a person who did not fulfill the prescribed qualifications;\n(ii) Section 54(2) mandates the first appellant to maintain cadre of officers as the State Government may, by order, direct. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 54(3), the State Government issued a notification dated 12 January 1971 which stipulated that the Central Cooperative Bank must appoint officers from the cadre constituted by the State Cooperative Bank. By virtue of Section 54(3) and the notification dated 12 January 1971, the first respondent (as a District Central Cooperative Bank) is obligated to accept and appoint the officer deputed by the appellant (as the Apex Society) as the CEO. In the present case, the person who was appointed by the first respondent did not fulfill the prescribed eligibility criteria. Hence, the sixth respondent was appointed as CEO in exercise of the appellant‟s authority under Section 54(3) to make that appointment;\n(iii) Pursuant to Section 54(3), a notification was issued on 26 June 1971 under which all Central Cooperative Banks in the state were permitted to maintain cadres of officers from whom appointments to Village Cooperative Societies, including Large Sized Agricultural Credit Societies would be made. By another notification dated 26 June 1971 also under Section 54(3), Central Cooperative Banks were permitted to maintain cadres of employees from whom managers for rural cooperative societies would be appointed. Thus, all Central Cooperative Banks in the State of Chhattisgarh have to maintain a cadre of employees in terms of the above notifications dated 26 June 1971 and all Village Cooperative Societies including Large Sized Agricultural Credit Societies shall employ officers only from the said cadres;\n(iv) Sub-section (2) of Section 49-E specifically deals with the appointment of the Managing Director or a General Manager who shall be the CEO of Central Societies to which the State Government has made a contribution of share capital, furnished loans or granted financial assistance or any other grant. Sub-clause (b)(i) of sub-section (2) clearly stipulates that the CEO shall be appointed from among officers in the cadre constituted under Section 54;\n(v) Rule 3 of the Central Cooperative Bank Staff Services Rules 1982 stipulates that appointments to all posts classified as Class-I posts shall be made by the Apex Bank from the list of cadre officers maintained by it. The Bye-laws of the first respondent stipulate that appointments to the post of Managing Director/General Manager/Manager shall be from the cadre of officers maintained by the Apex Bank. If a cadre officer is not available due to unforeseen circumstances, a temporary appointment may be made by the first respondent with the prior permission of the appellant, subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed;\n(vi) The 2016 Amendment Act which amended Section 54(3) must be read together with other provisions and not independently. The amendment in sub-section (3) only deals with the eligibility criteria and is equally applicable to both the Apex Society and to any Central Society. Both the appellant and the first respondent are cooperative banks. The appellant is an Apex Society while the first respondent is a Central Society;\n(vii) Under sub-section (2) of Section 54, both Apex Societies and Central Societies have to maintain cadres of officers and other servants as the State Government may, by order, direct. Sub-section (3) makes it obligatory on the first respondent (which is a Central Society) to accept and appoint a cadre officer to a cadre post as and when deputed by the appellant (which is the Apex Society). It is only if the CEO is not appointed within a specified period, that the Registrar is empowered to appoint an eligible officer as the CEO.\n(viii) In the present case, the earlier CEO of the first respondent was arrested on a charge of corruption under the PC Act. The Chairperson of the first respondent appointed a Manager as an interim CEO, who was not from the cadre of officers maintained by the Apex Bank. Hence, the appellant in exercise of its powers under Section 54(3) read with the notification dated 12 January 1971, deputed the sixth respondent as CEO of the first respondent on 11 August 2017 which appointment, the first respondent was bound to accept. On a clarification sought by the BoD of the first respondent, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, by his reply dated 21 August 2017 observed that the appointment made by the appellant was in accordance with law. Consequently, the BoDs accepted the appointment of the sixth respondent at a meeting on 25 August 2017. The order deputing the sixth respondent as CEO was ratified by the Registrar and accepted by the BoD of the first respondent; and\n(ix) The learned Single Judge correctly dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent. The Division Bench allowed the Writ Appeal on an erroneous appreciation of the applicable legal regime. In the case of all Central Cooperative Banks in Chhattisgarh, the CEO is an officer drawn from the cadre maintained by the Apex Bank. This is in consonance with Sections 49-E and 54(3) of the 1960 Act and notifications issued from time to time. The consequence of the impugned decision would be to deprive the Apex Bank of its authority to monitor the affairs of Central Cooperative Societies. Financial control can be maintained through the power to appoint CEOs. Such a position was occasioned as huge amounts of public funds is at stake. The view of the Division Bench will have far-reaching repercussions in the cooperative set up and the beneficial purpose of the legislation would be defeated resulting in mismanagement and misappropriation of public funds.\n19. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent urged that:\n(i) Section 57-B of the 1960 Act was inserted by the Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act 2012. Sub-section (19) of Section 57-B provides that the CEO of State Cooperative Banks and Central Cooperative Banks shall be appointed by the members of the board of the State Cooperative Bank and the Central Cooperative Bank, as the case may be, from among a panel of names not exceeding three persons eligible to hold the office of CEO in accordance with the criteria stipulated by the RBI. The aforesaid panel was to be recommended by a selection board consisting of the following persons, all of whom shall be the members of the Board of the State Cooperative Bank or the Central Cooperative Bank, as the case may be:\na) The nominee of the State government on the board;\nb) The nominee of the National Bank on the board; and\nc) One other member of the board, whether elected or co-opted.\n(ii) Section 57-B of the 1960 Act was omitted by the 2016 Amendment Act and clauses (a) and (b) were inserted in sub-section (3) of Section 54 of the 1960 Act, whereby the power was given to the Cooperative Bank to appoint the CEO within a specified time period and in default, the Registrar is empowered to appoint such eligible officer of the bank as the CEO;\n(iii) The language of the 1960 Act indicates that the CEO of Cooperative Societies, be it a Primary Cooperative Society, Central Cooperative Society or State Cooperative Society, can be appointed by that Cooperative Society only. A plain reading of Section 54(3) (a) and (b) makes it crystal clear that the power to appoint a CEO lies with the Cooperative Society and not with the Apex Society. It is also clear from the reading of the provision that the CEO of the Cooperative Bank shall be appointed from the eligible officers of the said Cooperative Bank. This can also be inferred from the fact that the said power was earlier given under section 57-B of the 1960 Act but by the 2016 Amendment Act, Section 57- B was omitted and the provision of appointment was inserted in Section 54(3)(b);\n(iv) Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 49-E enumerates that a CEO shall be appointed from among the Officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, if such a cadre has been created. Section 54(1) provides that the “no society shall appoint a Manager, Secretary, Accountant and other paid officer unless he holds such qualifications as may be prescribed”. The word “Society” mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 54 includes Primary Cooperative Societies, Central Cooperative Societies and State Cooperative Societies, which means that every society shall appoint its Manager, Secretary, Accountant and other paid officers;\n(v) The notification dated 12 January 1971 issued by the State Government under Section 54(3) will be considered to be nullified by the 2012 Amendment Act and subsequently by the 2016 Amendment Act. The said notification is not applicable in appointing a CEO in view of the omission of Section 57-B of the 1960 Act and the subsequent insertion of Section 54(3)(a) and (b). The 1960 Act does not mention that the CEO of the Central Cooperative Bank shall be appointed by the State Cooperative Bank from the cadre officers of the State Cooperative Bank. What is not provided in the statute cannot be read into it. This is more so when the language of section 54(3)(b) is plain, clear and unambiguous that the Cooperative Society shall appoint the CEO;\n(vi) It is settled law that if the language of the statute is clear, plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, then no question of interpretation arises. The appellant cannot be permitted to add words in the statute to make it workable for it; and\n(vii) The action of the State Cooperative Bank in appointing the CEO of the Central Cooperative Bank is arbitrary and illegal as it is beyond the powers of the State Cooperative Bank under the 1960 Act.\n20. The rival submissions now fall for consideration.\n21. Section 54 contains provisions for the appointment of Managers, Secretaries and other officers of societies. Sub-section (1) stipulates that a Manager, Secretary, Accountant or other paid officer shall be appointed only if they possess the prescribed qualifications. A reading of the sub-section denotes that the power to make appointments vests with the society itself.\n22. Sub-section (2) of Section 54 casts an obligation upon Apex and Central Societies to maintain such cadre of officers as the State Government may, by order, direct. The Registrar is empowered to frame the conditions of service of the members of the cadre so constituted.\n23. Section 49-E of the 1960 Act deals specifically with the appointment of Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers in certain circumstances. The provision deals only with the appointment of the Managing Director and the CEO. It covers appointments “in certain circumstances,” which are specified therein. Sub-section (1) of Section 49-E deals with the appointment of the Managing Director of an Apex Society. Sub-section (2) deals with the appointment of the Managing Director (who shall be the CEO) of Central Societies. Section 49-E applies to a situation where the State Government has:\n(i) contributed to the share capital; or\n(ii) given loans or financial assistance; or\n(iii) guaranteed the repayment of loans, debentures or advances; or\n(iv) given grants in any other form.\nThe provisions of both sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 49-E begin with an overriding non-obstante stipulation. The provisions operate notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in the 1960 Act, rules thereunder or bye-laws of the society. Section 49-E thus carves out an exception to the power vested in societies to make appointments under Section 54(1). Sub-section (2)(a) stipulates that for every Central Society, there shall be a Managing Director not below the rank of a Class-II officer, who shall be the CEO of the society. Clause (b) of Section (2) stipulates that the CEO would be appointed from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, if such a cadre has been constituted and in all other cases, with the prior approval of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. Thus, for Central Societies which fall within the purview of Section 49-E(2), the source of appointment for the Managing Director or the General Manager (who shall be the CEO) must be from the officers drawn from the cadre constituted under Section 54, if such cadre has been constituted. In all other cases, the Central Society may appoint the Managing Director or General Manager with the prior approval of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies.\n24. A pre-requisite to bring a Central Society within the fold of Section 49-E(2) is that the State Government has contributed to its share capital, given loans or financial assistance, guaranteed the repayment of loans, debentures or advances or has given grants in any other form. Evidently, this provision has been introduced by the legislature as an effort to maintain regulatory control over Central Societies to whom financial assistance has been extended by the State Government in the terms set out in the provision. For this reason, where the society is a Central Society that satisfies the requirements of Section 49-E(2), the general power vested in it to appoint its CEO under Section 54(1) is limited to appointment from the cadres constituted and maintained under Section 54.\n25. Sub-section (3) of Section 54 empowers the State Government to specify, by notification, the class of societies which shall employ officers from cadres maintained by Apex or Central Societies as specified therein. The provision stipulates that upon the issuance of such notification, it shall be obligatory for the class of societies notified therein to accept and appoint such cadre officers on cadre posts as and when deputed by the Apex or Central Society, as the case may be. Upon the issuance of a notification under Section 54(3), an exception is carved to the power of appointment conferred upon the notified class of societies under Section 54(1). Where a class of societies has been notified by the State Government to employ officers from cadres constituted by the Apex or Central Society, the power of appointment vests with the Apex or Central Society, as specified in the notification. The notified class of societies is under an obligation to accept and appoint cadre officers deputed to cadre posts by the Apex or Central Society, as the case may be.\n26. The present dispute has arisen by virtue of the 2016 Amending Act which inserted clauses (a) and (b) in Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act. Clause (a) of sub-section (3) stipulates that the eligibility criteria for the post of CEO of a Cooperative Bank are those prescribed by the RBI in this regard. Clause (b) stipulates that if the concerned Cooperative Bank fails to appoint a CEO under the eligibility criteria within a specified period, the Registrar may appoint an eligible officer of the Bank. The submission of the first respondent, which has found acceptance with the Division Bench of the High Court, is that as a result of the amendment which was made in 2016, the exclusive jurisdiction to appoint a CEO of a Cooperative Bank vests with the Bank itself. However, according to the submission, the CEO must fulfill the eligibility criteria prescribed by the RBI. Moreover, it is only where the Cooperative Bank fails to appoint an eligible CEO within a specified period, that clause (b) of Section 54(3) empowers the Registrar of Cooperative Societies to appoint an eligible officer of the bank.\n27. In the submission of the first respondent, clauses (a) and (b) are special provisions enacted for Cooperative Banks and are intended to have an overriding effect over: (i) the power of the State Government to issue a notification in exercise of its powers under Section 54(3); and (ii) Section 49-E(2) which mandates that Central Societies shall appoint their CEOs from the cadre constituted under Section 54. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3), it was contended, vests with Cooperative Banks the absolute power to appoint their CEOs, notwithstanding any other provision in the 1960 Act. The effect of the amended provision may be considered in two parts: first, its effect on the power of the State Government to issue a notification in pursuance of the power conferred upon it under Section 54(3); and second, its effect on Section 49-E(2).\n28. By virtue of the 2012 Amendment Act, Section 57-B was introduced as a new Chapter V-A with provisions for short term Co-operative Credit Structure Societies. The term „short term Co-operative Credit Structure Societies‟ was defined as including “the State Co-operative Bank, a Central Co-operative Bank and a Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society”. Section 57-B(19) stipulated that the Chief Executive Officer of the State Co-operative Bank and a Central Co-operative Bank, shall be appointed by the members of the Board of the State Co-operative Bank or the Central Co-operative Bank, as the case may be. The appointment was to be made from a panel of names eligible to hold the post in accordance with the criteria stipulated by the RBI. The constitution of the Selection Board was also set out in sub-section (19). By virtue of this provision, an exception was carved out for the appointment of the CEO of Central Co-operative Banks and State Co-operative Banks, subject to the conditions prescribed therein.\n29. By the 2016 Amendment Act, Section 57-B was deleted and clauses (a) and (b) were inserted in Section 54(3). Significantly, sub-section (3) of Section 54 is not confined only to Cooperative Banks. Section 54(3) empowers the State Government to specify, by notification, the class of societies which shall employ officers from cadres maintained by Apex or Central Societies. The term „class of societies‟ employed in Section 54(3) includes any type of society covered by the provisions of the 1960 Act, including Cooperative Banks (as resource societies). This view is strengthened by Section 10 of the 1960 Act which mandates that the Registrar of Cooperative Societies shall classify all societies under one or more of the following heads:\n(i) Consumer Society;\n(ii) Farming Society;\n(iii) Housing Society;\n(iv) Marketing Society;\n(v) Multipurpose Society;\n(vi) Producer‟s Society;\n(vii) Processing Society;\n(viii) Resource Society;\n(ix) General Society; and\n(x) Industrial Society.\nSection 10 also empowers the Registrar to further classify societies falling under any of the above classifications into:\n(i) Apex Society;\n(ii) Central Society; and\n(iii) Primary Society.\n30. The 1960 Act covers a myriad of societies under its ambit. Though the term „class of societies‟ includes within its ambit Cooperative Banks, the learned counsel for the first respondent has contended that clause (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) were intended to carve out Cooperative Banks from the enabling power conferred upon the State Government and vest with them the exclusive power to appoint their CEOs. It was been urged that were this Court to hold that there is an obligation upon a Cooperative Bank, as a notified society under Section 54(3), to accept from the Apex or Central Society as specified in the notification a deputed cadre officer as its CEO, clauses (a) and (b) would be rendered otiose.\n31. It is a settled principle of law that where two provisions of an enactment appear to conflict, courts must adopt an interpretation which harmonises, to the best extent possible, both provisions. Justice G P Singh in his seminal work Principles of Statutory Interpretation states:\n\n“To harmonise is not to destroy. A familiar approach in all such cases is to find out which of the two apparently conflicting provisions in more general and which is more specific and to construe the more general one as to exclude the more specific…The principle is expressed in the maxims Generalia specialibus non derogant and Generalibus specialia.”\n\nSimilarly, Craies in Statute Law states:\n\n“The rule is, that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply.”\n\nWhere two provisions conflict, courts may enquire which of the two provisions is specific in nature and whether it was intended that the specific provision is carved out from the application of the general provision. The general provision operates, save and except in situations covered by the specific provision. The rationale behind this principle of statutory construction is that were there appears a conflict between two provisions, it must be presumed that the legislature did not intend a conflict and a subject-specific provision governs those situations in exclusion to the operation of the general provision.\n32. In an early decision of this Court in JK Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co Ltd v State of Uttar Pradesh, a three judge Bench of this Court considered whether the principle applied to conflicts within the same enactment. Clause 5(a) of the Government Order dated 10 May 1948 conferred upon, inter alia, any employee or a registered trade union of employers the right to move the Board constituted under the Order to initiate an enquiry into an industrial dispute. Clause 23 stipulated that where an enquiry is pending before the Regional Conciliation Officer, notwithstanding the pendency of a case before the Board or Industrial Court, no employer shall discharge or dismiss any workman. Under Clause 24, an order of the Board, unless modified in appeal, was final and conclusive. The appellant, representing the employer‟s union, contended that once an order is made under Clause 5(a), Clause 23 has no application and the employer may proceed to dismiss the workmen. The Court rejected the contention noting that any employer could defeat the provisions of Clause 23 merely by an application under Clause 5(a). The Court held that Clause 23 was made with a definite purpose. Consequently, where an enquiry was pending under Clause 23, an application under Clause 5(a) was barred. The Court held:\n\n“9…We reach the same result by applying another well- known rule of construction that general provisions yield to special provisions. The learned Attorney-General seemed to suggest that while this rule of construction is applicable to resolve the conflict between the general provision in one Act and the special provision in another Act, the rule cannot apply in resolving a conflict between general and special provisions in the same legislative instrument. This suggestion does not find support in either principle or authority. The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and Judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect.\n\n10. Applying this rule of construction that in cases of conflict between a specific provision and a general provision the specific provision prevails over the general provision and the general provision applies only to such cases which are not covered by the special provision, we must hold that clause 5(a) has no application in a case where the special provisions of clause 23 are applicable.”\n\nThis Court affirmed that the principle that the general excludes the specific is a tool of statutory interpretation even in cases of conflict within the same enactment. Where one of the conflicting provisions is general in nature and the other is specific, „common understanding‟ dictates that the specific provision is given effect, while the general provision continues to apply to all other situations.\n33. In Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v M/s Binani Cements Ltd., the question concerned whether the respondent-assessee was entitled for the grant of an eligibility certificate for exemption from payment of Central Sales Tax and Rajasthan Sales Tax under Entry 4 in Annexure „C‟ of the Sales Tax New Incentive Scheme for Industries, 1989. Annexure „C‟ to the Scheme was titled the „Quantum of Sales Tax Exemption under the new Scheme‟. Entry 4 of the Annexure stipulated that „Prestigious Units‟ would be entitled to a 75% exemption from tax liability with 100% in terms of Fixed Capital Investment. By an amendment, Entry 1E was inserted which covered „new cement units‟ and stipulated that large-scale units would be entitled 25% tax exemption. A two judge Bench of this Court held:\n\n“27. Before we deal with the fact situation in the present appeal, we reiterate the settled legal position in law, that is, if in a Statutory Rule or Statutory Notification, there are two expressions used, one in General Terms and the other in special words, under the rules of interpretation, it has to be understood that the special words were not meant to be included in the general expression. Alternatively, it can be said that where a Statute contains both a General Provision as well as specific provision, the later must prevail.\n\n29…It is well established that when a general law and a special law dealing with some aspect dealt with by the general law are in question, the rule adopted and applied is one of harmonious construction whereby the general law, to the extent dealt with by the special law, is impliedly repealed. This principle finds its origins in the latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant...”\n\nThe Court held that where two provisions are in question – one of general application and the other specific in nature, a harmonious interpretation would mean that the general law, to the extent it is dealt with by the special law, is impliedly repealed. This Court, relying on the principle generalia specialibus non derogant held that Item 1E is a “subject specific provision”. The Court noted that the amendment removed “new cement industries” from the non-eligible Annexure „B‟ and placed it into Annexure „C‟ amongst the eligible industries. Consequently, the Court rejected the contention of the respondent-assessee and held that as Item 1E concerned the more specific unit, it was excluded in its application from other general entries.\nThe principle that the general provision excludes the more specific has been consistently applied by this Court in South Indian Corporation (P) Ltd. v Secretary, Board of Revenue, Paradip Port Trust v Their Workmen, Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Education v Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth, CCE v Jayant Oil Mills, P S Sathappan v Andhra Bank Ltd, Sarabjit Rick Singh v Union of India and Pankajakshi v Chandrika.\n34. While sub-section (3) of Section 54(3) deals with a class of societies, clauses (a) and (b), as inserted by the 2016 Amendment Act are specific in their application to only Cooperative Banks. Furthermore, while Section 54(3) deals with the appointment of deputed cadre officers on cadre posts, clauses (a) and (b) deal only with the appointment of the CEOs of Cooperative Banks. Clause (a) contemplates that the eligibility guidelines prescribed by the RBI will apply to officers holding the post of the CEO of a Cooperative Bank. Significantly, clause (b) of Section 54(3) beings with the words “if the concerning co-operative Bank fails to appoint” which denotes an intention to vest with Cooperative Banks the power to appoint their CEO. The provision also stipulates that where the Cooperative Bank fails to appoint the CEO within a specified period, the Registrar may appoint an eligible officer of the bank. The stipulation that in the case of default, the CEO shall be an officer of the bank and not an officer from the cadre as notified under Section 54(3) demonstrates the intention of the legislature to vest with Cooperative Banks the power to appoint their CEO.\n35. Evidently, by virtue of the 2016 Amendment Act, clauses (a) and (b) were inserted as specific provisions for the appointment of the CEO of Cooperative Banks, vesting in them the power of appointment. Where two interpretations of potentially conflicting provisions are possible, courts must adopt the interpretation that furthers the intention of the legislature as encapsulated in the maxim Verba ita sunt intelligenda ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Craies on Legislation states:\n\n“…if two constructions of a provision are possible on its face, and one would clearly advance the legislative purpose and the other would clearly achieve little or nothing, the former is to be preferred.”\n\n36. In this view of the matter, a harmonious construction of Section 54(3) and clauses (a) and (b) of the 2016 Amendment Act leads to the conclusion that clauses (a) and (b) are special provisions concerning the appointment of the CEO of Cooperative Banks which are carved out of power of the State Government to issue a notification under Section 54(3). We are strengthened in this view by the deletion of Section 57-B(19) and the simultaneous insertion of clauses (a) and (b) in Section 54(3).\n37. The difficulty in the present matters arises from the contention of the first respondent that the exception carved out by clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) also applies to Central Societies that fall within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) of the 1960 Act. In this submission, where a Cooperative Bank as a Central Society has received funds from the State Government in the manner stipulated in Section 49-E(2), such Central Banks may independently appoint a CEO and would not be obligated to appoint its CEO from the cadre constituted under Section 54, even if such cadre has been constituted.\n38. As we have noted, both sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 54 are not provisions confined only to Cooperative Banks. However, clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) specifically deal with the appointment of CEOs of Cooperative Banks. While introducing clauses (a) and (b) into sub-section (3) of Section 54 by the 2016 Amendment Act, the legislature has nonetheless left intact the provisions of Section 49-E. Section 49-E(2) stipulates that the CEO shall be appointed from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, where such cadre has been constituted. Section 49-E is a provision governing Apex and Central Societies to whom financial assistance has been extended by the State Government in the forms stipulated therein. The expression “Central Society” is defined to mean a Cooperative Land Development Bank or any other society whose operation is confined to a part of the State, as noticed earlier in Section (2)(c-i). The provisions contained in Section 49-E are intended to bring about regulatory control of the State Government by requiring the appointment of the CEO from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54. The 2016 Amendment Act which brought in the provision of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) has not affected the operation of Section 49-E. Hence, the appointment of a CEO of Central Society governed by Section 49-E(2) has to be from the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54. Significantly, sub-section (2) of Section 49-E contains a non- obstante stipulation. As a consequence, notwithstanding the 2016 Amendment Act, the CEO of a Central Society falling within the description of sub-section (2) of Section 49-E has to be appointed from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, if such cadre has been constituted.\n39. It is necessary here to note that Section 49-E(2) is not a self-contained provision. Section 49-E(2)(b)(i) merely stipulates that the CEO of a Central Society that falls within its ambit, shall be appointed from among the officers of the cadres maintained under Section 54. Thus, where a cadre under Section 54 has been constituted, a Central Society falling within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) is obligated to appoint its officer from such cadre. Neither Section 49-E nor Section 54(2) specify whether the appointment is to be made from the cadre of the Apex Society or Central Society as constituted under Section 54(2). Section 54(3) empowers the State Government to issue a notification specifying the class of societies which shall employ officers from such cadres maintained by Apex or Central Societies as may be specified therein. In addition to conferring upon the State Government the general power to notify the class of societies which would employ officers from the cadres maintained by Apex or Central Societies, the notification under Section 54(3) operationalizes the regulatory control of the State Government envisaged in Section 49-E(2) in the manner specified therein.\n40. This is evident in the notification dated 12 January 1971 issued by the State Government in exercise of the power conferred upon it which stipulated that the first respondent (as a District Central Cooperative Bank) is obligated to accept and appoint the officer deputed by the appellant (as the Apex Society) as the CEO. Had Section 49-E(2) an inbuilt mechanism for the determination of the officer who would be appointed as the CEO, no difficulty would arise given the use of a non-obstante provision therein. The difficulty arises precisely because of the link between Section 49-E and the notification issued by the State Government under Section 54(3). To hold that clauses (a) and (b) vest in Cooperative Banks which are Central Societies falling within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) the overriding power to appoint their CEO would render the provision inoperative. This would defeat the salient purpose of ensuring the regulatory control of the State Government over Societies to which it has made a financial contribution. On the other hand, to hold that a Cooperative Bank which is a Central Society within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) must accept and appoint the cadre officer deputed by the Apex Society, defeats the special provision inserted for Cooperative Banks in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3). Both Section 49- E(2)(b) and clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) deal with the appointment of a CEO.\n41. As we have noted before, it is settled principal of law that where two provisions of an enactment appear to conflict, courts must adopt an interpretation which harmonises, to the best extent possible, both provisions. Justice G P Singh in his seminal work Principles of Statutory Interpretation states:\n\n“…It is the duty of the court to avoid “a head on clash” between two sections of the same Act and, “whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise.”\n\nFrancis Benion in his work Statutory Interpretation states:\n\n“Inconsistent enactments – A common application of the principle is in relation to contradictory enactments within the same Act. Enactment A may in itself be clear and unambiguous. So may enactment B, located elsewhere in the Act. But if they contradict each other, they cannot both be applied literally. A undoes B, and B undoes A. The court must do the best it can to reconcile them, but this can be achieved only by giving one or both a strained construction.”\n\nWhere two provisions of an enactment appear to be in conflict, courts do not readily presume an „either/or‟ situation. Courts must construe the provisions harmoniously to ensure, as far as possible, the effective operation of both provisions in a manner that furthers the purpose of the enactment. Every provision, phrase, clause and word must be interpreted in a manner to further the object of the enactment. No word or part of a statute can be construed in isolation. Courts must be mindful that an interpretation which renders either provision otiose must be avoided unless the conflict does not yield any possible reconciliation.\n42. In Krishan Kumar v State of Rajasthan, the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur proposed a scheme in 1977 under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 for the exclusive operation of the disputed road. Upon the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, a Writ Petition was filed contending that due to undue delay in notifying the scheme under 1939 Act, the scheme was not saved by the 1988 Act. Section 100(4) of the 1988 Act stipulated that a draft scheme must be finalized within one year from the date of its publication, failing which it would lapse. Section 217(2)(e) stipulated that notwithstanding the repeal of the 1939 Act, a scheme proposed under Section 68-C, if pending immediately before the commencement of the 1988 Act, shall be finalised in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of the 1988 Act. The Court noted that, contrary to legislative intent, no scheme under the 1939 Act would be saved if schemes under that Act were to be assessed with reference to the date of their publication. Noting the apparent conflict between the two provisions, a two judge Bench of this Court interpreted both provisions harmoniously and held:\n\n“10. There appears to be some apparent conflict between Section 100(4) and Section 217(2)(e) of the Act. While Section 217(2)(e) permits finalisation of a scheme in accordance with Section 100 of the new Act sub-section (4) of Section 100 lays down that a scheme if not finalised within a period of one year shall be deemed to have lapsed. If the appellant's contention is accepted then Section 217(2)(e) will become nugatory and no scheme published under Section 68-C of the old Act could be finalised under the new Act. On the other hand if the period of one year as prescribed under Section 100(4) is not computed from the date of publication of the scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act and instead the period of one year is computed from the date of commencement of the Act both the provisions could be given full effect.\n\n11. It is settled principle of interpretation that where there appears to be inconsistency in two sections of the same Act, the principle of harmonious construction should be followed in avoiding a head on clash. It should not be lightly assumed that what the Parliament has given with one hand, it took away with the other. The provisions of one section of statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to reconcile the same.”\n\nThe Court held that where the Parliament confers a benefit, it must not be readily assumed that it intends to withdraw a benefit at the same time. Furthermore, the provisions of one section cannot be used to defeat another, unless there is no possibility of reconciling the two conflicting provisions.\n43. In British Airways Plc v Union Of India, the appellant was an aircraft carrier engaged in the business of international air transport of passengers and cargo. It was contended that as they were not a “person-in-charge” as defined in Section 2(31) of the Customs Act 1962, no penalty can be imposed upon them under Section 116 for shortages in offloading the quantity of goods consigned. Section 42 required an officer under the Act to issue a written order for the conveyance of the goods from the customs house. Clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 42 prescribes that no such order shall be given until the person-in-charge of the conveyance has satisfied the proper officer that no penalty is leviable on them under Section 116 or the payment of any penalty that may be levied upon them under that section has been secured by such guarantee or deposit of such amount as the proper officer may direct. The appellant contended that once a clearance order is issued, no liability can be imposed on them.\n44. A two judge Bench of this Court noted held that while Section 42 operated to expedite the clearance of goods, Section 116 operated to ensure the protection of cargo. Consequently, the two provisions subserved different purposes. Further, by an amendment in Section 148 which was a provision for the liability of an agent of the person in charge, sub-section (2) was inserted which stipulated that any person who represents himself to any officer of customs as an agent of any such person-in-charge, and is accepted as such by that officer, shall be liable for the fulfillment of any obligation of the person-in-charge. The Court held that effect must be given to the amendment, which would be rendered redundant if the contention of the appellant was accepted. Relying on the principle of harmonious interpretation, the Court held:\n\n“It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing the different provisions so that each provision will have its play and in the event of any conflict a harmonious construction should be given. The well- known principle of harmonious construction is that effect shall be given to all the provisions and for that any provision of the statute should be construed with reference to the other provisions so as to make it workable. A particular provision cannot be picked up and interpreted to defeat another provision made in that behalf under the statute. It is the duty of the court to make such construction of a statute which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.”\n\nThis Court held that courts must ensure that every provision is construed in a manner to render seemingly contradictory provisions workable. In interpreting two provisions of a statute, courts must adopt the interpretation which does not defeat either provision and advances the remedy envisaged by their enactment.\n45. In this view, this Court must ensure that neither provision – Section 49-E(2) nor Sections 54(3)(a) and (b) is reduced to a dead letter of law. It cannot be said that the carving out of Cooperative Banks for the appointment of their CEO from the enabling power conferred upon the State Government under Section 54(3) applies in equal measure to those Cooperative Banks that are Central Societies within the ambit of Section 49-E(2). We hold that the State Government is empowered to issue a notification under Section 54(3) for Cooperative Banks which are Central Societies falling within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) specifying that the Cooperative Bank shall appoint its CEO from the cadre constituted by the Apex Society. At the same time, to ensure that clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) are given effect, the notified Apex Society shall forward to the concerned Cooperative Bank a panel of officers from which the it shall appoint its CEO, subject to the officer satisfying the eligibility criteria prescribed by the RBI.\n46. In the view which we have taken, the regulatory control of the State Government over Cooperative Banks which have received state funding in the manner specified in Section 49-E(2) is retained, which furthers the object of the provision. The High Court was in error in holding that in the matter of an appointment of the CEO, “the Apex Body or the Central Society have no power or role to play”. The decision of the High Court will have serious ramifications in terms of divesting the regulatory control over the affairs of Central Societies. At the same time, conferring the power to the Cooperative Bank to appoint its CEO from a panel gives effect to the special provision inserted by virtue of clauses (a) and (b) in Section 54(3). This view is strengthened by virtue of the fact that prior to its deletion, Section 57-B(19) was a provision in Chapter VA of which sub-section (1) read thus:\n\n“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or Rules framed there under or bylaws of any registered society or orders issued there under, the provisions of this chapter shall have overriding effect.”\n\nSection 57-B(19), which was intended to have overriding effect, was deleted and clauses (a) and (b) were inserted in Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act. The absolute power conferred upon Cooperative Banks to appoint the CEO was deleted. In this view, Section 49-E(2) and clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) are to be read harmoniously in the manner noted above.\n47. The position of law that emerges from the above discussion is thus:\n(i) Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3), as special provisions for the appointment of the CEO of Cooperative Banks confer upon them the power to appoint their CEO, subject to such officer satisfying the eligibility criteria prescribed by the RBI in this regard. The term „class of societies‟ in Section 54(3) excludes Cooperative Banks for the limited purpose of the appointment of their CEO;\n(ii) However, where a Cooperative Bank is a Central Society within the ambit of Section 49-E(2), the CEO shall be appointed from among the officers of the cadre constituted and maintained under Section 54, where such cadre has been constituted. The State Government is empowered to issue a notification in pursuance of the power conferred upon it under Section 54(3) specifying that such Cooperative Bank shall appoint its CEO from the cadre maintained by the Apex Society as notified therein. The notified Apex Society shall forward to the concerned Cooperative Bank a panel of officers, from which the Cooperative Bank shall appoint its CEO, subject to such officer possessing the eligibility criteria as stipulated by the RBI; and\n(iii) Where no cadre has been constituted under Section 54, the CEO of a Cooperative Bank which is a Central Society under Section 49-E(2) shall be appointed with the prior approval of the Registrar as stipulated in Section 49-E(2)(b)(ii).\n48. In the present case, it was not disputed that the first respondent is a Central Society falling within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) of the 1960 Act. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act, the State Government issued a notification dated 12 January 1971 specifying that Central Cooperative Banks were obligated to employ officers, according to their availability, only from the cadres created by the State Cooperative Bank. A similar notification was issued on 26 June 1971 in terms of which, Central Cooperative Banks were permitted to maintain cadres of officers and, it was stipulated that Village Cooperative Societies including Large Sized Agricultural Credit Societies would have to employ officers drawn only from the cadres maintained by the Central Cooperative Bank. Similarly, by another notification dated 26 June 1971, Central Cooperative Banks were directed to maintain cadres of officers for the appointment of managers in rural cooperative societies including Large Sized Agricultural Credit Societies.\n49. The seventh respondent is not an officer from the cadre maintained by the appellant. Consequently, the action of the first respondent in seeking to appoint the seventh respondent as the CEO is not sustainable in law. The appointment of the sixth respondent as CEO was ratified by the Registrar of Societies by his reply dated 21 August 2017 and accepted by the BoD of the first respondent on 25 August 2017.\n50. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 7 August 2018. In consequence, we uphold the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ Petition, though for the reasons that we have indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.", + "case_record": "The appeal challenges a Rajasthan High Court order that allowed a revision petition, setting aside an Executing Court's order. The dispute concerns a property originally owned by Ghulam Mohiuddin (Defendant No.1). His brother, Saeeduddin (Defendant No.2), who held a power of attorney, entered into an Agreement to Sell dated 04.10.1967 with the appellant (plaintiff). The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance. A compromise was reached on 11.05.1978 between the plaintiff and Defendant No.1, acknowledging Defendant No.1's admission of the sale agreement and outlining terms for sale deed execution by 01.07.1978. Defendant No.1 was also to secure possession from Defendant No.2 and transfer rent notes. The Trial Court decreed the suit based on this compromise on 09.05.1979, dismissing it against Defendant No.2 and pro forma Defendant No.3. When Defendant No.1 failed to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff initiated execution. Defendant No.1's objections under Section 47 CPC were dismissed by the Executing Court on 09.12.1998, a decision upheld by the High Court and this Court in prior proceedings involving General Tariq, Defendant No.2's son and Defendant No.1's heir. Subsequently, Akhtar Un Nisa, wife of Defendant No.2, filed fresh objections under Section 47 CPC, arguing the decree was null and void. These objections were dismissed by the Executing Court on 03.05.2007. The High Court, however, allowed Akhtar Un Nisa's revision, declaring the decree inexecutable and a nullity.", + "generated_judgment": "**Decision: DISMISSED**\n\n**Reasoning:**\nThe appeal is **dismissed** because the High Court’s order upholding the **legality** of a null and void decree (recognition of a non-existent or invalid obligation) displaces the Excuuting Court’s discretion, warranting intervention only on questions of law—not procedural failures from the plaintiff. The issue of pre-existing title or substantive validity encapsulates sympathy for tidbits—*reparenting Gerunds over Granting Trite Protocol Through Asymmetric Timeaignment*—not any ready vulnerability necessitating rehearing.\n\nCritical missteps in procrastination suggest timeless legal obstinacy (Ghulam Mohiuddin, Saeeduddin array of dawk-in) that the courts, in concurrence, corrected finally. The pathos of preexisting title remained excluded as null legal nephurial unkernaled hereto by invalid compromise, made non-credentialing enforceable as self-covering: **\"unsketch\" solvency undécédé** ** bila kial kanjapundi étype**—suffice to observe acquiesced timeline tension.\n\n**Conclusion:** DISMISSED.\n---\n*(Judicial idiosyncrasy trumps XFR forecaster: why cleave to this mastery…?)*", + "reference_judgment": "Leave granted.\n2. This appeal, by the Decree Holder, assails the\ncorrectness of the judgment and order dated\n21.03.2014 passed by the Rajasthan High Court,\nJaipur Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil Revision Petition\nNo.95/2007, Smt. Akhtar Un Nisa vs. Rehan Ahmed,\nwhereby the revision filed under Section 115 of the\nCode of Civil Procedure, 19081 challenging the order of\nthe Executing Court dated 03.05.2007 rejecting the\nobjections under Section 47 CPC, has been allowed. The\norder impugned therein passed by the Executing Court\nwas set aside and it was held that the decree dated\n09.05.1979 passed by the Trial Court in Suit No.13/72\nwas inexecutable and a nullity and accordingly, the\nobjections under Section 47 CPC, were allowed.\n3. The factual matrix giving rise to the present appeal is\nas follows:\n3.1. The dispute relates to property being Municipal Nos.52-\n57, Maniharon Ka Rasta, Jaipur which was originally\nowned by Ghulam Mohiuddin (Defendant No.1). An\nagreement to Sell dated 04.10.1967 was executed for\nsale of the suit property by Saeeduddin – Defendant\nNo.2 (brother of Defendant No.1) and also the power of\n1 CPC\nattorney of Defendant No.1, for himself and for the\nprincipal Defendant No.1.\n3.2. Pursuant to the aforesaid agreement to sell, as the\nvendor was not executing the sale deed, the appellant\n(plaintiff) instituted a Civil Suit for specific performance\nregistered as Suit No.13/72 impleading Ghulam\nMohiuddin as Defendant no.1 and Saeeduddin as\nDefendant No.2. During the pendency of the Suit, the\nparties entered into a compromise dated 11.05.1978\nand presented the same before the Trial Court, a copy\nof which is filed as Annexure P-4. The terms of the\nCompromise Deed are briefly set out below:\n“ANNEXURE P-4\nIN THE COURT OF ADDL. DIST., CLASS-1,\nJAIPUR CITY, JAIPUR\nIN THE MATTER OF:\nRehan Ahmad S/o. Sh. Sultan Ahmad, aged about 22\nyears, Caste Muslim, R/o. Chaukadi Modikhana, Rasta,\nManiharan, H. No. 57, Jaipur-3\n... Plaintiff\n1. Gulam Mohiuddin Khan, aged about 58 years S/o.\nSh. Badiuddin Khan, Caste Muslimn, R/o. Mohalla\nKamnagran, Badayun (U.P)\n2. Saiduddin Khan aged about 52 years S/o. Sh.\nBadiuddin Khan, Caste Muslim, R/o. House of\nAbdulramham Khan, Gali Aatishbazi Rampur (U.P)\n...Defendants\n3. Ahsan Ahmad S/o. Sh. Sultan Ahmad aged about\n32 years, Caste Muslim, R/o. Chaukadi\nModikhana, Rasta Maniharan, H.No. 57, Jaipur-3\n...Pro forma Defendant\nSuit for specific performance of the contract regarding\nhouse and shop situated at Modikhana, Rasta\nManiharan, Jaipur\nMost respectfully showeth:\nIn the above civil suit, a compromise has been arrived at\nbetween the parties on under mentioned conditions,\ntherefore, the suit may be decreed as per the compromise.\n1. That, plaintiff and defendant No.3 executed an\nagreement for sale with the real brother and\ngeneral power of attorney of Def. No.2 named\nSaiduddin Khan on 4.10.1967 in writing in\nrespect to houses and shops No. 52 to 57,\nsituated at Circle No.1, Chaukadi Modikhana,\nJaipur, whose full description is given under, for\na sale consideration of Rs.40,000/-in his own\ncapacity and in the capacity of general power of\nattorney of Def. No.l, which was not accepted\nearlier by the defendant No.1 and 2, but now the\nDef. No.1 admits that agreement for sale was\nexecuted on 4.10.1967 on behalf of Def. No.2 in\nhis own capacity and on behalf and consent of\nDef. No.1.\n2. That, Def. No.l also admits that a sum of Rs.\n10,000/-out of entire agreed sale consideration\nwas received in respect to the disputed property\non 4.10.1967 and a sum of Rs.1,000/-was\nreceived on 1.1.69 and Rs.500/-on 22.1.69 i.e. a\ntotal of Rs.11,500/-was received by def. No. 2 on\nbehalf of Def No. 1 which is liable to be adjusted\nfrom the total consideration of the property, but\nthe plaintiff and defendant No.3 have alleged to\nspent Rs.6,500/-in the repairing of house etc,\nwhich amount shall not be adjusted from the sale\nconsideration because all these repairing and\nconstruction was done after the above agreement\nby the plaintiff and Def. No.3. besides this, the\nDef. No.1 has received Rs. 1500/-on 17.10.88,\nand Rs.1000/-on 24.10.77 and Rs.1000/-on\n11.11.77 from the plaintiff towards the cost of this\nproperty.\n3. That, the Def. No.1 shall get executed and\nregistered sale-deed of the above described\nhouses and shops in favor of plaintiff Rehan\nAhmad till 1.7.1978 and shall receive remaining\nsale consideration amount of Rs.25,000/-. If the\nDef. No. 1 fails to execute sale deed in this period\nthen the plaintiff Rehan Ahmad shall be entitled\nto get the sale-deed executed and registered in his\nfavor through the Court. Entire cost of registry\nwould be borne equally by the plaintiff Rehan\nAhmad and Def. No.1 Gulam Mohiuddin. In this\nrespect when the Def. No.1 will ask for half cost\nfor this from the plaintiff Rehan Ahmed then the\nplaintiff Rehan Ahmad shall pay the same taking\nreceipt from him and because of this the Def. No.1\nshall not be entitled to get the period agreed for\nregistry extended. The def. No.1 has received\ntoday the half cost of registry i.e. Rs.1,000/-from\nthe plaintiff Rehan Ahmad. Complete\nresponsibility to receive N.O.C. shall be of the Def.\nNo.l.\n4. That, Def. No.2 is residing in the third floor of\ndisputed property which would be got vacated by\ndefendant No.1 and the physical possession will\nbe given to the plaintiff Rehan Ahmed prior to\nregistration, and shall get the rent notes executed\nby the tenants who are presently occupying the\ndisputed property in favour of Rehan Ahmed.\n5. That, pro forma defendant No.3 has relinquished\nhis entire right in respect to the disputed property\nin favor of plaintiff Rehan Ahmad on 28.6.1977\nthrough a deed of Relinquishment, which was.\nordered by the court on 28.09.1977. Therefore,\npro forma defendant no.3 shall have no\nconnection now with this sale.\n6. That, the. def. No.2 Saiduddin Khan, himself has\nadmitted that he did not have right to sell or to\nexecute agreement for sale of the disputed\nproperty, but now, the defendant No.1, who is the\nreal owner of this disputed property, admits this\nagreement, therefore, now there is no hindrance\nin passing decree.\n7. That, cost of this suit shall be borne by the parties\nrespectively.\nDESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY\nPucca House comprising of three storeys and One chauk\nincluding entire internal houses of three storevs and five\nshops outside, out of which two shops are situated\ntowards south of Sadar Darwaja and three shops are\nsituated towards north of Sadar Darwaja along with\nstaircase adjoining the shops towards the north on which\nMunicipal No, written on the pole of House is 54/1 and\nMunicipal Number of shops situated towards south are\n52 and 53 and Municipal Number of shops situated\ntowards north are 55, 56 and 57, Circle 1 and no number\nis assigned to the staircase i.e. entire property including\nhouse and shops having municipal number 52 to 57,\nCircle No.1 and boundaries of these houses and shops\nare as under:\nIn East: Rasta Maniharan Government.\nIn west: House of Sindhi in between which littered\nGovernment street is situated.\nIn north: Temple of Digambar Jain\nIn south: House and shops of Tirthdas Shyamiani.\nTherefore, it is prayed that compromise be verified and\ndecree be passed in accordance with the compromise.\nApplicants\nRehan Ahmad, Plaintiff\nRehan (in English)\nGulam Mohiuddin Khan, Def. No.1\nsd.Ghulam mohiuddin khan (in\nEnglish)\nBoth Parties\nJaipur:\nDate: 11.5.78”\n4. In paragraph No.1 of the Compromise Deed, it is\nmentioned that Defendant No.1, although had earlier\nnot accepted the Agreement to Sell, now admits that the\nAgreement to Sell dated 04.10.1967 was executed by\nSaeeduddin–Defendant No.2, not only in his own\ncapacity but also on behalf of Defendant No.1 as Power\nof Attorney holder. Paragraph No.2 mentions the details\nof the amount received by the Defendant under the\nAgreement to Sell as advance until the time the\ncompromise was arrived at. It would be relevant to\nmention that the total sale consideration was\nRs.40,000/-out of which as per paragraph No.2 of the\nCompromise Deed, Rs.15,000/-had already been\nreceived by the Defendants. Paragraph No.3 mentions\nthat the Defendant No.1 will get the Sale Deed executed\nand registered in favour of the Plaintiff till 01.07.1978\nafter receiving Rs.25,000/-of the remaining sale\nconsideration. It, however, mentioned that if the\nDefendant No.1 does not execute the Sale Deed till\n01.07.1978, the Plaintiff would be entitled to get the\nSale Deed executed and registered in his favour through\nthe Court. The cost of registration would be borne\nequally by the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1. It was\nfurther mentioned that Defendant No.1 had also\nreceived half of the cost of registration from the Plaintiff\nand furthermore, the responsibility to receive the NOC\nwould be of Defendant No.1. Paragraph No.4 mentions\nthat Saeeduddin–Defendant No.2 was residing on the\nthird floor of the suit property which Defendant No.1-\nGhulam Mohiuddin would get vacated and ensure that\nphysical possession is delivered to the Plaintiff-Rehan\nAhmed prior to registration. Further, the rent notes\nexecuted by the tenants who are presently occupying\nthe suit property, would be executed by the tenants in\nfavour of Rehan Ahmed. One Ahsan Ahmed has been\nimpleaded as proforma defendant in respect of whom it\nwas stated in paragraph No.5 of the Compromise Deed\nthat he had relinquished his entire right to the property\nin favour of the Plaintiff–Rehan Ahmed through a Deed\nof Relinquishment dated 28.06.1977 which was\naccepted by the Court vide order dated 28.09.1977. In\nparagraph No.6 it was stated that Defendant No.2-\nSaeeduddin admitted that he did not have the right to\nsell or execute the Agreement to Sell but now Defendant\nNo.1, who was the real owner of the suit property,\nadmits this agreement. Therefore, there is no hindrance\nin passing the compromise decree. The property was\nalso described in the Compromise Deed to be a pacca\nhouse comprising of three stories and one chauk\nincluding the entire internal houses of the three storeys\nand five shops outside along with the staircase\nadjoining the shops. The house was numbered as 54/1\nin the municipal records, whereas the five shops were\nnumbered as 52, 53, 55, 56 and 57. Thus the entire\nproperty in question including the house of the five\nshops having municipal numbers 52 to 57 (except 54),\nCircle No.1.\n5. The Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Jaipur\nCity, Jaipur proceeded with the compromise and\nrequired the same to be duly verified for which due time\nwas granted to the parties. On 09.05.1979, initially the\nsuit was dismissed in the absence of the Plaintiff.\nHowever, on the same date, upon an application being\nfiled, the case was again taken up on board. The Trial\nCourt recorded that Rehan Ahmed and that Mohiuddin\n(Defendant No.1) had executed the compromise. The\nPlaintiff (Rehan Ahmed) further stated that he does not\nwant to pursue any proceedings against Saeeduddin\nand also Ahsan Ahmed-Defendant Nos.2 and 3, as such\nthe suit was dismissed against Saeeduddin and Ahsan\nAhmed. It was decreed against Ghulam Mohiuddin as\nper the compromise. Accordingly, a decree was drawn.\nAs per the decree, when the defendant did not execute\nthe Sale Deed, the Plaintiff-Decree holder initiated the\nproceedings for execution. In the execution proceedings\nDefendant No.1 Ghulam Mohiuddin filed objections\nstating that the Plaintiff had not paid the balance sale\nconsideration, and had allowed substantial time to pass\nfor about six to seven years, during which time the\nvalue of the property had doubled and as such the\ndecree could not be executed now on account of the\ndefault of the Plaintiff-Decree holder. These objections\nwere dismissed by the Executing Court by a detailed\norder dated 09.12.1998 on the findings that before the\nregistration of the Sale Deed, Defendant No.1 was\nrequired to fulfil his obligations which included getting\nthe third floor vacated, getting the NOC and also getting\nthe rent deeds transferred in the name of the Plaintiff.\nAs such there was no default on the part of the Plaintiff.\nIn the meantime, the Defendant No.1 Mohiuddin died.\nThe order dated 09.12.1998 was challenged by one\nGeneral Tariq, s/o. Defendant No.2-Saeeduddin and\nlegal heir of Defendant No.1 Gulam Mohiuddin,\nclaiming rights under a sale executed by Defendant\nNo.1 Mohiuddin by way of S.B.Civil Revision Petition\nNo.55 of 1999. The said revision came to be dismissed\nby the High Court vide order dated 02.06.2006. General\nTariq preferred a Special Leave Petition before this\nCourt registered as S.L.P.(C) No.12463 of 2006, which\ncame to be dismissed by this Court vide order dated\n11.08.2006. With the dismissal of the Special Leave\nPetition the innings of the objections under Section 47\nCPC filed by the Judgment-debtor – Defendant No.1\nMohiuddin came to an end. General Tariq, s/o.\nDefendant no.2-Saeeduddin did not carry the matter\nany further by way of review or otherwise before this\ncourt. However, a new round of objections under\nSection 47 CPC came to be initiated by respondent no.1\n– Akhtar Un Nisa, wife of Defendant No.2-Saeeduddin\nand the mother of General Tariq. The objections by\nrespondent No.1 Akhtar Un Nisa are to the following\neffect:\nI. The decree dated 09.05.1979 is without\njurisdiction and a nullity;\nII. The property in the suit was a joint property of\nGhulam Mohiuddin and Saeeduddin–\nDefendants No. 1 and 2 respectively;\nIII. The suit having been filed as against both the\nbrothers, the compromise deed could not have\nbeen arrived at between the Plaintiff and\nDefendant No.1 alone;\nIV. The Trial Court could not have accepted the\nsettlement/compromise between the Plaintiff\nand Defendant No.1 regarding Defendant No.2\nvacating the third story of the house in question\nand the rent notes being transferred in favour\nof the plaintiff.\nV. Since there was no decree against Saeeduddin,\nas such Decree holder could not have any right\nof getting possession of the portion of the\nproperty which was admittedly in possession of\nSaeeduddin and owner. Further, the tenants of\nSaeeduddin in the disputed property were\ntenants of the applicant-objector Akhtar Un\nNisa-respondent no.1.\n6. The Executing Court, vide judgment and order dated\n03.05.2007, dismissed the objections under Section 47\nCPC filed by Smt.Akhtar Un Nisa.\n7. Aggrieved by the same, Smt.Akhtar Un Nisa preferred a\nrevision before the High Court which has since been\nallowed by the impugned order giving rise to the present\nappeal.\n8. After careful consideration of the arguments presented\nby both sides, this Court believes that the High Court\nerred in setting aside the Executing Court's order dated\n09.12.1998 and in declaring the Trial Court's decree\ndated 09.05.1979 void. The High Court's decision\nappears to be based on several incorrect assumptions\nand observations.\n9. The core of the High Court's reasoning rests on the\nerroneous assumption that the property was jointly\nowned by Defendants No. 1 and No. 2, and that the\nabsence of Defendant No. 2's signature on the\ncompromise dated 11.05.1978 invalidated the decree.\nHowever, Defendant No. 2 has consistently\nacknowledged that he had no ownership rights over the\nproperty. In his written statement to the Trial Court in\nSuit No. 13/72, he explicitly stated that the property\nbelonged solely to Defendant No. 1. This was further\nsupported by a family arrangement dated 17.09.1976\nand reinforced in Paragraph 6 of the compromise deed.\nThe compromise, signed by Defendant No. 1 and the\nplaintiff and later verified by Defendant No. 2 through\nan application dated 14.05.1979, substantiates that\nDefendant No. 1 was the sole owner. These facts were\nupheld by the High Court and this Court in previous\nproceedings. During the challenge to the execution\nproceedings filed by General Tarik before the High\nCourt, the High Court vide order dated 11.8.2006 had\nalso recorded the finding that Defendant no.2 did not\nhave ownership rights over the suit property which fact\nwas also upheld by this Court. Defendant no. 2 had\nlimited rights of being in possession of the third floor of\nsuit property. Due to the aforesaid reasons, the Plaintiff\nand Defendant no. 1 were the only necessary parties\nneeded for the compromise dated 11.05.1978 as\nDefendant no.1 was the sole owner of the suit property.\n10. The High Court also incorrectly held that the provisions\nof Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the CPC were not adhered to,\nclaiming that the Trial Court failed to properly verify the\ncompromise. It is essential to clarify that the\ncompromise was indeed reached on 11.05.1978, with\nits verification delayed due to various adjournments\ncaused by the absence or illness of Defendant No.1 and\nother procedural delays. On 09.05.1979, a fresh\ncompromise application containing identical terms was\nsubmitted and duly signed by both parties due to the\noriginal being misplaced. The Trial Court then correctly\nrecorded and verified this compromise, fulfilling the\nrequirements of Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the CPC.\n11. It must be made clear that the compromise between the\nPlaintiff and Defendant no. 1 was arrived on 11.05.1978\nand it was only the procedural requirements of Order\nXXIII Rule 3 of verifying and the compromise before the\nCourt which were eventually completed on 09.05.1979.\nA perusal of the record of proceedings before the Trial\nCourt reveals that verification of the terms of the\ncompromise was attempted on 11.05.1978 but was not\npossible as Defendant No.1 was not present. Moreover,\non subsequent dates being 11.5.1978, 24.07.1978,\n31.01.1979 and 20.03.1979, either due to the illness of\nDefendant no.1 or due to the Presiding Officer not being\npresent, there were various adjournments before the\nTrial Court. Finally, on 09.05.1979, Gulam Mohiuddin\nappeared before the Court and the parties submitted a\nfresh compromise application was filed because the\nearlier compromise application submitted on 11-05-\n1978 was not traceable on the record of the Court\ncontaining the same terms and conditions as in the\ncompromise application earlier filed on 11.05.1978. The\nsaid application was also duly signed by both the\nparties. On the basis of the said compromise presented\non 09.05.1979, the Trial Court took the compromise\napplication on record, verified the fresh compromise\napplication fulfilling all the terms and conditions of\nOrder XXIII Rule 3 CPC. The terms and conditions of\nthe compromise were read over to the parties and were\naccepted by them and the signatures of the parities\nwere taken on the compromise application by the Court\nand thereafter the Court recorded its satisfaction on the\ncompromise application, which is on the record of the\nTrial Court. The decree dated 09.05.1979 was passed\nbased on this compromise.\n12. As far as the terms of the compromise are concerned,\nwhich have also been questioned by the High Court, the\nagreement stipulated that Defendant No. 1 was to\nexecute and register the sale deed in favor of the\nplaintiff by 01.07.1978, after receiving balance\npayment of Rs 25,000/-. The decree's execution was\ncontingent upon Defendant No. 1 fulfilling conditions\nsuch as obtaining the NOC and ensuring Defendant No.\n2 vacating the portion of the property in question in his\npossession. The recording of the compromise and the\nconsequent decree on 09.05.1979, although appearing\nprocedurally delayed, adhered to the process required\nunder CPC.\n13. Furthermore, the High Court overlooked the fact that\nGeneral Tarik, legal heir of Defendant No. 2, had\npreviously objected to the execution proceedings, which\nwas dismissed on 09.12.1988. Subsequent appeals\nbefore the High Court, including a Special Leave\nPetition to this Court, were also dismissed. Therefore,\nsimilar objections by Respondent No. 1, Smt. Akhtar Un\nNisa, in her capacity as one of the legal heirs of\nDefendant No. 2 would not be maintainable and would\namount to abuse of process of law.\n14. In light of the reasons recorded above, this Court finds\nmerit in the appellant-plaintiff’s argument and holds\nthat the Executing Court had rightly rejected the\nobjections under Section 47 CPC filed by Smt.Akhtar\nUn Nisa vide order 03.05.2007.\n15. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned\njudgement of the High Court is set aside, and the\nExecuting Court's order dated 03.05.2007 is restored\nand the objections of Respondent no.1 under Section 47\nof the CPC stand rejected.\n16. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -1738,26 +1738,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S014", - "case_id": "3530", - "experiment": "role_play_v3", - "model": "llama-3.3-70b-instruct", - "source_file": "S014__role_play_v3__llama-3.3-70b-instruct__3530.json", + "case_id": "5562", + "experiment": "baseline_no_firac", + "model": "ministral-8b", + "source_file": "S014__baseline_no_firac__ministral-8b__5562.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "04/03/2020", - "machine_error_stage": "conclusion", + "judgment_date": "22/04/2024", + "machine_error_stage": "facts", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in reasoning" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "BOMBAY HIGH COURT | APPEAL - 8 of 2021 | Anil V. Madgavkar v. Ifin Commodities Limited And Ors. | 07/04/2021", - "case_details": "Case: APPEAL - 8 of 2021 | Anil V. Madgavkar v. Ifin Commodities Limited And Ors.", - "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "The appellant invested Rs. 75 lakhs with Respondent No.1 (broker) through Respondent No.2 (Rajesh Sharma) in March 2011, under an agreement specifying a stop loss trigger and requiring prior written consent for trades. Following a commodity market crash in May 2011, resulting in a 70% loss, the appellant's family alleged unauthorized trades and breach of agreement. Respondent No.2 subsequently allegedly admitted liability via email and affidavit, issuing a Rs. 5 crore cheque. On May 13, 2011, appellant Anil Madgavkar emailed Respondent No.1 agreeing to continue *his own* investments. Respondent No.1 later communicated on July 22, 2011, that Respondent No.2 was no longer authorized from July 19, 2011. The appellant invoked arbitration, but the Arbitral Tribunal dismissed claims and dropped Respondent No.2. Section 34 petitions to set aside the award were initially allowed by the Panaji District Judge but later set aside by the Goa High Court due to jurisdictional issues. Fresh Section 34 petitions filed in the Mumbai High Court were dismissed by a Single Judge. This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act challenges that dismissal. The appellant argued that Respondent No.2 was an authorized agent of Respondent No.1, making Respondent No.1 liable for losses under MCX Rules, and that the award was non-speaking. Respondent No.1 countered that Respondent No.2 was not their authorized agent and that Respondent No.2's admissions were private arrangements.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. In March 2011, the appellant invested Rs. 75 lakhs with Respondent No.1 through Respondent No.2, under an agreement specifying a stop loss trigger and prior written consent for trades.\n2. A commodity market crash in May 2011 resulted in a 70% loss of the appellant's investment.\n3. Respondent No.2 allegedly admitted liability via email and affidavit and issued a cheque of Rs. 5 crore.\n4. On May 13, 2011, the appellant agreed to continue his own investments with Respondent No.1.\n5. On July 22, 2011, Respondent No.1 communicated that Respondent No.2 was no longer authorized from July 19, 2011.\n6. The appellant invoked arbitration, but the Tribunal dismissed the claims and dropped Respondent No.2 from the proceedings.\n7. Claims seeking to set aside the arbitral award were initially allowed by the Panaji District Judge but later set aside by the Goa High Court due to jurisdictional issues.\n8. Fresh Section 34 petitions were dismissed by the Mumbai High Court, leading to this appeal under Section 37.\n9. The appellant argued Respondent No.2 was an authorized agent of Respondent No.1, making them liable, and that the award was non-speaking.\n10. Respondent No.1 contended that Respondent No.2 was not their authorized agent and that his subsequent actions were private arrangements.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Was Respondent No.2 an authorized agent of Respondent No.1 at the time of the disputed trades?\n2. Did the Arbitral Tribunal's award fail to address or find as a fact the issue of agency between Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2?\n3. Did the Mumbai High Court properly exercise its jurisdiction to dismiss the fresh Section 34 petitions?\n4. Are the admissions and the Rs. 5 crore cheque issued by Respondent No.2 binding upon Respondent No.1?\n5. Did Respondent No.1 breach the agreement requiring prior written consent for trades?\n\n### Rules:\n1. Under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an appeal or application can be made against the order of the court under Section 34.\n2. An agency relationship may exist if an agent has the authority to act on behalf of the principal.\n3. An award may be set aside under Section 34 if it is found to be non-speaking or if it fails to address material issues of fact.\n4. The jurisdiction of a court in hearing Section 34 petitions is determined by which parties are included and the context of the arbitration agreement.\n5. An agreement requires compliance with specific provisions, and failure to do so, such as not obtaining prior written consent, may constitute a breach.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Issue 1: Authorized Agent** - The key dispute revolves around whether Respondent No.2 was an authorized agent of Respondent No.1 during the period of the disputed trades. If established as an agent, Respondent No.1 could be liable (Fact 1, Fact 5). The relationship between Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2 is crucial, and the evidence presented by the appellant is not definitive in establishing explicit authority (Fact 10).\n\n2. **Issue 2: Tribunal's Award** - The appellant alleges the award is non-speaking. A non-speaking award does not explicitly address all the issues before the tribunal, which in this case includes the agency relationship (Fact 9). The absence of explicit findings in the award is a foundation for questioning its validity under Rule 3.\n\n3. **Issue 3: Mumbai High Court Jurisdiction** - The Mumbai High Court dismissed the Section 34 petitions, an action potentially premised on procedural grounds related to jurisdiction. The appellant challenges this dismissal, asserting jurisdiction was exercised improperly (Fact 8).\n\n4. **Issue 4 and 5: Binding Nature of Admissions and Consent Breach** - Respondent No.2’s admissions and payment of the cheque are argued by the appellant to be liabilities of the Respondent No.1 (Fat 3). If Respondent No.2 was acting without authority, these actions would not necessarily bind Respondent No.1 unless it is proven there was implied authority or a personal arrangement involving Respondent No.1 (Rule 4).\n\n5. **Maintainability of Appeal** - The appeal centers on the dismissal of Section 34 petitions, which concerns the lawfulness of the tribunal's award and whether the judicial decision on such dismissal was legally sound. Since these elements engage directly within Rule 1 and questions jurisdictional propriety, the appeal is maintainable.\n\n### Conclusion:\nUpon consideration of the issues and analysis, the appeal should be **ALLOWED**. The questions surrounding the agency relationship, the non-speaking nature of the award, and the interpretation of jurisdictional propriety are critical and merit further factual and legal examination. Therefore, a reconsideration of the original dismissal of the Section 34 petitions by the Mumbai High Court is warranted.", - "reference_judgment": "1. By these Appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the appellants have impugned the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge dismissing the Arbitration Petitions filed by each of these Appellants under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Arbitration Act') . By consent of parties, all these appeals were heard finally at the admission stage. The parties have addressed this Court in the lead matter i.e. Appeal No. 8 of 2021 and have stated that the view that would be taken by this Court in the said lead matter would also apply to the other matters in this batch of appeals. Some of the relevant facts for the purpose of deciding these appeal are as under :- Facts and submissions in Appeal No. 8 of 2021 :-\n2. The appellant was the original claimant in the arbitral proceedings and was the original petitioner before the learned Single Judge. It was the case of the appellant that on 8 March, 2011, the appellant and the respondent no.1 entered into an agreement in respect of investment of Rs.50,00,000/- to be made by the appellant. The appellant issued a cheque for the said amount in the name of the respondent no.1. Under the said agreement, there was a stop loss trigger of 3.5% loss. According to the appellant, all trades were to be done with prior written consent of the appellant by the respondent no.1. On 14 March, 2011, the appellant invested an additional amount of Rs.25,00,000/- by issuing a cheque in the name of the respondent no.1. The transactions were carried out by the appellant through the respondent no.2.\n3. It is the case of the appellant that on 14 April, 2011, the respondent no.2 who was alleged to be an agent of the respondent no.1 asked for a massive increase in its commission. The entire family of the appellant who had invested along with the appellant immediately instructed the respondent no.1 to stop all further investments and called for refund of the amounts invested by the appellant. In the first week of May, 2011, there was a crash in the Commodity Market due to which the appellant lost 70% of its investment value.\n4. It is the case of the appellant that on 8 May, 2011, the entire family of the appellant sent an email to the respondent no.1 specifying that the trades had not been done with their consent and that the stop loss trigger clause had been breached by it. In response to the said email, on 11 May, 2011, the respondent no.2 who was alleged to be an agent of the respondent no.1 according to the appellant, pleaded on behalf of the respondent no.1 and allegedly admitted liability and requested that no legal action be taken against the respondent no.1/respondent no.2. Respondent no.2 issued a cheque for Rs.5 crores in favour of the family of the appellant as repayment allegedly on behalf of the respondent no.1.\n5. It is the case of the appellant that on 13 May, 2011, Mr. Anil Madgavkar, the appellant in Appeal No. 8 of 2021 sent an email only for himself stating that he was agreeable to continue with his investments with respondent no.1 It is the case of the appellant that the said email was sent on the basis of certain representations made by the respondent no.2 on behalf of the respondent no.1 which were then breached. On 13 June, 2011, the respondent no.2 forwarded an affidavit admitting that he was responsible for the losses incurred by the appellant and his family. On 22 July, 2011, the appellant received a communication from the respondent no.1 that w.e.f. 19 July, 2011 the respondent no.2 was not its authorized person.\n6. On 5 August, 2011, the entire family of the appellant sent an email to the respondent no.1 protesting the losses alleged to have been caused to them by the respondent no.1 by carrying out the trades contrary to the terms and conditions of the agreement in the accounts of the appellant and his family members including the stop loss trigger provision and without their prior written consent. It is the case of the appellant that there was no response to the said email dated 5 August, 2011 and also to email dated 8 May, 2011, which were sent by the respondent no.2 on behalf of the respondent no.1. On 10 August, 2011, the appellant and his family members sent an email to the Multi Commodity Exchange of India Limited with a request to take action against the respondent no.1 (hereinafter referred to as 'MCX').\n7. On 10 August, 2011, the respondent no.1 responded to the said email dated 5 August, 2011 referring the letter of 13 May, 2011 written by Mr. Anil Madgavkar and denied the allegations made by the appellant and his family members. In the said letter, the respondent no.1 denied its knowledge of the alleged representations made by the respondent no.2, appellant and his family members on or around 11 May, 2011. On 11 August, 2011, the appellant and his family members respondent no.1 to the letter dated 10 August, 2011 sent by the respondent no.1 and reiterated that the respondent no.1 could not disclaim liability for the action of the respondent no.2 and holding it accountable for trading contrary to the agreement as well as explicit instructions to close the accounts and seeking refund of the amounts invested by the appellant and his family members.\n8. On 19 August, 2011, the appellant and his entire family sent a legal notice to the respondent nos. 1 and 2 calling upon them to be pay the various amounts. On 24 August, 2011, the appellant and his family members sent an email to respondent no.1 alleging that all their accounts with the respondent no.1 were to be closed and the moneys were liable to be returned to the appellant and his family members. It is the case of the appellant that on 24 August, 2011, the respondent no.1 responded listing out certain actions for closure. On 24 August, 2011, the appellant and his family members responded to the said letter dated 24 August, 2011 and expressed surprise that the respondent no.1 was asking them to go through a broker when their broker's agency relationship with respondent no.1 had been allegedly terminated w.e.f. 19 July, 2011. On 16 January, 2012, the appellant and his family members invoked the arbitration clause against the respondent nos. 1 and 2. On 20 March, 2012, the respondent no.1 filed its written statement before the learned Arbitrator. The appellant and his family members filed rejoinder on 9 April,\n2012. 9. It is the case of the appellant that on 30 June, 2012, the Arbitral Tribunal made an award after hearing the parties only for two hours. The respondent no.2 was dropped from the arbitration proceedings without assigning any reasons. The Arbitral Tribunal dismissed the claims made by the appellant and his family members by making separate awards. Being aggrieved by the Arbitral Awards, the appellant and his family members filed separate Arbitration Petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Panaji. On 22 August, 2013, the respondent no.2 filed an intervention application in the said arbitration petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act on the ground that various findings in the arbitral awards rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal adversely affected it and that the said arbitral awards were passed without hearing the respondent no.2.\n10. By an order dated 23 March, 2015, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Panaji permitted the respondent no.2 to intervene in those proceedings filed under Section 34 though opposed by the respondent no.1. On 8 October, 2015, the respondent no.1 filed a writ petition impugning the said order dated 23 March, 2015, permitting the respondent no.2 to intervene in those petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The said writ petition was dismissed by the Goa Bench of this Court on 8 October, 2015. On 26 February, 2018, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Panaji allowed those petitions under Section 34 filed by the appellant and his family members and was pleased to set aside those arbitral awards.\n11. On 27 August, 2018, the appeals filed by the respondent no.1 impugning the said order dated 26 February, 2018 passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Panaji came to be set aside by the Goa Bench of this Court on the ground of jurisdiction. It was held that the arbitration proceedings having been held in Mumbai, only the Court in Mumbai had jurisdiction to entertain those petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration. On 29 September, 2018, the appellant along with his family members filed separate arbitration petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the learned Single Judge of this Court. On 26 September, 2019, the learned Single Judge dismissed all those petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act at the admission stage. Being aggrieved by the said judgment dated 26 September, 2019 passed by the learned Single Judge, each of the appellants have filed separate Appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.\n12. Mr. Ashwin Shanker, learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to various correspondence forming part of the record before the Arbitral Tribunal, various portions of the pleadings filed by both the parties before the Arbitral Tribunal and various findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal in the impugned arbitral award. He also strongly placed reliance on Rule 13 ii, v, vi, vii(c), 5.24 and the directives issued by the said MCX on 30 September, 2009 and more particularly clause (b) thereof stating that the member shall keep evidence of making the payment of having dispatched the contract note to the clients. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the respondent no.2 was an authorized agent of the respondent no.1. The appellant and his family members had issued sale instructions to the respondents and to close out the transactions and to refund the investments made by the appellant and his family members. On 1 May, 2011, the entire market was crashed.\n13. Learned counsel submits that the respondent no.2 had admitted on behalf of the respondent no.1 in the correspondence as well as in the affidavit filed by him that the sale instructions were received from the appellant and his family members and that various amounts were due and payable to the appellant by the respondents. He submits that under aforesaid Rules of the said MCX, the respondent no.1 broker was liable for each and every acts performed by the respondent no.2 as an authorized agent on behalf of the respondent no.1. The respondent no.1 thus could not disown the liability admitted by the respondent no.2 and the losses suffered by the appellant and his family members due to the acts on the part of the respondent no.2 carried out as an authorized agent on behalf of the respondent no.1.\n14. It is submitted that though these Rules were specifically pointed out to the Arbitral Tribunal by the appellant, there is no reference of any of these Rules in the impugned award. There was no findings rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on various issues raised by the appellant during the course of the argument. Though the defense raised by the respondent no.1 in the arbitral proceedings were untenable, the Arbitral Tribunal accepted those defences and rejected the claims made by the appellant and his family members. According to the learned counsel, the arbitral award was a non speaking award in respect of various issues though urged by the appellant but not having been dealt with in the impugned award at all.\n15. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the Arbitral Tribunal has erroneously construed the email dated 13 May, 2011 sent by Anil Madgavkar to the respondent no.1. He submits that though all other emails sent by Anil Madgavkar were sent for himself and his family members, the said mail was sent by Mr. Anil Madgavkar only in respect of his own account with the respondent no.1 and was not on behalf of all the family members. He submits that in any event, the said email was in respect of the problems faced by his account specially with reference to how the market operated during circuits and thus could not have been construed as the email on behalf of the entire family. He submits that email dated 8 May, 2011, disputing the transactions carried out by the respondent no.1 was sent on behalf of the appellant and all his family members having account with the respondent no.1 The family members of the appellant not having withdrawn the earlier email 8 May, 2011 and not having agreed to continue the account with the respondent no.1, the Arbitral Tribunal could not have rejected the claims made by the family members on the basis of such email dated 13 May, 2011 which was sent only by Mr. Anil Madgavkar in his individual capacity to the respondent no.1.\n16. Learned counsel for the appellant strongly placed reliance on the letter dated 11 May, 2011 sent by the respondent no.2 to the appellant and his family members and submits that the said letter was sent by the respondent no.2 on behalf of the respondent no.1 admitting his negligence and the loss caused to the appellant and his family members. The respondent no.2 had also admitted liability on behalf of the respondent no.1 and had issued a cheque for Rs. 5 crores in favour of the appellant. The Arbitral Tribunal did not consider the other correspondence entered into between the parties in the entire arbitral award. The Arbitral Tribunal also did not consider the affidavit dated 13 June, 2011 filed by the respondent no.2 admitting the liability on behalf of himself and respondent no.1.\n17. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the following judgments in support of the submission that the respondent no.1 was liable for all the losses suffered by the appellant and his family members due to acts of the respondent no.2 while carrying out the trading in the accounts of the appellant and his family members under the said MCX Business Rules. a) An unreported judgment passed by a Single Judge of this Court on 21 June, 2018 in Arbitration Petition No. 1543 of 2014 in case of Keynote Capitals Ltd. v/s. Eco Recycling Ltd. b) Judgment of this Court in case of Bonaza Commodities Brokers Pvt. Ltd. v/s. Mrs. Roshanara Bhinder, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 1411. c) Judgment of this Court in case of Mrs. Kaberi Mondal v/s. BMA Commodities Private Limited, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 3353.\n18. Mr. Charles D'Souza, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 on the other hand submits that there were no pleadings on the applicability or otherwise of the said MCX Rules and more particularly on the issue whether the acts committed by the respondent no.2 as an alleged authorized agent were binding on the respondent no.1 or not. No such arguments had been advanced before the Arbitral Tribunal by the appellant. He submits that on the contrary the oral arguments advanced before the Arbitral Tribunal were contrary to the pleadings filed before the Arbitral Tribunal by the appellant. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to various paragraphs of the arbitral award and the statement of case in case of Anil Madgavkar and submits that the similar pleadings and the arguments were advanced by other appellants also before the Arbitral Tribunal.\n19. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to a letter dated 14 April, 2011 from the appellant to Finance Factory and would submit that the said letter was neither addressed to the respondent no.1 nor received by it. In any event the said letter was alleged to have been addressed to Finance Factory requesting the said Finance Factory to instruct P-Word/ TFIL Commodities Limited to stop all other investment / management of his fund and to close all their accounts and to refund their moneys to them. He invited our attention to the alleged writing dated 11 May, 2011 between the appellant and P-Word/TFIL which was witnessed by Rajesh Cheda annexed at page 82 of the compilation. He submits that the said writing was alleged to have been executed between the appellant and the said P-Word/TFIL.\n20. The respondent no.1 was not at all party to any such agreement or communication inter- se and arrived at between the appellant and his family members and the said P-Word/TFIL. It is submitted that the said Finance Factory was the personal advisor of Madgavkar family. The respondent no.1 was not concerned with the said Finance Factory at all. It is the case of the respondent no.1 that the said P-Word/TFIL was the sole proprietrix concern of Ms.Rashmi M. T. The respondent no.1 had appointed only Ms. Rashmi M. T. as an authorized person. Rajesh (Raj) Sharma was not an authorized representative or authorized person or agent or franchise of the respondent no.1. The said Ms.Rashmi M. T. who was proprietrix of P-Word/TFIL had ceased to be the authorized person of the respondent no.1 with effect from 19 July, 2011.\n21. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to the letter dated 13 May, 2011 addressed by Anil Madgavkar to the respondent no.1 and would submit that the said letter has to be read with e-mail dated 8 May, 2011, which was even according to the appellant was not only on his behalf but also on behalf of his family members and all subsequent correspondence between the appellant and the said Rajesh Sharma and not between the appellant and the respondent no.1. The said Rajesh Sharma was not authorized by the respondent no.1. In any event, the affidavit disclosed admission of personal liability on the part of said Rajesh Sharma and not on behalf of the respondent no.1.\n22. It is submitted that the fact that the said Rajesh Sharma had given his own cheque for Rs.5 crores in favour of the appellant and had agreed to mortgage his personal property would also clearly indicate that there was personal transaction between the appellant and his family members with Rajesh Sharma. He submits that even the said affidavit was identified by Rajesh Cheda who was concerned with the said Finance Factory. The respondent was not a party to any such transaction between the appellant, Finance Factory and Mr. Rajesh Sharma.\n23. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to the written statement filed by the respondent no.1 before the Arbitral Tribunal contending that the respondent no.1 had appointed the counsel Ms.Rashmi MT, who was proprietrix of P-Word/TFIL as an authorized person and had ceased to be the authorized representative of the respondent no.1 with effect from 19 July, 2011. The respondent no.1 had no legal or contractual relationship with Rajesh Sharma. Rajesh Sharma was not even an employee or authorized representative or an agent of the respondent no.1. The so called promises, assurances or representations, if any, made by Rajesh Sharma to the appellant and his family members was their private arrangement and was not binding on the respondent no.1.\n24. It is submitted that the said Rajesh Cheda of Finance Factory was not authorized or had no authority to deal with the appellant and his family members on behalf of the respondent no.1. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to the letter dated 29 September, 2011 from the respondent no.1 to the legal department of the said MCX in response to the complaint made by one of the family member of the appellant to the said Exchange denying such allegations made by the said family member of the appellant.\n25. The respondent no.1 also had denied that the appellant had ever submitted any letter or e-mail to the respondent no.1 in the month of April, 2011 requesting the respondent no.1 to stop the transactions / close the account. He submits that on receipt of e-mail from Anil Madgavkar in the last week of 2011, the respondent had remitted the fund available in the account to the bank account of the family members of the said Anil Madgavkar. He submits that the appellant never made any application before the Arbitral Tribunal for seeking liberty to lead oral evidence. The onus was on the appellant to prove that the respondent no.2 was an authorized agent/representative of the respondent no.1 and had admitted the alleged liability of the respondent no.1 to Anil Madgavkar and his family members which onus the appellant had failed to discharge.\n26. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to various findings rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal in the impugned award and would submit that the learned single Judge in the petition filed by the appellants under section 34 of the Arbitration Act has rightly not interfered with those findings of fact. He invited our attention to the arguments advanced by the appellant before the Arbitral Tribunal and recorded in the arbitral award that the transactions between the parties were in the nature of Mutual Fund Deposit. He submits that the said arguments advanced before the Arbitral Tribunal were contrary to the pleadings filed by the appellant in the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal has also rendered various findings of fact on the issue that the respondent no.2 was not an authorized agent/representative of the respondent no.1. He submits that the powers of the Appellate Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act are very limited. This Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal while hearing an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act.\n27. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 relied upon paragraph 60 of the judgment of this Court in case of Keynote Capitals Ltd. (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant and would submit that the said judgment would support the case of the respondent no.1 and not the appellant. It is submitted that in the said judgment, learned single Judge has held that the Arbitral Tribunal could not have allowed the claim of the constituent based on confessional statement obtained by the constituent from the agent of the member without proving the authenticity of such employee to send such email and assign such financial statement thereby allegedly admitting the alleged liability of the member. He submits that the judgment of this Court in case of Kaberi Mondal (supra) and in case of Bonaza Commodities Brokers Pvt. Ltd.(supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 do not apply to the facts of this case even remotely.\n28. Mr. Ashwin Shanker, learned counsel for the appellant in rejoinder submits that the appellants have raised the ground in the petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act though the appellant had relied upon the Rules of the said MCX on the issue that the respondent no.1 member was liable to pay for the loss suffered by appellant due to the acts of the respondent no.2, the Arbitral Tribunal did not consider those Rules. He submits that judgments of this Court in case of Kaberi Mondal (supra) and in case of Bonaza Commodities Brokers Pvt. Ltd.(supra) had clearly held that the Rules of the said MCX were statutory and were binding on the member and also on the constituent. REASONS AND CONCLUSION :\n29. A perusal of the record indicates that there was a private arrangement between the appellant, Rajesh Cheda of Finance Factory and Rajesh Sharma who claimed to be an authorized representative of the respondent no.1. The appellant could not prove that respondent no.2 was an authorized representative or agent of the respondent no.1 to deal with the appellant in respect of any of the alleged transactions. No evidence was led by the appellants before the Arbitral Tribunal to prove their case.\n30. A perusal of the statement of claim filed by the appellants would indicate that it was the case of the appellants that they were approached by Rajesh Cheda of Finance Factory in the month of February, 2011 and made a representation that there would be safe and guaranteed return on the investment of the claimant. The funds / investment made by the appellant would be managed by P-Word/TFIL, an authorized person / (sub-broker) of the respondent no.1. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 rightly invited our attention to the Management Mandate Agreement alleged to have been entered into between the P- Word/TFIL and Rajesh Cheda.\n31. The said agreement does not refer to the respondent no.1 at all in respect of any of the alleged transaction. The correspondence placed on record would also indicate that various representations were alleged to have been made by the Finance Factory to the appellants and his family members for reasonable return on the investment proposed to be made by the appellant and his family members and not by the respondent no.1. It was not the case of the appellant that the said Finance Factory was authorized agent of the respondent no.1. The said letter dated 14 April, 2011 relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant was alleged to have been addressed to the Finance Factory thereby requesting to instruct P-Word/TFIL commodities to stop all further investments / management of his funds and to close all account and to refund their moneys. The said letter was disputed by the respondent no.1.\n32. Even otherwise the said letter was addressed to the Finance Factory and not to the respondent no.1. E-mail dated 8 May, 2011 was between the appellant, his family members and Rajesh Sharma alleging negligence and fraud on the part of Rajesh Sharma. In our view, since the appellant failed to prove that the respondent no.2 was authorized agent of the respondent no.1 and had acted on behalf of the respondent no.1 while allegedly carrying out any transaction on behalf of the appellant as authorized representative of the respondent no.1, the respondent no.1 was rightly held not liable to pay to the appellants towards any loss suffered by the appellant.\n33. In our view, the admission of the alleged liability by the respondent no.2 on behalf of the respondent no.1 to the appellant and his family members was not binding on the respondent no.1 as the same was not authorized by the respondent no.1. The judgment of this Court in case of Keynote Capitals Ltd. (supra) relied upon by the appellant would support the case of the respondent no.1 and not the appellant.\n34. In our view, the Arbitral Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have rightly not considered such alleged confessional statement obtained by the appellant from the respondent no.2 without proving the authority of the respondent no.2 to make such confession and admission of liability on the part of the respondent no.1. There cannot be any implied authority even to the agent on behalf of the principal to acknowledge the alleged liability on behalf of the principal or to make any such confessional statement on behalf of the principal. This Court in the said judgment in case of Keynote Capitals Ltd. (supra) had adverted to the judgment of this Court in case of Kotak Securities Ltd. v/s. Prakash S. Khanokar and Anr. (supra) in Arbitration Petition (L) No. 643 of 2002 delivered on 30 July, 2013 and judgment of Supreme Court in case of Lakshmirattan Cotton Mills Company Limited v/s. Aluminium Corporation of India Limited, AIR 1971 SC 1482. We are not inclined to take a different view from the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Keynote Capitals Ltd. (supra) which view was based on another judgment of this Court and also the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Kotak Securities Ltd. v/ s. Prakash S. Khanokar and Anr. (supra).\n35. There is no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned award is contrary to Rule 13 ii, v, vi, vii(c), 5.24 and the directives issued by the said MCX on 30 September, 2009 and more particularly clause (b). Since, the appellant failed to prove that the respondent no.2 was the authorized agent of the respondent no.1 to carry out transactions between the appellant and his family members with the respondent no.1, there would be no question of the Arbitral Tribunal allowing the claims made by the appellant on the basis of those Rules framed by the Multi Commodity Exchange or the directives issued by the Multi Commodity Exchange on 30 September, 2009. No reliance was placed by the appellant and his family members on those Rules in the statement of claim filed before the Arbitral Tribunal.\n36. The arguments advanced before the Arbitral Tribunal by the appellant and his family members were inconsistent with the pleadings filed before the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal after considering the agreement entered into between the appellant and the respondent no.1 has rendered a finding that the appellant had entered into an agreement with the respondent no.1 to trade in securities and derivatives transactions. The terms of the agreement did not spell out that the same was in the nature of mutual fund deposit as contended by the appellant during the oral hearing. The Arbitral Tribunal had interpreted the said agreement and had recorded a finding that there was no transaction in the nature of mutual fund deposit. The possible interpretation of the agreement entered into between the appellant and the respondent no.1 by the Arbitral Tribunal was rightly not substituted by another interpretation by the learned Single Judge.\n37. A perusal of the award clearly indicates that Arbitral Tribunal has referred to the various correspondence forming part of the record before the Arbitral Tribunal and has recorded a finding that by letter dated 13 May, 2011, whatever problems the appellant had with the respondent no.1 were resolved and the contention of the appellant that the respondents traded on their whims and fancies without obtaining the consent of the appellant and his family members was unwarranted. It was thus not open to the appellant to contend in the statement of claim that what was transacted by them with the respondent no.1 was a mutual fund account or that they had not placed any orders for trading or that the respondent no.1 had carried on the trading activity without the knowledge and consent of the appellant.\n38. The Arbitral Tribunal also dealt with the affidavit filed by Mr.Rajesh Sharma dated 13 June, 2011 allegedly admitting the liability on behalf of the respondent no.1 and has rightly recorded a finding that the said affidavit reflected a private arrangement between the appellant and Mr. Rajesh Sharma and was thus not binding upon the respondent no.1. The learned counsel for the appellant could not dispute before this Court that the 3P World was appointed as the authorized person by the respondent no.1 and not the said Mr. Rajesh Sharma. He also could not demonstrate before this Court as to how the said Finance Factory managed by Mr.Rajesh Chheda came in picture in the transaction between the appellant and the respondent no.1 with authority and consent of the respondent no.1. The learned Single Judge rightly did not interfere with the findings of fact rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal. There is no substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Arbitral Tribunal did not deal with any of the arguments advanced by the appellant and his family members in the impugned awards. The record of the arbitral proceedings speak for itself. There is thus no substance in this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant.\n39. The learned counsel for the appellant could not demonstrate before this Court that the letter dated 14 April, 2011 from the appellant to the Finance Factory was ever served upon the respondent no.1. Be that as it may, there was no such transaction between the said Finance Factory and the respondent no.1. The said Finance Factory was personal advisors of Madgavkar family. The respondent no.1 was not concerned at all with the said Finance Factory. The appellant could not dispute before this Court that the said 3P World was the sole proprietor concerned of Ms.Rashmi M.T. who alone was appointed as authorized agent of the respondent no.1 and not the said Mr. Rajesh Sharma.\n40. In our view, the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 is right in his submission that the letter dated 13 May, 2011 addressed by Mr.Anil Madgavkar to the respondent no.1 has to be read with email dated 8 May, 2011, which was even according to the appellant was not only on his behalf but also on behalf of his family members. All through out the said Mr. Anil Madgavkar was representing the entire family members in those transaction with the respondent no.1 had addressed all the letters on behalf of the entire family and also in the arbitration proceedings. We are thus not inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the said letter dated 13 May, 2011 was only on behalf of the said Mr. Anil Madgavkar.\n41. The appellant did not make any application before the Arbitral Tribunal for leading any oral evidence. The onus was on the appellant to prove that the respondent no.2 was an authorized agent of the respondent no.1 and had admitted the alleged liability of the respondent no.1 to the appellant and his family members, which onus the appellant and his family members had failed to discharge. The appellant failed to prove before the Arbitral Tribunal that he and his family members had made any request to the respondent no.1 for closure of the accounts at any point of time.\n42. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in case of Bonanza Commodities Brokers (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, this Court in the said judgment had held that since the member of the Multi Commodity Exchange had failed to carry out his obligation of squaring up the transactions when there was a shortfall in the margin money which according to the member was not paid by the constituent though demanded, the member cannot be allowed to make any claim against the constituent for such unauthorized transactions. In that context, the learned Single Judge had held that the by-laws of the MCX referred to in the said judgment were mandatory and the transaction carried out in violation of such mandatory by- laws would not make the broker entitled to make any claim against the constituent based on such unauthorized trade effected by the member of the exchange. In our view, the said judgment would not even apply remotedly to the facts of this case.\n43. There is no dispute in the proposition of law that the Rules and by-laws of the Multi Commodity Exchange Limited are mandatory and binding on the member as well as constituent. However, in the facts of this case, since the appellant failed to prove that the respondent no.2 was an authorized agent of the respondent no.1, the appellant cannot take shelter of the Rules providing that the member shall be responsible of all acts, omission and commission of the authorized person or that all the acts, omission and commission of the authorized shall be deemed to be those of the member.\n44. Under Rule 13 of the said Rules, it is clearly provided that the members desirous of dealing through authorized person are required to seek approval of the exchange by submitting an application as per the modes specified by the exchange duly completed in all respect to the membership department of the exchange as per the regulatory frame work of the SEBI and also the circulars issued by the said MCX from time to time. The appellant did not produce any document in support of the case that the respondent no.2 had acted as an authorized person on behalf of the respondent no.1 pursuant to any approval granted by the Multi Commodity Exchange in the prescribed manner under Rule 13 by following the procedure for appointment of such authorized person under Rule 13(iii).\n45. In our view, Rule 13(V) which provides that the member shall be responsible in all acts, omission and commission for the authorized person would apply only if such authorized person is appointed pursuant to the approval of the Multi Commodity Exchange in the manner prescribed under Rule 13(iii) after following the eligibility criteria and not otherwise. In our view, conditions prescribed under Rules 13(v) and 13(vi) were not satisfied in the facts of this case. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in case of Kaberi Mondal (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, a learned Single Judge of this Court in the said judgment after adverting to the judgment of this Court in case of Bonanza Commodities Brokers (supra) has reiterated that the by-laws of the Multi Commodity Exchange of India are mandatory and the broker member cannot make any claim against the constituent based on any unauthorized trade effected by him. The said judgment also would not advance the case of the appellant.\n46. The powers of the Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act are very limited. The learned counsel for the appellant could not make out a case for interference with the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge. This batch of appeals are thus devoid of merits.\n47. We therefore pass the following order :- (a) The Appeal Nos.8 of 2021, 5 of 2021, 6 of 2021, 7 of 2021, 10 of 2021, 11 of 2021, 12 of 2021 and 13 of 2021 are dismissed. (b) In view of dismissal of aforesaid appeals, all pending Interim Applications in the said appeals are also dismissed. (c) There shall be no order as to costs.", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12812 OF 2024 | Sincere Securities Private Limited & Ors. v. Chandrakant Khemka & Ors. | 05/08/2025", + "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12812 OF 2024 | Sincere Securities Private Limited & Ors. v. Chandrakant Khemka & Ors.", + "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "case_record": "Nandini Impex Private Limited, the corporate debtor, secured ₹3 crores each from Sincere Securities Private Limited (appellant 1) and Noble Dealcom Private Limited along with Jodhpur Properties and Finance Private Limited (appellants 2 & 3) via MoUs in February 2019. These loans were secured by depositing title deeds for the front and rear portions of the ground floor of White House, New Delhi. Following loan defaults, conveyance deeds were executed on February 27, 2020, transferring title of these portions to the respective appellants. Simultaneously, Leave and License Agreements allowed Nandini Impex to retain possession on payment of ₹6 lakhs monthly rent for each portion. Appellants terminated these agreements on May 8, 2020, and initiated eviction suits due to rental payment defaults. UCO Bank, the sole Committee of Creditors member, initiated CIRP against Nandini Impex on September 20, 2022. The CoC decided the property was unnecessary due to high rentals and directed the Resolution Professional to return possession to the appellants. Chandrakant Khemka, a suspended director, objected to this decision. The NCLT, on August 7, 2023, directed the Resolution Professional to deliver possession to the appellants. Chandrakant Khemka appealed to the NCLAT, which, on November 12, 2024, set aside the NCLT order, citing Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC, and remanded the matter. The Supreme Court noted that UCO Bank and the current Resolution Professional supported the property's return, while Chandrakant Khemka refused to pay rent.", + "generated_judgment": "### Facts \n1. Nandini Impex Private Limited (the corporate debtor) obtained three separate loans of ₹3 crore each from Sincere Securities Pvt. Ltd. (appellant 1) and Noble Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. together with Jodhpur Properties and Finance Pvt. Ltd. (appellants 2 & 3) pursuant to MoUs executed in February 2019. \n2. The loans were secured by the title deeds of the front‑ and rear‑portions of the ground‑floor of the White‑House premises, New Delhi, which were later handed over to the secured‑creditors by conveyance deeds dated 27 February 2020. \n3. Simultaneously the parties executed Leave‑and‑License Agreements permitting Nandini Impex to retain possession of the conveyed portions on payment of ₹6 lakhs per month as rent to each secured‑creditor. \n4. The secured‑creditors terminated the Leave‑and‑License Agreements on 8 May 2020 and instituted civil eviction suits on the ground of non‑payment of rent. \n5. UCO Bank, the sole member of the Committee of Creditors (CoC), admitted a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Nandini Impex on 20 September 2022. \n6. The CoC, after evaluating the estate, concluded that the White‑House premises were “unnecessary” for the resolution‑plan because the rental receipts were high, and directed the Resolution Professional (RP) to return possession of the premises to the secured‑creditor appellants. \n7. Chandrakant Khemka, a director who had been suspended from the board of Nandini Impex, objected to the CoC’s decision. \n8. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) on 7 August 2023 ordered the RP to deliver possession of the premises to the secured‑creditor appellants. \n9. Khemka appealed to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), which on 12 November 2024 set aside the NCLT order, holding that the CoC’s reliance on Section 14(1)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was erroneous and remanded the matter. \n10. The Supreme Court, noting that the RP and UCO Bank supported the return of possession while Khemka refused to pay rent, recorded observations but did not pronounce a substantive order on the merits. \n\n### Issues \n1. Whether the appeal filed by the suspended director, Chandrakant Khemka, is maintainable under Section 14(4) IBC, i.e., whether a suspended director has a statutory right to raise an “objection” that can stall or set aside the CoC’s decision. \n2. (Assuming maintainability) Whether the CoC correctly applied the “unnecessary property” test under Section 14(1)(d) IBC in classifying the White‑House premises as unnecessary. \n3. (Assuming maintainability) Whether the NCLAT was correct in setting aside the NCLT order on the basis of the alleged mis‑application of Section 14(1)(d). \n\n### Rules \n1. **Section 14(4), IBC** – Allows an “objection” to a resolution‑plan only from a “creditor” (including a financial or operational creditor) or a “debtor” as defined in the Code. The objection must be filed within the prescribed period and be in respect of the resolution‑plan as a whole. \n2. **Section 14(1)(d), IBC** – Permits the CoC to deem a “property” “unnecessary” for the purpose of the resolution‑plan if the property is not required for the revival of the corporate debtor and its sale would maximise the value of the assets. \n3. **Section 31, IBC** – Deals with the failure to comply with the terms of the approved resolution‑plan. \n4. The Supreme Court of India, in *Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Hon’ble Supreme Court* (2022) 4 SCC 344, clarified that only persons recognised as “creditors” or “debtor” under the Code have locus standi to file an objection under Section 14(4). \n5. The NCLAT is empowered to examine whether the CoC’s decision is in accordance with the provisions of the IBC and may set aside an NCLT order only on a finding of error of law or jurisdiction. \n\n### Analysis \n**1. Maintainability of the appeal (Issue 1)** \n- The appellant, Chandrakant Khemka, is a *suspended* director of Nandini Impex. Under Section 14(4) the statutory “objection” is limited to a *creditor* or the *debtor* (the corporate debtor itself). A director, whether active or suspended, does not fall within either category unless he is also a creditor. No allegation is made that Khemka holds any claim as a financial or operational creditor. \n- The Supreme Court’s pronouncement in *Swiss Ribbons* confirms that a director, absent creditor status, lacks locus standi to raise a Section 14(4) objection. Consequently, Khemka’s objection is a personal grievance and not a statutory objection. \n- As the appeal is premised on the existence of a valid objection under Section 14(4), the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The appeal is therefore *not maintainable*. \n\n**2. (Sub‑issues) – Not proceeded** \nSince the appeal is not maintainable, the court does not need to address the substantive questions concerning the “unnecessary property” test or the correctness of the NCLAT’s order. \n\n### Conclusion \nThe appeal filed by the suspended director, Chandrakant Khemka, is not maintainable because he does not possess the statutory standing required under Section 14(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code to raise an objection to the CoC’s decision. Accordingly, the appeal must be **DISMISSED**.", + "reference_judgment": "1. This appeal, under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 20161, calls in question the order dated 12.11.2024 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi2, allowing Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1064 of 2023 filed by Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, and setting aside the order dated 07.08.2023 of the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench3, in CP(IB) No. 1377/KB/2020. Thereby, the NCLT had directed delivery of possession of the property in question to the appellants herein.\n1 for short, “IBC”\n2 for short, “NCLAT”\n3 for short, “NCLT”\n\n12. Facts, relevant to this adjudication, need recounting at some length. On 13.02.2019, a Memorandum of Understanding was executed by and between Nandini Impex Private Limited, which became a corporate debtor under the IBC thereafter, represented by its Director, Chandrakant Khemka, on the one hand, and Noble Dealcom Private Limited along with Jodhpur Properties and Finance Private Limited, appellant Nos. 2 and 3 herein, on the other hand, whereby Nandini Impex Private Limited availed financial assistance to the tune of ₹3 crores from them and secured the same through deposit of the title deeds relating to the rear portion of the ground floor of White House, 1/18-20, Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi. Another Memorandum of Understanding was executed by Nandini Impex Private Limited on 15.02.2019 with Sincere Securities Private Limited, appellant No.1 herein, for availing a loan of ₹3 crores from it and the same was secured through deposit of the title deeds of the front portion of the ground floor of White House. As Nandini Impex Private Limited failed to repay the loans, separate conveyance deeds were executed by it on 27.02.2020 transferring the title over the front and rear portions of the ground floor of White House to the appellants respectively. However, two separate Leave and License Agreements were executed simultaneously on the same day, whereby possession of the front and rear portions of the ground floor of White House was retained by Nandini Impex Private Limited on payment of rentals of ₹6 lakhs per month for each portion. Owing to the default in payment of the rentals, the appellants terminated the Leave and License Agreements on 08.05.2020. Eviction suits were also instituted by the appellants for regaining possession of the subject ground floor portions along with other reliefs.\n\n3. While so, UCO Bank, respondent No. 3 herein, filed a petition under Section 7 of the IBC against Nandini Impex Private Limited. The same was admitted on 20.09.2022 by the NCLT, initiating corporate insolvency resolution process4 against Nandini Impex Private Limited, the corporate debtor. Significantly, UCO Bank was the sole member of its Committee of Creditors5. The appellants, as operational creditors, filed their respective claims before the Interim Resolution Professional appointed for the corporate debtor and the said claims were accepted in toto. At that stage, UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, deputed the Resolution Professional to visit the subject property on the ground floor of White House and decide whether there was any need to retain the same by paying huge rentals. Thereafter, at its meeting held on 06.04.2023, the CoC decided that there was no requirement to hold on to the subject property and requested the Resolution Professional to hand over the possession thereof to the appellants. Chandrakant Khemka, being a suspended director of the corporate debtor, raised objections to this move. Interlocutory Applications came to be filed by the appellants in 2023 seeking a direction from the NCLT to return the subject property to them. By order dated 07.08.2023, the NCLT noted the decision of the CoC that the subject property was not required and directed the Resolution Professional to deliver possession of the same to the appellants. Aggrieved thereby, Chandrakant Khemka filed an appeal before the NCLAT. By way of the impugned order dated 12.11.2024, the NCLAT allowed his appeal and set aside the order dated 07.08.2023 passed by the NCLT, observing that Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC barred recovery by an owner of property during the CIRP, when such property was occupied by the corporate debtor. The NCLAT remanded the matter to the NCLT to consider the issue afresh.\n4 for short, “CIRP”\n5 for short, “CoC”\n\n4. By order dated 25.11.2024, this Court permitted the proceedings before the NCLT to continue, subject to the final outcome of this appeal. This Court also noted that UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, supported the appellants in so far as return of possession of the subject property was concerned. Further, this Court noted that the learned counsel appearing on advance notice for Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, conceded that he was not willing to pay the current rent or the arrears of rent, post initiation of the CIRP. This Court also recorded that the Resolution Professional did not wish to retain possession of the property in question.\n\n5. Thereafter, on 14.07.2025, upon being informed that a new Resolution Professional was appointed for the corporate debtor, this Court required him to make known his stand by way of a written affidavit. Pursuant thereto, Pratim Bayal, the new Resolution Professional, filed affidavit dated 17.07.2025. Therein, he categorically stated that, given the extremely limited operations of the corporate debtor at present and the extremely high rent of the White House property, it was not feasible and was totally unnecessary for the corporate debtor to continue to hold on to the said property. He, therefore, reiterated the statement made by his predecessor before the NCLT to the effect that the property could be returned to the appellants.\n\n6. Given the aforestated facts, it is clear that except for Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, who is a suspended director of the corporate debtor, all other parties are at consensus that the property in question need not be retained by the corporate debtor, as it is not required by it and imposes a huge financial burden on it, in terms of the lease/license rentals payable therefor. It is, however, the case of Chandrakant Khemka that the erstwhile Resolution Professional of the corporate debtor made a factually incorrect statement before the NCLT, leading to the passing of the unreasoned order dated 07.08.2023 and, therefore, the NCLAT was justified in remanding the matter for a comprehensive adjudication afresh. It is his further case that the property in question is essential for the functioning of the corporate debtor and Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC barred its return to the appellants.\n\n7. Despite all others involved in the CIRP being in favour of doing so, Chandrakant Khemka alone opposes the return of the subject property to the appellants. His lofty claim that the rent due to the appellants would stand secured by the provisions of the IBC does not stand to reason, Further, Chandrakant Khemka is himself not willing to bear the expenditure for retaining the possession of the subject property.\n\n8. UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, echoed the stand of the Resolution Professional, by filing separate written submissions. Reference was made therein to the decision of this Court in K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank and others6. Paragraph 52 of the decision reads as follows:\n 52. As aforesaid, upon receipt of a “rejected” resolution plan the adjudicating authority (NCLT) is not expected to do anything more; but is obligated to initiate liquidation process under Section 33(1) of the I&B Code. The legislature has not endowed the adjudicating authority (NCLT) with the jurisdiction or authority to analyse or evaluate the commercial decision of CoC much less to enquire into the justness of the rejection of the resolution plan by the dissenting financial creditors. From the legislative history and the background in which the I&B Code has been enacted, it is noticed that a completely new approach has been adopted for speeding up the recovery of the debt due from the defaulting companies. In the new approach, there is a calm period followed by a swift resolution process to be completed within 270 days (outer limit) failing which, initiation of liquidation process has been made inevitable and mandatory. In the earlier regime, the corporate debtor could indefinitely continue to enjoy the protection given under Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 or under other such enactments which has now been forsaken. Besides, the commercial wisdom of CoC has been given paramount status without any judicial intervention, for ensuring completion of the stated processes within the timelines prescribed by the I&B Code. There is an intrinsic assumption that financial creditors are fully informed about the viability of the corporate debtor and feasibility of the proposed resolution plan. They act on the basis of thorough examination of the proposed resolution plan and assessment made by their team of experts. The opinion on the subject-matter expressed by them after due deliberations in CoC meetings through voting, as per voting shares, is a collective business decision. The legislature, consciously, has not provided any ground to challenge the “commercial wisdom” of the individual financial creditors or their collective decision before the adjudicating authority. That is made non-justiciable. \n\nThe commercial wisdom of the CoC must, accordingly, be given primacy during the CIRP. When UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, decided that retention of the possession of the subject property was not in the interest of the CIRP, that decision must be given the respect that is lawfully due to it.\n6 (2019) 12 SCC 150\n\n9. Lastly, we may note that Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC states that once the adjudicating authority, by order, declares a moratorium, it would prohibit, amongst other acts, the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or is in the possession of the corporate debtor. In the case on hand, the chronology of events manifests that, at its very first meeting held on 20.02.2023, the CoC discussed the issue of retention of the ground floor of White House. It asked the Resolution Professional to visit the said premises and decide as to whether holding on to the same was required, spending a huge amount towards rentals. Thereafter, at its third meeting held on 06.04.2023, the CoC took note of the Resolution Professional’s report that it was not feasible to hold on to the subject property, as only 8 to 9 staff members were there and the revenue generated would not be sufficient to pay the lease/license rentals. The CoC recorded that the matter was duly discussed and the Resolution Professional was asked to hand over possession as early as possible, as there was no requirement to hold on to the said premises spending such a huge amount towards rentals.\n\n10. It was only thereafter that the appellants filed Interlocutory Applications before the NCLT praying for a direction to deliver possession of the subject property to them along with other reliefs. It is, therefore, manifest that this was not a simple case of the owner of the property seeking recovery of possession thereof from the corporate debtor, which would be barred by the express language of Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC. On the other hand, as already noted hereinbefore, it was the CoC and the Resolution Professional who were and still are desirous of returning the possession of the property in question to the appellants, keeping in mind the adverse financial implications of retaining the same. It appears that Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, who is not willing to personally bear the expenditure for such retention, is bent upon stalling that process for some undisclosed and extraneous reasons.\n\n11. This was, therefore, not a situation which warranted an order of remand in the context of Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC. The order dated 12.11.2024 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1064 of 2023, is accordingly set aside and the order dated 07.08.2023 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, in CP(IB) No. 1377/KB/2020, is restored. The Resolution Professional shall act upon and implement the said order expeditiously.\n\nThe appeal is allowed, in the aforesaid terms.\n\nPending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -1863,26 +1863,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S015", - "case_id": "141", + "case_id": "4274", "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "phi-4", - "source_file": "S015__ablation_issue__phi-4__141.json", - "court": "BOMBAY HIGH COURT", - "judgment_date": "07/04/2021", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "model": "gpt-oss-120b-noreason", + "source_file": "S015__ablation_issue__gpt-oss-120b-noreason__4274.json", + "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", + "judgment_date": "05/08/2025", + "machine_error_stage": "issues", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue misframing" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "DELHI HIGH COURT | FAO(OS) - 47 of 2020 | Ram Sarup Lugani And Anr. v. Nirmal Lugani And Ors. | 19/10/2020", - "case_details": "Case: FAO(OS) - 47 of 2020 | Ram Sarup Lugani And Anr. v. Nirmal Lugani And Ors.", - "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "Appellants/plaintiffs filed a civil suit in April 2019. Summons were issued, and respondents/defendants filed their written statement. On July 23, 2019, the court granted appellants four weeks for replication. On September 30, 2019, the Joint Registrar closed their right to file replication, noting over two months had passed without filing or extension application. Appellants challenged this order by filing a Chamber Appeal. They argued the delay, attributable to voluminous pleadings (125+ pages, 500+ documents) and appellant no.1's advanced age and medical condition, was not deliberate and should be condoned. They contended that Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 (DHC Rules), which prescribes 30 days + 15 days for replication, is directory, not mandatory, drawing analogy with Order VIII Rule 1 CPC (citing Desh Raj). They also argued that Rule 5's provision for the Registrar to place the matter \"for appropriate orders before the Court\" implies judicial discretion for further extension. Furthermore, they invoked DHC Rules 14 & 16 (Court's power to dispense with compliance and inherent powers) and the High Court's inherent constitutional powers, asserting these allowed condonation of delay beyond 45 days. On August 6, 2020, the learned Single Judge dismissed the Chamber Appeal, holding replication could not be filed beyond 45 days as prescribed under Rule 5 of the DHC Rules, and there was no power to condone delay beyond that period. The present appeal was filed against the Single Judge's order.", - "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let's tackle this legal judgment. First, I need to understand the case thoroughly. The appellants filed a civil suit in April 2019. The defendants responded, and the court gave them four weeks to replicate. But the Joint Registrar closed their right to file replication on September 30, 2019, saying two months had passed without an extension. The appellants appealed, arguing the delay was due to voluminous documents and the plaintiff's age and health. They claim Rule 5 of the DHC Rules is directory, not mandatory, and that the court can extend beyond 45 days using inherent powers.\n\nThe Single Judge dismissed the appeal, saying replication couldn't go beyond 45 days. Now, the appellants are appealing that decision. \n\nSo, the main issues here are whether the delay was excusable and if the rules are mandatory or directory. The rules mentioned are Rule 5 of DHC Rules, Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, and the inherent powers of the court. \n\nI need to check if Rule 5 is mandatory or directory. The appellants are citing Desh Raj, which might be a case where a rule was considered directory. Also, the DHC Rules 14 and 16 mention the court's power to dispense with compliance. The High Court's inherent powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could also be relevant. \n\nThe analysis should consider whether the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and if the court has discretion to condone beyond the 45 days. The Single Judge said no, but the appellants argue that the rules allow for judicial discretion. \n\nI need to structure this into the FIRAC framework. The facts are the timeline, the reasons for delay, the rules cited. The issues are whether the delay is excusable and if the rules are mandatory. The rules are the DHC Rules, CPC, and inherent powers. The analysis would weigh the arguments of both sides, considering the circumstances and the flexibility of the rules. The conclusion would depend on whether the court can extend beyond the 45 days based on the rules and the circumstances.\n\n\n### Facts: \n1. Appellants/plaintiffs filed a civil suit in April 2019, and respondents/defendants filed their written statement. \n2. On July 23, 2019, the court granted appellants four weeks (i.e., 28 days) to file replication. \n3. The Joint Registrar closed the right to file replication on September 30, 2019, citing that over two months had passed without filing or an extension application. \n4. Appellants challenged this order by filing a Chamber Appeal, arguing the delay was attributable to voluminous pleadings (125+ pages, 500+ documents) and appellant no.1’s advanced age and medical condition. \n5. Appellants contended Rule 5 of the DHC Rules (30 days + 15 days for replication) is directory, not mandatory, and that the Registrar’s power to refer the matter to the court for “appropriate orders” implies judicial discretion. \n6. They invoked DHC Rules 14 & 16 (court’s power to dispense with compliance and inherent powers) and the High Court’s constitutional inherent powers to condone delays beyond 45 days. \n7. The Single Judge dismissed the Chamber Appeal, holding replication could not be filed beyond 45 days under Rule 5 and no power existed to condone delays beyond that. \n8. The present appeal challenges the Single Judge’s order. \n\n---\n\n### Issues: \n1. Whether the delay in filing replication was attributable to unavoidable circumstances and thus excusable under the DHC Rules and inherent powers of the court. \n2. Whether Rule 5 of the DHC Rules is mandatory or directory, and whether the court has discretion to extend the replication period beyond 45 days. \n\n---\n\n### Rules: \n1. **Rule 5 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 (DHC Rules)**: Prescribes a 30-day period for replication, with an additional 15 days for the Registrar to place the matter “for appropriate orders before the Court.” \n2. **Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)**: Provides for condonation of delay in filing pleadings if the delay is not deliberate. \n3. **DHC Rules 14 & 16**: Grant the court inherent powers to dispense with compliance with procedural rules and exercise inherent authority. \n4. **Inherent Constitutional Powers**: Under Article 226 of the Constitution, High Courts have inherent powers to ensure justice, including condoning procedural defaults. \n5. **Desh Raj v. State of Punjab (1975)**: A precedent where a rule was deemed directory, not mandatory, allowing flexibility in its application. \n\n---\n\n### Analysis: \n1. **Nature of Rule 5**: The appellants argue Rule 5 is directory, not mandatory, based on the phrase “for appropriate orders before the Court,” which implies judicial discretion. This aligns with the precedent in *Desh Raj*, where procedural rules were treated as directory when they allowed for judicial flexibility. The Single Judge’s rigid interpretation of Rule 5 as mandatory overlooks this textual ambiguity. \n \n2. **Excusable Delay**: The appellants’ delay was caused by voluminous pleadings (125+ pages, 500+ documents) and appellant no.1’s medical condition. These are recognized as unavoidable circumstances under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC and the court’s inherent powers. The Single Judge’s dismissal of these factors ignores the factual context and the burden on the appellants to comply with a procedural deadline under exceptional circumstances. \n\n3. **Inherent Powers of the Court**: DHC Rules 14 & 16, along with the High Court’s constitutional inherent powers under Article 226, empower the court to condone delays when justice demands it. The Single Judge’s refusal to exercise this discretion contravenes the spirit of procedural flexibility and the principle of justice being done. \n\n4. **Procedural Rigidity vs. Judicial Discretion**: While Rule 5 sets a 45-day deadline, the Registrar’s role in referring the matter to the court for “appropriate orders” explicitly leaves room for judicial extension. The Single Judge’s rigid adherence to the 45-day limit without considering the appellants’ specific circumstances constitutes an error in applying the rules. \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion: \nThe appeal is **ALLOWED**. The Single Judge erred in treating Rule 5 as a mandatory deadline without considering the appellants’ excusable delay and the court’s inherent powers to condone procedural defaults. The facts demonstrate that the delay was unavoidable, and the rules permit judicial discretion to extend the replication period. The High Court’s inherent authority and the principles of justice require a departure from the rigid application of the 45-day limit in this case.", - "reference_judgment": "1. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 06.08.2020 passed by a learned Single Judge whereby, Chamber Appeal registered as OA 122/2019, filed by the appellants/plaintiffs in CS(OS) 182/2019, challenging the order dated 30.09.2020, passed by the learned Joint Registrar closing their right to file the replication in response to the written statement of the respondents/defendants, has been dismissed.\n2. The appellants/plaintiffs herein had instituted a suit on the Original Side of the court in April, 2019 with the following prayers:- \"a. A Decree of Declaration thereby declaring that defendants 1 to 6 are not eligible to continue as Trustee of defendant no. 7 Trust and hence cease to be Trustees of the said Trust and consequently appoint an Administrator to frame a scheme for appointing new Trustees in place of defendants 1 to 6, while retaining plaintiffs as trustees. b. A Decree of Permanent Injunction restraining defendant no.1 from representing herself as a Trustee of Defendant Trust. c. A Decree of Mandatory Injunction directing the defendants to deposit all original title deeds/ lease deeds and other ownership documents pertaining to Sector 55 and Sector 62 Schools, with plaintiff no.1 and also return all assets/properties of defendant Trust or of the schools running under the aegis of defendant Trust, i.e. 'Gurugram Public School' to the respective Schools. d. A Decree of Recovery of amount from defendants 1 to 6, assessed by a valuer appointed by this Hon'ble Court, for the loss suffered by the Sector 55 School of Defendant Trust, due to loss of vehicles bearing nos. HR26BE4849 and HR26BP2892. e. A Decree of rendition of accounts directing the defendants to render accounts for the period 2011 till date of decree, and further direct the defendants to make good all losses caused by their acts of omission and commission and consequently to replenish all such amounts in to the trust with interest. f. Award cost of suit in favour of plaintiffs. Such other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may kindly be granted in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.\"\n3. Summons were issued in the suit and the case was adjourned to 23.07.2019. In the meantime, written statement was filed by the respondents/defendants. When the matter was listed in court on 23.07.2019, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs had stated that he had received a copy of the written statement and the court had granted him four weeks' to file the replication and the affidavit of admission/denial of documents. The suit was directed to be posted before the learned Joint Registrar on 30.09.2019, for further proceedings. On 30.09.2019, when learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs had sought for more time from the learned Joint Registrar to file the replication, noting that over two months had lapsed reckoned from 23.7.2019, he had closed their right to do so and directed that admission/denial of the documents of the respondents/defendants be carried out. The order passed by the learned Joint Registrar on 30.09.2019, reads as under: \"Written statement and affidavit of admission/denial of documents filed on behalf of defendants no.1 to 6. Copy supplied. No replication to the written statement filed. Learned counsel for plaintiff has submitted that he is going to file replication within two weeks along with appropriate application, but same is strongly opposed by learned counsel for defendants on the ground that as per Chapter 7 Rule 5 Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, only 45 days has been granted to the plaintiff to file replication including 15 days time of extension on application, but neither such application moved nor replication filed within 30 days. On 23.07.2019, plaintiff sought time to file replication, but no replication has been filed despite lapse of more than two months and no ground is made out for further extension of time. Accordingly, opportunity of plaintiff to file replication is hereby closed. Admission/denial of documents on behalf of defendant qua the documents of plaintiff carried out. Learned counsel for defendant has admitted six documents of plaintiff which are Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-6. Rest of the documents are denied. On the other hand, plaintiff has not filed any affidavit of admission/denial of documents qua the documents of defendants due to no admission/denial is carried out on behalf of plaintiff and consequences of non-filing of affidavit of admission/denial shall follow. List the matter before the Hon'ble Court for issues/further direction on the date already fixed i.e. 01.11.2019.\"\n4. The above order of the Joint Registrar was challenged by the appellants/plaintiffs by filing a Chamber Appeal. Vide judgment/order dated 06.08.2020 impugned herein, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the said Chamber Appeal holding that the replication could not be filed beyond the period of 45 days, as prescribed under Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court(Original Side) Rules, 2018 (for short 'DHC Rules') and there is no power to condone the delay beyond the time prescribed under the DHC Rules. Aggrieved by the said order, the present appeal has been filed.\n5. The short question which arises for our consideration is as to whether in a non-commercial ordinary civil suit, the period prescribed for filing the replication under Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the DHC Rules is directory or mandatory in nature and whether the time prescribed therein, even if not extendable by the Joint Registrar, can still be extended by the court.\n6. Arguing for the appellants/plaintiffs, Mr. Tanmaya Mehta, learned counsel submitted that the respondents 1 to 6 had filed a written statement running into over 125 pages and they had filed over 500 pages of documents. Due to the voluminous pleadings in the written statement and the documents filed and the medical condition of the appellant No.1, who is the Managing Trustee of the respondent No.7/Trust and is 93 years of age with constraints in his movement, the appellants and the counsel took some time to prepare the replication. The said delay was not deliberate and ought to have been condoned. Learned counsel places reliance on Desh Raj v. Balkishan, reported as (2020) 2 SCC 708 wherein, in an appeal arising from a decision of the Delhi High Court, while interpreting the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC, in circumstances where the defendant therein had filed his written statement after a delay of 95 days beyond the maximum extendable period provided under Proviso 2 of Rule 1, Order VIII of the CPC, the Supreme Court has held that the said provision is only directory and not mandatory. Drawing an analogy with the fact situation in the said decision, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs contended that the time period prescribed in Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the DHC Rules is also directory in nature and therefore, it cannot be said that the court is powerless to condone the delay and accept the replication beyond the time prescribed therein.\n7. Seeking to distinguish the way Rule 4 and Rule 5 of the DHC Rules are worded, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs submitted that unlike Rule 4, that mandates the Registrar to close the right to file the written statement upon expiry of 120 days, no such rigorous language has been used in Rule 5. Rather, Rule 5 stipulates that upon expiry of 45 days, the Registrar has to place the matter before court for further orders. Therefore, even if the Registrar has no power to condone the delay beyond the period of 45 days, the court can condone the delay even beyond the said period and take the replication on record.\n8. Adverting to Rule 16 in Chapter I of the DHC Rules, learned counsel for the appellant sought to urge that the said Rule stipulates that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of court and the said provision could have been well invoked by the learned Single Judge in the present case. Placing reliance on Rule 14 of Chapter I that empowers the court to dispense with making compliance of the DHC Rules for sufficient cause shown it was argued that Rules 14 and 16 vest sufficient powers in the court to relax the period prescribed in Rule 5 and permit filing of the replication beyond the period of 45 days. It was sought to be canvassed that if it is held that there is no power vested in the court to condone the delay in filing the replication beyond the period of 45 days, then Rules 14 and Rule 16 will become superfluous.\n9. Another argument sought to be advanced on behalf of the appellants/plaintiffs was that when Rule 5 provides that after the period of 45 days, the Registrar has to place the matter before the court for passing appropriate orders, it postulates that discretion still vests in the court to accept the replication even beyond the period of 45 days, on sufficient reasons being offered as to why the same was not filed within the prescribed time. Learned counsel submitted that if the Rule is not construed in this manner, the words 'for appropriate orders' used in Rule 5, will be rendered nugatory.\n10. Referring to the scheme of Chapter VII of the Rules which shows that after the replication, parties are to proceed with admission/denial of documents which the Registrar can get done himself, learned counsel contended that the very fact that the matter has to be placed in court, shows that there is ample power in the court to accept the replication filed beyond the period of 45 days and that is the reason why the matter is required to be placed before the court to consider as to whether sufficient cause has been shown by a party to condone the delay even beyond the period of 45 days. Lastly, it was submitted that the High Court being a Constitutional court, has the inherent power to accept replications even beyond the time prescribed in the DHC Rules and the said power cannot be circumscribed or curtailed in any manner.\n11. A quick glance at the rule position first. Rule 4 falling under Chapter I of the DHC Rules is the definition clause which defines various terms used in the Rules. Rule 4(e) defines \"The Court\" or \"this Court\", while Rule 4(k) defines 'Registrar' and read as under:\n\"4. Definitions. -In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires: ... ... (e) \"The Court\" or \"this Court\" means the Delhi High Court; .... ... (k) \"Registrar\" means and includes the Registrar and Joint Registrar, respectively of the Court, and includes any other officer of the Court to whom the powers and functions of the Registrar under these Rules, may be delegated or assigned;\"\n12. Chapter VII of the DHC Rules lays down the procedure for appearance by the defendant, of filing of the written statement, set off, counter-claim and replication. Rule 4 and Rule 5 of Chapter VII are relevant for this case and read as under:\n\"4. Extension of time for filing written statement.-If the Court is satisfied that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause for exceptional and unavoidable reasons in filing the written statement within 30 days, it may extend the time for filing the same by a further period not exceeding 90 days, but not thereafter. For such extension of time, the party in delay shall be burdened with costs as deemed appropriate. The written statement shall not be taken on record unless such costs have been paid/ deposited. In case the defendant fails to file the affidavit of admission/ denial of documents filed by the plaintiff, the documents filed by the plaintiff shall be deemed to be admitted. In case, no written statement is filed within the extended time also, the Registrar may pass orders for closing the right to file the written statement.\n5. Replication.-The replication, if any, shall be filed within 30 days of receipt of the written statement. If the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause for exceptional and unavoidable reasons in filing the replication within 30 days, it may extend the time for filing the same by a further period not exceeding 15 days but not thereafter. For such extension, the plaintiff shall be burdened with costs, as deemed appropriate. The replication shall not be taken on record, unless such costs have been paid/ deposited. In case no replication is filed within the extended time also, the Registrar shall forthwith place the matter for appropriate orders before the Court. An advance copy of the replication together with legible copies of all documents in possession and power of plaintiff, that it seeks to file along with the replication, shall be served on the defendant and the replication together with the said documents shall not be accepted unless it contains an endorsement of service signed by the defendant/ his Advocate.\" (emphasis supplied)\n13. Rules 14 and 16 of Chapter I of the DHC Rules that lays down the general provisions, read as under:\n\"14. Court's power to dispense with compliance with the Rules.- The Court may, for sufficient cause shown, excuse parties from compliance with any requirement of these Rules, and may give such directions in matters of practice and procedure, as it may consider just and expedient. [Provided where the Court/Judge is of the opinion that Practice Directions are required to be issued, he may make it suitable reference to the Hon'ble Chief Justice.]\" ... ...\n\"16. Inherent power of the Court not affected.- Nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court.\"\n14. The term \"The Court\" and \"Registrar\" have been defined in Rule 4 that is a part of Chapter I of the Rules. On a reading of Rule 5 it is clear that the replication, if any, should be filed within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the written statement. The word \"shall\" used in the said Rule postulates that the replication must be filed within 30 days of the receipt of the written statement. The Registrar does not have the power to condone any delay beyond 30 days. The permission to condone the delay beyond the period of 30 days, lies with the court. If the court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause or for exceptional and unavoidable reasons from filing the replication within 30 days, it may extend the time for filing the same by a further period not exceeding 15 days with a suffix appended to the Rule stating, \"but not thereafter\". The phrase \"but not thereafter\" mentioned in the Rule indicates that the intention of the rule making authority was not to permit any replication to be entertained beyond a total period of 45 days. If any other interpretation is given to the said Rule, then the words \"but not thereafter\", will become otiose.\n15. This is not the first time that the phrase, \"but not thereafter\" have been used in the statute. The said preemptory words have been used in other provisions that have come up for interpretation before the Supreme Court. In Union of India v. Popular Construction Co, reported as (2001) 8 SCC 470, the words \"but not thereafter\" were used in relation to the power of the court to condone the delay in challenging the award beyond the period prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Supreme Court observed as below:-\n\"12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are \"but not thereafter\" used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase \"but not thereafter\" wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.\n16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award \"in accordance with\" sub- section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application \"in accordance with\" that sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that \"where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired ... the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court\". This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to \"proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow\" (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.\" (emphasis supplied)\n16. In Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors, reported as (2008) 3 SCC 70, on interpreting Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, which contains similar provisions, the Supreme Court has observed as under:\n\"8. The Commissioner of Central Excise(appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short \"the Limitation Act\") can be available for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision of order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section(1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period.\" (emphasis supplied)\n17. After referring to the above decision, in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited and Anr, reported as (2009) 5 SCC 791, the Supreme Court went on to observe as under:\n\"30. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which provides for appeals and revisions to various authorities. Though Parliament has specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by the Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and reference application to the High Court under Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act. X X X X\n32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. X X X X\n35. It was contended before us that the words \"expressly excluded\" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court.\" (emphasis supplied)\n18. We may also profitably refer to Bengal Chemists and Druggists Association v. Kalyan Chowdhury, reported as (2018) 3 SCC 41, where while examining the provisions of the Companies Act, the Supreme Court made the following observations:\n\"3. Before coming to the judgments of this Court, it is important to first set out Section 421(3) and Section 433 of the Act. These provisions read as follows:\n\"421. Appeal from orders of Tribunal.-(1)- (2) * * * (3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved and shall be in such form, and accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days from the date aforesaid, but within a further period not exceeding forty-five days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period. ... * * *\n433. Limitation.-The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall, as far as may be, apply to proceedings or appeals before the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be.\"\n4. A cursory reading of Section 421(3) makes it clear that the proviso provides a period of limitation different from that provided in the Limitation Act, and also provides a further period not exceeding 45 days only if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period. Section 433 obviously cannot come to the aid of the appellant because the provisions of the Limitation Act only apply \"as far as may be\". In a case like the present, where there is a special provision contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply.\n5. Another very important aspect of the case is that 45 days is the period of limitation, and a further period not exceeding 45 days is provided only if sufficient cause is made out for filing the appeal within the extended period. According to us, this is a peremptory provision, which will otherwise be rendered completely ineffective, if we were to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. If we were to accept such argument, it would mean that notwithstanding that the further period of 45 days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if the facts so warrant, condone the delay. This would be to render otiose the second time-limit of 45 days, which, as has been pointed out by us above, is peremptory in nature.\" (emphasis supplied)\n19. In P. Radhabai v. P. Ashok Kumar, reported as (2019) 13 SCC 445, while construing the phrase, \"but not thereafter\" used in the proviso to sub section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the Supreme Court held thus: \"32.4. The limitation provision in Section 34(3) also provides for condonation of delay. Unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay can only be condoned for 30 days on showing sufficient cause. The crucial phrase \"but not thereafter\" reveals the legislative intent to fix an outer boundary period for challenging an award. X X X X 33.2. The proviso to Section 34(3) enables a court to entertain an application to challenge an award after the three months' period is expired, but only within an additional period of thirty dates, \"but not thereafter\". The use of the phrase \"but not thereafter\" shows that the 120 days' period is the outer boundary for challenging an award. If Section 17 were to be applied, the outer boundary for challenging an award could go beyond 120 days. The phrase \"but not thereafter\" would be rendered redundant and otiose. This Court has consistently taken this view that the words \"but not thereafter\" in the proviso of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act are of a mandatory nature, and couched in negative terms, which leaves no room for doubt. (State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers [State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 605] , Assam Urban Water Supply and SewerageBoard v. Subash Projects and Mktg. Ltd. [Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Mktg. Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831] and Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel [Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel, (2018) 15 SCC 178 : (2019) 1 SCC (Civ) 141] .)\n34. In our view, the aforesaid inconsistencies with the language of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act tantamount to an \"express exclusion\" of Section 17 of the Limitation Act.\" (emphasis supplied)\n20. In New India Assurance Company Limited v. Hili Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited, reported as (2020) 5 SCC 757, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 that provides for the respondent/opposite party to file its response to the complaint within 30 days or such extended period, not extending 15 days, should be read as mandatory or directory i.e. whether the District Forum would have the power to extend the time for filing the response beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days. The Supreme Court has answered the said question in the following words:\n\"20. The legislature in its wisdom has provided for filing of complaint or appeals beyond the period specified under the relevant provisions of the Act and Regulations, if there is sufficient cause given by the party, which has to be to the satisfaction of the authority concerned. No such discretion has been provided for under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act for filing a response to the complaint beyond the extended period of 45 days (30 days plus 15 days). Had the legislature not wanted to make such provision mandatory but only directory, the provision for further extension of the period for filing the response beyond 45 days would have been provided, as has been provided for in the cases of filing of complaint and appeals. To carve out an exception in a specific provision of the statute is not within the jurisdiction of the courts, and if it is so done, it would amount to legislating or inserting a provision into the statute, which is not permissible. X X X X\n25. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that by not leaving a discretion with the District Forum for extending the period of limitation for filing the response before it by the opposite party, grave injustice would be caused as there could be circumstances beyond the control of the opposite party because of which the opposite party may not be able to file the response within the period of 30 days or the extended period of 15 days. In our view, if the law so provides, the same has to be strictly complied, so as to achieve the object of the statute. It is well settled that law prevails over equity, as equity can only supplement the law, and not supplant it. X X X X\n27. It is thus settled law that where the provision of the Act is clear and unambiguous, it has no scope for any interpretation on equitable ground.\" (emphasis supplied)\n21. A conspectus of the decisions referred to above leaves no manner of doubt that where ever the phrase \"but not thereafter\" has been used in a provision for setting a deadline, the intention of the legislature is to treat the same as a preemptory provision. Thus, if Rule 15 of the DHC Rules mandates filing of a replication within a period of 30 days reckoned from the date of receipt of the written statement, with an additional period of 15 days provided and that too only if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has been able to demonstrate that it was prevented to do so by sufficient cause or for exceptional and unavoidable reasons, can the time for filing the replication be extended for a further period not exceeding 15 days in any event, with costs imposed on the plaintiff. The critical phrase \"but not thereafter\" used in Rule 15 must be understood to mean that even the court cannot extend the period for filing the replication beyond the outer limit of 45 days provided in the DHC Rules. Upon expiry of the said period, the plaintiff's right to file the replication would stand extinguished. Any other meaning sought to be bestowed on the above provision, would make the words \"but not thereafter\", inconsequential.\n22. The next contention of Mr. Mehta that the words \"the Registrar shall forthwith place the matter for appropriate orders before the court\" used in Rule 5 of the DHC Rules indicates that the court would still have the power to accept a replication filed beyond a period of 45 days, is also untenable. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the answer to the problem as to whether a statutory provision is mandatory or is directory in nature, lies in the intention of the law maker, as expressed in the law itself. The words \"replication, if any, shall be filed within 30 days of the receipt of the written statement\" and further, the words \"further period not exceeding 15 days, but not thereafter\" used in Rule 5 will lose its entire meaning if we accept the submission made on behalf of the appellants that even if the timeline for filing the replication cannot be extended by the Registrar, there is no such embargo placed on the court.\n23. The court must start with the assumption that every word used in a statute, has been well thought out and inserted with a specific purpose and ordinarily, the court must not deviate from what is expressly stated therein. The period granted for filing the replication under Rule 15 of the DHC Rules is only 30 days and on expiry of 30 days, the court can only condone a delay which does not exceed 15 days over and above 30 days and that too on the condition that the plaintiff is able to offer adequate and sufficient reasons explaining as to why the replication could not be filed within 30 days. As observed earlier, since the terms 'Court' and 'Registrar' have been defined in the DHC Rules, Rule 5 requires that the court alone can extend the time to file the replication beyond the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the written statement. Even the discretion vested in the court for granting extension of time is hedged with conditions and the outer limit prescribed is 15 days. If the replication is not filed within the extended time granted, the Registrar is required to place the matter back before the court for closing the right of the plaintiff to file the replication.\n24. A reading of the relevant provisions of the DHC Rules shows that it is a special provision within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act (for short 'the Act'), that contemplates that where any special or local law prescribes a time limit that is different from the one provided for under the Limitation Act, 1963, then Section 4 to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be expressly excluded. It is well settled that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Section 4 to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by an express provision or reference, then too, if it is clear from the mandate or the language of the statute, the scheme of the special law will exclude the application of Section 4 to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (Ref: Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, reported as (1974) 2 SCC 133).\n25. It is equally well settled that when the provision of a law/statute prescribes specific provisions, then those provisions cannot be sidestepped or circumvented by seeking to invoke the inherent powers of the court under the statute. The principles required to be followed for regulating the inherent powers of the court in the context of applying the provisions of Section 151 CPC, have been highlighted in State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Roshan Singh and Ors., reported as (2008) 2 SCC 488, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under:\n\"7. The principles which regulate the exercise of inherent powers by a court have been highlighted in many cases. In matters with which the Code of Civil Procedure does not deal with, the court will exercise its inherent power to do justice between the parties which is warranted under the circumstances and which the necessities of the case require. If there are specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with the particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter, the inherent powers of the court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. The inherent powers of the court are not to be used for the benefit of a litigant who has a remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure. Similar is the position vis-a-vis other statutes.\n8. The object of Section 151 CPC is to supplement and not to replace the remedies provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 151 CPC will not be available when there is alternative remedy and the same is accepted to be a well- settled ratio of law. The operative field of power being thus restricted, the same cannot be risen to inherent power. The inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on it. If there are express provisions covering a particular topic, such power cannot be exercised in that regard. The section confers on the court power of making such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice of the court. Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked when there is express provision even under which the relief can be claimed by the aggrieved party. The power can only be invoked to supplement the provisions of the Code and not to override or evade other express provisions. The position is not different so far as the other statutes are concerned. Undisputedly, an aggrieved person is not remediless under the Act.\" (emphasis supplied)\n26. Yet again, expounding on the inherent powers of the court and the fetters placed on it, in K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, reported as (2011) 11 SCC 275, the Supreme Court has made the following pertinent observations:\n\"12. The respondent contended that Section 151 cannot be used for reopening evidence or for recalling witnesses. We are not able to accept the said submission as an absolute proposition. We however agree that Section 151 of the Code cannot be routinely invoked for reopening evidence or recalling witnesses. The scope of Section 151 has been explained by this Court in several decisions [see Padam Sen v. State of U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 218 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 322] , Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal [AIR 1962 SC 527] , Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] , Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava [AIR 1966 SC 1899], Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee [(1970) 1 SCC 732] , Newabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [(1976) 1 SCC 120 : AIR 1976 SC 1152] , Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. CIT [(1977) 1 SCC 508 : 1977 SCC (Tax) 208 : AIR 1977 SC 1348] , National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara [(2005) 2 SCC 256] and Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj [(2010) 8 SCC 1 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 212] ]. We may summarise them as follows: (a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognises the discretionary power inherent in every court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is \"right\" and undo what is \"wrong\", that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. (b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, Section 151 recognises and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. (c) A court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or in a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. (d) The inherent powers of the court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the legislature. (e) While exercising the inherent power, the court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends upon the discretion and wisdom of the court, and in the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of an express provision in the Code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief. (f) The power under Section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court.\" (emphasis supplied)\n27. Since the language of Rule 5 shows that the intention of the Rule making Authority was to exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, giving no power to the court to condone any delay beyond the period of 45 days for accepting the replication, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs cannot be heard to state that Rule 16 could have been very well invoked by the learned Single Judge to take on record the belatedly filed replication. The sanctity of the period of 30 days, extendable by another period of 15 days cannot be diluted by giving such an interpretation. In view of the specific provision and the timeline stated in Rule 5 of Chapter VII, that precludes the court from extending the timeline beyond 45 days for accepting the replication, the argument advanced by Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs that notwithstanding Rule 5, provisions of Rule 16 and Rule 14 of Chapter I of the DHC Rules empower the court to take on record, the replication even beyond the period of 45 days and ought to have been resorted to by the learned Single Judge, cannot be accepted\n28. In our opinion, reliance placed by Mr. Mehta on Desh Raj (supra), is also misplaced. No doubt, the Supreme Court has held that a reading of proviso 2 appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII would show that the said Rule is only directory and not mandatory, ultimately the Supreme Court has refused to condone the delay in that case. In fact, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of this case for the reason that in the said judgment, there was no occasion to deal with the scope and effect of Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the DHC Rules. In any event, the DHC Rules will have an overriding effect on the CPC. Notably the Code does not provide for filing of any replication. Order VI, Rule 1 describes \"pleadings\" to mean plaint or written statement. It is the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 that provides a time limit for filing the replication and since the said Rules regulate the procedure, the same will have to prevail over the Code. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of this court in DDA and Another Vs. K.R. Builders (P) Ltd., reported as 2005 (81) DRJ 708 and relied on in HTIL Corporation, B.V. and Ors. v. Ajay Kohli and Ors., reported as (2006) 90 DRJ 410, where it was observed as under:\n\"6. The question as to whether the CPC or the Original Side Rules will apply was considered by a Division Bench of this court in the recent case of DDA and Anr. v. K.R. Builders P. Ltd., 2005 (81) DRJ 708 (DB). The finding of the Division Bench supported the view of the learned defence counsel that suits filed on the original side of this court would be governed by the rules framed by the High Court to the exclusion of the provisions of the CPC wherever the field is occupied by these Rules and that this court has the power to extend the time for filing the written statement even beyond 90 days. However, the Division Bench also clarified that Rule 3, as it then stood, of Chapter IV of the Delhi High Court (Original Side Rules) does not contemplate unending extensions to be granted on the asking. Rule 3 provided as under:\n\"3. Extension of time for filing written statement.- Ordinarily, not more than one extension of time shall be granted to the defendant for filing a written statement provided that a second or any further extension may be granted only on an application made in writing setting forth sufficient grounds for such extension and supported, if so required, by an affidavit.\"\n7. The Division Bench pointed out that as per the rule quoted above, only one extension of time was to be granted for filing written statement and that the second or further extension may be granted only on an application made in writing setting forth sufficient grounds. It was also pointed out that the expression 'any further extension' in this proviso does not contemplate unending extensions on the asking and that 'any further extension' should receive a restricted interpretation. The situation has now changed since the Delhi High Court (Original Side Rules) have also been amended. The amendment which has taken effect on 9.1.2006 is now as under:\n\"3. Extension of time for filing written statement.- Where the defendant fails to file written statement within the period of 30 days as stated in Rule 2(ii) he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day as may be specified by the Court on an application made in writing setting forth sufficient ground for such extension and supported, if so required, by an affidavit but such day shall not be later than 90 days from the service of summons.\"\n8. In view of this amendment, the Delhi High Court (Original Side Rules) give the same time schedule for filing a written statement. Written statement, therefore, can be filed within 30 days and thereafter on sufficient ground for such extension being shown on an affidavit but such extension shall not be later than 90 days from the date of service.\" (emphasis supplied)\n29. In M/s Print Pak Machinery Ltd. v. Jay Kay Papers Converters, reported as AIR 1979 Del 217, answering a reference placed before it for reconciling the consistency between the scheme of Order 37 of the CPC, as amended in 1976 and the provisions Chapter XV of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967 that deals with \"summary suits\", a Full Bench of this court held that the Rules will take a precedence over the Code and observed as under:-\n\"8. I think, the question is really concluded by Section 129 of the Code. It reads: \"Notwithstanding anything in this Code, any High Court not being the Court of a Judicial Commissioner may make such rules not inconsistent with the Letters Patent or order or other law establishing it to regulate its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction as it shall think fit, and nothing herein contained shall affect the validity of any such rules in force at the commencement of this Code.\" No doubt the closing words will not save the Original Side Rules of this Court, as they were not 'in force at the commencement' of the Code. But, the opening words 'Notwithstanding anything in this Code' are self-effacing, and subordinate the Code to rules made by a High Court for its original side at any time. The cumulative effect of those two parts of the section is to leave untouched the original rules of a High Court whether framed before or after 1908. Since section 2(1) says that the '\"Code\" includes rules', the original side rules will prevail both over the body of the Code and the First Schedule. Therefore, the statement in Order 37 rule 1(a) that 'This order shall apply to........High Courts' must be read subject to section 129.\n9. These propositions are old and well-established. In Newab Behram Jung v. Haji Sultan Ali Shustry, ILR 27 Bombay 572 (1) it was held that, in view of section 129, a rule in the Code did not apply as it was inconsistent with a rule in the Bombay High Court Rules. Similarly, in Virupaksha Rao Naidu v. M. Ranganayaki Ammal, AIR 1925 Madras 1132 (2), it was said: 'Section 129 of the Code gives the High Court the power to make rules, regulating the procedure of the Original Side and nothing in the Code will affect such rules. The effect is that if the rules of the High Court, Original Side, and the Code are inconsistent, the rules prevail.' Many cases from Calcutta hold the same: Umeshchandra Banerji v. Kunjilal Biswas, AIR 1930 Calcutta 685 (3), Gowal Das Sidany v. Luchmi Chand Jhawar, AIR 1930 Calcutta 324 (4); In re: Ram Dayal De, AIR 1932 Calcutta 1 (5); Shaw and Co. v. B. Shamaldas and Co., AIR 1954 Calcutta 369 (6) and Manickchand Durgaprasad v. Pratabmull Rameswar, AIR 1961 Calcutta 483 (7). And, so does the High Court of Allahabad: Mool Chand v. Kamta Prasad, AIR 1961 Allahabad 595 (8).\n11. The conclusion thus drawn from section 129 can also be reached from section 4(1) of the Code, though not in the manner that was suggested in argument. Section 4(1) of the Code provides that: 'In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force.' It has been held that rules made by a High Court or the Supreme Court to regulate their procedure and practice are a 'special law' as they deal with a particular subject: The Union of India v. Ram Kanwar, AIR 1962 SC 247 (11); Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lahore v. Official Liquidators, Punjab Cotton Press Co. Ltd. (in liquidation), AIR 1941 Lahore 257 (12) and The Deities of Sri Audinarayana Swamy and Anjenayaswami Temples of Donepudi v. R. Hanumacharyulu, AIR 1962 AP 245 (13). Nevertheless, the Original Side Rules of Delhi High Court would not be protected by section 4(1) of the Code. Only those 'special laws' are saved which are 'now in force', which means 1908. But, they are a 'special form of procedure prescribed' by or under a law 'for the time being in force', and would be covered on that account. There is no 'specific provision to the contrary' and the result is that nothing in the Code 'shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect' anything in the Original Side Rules.\" (emphasis supplied)\n30. To answer the last plea taken by Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs that a Constitutional Court cannot be denuded of the power to condone the delay in filing the replication even if the power of the High Court to condone delay in relation to periods prescribed in the DHC Rules has been circumscribed, we need not travel beyond Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, reported as (2001) 7 SCC 549, where the Supreme Court has observed as under:\n\"31. This Court has always frowned upon the grant or existence of absolute or unbridled power. Just as power or jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in accordance with law, if any, enacted by the legislature, it would stand to reason that the power under Article 129 and/ or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted law. In case of apparent or likelihood of conflict the provisions should be construed harmoniously.\"\n31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 will prevail over the Civil Procedure Code. The inherent powers contemplated in Rule 16 are not to be exercised to overcome the period of limitation expressly prescribed in Rule 5 for filing the replication. Nor can Rule 5 be circumvented by invoking any other provision or even the inherent powers of the court, contrary to the scheme of the Rules. The phrase, \"but not thereafter\" used in Rule 5 makes it crystal clear that the Rule is mandatory in nature and the court cannot permit the replication to be taken on the record after the plaintiff has exhausted the maximum prescribed period of 45 days. Any other interpretation will result in causing violence to the DHC Rules.\n32. In view of the above, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order whereby the Chamber Appeal filed by the appellants/plaintiffs was dismissed. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed as meritless, along with the pending applications.", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Appeal (Civil) 6782 of 2001 | Secretary, School Of Committee, Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School v. The Govt. Of Tamil Nadu And Others | 02/04/2003", + "case_details": "Case: Appeal (Civil) 6782 of 2001 | Secretary, School Of Committee, Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School v. The Govt. Of Tamil Nadu And Others", + "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "case_record": "The Managing Committee of Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School appeals against a High Court decision concerning the termination of an employee (P.G. Assistant for English, appointed in 1978). The management deemed the employee's performance and attendance unsatisfactory, citing irregular teaching, absence without prior permission from December 1, 1984, and failure to pass a mandatory Tamil language examination. Memos were issued regarding these deficiencies, and charges were framed. Despite show cause notices, the employee did not respond. The management terminated the employee's services effective December 1, 1984, and sought approval from the Chief Educational Officer (CEO) as per Rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974. The CEO refused approval, deeming the allegations not grave enough for dismissal. An appeal to the Joint Director was rejected, and the CEO later directed reinstatement with back wages. The management challenged this in the High Court, arguing that student welfare necessitated disciplinary action and that the authorities overstepped their jurisdiction by examining punishment proportionality. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The employee, who has since been superannuated, appeared in person, claiming to be a victim of mala fides. The State Government has been paying the employee's salary based on interim court orders.", + "generated_judgment": "**CONCLUSION: DISMISSED.**\n\n### **Rationale:**\nThe appeal fails on all material grounds due to a **lack of substantial errors of law or fact** in the process followed:\n\n1. **Sufficient Evidence for Dismissal** – The record confirms the grounds stated (irregular teaching, unauthorized absence, and failure to pass a qualifying examination) as demonstrably viable under administrative discipline. The Demonstrations in earnest followed, with the employee not responding—material that Mastersավորced their containment.\n\n2. **Procedural Strict Communications**: The management complied with legal wellreacied by this Rule 17, seeking CEO’s veil on time. The CEO’s stay call **not oppress/search but case-specific** (*Role 31(1)(c)* broadly covered ‘unsatisfactory services.’ Multiple charges and per collation was at lawful interpretation.\n\n3. **High Court Ruling Grounds Valid**: The school argued studentability motives (e.g., correcting intra-school misconduct habits), not exceeding jurisdiction. The High Court *fully assessed* the proportionality of dismissal admissible disciplinary action beyond 1st years lin-this teacher’s 36 years’ duration (e.g., not analogous to punitive salary dedctions).\n\n4. **No Mala fides Misconduct—Writ in *Recap***: Superannuation matter *is locked*, establishing arbitrary cruelty accusation a rejection of the facts.\n\nThus, failure recurrence— Wald independently, Pursuant to stopping order criteria as meeting procedural/statutory ‘constituted force rules’—isopposably dismissed for *no viable merits.*", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : Arijit Pasayat, J.\n1. Undaunted by reverses before the departmental authorities and the High Court, the Managing Committee of Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School (hereinafter referred to as the 'management') has filed this appeal. The controversy lies within u narrow compass and factual position being undisputed, a brief reference thereto would suffice.\n2. The 5th respondent (hereinafter referred to as the 'employee') was appointed as P.G. Assistant for teaching English in 1978. According to management, his behaviour and performance was not satisfactory and that he was highly irregular both in attendance as well as in teaching. A memorandum was sent to him and to another teacher on 14.1.1983 stating therein that they would be required to pass examination conducted by the State of Tamil Nadu in Tamil language before the end of the academic year in order to qualify for the posts they were holding, failing which appropriate action was to be taken. From 1.12.1984, the employee did not attend school.\n3. The management was of the view that since he had not taken prior permission from the school and had not chosen to intimate the school authorities; it resulted in dislocation of the teaching. Prior to his long absence, he had not been taking classes regularly. The students were put to grave and irreparable loss and hardship. Students as well as their parents complained about the deficiencies of the employee in not taking classes regularly and leaving the classes in the middle. He had also not completed portions of the lessons for the 11th standard. Several requests were made to the employee to attend classes, but he turned down their requests. On 29.8.1984, the management issued another memo to him seeking a clarification as to whether he had passed the Tamil examination. On 31.8.1984, the management issued another memo to the employee stating therein that since he had not attended the school for very long period without obtaining prior permission and as he had cancelled the classes and left for home early, same amounted to deficiency in service, misconduct and warranted action. Charges were framed and the employee was called upon to submit his reply to the charges. Another memo was issued on 30.10.1984 containing similar charges.\n4. Additionally, it was indicated that as he had not completed portions of the lessons for 11th standard and the students and parents had complained. He was required to show cause in respect of the allegations. On 24.1.1985 memo of charges was also issued to him, inter alia, indicating that since he had not passed the Tamil examination as required, and since he had failed to discharge his duties diligently having absented from school frequently without prior permission and having not taken classes regularly, there was serious dislocation of work and inconvenience to the students. On 13.3.1985, the show cause notice was issued indicating that in spite of opportunity given; he had failed to respond and was called upon to submit his explanation as to why his services should not be terminated for violation of code of conduct prescribed for teachers employed in private schools.\n5. Another copy of the show cause notice was served through another mode on 9.4.1985. The employee did not respond to the show cause notice. Therefore, a decision was taken by school committee unanimously to terminate his services w.e.f. 1.12.1984, the date from which he had stopped attending the school. On 9.5.1985, letter was written to the Chief Educational Officer, respondent No.3 (in short the 'CEO') seeking his approval for term (nation of employee's services in terms of Rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'). On 29.8.1985 letter was written to the District Educational Officer, respondent No.4 (in short the 'DEO') requesting for early action in the matter.\n6. The DEO issued a notice to the employee but there was no response thereto. On 3.12.1985, DEO sent a report to the CEO. inter alia, indicating that the employee had not denied any of the charges and since the management had produced materials in support of the charges, sanction for dismissal should be granted. On 21.4.1987, an enquiry was conducted by the authorities and the employee was called to the school. But he did not make any effective participation. Again, an enquiry was conducted by the CEO on 23.4.1987. After seeing the employee, the CEO was prima facie of the view that he was psychic.\n7. Finally, on 24.4.1987 the CEO passed an order refusing permission for termination on the ground that the allegations which constituted foundation for the proposed order of termination, were not so grave as to warrant punishment like dismissal. Therefore, permission was refused. Aggrieved by the said order, the Management preferred an appeal under Section 41 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (in short the 'Act') to the Joint Director of School Education (Secondary), Directorate of School Education (in short the 'Joint Director'). The appeal was rejected. inter alia, observing that though the employee did not give any reply to the charges as against him though he appeared before the CEO twice, yet the charges were not so grave as to warrant dismissal. The Joint Director wrote to the management that if it does not pay the wages directly to the employee, action should be taken for making direct payment to him.\n8. On 9.3.1988. CEO asked the management for re instatement of the employee with back wages. Aggrieved by such direction, management preferred a revision before the State Government. It was indicated that the very purpose for which a teacher is appointed is to impart teaching to the students. If the teacher was deficient in teaching and was irregular in taking classes, that is a very serious matter warranting termination of service. It also took a stand that since it had neither suspended the employee nor terminated his services and awaiting approval of the concerned authority, the question of reinstatement and paying back wages did not arise. In fact, the employee had not worked and abandoned work. But the DEO again directed the management to reinstate the employee and pay him back wages failing which the steps regarding direct payment were to be taken. Aggrieved by these orders, the Management filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court. Learned Single Judge was of the view that in terms of what is required under Section 22(1) of the Act, prior approval for effecting termination was necessary. This was intended to be a safeguard to protect the interest of the teacher so that there is no victimisation. An appeal was preferred before the Division Bench, inter alia, taking a stand that disciplinary action was taken was necessary in the interest of the Institution and the students whose interest was of paramount consideration.\n9. The authority and the learned Single Judge lost sight of this vital aspect. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal holding that the authorities had considered the materials on record and, therefore, no interference was called for.\n10. In support of the appeal, Mr. L. Nageshwara Rao, learned senior counsel submitted that the authorities and the High Court were not justified in their views and approach. It was submitted that Section 22 has not been interpreted in the proper perspective. Action of the authorities was beyond jurisdiction. They could not have gone into the question of the proportionality of punishment, as it was beyond the scope of their authority. Secondly, even if it is conceded for the sake of argument that there was jurisdiction to deal with the quantum of punishment, yet there was no application of mind in considering the relevant materials.\n11. Finally, it was submitted that if any amount has to be paid, the same has to be borne by the State Government as the post was a sanctioned and aided post. Another teacher has been appointed and the management is paying his salary. In elaborating the first ground of challenge, it was submitted that if the authorities can decide the quantum of punishment aspect, it would mean as if they are acting as an appellate authority. In case of approved action, appeal is provided under Section 23 of the Act and the effected employee is given an opportunity to prefer an appeal. There is also a scope for second appeal in terms of Section 24 of the Act. Proportionality is not within the domain of approved authority.\n12. The satisfaction of the approving authority is limited to consider whether adequate and reasonable grounds exist for taking action in the manner proposed by the management. The authorities and the High Court have lost sight of the fact that what was of paramount consideration is the welfare of the institution and the students in particular. A teacher, who is deficient in teaching as well as irregular, does not meet the requirements of a teacher, as one would expect him to be. This aspect which was of vital importance has been lost sight of, and not taken note of by the authorities and the High Court. The employee reflected very casual approach and even has absented from duty on several occasions for very long periods and after 1.12.1984 has not bothered to join duty. The employee who appeared in person supported the action and took the stand that he is victim of circumstances, and mala fides, and the management has been unfair to him. He claimed to be an ideal teacher for whom truth and honesty are the key-words.\n13. Learned counsel for the State Government submitted that pursuant to the interim directions given by this Court, the State has been paying the employee the amounts of salary directed to be paid. In fact, it has filed an interlocutory application No. 2 for modification of this Court's order. With reference to the counter affidavit filed in appeal, it is pointed out that the management has not drawn the amount sanctioned to it on the ground that it cannot make payment of said amount to a person (the teacher appointed in place of the employee) whose appointment has not been approved and, therefore, it was paying from its own funds. It was further submitted that the management has, in spite of the fact that no order of stay has been passed, not taken back the employee to service. Since no approval was given to the proposed order of termination, for all prActical purposes, there was no termination of the services of the employee and if any amount has to be paid, the same has to be borne by the management\n14. For considering the rival submissions, a few provisions need to be quoted. The pivotal provisions are Sections 22(1) and (2) and Rule 17(1) which so far as relevant read as follows:\n \"Section 22- Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers or other persons employed in private school- (1) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no teacher or other person employed in any private school shall be dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority.\n(2) Where the proposal to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher or other person employed in any private school is communicated to the competent authority, that authority shall, if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal, approve such dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of appointment.\nRule 17, Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers or other person employed in private schools:- \n(1) The competent authorities to accord prior approval for the dismissal. removal or reduction in rank of a teacher or other person employed in any private school, shall be the District Educational Officer in respect of teacher or other person employed in Pre-Primary, Primary and Middle Schools and the Chief Educational Officer in respect of teacher or other person employed in High Schools, Higher Secondary Schools and Teachers' Training Institutes.\" \n15. Though attempt was made to contend that at the stage of consideration under Section 22(1) and 22(2) and Rule 17(1), there is no scope for looking into the proportionality of punishment aspect, the same is clearly without any substance. What an authority is required to do at that stage is to see whether the proposed punishment is to be approved. Obviously, it has to consider whether the punishment as proposed is proper one; otherwise there is no need for seeking its approval. The crucial words used in sub-section (2) of Section 22 are \"adequate and reasonable ground\" for the proposal.\n16. The proposal relates to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or otherwise termination of appointment of any teacher or any other person employed in a private school. While considering whether adequate and reasonable ground exist for giving approval, the authority is certainly required to look into the gravity of the proved charges and whether the punishment as proposed commensurates with it. Any other interpretation would make the question of approval an exercise in futility.\n17. Stand of the learned counsel for the Management is that if adequate and reasonable grounds exist for the action, then no other question needs to be looked into. This argument overlooks a vital aspect that the adequacy and reasonableness of grounds are relateable to the proposals for the enumerated actions. The proposed Actions being punishments, there is an inbuilt requirement to see whether the quantum of punishment commensurates with the gravity of the proved charges. Therefore, clearly the authority has jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the punishment proposed commensurates with the proved charges. One of the related pleas was that if quantum of punishment is permitted to be considered, it would partake charActer of an appeal. This plea is equally untenable. Sections 22 and 23 operate in different fields. At the stage of consideration under Section 22, the teacher does not get any opportunity for presenting his side of the case. This opportunity is provided under Sections 23 or 24 as the case may be.\n18. The authority under Section 22 takes decision on the material placed before it by the management. So the question of action under Section 22 partaking appellate charActeristics does not arise. The second plea of learned counsel for the management was even if the authority had jurisdiction, there was no application of mind, as relevant factors have not been looked into. The basic duties of a teacher and what is expected from him were highlighted. It was strenuously contended that the welfare of the students' aspect was not even taken note of.\n19. The role a teacher plays in shaping the career and future of a student needs no great emphasis. In olden times, a teacher was considered equal to God. He is required to ensure good conduct of his pupils in addition to teaching lessons to them. The situation has not changed now so far as this basic concept is concerned. But nevertheless, the number of such teachers is sadly on the decline, and instead of tribe of such teachers increasing, it is alarming decreasing. A teacher is required to remove darkness and ignorance from the minds of students. But present day experiences show that the teachers are themselves ill-equipped and take their jobs very casually. No doubt, there are exceptions and those teachers who belong to the exception category are trying their best to make up the deficiency of their brothers in service.\n20. In the hands of these ill-equipped teachers, the destiny of the students does not get moulded in the way it ought to be. The centres of learning are becoming trade and money-making business centres. Learned counsel for the appellant is correct in his submission that welfare of the students has to receive utmost priority. But his submission that there was no application of mind by the authorities to the materials has not borne out from the records. The appellate authority has addressed itself to the relevant factors in greater details and has come to the conclusion that CEO was justified in not according approval for the proposed action of dismissal.\n21. Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have put their seal of approval on the findings recorded. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that once the disciplinary authority comes to a view that there was adequate material for imposing a particular punishment; the approving authority should not lightly interfere with the findings. This submission holds good only when the authority does not apply its mind to the materials forming the foundation of the proposed action. When after consideration of the material, it comes to a conclusion that the proposed punishment is harsh or disproportionate to the proved charges; the scope of interference with the finding is rather limited. This is because the approving authority has to consider whether the proved charges on the facts and the materials justify a particular action. Since reasons have been given on consideration of the materials, there is no scope for interference.\n22. The order of the authorities declining to accord approval does not suffer from any infirmity. The High Court was justified in declining to interfere.\n23. Another point urged by learned counsel for the appellant was that the direction for the back wages in its entirety is not justified because the employee absented from duty without sanctioned leave for long periods and even on some dates he went away during the school period and even abandoned the classes on several days. This certainly is a factor which needed consideration by the authorities. Except for the enumerated categories for other actions no approval is necessary. Authority acting under Section 22 could not have indicated any other aspect. Looking into the circumstances of the case, we feel that payment of 60% salary for the concerned period up to the date of superannuation (since we are told that the employee has been superannuated in the meantime) shall be proper. The undisputed position is that the charges have been proved. The question as to who will make the payment to the employee is a matter between the management and the Government. (The payment has, in any event, to be made, at the first instance, by the Management). So far as the question of re-imbursement is concerned, we do not think it necessary to give any direction in that regard, so far as the present dispute is concerned. No further orders are to be passed in the application for modification of earlier interim orders passed.\nThe appeal is disposed of accordingly.\nAppeal disposed of\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -1988,26 +1988,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S016", - "case_id": "6768", - "experiment": "baseline_firac", - "model": "qwen3-8b", - "source_file": "S016__baseline_firac__qwen3-8b__6768.json", - "court": "DELHI HIGH COURT", - "judgment_date": "19/10/2020", - "machine_error_stage": "facts", - "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Missing fact" + "case_id": "2104", + "experiment": "baseline_no_firac", + "model": "ministral-3b", + "source_file": "S016__baseline_no_firac__ministral-3b__2104.json", + "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", + "judgment_date": "02/04/2003", + "machine_error_stage": "issues", + "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue omission" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Ia No. 336 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 With Cp (C) No. 398 of 1998 In Ias Nos. 245-46 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 With Ia No. 284 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987, Ias Nos. 340-48 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987, Ias Nos. 349-50 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 and Ia No. 351 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 | (1) Rajendra Kumar And Others, (2) Pushpa Market Subji Evam Phal Tatha Laghu Variety Patri Association v. (1) M. C. D. And Another, (2) V. K. Duggal And Others | 01/12/2000", - "case_details": "Case: Ia No. 336 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 With Cp (C) No. 398 of 1998 In Ias Nos. 245-46 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 With Ia No. 284 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987, Ias Nos. 340-48 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987, Ias Nos. 349-50 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 and Ia No. 351 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 | (1) Rajendra Kumar And Others, (2) Pushpa Market Subji Evam Phal Tatha Laghu Variety Patri Association v. (1) M. C. D. And Another, (2) V. K. Duggal And Others", - "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "This case involves multiple interlocutory applications (IAs) and a contempt petition related to hawkers and tehbazari sites in Delhi, particularly near a bomb blast site. Previously, the Court directed the Government of NCT of Delhi to examine the necessity of prohibiting tehbazari in Blocks 'D' and 'T' near the bomb blast site. Following this, an affidavit was filed by the Additional Secretary, Department of Urban Development, Government of NCT of Delhi, referencing a Lt. Governor's decision from November 13, 1996. The affidavit stated that permitting tehbazari in sites closer to the bomb blast site while excluding Blocks 'D' and 'T' was unsustainable. The Lt. Governor's view was that tehbazari should only be permitted in properly selected squatting zones according to Supreme Court directions in Gainda Ram v. M.C.D. The Government's policy is to maintain prohibitory orders against encroachments in roads, lanes, and bylanes in that area, and it was decided that tehbazari should not have been permitted in some pockets closer to the bomb blast site. Consequently, the Court ordered that Blocks 'D' and 'J' (likely a typo for 'T') and other areas closer to the bomb blast site where tehbazari was permitted, would be treated as non-squatting areas. Occupants of these areas were to be removed and provided alternative sites based on seniority. M.C.D. was directed to give occupants three months to vacate, with eviction starting from the juniormost. For applicants in IAs Nos. 349-50, their files were to be examined by M.C.D. for seniority determination by a Committee in the Central Zone, allowing them to continue squatting temporarily if the areas were not non-squatting zones.", - "generated_judgment": "Based on the provided facts, here's a step-by-step analysis to determine whether the appeal should be allowed or dismissed:\n\n1. **Initial Court Directive**: The Court initially directed the Government of NCT of Delhi to examine the necessity of prohibiting tehbazari in Blocks 'D' and 'T' near the bomb blast site. This was likely due to safety and security concerns.\n\n2. **Government's Response**: The Government, through an affidavit, agreed with the Lt. Governor's decision from 1996, which advocated for tehbazari to be permitted only in properly selected squatting zones as per the Supreme Court's directives in Gainda Ram v. M.C.D. Notably, the affidavit stated that the current permit system (where tehbazari was allowed in some pockets closer to the bomb blast site while excluding Blocks 'D' and 'T') was unsustainable.\n\n3. **Court's Order**: Based on the above, the Court ordered that Blocks 'D' and 'J' (likely a typo for 'T') and other areas closer to the bomb blast site where tehbazari was permitted, would be treated as non-squatting zones. The occupants of these areas were to be removed and provided alternative sites based on seniority. M.C.D. was given three months to carry out this eviction process, starting from the juniormost. This order aligns with the Government's policy to maintain prohibitory orders against encroachments in roads, lanes, and bylanes in that area.\n\n4. **Interlocutory Applications (IAs) Nos. 349-50**: The applicants in these IAs sought seniority determination by a Committee in the Central Zone. The Court directed M.C.D. to examine their files for this purpose and allowed them to continue squatting temporarily if their areas were not non-squatting zones.\n\nGiven these facts, the appeal should be **DISMISSED** for the following reasons:\n\n- The Court's order is in line with the Government's policy and a 1996 Lt. Governor's decision, which emphasizes the need to strictly regulate tehbazari sites, especially near sensitive areas like a bomb blast site.\n- The order provides a systematic process for eviction and relocation, considering the seniority of the occupants.\n- The Court also made provisions for those who applied for seniority determination, allowing them to continue squatting temporarily if their areas are not non-squatting zones.\n- There's no indication that the Court's order or the Government's decision was arbitrary or unfair, which are common grounds for allowing an appeal.", - "reference_judgment": "The Order of the Court was as follows :\nWP (C) No. 1699 of 1987\nThis Court will not entertain any SLPs, writ petitions, IAs or contempt petitions pertaining to the hawkers' cases unless the same are first served upon Mr. Shiv Kumar, learned counsel for M.C.D. Mr. Shiv Kumar will present the same in open court and it is only after hearing, the same shall be registered by the Registry.\nIAs Nos. 336, 284, 340-48 in WP (C) No. 1699 of 1987 and Contempt Petition (C) No. 398 of 1998 in IAs Nos. 245-46 in WP (C) No. 1699 of 1987\nOn 4-8-2000 this Court directed the Government of NCT of Delhi to look into the question whether it is still necessary to prohibit tehbazari in Blocks 'D' and T near the bomb blast site, shown in the plan filed along with IAs Nos. 340-48 etc. Unfortunately, no decision was taken after 4-8-2000, therefore we passed a further order on 28-11-2000 that the Government of NCT of Delhi should look into the matter and inform the Court whether Blocks 'D' and T could be declared as squatting areas in view of the fact that certain other areas close to the place where bomb blast had taken place are being used for squatting purposes.\nAn affidavit has now been filed by Dr. B. S. Banerjee, working as Additional Secretary in the Department of Urban Development, Government of NCT of Delhi wherein after referring to the earlier decision of the Lt. Governor of Delhi dated 13-11-1996 it is stated in para 5 as follows:\n\"5. That the action of M.C.D. in permitting tehbazari in sites closer to the bomb blast site even while excluding Blocks 'D' and T is not sustainable and the Lieutenant Governor is of the view that it would be appropriate to permit tehbazari only on sites or squatting zones properly selected in accordance with the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its order dated 1-5-1997 in the matter of Gainda Ram v. M.C.D. ((1998) 1 SCC 98) and not permitting this in any non-squatting zones.\"\nIf it is the policy decision of the Government of NCT of Delhi to maintain the earlier prohibitory orders dated 13-11-1996 of the Lt. Governor to clear all roads, lanes and bylanes of all encroachments in that area and now a further decision has also been taken that ought not to have permitted tehbazari in some pockets closer to the bomb blast site, then there is no question of excluding Blocks 'D' and 'J' from the purview of prohibition contained in the earlier orders of the Lt. Governor. Not only will Blocks 'D' and 'J' be treated as non-squatting areas but the areas which are shown in the same plan closer to the bomb blast site, where M.C.D. has permitted tehbazari will now be treated as non-squatting areas and all those who are occupying those areas will be removed from that area and provided tehbazari sites for squatting in accordance with their seniority, elsewhere. Before the aforesaid persons who are in occupation of the other areas near the bomb blast site are asked to vacate, M.C.D. is directed to give them reasonable time to vacate. The reasonable time shall be a period of 3 months from today. No. objection will be entertained from those persons for squatting in view of the earlier order passed by the Lt. Governor and the policy of the Government of NCT of Delhi which has been reiterated and now accepted by this Court. It is expected that M.C.D. will be able to allocate other particular places for these persons in squatting areas as per their seniority i.e. non-prohibited areas, within the aforesaid period of 3 months.\nThe applicants also will be allowed to continue for three months till an alternative temporary or final arrangement is made. While asking these eligible squatters from vacating the prohibited areas near the bomb blast site, the eviction will start with the juniormost.\nAll these IAs stand disposed of.\nContempt Petition (C) No. 398 of 1998 in IAs Nos. 245-46 is also disposed of.\nIAs Nos. 349-50\nPursuant to the orders passed on 28-11-2000 the officer concerned of M.C.D. has examined the reconstructed files of these applicants on the basis of the documents produced by them and the file has now been submitted to the Committee which is competent to fix up the seniority on examination of these documents. The Committee in the Central Zone is hereby directed to give hearing to the petitioner-applicants and decide the question relating to their seniority. Till the final allotment is made, these applicants may continue to squat at the places where they are presently squatting, provided that the same are not non-squatting areas. The IAs stand disposed of.\nIA No. 351\nThis application is adjourned to await the report of M.C.D. as directed in the order of this Court dated 28-11-2000. However, we are making it clear that if M.C.D. has fixed up the seniority, no further arguments will be allowed.\n\n", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal - 1627 of 2019 | Union Of India And Ors. v. Sepoy Pravat Kumar Behuria | 06/11/2019", + "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal - 1627 of 2019 | Union Of India And Ors. v. Sepoy Pravat Kumar Behuria", + "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "case_record": "The Respondent, enrolled in the Indian Army in 2002, was dismissed from service on 23.07.2012 following a Summary Court Martial. On 02.06.2011, he assaulted Subedar Satyendra Singh Yadav with a Talwar, causing a skull fracture and internal bleeding. A Court of Inquiry was convened, and summary of evidence was recorded. The Respondent declined to cross-examine witnesses during these proceedings and made no statement in his defence, though he voluntarily stated he attacked without provocation. The Summary Court Martial found him guilty under Section 326 of the IPC. The Respondent appealed to the Armed Forces Tribunal, alleging procedural irregularities, including being kept in close arrest without proper authorization, denial of participation in the Court of Inquiry and summary of evidence, hasty conduct of the Court Martial (45 minutes), and inconsistency between medical and oral evidence regarding the injury. The Tribunal accepted these contentions, finding inconsistencies between the medical report (compressed injury) and the weapon used (sharp-edged Talwar), noting the absence of blood and fingerprints on the weapon, and concluding that the proceedings were conducted hastily and without following prescribed rules, specifically Rules 179, 180, 115, and 116. The Tribunal also noted that the Respondent's signatures appeared to be taken in advance on blank papers.", + "generated_judgment": "### **Facts:**\n1. The Respondent was enrolled in the Indian Army in 2002 and was dismissed from service on **23.07.2012** following a **Summary Court Martial**.\n2. On **02.06.2011**, the Respondent assaulted **Subedar Satyendra Singh Yadav** with a **Talwar**, causing a **skull fracture and internal bleeding**.\n3. A **Court of Inquiry** was convened, and a **summary of evidence** was recorded.\n4. The Respondent **declined to cross-examine witnesses** and made **no statement in his defence**, though he **voluntarily admitted** attacking without provocation.\n5. The **Summary Court Martial found him guilty under Section 326 of the IPC** (voluntarily causing grievous hurt).\n6. The Respondent appealed to the **Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT)**, alleging:\n - **Procedural irregularities**, including:\n - Being kept in **close arrest without proper authorization**.\n - **Denial of participation** in the Court of Inquiry and summary of evidence.\n - **Hasty conduct of the Court Martial** (completed in **45 minutes**).\n - **Inconsistency between medical and oral evidence** regarding the injury.\n7. The **AFT accepted these contentions**, noting:\n - **Inconsistencies** between the **medical report** (compressed injury) and the **weapon used** (sharp-edged Talwar).\n - **Absence of blood and fingerprints** on the weapon.\n - **Proceedings were conducted hastily** and **without following prescribed rules** (Rules **179, 180, 115, and 116**).\n - The Respondent’s **signatures appeared to be taken in advance on blank papers**.\n\n### **Issues:**\n1. **Whether the Summary Court Martial proceedings were conducted in violation of procedural rules, rendering the conviction unlawful?**\n2. **Whether the inconsistencies in evidence and alleged coercion justify setting aside the dismissal?**\n\n### **Rules:**\n1. **Article 142 of the Constitution of India** – The Supreme Court and High Courts have the power to pass any order necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before them.\n2. **Army Act, 1950 (Sections 115, 116, 179, 180)** – These sections prescribe procedural safeguards in Court Martial proceedings, including:\n - **Right to a fair hearing** (Rule 115).\n - **Proper recording of evidence** (Rule 116).\n - **Adequate time for defence** (Rule 179).\n - **Proper authorization for arrest** (Rule 180).\n3. **Principles of Natural Justice** – Require fairness, impartiality, and an opportunity to defend oneself.\n4. **Precedents on Procedural Irregularities in Court Martial** – Courts have set aside convictions where fundamental procedural violations occurred (e.g., **Union of India v. Col. K.S. Kahlon**).\n\n### **Analysis:**\n1. **Procedural Violations (Facts 6, 7; Rules 2, 3, 4):**\n - The **AFT found violations of Rules 179, 180, 115, and 116**, which are **mandatory procedural safeguards** in Court Martial proceedings.\n - The **hasty conduct (45 minutes)** and **lack of proper authorization for arrest** (Rule 180) **deprived the Respondent of a fair trial**.\n - The **pre-signed blank papers** suggest **coercion or lack of free consent**, violating **natural justice principles**.\n\n2. **Inconsistencies in Evidence (Facts 6, 7; Rule 3):**\n - The **medical report (compressed injury) vs. weapon (Talwar)** discrepancy raises **reasonable doubt** about the prosecution’s case.\n - The **absence of blood and fingerprints** further weakens the prosecution’s evidence.\n\n3. **Respondent’s Conduct (Facts 3, 4):**\n - While the Respondent **admitted the attack**, his **refusal to cross-examine witnesses** does not negate the **procedural violations** or **evidentiary inconsistencies**.\n - The **lack of proper defence opportunity** (Rule 115) makes the conviction **vulnerable to challenge**.\n\n### **Conclusion:**\nGiven the **gross procedural violations**, **inconsistent evidence**, and **lack of a fair trial**, the **appeal is ALLOWED**. The dismissal from service is set aside, and the Respondent is entitled to a **fresh inquiry** in accordance with the law.", + "reference_judgment": "1. This Appeal is filed against the judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow (hereinafter, 'the Tribunal') by which the order of dismissal of the Respondent dated 23.07.2012 was set aside.\n2. The Respondent was enrolled in the Indian Army as Sepoy in the Unit 981 AD Regiment Workshop on 02.02.2002. He was posted at Jamnagar on 01.06.2011 and was scheduled to be on the third night duty from 04:00 hrs to 06:00 hrs. Thus, he was excused from physical training parade. On 02.06.2011, at about 07:45 1 hrs, he assaulted Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav, with a Talwar (grass cutting tool) without any provocation. Initially, the Respondent hit Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav on his head from behind and when Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav turned around, the Respondent hit on his forehead with the Talwar. When the Respondent attempted to give a third blow, Naib Subedar A. P. Singh intervened. Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav was immediately shifted to Gokul Hospital, Jamnagar and a surgery was conducted by a Neurosurgeon as his skull bone was fractured leading to internal bleeding and blood clotting in the brain.\n3. The Court of Inquiry was convened against the Respondent by Colonel Sanjay Khanna, Commanding Officer, 48 AD Regiment on 03.06.2011 to investigate into the circumstances which led the Respondent using criminal force against Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav. Nine witnesses were examined and the Respondent declined to cross- examine the witnesses though he was given an opportunity. The Respondent also did not make any statement in his defence. After appreciating the material on record, the Court of Inquiry recommended action to be initiated against the Respondent.\n4. The proceedings for recording the summary of evidence were initiated by Lt. Col. Amarvir Singh. Twelve witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution between 10.06.2011 and 15.06.2011. According to the Appellants, the Respondent declined to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. The Respondent had voluntarily given a statement that he hit the victim with a grass cutting tool without any provocation. Thereafter, on 20.10.2011, additional summary of evidence was recorded. Two additional witnesses were examined and witness No. 2 and 12 were re-examined in the presence of the Respondent. The prosecution alleges that the Respondent refused to cross-examine the witnesses though he was given an opportunity to do so.\n5. By an order dated 23.07.2012, the Summary Court Martial found the respondent guilty and imposed the sentence of dismissal from service.\n6. The order dated 23.07.2012 was questioned by the Respondent before the Tribunal. The Respondent contended that he was kept in close arrest from 02.06.2011 to 05.10.2011 without the permission from the Chief of the Army Staff. It was further contended that he was not given an opportunity to participate in the Court of Inquiry and during the recording of summary of evidence. He complained that the Summary Court Martial was conducted in a hasty manner. The entire proceedings before the Court Martial was completed within a period of 45 minutes. It was further argued on his behalf that the oral evidence was inconsistent with the medical evidence. The Respondent's case was that there was no incised wound on the head of the victim though the Respondent is alleged to have used a Talwar which is a sharp-edged weapon. He submitted before the Tribunal that non- compliance of the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 and the Army Rules, 1954 (hereinafter, 'the Rules') vitiated the Summary Court Martial proceedings.\n7. The Tribunal accepted the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent and held that there was an irreconcilable inconsistency between the medical evidence and the oral testimonies of the witnesses. According to the medical certificate, the injury caused to Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav was a compressed injury whereas the Respondent is alleged to have wielded a grass cutting tool which is sharp-edged. The Tribunal also found that there was no blood on the weapon and the prosecution was unable to prove that there were any finger prints of the Respondent on the weapon. The Tribunal agreed with the Respondent that the Summary Court Martial was conducted in a hasty manner. The entire enquiry was completed within a period of 45 minutes. After perusing the record of the summary of evidence, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the signatures of the Respondent appear to have been taken before the proceedings were held. The Tribunal found that the signatures of the Respondent were at the right-side corner at the bottom of every page. On some pages where the depositions of the witnesses concluded at the middle of the page, the signature of the Respondent was found at the right side at the bottom of the page. After examining the material on record, the Tribunal held that the Respondent was not afforded an opportunity as provided in Rules 179 and 180 of the Rules. The Tribunal was of the further opinion that the procedure prescribed in Rules 115 and 116 of the Rules which deals with recording the plea of guilt of a delinquent was not followed. After a detailed discussion, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the Respondent by holding that the imposition of the penalty of dismissal was with a pre-determined mind and was arrived at without following the procedure prescribed by law.\n8. We have heard Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants and Mr. Sudhanshu S. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent. The Court of Inquiry was ordered against the Respondent to investigate the circumstances under which he used criminal force against Subedar/Master Technical, Satyendra Singh Yadav. The Court of Inquiry assembled on 03.06.2011. During the Court of Inquiry, the statement of the Respondent was recorded in which he stated that he was not provided liquor at 20:00 hrs on 01.06.2011 by Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav. He was angry about the refusal of liquor due to which he attacked the victim by using Talwar on the morning of 02.06.2011. Other witnesses, including the victim Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav were examined in the Court of Inquiry.\n9. We have perused the original record relating to the summary of evidence which was recorded between 10.06.2011 to 15.06.2011. The signatures of the Respondent are found on the right- hand side at the bottom of each page, at the same place on each page. The manner in which the signatures of the officer who recorded the summary of evidence and the other officers were put on certain pages would clearly show that the signature of the Respondent was taken in advance on blank papers. The statement of the Respondent was recorded under Rule 23 (2) of the Rules. Lt. Col. Amarvir Singh who recorded the summary of evidence certified that the summary of evidence containing 40 pages were recorded by him in the presence of the Respondent and that Clauses (1), (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 23 have been complied with while recording the summary of evidence. Even on this certificate, whereas the signature of Lt. Col. Amarvir Singh is at the center of the page, the signature of the Respondent is found at the right-hand side at the bottom of the page. The second half of the page is left blank. A bare perusal of the recording would indicate that the signatures of the Respondent were obtained and filled up with the depositions of the witnesses later. The contention of the Appellant that the summary of evidence was recorded in the presence of the Respondent is not acceptable. We have also perused the additional summary of evidence which was recorded on 20.10.2011. The original record discloses that the signatures of the Respondent were taken earlier as there is a huge gap on certain pages between the place where the depositions have ended and the place where the signature of the Respondent is found. The certificate given by the officer recording additional summary of evidence on 20.10.2011 actually ends with his signature at the center of the page and the signature of the Respondent was found at the bottom of the page without anything being written in between.\n10. After the judgment was reserved, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Union of India, handed over the original record pertaining to the Court of Inquiry. The proceedings of the Court of Inquiry were conducted between 04.06.2011 and 08.06.2011 during which the statements of the Respondent and the other witnesses were recorded. The signature of the Respondent is found on the left-hand side at the bottom of each page. The statement of witness No.3, Naib Subedar A. P. Singh ends at the middle of page No.9 of the original record. The signature of the Respondent is found at the left-hand side at the bottom of the said page. Major Hemant Juneja, who was the Presiding Officer of the Court of Inquiry appears to have signed at the bottom of each page on the right-hand side. On some pages where the deposition ended at the center of the page, signature of Major Hemant Juneja is found. Resultantly, on some pages, the signature of the Presiding Officer i.e. Major Hemant Juneja is found at the appropriate place i.e. immediately after the deposition has ended, as well as at the right-hand side of the bottom of the page.\n11. The Summary Court Martial was held on 23.07.2012. The Respondent was charged for committing an offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by causing grievous hurt to Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav. We agree with the Tribunal that the entire Summary Court Martial was held in a hasty manner. The enquiry commenced at 12.45 p.m. and concluded at 1.30 p.m. and the sentence was imposed at 2.30 p.m.\n12. It is clear from the record that Respondent was not given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses whose statements were recorded in the summary of evidence. The proceedings of Court of Inquiry, recording of summary of evidence and the Summary Court Martial have been conducted without following the procedure prescribed by the Act and the Rules.\n13. The Tribunal examined the evidence on record to hold that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the Respondent. The irreconcilable inconsistency between the medical evidence and ocular testimony, lack of scientific evidence like finger prints on the weapon and the absence of blood on the weapon have been taken into account by the Tribunal to hold that the charge against the Respondent was not proved.\n14. It is trite law that judgments of acquittal should not be disturbed unless there are substantial or compelling reasons. The substantial or compelling reasons to discard judgment of acquittal were examined by this Court in Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh1which are as follows: 1 (2008) 10 SCC 450 \" 1....... i) The trial Court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii) The trial Court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii) The trial Court's judgment is likely to result in \"grave miscarriage of justice\"; iv) The entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v) The trial Court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi) The trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/ report of the Ballistic expert, etc. vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.\n2. The Appellate Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial Court.\n3. If two reasonable views can be reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts /appellate Courts must rule in favour of the accused.\"\n15. Applying the law laid down by this Court as stated above, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Tribunal should not be interfered with.\n16. We have carefully examined the evidence. A view that the respondent is guilty is possible on a scrutiny of the oral evidence. However, the relevant factors taken into account by the Tribunal present another probable view. It is settled law that if two views can be reached, the one that leads to acquittal has to be preferred to the other, which would end in conviction. That apart, there is a clear violation of Rules 179 and 180 of the Rules and the respondent was deprived of an opportunity to defend himself.\n17. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the Tribunal is upheld and the Appeal is dismissed.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -2113,26 +2113,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S017", - "case_id": "1808", - "experiment": "baseline_cot", - "model": "mistral-nemo", - "source_file": "S017__baseline_cot__mistral-nemo__1808.json", + "case_id": "4759", + "experiment": "baseline_firac", + "model": "mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct", + "source_file": "S017__baseline_firac__mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct__4759.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/12/2000", - "machine_error_stage": "issues", + "judgment_date": "06/11/2019", + "machine_error_stage": "rules", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue omission" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Wrong legal test / threshold" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal' Appeal No. 93 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the April 14, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1955 and Criminal Revision Application No. 435 of 1955 arising out of Judgment dated the January 3, 1955, of the Court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, in Case No. 9/p of 1954. | Hansraj Moolji v. State Of Bombay | 12/02/1957", - "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal' Appeal No. 93 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the April 14, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1955 and Criminal Revision Application No. 435 of 1955 arising out of Judgment dated the January 3, 1955, of the Court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, in Case No. 9/p of 1954. | Hansraj Moolji v. State Of Bombay", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 12645 of 1996 | Madan Mohan Rajgarhia v. Messrs Mahendra R. Shah And Brothers And Another | 31/07/2003", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 12645 of 1996 | Madan Mohan Rajgarhia v. Messrs Mahendra R. Shah And Brothers And Another", "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "The appellant was charged with transferring by sale 10 High Denomination Bank Notes of Rs. 1,000 each on July 11, 1953, contravening Section 4 and punishable under Section 7 of the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No III of 1946), read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The Ordinance was promulgated on January 12, 1946. The appellant's preliminary objection that the Ordinance was not in operation on the date of the alleged offence was overruled by the Presidency Magistrate, who convicted the appellant. The High Court of Judicature at Bombay upheld the conviction. The appellant, after his application for a certificate under Article 134 (1) (c) was dismissed, obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The core of the appeal hinges on the interpretation of Section 72 of the 9th Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Section 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, in relation to the Ordinance's duration. The India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946, declared the end of the emergency period on April 1, 1946, which was the period specified in Section 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940. The Ordinance was promulgated within this period.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts \n1. The appellant was charged with selling ten high‑denomination bank‑notes of Rs. 1,000 each on **11 July 1953**. \n2. The charge was under **Section 4** of the **High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946** (Ordinance No III of 1946), punishable by **Section 7** of that Ordinance read with **Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code**. \n3. The Ordinance was **promulgated on 12 January 1946**. \n4. The appellant argued that the Ordinance was **not in operation on the date of the alleged offence**; the Presidency Magistrate rejected this preliminary objection, convicted the appellant, and the conviction was affirmed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. \n5. The appellant’s application for a certificate under **Article 134(1)(c)** of the Constitution was dismissed; he thereafter obtained **special leave to appeal** to the Supreme Court under **Article 136**. \n6. The appeal turns on the interpretation of **Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935** and **Section 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940**, regarding the **duration of the Ordinance**. \n7. The **India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946** declared the emergency to have ended on **1 April 1946**, which is the date prescribed in **Section 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940**. \n8. The Ordinance was **promulgated within the emergency period** (January 1946, before 1 April 1946). \n\n### Issues \n1. **Whether the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 was still in force on 11 July 1953**, i.e., whether it survived the termination of the emergency on 1 April 1946. \n2. **If the Ordinance had ceased to operate, whether the conviction of the appellant under that Ordinance is void**, necessitating reversal of the judgment of the lower courts. \n\n### Rules \n1. **Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935** – an Ordinance promulgated during an emergency *shall cease to have effect* on the termination of that emergency unless it has been **refreshed, ratified, or otherwise validated** by the competent legislature. \n2. **Section 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940** – defines the period of the emergency and confers on the Governor‑General the power to promulgate Ordinances “*during the continuance of the emergency*”. \n3. **India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946** – formally ended the emergency on **1 April 1946**. \n4. **Doctrine of *nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege* (no crime, no penalty without law)** – a person cannot be convicted for an act that was not unlawful at the time it was performed. \n5. **Supreme Court precedent** (e.g., *A.K. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal*, (1970) 1 SCC 139) – an Ordinance that lapses for lack of legislative ratification is treated as if it never existed for purposes of criminal liability. \n\n### Analysis \n1. **Existence of the Ordinance on the date of the offence (Fact 1, Issue 1).** \n - The Ordinance was promulgated on 12 January 1946 (Fact 3), which was **within** the emergency period that terminated on 1 April 1946 (Fact 7). \n - Under **Rule 1**, an emergency‑originated Ordinance automatically **ceases** on the termination of the emergency **unless** it is subsequently ratified or refreshed. The material facts contain **no indication** that the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance was ever ratified by the Legislature or otherwise revived after 1 April 1946. \n - Consequently, by **Rule 1** and **Rule 2**, the Ordinance **lapsed** on 1 April 1946. \n\n2. **Effect of the lapse on the conviction (Fact 4, Issue 2).** \n - The appellant’s alleged conduct occurred on **11 July 1953** (Fact 1), **more than seven years after** the Ordinance had ceased to operate. \n - Applying **Rule 4**, a person cannot be punished under a law that was not in force at the time of the act. \n - Following **Rule 5**, Supreme Court precedent holds that where an Ordinance has lapsed for lack of ratification, it is treated as non‑existent for criminal prosecutions. Hence, the conviction under a non‑existent law is void. \n\n3. **Procedural posture.** \n - The lower courts had erred in rejecting the preliminary objection that the Ordinance was not in operation on the date of offence. Their error is a legal error of *jurisdiction* and *misinterpretation* of Section 72 and the termination order. \n - The Supreme Court, exercising its jurisdiction under **Article 136**, must correct this error. \n\n### Conclusion \nThe High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 was no longer in force on 11 July 1953 because the emergency under which it was promulgated ended on 1 April 1946 and the Ordinance was never ratified thereafter. Accordingly, the appellant cannot be convicted for an act that was not unlawful at the time it was committed. The conviction is therefore invalid.\n\n**The appeal is ALLOWED.**", - "reference_judgment": "1957. February 12. The Judgment was delivered by BHAGWATI J.-This appeal with special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution raises the question whether the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No III of 1946) promulgated by the Governor- General of India on January 12, 1946, was in operation on July 11, 1953, when the offence under s. 7 read with s. 4 thereof was committed by the appellant herein.\nThe appellant who was the accused No. 1 before the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate's Court, Bombay, was charged along with the accused Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 with having on or about July II, 1953, transferred by sale 10 High Denomination Bank Notes of the Denomination of Rs. 1, 000 each to one Velji Lakhamshi Joshi for Rs. 1, 800 at the rate of Rs. 180 per note and thus contravened the provisions of s. 4 of the Ordinance and committed an offence punishable under s. 7 of the Ordinance read with s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code.\nA preliminary objection was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the said Ordinance was not in operation at the date when the offence was alleged to have been committed and that therefore the prosecution was not maintainable. This objection was overruled by the learned Presidency Magistrate and the trial ended in the conviction of the appellant along with the co-accused of the offence with which they had been charged. The appellant was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 8, 000 and in default suffer six months' rigorous imprisonment and the co-accused of the appellant were awarded varying sentences of fine with which however we are not concerned.\nThe appellant took an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay being Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1955. The State of Bombay, the respondent herein, also filed an application for enhancement of the sentence, being Criminal Revision Application No. 435 of 1955. The co- accused of the appellant had also filed appeals against their convictions and sentences of fine imposed upon them and all these appeals and the application of the respondent were heard together by a Division, Bench of the High Court. The High Court agreed with the learned Presidency Magistrate in regard to the finding of fact and held that the appellant had in fact transferred by sale 10 High Denomination Bank Notes of Rs. 1, 000 each to the possession of Velji Lakhamshi and his act fell within the prohibition enacted in s. 4 of the Ordinance. The High Court also overruled the contentions which were urged before it in regard to the Ordinance having lapsed and ceased to be in operation before July 11, 1953, the date on which the offence was alleged to have been committed. It accordingly confirmed the conviction recorded against the appellant by the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate. In regard to the sentence the High Court saw no ground for enhancing the same and confirmed the sentence of fine of Rs. 8, 000 and in default six months' rigorous imprisonment which had been awarded by the learned Presidency Magistrate to the appellant.The appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate under Art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. The said application was however dismissed by the High Court with the result that he applied for and obtained from this Court special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\nThe decision of this appeal turns on the construction of s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935 (25 and 26 Geo. 5 ch. 42 ) and s. 1 (3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940 (3 and 4 Geo. 6 ch. 33 ).\nSection 72 of the 9th sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, read as follows: \"The Governor-General may, in cases of emergency, make and promulgate ordinances for the peace and good Government of British India or any part thereof, and any ordinance so made shall, for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation, have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature; but the power of making ordinances under this section is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Indian Legislature to make laws; and any ordinance made under this section is subject to the like disallowance as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature, and may be controlled or , superseded by any such Acts.\" Section 1 (3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, ran as under: \"Section seventy-two of the Government of India Act, (which, as set out in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, confers on the Governor-General power to make Ordinances in cases of emergency) shall, as respects Ordinances made during the period specified in section three of this Act, have effect as if the words \"for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\" were omitted; and, notwithstanding the provision in the said section seventy-two that the power of making Ordinances thereunder is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Indian Legislature to make laws- (a) Ordinances may, during the said period, be made under that section affecting the Army Act, the Air Force Act, or the Naval Discipline Act; and (b) Section one hundred and eleven of the Government of India Act, 1935 (which exempts certain British subjects from certain Indian Laws) shall not apply to any ordinance made under the said section seventy-two during that period.\"Section 3 referred to hereinabove -was in the terms following:\" The period referred to in the preceding sections is the period beginning with the date of the passing of this Act and ending with such date as His Majesty may by Order in Council declare to be the end of the emergency which was the occasion of the passing of this Act.\"\nThe India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, was passed on June 27, 1940 , and was an Act to make emergency provisions with respect to Government of India and Burma. On April 1, 1946, was published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary His Majesty's Order in Council called \"The India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946\". By the said order the period of emergency referred to in s. 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, was declared to have ended on April 1, 1946. The period specified in s. 3 of the said Act thus extended from June 27, 1940, to April 1, 1946. The Ordinance in question was promulgated on January 12, 1946, and was therefore within the said period.\nThe argument which was addressed before us by the learned counsel for the appellant based on these provisions was (a) that as soon as the declaration that the emergency was at an end was made on April 1, 1946, the original position was restored and the Ordinance in question which had been promulgated in exercise of the emergency powers ipso facto lapsed when the emergency was declared to have ended, (b) that, in the alternative, s. 72. of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, having been thus restored with effect from April 1, 1946, one must look to its terms as they originally stood to justify the continuance of the ordinance in question after April 1, 1946, whensoever it may have been promulgated.\nIt will be useful at this stage to see what was the scheme provided in the Government of India Act, 1935, for enacting legislative measures. It may be noted that the Act envisaged the establishment of the Federation of India. Part II, ch. 3 provided for the constitution of the Federal Legislature which was to consist of two chambers known respectively as the Council of States and the House of Assembly. The normal legislative procedure required a bill to be passed by both the Chambers of the Federal Legislature and assented to by the Governor-General. There was a distribution of legislative powers between the Federal Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures and the Federal Legislature was invested with the power to make laws for. the whole or any part of British India or for any Federated State with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Federal Legislative List and any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List. Power was however given, to the Federal Legislature, if the Governor- General in his discretion declared by a \"Proclamation of Emergency\" that a grave emergency existed whereby the security of India was threatened, whether by war or internal disturbance, to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List.. These were the powers of the Federal Legislature to enact legislative measures.The Governor-General was, however, conferred certain legislative powers in Part II, ch. 4. Power was conferred upon him to promulgate Ordinances if at any time when the Federal Legislature was not in session he was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate action. Ordinances thus promulgated were to have the same force and effect as Acts of the Federal Legislature assented to by the Governor-General. But every such Ordinance would cease to operate at the expiration of six months from the re-assembly of the Legislature. Similar power was conferred upon the Governor-General to promulgate Ordinances if at any time he was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate action for the purpose of enabling him satisfactorily to discharge his functions in so far as he was required in the exercise thereof to act in his discretion or to exercise his individual judgment. Such Ordinances also were to have the same force and effect as the Acts of the Federal Legislature assented to by the Governor-General and were to continue in operation for such period not exceeding six months as may be specified therein but could by subsequent Ordinances be extended for a further period not exceeding six months. Power was also conferred upon the Governor-General if at any time it appeared to him that for the purpose of enabling him satisfactorily to discharge his functions in so far as he was required in the exercise thereof to act in his discretion or, to exercise his individual judgment it was essential that provision should be made by legislation, to enact\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS Governor-General's Acts which when enacted were to have the same force and effect as Acts of the Federal Legislature assented to by the Governor-General. These were the special legislative powers conferred upon the Governor-General which could be exercised by him when the normal legislative procedure could not be resorted to. It is worthy of note however that howsoever and under whatever circumstances the legislative powers vested in the Governor-General were exercised by him, the Governor-General's Acts thus enacted and the Ordinances thus promulgated were equated with the Acts of the Federal Legislature assented to by the Governor- General.Part XIII enacted Transitional Provisions. A period of time was bound to elapse between the commencement of Part III of the Act which related to the Governor's Provinces and the establishment of the Federation and s. 317 of the Act continued in force certain provisions of the Government of India Act with amendments consequential on the provisions of the Act set out in the 9th Sch. thereof until the estab- lishment of the Federation. Section 72 above quoted formed part of the 9th Sch. under the caption \"Indian Legislature\" and conferred upon the Governor-General power to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good Government of British India or any part thereof in cases of emergency. Ordinances thus promulgated by the Governor-General in exercise of the power thus conferred upon him were to continue in operation for the space of not more than six months from the date of their promulgation and were to have the like force of law as Acts passed by the Indian Legislature. They were also equated with the. Acts passed by the Indian Legislature by having resort to the normal legislative procedure set out in the Government of India Act.\nEven though the Governor-General's Acts and the Ordinances promulgated by him were thus equated with the Acts passed by the Federal Legislature or the Indian Legislature as the case may be, the period of duration thereof had to be determined. Every statute for which no time is limited is I SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] called a perpetual Act, and its duration is prima facie perpetual. It continues in force until it is repealed. (Vide Craies on Statute Law, 5th Ed. p. 374; Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Ed., Vol. XXXI, p. 511, para. 664). If an Act contains a proviso that it is to continue in force only for a certain specified time, it is called a Temporary Act. This result would follow not only from the terms of the Act itself but also from the fact that it was intended only as a temporary measure. This ratio has also been applied to emergency measures which continue during the subsistence of the emergency but lapse with the cessation thereof. It was therefore contended that Ordinances promulgated under the emergency powers vested in the Governor-General would be in operation during the period of emergency but would cease to be in operation once the emergency was declared to have ended. In the instant case before us the Ordinance in question was promulgated in exercise of the emergency powers vested in the Governor- General under s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, and it was urged that the Ordinance thus promulgated would cease to be in operation after the emergency was declared to have ended on April 1, 1946, by the India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946, in spite of the words of limitation \"for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\" having been omitted from s. 72 by s. 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940.Reliance was placed in support of this contention on the observations of Vardachariar C. J. in King Emperor v. Benoari Lall Sharma and others([1943] F.C.R. 96 , 137.): \"Legislation by Ordinance has no doubt been given the same effect as ordinary legislation and the ambit as to the subject-matter is the same in both cases. But there are two fundamental points of difference which have a material bearing on the present question: One is that by the very terms of s.72 of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution Act, the operation of the Ordinance is limited to a period of six months (and even now it is only temporary, though the particular limit has been removed), and secondly, it is avowedly the exercise of a special power intended to meet an emergency.\"\nZafrulla Khan J. also had expressed himself to the same effect in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee ([1944] F.C.R. 1 , 12.): \"The legislature can at any time enact a measure and such measure can remain in force without any limit of time; but the exercise of the Ordinance-making power is limited in two ways (1) by the limitation as to the circumstances in which it can be exercised, and (ii) by the limitation as to the time during which any measure so enacted can remain in operation. The existence of an emergency is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power. The fact that the Court cannot go behind a declaration of emergency made by the Ordinance-making authority cannot affect this question. The power was intended to be availed of and could be availed of only in an emergency, whereas ordinary legislation is not governed by any such limitation. Similarly, an Ordinance is necessarily of limited duration, whether under s. 72 or under the terms of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1940.\"\nAn argument was accordingly addressed before us that even though the Ordinance in question had been promulgated during the period specified in a. 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, viz., between June 27, 1940, and April 1, 1946, and s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, was to be read with the omission of the words \"for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\" therefrom, the effect of such omission was not to continue the duration of the Ordinance in question in any event beyond April 1, 1946. The Ordinance lapsed or ceased to be in operation on the, declaration having been made on April 1, 1946, that the emergency had ended.This argument however ignores the fact that whatever Governor-General's Acts were enacted or Ordinances promulgated by him in exercise of his special legislative powers or in exercise of the emergency power conferred upon him by s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, were all equated with the Acts of the Federal Legislature or the Indian Legislature, as the case may be, assented to by the Governor-General. If there was a limitation to be found in the Acts or the Ordinances themselves in regard to the duration thereof the same was to prevail. But if no time was limited in the enactment itself for its duration it was to continue in force until it was repealed. If by the operation of s. 1 (3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, the words \"for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\" were omitted from s. 72 during the period specified in s. 3 of that Act, viz., June 27, 1940 to April 1, 1946, there was no limitation of the period of duration of the Ordinance in question and the Ordinance having the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature without any limitation on its duration was to continue in force until it was repealed. The emergency under which the Governor-General was invested with the power to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good government of British India or any part thereof under s. 72 was the condition of the exercise of such power, by the Governor- General and did not impose any limitation on the duration of the Ordinances thus promulgated. For determining the duration of such Ordinances one had to look to the substantive provisions of s. 72 which in terms enacted and laid down the limitation of \"not more than six months from its promulgation\" on the life of the Ordinance. If these words had not been omitted by s. 1 (3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, the Ordinances thus promulgated -would have been of a duration of not more than six months from their promulgation. Once these words were omitted by a. 1 (3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, would read as under:- The Governor-General may, in cases of emergency, make and promulgate ordinances for the peace and good government of British India or any part thereof and any ordinance so made shall.................. have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature; but the power of making ordinances under this section is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Indian Legislature to make laws; and the like disallowance as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature, and may be controlled or superseded by any such Act. \"The effect of the deletion of these words from s. 72 leaving the section to be read as above had the necessary effect of equating the Ordinances which were promulgated between June 27, 1940, and April 1, 1946, with Acts passed by the Indian Legislature without any limitation of time as regards their duration. Ordinances thus promulgated were perpetual in duration and continued in force until they were repealed. This position was considered by the Federal Court in J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., (Rampur) Ltd. and others v. King Emperor ([1947] F.C.R. 141 , 161.) where Spens C. J. observed:-\" These Ordinances were made under the powers conferred on the Governor-General by s. 72 of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution Act, as amended by the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940 (3 & 4 Geo. 6, Ch. 33 ). Under the said s. 72, as it originally stood, Ordinances were limited to an effective life of six months only from the date of promulgation. Sub-section (3) of s. I of the said Act, however, provided that in respect of Ordinances made under s. 72 during the period specified in s. 3 of the Act, s. 72 should have effect as if the words , for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\"were omitted. The period specified in s. 3 of the Act is\" the period beginning with the date of the passing of this Act and ending with such date as His Majesty may by Order in Council declare to be the end of the emergency which was the occasion of the passing of this Act. \"The date of `the passing of the said Act was the 27th June, 1940, and the emergency was not notified to have come to an end on the 1st April, 1946.\nIt was contended on behalf of the appellants that the true construction to be given to s. 72 as so amended was in effect to substitute in s. 72 in respect of the duration of an Ordinance, -the period specified in s. 3 of the Act for the original six months' period and that accordingly on the expiration of that period, viz., on the 1st April, 1946, Ordinances made after the passing of the Act automatically came to an end. It was not made very clear how one could arrive at such a construction. It appears to be based on the suggestion that the power to promulgate an Ordinance under s. 72 was by the section confined to the existence of an emergency, Cf: the words in the sub-section \"in cases of emergency\", and that the Act was intituled an Act to make emergency provision with respect to the Government of India and Burma and defined the period of emergency. Unless therefore the construction contended for by the appellants was accepted no period would be provided for the continuance of these Ordinances, and that could not have been the intention of the legislature, as the ordinance-making power of the Governor-General was recognised as temporary only. In our opinion, the emergency on the happening of which an Ordinance can be promulgated is separate and distinct from and must not be confused with the, emergency which occasioned the pawing of the Act and the clear effect of the words of the, Act on s. 72 is that Ordinances promulgated under that subsection during the period specified in s. 3 of the Act are subject to no time limit as regards their existence and validity, unless imposed by the Ordinances themselves, or other amending or repealing legislation, whether by Ordinance or other. wise. In our judgment, it is clear that the second Lahore Tribunal did not cease to exist or to have jurisdiction in the case under appeal by reason of the expiration on the 1st April, 1946, of the period specified in s. 3 of the Act in question.\" In our opinion, the above observations of Spens C. J. enunciate the correct position. The Ordinance in question having been promulgated during the period between June 27, 1940, 'and April 1, 1946, was perpetual in duration and continued in force until it was repealed. Our attention has not been drawn to any subsequent Ordinance or Act of the Indian Legislature amending or repealing the said Ordinance with the result that it continues to be in force and was in operation on July 11, 1953, the date on which the offence in question was committed by the appellant.\nThis position was recognized in the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, issued under -the Constitution Of India. In the Second Schedule to the said Order were contained several Central Ordinances enacted between 1940 and 1946 including the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. III of 1946) where in s.. II thereof the words \"Part A States and Part C States\" were to be sub- stituted for \"the provinces\". It is not necessary to refer to the other Ordinances appearing in this compilation but suffice it to say that in respect of all the Ordinances which were thus promulgated by the Governor-General in exercise of the power conferred upon him under s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, the continuance thereof even after April 1, 1946, was predicated and the adaptations prescribed in the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, issued under the Constitution of India were made applicable thereto.\nThis position is further supported by referring to the relevant provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (II of 1934). Section 26 of that Act provided ill (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), every bank note shall be legal tender at any place in India in payment or on account for the amount expressed therein, and shall be guaranteed by the Central Government.(2)On recommendation of the Central Board the Central Government may, by notification in the Gazette of India, declare that, with effect from such date as -may be specified in the notification, any series of bank notes of any denomination, shall cease to be legal tender save at such office or a agency of the bank and to such extent as may be specified in the notification. Under s. 1 (2) of the Act as it stood, the Act extended to whole of India excepting the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The' High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. III of 1946) declared that Denomination Notes of the denominational value of Rs. 500, Rs. 1, 000 or Rs. 10, 000 ceased to be legal tender in payment or on account at any place in British India on the expiry of January 12, 1946. The Ordinance having continued in operation even after the declaration of the emergency having come to an end was made on April 1, 1946, the said notes continued to be ineffective as legal tender in India, though the position in Jammu and Kashmir in regard to the same could not be affected by reason of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, not having been made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir as stated above. On September 25, 1956, however, the Jammu and Kashmir (Extension of Laws) Act, 1956 (LXII of 1956) being an Act to provide for the extension of certain laws to the State of Jammu and Kashmir was passed by the Parliament. In the Schedule to that Act was contained the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (II of 1934). The words \"except the State of Jammu and Kashmir\" were omitted from s. 1, sub-s. (2) and s. 26A was added after s. 26 of the Act.\nSection 26A provides:- , , Notwithstanding anything contained in section 26, no bank note of the denominational value of five hundred rupees, one thousand rupees or ten thousand rupees issued before the 13th day of January, 1946, shall be legal tender in payment or on account for the -amount expressed therein.The law in the State of Jammu and Kashmir with regard to these High Denomination Bank Notes issued before January 13, 1946, was thus brought into line with the law as it obtained in the rest of India. This would certainly have not been done but for the acceptance of the position that the Ordinance in question continued in operation even after April 1, 1946, and was in operation right throughout even after April 1, 1946. The alternative argument addressed before us by the learned counsel for the appellant need not detain us at all, for the simple reason that reading s. 72 in the manner suggested would be tantamount to giving a retrospective effect to the section as it originally stood in regard to Ordinances which had been promulgated between June 27, 1940, and April 1, 1946. There is nothing to justify such retrospective operation. As regards such Ordinances the period of their duration had to be determined having regard to the provisions of s. 72 as they stood with the omission of the words \"for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\" therefrom during tHe period specified in s. 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, and the Ordinance in question was therefore not limited to the space of not more than six months from the date of its promulgation but was perpetual in its duration with the result that it continues in operation until it is repealed. There is no warrant for reading the provisions of s. 72 with the omitted words restored to their original position after April 1, 1946, while determining the duration of the Ordinances which had been promulgated between June 27, 1940, and April 1, 1946.\nBoth the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the appellant before us having thus failed, it follows that the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetization) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. III of 1946) was in operation on July 11, 1953, the date on which the offence was committed by the appellant and the appellant was rightly convicted by both the courts below. The appeal will accordingly stand dismissed.\n", + "case_record": "The appellant, engaged in the purchase and sale of shares, utilized the services of the respondent, a broker at the Bombay Stock Exchange. A dispute arose, leading the appellant to file a suit for recovery of Rs. 5,63,334/-. Upon receiving summons, the respondent filed an application under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking to stay the proceedings on the ground that an arbitration provision covered the dispute. The learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted this contention and stayed the suit. The appellant's First Appeal against this order was dismissed. The appellant then filed the present appeal by way of special leave petition. The bills for transactions contained two arbitration clauses: one on the front, defining 'non-member' to 'include a remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom the members shares (brokerage)', and another on the back, stating 'In the event of any claim... arising between you and us out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration'. The appellant contended that as he was not a remisier, authorized clerk, or employee, nor did he share brokerage, he was not covered by the definition of 'non-member', arguing that 'any other person' should be interpreted narrowly (ejusdem generis).", + "generated_judgment": "To evaluate the appeal, we need to assess whether the arbitration clause should apply to the appellant under the principles of contractual interpretation, particularly considering the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which the appellant has invoked. Here are the critical steps:\n\n1. **Understanding the Dispute and Legal Framework**:\n - The dispute involves the appellant and the respondent, a broker at the Bombay Stock Exchange, regarding the recovery of a certain sum.\n - The respondent invoked Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, to stay court proceedings, arguing that an arbitration clause covered the dispute.\n - The arbitration clause defines 'non-member' and contains provisions that may apply to the appellant.\n\n2. **Interpretation of the Arbitration Clause**:\n - The arbitration clause includes two parts:\n - A definition on the front of the bills: \"non-member\" to \"include a remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom members share (brokerage).\"\n - An arbitration agreement on the back: \"In the event of any claim... arising between you and us out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration.\"\n - The appellant argues that he does not fall within the definition of 'non-member' as he is not a remisier, authorized clerk, or employee, nor does he share brokerage. Here, he relies on the ejusdem generis principle, which suggests that where general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are construed to apply only to items of the same kind.\n\n3. **Application of Ejusdem Generis**:\n - The specific items listed are \"remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom members share (brokerage).\"\n - 'Any other person' is the general term following this list. Under ejusdem generis, 'any other person' should be interpreted as similar to the specific items preceding it, which are specifically related to brokerage or employment in broker-related roles.\n - The appellant’s situation must be evaluated to see if he fits within this context. If his activities do not involve brokerage or employment in a related role, the ejusdem generis argument suggests he may not be covered by the arbitration clause.\n\n4. **Judicial Precedents and Interpretation**:\n - Courts typically look to the intention of the parties when interpreting contract terms. If the language is ambiguous, they may lean towards a narrower interpretation unless clearly stated otherwise.\n - The intention behind arbitration clauses is often to provide a streamlined dispute resolution process, but they must clearly specify the parties they cover.\n\n5. **Decision**:\n - Given the appellant’s argument and the principle of ejusdem generis, there is a valid reason to believe that the arbitration provision might not encompass the appellant if he does not fit the specific categories or a similar context.\n - Previous court decisions often favor the party not drafting ambiguous terms unless explicitly stated otherwise. Here, the ambiguity exists concerning whether the term 'any other person' extends to the appellant's role and activities.\n\nBased on the above analysis, the appeal hinges on how the term 'any other person' is interpreted within the arbitration clause. Given the appellant’s strong argument based on ejusdem generis and the ambiguity around 'any other person,' it seems fair that this matter should be considered, potentially in a non-arbitral forum, unless the clause is unequivocally applicable.\n\n**Conclusion**: The appeal is **ALLOWED** to provide a more thorough examination of whether the arbitration clause applicability, as contested by the appellant, should indeed exclude him based on the principles of contractual interpretation and ejusdem generis.", + "reference_judgment": "The Order of the Court is as follows\n1. The appellant herein was engaged in the business of purchase and sale of shares and for that purpose he had been utilizing the services of the defendant, who is a broker at the Bombay Stock Exchange. The appellant herein filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 5,63, 334/- against M/s. Mahendra R. Shah & Bros., who are the respondents herein. The respondents herein on receipt of the summons in the suit, filed an application under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 for staying the proceeding on the ground that there is a provision for arbitration as regards the dispute in the suit. The learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the contention of the respondents herein and directed the stay of proceedings of the suit. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the First Appeal from the said order, which was dismissed. It is against the said order of the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal by way of special leave petition.\n2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that the arbitration clause printed on the bills does not include the persons like plaintiff and, therefore, the appellant being a non-member is not required to seek arbitration. We do not find any merit in the contention. One clause of the Bill, which is printed on the front, reads as under:\n \"All the claims (whether admitted or not) difference and disputes between a member and a non-member or a non-member (the terms \"non-member\" shall include a remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom the members shares (brokerage) arising out of or in relation to dealing transactions and contracts made subject to the rules and bye-laws and regulations of the Exchange or with reference to anything incidental thereto or in pursuance thereof or relating their construction, fulfillment or validity or relating to the rights, obligation and liabilities of remisier, authorised clerk, employees or any other persons with whom the member shares brokerage in relation to such dealings, transactions and contracts shall be referred to and decided by arbitration as provided in the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Exchange.\" \n3. Another clause of the Bill, which is printed on the back side, reads as under:\n \"In the event of any claim (whether admitted or not) difference or dispute arising between you and us out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration in Bombay as provided in the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Stock Exchange, Bombay\". \n4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that a non-member will only be covered if he falls under the definition of a non-member. Since the appellant is neither a remisier or authorised clerk or employee or shares any brokerage with the member, he cannot be covered by the said definition and, therefore, the said rules, definition and bye-laws do not apply to him. In fact, the argument is that the words 'any other person\" should take colour from the preceding words, namely, 'remiser, authorised clerk or employee' and since the appellant is not one of those mentioned, he does not fall within the expression 'any other person'. T he reading of clause quoted above, as a whole, would clearly show that this clause is quite wide and comprehensive enough to cover the case of the plaintiff. In order to make it comprehensive, unauthorised clerk and employee and other persons like remisier, who are or have been receiving brokerage form the members of the Exchange have been included in the definition of non-member person. In fact by including these categories, the definition of a 'non-member' has been widened. The inclusion of such persons does not mean that no person like the appellant who is not a member of the Exchange has been excluded from the definition of the non-member. This aspect may be examined from another angle. The other Clause in the same bill puts the matter beyond doubt. The said clause shows that any claim (whether admitted or not) difference or dispute arising between you and us' out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration in Bombay as providing in the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Stock Exchange. It does not show that what does it contemplate as regards arbitration clause printed on the front of the Bill, and that it provides for arbitration and the persons like appellant are included therein.\n5. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the appeal. It, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -2238,26 +2238,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S018", - "case_id": "1335", - "experiment": "baseline_firac", - "model": "gpt-oss-120b-noreason", - "source_file": "S018__baseline_firac__gpt-oss-120b-noreason__1335.json", + "case_id": "172", + "experiment": "baseline_cot", + "model": "phi-4", + "source_file": "S018__baseline_cot__phi-4__172.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "12/02/1957", + "judgment_date": "31/07/2003", "machine_error_stage": "rules", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misinterpretation" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 755 of 1967, decided on August 3, 1972. | Daulat Rao Jai Ram Ji (Since Dead) L. Rs v. Harish Chandra And Others | 03/08/1972", - "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 755 of 1967, decided on August 3, 1972. | Daulat Rao Jai Ram Ji (Since Dead) L. Rs v. Harish Chandra And Others", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl) No.4661 of 2007) | S.K. Alagh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others | 15/02/2008", + "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl) No.4661 of 2007) | S.K. Alagh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "Plaintiff Daulat Rao sought a declaration that he had not adopted the third defendant, Harishchandra, who claimed adoption on January 5, 1955. The trial court found the adoption untrue and invalid, but the High Court reversed this, upholding the adoption. A partition had occurred between the plaintiff and his brother (Defendant No. 1) in 1948. The plaintiff, in his plaint, averred his intention to separate from the third defendant if the adoption was upheld and had expressed this intention in a notice on January 29, 1955. He also sought an alternative relief for partition of his 1948 share. No proper issue was raised on this partition plea in the lower courts. The plaintiff had no sons but a daughter, and Harishchandra is his brother's son. An adoption deed was written on January 5, 1955, and registered on January 7, 1955, and a photograph was taken immediately after the alleged adoption. The plaintiff admitted his signatures on the deed but claimed fraud/unconsciousness. He also executed other gift deeds around the same time. The Hindu Succession Act came into force before the plaintiff's death in 1969. The third defendant admitted the plaintiff's right to a share in his written statement.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. Daulat Rao (the plaintiff) sought a declaration that he had not adopted Harishchandra (the third defendant) on January 5, 1955.\n2. The trial court found the adoption untrue and invalid, but the High Court reversed this and upheld the adoption.\n3. A partition occurred between the plaintiff and his brother (Defendant No. 1) in 1948.\n4. The plaintiff expressed his intention to separate from Harishchandra if the adoption was upheld, in a notice dated January 29, 1955.\n5. An adoption deed was written on January 5, 1955, and registered on January 7, 1955, with a photograph taken immediately after the alleged adoption.\n6. The plaintiff admitted his signatures on the deed but claimed fraud/unconsciousness.\n7. The plaintiff had no sons but a daughter, and Harishchandra is his brother's son.\n8. The Hindu Succession Act came into force before the plaintiff's death in 1969.\n9. No proper issue was raised on the plaintiff's alternative plea for partition of his 1948 share in lower courts.\n10. The third defendant admitted the plaintiff's right to a share in his written statement.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Did the High Court err in reversing the trial court's finding that the adoption was untrue and invalid?\n2. Should the plaintiff's request for separation from Harishchandra be granted, given his notice of intention to separate?\n3. Did the lower courts err in not properly addressing the plaintiff's alternative plea for partition of his 1948 share?\n4. Does the plaintiff's status (adoptive father or not) impact his daughter's rights to intestate succession under the Hindu Succession Act?\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Adoption and Succession** (Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956)\n - An adoption shall be invalid if it is made with the intention of disowning the adopted son from his rights of inheritance (Section 7).\n - An adoption will not cause a person to have more heirs by succession than he would have had if he had died intestate on the date of adoption (Section 11).\n2. **Partition** (Indian Partition Act, 1891)\n - Any person interested in the Partition may apply for an order for partition (Section 6).\n3. **Notice** (Principles of Indian Law)\n - A notice of intention expresses the sender's current intention and may be revoked or modified.\n - A notice can serve as an expression of intention in certain legal contexts.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Appeal maintainability**: The plaintiff has challenged the High Court's decision to uphold the adoption. He has also raised two fringe issues—the notice of separation and the alternative plea for partition. These issues create a prima facie case for appeal, but considering the primary focus on the adoption's validity, **the appeal is maintainable**.\n\n2. **Issue 1**: The High Court's reversal of the trial court's order should be examined for error.\n - **Sub-issue 2.1**: The plaintiff's admission of his signature on the adoption deed, coupled with his claim of fraud/unconsciousness, creates an inconsistency. However, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to establish these contentions. The trial court, after assessing evidence, found the adoption untrue and invalid. The High Court reversed this based on its assessment of the same evidence. Since both courts have considered the evidence, no clear error is apparent.\n - **Sub-issue 2.2**: The notice of intention to separate does not automatically invalidate the adoption, as it post-dates the adoption. However, it may be considered alongside other evidence to determine the plaintiff's state of mind and intention at the time of adoption.\n\n3. **Issue 2**: Even if the adoption is upheld, the plaintiff's notice of intention to separate suggests his disapproval of the adoption.\n - The notice was given promptly after the adoption and indicates a clear intention to disown Harishchandra if the adoption was upheld. However, it was not communicated to the parties involved in the adoption process, raising questions about its effectiveness as a contemporaneous expression of intention.\n\n4. **Issue 3**: The lower courts' failure to address the partition plea might constitute an error.\n - The plaintiff raised the partition plea in his plaint, but it was not properly addressed in the lower courts. Despite this oversight, the court should consider the merits of the partition claim, especially if the adoption is upheld.\n\n5. **Issue 4**: The plaintiff's status impacts his daughter's rights to intestate succession.\n - If the adoption is invalidated, the plaintiff's daughter would revert to being his sole heir according to his share from the 1948 partition, as per Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.\n\n### Conclusion:\nConsidering the analyses above, the appeal is maintainable. However, there is no clear error in the High Court's reversal of the trial court's order on the adoption's validity. The notice of separation may not be sufficient to invalidate the adoption but should be considered in assessing the plaintiff's intentions. The lower courts' oversight in not addressing the partition plea is an error, and the partition claim should be reconsidered. Finally, the plaintiff's status impacts his daughter's intestate succession rights. Therefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED** without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to pursue the partition claim or other remedies based on the adopted son's treatment.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by HEGDE, J. :\nHEGDE, J. for the This is a plaintiffs' appeal by certificate. Plaintiff Daulat rao who died during the pendency of this appeal sought several reliefs in suit No. 5-A of 1955 in the Court of the Second Additional District Judge, Amravati. But at present we are primarily concerned with relief No. 1 claimed in the plaint viz :\n\"That it be declared that defendant No. 3 has no right or title to the property in Schedules A, B and 1/2 share in Schedule D and permanent injunction be issued to him not to interfere with plaintiff's enjoyment and possession of property shown in Schedules A, B and 1/2 share in Schedule D.\"\n2. The relief claimed does not properly bring out the controversy between the parties. The plaintiff really wanted a declaration that he had not adopted the third defendant, Harishchandra and as such the said Harishchandra has no interest in the plaintiff's properties. The third defendant claimed that he had been adopted by the plaintiff on January 5, 1955. The trial court held that the adoption pleaded by the third defendant is neither true nor valid. The High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench) reversing the judgment of the trial court upheld the adoption put forward by the third defendant.\n3. There was a controversy between the parties as to whether the plaintiff and his brother Champatrao, defendant No. 1 were members of an undivided family or whether they were divided. Both the trial court as well as the High Court came to the conclusion that there was partition between the plaintiff and his brother in the year 1948. That conclusion was not even challenged before the High Court. Hence there is no need to go into it.\n4. In paragraph 7 of the plaint, the plaintiff had definitely averred that if the court is pleased to uphold the adoption put forward by the third defendant, he does not wish to remain joint with the third defendant. It was further averred therein that in the notice issued by him on January 29, 1955 to Defendants 1 and 3, he had expressed his intention to separate and he had effected severance between him and the third defendant. As an alternative relief he claimed partition of the properties that fell to his share in 1948 between himself and the third defendant. No proper issue was raised on this plea. Evidently the trial court having granted the main relief in favour of the plaintiff did not think it relevant to go into the alternative relief asked for. No arguments relating to that relief appear to have been advanced before the High Court. The High Court has also not considered that question. But in this Court Mr. V. S. Desai appearing for the appellants pressed that alternative contention. We shall consider that contention at a later stage.\n5. In order to decide the question whether the third defendant was in fact adopted by the plaintiff on January 5, 1955, and whether the adoption pleaded was a valid one, it is necessary to state a few more facts. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant Champatrao are direct brother. They are the sons of one Jairam. The plaintiff had two wives, Mankarnika (Defendant 4) and Deokabai (Defendant 5). He had no sons. But he had a daughter by name Vatsala (Defendant 6). This daughter had a son and a daughter. The plaintiff had also a mistress by name Savitri, who was defendant No. 7 in the suit. Champatrao had three sons : Abarao (Defendant 2), Harishchandra (Defendant 3) and Vasant (Defendant 8). Vasant had been adopted by one Khushalrao Deshmukh.\n6. The case for Defendants 1 to 3 is that the plaintiff adopted defendant No. 3 on January 5, 1955 at Amravati in the compound of Dr. Mudaliar's nursing home. Thereafter a photo was taken. A deed of adoption was also written up on that day and registered on January 7, 1955. The plaintiff and Defendants 4, 5 and 6 denied the adoption pleaded. According to them the plaintiff had a paralytic stroke sometime in the year 1954. At that time he was treated by Dr. Mudaliar but he was nursed by his brother defendant No. 1. In about the beginning of January 1955, he had attack of pneumonia. Hence he was brought to the hospital of Dr. Mudaliar. While he was in that hospital, he was unconscious for several days; taking advantage of the physical and mental condition of the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 got up the adoption deed as well as several other documents.\n7. The burden of establishing that there was a valid adoption which deflected the ordinary course of succession is undoubtedly on the party who pleads the case of adoption. In the instant case, there is almost conclusive evidence to show that the plaintiff had adopted the third defendant on January 5, 1955. Immediately after the adoption, as is usual in Maharashtra, a photograph of the adoptive father, the adopted boy as well as of other relations had been taken. The photographer has been examined. he has also produced the negative. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the photographer. The photograph in question completely falsifies the story of the plaintiff that at about the time of the adoption, he was unconscious. It is seen from the photograph that the plaintiff was well-dressed when the photograph was taken. He was sitting erect and alert. Though he looks old and weak in the photograph, he looks quite cheerful. As regards the state of his health at about the time of adoption, the plaintiff has given various versions each contradicting the other. At one stage of his evidence he stated that he was only mentally feeble at that time because of the illness; at another place he deposed that he was unconscious for four or five days but he later asserted that he was unconscious for one full month. Hardly any reliance can be placed on the testimony of the plaintiff. The best witness who could have spoken to the physical and mental condition of the plaintiff was Dr. Mudaliar. Dr. Mudaliar has not been examined. No reason is forthcoming for his non-examination. Curiously enough instead of examining Dr. Mudaliar, the plaintiff has chosen to examine his compounder, whose evidence clearly discloses that he knew very little about the nature of the plaintiff's ailment. Some records said to have been maintained in Dr. Mudaliar's dispensary had been produced. Naturally the High Court was not able to attach any importance to those documents. Nor do we attach any importance to them.\n8. We next come to the question of the adoption deed. The plaintiff admits that the signatures found therein are his. His explanation is that the said signatures were obtained by practising fraud on him and that he did not know the contents of the document when he signed the same. This is clearly falsified by the testimony of the Sub-Registrar who registered the document. The Sub-Registrar deposed that the adoption deed was presented before him by the plaintiff on January 7, 1955 and that the plaintiff admitted before him the correctness of its contents. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the Sub-Registrar who appears to be an independent witness. In addition to the evidence of the Sub-Registrar, the third defendant has examined two of the attestors to the adoption deed. One of the attesters to the adoption deed is a common relation of the plaintiff as well as of the first defendant.\n9. The story put forward by the plaintiff as regards the execution of the deed is extremely artificial. It may be noted that at about the time, the plaintiff executed the adoption deed, he had also executed gift deeds in favour of his two wives, his mistress and his daughter. He himself presented all those documents for registration. Apart from averring in the plaint that those documents were fictitiously got up by the 1st defendant, the plaintiff has not even challenged the validity of those documents. Apparently he stood by those documents. The 1st defendant could not have had any interest in getting gift deeds in favour of the plaintiff's wives, his mistress and the daughter. The execution of these deeds undoubtedly go to strengthen the case of the third defendant that the plaintiff voluntarily executed the adoption deed.\n10. Now coming to the factum of adoption, firstly there is an admission of that fact in the adoption deed executed by the plaintiff. Then we have the evidence of the photographer who speaks to the fact that a photograph of the persons who participated in the adoption was taken by him very soon after the adoption. Added to this we have the evidence of the priest who officiated at the adoption. As many as six witnesses had attested the adoption deed. Out of them, two have been examined. They speak to the adoption ceremony. They speak to the giving and taking of the boy. The High Court has accepted their testimony. We see no reason to differ from the conclusions reached by the High Court.\n11. Some comment was made on the facts that the adoption is said to have taken place in the compound of Dr. Mudaliar's hospital and that too very near a latrine; no invitations had been issued for the adoption, there was no music and that there was no reception. In addition, it was also alleged that the ladies of the house who were alleged to have been present at the time of the adoption do not appear in the photo and that circumstance indicates that there was no adoption. These circumstances undoubtedly show that the adoption in question was not done with the concurrence of the wives of the plaintiff. It may be that the plaintiff had adopted the third defendant without the knowledge of his wives and with a view to avoid any obstruction by them he had gone to Amravati and adopted the third defendant. Possibly under the influence of his wives, he had later tried to resile from the adoption made.\n12. This Court ordinarily attaches great deal of importance to the findings of fact reached by the High Courts. The findings reached by the High Court are probabilised by the circumstances appearing in the case and are supported by oral and documentary evidence. Under these circumstances, we are not called upon to reassess the evidence minutely. In the result we agree with the High Court that the plaintiff had adopted the third defendant on January 5, 1955. We do not agree with the trial court that there is no satisfactory evidence as regards giving and taking of the boy.\n13. This takes us to the alternative relief asked for in the plaint. Obviously parties to the suit as well as the trial court as well as the High Court had exclusively focussed their attention on the question of adoption. The trial Judge having decided the main question in favour of the plaintiff probably thought it unnecessary to examine the alternative relief claimed. It must also be said that the issues framed did not directly touch the said relief. The High Court in its judgment after dealing with the question of adoption clearly says that \"no other issue was canvassed in the appeal.\" But all the same, the plaintiff had clearly declared his intention to be separated from the third defendant in paragraph 7 of the plaint. He had also claimed that a partition be effected by metes and bounds through court. In his written statement, the third defendant has admitted the plaintiff's right to get a share. The plaintiff's right to get a share is not open to any dispute. The plaintiff stood separated from the third defendant by the time the suit was filed. His share had to be determined as on the date he got separated from the third defendant. The plaintiff died in 1969 during the pendency of the litigation. His share devolved on his heirs according to law. It was contended on behalf of the contesting respondents that the plaintiff having not pressed the alternative relief claimed before the High Court, we should not go into that question at this stage and the parties should be allowed to work out their rights in a separate suit. We see no justification for that course. The deceased plaintiff was entitled to have his share worked out in the present suit itself. He having died during the pendency of the litigation his share devolved on his heirs. It is but appropriate that the rights inter se between his heirs should be worked out in this very litigation. We were told at the bar that the plaintiff died in 1969 after the Hindu Succession Act came into force. It is not possible for us to work out the rights of the parties in this Court. We think that under the circumstances of the case, it is appropriate to remand this case to the trial court to ascertain as to what was the share of the deceased plaintiff on the date he got separated from the third defendant, who are all his heirs and to what share each one of them is entitled to. The trial court will also divide by metes and bounds not merely the shares inter se between the deceased plaintiff and the third defendant but also between the heirs of the deceased plaintiff. Unless there was any disposition made by the deceased plaintiff of his share, the third defendant is also admittedly one of the heirs of the deceased plaintiff.\n14. In the result this appeal is partly allowed and the case remanded to the trial court to carry out the directions given above. So far as the costs of the trial court and the High Court are concerned, the High Court has already directed the parties to bear their own costs throughout. We make a similar order as to the costs in this Court. In other words, the parties shall bear their own costs in this Court also.", + "case_record": "M/s. Akash Traders was an Area Wholesale dealer for Britannia Industries Limited (the Company). The dealership was terminated. Despite this, the complainant sent two demand drafts totaling Rs. 1,68,000/- on 14.09.2000 for goods. The company reiterated the termination of the dealership. The proprietor of M/s. Akash Traders filed a complaint under Section 406 IPC against the appellant (Managing Director of the Company), but the company was not made an accused. The demand drafts were in the company's name. After the complainant's death and substitution, the Magistrate summoned the appellants. The Magistrate discharged the accused under Section 245(2) CrPC, finding no criminal intent due to the delay in returning the drafts being attributable to banking processes and the fact that the drafts were eventually received back by the complainant. The revisional court allowed the complainant's revision, stating the Magistrate erred by not allowing evidence under Section 244 CrPC. The High Court dismissed the appellant's application under Section 482 CrPC, finding a prima facie case.", + "generated_judgment": "In evaluating the appeal, it's essential to consider the sequence of legal proceedings and the reasoning provided by the courts at different levels.\n\n1. **Initial Complaint and Discharge**: The complainant, M/s. Akash Traders, filed a complaint under Section 406 IPC. The Magistrate discharged the accused, finding no criminal intent. This was based on the conclusion that the delay in returning the drafts was due to banking processes and that the drafts were eventually returned to the complainant.\n\n2. **Revision by Complainant**: The complainant appealed, and the revisional court found that the Magistrate erred by not allowing evidence under Section 244 CrPC. As a result, the revision was allowed.\n\n3. **High Court's Decision**: The High Court dismissed the appellant's application under Section 482 CrPC, indicating that there was a prima facie case to be answered. This suggests that the High Court found merit in the revisional court's decision to allow the revision, implying that the Magistrate's decision to discharge might have been premature or without sufficient regard to evidence that could have been presented.\n\nConsidering these facts, the sequence of judicial decisions indicates that the higher courts found procedural and substantive grounds to question the Magistrate's discharge of the accused. The High Court's dismissal of the Section 482 CrPC application further supports the position that a prima facie case existed, warranting further examination.\n\nTherefore, based on the facts provided and the decisions of the revisional court and the High Court, the appeal should be **DISMISSED**.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE S. B. SINHA\n1. Leave granted.\n2. M/s. Akash Traders was an Area Wholesale dealer of Britannia Industries Limited (the Company) for Azamgarh, U.P. Dealership of Respondent No.2 was terminated by the said company. It was earlier informed that goods will be delivered only upon receipt of demand drafts issued by it. Complainant sent two demand drafts for a sum of Rs.18, 000/- and Rs.1, 50, 000/- for supply of goods on 14.9.2000 despite the fact that the dealership had been terminated earlier.\n3. The said demand drafts were sent to the appellant through the local Sales In-charge of the Company. It is stated that the complainant refused to take the same back.\n4. A new Area Wholesaler for Azamgarh was appointed by the company.\n5. A demand was made by the complainant to deliver goods by a letter dated 24.9.2000 stating that the company owes him a sum of Rs.1, 00, 000/-. The stand of the company that his dealership had been terminated was reiterated by a letter dated 25.9.2000.\n6. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, purported to be the proprietor of the firm M/s. Akash Traders, filed a complaint petition in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh against the appellant herein for commission of an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Britania Industries Ltd. was not impleaded as an accused therein.\n7. On or about 17.2.2001, i.e., after filing of the complaint petition, the dealer accepted the said demand drafts being dated 8.1.2002 for a sum of Rs.1, 68, 000/-. On or about 25.2.2001, Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, the original complainant expired. A substitution application was filed by the second respondent-Alok Kumar Aggarwal on or about 19.4.2001.\n8. Inter alia, relying on or on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint petition that 'the company with mala fide intention neither sent the goods, nor returned the money'; an order for summoning the appellants was passed on 8.5.2001. A publication to that effect was also made in an article in a local newspaper.\n9. An application for recalling the order summoning before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was filed by the appellant. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, by an order dated 13.12.2001 discharged the accused in terms of Section 245(2) of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, holding :\n \"From the perusal of the record, this fact has come to light that in between the complainant M/s. Akash Traders, Azamgarh and Britannia Industries Ltd., Kolkata an agreement was made. M/s. Akash Traders were the authorized agent of Britannia Industries Ltd. and according to terms and conditions of the Agreement, Britannia Industries Ltd. used to supply biscuit to M/s. Akash Traders, Azamgarh. On 8.9.2000, Britannia Industries Ltd. terminated the agency regarding agreement as a result of which in between the parties dispute arose. It is the submission of the complainant that on 13.9.2001 bank draft of Rs.1, 68, 000/- was sent in favour of Britannia Industries Ltd. but on behalf of the accused the above amount did not return till 7.2.2001 to the complainant. The pleading on behalf of the accused is that the bank draft of Rs.1, 68, 000/- was returned to M/s. Akash Traders on 8.1.2001 and its payment was received by the complainant on 19.2.2001 under protest. Both the parties regarding the above reference after the case being decided this legal position has been made clear that if in any matter civil or criminal case is made out then on the basis of obtaining civil relief the proceedings of the suit could not be terminated. In the present matter, it has to be decided that whether in between both the parties during the business transactions prima facie criminal case was found? If in the present case any criminal case is not found then under Section 245(2) Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the accused could be released at any stage. After the termination of agreement in between the accused and the complainant regarding agency on 13.9.2001 bank draft for an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/- was sent to Britannia Industries Ltd. for the supply of biscuits. Prior to this also agreement dated 8.9.2000 has already been terminated regarding the agency in favour of M/s. Akash Traders Azamgarh. The complainant for receiving back an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/- sent letters dated 11.10.2000 and 21.10.2000 but till 7.2.2001, the complainant did not receive back the above amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/-. But from the perusal of the photo copy of the letter enclosed with the file of bank draft of State Bank of India, Keshavpuram, Delhi it has become clear that bank draft No.597805 dated 8.1.2001 for an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/ had already been prepared in favour of M/s. Akash Traders, Azamgarh and after the departmental proceedings of clearance on 19.2.2001 the complainant had received back the amount on 19.2.2001. Thus, it is clear that the applicant/accused had transferred an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/- on 8.1.2001in favour of the complainant M/s. Akash Traders through Bank Draft, thus, in transaction whatever delay was made in returning back the amount of bank draft that has been committed due to proceedings relating to payment being done due to banking process and looking to the aforesaid facts it becomes clear that on the side of applicant/accused there was no intention of criminal misappropriation and, thus, there is no appropriate basis to initiate any action against the accused. Therefore, under Section 245(2) Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the proceedings of the case are terminated and the accused is released.\" \n10. A revision application was filed thereagainst by the complainant which, by reason of an order dated 5.6.2002, was allowed, stating :\n \"It is clear from the perusal of the file that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in the impugned order dated 13.12.2001 has not granted any opportunity of adducing the evidences in detail under the provisions of Section 244 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 but by not granting any opportunity to adduce the evidences by the complainant under Section 244 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has passed the impugned order under the provisions of Section 245(2) Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which is not legal and proper. Under the provisions of Section 244 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973the complainant must be granted opportunity of filing the evidences in detail as per the law. Under the above, provisions, the charges are framed against the accused persons after the evidences are taken on record otherwise not, that is to say, passing of order under Section 245 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would be proper and justifiable.\" \n11. An application filed by the appellant before the High Court in terms of Section 482 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment, stating :\n \"From the perusal of the allegations made against the applicants and from the perusal of the impugned order, it appears that prima facie offence is made out against the applicant and there is no procedural mistake in taking cognizance and summoning the applicants, therefore, the prayer for quashing the impugned orders dated 8.5.2001 passed by the learned Magistrate, Azamgarh and 5.6.2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.2, Azamgarh is refused.\nThe interim stay order dated 3.7.2002 is vacated.\nAccordingly, this application is dismissed.\" \n12. The short question which arises for consideration is as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, disclosed an offence as against the appellant under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.\n13. Section 405 defines 'criminal breach of trust' to mean :\n Section 405.'Criminal breach of trust'\nWhoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits \"criminal breach of trust\".\" \n14. Appellant No.1 is the Managing Director of the Company. Respondent No.3 was its General Manager. Indisputably, the company is a juristic person. The demand drafts were issued in the name of the company. The company was not made an accused. The dealership agreement was by and between M/s. Akash Traders and the company.\n15. Mr. Pramod Swarup, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Responent No.2, in support of the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate as also the High Court, submitted that as, prima facie, the appellant was in charge of and was in control of the business of the company, he would be deemed to be liable for the offence committed by the company.\n16. Indian Penal Code, 1860, save and except some provisions specifically providing therefor, does not contemplate any vicarious liability on the part of a party who is not charged directly for commission of an offence.\n17. A criminal breach of trust is an offence committed by a person to whom the property is entrusted.\n18. Ingredients of the offence under Section 406 are :\n \"(1) a person should have been entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property;\n(2) that person should dishonestly misappropriate or convert to his own use that property, or dishonestly use or dispose of that property or willfully suffer any other person to do so;\n(3) that such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust.\" \n19. As, admittedly,drafts were drawn in the name of the company, even if appellant was its Managing Director, he cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. If and when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides specifically therefor. In absence of any provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence committed by the company itself.{See Sabitha Ramamurthy and Anr. v. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya [(2006) 10 SCC 581]} .\n20. We may, in this regard, notice that the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 etc. have created such vicarious liability. It is interesting to note that Section 14A of the 1952 Act specifically creates an offence of criminal breach of trust in respect of the amount deducted from the employees by the company. In terms of the explanations appended to Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, a legal fiction has been created to the effect that the employer shall be deemed to have committed an offence of criminal breach of trust. Whereas a person in charge of the affairs of the company and in control thereof has been made vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company along with the company but even in a case falling under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 vicarious liability has been held to be not extendable to the Directors or officers of the company. {See Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and Ors. [2007 (11) SCALE 318]} .\n21. The High Court, therefore, committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment.\n22. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. Respondent No.2 is liable to bear the costs of the appellant for causing harassment to him which is quantified at Rs.1, 00, 000/- (Rupees one lac only).", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -2363,12 +2363,12 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S019", - "case_id": "3051", - "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "mistral-nemo", - "source_file": "S019__ablation_issue__mistral-nemo__3051.json", + "case_id": "6471", + "experiment": "baseline_no_firac", + "model": "phi-4", + "source_file": "S019__baseline_no_firac__phi-4__6471.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "03/08/1972", + "judgment_date": "15/02/2008", "machine_error_stage": "issues", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue omission" @@ -2376,13 +2376,13 @@ }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Appeal (Crl.) 230 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl.) No. 1409 of 2006) | Ashfaq Khan And Another v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others | 01/02/2008", - "case_details": "Case: Appeal (Crl.) 230 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl.) No. 1409 of 2006) | Ashfaq Khan And Another v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 317 of 1976. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th February, 1976 of the Jammu &Kashmir High Court in Election Petition No. 2 of 1972. | Bashir Ahmed Magrey v. Ghulam Quadir Mir And Others | 02/12/1976", + "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 317 of 1976. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th February, 1976 of the Jammu &Kashmir High Court in Election Petition No. 2 of 1972. | Bashir Ahmed Magrey v. Ghulam Quadir Mir And Others", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The appellant challenged a First Information Report (FIR) lodged against them for offences under Sections 420 and 424 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 2 and 3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986. The appellant contended that the FIR, on its face, did not constitute cheating or an offence under the Prevention Act, but at most, a case of tax evasion. The High Court had previously disposed of numerous similar writ petitions, categorizing cases and formulating guidelines. However, the High Court's order in the present case did not explain how its prior rulings were relevant to the appellant's situation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and remitted the matter back to the High Court to consider the applicability of its previous decisions to the facts of this case, explicitly stating that no opinion on the merits was expressed.", - "generated_judgment": "**Judgment**\n\n---\n\n### **Facts**\n1. An appellant appeals against a High Court order disposing a Writ Petition dismissing charges under Sections 420 and 424 of the Indian Penal Code (cheating and dishonesty-inducing delivery of property) and Sections 2 and 3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986.\n2. The High Court categorized these charges under tax evasion rather than flagging them as established offences under Section 420 IPC or the Gangsters Act, sneaking alternate allegations of suboptimal prosecution logistics.\n3. The High Court had previously handled numerous similar disputes and applied its own directives, but conspicuously failed to consistently integrate its prior case-law rulings into the factual analysis for this specific case.\n4. Despite labeling this appeal “aptly reasonable,” the **Supreme Court** unique remanded matters for the High Court to repeat articulating how its prior jurisprudence aligns with facts before it.\n\n---\n\n### **Issues**\n1. **Maintainability**:\n - Did the remand order result from a legally correct renewal—specifically, was the High Court instructed to apply its rulings without substantial merit input (or were errors steeped into lack of contextual reasoning)?\n - Did the High Court achieve its ends by robes and policy messages properly, or did it imply an unfaithful recitation of precedents?\n - What loopholes remained unresolved by procedural flaws in making appeasin Нашканна *конститутуальтіine dispute?\n\n2. **Measures contrary to durable precedent**\n - Was the appeal tranéeed by invalid preconcgenerated duties must incompetent compulsion? Last to *BG Counteroccasive standard, SC reverting agvity snatched.*\n\n---\n\n### **Rules**\nThe applicable legal principles are extracted from **constitutional law, judicial bank procedures, fooling-informed certiorary review, and/or notions of the Ratio Decidenti in specific sects**:\n1. **The Supreme Court Reto ujurus-cable issue:** Factually bound review focus remand's viability in resultant influence to prior writ-rulings. If those mechanisms which examined factors into place, alter mounts \"plausibly embbergen\" contempt, declines upgrade (*BCUT v. State 8%8%8 Case Lite*).\n2. Certiorary operations (Artic/226) warrant scrupulous scrutiny—a writ should not overstep due procedural adhesion or procedural drafting.\n3. When applicationping precedent for Intented legal reason formulations the fail action sucles fact-manifestion ***ust hold equal steps*.\n\n *(Exemplarily cited*: *David Alexander v. State*, sscribing great damage if clear mandate drops rarity-managed party's preference of societially said proceedings for finding new arguments.)\n\n---\n\n### **Analysis**\n\n#### **Faimaintaining Issue analysis**\n1. **Maintainability Blunder #1: Null-deferred Rechtprecedent Match**\n The High Court swallowed its unresolved \"thresholds to taxonomic establishing\" Twitter-like last nestin' words. A remand connoise—at this level—expects not winging proof-to-quotation but specific pointer text to deploy **efficient and intelligible** mechano pretense's bounds fore-dellavery's semantic anchors.\n - The SC emanated \"tips opening pari bus\" requiring the HC to reference its Hollie Precedents **unlated*. That found viol American’s prima-fecial-banced clauses preceding roles *to grapes_. Vide SC’s Tribunal Scanning strangles veril hag as acting against a requisite consecutives' baseline con regime. The likelihood that HC followed a particular dry reasoning capable of formative opportually relevance (CSS) ≈-> A case modified as dispatching appealing-building-trail's orientation potential, with retreatbacks distributing adjoined justifications.\n\n---\n\n2. **Judicial Disaffiliate Reasonable Rules from precedent**\n - HC stung lacks public-logical/original-response mechanism: Treaty imports เสviously-ranked anomalies circulating actual recriminoxy analysis“*Rising Violation*constituted was retruded: Should courts reject unless those judged emergencies are subservily mirrored? Dominant opinion maps to *Clarifying Precedes continuation*—like inter-N2-provenance's isomorphism (absive hatswood); replacing.{Case-yellow / Validation: precisely went [*BCUT totalling*]\n---\n\n#### **Manifestley Anti-Lad Conclusions From Conservantิดation Configuration gallery**\nHigh Court overlooked essentials:\n(a) **Certain remand terms**: SC demanded new articulation on theories to inves­tic fidicate paradigm span fields—**HC failed to compromise intellectual candidate hub**; rendering categorical dismissive without nuanced tailoring.\n(b) **Unshown Connection**: Hardly provided these explanations; rather belaboured popular argumeti polyphonic ecclesiastical, bold-liberate that **dismissions enforced *\n(review portrayed as non-judicial fashion, say).\n\n---\n\n### **Conclusion**\nThe High Court’s judgement is, thereby, **absent titles resulting square or straws rendering accountability mainy viable**.\nDue to being teetered upon ^{technical} over-aggregate in these ~maintainability, s وجود hegemony decay—**The court ejects appeal on this side issue fundamental violations of due process**.\n\n---\n**DISMISSED**", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT\n1. Leave granted.\n2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellant.\n3. The facts in a nutshell are as follows:\nA Writ Petition was filed before the High Court for quashing the First Information Report (in short the 'FIR') lodged for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 and 424 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and Sections 2 and 3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti- Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (in short the 'Prevention Act'). The stand in the writ petition was that even if the FIR is taken at its face value, there is no scope for holding that the appellants committed cheating or an offence punishable under the Prevention Act. At the most it may make out a case for evasion of tax for which action is permissible under the concerned Trade Tax Act.\n4. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that in the cases referred to, a Division Bench of the High Court had disposed of large number of cases involving more or less similar prayers to quash the FIR in each case. It is pointed out that the High Court had categorised different type of cases and one of such categories was where no previous case was pending under any other law prior to initiation of investigation under the Prevention Act. It is also submitted that the appellants' case falls within the following parameters and guidelines formulated by the High Court:\n \"(a) It is expected that the investigation will be completed by the police within the prescribed limit under the general law i.e. Section 167 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by filing the charge-sheet or final report, if the accused is in custody within that period;.\n(b) It is expected that the Special Court will conclude the hearing of the cases, where rate of crime is not so higher by applying a summary procedure preferably within a period of 3-6 months from the date of filing the charge-sheet before the Court depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case;\n(c) In case of pendency of Appeal/Revision/Review by an accused, Special Court will be empowered to split up the file in respect of other co-accused to avoid delay in hearing the case;\n(d) If any person applied or surrendered or produced before the Court in connection with the matters where rate of crime is not higher, the Special Court expeditiously dispose it of following the principles as laid down in Smt. Amarawati and Anr. vs. State of U.P.\n(e) In case the Special Court found that the crime case is not so negligible nor the rate of crime is lower in nature, it will proceed strictly in accordance with law;\n(f) It will be solemn duty of the Special Courts and the police authorities to follow the guidelines for the sake of investigation viz-a-viz personal liberties.\" \n5. The order of the High Court does not show as to how the ratio of the decision in a batch of writ petitions disposed of had any application or relevance so far as the present case is concerned.\n6. In the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter to it to consider as to how the facts involved in Writ Petition No.10500 of 2005 and/or the ratio of that decision had any relevance so far as the present dispute is concerned. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.\n7. The appeal is allowed.", + "case_record": "In March 1972, the appellant was declared elected to the J&K State Legislative Assembly from Rajpura constituency with 9,079 votes, while Respondent No. 1 secured 8,248 votes. Respondent No. 1 filed an election petition seeking to void the appellant's election and declare himself duly elected. The petition alleged improper rejection of votes cast for Respondent No. 1 and improper reception of votes for the appellant at various polling stations. The High Court declared the appellant's election void, finding 59 votes for Respondent No. 1 improperly rejected and 901 votes improperly polled (351 for appellant, 550 unclear beneficiaries). The High Court did not declare Respondent No. 1 elected. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, and Respondent No. 1 filed cross-objections. The Supreme Court ordered its Registrar to scrutinize the disputed ballot papers to ascertain beneficiaries.", + "generated_judgment": "Based on the given facts, the appeal should be **DISMISSED**. Here’s the detailed reasoning:\n\n1. **Initial Election Outcome**: In March 1972, the appellant was declared elected to the J&K State Legislative Assembly from Rajpura constituency with 9,079 votes, while Respondent No. 1 secured 8,248 votes. This establishes the initial electoral outcome.\n\n2. **Election Petition**: Respondent No. 1 filed an election petition alleging improper rejection of votes and improper reception of votes at various polling stations. This led to a dispute over the election results.\n\n3. **High Court Decision**: The High Court, after considering the evidence and arguments, declared the appellant's election void. The reasons provided were that 59 votes for Respondent No. 1 were improperly rejected, and 901 votes were improperly polled (351 for the appellant and 550 unclear beneficiaries). Importantly, the High Court did not declare Respondent No. 1 as the duly elected candidate.\n\n4. **Supreme Court Order**: The Supreme Court ordered its Registrar to scrutinize the disputed ballot papers to ascertain the beneficiaries. This indicates that the Supreme Court acknowledged the need for further scrutiny but did not directly overturn the High Court's decision.\n\n5. **Appeal and Cross-Objections**: The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, and Respondent No. 1 filed cross-objections. However, the facts do not indicate that these appeals and objections have resulted in a change in the High Court's decision.\n\n6. **Conclusion**: Given that the High Court declared the appellant's election void and did not declare Respondent No. 1 as the duly elected candidate, and the Supreme Court’s order for further scrutiny does not imply a change in the High Court's decision, the appeal should be dismissed.\n\nTherefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by\nKHANNA, J. During the general elections held in March 1972 five candidates, namely, the appellant and respondents No. 1 to 4, contested tile election for the Jammu &Kashmir State Legislative Assembly from Rajpura constituency. There was a sixth candidate, namely, Mohamed Abdullah Sheikh, respondent No. 5, but his nomination paper was rejected. The appellant secured 9, 079 votes and was declared elected. Respondent No. 1 was the nearest rival and he secured 8, 248 votes. Respondents 2 to 4 secured 1, 340, 1, 126 and 1, 217 votes respective ly. 2, 034 votes were declared invalid at the time of counting. After the declaration of the result of the election, respondent No. 1 filed election petition out of which the present appeal arises. Two prayers were made in the election petition: (1) that the election of the appellant be declared to be void; and (2) that respondent No. 1 be declared to have been duly elected. The High Court accepted the first prayer and declared the e lection of the appellant to be void. The second prayer that respondent No. 1 be declared to have been duly elected was not granted. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of the High Court insofar as it has declared his election to be void. Cross-objections have been filed by respondent No. 1 and it has been prayed on his behalf that he be declared to have been duly elected.\nThe elect ion petition was founded on the following three grounds:\n(1 ) Improper rejection of the nomination paper of respondent No. 5.\n(2) Improper rejection of the votes which had been cast in favour of respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the respondent); and\n(3) Improper reception of the votes in favour of the appellant on the day of polling at the following polling stations:1. Lassipora--Polling station No. 49\n2. Nowpora Pain--Polling station No. 50\n2 99\n3. Drubgham-B--Polling station No. 24 4.\nDrubgham-A--Polling station No. 23\n4. Drugbham-A--Polling station No.23\n5. Aliaipora--Polling station No. 51\n6. Chandgham--Polling station No. 46\n7. Arihal--Polling station No. 35, and\n8. Tikan Batapora--Polling station No. 26.\nAccording to the case of the respondent as set up in the election petition, the result of the election was materially affected because of the improper rejection at the time of counting of the votes which had been cast in his favour and by the improper reception of t he votes in favour of the appellant on the day of polling. Giving particulars in respect of the third ground, namely, that there was improper reception of votes in favour of the appellant on the day of polling, th e respondent stated that the total number of votes at Lassipura (polling station No. 49) was 824. All those votes were shown to have ben polled, although 162 voters registered in that area did not cast their votes. The figure of 162 included 16 persons who were dead before the date of polling. Electoral numbers of those 162 voters, including 16 dead persons, were also mentioned in the petition. The votes of 162 persons were thus stated to have been improperly received. Similar allegations were made in respect of Nowpora Pain (polling station No. 50), Drubgham B (polling station No. 24), Drubgham A (polling station No. 23), Alaipora (polli ng station No. 51), Chandgam (polling station. No. 46), Arihal (polling station No. 35) and Tikan Batapora (polling station No. 26).\nWe may add at this stage that the first ground, namely, that relating to the improper rejection of the nomination paper of respondent No. 5, was not pressed at the trial of the election petition, and as such no 1onger survives.The election petition was resisted by the appellant and he denied the various allegations made by the respondent. He also pleaded that the allegations in the election petition were vague, indefinite and uncertain. Objection was also raised regarding the maintainability of the petition on the grounds that it had not been properly verified and there war misjoinder of parties.\nThe petition was initially heard by Wasi-ud-Din J. It thereafter came up for hearing before Jalal-ud-Din J. Ultimat ely, it came up for hearing before Mufti Baha-ud-Din Farooqi J. who finally decided the petition and gave the judgment under appeal.\nDuring the pendency of the petition, orders were made on three occasions for inspection of the ballot papers. The first order was made by Wasi-ud-Din J. on August 13, 1973. The learned Judge, considered the prayer for inspection of ballot papers under three heads:\n\"(1) Request for inspection of ballot papers which were rejected at the time of counting;\n(2) Request for inspection a ballot paper account (Form No. 16) in respect of the various polling stations and of the ballot papers relevant thereto;\n(3) Request for inspection of marked copies of electoral rolls at polling stations Lassipora, Drubgham A &B, Achan, Chandgham, Afthal, Nowpora Pain, Tikam Batopora, Alaipora.\"\nPrayer under the first and third heads was rejected but that under the second head was allowed to the extent of the inspection of form No. 16 in respect of Lassipora, Nowpora Pain, Drubgham B, Drubgham A, Alaipora, Chandgham, Arihal and Tikan Batopora polling stations. Inspection of a few ballot papers, of which the numbers were specified, relating to some of the polling stations was allowed. On November 2, 1973 the learned Judge amplified his previous orders in these words: \"My order as it stands should be read to Clearly signify which I am amplifying here also that the sorting of the ballot papers will be done by the Deputy Registrar but in the presence of the learned counsel for both the parties. The learned counsel for the parties will not be allowed to handle the ballot papers until they are sorted out by the Deputy Registrar and after this is done, the respective learned counsel for the parties can handle and inspect the ballot papers.\"\nOn June 13, 1974 the learned Judge, on an ap plication made by the respondent, allowed inspection of ballot papers of two more polling stations, viz., Chandgham and Alaipora. The respondent also made prayer for leave to inspect the ballot papers of other polling stations, but the prayer in that behalf was rejected. The following directions were further issued by the learned Judge:\n\"The petitioner has also made a prayer that the Deputy Registrar be given directions to ascertain if the 34 series of two inspected polling stations Nos. 24 and 50 are not mixed in the fourth trunk which has been produced. The Deputy Registrar will of course see to this and such other discrepancies which may come to his notice, he will make a separate note and he will also make a note on the envelope if he found the discrepancy.\"\nAfter Wasi-ud-Din J. relinquished his office, the case was assigned to Jalal-ud-Din J. An application was then made on July 29, 1974 by the respondent seeking permission to inspect ballot papers and other documents pertaining to the various polling stations, This application was disposed of by Jalal-ud-Din J. as per order dated January 6, 1975 in these words:\n\"I, therefore, allow the application of the petitioner for inspection of ballot papers in respect of four veiling stations, namely, 26 Tikan Batapora from serial No. 0150 51 to 15700, 35 Arihal-A from serial No. 020901 to 021550, 49 Lassipora from serial No. 031051 to 031900, 23 Drubgham from serial No. 013201 to 013800 and also the counterfoils of 15 Nowpora Pain, 24 Drubgham B. 46 Chandgham and 51 Alaipora, the polling stations of which the ballot papers have already been inspected by the petitioner. 1, however, do not accede to the request of the petitioner to inspect electoral roll and counterfoils and from 16 of the entire constituency. The inspection as ordered will be held by and in presence of the counsel for the parties. But the Deputy Registrar will see that neither the candidate nor their counsel shall, handle the record. The Deputy Registrar will further make a separate note and record of the discrepancies found, if any. The inspection will be held during vacation on a date to be fixed by the Deputy Registrar.\" In the judgment under appeal the learned Judge held that 59 votes validly polled in favour of the respondent were improperly rejected at the time of counting. It was further found that 901 votes, including 28 votes of dead voters, were improperly polled.. Out of 901 votes, 351 votes were found to have been polled in favour of the appellant. Details of those 351 votes were as under:\nAlaipora polling station No. 51\n200\nArihal polling station No. 35\n51\nTakin Batapora P.S. No. 26 100\nRegarding the remaining 550 votes, the learned Judge found that the evidence was not clear, and observed as under:\n\"The evidence, however, is not clear as regards the fate of the remaining 550 such votes. But having regard to overall circumstances of the case it will not be unreasonable to conclude that respondent No. 1 was the greatest beneficiary of these 550 votes although the precise number by which he was benefited out of those votes may not be easily ascertainable. To these circumstances may be added the circumstance that 59 votes validly polled in favour of the petitioner were improperly rejected at the time o f counting, as held by me before. The cumulative effect of these circumstances is that the respondent No. 1 was able to get an undue advantage of no less magnitude and may be, even greater than that reflected in his declared success over the petitioner by 831 votes. In this view it must be held that the result of the election, insofar as respondent No. 1 is concerned, was materially affected by the improper rejection of votes in favour of the petitioner at the time of counting and the improper reception of votes on the day of poll and that his election must be declared to be void. But that should not entitle the petitioner to a declaration that he was duly elected as the total number of the votes improperly received in favour of respondent No. 1 on the date of poll could not be exactly worked out. The prayer for such declaration must be rejected.\" In the result, the election of the appellant was declared to be void. The prayer of the respondent for a declaration that he be declared to have been elected was rejected.\nWhen this appeal came up for hearing before this Court on September 3, 1976, we passed an order wherein we referred to the finding of the High Court that it cannot be said as to who was the beneficiary of the 550 votes which were found to have been improperly polled. We thereafter stated in that order:\n\"In our opinion, it is necessary to find out as a result of further inspection as to how many d those 550 votes were in favour of the appellant, and how many, in favour of respondent No. 1 and the other contesting candidates. For this purpose, we depute the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court to make an inspection in the presence of the parties and their counsel and submit a report to this Court within six weeks from today. The Registrar may also have to locate the 55 ballot papers referred to in the judgment of the High Court at pages 31-51 of the cyclostyled judgment. He may also, if necessary, refer to the reports of the Deputy Registrar of the High Court. The appeal should be put up for further hearing as soon as the report is ready.\"\nThe Registrar of this Court thereafter submitted his report dated September 15, 1976. The Registrar dealt with most of the matters but in respect of some of the matters he sought further directions. Necessary directions were thereafter issued by this Court on September 17, 1976. As a result of those directions, the Registrar had to scrutinise 571 ballot papers in all instead of 550 votes. The final report of the Registrar is dated September 24, 1976. The result of the reports of the Registrar taken along with the findings of the High Court may be set out:(1) Votes found by the High Court to have been improperly received in favour of the appellant\n351\n(2) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the appellant as per the first report of the Registrar\n286\n(3) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the appellant as per the second report of Registrar.\n141\nTotal\n778\n(4) Total number of votes polled by the appellant as per the results of the election\n9, 079\n(5) Valid votes polled by the appellant\n9, 079-778=8301\n(6) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the respondent as per the first report\n25\n(7) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the respondent as per the second report\n19\nTotal\n44\n(8) Total votes polled by the respondent as per the result of the election\n8, 248\n(9) Votes validly polled in favour of the respondent which were found by the High Court to have been improperly rejected at the time of counting\n59\n(10) Total number of votes thus polled by the respondent\n8, 248+59=8, 307\n(11) Valid votes polled by the respondent\n8, 307- 44=8, 263\n(12) Excess of votes validity polled in favour of the appellant over those of of the respondent.\n38\nSome votes were found by the Registrar to have been improperly received in favour of respondents 2 to 4, but it is not necessary to set out those votes.\nIn appeal before us Mr. Phadke on behalf of the appellant has urged that in view of the final picture as it emerges from the reports of the Registrar, the appeal should be allowed and the election petition be dismissed as the appellant secured more valid votes than the respondent. The above stand has been controverted by the respondent, who has argued the case in person. At an earlier hearing we requested Mr. Gambhir to argue the case amicus curiae in view of the fact that the respondent was not represented by counsel. The respondent thereafter stated that he Would like the matter to be argued by counsel of his own choice. Mr. Shaukat Hussain thereafter appeared on behalf of the respondent. At the final hearing the respondent, as mentioned above, chose to argue the case in person.Perusal of the election petition filed by the respondent shows that apart from the ground not subsequently pressed of the improper rejection of the nomination paper of respondent No. 5, the only ground on which the respondent challenged. the election of the appellant was the improper reception of votes in favour of the appellant and the improper rejection of the votes cast in favour of the respondent. This ground is based upon sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 108 of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act, 1957 (Act 4 of 1957) corresponding to sub -clause (iii) of clause (d) of sub- section (1) of section 100 of the Representation of the People, Act 1951 fact 43 of 1951). According to the above provision, if the High Court is of the opinion that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote of the reception of any vote which is void, the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. Keeping the above provision in view, we may now turn to the facts of the present case. The High Court found that 351 votes had been improperly received in favour of the appellant. The High Court further found that 59 votes which had been validly polled in favour of the, respondent were improperly rejected at the time of counting. In addition to. that, the High Court found that 550 votes had been improperly received, but it was not possible on the material on record to find out as to who was the beneficiary of those votes. The High Court all the same was inclined to believe that the appellant must have been the major beneficiary of those 550 votes. This necessarily involved an element of surmise and conjecture. To find out the exact position, we directed the Registrar of this Court to scrutinise the 550 ballot papers in question and to make a report as to how many of those votes were cast in favour of the appellant and how many in favour of the respondent and the other candidates. The Registrar thereafter submitted reports and we have already set out the outcome of those reports taken along with the findings of the High Court. It would appear from the figures set out above that, excluding all the votes which were found to have been improperly received by the appellant and also giving credit to the respondent for 59 votes which were found by the High Court to have been improperly rejected at that time of counting, the net result still is that the appellant has a lead of 38 votes over the respondent. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the election of tile appellant should be upheld. In an election petition founded upon the ground that the result of the election was materially affected by the improper reception or rejection of votes, the court has first to decide whether certain ballot papers were improperly received or were improperly rejected. Once , that controversy is resolved, the rest is purely a matter of arithmetical calculation. If the result of arithmetical calculation is that the returned candidate has still a lead over his nearest rival , his election would not be declared to be void on the ground of improper reception or improper rejection of votes. Improper reception or improper rejection of votes can result in invalidating an election only if such improper reception or improper rejection materially affects the result of the election.In the course of his arguments, the respondent has submitted that a number of improprieties were committed in the con duct of election and therefore the election of the appellant be declared to be void. Although it does appear from the material on record to which our attention was invited by the respondent that irregularities were commit ted in the conduct of the election, the respondent cannot derive any benefit on that account. As already mentioned, the respondent sought to challenge the election of the appellant only on the ground of improper reception and improper rejection of certain votes. The election of the appellant was not challenged on the ground of any irregular- ity or non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitu- tion or of the R epresentation of the People Act or of any rules or orders made thereunder. Nor was the election of the appellant assailed on the ground of being vitiated by corrupt practice. As it is not permissible to widen the scope of an election petition beyond the grounds actually set up in the election petition, the respondent cannot seek relief on grounds which were not taken by him in the elec- tion petition.\nIt has also been urged by the respondent that the number of votes which were improperly received was larger than that found by the High Court. Nothing cogent has, however, been brought to our notice in support of the above sub mission to induce us to interfere with the finding of the High Court in, this respect.\nLastly, the respondent submits that 153 ballot papers of Lassipora polling station cast in favour of the appellant should be rejected as they bore the initials and not the full signatures of the presiding officer. Our attention in this respect is invited to clause (h) of rule 56(2) of the Jammu and Kashmir Conduct of Election Rules, 1965, according to which the returning officer at the time of counting shall reject a ballot paper if it does not bear both the mark and the signatures which it should have borne under the provisions of sub-rule (1) of rule 3 8. According to sub-rule (1 ) of rule 3 8, every ballot paper shall before issue to elector, be stamped by such distinguishing mark as the Election Commission may direct, and be signed in full on its back by the presiding officer. It is not disputed that the ballot papers in question bore the distinguishing mark. The only contention of the respondent, as already mentioned, is that the ballot papers in question b ore the initials and not the full signatures of the presiding officer. In this respect we find that no express ground on that score was set up by the respondent in the election petition. This apart, we that the matter is covered by the first proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 56 which reads as under; \"Provided that where the returning officer is satisfied that any such defect as is mentioned in clause (g) or clause (h) has been caused by any mistake or failure on the part of a presiding officer or polling officer, the ballot paper shall not be rejected merely on the ground of such defect.\"\nThe above proviso which is based upon the principle that a vote validly cast should not be excluded from consideration because of the mistake or omission of the presiding or polling officer, makes it plain that where the returning officer is satisfied that any defect mentioned in clause (h) has been caused by the mistake or failure on the part of a presiding officer or polling officer, the ballot paper shall not be rejected merely on the ground of such defect. The fact that the returning officer in the present case did not reject the ballot papers in question on the ground that they bore only the initials and not the full signatures of the presiding officer would go to show that the returning officer was satisfied that the alleged defect was caused by the mistake or failure on the part of the presiding officer: Ther e can indeed be hardly any doubt on the point that the defect referred to by the respondent occurred because of the mistake or failure of the presiding officer. We, therefore, see no cogent ground to exclude from consideration 153 ballot papers polled in favour of the appellant.\nBefore we conclude, we may observe that some other contentions were also advanced on behalf of the appellant. In view of the fact that the appeal in any case has to be allowed because of the arithmetical calculations referred to above, it is not necessary to go into those contentions.\nAs a result of the above, we accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of , the High Court and dismiss the election petition. Cross objections filed by the respondent are dismissed. Looking to all the facts, we leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -2488,26 +2488,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S020", - "case_id": "374", - "experiment": "role_play_v3", - "model": "ministral-3b", - "source_file": "S020__role_play_v3__ministral-3b__374.json", + "case_id": "2544", + "experiment": "baseline_cot", + "model": "qwen-2.5-7b-instruct", + "source_file": "S020__baseline_cot__qwen-2.5-7b-instruct__2544.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/02/2008", + "judgment_date": "02/12/1976", "machine_error_stage": "facts", - "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in reasoning" + "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Missing fact" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1424 OF 2012 | Umakant & Anr. v. State Of Chhatisgarh | 01/07/2014", - "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1424 OF 2012 | Umakant & Anr. v. State Of Chhatisgarh", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | C.A. No. 382 of 1960 | Shri Raja Durga Singh Of Solan v. Tholu | 01/05/1962", + "case_details": "Case: C.A. No. 382 of 1960 | Shri Raja Durga Singh Of Solan v. Tholu", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The appellants, husband and mother-in-law, were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC, by the Trial Court and the High Court. The deceased, Anita Jaiswal, married to appellant No. 1, allegedly faced dowry harassment and torture. On August 2, 2003, she sustained burn injuries. The prosecution alleged the husband poured kerosene on her and the mother-in-law set her ablaze. Initially, the mother-in-law informed doctors of an accidental injury (Ext. P-2), and the deceased's sister and brother-in-law also provided a consent letter stating the injuries were accidental and self-inflicted. The deceased died on September 7, 2003. Her dying declaration (Ext. P-13), recorded on August 13, 2003, implicated the appellants. The Trial Court convicted them under various sections, including 302/34, IPC. The High Court acquitted them of charges under Sections 498-A, 304-B, IPC, and the Dowry Prohibition Act but upheld the Section 302/34, IPC conviction based solely on the dying declaration. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the dying declaration was unreliable.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts \n1. The deceased, Anita Jaiswal, was married to Appellant‑No. 1 (the husband). \n2. On 2 August 2003 she sustained burn injuries. \n3. The prosecution alleged that the husband poured kerosene on her and the mother‑in‑law (Appellant‑No. 2) set her alight. \n4. The mother‑in‑law, immediately after the injury, told the treating doctors that the injuries were accidental (Exhibit P‑2). \n5. The deceased’s sister and brother‑in‑law later produced a consent‑letter stating that the burns were self‑inflicted. \n6. The deceased died on 7 September 2003. \n7. Her dying declaration was recorded on 13 August 2003 (Exhibit P‑13) and implicated both the husband and the mother‑in‑law. \n8. The Trial Court convicted both appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC, and other sections. \n9. The High Court acquitted the appellants of the dowry‑related charges but upheld the conviction under Section 302/34, IPC **solely** on the basis of the dying declaration. \n10. The appellants have filed an appeal before this Court, challenging the reliability of the dying declaration. \n11. No material indicating the date of filing, existence of a condonation order, or a certificate of appeal has been placed on record. \n\n### Issues \n1. **Maintainability** – Whether the appeal is procedurally maintainable (timeliness, condonation of delay, certificate of appeal, service of notice). \n2. **Reliability and admissibility of the dying declaration** – Whether the declaration satisfies the requirements of Sections 27 & 117 of the Evidence Act and the procedural safeguards of Section 165 CrPC. \n3. **Proof of common intention** – Whether the prosecution proved a common intention between the husband and his mother‑in‑law under Section 34 IPC. \n4. **Effect of contradictory contemporaneous statements** – Whether the mother‑in‑law’s statement to the doctors (Exhibit P‑2) and the consent‑letter of the sister/brother‑in‑law create reasonable doubt that defeats the conviction. \n5. **Sufficiency of other evidence** – Whether any evidence aside from the dying declaration can sustain a conviction for murder. \n\n### Rules \n1. **Section 374 CrPC** – An appeal against a conviction of a High Court is appealable to the Supreme Court if filed within 30 days; otherwise a condonation of delay is required. \n2. **Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Rule 5(2)** – A certificate of appeal (or certificate of fitness) is mandatory for criminal appeals from High Courts unless the appeal is filed as a Special Leave Petition under Article 136. \n3. **Section 27, Evidence Act** – A dying declaration is admissible only if the declarant believed death was imminent, the statement was made voluntarily, and the declarant possessed mental and physical capacity. \n4. **Section 117, Evidence Act** – A statement is inadmissible if it was not voluntary. \n5. **Section 165 CrPC** – A dying declaration must be recorded by a magistrate (or police officer) in the presence of a doctor who certifies that death was imminent. \n6. **Section 34, IPC** – Liability for a common intention requires proof that the accused shared a pre‑arranged plan to commit the offence. \n7. **Section 20, 24, 25, Evidence Act** – Contradictory statements and documents are relevant facts; if they create a reasonable doubt, the prosecution’s case fails. \n8. **Section 32, Evidence Act** – The prosecution must prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. \n\n### Analysis \n\n#### 1. Maintainability \n- The appeal challenges a final conviction of murder affirmed by the High Court; therefore an appeal is *prima facie* maintainable under **Rule 1**. \n- The record **does not disclose** the date of filing, a condonation order, or a certificate of appeal. Absence of these details creates a serious procedural defect. \n- Under **Rule 2**, a criminal appeal to this Court **must** be accompanied by a certificate of appeal (or fitness) unless filed as an SLP. The facts contain no evidence of such a certificate. \n- Consequently, the appeal is **non‑maintainable** on procedural grounds unless the petition is pleaded as an SLP and the Court, exercising its discretion under **Article 136**, decides to admit it despite the defect. \n\nGiven the lack of any showing that the 30‑day limit was respected or that a certificate was obtained, the proper preliminary determination is that the appeal **fails to satisfy a mandatory pre‑condition of maintainability**. \n\n#### 2. Reliability and admissibility of the dying declaration (assuming the appeal were maintainable) \n- **Certainty of death**: The declaration was recorded **ten days after the injury** while the victim was still alive and receiving treatment. This fails the “imminent death” requirement of **Rule 3**. \n- **Voluntariness**: The mother‑in‑law’s earlier statement to doctors (Exhibit P‑2) that the injury was accidental, together with the consent‑letter alleging self‑infliction, indicates the existence of contrary narratives that could have exerted pressure on the deceased. Under **Rule 4**, the declaration is therefore **not voluntary**. \n- **Procedural compliance**: No documentary evidence of a doctor’s certification under **Rule 5** is present. Hence the statutory safeguard for a dying declaration is absent. \n\nAll three statutory requisites are unfulfilled; the dying declaration must be **excluded**. \n\n#### 3. Common intention under Section 34 IPC \nEven if the declaration were admitted, liability of the mother‑in‑law depends on proof of a **pre‑arranged plan**. The only link between the two accused is the dying declaration; no independent evidence (e.g., eye‑witnesses, forensic proof of coordinated action) exists. As held in **Balu v. State of Tamil Nadu**, simultaneity of acts without a proven plan does not satisfy § 34. Hence, **common intention is not proved**. \n\n#### 4. Contradictory contemporaneous statements \nThe mother‑in‑law’s statement to the doctors (Accidental injury) and the sister’s consent‑letter (Self‑inflicted burns) are **relevant facts** under **Rule 7**. Their inconsistency with the dying declaration creates a **reasonable doubt** regarding the factual matrix of the alleged murder. Under the principle that a conviction cannot rest on a statement that is materially contradicted, the High Court’s reliance on the dying declaration alone is unsafe. \n\n#### 5. Sufficiency of other evidence \nAside from the dying declaration, the record contains **no forensic report, medical opinion, or eyewitness testimony** linking the accused to the act. Consequently, the prosecution fails to meet the **beyond‑reasonable‑doubt** standard of **Rule 8**. In the absence of the dying declaration, the case collapses. \n\n### Conclusion \nThe appeal is **procedurally defective**: the petition does not demonstrate compliance with the 30‑day filing limit, nor does it produce a certificate of appeal or proof of condonation of delay as mandated by **Rule 1** and **Rule 2**. Because these requirements are jurisdictional, the Court must dismiss the appeal **without addressing the merits**. \n\n**DISMISSED**", - "reference_judgment": "Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 24th September, 2010 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 495 of 2005 maintaining their conviction and sentence under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC, the appellants have filed this appeal by special leave.\n2. Brief history of the case, as per prosecution case, is that Anita Jaiswal (deceased) was married to Umakant (appellant No.1) and after six months of the marriage, her husband and in-laws started harassing her to bring money from her father whenever she visits her parental home and also made a demand of Rs.50,000/- as dowry. She was also subjected to torture and cruelty every now and then by the husband and in-laws. On 2nd August, 2003, within one and a half years of her marriage, the appellant No. 1 (husband) beat her with an iron rod before night and while she was going to take bath in the morning, he caught hold of her and allegedly poured kerosene on her body. Appellant No. 2 (mother-in-law) set her ablaze by lighting a match stick. The victim was immediately taken to Revival Medical Centre, Bhilai where appellant No. 2 stated to the Doctors that the victim sustained burn injuries due to accident (Ext. P-2) with a chimney (local lamp). The victim was treated at the Revival Medical Centre till 13th August, 2003 on which date, when the condition of the victim was getting deteriorated, the Revival Medical Centre intimated the police about the incident vide Ext. P-21. Immediately thereafter, F.I.R. (Ext. P-24) was registered by the ASI, PS Newai (PW23). Investigation was taken up by PWs 26 and 27, the Superintendent of Police and the Station House Officer respectively who also seized a bottle of kerosene oil, one wooden stool, one iron pipe etc., and a seizure memo was accordingly prepared. On 13th August, 2003 itself the victim’s dying declaration (Ext. P-13) was also recorded by the Executive Magistrate (PW 12). The victim was then shifted to Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital & Research Centre, Bhilai for further treatment. However, on 7th September, 2003, during the course of her treatment, the victim died.\n3. After the death of the deceased, investigation continued, witnesses were summoned, inquest was made, dead body was sent for autopsy, spot map was prepared. Having recorded statements of witnesses under Section 161, Cr.P.C., charge sheet was filed against the accused (husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law). The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class committed the case to the Court of Session. The learned Trial Judge framed charges against the accused under Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and under Sections 304B/34, 302/34 and 498-A, IPC. In their statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. the accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. At the trial, they took the plea that the deceased died as a result of accident of chimney (local lamp) and they have been falsely implicated.\n4. To bring home the charges against the accused, the prosecution in all examined 27 witnesses whereas the accused, in their defence examined two witnesses.\n5. The Trial Court, after analyzing the statements of witnesses and keenly considering the material evidence came to the opinion that the prosecution had got established its case and the dying declaration (Ext. P-13) was also proved from its writer (PW-12). After going through the entire process of trial and in the light of various rulings of this Court, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that all the three accused were guilty of the offences charged against them, except charge under Section 304/B/34, IPC against father-in-law of the deceased. The Trial Court accordingly acquitted him of the said charge and sentenced all the accused in the following terms.\n Accused No.1-Umakant (Appellant No.1-husband of the deceased)\nUnder Section 3 of Dowry R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in default, additional\nProhibition Act, 1961 RI for one year\nUnder section 4 of Dowry R.I. for 1 year and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, additional\nProhibition Act, 1961 RI for six months.\nUnder Section 498-A of RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, additional\nIPC RI for six months.\nUnder Section 304-B of Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default,\nIPC additional RI for one year\nUnder Section 302/34, Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default,\nIPC additional R.I. for one year.\nAccused No. 2-Yashoda (Appellant No. 2-mother-in-law of the deceased)\nUnder Section 3 of Dowry R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, additional\nProhibition Act, 1961 RI for six months.\nUnder section 4 of Dowry R.I. 6 month and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, additional RI\nProhibition Act, 1961 for one month.\nUnder Section 498-A of RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, additional\nIPC RI for six months.\nUnder Section 304-B of Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default,\nIPC additional RI for six months.\nUnder Section 302/34 of Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default,\nIPC additional RI for six months.\n Accused No. 3 – Om Prakash (father-in-law of the deceased)\nUnder Section 3 of Dowry R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, additional\nProhibition Act, 1961 RI for six months.\nUnder section 4 of Dowry R.I. for 1 year and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, additional\nProhibition Act, 1961 RI for two months.\nUnder Section 498-A of RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, additional\nIPC RI for six months.\n6. While dealing with the appeal filed by the accused, the High Court formed the opinion that there was not enough evidence to uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellants as awarded by the Trial Court under Sections 498-A, 304-B, IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Therefore, the High Court acquitted all the accused from the charges against the aforementioned Sections. But, placing reliance solely on the dying declaration (Ext. P-13), the High Court thought it fit to convict the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC on the basis of dying declaration itself. Accordingly, the High Court maintained the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court against the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC.\n7. In view of the above conviction and sentence maintained by the High Court, the appellants approached this Court in this appeal finding fault with the decision of the High Court, which is impugned herein.\n8. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the Courts below have dealt with the case without proper application of mind and there were several discrepancies and contradictories in the statements of witnesses. Normally, before convicting an accused under Section 302, IPC, Courts provide so many safeguards to the defence, whereas in the present case those safeguards have not been provided. Thus, entire process of trial has been vitiated and led to the miscarriage of justice against the appellants. He also contended that when the High Court was of the opinion that there is no cogent evidence to sustain the order of conviction passed by the Trial Court under Sections 498A, 304B, IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, the dying declaration also ought not have been relied upon for punishing the accused under Section 302/34, IPC. The alleged dying declaration was a product of tutoring and not voluntarily given by the deceased, hence it is not trustworthy. He, therefore, argued that the conviction of appellants under Section 302/34, IPC. is completely erroneous, misconceived and deserves to be set aside.\n9. On the contrary, learned counsel for the State submitted that the impugned judgment was rendered by the High Court after a thorough analysis of the entire case with scrutiny of the evidence of all material witnesses. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of cruelty and torture caused by the appellants to the victim which stands proved by the dying declaration, the High Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants and there is no illegality in the impugned order. He therefore submitted that there is no ground calling for interference by this Court and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.\n10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully gone through the records of both the Trial Court as well as the High Court.\n11. Before we deal with the judgment of the High Court which is impugned before us, whereby it has acquitted the accused of the charges under Section 498-A, 304-B IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and convicted them for the offence under Section 302 IPC, curiously the basis for acquittal under the other offences and conviction of the accused under Section 302 IPC is based on the dying declaration of the deceased which is marked as Ex.P-13. For better appreciation, we shall refer to the important facts of the case. As per the case of the prosecution, the deceased was admitted in the hospital i.e. Revival Medical Centre on 02.08.2003 with burn injuries. The deceased when enquired by the Doctor as to how she sustained burn injuries, she informed him that she caught fire accidentally. This version of the deceased, was recorded by the Doctor, in the presence of her sister. Her sister and brother-in-law gave consent letter, which was marked as Ex.P-2, and it reveals that the deceased suffered burn injuries accidentally and the deceased Anita had burnt herself. Nobody had burnt her. When the Doctor asked the deceased several times, she gave the same answer. On 06.08.2003, her parents also came to Bhilai and stayed with her. She remained in the hospital till 10.00 p.m. of 13.08.2003. Thereafter, as her condition deteriorated, she was shifted to another hospital. On 13.08.2003, for the first time, Police were informed about the incident. On that day, her dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate who was later examined as P.W.12. The deceased succumbed to the burn injuries on 07.09.2003.\n12. The trial Court basing on the evidence available on record convicted and sentenced the appellants under Section 498-A, 304-B, 302 r/w 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. While the High Court though acquitted the accused under Section 498-A and 304-B IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, but found them guilty for the offence under Sections 302 r/w 34 IPC and confirmed the sentence imposed by the trial Court on that count.\n13. We have given our anxious consideration to the judgment of the High Court which is impugned before us, to find out the legality or otherwise of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed against the appellants for the offence under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC. The whole basis for the High Court to convict and sentence the accused under Section 302 IPC is the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate which was marked as Ex.P-13. It would be appropriate to extract the same, which reads:\n “Question: Whether would you able to give your statement?\nAnswer: Yes.\nQ: What is your name? What is the name of your husband? Where do you live at? Please tell your complete name.\nA: My name is Anita Jaiswal. Umakant is the name of my husband. I reside in Marauda Bhilai.\nQ: Who had admitted you at this place and when they had admitted you?\nA: My husband and mother-in-law have admitted me at this place. I do not remember the date of my admission. I have been burnt therefore they have admitted me.\nQ: How you were burnt, the incident is of which date, please tell the whole description.\nA: My mother-in-law was committing cruelty against me, whenever I went my Mayeka she used to tell me for taking Rs.50,000/- from my Mayeka. We are total four sisters and four brothers. Whenever I returned from my Mayeka, upon not taking the money she used to torture me badly, recently some mothers back while I went to Gujarat, my mayeka, when I came back my Sasural then they started telling about the money. One day prior to the date of the incident my husband had heavily beaten me, he beaten me from the Pirha (wooden structure) and from the iron rod, on the next day to that at about 8.00 a.m. after holding me my husband poured kerosene oil over me and after lit up a match stick my mother-in-law thrown the same at me, after becoming frightened, I held the hands of my Jeth, while my Jeth also started burning then after giving jolt at me, he got me fell down, the ladies residing in the back side of my residence arrived there and they changed my clothes after than by arranging a temp, I got admitted in the hospital.\nQ: Whether you did not tell your parents that your husband and mother-in-law were harassing you?\nA: After the marriage, I visited Mayeka for three times, then on the third occasion while I had gone to Mayeka then I had told my father then my father had told me that presently his position was not good, after managing the money as earliest he would sent the money. I had told abiout the cruelty of my husband and mother-in-law.\nQ: Since how may days from the marriage they have been committing cruelty? You have been burnt at which body parts?\nA: They have been harassing me since 4 -5 months after the marriage. They were committing cruelty for the dowry. My whole body parts below the neck have been burnt.\nQ: Whether you want to tell anything more?\nA: No”. \n14. According to the High Court, Ex.P-2, the alleged consent letter given by sister and brother-in-law, which says that burn injuries sustained by the deceased was a case of accident and Anita had burnt herself, runs contrary to each other, because in the case of accident, the patient will burn herself, but if she burnt herself, then it cannot be a case of accident. Hence, the High Court disbelieved Ex.P-2. The High Court further observed that not giving the information about the incident by the Revival Medical Centre to the police shows that the hospital staff in connivance with the accused, treated the deceased without informing about the incident to the police.\n15. Another reason given by the High Court for convicting the accused under Section 302, IPC is that, as per the dying declaration, the deceased had stated that when her mother-in-law and husband lit fire to her, she asked the brother-in-law and caught hold of him, and at that time, he also sustained burn injuries, which is supported by the evidence of the Doctor P.W.13, who has deposed that the injury on the hands of the brother-in-law P.W.14 is possible if a person who is in flames catch holds of another person. The High Court disbelieved the evidence of Doctor Vijay Kumar Sharma, which is in favour of the accused, basing on the contradictions in his evidence with regard to the nature of injuries and not informing about the incident to the police.\n16. Finally, the High Court convicted and sentenced the accused, basing on the dying declaration that the deceased was not having cordial relationship with the accused. The appellant No.1 poured kerosene oil upon the deceased and appellant No.2 had set her ablaze. As the dying declaration inspires confidence, it is trustworthy and drew inference that the appellants Umakanth and Yashoda poured kerosene oil upon the deceased, set her afire and caused her death. However, the High Court felt that there is no cogent evidence to convict the accused under Section 498-A and 304-B IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.\n17. Now the issue that falls for consideration before us is whether the High Court was right in convicting and sentencing the accused under Section 302 IPC basing on the dying declaration of the deceased?\n18. The philosophy of law which signifies the importance of a dying declaration is based on the maxim “nemo moritusus prasumitus mennre”, which means, “no one at the time of death is presumed to lie and he will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth”. Though a dying declaration is not recorded in the Court in the presence of accused nor it is put to strict proof of cross-examination by the accused, still it is admitted in evidence against the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible in evidence. The dying declaration does not even require any corroboration as long as it inspires confidence in the mind of the Court and that it is free from any form of tutoring. At the same time, dying declaration has to be judged and appreciated in the light of surrounding circumstances. The whole point in giving lot of credence and importance to the piece of dying declaration, deviating from the rule of evidence is that such declaration is made by the victim when he/she is on the verge of death.\n19. In spite of all the importance attached and the sanctity given to the piece of dying declaration, Courts have to be very careful while analyzing the truthfulness, genuineness of the dying declaration and should come to a proper conclusion that the dying declaration is not a product of prompting or tutoring.\n20. The legal position about the admissibility of a dying declaration is settled by this Court in several judgments. This Court in Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi - 2010 (9) SCC 1, taking into consideration the earlier judgments of this Court in Paniben v. State of Gujarat - 1992 (2) SCC 474 and another judgment of this Court in Panneerselvam v. State of Tamilnadu - 2008 (17) SCC 190 has given certain guidelines while considering a dying declaration:\n1. Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires full confidence of the Court.\n2. The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.\n3. Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration.\n4. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborative. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.\n5. Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.\n6. A dying declaration which suffers from infirmities, such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction.\n7. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.\n8. Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded.\n9. When the eye-witness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail.\n10. If after careful scrutiny the Court is satisfied that it is free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.\n21. In the light of the above legal position that governs the consideration of a dying declaration, the factual matrix has to be scrutinised. As already extracted above, in the dying declaration Ex.P-13, the deceased stated before the Magistrate that the appellants demanded dowry and that the appellants set fire to her and she asked her brother-in-law to rescue her, but he had chosen not to do so, and further on hearing her cries, the neighbours came and extinguished the fire and admitted her in the hospital. After she was admitted in the hospital, her parents came and she informed them about the incident.\nThe deceased is said to have stated that when she was pregnant she was beaten up by the accused and because of which the child died in the womb. At that time, she had taken treatment in Revival Hospital]. This statement is found in Ex.P-23, FIR written by K.B. Singh (P.W.23), and not in Ex.P13 dying declaration.\n22. When we look at the dying declaration, it is not inspiring confidence in the mind of this Court and throws serious doubt that the same is a product of tutoring by the family members of the deceased for the reason that, the sister of the deceased who was present when the deceased was admitted in the hospital had signed in Ex.P-2 wherein it is stated that it was an accident and nobody has burnt the deceased, but later she turned around and stated that unless she signed on that, they were told that the deceased would not be treated, and the High Court has taken this fact into consideration, whereas in the dying declaration, the deceased has stated that when her parents came to the hospital on 06.08.2003, she informed to the parents for the first time and she had not mentioned that she informed her sister or anybody before that, but according to the sister of the deceased, on 02.08.2003, she was aware of this, which shows that the evidence of the witness is not reliable and clouded with doubt.\n23. The other circumstances which draw our attention is when the deceased informed her parents on 06.08.2003, it is quite natural that the parents will inform the police about the incident, because it is nobody’s case that they were restrained in any manner from informing the police. Even the deceased throughout the stay in the hospital for those 11 days had many an occasion to meet the Doctors and other staff of the hospital, but she had chosen not to give any complaint nor tried to share her agony with them, which throws a grave doubt on the genuineness of the dying declaration. We have gone through the judgment of the High Court, where P.W.7 who has specifically deposed that they have tutored the deceased to state that she was burnt by the accused.\n24. The High Court while considering Ex.P-2 has come to a conclusion that the statement given in that one line is contradictory to one another. In one line, it says that the injuries sustained by her are by accident. Nobody has burnt her and she burnt herself. Hence, the High Court discarded Ex.P-2. But, in our considered opinion, the High Court did not appreciate the same in its proper perspective and interpreted it in a wrong way. What Ex.P-2 states is that it is an accident, and nobody has pushed her and for that accident, only the deceased is responsible.\n25. The burden of proof in criminal law is beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and it is also rule of justice in criminal law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. After considering the evidence and the judgments of the Courts below, we are of the considered opinion that the evidence available on record and the dying declaration does not inspire confidence in the mind of this Court to make it the basis for the conviction of the appellants. Apart from this, the High Court basing on the same dying declaration, ought not to have convicted the appellants under Section 302 IPC, when they were acquitted under Section 304-B and 498-B IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act by the High Court.\n26. Accordingly, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court vide its judgment dated 24th September, 2010 in Criminal Appeal No. 495 of 2005, against the appellants for the offence under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC, is set aside. Consequently, the appellants shall be released forthwith, if they are not required in any other case.", + "case_record": "The appellant, former ruler of Bhagat State, claimed specific lands (15 bighas 19 biswas) as his private Khudkhast property, recorded as such since 1936. He asserted the respondents were licensees, obligated to provide annual produce, and sued for possession and mesne profits after alleged non-delivery and obstruction. The respondents contended they were occupancy tenants for generations and that the civil court lacked jurisdiction under Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. The trial court decreed the appellant's suit. The District Judge dismissed the respondents' appeal, affirming the trial court's finding that the lands were the appellant's khudkhast and in his possession based on revenue records. The Judicial Commissioner, in second appeal, allowed the respondents' appeal, holding them to be occupancy tenants and that Section 77 barred the civil court's jurisdiction, directing the plaint be returned.", + "generated_judgment": "### **Facts:**\n1. **Parties and Property Allocation**: The appellant (Former Ruler of Bhagat State) declared **15 bighas 19 biswas** of land as his **private Khudkhast property**, recorded in revenue records since **1936**. The respondents alleged they were **occupancy tenants for generations**, claiming long-standing possession and usufruct.\n2. **Legal Status Under Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887**: The respondents argued that under this provision, **civil courts lack jurisdiction** over Khudkhast lands or disputes arising from them, mandatingOptional Land Settlement Procedure (or OLS) instead.\n3. **Claims and Pleadings**:\n - The appellant sued the respondents for **possession and mesne profits** after alleging breach of their obligation to deliver annual produce and obstruction to his rights.\n - The trial court ruled in favor of the appellant, finding the land was indeed Khudkhast in his possession.\n - The **District Judge dismissed the respondents’ appeal**, affirming the trial finding without issuing Section 77 (civil court jurisdiction) checks.\n - The **Judicial Commissioner (Second Appeal)**, reviewing an **archival case count**, reversed the judgment, declaring the civil court lacked jurisdiction and directing the lower courts to **return the plaint** under Section 77.\n4. **Order History**:\n - **First Instance (Trial Court)**: Holder’s title confirmed via revenue records.\n - **Second Appeal (District Judge)**: Restricted to a prior case count; affirmed the lower court’s judgment without reviewing civil jurisdiction.\n - **Second Appeal (Judicial Commissioner)**: Explicitly ruled on Section 77 jurisdiction’s application for Khudkhast lands, warranting a return of the plaint.\n\n---\n\n### **Issues:**\n1. **Whether the civil court had jurisdiction over this Khudkhast land dispute, and if Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, precluded civil court resolution under Rule 12(a) CPC or analogous proviso in OLSM Schedules?**\n2. **Was the District Judgeoleatially obliged to investigate/examine Section 77 jurisdiction before finalizing the claim, despite an affirmance upon limited findings?**\n3. **Did the Judicial Commissioner commit a “curial error” by overriding the District Judge ad hoc conviction on Section 77, or was the reversal a correct exercise of appellate supervision?**\n*(Framed as a procedural issue vs substantive jurisdictional redemption.)*\n\n---\n### **Rules:**\n1. **Section 77, Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887**:\n - Affirms that civil courts generally **lack jurisdiction over (i) Khudkhast lands, or (ii) tenancy disputes in OLS-provoked proceedings**.\n (*The 1887 Act splintered law from state securities for tenure systems; subsequent 1930 *LL Act Amendment* codified these curials for juridical mercy.*).\n - Mandates **adjudication smushing in OLS Procedures declare below Rule 12(a) CPC codification.matters requiring** plans/jurisdiction pre-eligibility screening/zero evidence**.\n2. **Procedure Such as CCP Rule 12(a)**:\n - Defines court procedure requirements when **initial findings in dispute Ipse dijuris contest indicated; Pellicrimination approved by appellant courts like District Judge and Judicial Commissioner.**\n3. **Appeal Pointers under PP Code 351**:\n - Appellate language has belated juris activism freed him to re-weigh merits **once new Section 77 admissibility facts were prima facie deduced** from records, even if the District Judge had allowed unclean rectifications.\n4. **Coexistence Rules with 2nd T.S. OLSM** (Optional Land Settlement Measures):\n - Post-1930 LL Act statutes codified: Khudkhast reclassification shall reserve revenue privileges quasi from state structure. The **2nd Tenancy Schedule** affirmatively delineated occupation codes (e.g., Kukars vs Reeri) to gag unilateral civil tort’s entry over title. Section 53 RB of assumed revisional 1964 Act reiterated the **superceded motherland’s terms**, specifically for original tenaceries ensconced before 1930s.\n---\n\n### **Analysis:**\n1. **Key Jurisdictional Event & Precedent**:\n Upon finding the land rantes of certainty (Khundhast footer), both District Judge and Judicial Commissioner correctly brought into perspective **Punjab Nature Act’s §77 scop drinking**. Though the lower court's affirmance embraced the title conclusion, its head responsibility rested directly in evaluating whether pliant respondents could play the role *in surprise* Rice believes fulfill mid-theocratic codec. Additionally,the District Judge’s unambiguous language on decisions $(\"# Place\", which indicated securities across 2021 have not coordinated with revenue Regiven's summarizing factums for class diffracts that would have propelled a latter criminal inquiry)—recognized a *link and found violation.\n\n2. **Procedure(\n2(a) —Steerage by Later Appeals):\n The second-reviewed allowed redefinitive in deserted strangely the LHS was incorrect to invoke Section 77, leaving incomplete substantive assessments() routine appeals but chose against sanctioning subperject disputes as contradicting proper notice norms. The District Judge projected *inherently impelled toxicity* (veronicas still mailed, no interim stays granted—fulfilled to limit full testimomials) ensuring competent qualification validation prior adjudication happening—their permission triggered by knowledge even‐deans from the flavor of Conway institutions admonishment.\n\n2(b) —Proportion (and Reverse):\n At **pari-passu**, *particular* conduct overseen remained reduced: The District Judge did effectively and **armchair-criintially test jurisdiction** (*“excutive must exercise”*), allowing verification under Price-Code RR12. As the 1887 fragment had aligned hands, even the augury model *adjudged fait objectionals on practice sides*—basic imaging distance taken since Historowicz’s original 1930 peer reviewed jurisprudence-debalance. Thus the appeal **allowed** on procedural correctness breaching contrageneral of law, wherein moot autonomy invoking taxation landmarks binds principal interest claimant personally to judi-Alternative Security Rules present.\n\n3. **Bill Participants Role in Lands-Jobs Misexports**:\n Evidence tagged **%\"...\"** (**bill baap as defined at Rs 1,750 district disposition certified ~12 years**), shows plaint statement-signature likely conflated Fact Sheet error to “Always!” unreversal consequence—burdening zoning act PRC levels, accepted these power falblow proceedings. equally forms for hearings needed re-queryed (note proceeding 200 seeks OLS dis-quash impediment, no permissible reasons--> thus denying hearsays warrant—trenining legal certainty denied by The OLS-mafias-agenda mindset favored by review finalists.\n\n---\n### **Conclusion:**\n**The appellants’ second appeal is *DISMISSED* under Error 12(a) with no error noticed as executives’ specific Panel versions proper abridged ranking allowed affirmance. This could be prospective basis** under the same violation discovery whistle–blowing contemporary arbitees extend deemed primary 1887 govern-ment securities at law—rejecting actual Section 77 presumption operatives inherent in both court revenges vs plain arranging positioning precedents.\n\nHowever, **allow the respondent’s Suit recurrence correct on legal principles replying proper interdict reigns remediation;**—violating parliamentary legislature as per their systemic hierarchy making impeding tenant’s consolidation QT utilize, giving adds its jurisdiction and abusing executives. **fully ALLOW renew Plaint retrieverssocial-to-servicing sequence** leniency as requested on all adobe qualifications for punishment illegal prosecution blunder. **While the District Judge’s default jurisdiction adjudgment appropriately bared benchproof exam, second order duly only requested avoidance form checks**.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : J. R. Mudholkar, J.\n1. In this appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh in second appeal two points have been urged on behalf of the appellant. The first is that the Court of the Judicial Commissioner was in error in interfering with a finding of fact of the District Judge and the second is that the Court of the Judicial Commissioner was wrong in holding that the suit was not triable by a civil court but is triable by a revenue court under s. 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (Punj. XVI of 1887) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which applies to Himachal Pradesh.\n2. In order to appreciate these points it is necessary to state some facts. The appellant who was plaintiff in the suit was the former ruler of the State of Bhagat, one of the Simla Hill states. The State of Bhagat and several other Simla Hill States were merged in Himachal Pradesh on July 1, 1947. As a consequence of the merger the ruler surrendered his sovereignty to the new States. Khasra Nos. 70, 80, 81, 167, 263/170, 171, 172, 173 and 2691177 measuring in all 15 bighas and 19 biswas, among other property, were declared to be the private property of the appellant. It is the appellant's case that these fields are his Khudkhast lands, that they are recorded as much in the revenue papers ever since the year 1936 and that the defendants were granted licence to cultivate these lands on his behalf with the obligation that the entire produce from the lands should be hamded over by them to the appellant at the end of every year.\n3. The consideration for the arrangement was a remission in rent and land revenue which the appellant had granted to the respondents with respect to certain other lands which were leased out by him to the respondents. Bulk of these lands were declared to be the State property as a result of the merger and presumably the respondents have now to pay full assessment or rent with respect to them. According to the appellant the respondents failed to hand over the annual produce from the fields in suit to him and, therefore, he leased out the lands at Rs. 500/- per annum to Chuku Koli for Rs. 500/- for a period of one year from October, 1950. The respondents, however, obstructed Choku in taking possession of the land and despite repeated demands by the appellant, they kept him out of possession. He therefore instituted a suit for possession and mesneprofits from Rabi 1950 to Kharif 1953 at m. 500 per annum and future profits in July, 1954.\n4. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that they were the occupancy tenants of these lands for the last two or three generations. that they were cultivating these lands jointly and severally and that the suit was not cognizable by a civil court. They also contended that had filed a suit against the appellant in the court of the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Solon for a declaration to the effect that they are in possession of the lands as occupation tenants and that, therefore, the appellant's suit should be stayed. The trial court decreed the suit of the appellant as against all the respondents including the claim for mesne profits. The respondents preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Mahau. He dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree of the trial court.\n5. They therefore preferred second appeal to the Court of Judicial Commissioner. The Judicial Commissioner allowed the appeal holding that the respondents were occupancy tenants of the lands and that consequently the provisions of s. 77 read with the first proviso thereto barred the jurisdiction of the civil court. On this finding the Judicial Commissioner set aside the decree granted by the trial court and affirmed by the District Judge and directed that the plaint be returned for presentation to proper court.\n6. It is contended before us by Mr. Achhru Ram for the appellant that for a suit to be barred under s. 77 of the Act from the cognizance of a civil court two conditions have to be satisfied. The first is that the suit should relate to one of the matters described in sub-s. 3 and the second is that the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant should be admitted by the parties. If these two conditions are not satisfied then, according to him, the suit is not barred from the cognizance of a civil court. In support of his contention he has relied upon the decision in Sham Singh v. Amarjit Singh Baru v. Nader ; (1942) I.L.R.24 Lah.191 F.B. Daya Ram v. Jagir Singh He has also relied upon certain observations of this Court in Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi (1962) 3 S.C.R. 673. S. 77 A.I.R (1956) Him. Pis. 61 and the first proviso there to run as follows: \"The following suits shall be instituted in, and heard and determined by Revenue Courts, and no other Court shall take cognizance of (1930) I.L.R 12 Lah. III any dispute or matter with respect to which, any such suit might be instituted:- Provided that-\n \"(1) Where in a suit cognizable and instituted in a Civil Court it becomes necessary to decide any matter which can under this sub-section be heard and determined only by a Revenue Court shall endorse upon the plaint the nature of the matter for decision and the particulars required by Order VII, rule 10, Code of Civil procedure and return the plaint for presentation to the Collector.\" We are not concerned with the second proviso. Below the second proviso the kind of suits which are triable by the revenue courts are set out in three groups. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the suit in question would fall under entry (e) in the second group. That entry reads thus:\n\"suits by a landlord to eject a tenant.\" They also contend that their suit before the revenue court was one under entry (d) which reads thus: \"Suits by a tenant to establish a Claim to a right of occupancy, or by landlord to prove that a tenent has not such a right.\" \n7. It would, however, appear that not only it can (d) and (e) but every other item in the three groups relates to a dispute between tenants on the one hand and the landlord on the other. There is no entry or item relating to a suit by or against a person claiming to be a tenant and whose status as a tenant is not admitted by the landlord. It would, therefore, be reasonable to infer that the legislature barred only those suits form the cognizance of a civil court where there was no dispute between the parties that a person cultivating land or who was in possession of land was a tenant. This is precisely what has been held in the two decisions of the Lahore High Court relied upon by Mr. Achhru Ran. In the first of these two cases Tek Chand J., observed:\n\" It is obvious that the bar u/cl. (4) is applicable to those cases only in which the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted and the object of the suit is to determine the nature of the tenancy i. e. whether the status of the tenant falls under sections 5, 6, 7 or 8 of the Act.\" \n8. In that case the suit was instituted by someone claiming to succeed to the tenancy of certain land on the death of the occupancy tenant. The learned Tudge observed:\n\" In a suit like the one before us the point for decision is not the nature of the tenancy, but whether the defendant is related to the deceased tanant and if so whether their common ancestor had occupied the land. If these facts are established, the claimant ipso facto succeeds to the occupancy tenancy. But if they are found against him, he is not a tenant at all.\" \n9. As this facts were not established the High Court held that the landlord was entitled to sue the defendant who had entered on the land asserting a claim to be a collateral of the deceased tenant but who failed to substantiate his claim. This view was affirmed by a Full Bench consisting of five Judges in the other, Lahore case. In Daya Ram v. Jagir Singh A.I.R. (1956) Him. Pra. 61 the same Judicial Commissioner who decided the appeal before us has expressed the view that where in a suit for ejectment the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant is not admitted by the' parties the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit and that such a suit did not fall under s. 77 (3) of the Act. In Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi A.I.R. (1956) Him. Pra. 61 this Court was considering the provisions of s. 17 A.I.R. (1956) Him. Pra. 61 of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1948 (3 of 1948). The provisions of that section run thus:\n\" Any dispute between the tenant and the landlord as regards, (a) tenant's possession of the land on the 1st day of September, 1947 and his right to the benefits under this Act, or (b) misuse of the land by tenant, or (c) failure or the tenant to cultivate the land properly, or (d) failure of the tenant to deliver to the landlord the rent accrued due within two months from the date on which it becomes payable, or (e) the quantity of the produce payable to the landlord as rent, shall be decided by the Collector on the application of either of the parties.\" \n10. It was contended in that case on behalf of the respondents who claimed to be tenants that suit for permanent injunction instituted by the appellant landlord was barred by the provisions of s. 7 A. I. R. (1959) S. C. 57. Dealing with this contention this Court observed as follows:\n\" In other words, s. 7 (1962) 3 S.C.R. 673 postulates the relationship of tenants and landlord between the parties and proceeds to provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector to try the five categories of disputes that may arise between the landlord and the tenant. The disputes which are the subject-matter of s. 7 (1962) 3 S.C.R. 673 must be in regard to the five categories. That in the plain and obvious construction of the words any dispute as regards'. On this construction it would be unreasonable to hold that a dispute about the status of the tenant also falls within the purview of the said section. The scheme of s. 7 (1962) 3 S.C.R. 673 is unam- biguous and clear.\nIt refers to the tenant and landlord as such and it contemplates disputes of the specified character arising between them. Therefore, in our opinion, even on a liberal construction of s. 7 (1962) 3 S.C.R. 673 it would be difficult to uphold the argument that a dispute as regards the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant falls to be determined by the Collector under s. 7 A. 1. R. (1959) S. C. 57 \".\n11. The observations of this Court would clearly apply to the present case also inasmuch as the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the parties to the suit is riot admitted by the appellant.\n12. Now we will come to the second point because the argument is that on the finding of the learned District Judge the respondents are tenants arid, therefore, their ejectment cannot be ordered by a Civil Court. As already stated the appellant challenged the finding of the Judicial Commissioner on the point on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to reverse the finding of the District Court because it was a finding of fact on the question. There is no doubt in our mind that the learned Judicial Commissioner was in error in reversing the finding of fact of the District Judge particularly so because the finding of the District Judge is based upon a consideration of entries in the record of rights from the year 1936 onwards showing that the lands were the khudkhast lands of the appellant and were in his possession, The learned Judicial Commissioner has omitted to bear in mind the provisions of s. 44 of the Act which give a presumptive value to the entries in revenue records. It was argued before us that there are prior entaries which are in conflict with those on which the learned District Judge has relied.\n13. It is sufficient to say that where there is such a conflict, it is the later entry which must prevail. Indeed from the language of s. 44 itself it follows that where a new entry is substituted for an old one it is that new entry which will take the place of the old one and will be entitled to the presumption of correctness until and unless it is established to be wrong or substituted by another entry. In Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya this Court held that a finding of fact arrived at by the District Judge on the consideration of all evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by the parties, cannot be set aside in second appeal. the question here is whether the respondents are the tenants of the appellant.\n14. Though for determining the question documentary evidence fell to be considered, the finding on the question is no less a finding of fact than may have been the case if the evidence to, be considered was merely oral. As was pointed out by this Court in that case as well as recently in Sir Chunilal V. Mohta &amp; Sons Ltd., Bombay v. The Century Spinning &amp; Manufacturing Co. Ltd, Bombay (1962) Supp. 3 S.C.R an issue of law does not arise merely because documents which are not instruments of title or otherwise the direct foundation of rights but are merely historical documents, have to be construed. Of course here, as we have already pointed out, the Judicial Commissioner has ignored the presumption arising from certain documentary evidence and, therefore, there is an additional reason vitiating its finding.\n15. Upon this view we set aside the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and restore that of the trial court as affirmed by the District Court. Costs throughout will be borne by the parties as incurred. \nAppeal allowed\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -2613,26 +2613,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S021", - "case_id": "1309", - "experiment": "role_play_v3", - "model": "gpt-oss-120b-noreason", - "source_file": "S021__role_play_v3__gpt-oss-120b-noreason__1309.json", + "case_id": "974", + "experiment": "baseline_firac", + "model": "ministral-3b", + "source_file": "S021__baseline_firac__ministral-3b__974.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/07/2014", - "machine_error_stage": "analysis", + "judgment_date": "01/05/1962", + "machine_error_stage": "rules", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in reasoning" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 1812 of 1972 | Abdulla Bin Ali And Others v. Galappa And Others | 01/02/1985", - "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 1812 of 1972 | Abdulla Bin Ali And Others v. Galappa And Others", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Ram Kumar Aggrawal | 02/11/1993", + "case_details": "Case: Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Ram Kumar Aggrawal", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The dispute centers on survey plots 149 and 150, originally owned by Galappa. In 1917, the appellants' father purchased these plots from Galappa's mother, Tayamma, acting as guardian for minor Galappa. In 1919, Tayamma's claim that the deed was a mortgage, not a sale, was rejected by the Tahsildar, who confirmed it as a sale, directing parties to a civil court. Saibanna, Galappa's brother, was subsequently inducted as a tenant. In 1982, the appellants' father obtained a civil court decree declaring his title against Galappa and Saibanna. After the appellants succeeded their father, Saibanna fell into rent arrears (1951-1954). The appellants initiated revenue proceedings for rent recovery and tenancy register correction. In both proceedings, Saibanna denied the appellants' title and his tenancy, leading the revenue courts to dismiss the applications and direct the appellants to a civil court due to the title dispute. Consequently, the appellants filed the present suit in civil court for possession and mesne profits, treating the defendants as trespassers. The defendants argued the civil court lacked jurisdiction under Sections 32 and 99 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court decreed the suit for the appellants, but the High Court set aside their judgment, holding the civil court lacked jurisdiction, interpreting the plaint as alleging a landlord-tenant relationship.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts \n1. Survey plots 149 and 150 were originally the property of Galappa. \n2. In 1917 the appellants’ father purchased the two plots from Galappa’s mother, Tayamma, who was acting as guardian for the minor Galappa. \n3. In 1919 Tayamma claimed that the deed conveyed was a mortgage, not a sale. The Tahsildar rejected this claim, held that the deed was a sale and directed the parties to the civil court for determination of title. \n4. Saibanna, Galappa’s brother, was subsequently inducted as a tenant of the land. \n5. In 1982 the appellants’ father obtained a decree from a civil court declaring his title to the plots against Galappa and Saibanna. \n6. After the father’s death the appellants succeeded to his interest. Saibanna fell into arrears of rent for the years 1951‑1954. \n7. The appellants commenced revenue‑court proceedings for recovery of the unpaid rent and for correction of the tenancy register. Saibanna denied both the appellants’ title and his status as a tenant; the revenue courts dismissed the applications and remitted the parties to a civil court on the ground that the title dispute required civil jurisdiction. \n8. The appellants then filed a suit in a civil court for **possession** of the plots and for **mesne profits**, treating the defendants as trespassers. \n9. The defendants contended that the civil court bore **no jurisdiction** because the suit fell within the ambit of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, §§ 32 and 99, which govern landlord‑tenant disputes. \n10. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court decreed in favour of the appellants. \n11. The High Court set aside those decrees, holding that the civil court lacked jurisdiction, construing the plaint as a suit arising out of a landlord‑tenant relationship and therefore subject to the statutory scheme of the Tenancy Act. \n\n### Issues \n1. **Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit for possession and mesne profits when the dispute involved a landlord‑tenant relationship governed by the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (“the Act”).** \n2. **Whether the plaint, by alleging a landlord‑tenant relationship and seeking possession, must be tried under the Act pursuant to §§ 32 and 99, rendering the civil suit barred.** \n\n### Rules \n1. **Section 32, Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act** – authorises a landlord to recover possession of agricultural land for non‑payment of rent, but the remedy is **exclusively** within the jurisdiction of the revenue authority designated under the Act; civil courts are **statutorily barred** from entertaining such eviction proceedings. \n2. **Section 99, the Act** – bars the civil courts from entertaining any suit that arises out of a landlord‑tenant relationship covered by the Act; only the authority or tribunal prescribed by the Act may determine the dispute. \n3. **Statutory Bar Doctrine** – when a statute provides a specialised remedial scheme, the ordinary civil jurisdiction is ousted to the extent the statute intends exclusive jurisdiction. \n4. **Precedent** – *State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Lingam*, AIR 1973 SC 193; *K. K. Reddy v. B. M. Krishna*, (1990) 125 All ER 604, holding that eviction or possession suits based on tenancy under a state tenancy law must be instituted before the statutory authority and that civil courts lack jurisdiction. \n5. **Doctrine of Continuity of Tenancy** – even after a transfer of title, a person who occupies the land as a tenant under the Act continues to enjoy statutory protection; any dispute over possession for rent arrears remains within the ambit of the tenancy legislation. \n6. **Mesne Profits Connected with Possession** – where the claim for mesne profits is inseparable from a claim for possession of agricultural land held under a tenancy, the entire proceeding is governed by the Act; a separate civil suit for pure rent recovery may be permissible, but not when possession is also sought. \n\n### Analysis \n1. **Nature of the dispute (Facts 6‑8)** – The appellants’ claim is founded on Saibanna’s failure to pay rent for 1951‑1954 and on his continued occupation of the land. The suit therefore seeks to evict a statutory tenant and to recover rent (mesne profits). This falls squarely within the subject‑matter covered by §§ 32 and 99 of the Act. \n\n2. **Effect of the 1982 decree (Fact 5)** – The decree merely confirmed the appellants’ ownership of the plots. Ownership does not extinguish the statutory tenancy that arose thereafter; under the Act the tenant’s right to occupy the land continues until the landlord obtains a decree **under the Act** for eviction for rent arrears. Hence, the issue before the court is not a pure title dispute but the exercise of a statutory right to possession. \n\n3. **Statutory jurisdiction (Rules 1‑3)** – Because the Act expressly confers exclusive jurisdiction on the revenue authority for eviction on non‑payment of rent, the civil court is statutorily barred from hearing the suit. The High Court correctly applied the statutory bar doctrine. \n\n4. **Precedent (Rule 4)** – The Supreme Court in *P. Lingam* held that where a tenancy Act provides a specific remedy for eviction, a civil suit for possession is a nullity. The present facts are on all fours with that authority. \n\n5. **Mesne profits claim (Rule 6)** – The appellants’ claim for mesne profits is pleaded together with a claim for possession. Since the possession claim is barred, the mesne‑profits claim cannot be entertained separately in the same suit; it must be pursued in the proper statutory forum. \n\n6. **Lower courts’ error (Facts 10‑11)** – The Trial Court and First Appellate Court ignored the mandatory jurisdictional bar of the Act and proceeded on the basis that a civil suit for possession was permissible. The High Court correctly reversed that view, interpreting the plaint as invoking the landlord‑tenant relationship and therefore requiring adjudication under the Act. \n\n### Conclusion \nThe civil court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit for possession and mesne profits because the dispute arose out of a landlord‑tenant relationship governed by the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, §§ 32 and 99. Accordingly, the High Court’s judgment setting aside the decrees of the lower courts is legally sound. \n\n**The appeal is DISMISSED.**", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : MISRA\nMISRA, J. : - The dispute in the present appeal by special leave centres round survey plots Nos. 149 and 150 measuring 17 acres 23 gunthas and 11 acres and 35 gunthas respectively. at Yadgir, District Gulbarga. The disputed plots admittedly belonged to one Galappa. The appellants' father purchased the aforesaid two plots under a registered sale deed from Galappa in 1917. As Galappa was a minor at that time the sale deed was executed by his mother, Tayamma as a guardian.\n2. In 1919 Tayamma filed an application before the Tahsildar alleging that she executed only a mortgage deed and not a sale deed in favour of the appellants' father. The Tahsildar, however, negatived her claim and came to the conclusion after investigation that Tayamma executed a sale deed and not a mortgage deed in favour of the appellants' father. She went up in appeal but the same was dismissed and the parties were directed to approach the civil court for a proper redress of the grievances. In the meantime, Saibanna the brother of Galappa, was inducted as a tenant. In 1982 the father of the appellants filed a suit for the declaration of his title and ownership in respect of the disputed lands against Galappa and his brother Saibanna which was decreed. The father of the appellants died and he was succeeded by the appellants. Saibanna continued to pay the rent for sometime but thereafter he fell in arrears for the period 1951 to 1954. The appellants, therefore, filed an application for recovery of the said amount in the court of the Tahsildar. In that proceedings Saibanna, however, denied the title of the appellants as also the tenancy. The appellants also initiated proceedings for the correction of tenancy register and there also the tenant denied the title of the appellants. The application. for the recovery of arrears of rent as well as for the correction of tenancy register were dismissed and the appellants were directed to approach the civil court as the dispute between the parties involved a question of title. In the circumstances the appellants were obliged to file a suit for possession and mesne profits treating the defendants-respondents as trespassers. Saibanna has since died and he is now represented by his son Shivappa.\n3. The suit was resisted by the defendants-respondents on a number of grounds but it is not necessary to refer to all those pleas for the disposal of the present appeal. One of the pleas though not specifically taken in the written statement but allowed by the Court to be urged was the question of jurisdiction. According to the defendants-respondents the civil Court had no. jurisdiction to try the suit on the own allegations made in the plaint inasmuch as the plaintiffs-appellants had pleaded that defendant No. 2 was the tenant of the disputed plots. They set up the bar of Ss. 32 and 99 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court decreed the suit deciding all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. The High Court, however, set aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below and held that the civil Court had no. jurisdiction to try the suit on the allegations of the plaintiffs in the plaint, In its opinion the plaintiffs-appellants could get the relief of possession only from the revenue Court under S. 32(1) of the said Act and that S. 99 stood as a complete bar to the entertainment of the suit by the civil Court on the allegations in the plaint and on that finding it dismissed the suit. Therefore, the only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit.\n4. It has already been pointed out that the plaintiffs-appellants had earlier initiated the proceedings for the recovery of the arrears of rent from the defendants-respondents and had also initiated a separate proceeding for the correction of the tenancy register. In both those proceedings the defendant No. 2 had denied the title of the plaintiffs-appellants and the revenue Court directed the plaintiffs to get their redress by filing a suit in the civil Court. Accordingly, the plaintiffs-appellants had no. option but to file the suit. Curiously enough this time the defendants took up the stand that the civil Court had no. jurisdiction to try the suit when in the earlier proceedings before the revenue Court too the defendants had raised an objection that the revenue, Court had no. jurisdiction. Thus, the plaintiffs-appellants had been running from pillar to post to get relief on account of the unreasonable attitude taken by the defendants-respondents.\n5. There is no. denying the fact that the allegations made in the plaint decide the forum. The jurisdiction does not depend upon the defence taken by the defendants in the written statement. On a reading of the plaint as a whole it is evident that the plaintiffs-appellants had filed the suit giving rise to the present appeal treating the defendants as trespassers as they denied the title of the plaintiffs-appellants. Now a suit against the trespasser would lie only in the civil Court and not in the revenue Court. The High Court, however, took the view that the plaintiffs-appellants had not claimed a declaration of title over the disputed plots and all that has been set up by them in the plaint is the relationship of landlord and tenant.\n6. In our opinion the High Court was not quite correct in observing that the suit was filed by the plaintiffs-appellants on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant. Indeed, when the defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs and the tenancy the plaintiffs filed the present suit treating them to be trespassers and the suit is not on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It is no. doubt true that the plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant No. 2 was a tenant but on the denial of the tenancy and the title of the plaintiffs-appellants they filed a suit treating the defendant to be a trespasser and a suit against a trespasser would lie only in the civil Court and not in the revenue Court.\n7. We are, therefore. of the considered opinion that on the allegations made in the plaint the suit was cognizable by the civil Courtand that the High Court has erred in law in non-suiting the plaintiffs-appellants on the ground that the civil Court had no. jurisdiction.\n8. The learned counsel for the appellants, Shri R. B. Datar, however, contended that the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court had decided all the issues involved in the case in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants and in case we come to the conclusion, as indeed we have come to that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not barred, the judgment of the first appellate Court should be confirmed and there is no. need to remand the case again to the High Court for deciding it afresh on merits.\n9. We are not inclined to accept the contention raised by the counsel for the appellants. A number of issues were involved in the case and the High Court has decided the case only on the ground of jurisdiction and no. other point has been dealt with. It will not he fair to the respondents to accept the finding of the first appellate Court without the same being examined by the High Court.\n10. For the reasons given above the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the other issues involved in the case on merits. However, this decision will be without any prejudice to the respondents rights, if any, under any other enactment. There shall, however, be no. orders as to costs.\n\n\n", + "case_record": "The assessee, a partnership firm, received Rs 32,25,550 from the liquidator of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. upon its voluntary liquidation. The Income Tax Officer and Appellate Assistant Commissioner included this sum in the assessee's income for assessment year 1956-57, treating it as a revenue receipt. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, however, ruled in favor of the assessee. Notably, the assessee had consistently treated its shares in Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. as stock-in-trade since 1949-50, even claiming trading losses on this basis. The assessee purchased all equity shares in 1945, and the company was converted to a private limited company in 1947. Before the High Court, the assessee argued its prior treatment of shares as stock-in-trade was erroneous and that the shares ceased to be stock-in-trade upon the company's conversion. The High Court rejected these arguments and held, following IRC v. George Burrell, that liquidation proceeds are capital, not income, and that a liquidator deals with company assets, not shareholder shares.", + "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The assessee, a partnership firm, received Rs 32,25,550 from the liquidator of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. upon its voluntary liquidation.\n2. The Income Tax Officer and Appellate Assistant Commissioner included this sum in the assessee's income for assessment year 1956-57, treating it as a revenue receipt.\n3. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, deciding that the sum was not income.\n4. The assessee had consistently treated its shares in Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. as stock-in-trade since 1949-50 and claimed trading losses on this basis.\n5. The assessee purchased all equity shares in 1945, and the company was converted to a private limited company in 1947.\n6. The High Court held that the liquidation proceeds were capital, not income, following IRC v. George Burrell.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Was the sum of Rs 32,25,550 received by the assessee from the liquidator of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. properly characterized as income for the assessment year 1956-57?\n2. Did the conversion of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. into a private limited company in 1947 change the nature of the assessee's shares from stock-in-trade to capital assets?\n3. Can the assessee's historical treatment of its shares as stock-in-trade since 1949-50 justify the classification of the liquidation proceeds as income rather than capital?\n4. Is the ruling of the High Court, following IRC v. George Burrell, that liquidation proceeds are capital, not income, legally binding and applicable in this context?\n\n### Rules:\n1. Proceeds from liquidation are typically considered capital receipts rather than income, as they are returns on investment rather than revenue generated from business operations.\n2. The classification of shares as stock-in-trade is crucial in determining whether proceeds upon their sale are treated as income or capital, based on their use (trading vs. capital investment).\n3. The conversion of a company from public to private limited company can affect the nature of investment, potentially impacting whether such investments are treated as stock-in-trade or capital assets.\n4. Precedents such as IRC v. George Burrell establish legal interpretations on the nature of liquidation proceeds, influencing current decisions.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Maintainability**: The appeal is maintainable as it raises significant legal questions about the correct characterization of liquidation proceeds and the relevance of historical treatment of shares.\n\n2. **Issue 1 (Income vs. Capital)**: According to the High Court's interpretation of IRC v. George Burrell, liquidation proceeds are to be considered capital rather than income. This precedent supports the assessee's position that the proceeds do not constitute taxable revenue income.\n\n3. **Issue 2 (Conversion Impact)**: The conversion of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. into a private limited company in 1947 could reasonably lead to reclassification of the shares from stock-in-trade to capital assets. This change possibly affected the tax nature of proceeds from the liquidation, aligning with capital rather than revenue treatment.\n\n4. **Issue 3 (Historical Treatment)**: While the assessee treated shares as stock-in-trade since 1949-50, a consistent but erroneous treatment does not bind the legal classification of proceeds if the nature of the asset fundamentally changed due to the company's conversion.\n\n5. **Issue 4 (Applicability of Precedent)**: The ruling in IRC v. George Burrell is legally binding and applicable in this context. Given the established precedent that liquidation proceeds are capital, it supports the High Court's conclusion.\n\n### Conclusion:\nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The ruling of the High Court, supported by the precedent in IRC v. George Burrell and the nature of the proceeds, suggests that the liquidation proceeds are rightly classified as capital, not income. The conversion of the company and the erroneous historical treatment by the assessee do not warrant reclassification of these proceeds as income.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.- This appeal arises from the judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court answering the questions referred to it in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The assessment year concerned herein is 1956-57. The three questions referred at the instance of Revenue, for the opinion of the High Court are:\n\"(1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified i n investigating the nature of the shares held by the assessee in Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. when both the assessee and the Income Tax Authorities had treated them as the stock- in-trade of the assessee as a dealer in share for every assessment year since 1949-50 and proceeded on the same basis for the instant assessment year?\n(2) Whether on the facts and in the circu mstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the shares held by assessee in Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. were not its stock-in-trade for dealing in shares?\n(3) If the answer to question (2) be in the negative then whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of Rupees Thirty- two lakhs twenty-five thousand and five hundred and fifty was not assessable in the hands of the Assessee?\"\n2. The assessee is a partnership firm. The accounting year relevant to A.Y. 1956-57 was the year ending on December 31, 1955. The Income Tax Officer made an assessment on a total income of Rs 36, 41, 544 which included a sum of Rs 32, 25, 550 representing the surplus which the assessee received during the previous year from the liquidator of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. which went into voluntary liquidation in the year 1955. The assessee preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner objecting to the inclusion of the said surplus amount. The appeal was dismissed. But on further appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal agreed with its contention.\n3. The assessee was a regular dealer in shares. In the year 1945, it purchased all the equity shares of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. which was then a public limited company. The assessee took over its management. In 1947, the company was converted into a private limited company. For the A.Y. 1949-50, the assessee claimed a trading loss of Rs 20, 88, 735 stated to be the\nloss suffered on account of depreciation of the value of the shares of the said company. This claim was made on the basis that all the shares of the company were held by it as stock-in-trade. Its claim was allowed by the Tribunal on appeal. In all the subsequent assessments, the said shares were treated as its stock-in-trade and value of those shares as claimed by the assessee was adopted.\n4. In the assessment proceedings relating to the assessment year concerned herein (1956-57), the assessee admitted that the shares of the said company were held by it as stock-in-trade. On that basis, the said surplus amount received by it from the liquidator was included in its total income by the ITO and the AAC. On appeal, however, there was a difference of opinion between the Judicial Member and the Accountant Member whereupon the matter was referred to the Vice-President. He upheld the assessee's plea. Then followed the reference to the High Court.\n5. Before the High Court, the counsel for the assessee contended that the admission and concession made by the assessee to the effect that the said shares were held by it as stock-in-trade was erroneous and was, therefore, not binding upon it. Some decisions relating to adventure in the nature of trade were relied upon in that behalf. The said contention was, however, rejected by the High Court and rightly in our opinion. It was then argued for the assessee that the said shares ceased to be stock-in-trade of the assessee the moment the company was converted from a public limited company to a private limited company. This contention was also rejected by the High Court. The High Court then considered the question whether the amount received by the assessee from the liquidator was in lieu of the shares held by it. Following the decision of the House of Lords in IRC v. George Burrell' it held that whatever is received by a shareholder on the liquidation of a company is not the income of the property but the property it self. The High Court referred to certain other English and Indian decisions and observed that as a general rule, what is distributed in a liquidation is capital whatever may have been its source. It also observed that there was no sale or transfer of the shares held by the assessee \"the liquidator sells the assets of the company and not the shares of the shareholders\" , it observed. Reference was also made to the provisions of Section 211 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and Section 511 of the Companies Act, 1956. For all the said reasons, the questions referred were answered in favour of the assessee. Dipak Kumar Sen, J. delivered a separate concurring opinion. The learned Judge did not place much reliance upon the English decisions. He pointed out that in none of the English decisions relied upon before them, did the assessee hold the shares as stock- in-trade. The main ground upon which he held in favour of the assessee runs thus: \"Where a limited liability company is liquidated and the liquidator distributes the surplus assets, there is no transaction in the trading sense between the liquidator and the shareholders. Irrespective of the decision\n1 9 Tax Cases 27 : (1924) All ER Rep 672 : (1924) 2 KB 52 205 of the shareholders the liquidator has to carry out his duties and obligation as laid down in the Companies Act. No consideration passes from the liquidator to the shareholder as in the case of sale. Nor can it be said that the liquidator in distributing the surplus assets is realising or redeeming the shares. In law, a shareholder may technically continue to be a shareholder even after he gets his share of the surplus. Till the company is struck off the register, he remains a shareholder in law. He retains his share Scripps. By virtue of his holding, a shareholder is entitled to surplus assets on the liquidation of company and such surplus assets appear to me to be in the nature of an accretion to his share.\"\n6. Shri G.C. Sharma, learned counsel for the Revenue characterised the view taken by the High Court as unsustainable in law besides being unrealistic and hypertechnical. Learned counsel submitted that the assets which a shareholder receives on the liquidation of a company is in lieu of and on account of the shares held by him. Once a company goes into liquidation and the liquidator distributes the assets among the shareholders (after discharging the liabilities, if any) the company ceases to exist, though technically speaking it may continue as such until its name is struck off the register of companies. It is not necessary, submitted the learned counsel, that there should be a sale or transfer of shares for the income to arise. Once the shares get converted into money (or other assets), by whatever means it may be, the money (or assets) received by the holder of such shares must be held to have realised the value of the said shares.\n7. Though the respondent was duly served and was represented by Shri P.K. Mukherjee, it was represented by the learned counsel on the last date of hearing that in spite of repeated letters by him, the assessee was not responding and, therefore, he was obliged to report 'no instructions'. Thereafter, he did not participate in the hearing of the appeal.\n8. Whether shares of a company held by a person constitute his capital or his stock-in-trade, is not a pure question of law but essentially one of fact. While one person may hold the shares of a company by way of investment, the other may hold them as his stock-in-trade. In this case, it is clear beyond any doubt that the assessee has been holding the shares of the aforesaid company as its stock-in-trade. In the earlier years, it claimed a trading loss on the footing that they represented its stock-in-trade. Even in the assessment proceedings for the A.Y. 1956-57 (concerned herein), it took the very same stand though at the stage of Tribunal and High Court, it sought to wriggle out of the said admission unsuccessfully. The High Court has held rightly that it cannot do so and that it is bound by its admission and its course of conduct over the past several years. The High Court, it may be recalled, has also rejected its further submission that the said shares ceased to be its stocking trade on the conversion of the company from a public limited company to a private limited company. If so, it follows that if the assessee receives any surplus amount in lieu of the said shares, it must be held to be a revenue receipt in his hands. It cannot be denied that the amount received by the assessee from the liquidator in this case was in lieu of its share-holding.\nIn effect and in truth, the amount received by it represented the recompense for its shares, even though it is true there was no transfer of shares from the assessee to the liquidator or to anyone else. It was a case of return for the money paid by the assessee for acquiring the said shares. In one case, the return may be more than what the holder paid for them while in another it may be less; the character of the receipt remains the same. The High Court has however held in favour of the assessee opining that (i) whatever is received by the shareholder on liquidation of a company is \"no income of the property but the property itself'; (ii) that whatever is disturbed in a liquidation is capital, whatever may have been its source, as held in Brogan (Inspector of Taxes) v. Stafford Coal and Iron Co.Ltd'; (iii) in the course of liquidation of the company the liquidator sells the assets of the company and not the shares of the shareholders; and (iv) where a limited company is liquidated and the liquidator distributes the surplus assets, there is no transaction in the trading sense between t he liquidator and the shareholders. By virtue of his holding, a shareholder is entitled to surplus assets on the liquidation of the company and such surplus assets are in the nature of an accretion to the shares held by him.\n9. The question is whether the opinion of the High Court is correct in law? We find it difficult to say so. Section 51 1 of the Companies Act applies to every voluntary winding up. It says that:\" 511. Subject to the provisions of this Act as to preferential payments, the assets of a company shall, on its winding up, be applied in satisfaction of its liabilities paripassu and, subject to such application, shall, unless the articles otherwise provide, be distributed among the members according to their rights and interests in the company. \"The concluding words of this section indicate that the assets of a company, on its liquidation, shall be distributed among the shareholders according to their rights and interests in the company which necessarily means according to their share-holding. What each shareholder gets is proportionate to his share-holding in the company.\nOnce the distribution takes place, the shares and the share- holding come to an end. The fact that the shares may technically continue until the name of the company is struck off the register of the company is of little significance.\nAfter the distribution of the assets, nothing remains of the shares. To say that the assets a shareholder receives on the liquidation of the company are unrelated to his share- holding is to be blind to the reality. Such an argument ignores the basic reality recognised by Section 511 of the Companies Act. The same comment holds good about the argument that the amount received is an accretion to the shares. It is true that a liquidator does not sell the shares. It is equally true that there is no transfer of shares by the shareholder to the liquidator or to any other person. That is not really necessary. So long as money is received in lieu of shares, there is a receipt and where an assessee is a dealer in shares, any surplus amount received by him constitutes his income. As stated above, where a company2 41 Tax Cases 305 : (1963) 3 All ER 277 : (1963) 1 WLR 905 \ngoes into liquidation and the liquidator distributes the assets of the company among the shareholders, what each shareholder gets is in lieu of his shareholding. That is the worth, the value and the price of his share-holding. A shareholder participates in the distribution of the assets of a company on its liquidation by virtue of and because of his share-holding. We, therefore, find it difficult to agree with the High Court that a shareholder participates in the distribution of assets on the liquidation of the company decors his shareholding. Once this is so, it follows that the money received by the assessee in lieu of its share- holding partakes of the same character in which he held the shares. If he held the shares as stock-in-trade, the money received by it represents his income, i.e., a revenue receipt in its hands. If it held them by way of investment, the money it receives represents a capital receipt by it.\n10. It would be appropriate at this stage to consider the decisions cited by Shri G.C. Sharma and those referred to in the judgment of the High Court. In CIT v. Madan Gopal Radhey Lal3, it was held that though the assessee held certain shares of a company as stock-in-trade, the bonus shares issued by the company and received by him were received by him as capital. On the facts of that case, however, it was held that since the assessee had converted the same into his stock-in-trade, the sale proceeds of the said bonus shares represented his business receipts. We are unable to see any relevance of the said proposition to the question at issue herein. At the relevant time, under the Income Tax Act, 1922, issue of bonus shares by capitalisation of the accumulated profits was not treated as distribution of dividend. It is the said circumstance which seems to have influenced the decision of this Court. The learned counsel for the Revenue brought to our notice a passage from the opinion of Lord Evershed in Brogan2. At page 333 (All ER p. 283) , the following statement occurs:\" It cannot now be in doubt that surplus assets in the hands of the liquidator of a limited liability company whether limited by share capital or by guarantee are in his hands capital. Such a conclusion was laid down by the Court of Appeal in IRC v. Burrell' and it has never since been questioned. The terms of Section 302 of the Companies Act, 1948, are entirely consistent with this vie w, for they speak of the 'property of the company' being distributed as therein stated. I agree that the fact that the surplus assets of a company on its winding-up are capital in the hands of the liquidator is not conclusive on the question whether the respective shares of them handed out to the members are likewise in their respective hands capital also. But prima facie beyond doubt they are. Some businesses may consist of dealing with capital assets; for example a company whose business is that of buying and selling real property or stocks and shares. In the case of such a company, no doubt the capital share of the surplus assets in a liquidation would be no less a trading receipt than the proceeds of sale of any other of the assets it had acquired for the purposes of its business.\"\n3 (1969) 73 ITR 652 : AIR 1969 SC 840 : (1969) 2 SCR 7 \n11. The learned counsel says that the said statement of law runs counter to the decision of this Court in Madan Gopal Radhey Lal3. He also invited our attention to Hari Prasad Jayantilal &Co. v. V.S. Gupta, ITO4 to contend that the principle of this decision also runs counter to the decision in Madan Gopal Radhey Lal3. It is unnecessary for us to go into the said aspect as in our opinion the principle of Madan Gopal Radhey Lal3 has no application to the facts herein.\n12. The High Court has placed strong reliance upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in IRC v. Burrell'. In that case, the respondents-assessees were partners in a firm which held shares in a number of single ship companies. On the sale or loss of each ship, each of the companies went into voluntary liquidation, and its surplus assets, including reserves set aside out of profits, and other undivided profits, accumulated and current, were distributed by the liquidator among the shareholders. On those facts, it was held that on the liquidation of a company undistributed profits can no longer be distinguished from the capital and that such portion of the assets distributed by the liquidator as represents undistributed profits is not income in the hands of the shareholders which they are required to include in their returns of tot al income for super-tax purposes. Firstly, it is not a case where the assessees or the firms of which they were partners held the shares as stock-in-trade. Secondly, the said decision cannot mechanically be applied to the cases arising in t his country in view of the definition of the expression \"dividend\" in Section 2(6-A) of 1922 Act and in Section 2(22) of the 1961 Act. The same comment holds good with respect to the decision of the House of Lords in Brogan 2 .This was also not a case where the shares were held by the assessee as his stock-in-trade.\n13. Reference may now be made to the decision of the Patna High Court in Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Co. Ltd. v. CIT5. In this case, the assessee-company was a dealer in shares and securities. It held the shares of another company of the face value of Rupees Four lakhs which formed part of the stock-in-trade of the assessee's share-dealing business. The other company went into voluntary liquidation as a result of which the liquidator sold its assets and distributed a certain amount pro rata among the shareholders. The assessee received Rs 4, 75, 000 in one year and Rs 8021 in the next year. The Income Tax Authorities treated Rs 7 5, 000 and Rs 8021 (being the surplus amount over the purchase price of the shares) as revenue receipts and included them in the assessable income of the respective years. It was held by the Patna High Court that the Income Tax Authorities acted in accordance with law in doing so inasmuch as the said amounts represented revenue receipts in the hands of the assessee. In the judgment under appeal, the Calcutta High Court has disagreed with this view but, for the reasons given hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Patna High Court is the correct one.\n4 (1966) 59 ITR 794 : AIR 1966 SC 1481 : (1966) 2 SCR 732 5 (1949) 17 ITR 141 (Pat)\n14. For the above reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and answer all the three questions referred in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -2738,12 +2738,12 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S022", - "case_id": "254", - "experiment": "baseline_firac", - "model": "gpt-oss-120b", - "source_file": "S022__baseline_firac__gpt-oss-120b__254.json", + "case_id": "2484", + "experiment": "ablation_issue", + "model": "phi-4", + "source_file": "S022__ablation_issue__phi-4__2484.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/02/1985", + "judgment_date": "02/11/1993", "machine_error_stage": "rules", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification" @@ -2751,13 +2751,13 @@ }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 64/2012 | Pramila Appellant(S) v. State Of Chhattisgarh | 17/01/2024", - "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 64/2012 | Pramila Appellant(S) v. State Of Chhattisgarh", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Writ Petition No. 1219 of 1987 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) | All India Sainik Schools Employees' Association v. Defence Minister-Cum-Chairman Board Of Governors, Sainik Schools Society, New Delhi And Others | 04/10/1988", + "case_details": "Case: Writ Petition No. 1219 of 1987 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) | All India Sainik Schools Employees' Association v. Defence Minister-Cum-Chairman Board Of Governors, Sainik Schools Society, New Delhi And Others", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The appellant was convicted for offences under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court and the High Court of Chhattisgarh. During the appeal, the appellant raised the issue of juvenility. This Court directed an inquiry into the appellant's age. The inquiry report, based on the school leaving register and primary certificate examination result-sheet, established the appellant's date of birth as 1st September, 1982. The date of the offence was 15th June, 2000. Consequently, on the date of the offence, the appellant was 17 years, 09 months, and 14 days old. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, was not in force at the time of the incident, making the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, the applicable law. The appellant had already undergone incarceration for over eight years.", - "generated_judgment": "DISMISSED\n\nBased on the facts provided, the appellant was 17 years, 9 months, and 14 days old at the time of the offence. Under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, a person who has attained the age of 16 years but is below 18 years of age is not punishable for an offence and the provisions of the Act shall apply to such a person. Since the appellant was 17 years old at the time of the offence, he falls within this category. Therefore, the conviction and sentence cannot stand, and the appeal should be allowed to correct the legal error. However, given that the appellant has already served over eight years of his sentence, allowing the appeal would likely lead to his release, which may not be the desired outcome from a judicial perspective considering the seriousness of the offenses. Nonetheless, the legal basis for the appeal is valid. \n\nGiven the instructions to make a decision based strictly on the facts provided and without additional context, the appeal should be allowed to correct the application of the law. Thus, the decision is to DISMISS the appeal as the facts do not support a direct reversal of the sentence, but rather indicate that the conviction itself may be legally flawed.", - "reference_judgment": "Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant\nand the learned counsel for the respondent/State.\nThe appellant has taken an exception to the judgment and order\ndated 3rd May, 2010 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court\nof Chhattisgarh. The appellant herein was the second appellant\nbefore the High Court. The appellant was convicted for the\noffences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34\nof the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to undergo life\nimprisonment.\nThe issue of juvenility was raised by the appellant in this\nAppeal during the course of hearing by filing an interlocutory\napplication. Therefore, vide order dated 13th September, 2023, this\nCourt directed the Sessions Court to hold an enquiry into that\naspect of issue of juvenility. In terms of the order of this\nCourt, the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj,\nDistrict Balrampur, Chhattisgarh, has submitted a finding dated 30th\nOctober, 2023, which records that the date of birth of the\n1appellant is 1st September, 1982 and, therefore, on 15th June, 2000,\nwhich is the date of the occurrence of the offence, the age of the\nappellant was 17 years, 09 months and 14 days. The statements of\nthe witnesses as well as the documents produced on record during\nthe inquiry have been forwarded to this Court.\nA perusal of the report shows that apart from other documents,\nreliance has been placed on the entries in the school leaving\nregister of the school last attended by the appellant. This\ndocument is of the year 1988. The name of the appellant appears at\nserial no.369 and her date of birth shown therein is 1 st September,\n1982. Even the primary certificate examination result-sheet of\n1995 shows the same date of birth.\nTherefore, we have to proceed on the footing that on the date\non which the incident constituting the offence took place, the age\nof the appellant was less than 18 years. The Juvenile Justice\n(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short, “the 2000\nJJ Act”) was admittedly not in force when the incident occurred.\nTherefore, the case will be governed by the Juvenile Justice Act,\n1986 (for short, “the 1986 JJ Act”). Under clause (h) of Section 2\nof the 1986 JJ Act, a ‘juvenile’ has been defined to mean a boy who\nhas not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not\nattained the age of eighteen years. Thus, on the date of\noccurrence of the offence, the appellant was a juvenile. Therefore,\nthe appellant ought to have been dealt with in accordance with\nSection 21 of the 1986 JJ Act. The maximum action which could have\nbeen taken against the appellant was of sending her to a special\nhome. In the case of a girl of sixteen years of age, she could\n2have been sent to a special home for a period of not less than\nthree years. As per Section 22(1) of the 1986 JJ Act, there was a\nprohibition on sentencing a juvenile to undergo imprisonment.\nThere is a similar provision under Section 16 of the 2000 JJ Act.\nIn the present case, as can be seen from the order dated\n6th January, 2012, the appellant had undergone incarceration for a\nperiod of more than eight years.\nHence, the present Appeal must succeed and the impugned\njudgment and order dated 3rd May, 2010 passed by the High Court and\nthe impugned judgment and order dated 30th June, 2003 passed by the\nAdditional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj, District Sarguja,\nChhattisgarh, are hereby quashed and set aside only insofar as the\nappellant (accused no.2) is concerned.\nAs the appellant has undergone incarceration for a period of\nmore than eight years, no purpose will be served by sending the\nappellant before the Juvenile Justice Board.\nThe bail bonds of the appellant stand cancelled.\nThe Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.", + "case_record": "The All India Sainik Schools Employees' Association filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking various benefits for employees of Sainik Schools, such as implementation of the Fourth Pay Commission recommendations, parity with Kendriya Vidyalayas (KVS) employees in matters of pay, leave travel concession, house rent, pension, group insurance, contributory provident fund, gratuity, and age of superannuation. The Sainik School Society, registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, aims to prepare boys for the National Defence Academy. The Union of India (respondent 1) argued that the Society was not an instrumentality of the State, as funding primarily came from State Governments, though the Central Government contributed to certain key personnel. The petitioner contended that the Society was 'State' under Article 12 and thus amenable to fundamental rights enforcement, seeking equal treatment with KVS employees. During the pendency of the petition, the Board of Governors decided to extend certain benefits, but some claims remained unresolved, including the effective date for pension, gratuity, medical reimbursement, and LTC.", + "generated_judgment": "---\n### **FINAL JUDGMENT**\n\n---\n\n#### **FACTS**\n1. The **All India Sainik Schools Employees’ Association** filed an appeal under **Article 32 of the Constitution** demanding remedies for Sainik Schools employees, calling for parity in wages, leave travel concessions, pensions, gratuity, provident fund contributions, and age of superannuation with **Kendriya Vidyalaya (KVS) employees**, and further for application of the **4th Pay Commission recommendations**.\n2. The **Sainik School Society**, registered under the **Societies Registration Act, 1860**, is jointly funded by **State Governments (primary source) and the Central Government (critical for key personnel remuneration)**, and operates under federal mandates to train recruits for the **National Defence Academy**.\n3. **The Union of India** asserted the Society is *not* an instrumental body of the state, arguing its funding model (predominantly state-led) excludes constitutional amendments for fundamental rights enforcement.\n4. **The Society extended some concessions during the proceedings**, but claims—such as retroactive pension grants and gratuity—remain unresolved.\n5. **No final conclusion** by the Court has yet been rendered, and the petition remains pending for over **20 years**.\n6. The **Board of Governors** partially adopted certain benefits, but critical litigated remnants persist.\n\n---\n#### **ISSUES**\n\n1. ** MAINTAINABILITY** – Is the appeal *maintainable* under **Article 32** given the **not fully finalized lower judgment** and the **delayed proceedings** lacking administrative resolution nodules?\n2. **JURISDICTION** – Is the **Sainik School Society** a **State** or an **instrumentality of the State** under **Article 12** of the Constitution?\n3. **RETROSPECTIVE BENEFITS** – Are the demands of retroactive benefits—like pension and gratuity—fraught with **game-relevance**, given jurisdictional confinements and quasi-creditor aspects?\n4. **UNFINISHED PROCEEDINGS** – Must the Court in this appellate capacity **override incomplete directives or Board decisions**, or ascribe more to]];\n5. **ONOLOGICAL REASONS** – Are the **costs of delay conditions** irretrievables that negate just requestability?\n\n---\n#### **RULES**\n\n1. **Constitutional Principles**:\n - **Article 32 and 226**: Supervisory jurisdiction over fundamental rights violations.\n - **Article 12**: \"State\" includes not only the Union/State but any instrumentality whose core functions serve public policy objectives.\n - **Article 14** and **21**: Equality and security of life principles necessary to economic livelihood.\n\n2. **FundamentalJudgemment Rules**:\n - **Article 16, Parity Clauses**: Standard in **KVS employee service benefits** as national policy groundwater model.\n - **Constitutional Guidelines on Retroactivity (Unabated Execution)**: **Application of Benefits/Claims** if framed Bona Fide by statutory schemes and adhering stability motives.\n\n3. **Precedential Doctrine and Decisions**:\n - **GuhaCONNAR SR [1986]** – \" instrumentality of state\" standard for executive functions if revealing \"quasi-public lending agencies\".\n - **Arthapritha [Union of India, 2012]** – \" The union’s act to declare related regimes as ‘providential 本 comes% thereby confer state agency\" impacts.\n - **Barasseana v. State [AIR 1981]** Identifies fundamental customs of **decreed** cluture for contractual respects tied to Green Observatory.\n\n4. **Judicial Deliberation Outer Moderatorist **RANGE****:\n - **Application Judicature: ‘delay effects cannot override primary permanent notifications’** under Art 12 norms well unguided by authoritative.\n\n---\n#### **ANALYSIS**\n\n1. **MAINTAINABILITY & SPECIFYING JURISDICTION**\n - **No Irrevocable Findings on the Core**: Consultation jurisprudence (e.g., **Union Lab [[2005]] for Pragmatic Deference**) must recognize:\n The conflict targets **Article 12** jurisdiction—central sweep mandating compliance.\n - **Limitation from Sales Decisions**: The 20-year delay is an ethical complication but *not* irretrievable: Where constitutional familyline mechanism opportunities ineluctability tolerated Sustainable Features to form for a12 isady.\n\n2. **POWER AND ORGANISATION UNDER Article 12**\n The **Sociertry’s Trust/Significant & Aligned Jurisdiction** under **Article 12** as it:\n - Runs with **quasi-national and defence-linked characteristics** akin to **KVS** with governmental infrastructure but primary state-funded operations.\n - These do not fully decouple jurisdiction: States are parties where **supervised** functions overlap with primary policy-wrappicial objectives.\n **Status evidence is legitimate**:\n * Any “instrumentality” part-fund issued does not deviate displayed degree order for constitutional enforcement*\n → **Analysis finds sufficient linkages for “state/society institution mechanisation”.**\n\n3. **RETROSPECTIVE CLAIMS**\n Challenges over retroactive award of pensions and gratuity need:\n - A clear **pathframe** traditionally addressing right equilibrium vis-à vis Herodotus forward policy execution.\n - Because the trends lead toward assertive adherence, **retroactivity reads as equitable** for government engaged recruitment benefits—no alternate hawkish judgment.\n → Ensures Splashes on policy Merit, yet Narrative retrospectiveness presuming need.\n\n4. ** unfinished proceedings & advisory impact**\n Ultimately:\n - Grants **Central vs State** funding standpoint lauds conditional sub-state emblouting limits.\n → **Links subject legal harmony made apparent**\n - No “wholly unexplained advances require” re-echoing requires.\n\n5. **Concluding Vise Off Blocks Review**:\n **Inter-Functional rationale**:\nMost comprehensive review insights integrate:\n- Delay signals but *doesn’t* conclude after extra-constitutional effrontery.\n- Mixed funding sets bifurcation but **maybe entangers rights** in state-production contracts.\n→ Historical judgments then fall under obligation’s unfair demand tracking omission for articulative orientation **lotteriesendes**.\n\n---\n#### **CONCLUSION**\nDIVERTIVE use of **the distinctive proverb-sentering silo’s acceptance** cups along an **exercisable justice delineation strategy**.\n\nThe Court herein **concurring with legal coherence** articulates:\nThe **Sainik School Society does operate as structurally significant elements aligning with mechanisms under “State\"\nBeyond this adjudicated demarcation road map_FRAMEless aligning 문제는stellung demands exerted quality prevalent 4th Pay commissions** and **residual backdated claims**.\n\nThese quandary-impercuses mandates **retroactive milestone usher rights centralized**, leaving a\nReduced extent of overall **Please to intention misfit** as gap**version**.\n\n### Judgment Passed:\n**THE APPEAL STRONG DISMISSED.**\n*With background determined invocation formula’ll margin appeal re-analyzed, and time interests stipolated as no underlying material oversight persists clearly in resolving demanding standard.*\n\n(Conclusion involves the application in finality—partnerships were questionable through dismissed standing for enlivenment.)", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.\nRANGANATH MISRA, J. -\nThis application is under Article 32 of the Constitution. The All India Sainik Schools Employees' Association through its President is the petition. The Sainik School Society (hereinafter referred to as \"the Society\") is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 21 of 1860. The main object of the Society, as available from Clause 3(a) of the Memorandum of Association is\nto establish Sainik Schools in various parts of India, providing special school education of a high standard with the aim of preparing boys academically and physically for entry into National Defence Academy and other walks of life\nWith a view to implementing this object 18 schools located in different States of the country have been established. The petitioner has impleaded the Chairman and Members of the Board of Governors of the Society as respondents 1 to 6 : Minister of Education of the seventeen States as respondents 7 to 23 and Principals of the 18 school as respondents 24 to 41. The petitioner has asked for a writ of mandamus to the Union of India as also respondent 1\n(1) to implement the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission in the Sainik Schools and to extend all the benefits already given to employees of the Kendriya Vidyalayas by way of implementing the recommendations of the Chattopadhyay Commission;\n(2) to give to the employees of the Sainik Schools the differential wages in terms of the Third Pay Commission between 1973 (when it applied to government institutions) and 1978 (when the benefits were extended to the employees of the Sainik Schools);\n(3) to direct that the employees of the Sainik Schools shall have the benefits of leave travel concession, house rent, pension, group insurance, contributory provident fund, pensionary benefits and gratuity in the same pattern as obtaining in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan or given to Defence Services Officers working in the Sainik Schools, and(4) enhance the age of superannuation to 60 years as in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya employees\n2. When notice was issued to the respondents, respondent 1 alone entered appearance and made a return. Apart from raising certain technical pleas against the maintainability of the petition, it has pleaded that the Society was not an instrumentality of the State. According to respondent 1, the entire capital expenditure on land, buildings, furniture and educational equipment and major portion of the recurring expenditure is borne by the concerned State Government/Union Territory administration of the places where the school is located. Maintenance, additions and replacements are also the obligation of the respective State Governments. The Principal, the Head Master, the Registrar and an Army Physical Training Corps/National Cadet Corps Instructor posted in every school are paid out of the defence budget. All other expenses are met out of the fees payable by the parents or taken out of the scholarships paid by the State/Central Governments to the students. The quantum of the fees/scholarships is fixed by the Board of Governors from time to time taking into consideration the financial position\n3. The counter-affidavit accepted the petitioner's plea that several Committees had been established for bringing about improvement in the functioning of the Sainik Schools and improvement of conditions of service such as the High Power Committee, Sahara Committee, Balaram Committee and the Academic Study Group. Though in essence the Kendriya Vidyalayas and the other establishments of the Central Government differ from the Sainik Schools, many of the benefits admissible to government servants and Vidyalaya teachers have already been extended to employees of the Sainik Schools. The counter-affidavit traversed the petitioner's averment that the guideline of Kendriya Vidyalayas has to be adopted and the benefits admissible to the employees of such Vidyalayas should be extended to the employees of Sainik Schools. According to the respondent, the Sainik School are of a different pattern; the historical background of their creation, the purpose for which they are founded and the other benefits which are admissible to the employees should also be borne in mind when considering the claim raised by the petitioner. According to the respondents the claim based on the concept of equal pay for equal work contained in Article 39(d) of the Constitution is misconceived inasmuch as unless the nature and the status of the service is the same there can be no equality\n4. On behalf of the petitioner a rejoinder has been filed reiterating some of the averments in the main petition and meeting some of the pleadings in the counter-affidavit of respondents 1\n5. During the pendency of this application, the Board of Governors decided to extend certain advantages and benefits to the employees of the Sainik Schools. Some of these benefits had been claimed in the writ petition. An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioner indicating what are the claims still in issue on the basis of the respondents' affidavit dated July 29, 1988. It is not necessary to recount the concessions extended by the Society and in our view what is claimed as subsisting items may now be dealt with. These are\n(1) The age of retirement should be 60 years applicable to all categories of employees being the same as obtaining in he case of employees of the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS) /\n(2) Bonus and gratuity should be effective from January 1, 1986 and employees who have either retired or resigned after that date should be given benefit of the contributory provident fund and gratuity at Central Government rates\n(3) Medical reimbursement should be provided on the same basis as admissible to KVS and Central Government employees\n(4) Leave travel concession including once in a block of four years to travel anywhere in India as available to employees of KVS and Central Government employees should be available\n(5) Leave rules to all categories of employees should be placed at par with employees of KVS\n(6) House Rent Allowance should be granted with effect from October 1, 1986, at par with Central Government employees\n(7) The pay scale recommended by the Chattopadhyay Commission to teachers should be effective from January 1, 1986(8) The Librarians should be given the benefit of pay revision as per the Chattopadhyay Commission pay scale with effect from January 1, 1986\n(9) Office Superintendent, Accountants and Personal Assistants to the Principals should be given the same pay as their counterpart receive from the Central Government with effect from January 1, 1986\n(10) Nursing Sister/Assistants/Compounders should be granted pay scales at par with Pharmacists in Central Government under Para-Medical Staff as per recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission with effect from January 1, 1986\n(11) House Construction Loan, Scooter and Car Purchase Loan should be granted at par with KVS/Central Government scheme\n(12) 15 percent extra pay over and above scales admissible to KVS teachers should be admissible to the Sainik School teachers\n(13) The difference in wages between January 1, 1973 and June 30, 1978 on account of delayed implementation of the Third Pay Commission's recommendations should be paid\n(14) Bonus for 1984-85 and 1985-86 should also be paid at par with KVS\n(15) All employees who have retired by now before completing 60 years of age and have not yet attained the age of 60 years should be called back to duty and given postings\n6. As we have already indicated, it is the contention of the petitioner that the Sainik School Society is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 and is accordingly amenable to claim and enforcement of fundamental rights. It is also to be guided by what is provided in Part IV of the Constitution by way of Directive Principles of State Policy\n7. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi was considering whether a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1861 could be \"State\" within the meaning of Article 12. Bhagwati, J., as he then was, speaking for the unanimous Bench culled out six tests from he judgment of this Court in International Airport Authority case. Those tests are : (SCC p. 737, para 9)(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by government, it would go long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government\n(2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character\n(3) It may also be relevant factor. whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected\n(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality\n(5) If the functions of the Corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of government\n(6) \"Specifically, if a department of government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference\" of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of government\n8. Applying those tests the Constitution Bench found that the Society which managed the Regional Engineering College at Srinagar and several others elsewhere was 'State'. Having said so, this Court pointed out : (SCC p. 738, para 12)\nIt is also necessary to add that merely because a juristic entity may be an \"authority\" and therefor \"State\" within the meaning for the purpose of Articles 309, 310 and 311 which find a place in Part XIV. The definition of \"State\" in Article 12 which includes an \"authority\" within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India is limited in its application only to Part III and by virtue of Article 36, to Part IV : it does not extend to the other provisions of the Constitution and hence a juristic entity which may be \"State\" for the purpose of Parts III and IV would not be so for the purpose of Part XIV or any other provision of the Constitution\n9. Applying the tests indicated at page 737 of the reports it cannot be doubted that the Sainik School Society is also 'State'. The entire funding is by the State Governments and the Central Government. The overall control vests in the governmental authority. The main object of the Society is to run schools and prepare students for the purpose of feeding the National Defence Academy. Defence of the country is one of the regal functions of the State\n10. Once it is held that the Sainik School Society is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, application of Article 14 is attracted. Similarly under the Directive Principles - the claim for equal pay for equal work becomes tenable\n11. The main plank for substantiating the petitioner's claim for relief is the allegation of discrimination founded upon the basis that the employees of the Sainik School Society though in every respect comparable to employees of KVS and the Central Government are not being given the same treatment. KVS is a creation of the Government of India and is wholly financed out of the Central exchequer. Sainik School Society, as already pointed out, is not wholly funded by the Central Government. In fact substantial contribution for running Sainik School comes from the funds of the State where the school is located. The Central Government's contribution is minimal. The mode of funding is mainly through scholarship by the State payable to the students. It follows out of this fact that the employees of the Sainik School cannot be treated as Central Government employees - nor can they be treated as at par with the employees of KVS. They are a class by themselves and, therefore, the stand on the basis of Article 14 by pleading discrimination against the guarantee of equality is not available. To put unequals as equals is against the objective of Article 14, in the same way is to discriminate between equals. The later, however, is on the hypothesis that the two are equals. In view of the position that the employees of the Society are a distinct class by themselves, we do not think that there is any merit in the claim that there has been discrimination\n12. Similarly the claim of equal pay for equal work is indeed not tenable. No acceptable material has been placed before us to support the stand that the work in the two institution is equal. A bare statement that both the Kendriya Vidyalayas and the Sainik Schools impart education to the students cannot sustain the claim of equal work. To maintain a claim for equal pay on the allegation of equal work requires clear material to support the basis that the work in both the institutions is the same. Kendriya Vidyalayas popularly known as Central Schools, are more or less schools as understood in common parlance. A Sainik School intended essentially to draw young men for being recruited into the National Defence Academy is not an ordinary schools. Its curriculum, the pattern of teaching, the life style, the discipline and attention differ. The Sainik Schools are totally residential and the teacher is provided accommodation within the complex with a view to exposure of students to the teacher throughout the period and allow the teacher to exercise regulation over the students at all material times. The teacher is also expected to interact with the students beyond the classroom. The Principal of the Sainik School is a defence service officer; so is the Headmaster for the lower classes; the Physical Instructor is also drawn from the army. We are not in a position to accept the claim of the petitioner that the work in the two institutions is equal, and, therefore, the claim for equality of pay cannot be accepted. Even though that claim is not accepted, the Sainik Schools Society being 'State' is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court and it is open to the court to examine whether the conditions of service are of an acceptable pattern\n13. The age of retirement of teachers in the Sainik School is till 60 years but continuance beyond 58 years is subject to physical fitness and continued satisfactory performance of duties. For non-academic staff the age is 58 years which is same for most government employees. There is nothing unreasonable in this condition of service. There has been a switch over to pension and gratuity scheme with effect from July 29, 1988. The claim of the petitioner is that it should be with effect from January 1, 1986. Keeping the mode of funding in view, we do not think the liability that would arise by antedating the benefit from January 1, 1986 can be conveniently met. We, however, see no reason why the benefit should be extended only from July 29, 1988, which is said to be the date of the decision. It should be made operative from April 1, 1988, which is the commencement of the current financial year. We would accordingly direct that the pension and revised gratuity scheme should be made operative from April 1, 1988\n14. We see no reason to interfere in the matter of claim for medical reimbursement. The Society has extended the benefit of medical allowance which is a known form in respect of even government servants not covered under the CGH Scheme. But her again the benefit should be operative from April 1, 1988\n15. Coming to the Leave Travel Concession advantage, the same should be available from April 1, 1988, while permitting the visit to the home town once in a block of two years. In terms of the recommendation of the Academic Study Group, we are inclined to extend the benefit of Leave Travel Concession for visiting any place in India once in a block of four years. When such scheme is being accepted even by non-government employers on the basis that these visits improve the quality of service, we extend it to the Sainik School employees effective from April 1, 1988\n16. Most of the employees have accommodation provided by the Sainik Schools and according to respondent 1 free furnished accommodation is provided. There may be cases where in the absence of such accommodation the employees may be living in rented accommodation, but we do not think that we should interfere in respect of this claim\n17. The other claims raised do not appear to be reasonable except the prayer for providing house construction loan, scooter, car purchase loan. This is really not a heavy burden and out of the fund to be created loans are to be provided and the loan amounts are recoverable with concessional interest. According to modern thinking these advantages are normal service benefits. A residential accommodation adds to the security of the employee and a conveyance adds to his mobility. We are of the view that this benefit should be admissible to the employees. The Society shall, therefore, create an appropriate fund either to be operated through every college or through such method as may be found convenient for entertaining claims for house construction loan and loans for purchase of scooter, car etc. as may be admissible in terms of the scheme to be framed. We direct that the further benefits which we have granted by our present order should be made available to the employees by the end of March 31, 1989. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs\n18. Before we part, we would like to place on record that learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for respondent 1 had candidly stated in court that if over and above what the Board of Governors had decided to sanction, if this Court was of the view that some more benefits should be given, the same may be ordered", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -2863,26 +2863,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S023", - "case_id": "3205", - "experiment": "baseline_no_firac", - "model": "qwen-2.5-7b-instruct", - "source_file": "S023__baseline_no_firac__qwen-2.5-7b-instruct__3205.json", + "case_id": "3832", + "experiment": "role_play_v3", + "model": "ministral-8b", + "source_file": "S023__role_play_v3__ministral-8b__3832.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "17/01/2024", - "machine_error_stage": "conclusion", + "judgment_date": "04/10/1988", + "machine_error_stage": "facts", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in reasoning" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeals No. 7522 of 1996 (From the Judgment and Order dated 26-3-1996 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 43 of 1996), with Nos. 7523, 7525-27 and 7524 of 1996 | Om Pal Singh Hoon And Others v. Bobby Art International | 01/05/1996", - "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeals No. 7522 of 1996 (From the Judgment and Order dated 26-3-1996 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 43 of 1996), with Nos. 7523, 7525-27 and 7524 of 1996 | Om Pal Singh Hoon And Others v. Bobby Art International", - "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The case involves appeals against a Delhi High Court judgment that quashed the 'A' certificate awarded to the film \"Bandit Queen.\" The film depicts the life of Phoolan Devi, detailing her experiences of child marriage, abuse, rape, humiliation, and subsequent turn to dacoity and revenge. The film is based on a book published in 1991. After being presented for certification, the Revising Committee recommended an 'A' certificate with excisions. The Appellate Tribunal, comprising a retired judge and three women, upheld the 'A' certificate, finding that expletives reflected local parlance and controversial scenes like nudity and rape were integral to depicting the protagonist's suffering and societal issues, aiming to evoke sympathy and revulsion, not titillation. The film was subsequently screened and released to the public. A writ petition was filed by a member of the Gujjar community, alleging the film depicted his community as depraved, particularly in a rape scene, and lowered their reputation. The Single Judge quashed the certificate, and the Division Bench upheld this, focusing on specific scenes of nudity, rape, and expletives as indecent and violating certification guidelines. The appeals are against this High Court judgment.", - "generated_judgment": "**Conclusion: DISMISSED**\n\n---\n\n### **Step-by-Step Analysis:**\n\n#### **1. Nature of the Appeal:**\nThe appeal is against a Delhi High Court judgment that quashed the 'A' certificate for the film *Bandit Queen*. The appeal seeks to overturn the High Court’s decision, which had upheld the petition of a member of the Gujjar community, who alleged that the film misrepresented his community and lowered its reputation.\n\n#### **2. Facts of the Case:**\n- The film *Bandit Queen* is based on a book published in 1991, depicting the life of Phoolan Devi, a real-life figure who experienced extreme trauma, including child marriage, abuse, rape, and later turned to dacoity.\n- The film was certified as 'A' by the Revising Committee, with recommendations for excisions.\n- The Appellate Tribunal (comprising a retired judge and three women) upheld the 'A' certificate, emphasizing that the film’s depiction of nudity, rape, and expletives was necessary to portray the protagonist’s suffering and societal issues, not for titillation.\n- The film was released to the public.\n- A writ petition was filed by a member of the Gujjar community, alleging the film depicted his community as depraved and lowered its reputation.\n- The Single Judge quashed the certificate, and the Division Bench upheld this decision, focusing on the indecency of specific scenes (nudity, rape, expletives) as violating certification guidelines.\n\n#### **3. Legal Framework:**\n- Under the **Certification of Films Act, 1952**, and **Cinema Certifying Society Rules**, the content of a film must be judged based on its artistic merit, social value, and public interest, rather than on moral or communal sensitivities.\n- The **Appellate Tribunal** is empowered to review the certification and make recommendations based on the film’s content and its impact on public morality and values.\n- The **Delhi High Court**, in its judgment, focused on the **specific scenes** of nudity, rape, and expletives, interpreting them as indecent and violating the certification guidelines.\n\n#### **4. Key Legal Considerations:**\n- **Artistic Freedom vs. Public Morality:** The film was judged on its artistic and narrative value, which the Appellate Tribunal upheld. However, the High Court focused on the **moral and communal impact**, which is not the correct standard for film certification.\n- **Community Sensitivity:** The petition was based on the claim that the film misrepresented the Gujjar community. However, **film certification is not a platform for addressing community sensitivities**, especially when the film is based on a real-life story and aims to depict societal issues.\n- **Judicial Review of Certification:** The **Delhi High Court** overstepped its authority by quashing the certificate based on **subjective interpretations of indecency**, rather than adhering to the **objective criteria** set out in the certification rules.\n\n#### **5. Judicial Precedent and Interpretation:**\n- The **Appellate Tribunal’s** reasoning was consistent with the **intent of the certification process**, which is to allow films that are socially relevant and artistically significant, even if they contain controversial or sensitive content.\n- The **Delhi High Court’s** decision appears to have been influenced by **community sensitivities** rather than the **legal standards** for film certification. This is a **departure from the established jurisprudence** that upholds artistic and social expression in cinema.\n- The **Supreme Court** has consistently held that **film certification should not be based on moral or communal objections**, unless the content is **explicitly indecent** or **violates the law**.\n\n#### **6. Conclusion:**\n- The **Delhi High Court’s** decision to quash the 'A' certificate was based on **subjective and community-based reasoning**, which is not aligned with the **objective criteria** of film certification.\n- The **Appellate Tribunal** correctly upheld the certificate, recognizing the film’s **artistic and social value**.\n- Therefore, the **appeal against the High Court’s judgment should be DISMISSED**, as the High Court’s reasoning was **legally flawed** and **not in accordance with the established standards of film certification**.\n\n---\n\n### **Final Decision: DISMISSED**", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by BHARUCHA, J.\nBHARUCHA, J. -\nSpecial leave granted\n2. These appeals impugn the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in letters patent appeals. The letters patent appeals challenged the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge allowing a writ petition. The letters patent appeals were dismissed, subject to a direction to the Union of India (the second respondent). The writ petition was filed by the first respondent to quash the certificate of exhibition awarded to the film \"Bandit Queen\" and to restrain its exhibition in India\n3. The film deals with the life of Phoolan Devi. It is based upon a true story. Still a child, Phoolan Devi was married off to a man old enough to be her father. She was beaten and raped by him. She was tormented by the boys of the village; and beaten by them when she foiled the advances of one of them. A village panchayat called after the incident blamed Phoolan Devi for attempting to entice the boy, who belonged to a higher caste. Consequent upon the decision of the village panchayat, Phoolan Devi had to leave the village. She was then arrested by the police and subjected to indignity and humiliation in the police station. Upon the intervention of some persons she was released on bail; their intervention was not due to compassion but to satisfy their carnal appetite. Phoolan Devi was thereafter kidnapped by dacoits and sexually brutalised by their leader, a man named Babu Gujjar. Another member of the gang, Vikram Mallah, shot Babu Gujjar dead in a fit of rage while he was assaulting Phoolan Devi. Phoolan Devi was attracted by Vikram Mallah and threw her lot in with him. Along with Vikram Mallah she accosted her husband, tied him to a tree and took her revenge by brutally beating him. One Sri Ram, the leader of a gang of Thakurs, who had been released from jail, made advances to Phoolan Devi and was spurned. He killed Vikram Mallah. Having lost Vikram Mallah's protection, Phoolan Devi was gang-raped by Sri Ram, Lalaram and others. She was stripped naked, paraded and made to fetch water from the village well under the gaze of the villagers, but no one came to her rescue. To avenge herself upon her persecutors, she joined a dacoits' gang headed by Baba Mustkin. In avenging herself upon Sri Ram, she humiliated and killed twenty Thakurs of the village of Behmai. Ultimately, she surrendered and was in jail for a number of years(We have not viewed the film. The story thereof as set out above comes from the judgment under appeal.)\n4. The film is based on a book written by Mala Sen called India's Bandit Queen. The book has been in the market since the year 1991 without objection\n5. On 17-8-1994, the film was presented for certification to the Censor Board under the Cinematograph Act, 1952. The Examining Committee of the Censor Board referred it to the Revising Committee under Rule 24(1) of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983. On 19-7-1995, the Revising Committee recommended that the film be granted an 'A' certificate, subject to certain excisions and modifications. (An 'A' certificate implies that the film may be viewed only by adults.)\n6. Aggrieved by the decision of the Revising Committee, an appeal was filed under Section 5-C of the Cinematograph Act before the Appellate Tribunal. It is constituted by virtue of the provisions of Section 5-D of the Cinematograph Act and consists of a Chairman and members who \"are qualified to judge the effect of films on the public\". In the present case the Tribunal was chaired by Lentin, J., a retired Judge of the Bombay High Court, and three ladies, Smt. Sara Mohammad, Dr. Sarayu V. Doshi and Smt. Reena Kumari, were its members\n7. The Tribunal's order states that the film\n\"portrays the trials and tribulations and the various humiliations (mental and physical) heaped on her (Phoolan Devi) from childhood onwards, which out of desperation and misery drove her to dacoity and the revenge which she takes on her tormentors and those who had humiliated and tortured her and had physically abused her\n3.1 The tone and tenor of the dialogues in this film reflect the nuances locally and habitually used and spoken in the villages and in the ravines of the Chambal, not bereft of expletives used for force and effect by way of normal and common parlance in those parts; these expletives are not intended to be taken literally. There is nothing sensual or sexual about these expletives used as they are in ordinary and habitual course as part of the language in those parts and express as they do emotions such as anger, rage, frustration and the like, and represent as they do the colour of the various locales in this film.\"\n8. The Tribunal accepted the argument of the appellant before it in respect of certain scenes where excisions or modifications had been required. We shall restrict ourselves to the Tribunal's findings on the scenes which are presently in dispute, and to observations relating to the film as a whole. A scene of policemen hitting Phoolan Devi with the butt of a gun had been ordered to be deleted; the Tribunal said that the deletion\n\"would negate the very impact of this film in its endeavour to depict the maltreatment and cruelty heaped upon the victim by the perpetrators, which resulted in the former turning her face against, and seeking revenge on, the perpetrators of her humiliation and degradation. Deletion or even reduction of this sequence would have a deleterious effect on the powerful sequences which follow, as it would also leave the average audience bewildered as to the intensity of the bitterness the victim rightly feels towards her tormentors.\"\nAnother scene dealt with the rape of Phoolan Devi by Babu Gujjar. The sequence was in three parts and the appellant had volunteered to reduce the first two sequences \"to the bare cinematic necessity\": the Tribunal did not accept this, having ascertained what was meant. It directed that the second of the three sequences be deleted altogether, and that there be a reduction by 30% of the first sequence and by 20% of the third sequence, with the qualification that the visuals of the man's bare posterior in the first and third sequences be reduced to a flash. Exception was taken before the Tribunal to the direction to reduce by 70% the sequence of Phoolan Devi torturing her husband. The Tribunal found that the sequence brought to the fore the ferocity of Phoolan Devi's hatred and revulsion towards the man who drove her to being the hunted dacoit she became. Phoolan Devi's pent-up anger, emotions and revulsion were demonstrated in the scene. It was a powerful scene the reduction of which would negate its impact. Much emphasis was laid before us upon the fact that Phoolan Devi is shown naked being paraded in the village after being humiliated. The Tribunal observed that these visuals could but create sympathy towards the unfortunate woman in particular and revulsion against the perpetrators of crimes against women in general. The sequence was an integral part of the story. It was not sensual or sexual, and was intended to, as indeed it did, create revulsion in the minds of the average audience towards the tormentors and oppressors of women. \"To delete or even to reduce these climactic visuals\", the Tribunal said, \"would be a sacrilege\". It added \"4.9.1. While recommending the deletion of the visuals aforestated, perhaps the Revising Committee momentarily forgot 'Schindler's List' which was passed by the Board without a cut and despite prolonged sequences of frontal nudity of men and women depicted therein, and rightly so because the scenes of frontal nudity in that film were intended to create a feeling of revulsion and a sense of horror that such crimes could indeed be committed. Likewise in the present film.\"\nThe Tribunal permitted certain words of abuse in the vernacular to be retained because of the context in which they were spoken and the persons by whom they were spoken\n\"Spoken as they are as colloquially and as part of their daily life, it would be unfair on our part to castigate the use of these words which we would otherwise have done.\"\n9. Upon the basis of this unanimous order of the Tribunal, the film was granted an 'A' certificate\n10. On 31-8-1995, the film was screened, with English subtitles, at the Siri Fort Auditorium on the occasion of the 27th International Film Festival of India with the permission of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. From 25-1-1996 onwards the censored film was open to public viewing at various cinema theatres in the country\n11. On 27-1-1996, the first respondent filed the writ petition before the Delhi High Court seeking to quash the certificate granted to the film and to restrain its exhibition in India. The first respondent stated in the writ petition that he was a Hindu and a Gujjar by caste. He was the President of the Gujjar Gaurav Sansthan and was involved in the welfare of the Gujjar community. He had seen the film when it was exhibited at the International Film Festival; he had felt aggrieved and his fundamental rights had been violated. Though audiences were led to believe that the film depicted the character of \"a former queen of ravines\" also known as Phoolan Devi, the depiction was \"abhorrent and unconscionable and a slur on the womanhood of India\". The petitioner and his community had been depicted in a most depraved way specially in the scene of rape by Babu Gujjar, which scene was \"suggestive of the moral depravity of the Gujjar community\". The film depicted the petitioner and his community as rapists and the use of the name Babu Gujjar for the principal villain lowered the reputation of the Gujjar community and the petitioner. It lowered the respect of the petitioner in the eyes of society and his friends. The scene of rape was obscene and horrendous and cast a slur on the face of the Gujjar community. The film went beyond the limits of decency and lowered the prestige and position of the woman in general and the community of Mallahs in particular. The first respondent had been discriminated against and Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution had been violated\n12. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the certificate granted to the film. He directed the Censor Board to consider the grant of an 'A' certificate to it after excisions and modifications in accordance with his order had been made. Till a fresh certificate was granted the screening of the film was injuncted\n13. The Division Bench, in the judgment under appeal, upheld the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Having viewed the film, it examined it in regard to three aspects. He first dealt with the frontal nudity scene. The scene, the Division Bench said, ran for a full two minutes. The heroine was stripped totally naked in the gaze of about a hundred villagers standing in a circle at a distance around a well and she was paraded nude from head to toe all along the circle, with her front, including her private parts, exposed. The Division Bench noted the findings of the Tribunal in regard to this scene (which have been referred to above) and held\n\"In the face of a finding by the Appellate Tribunal of the scene creating revulsion, the only inference could have been that the scene of total frontal nudity from top to toe was 'indecent' within Section 5-B and Article 19(2).\"\nThe scene also offended the guidelines in paragraphs 2(ix), 2(xi) and 2(vii). The second aspect that was considered by the Division Bench was that which showed the naked posterior of Babu Gujjar in the rape scene. As noticed by the Division Bench by stopwatch, this scene ran for about 20 seconds. It showed sexual intercourse by the man and his physical movement, with his posterior exposed. The High Court took the view that the direction of the Tribunal that the posterior should be shown as a flash was inconsistent with retention of 70% and 80% of the first and third sequences as directed by the Tribunal. The scene of violent rape was disgusting and revolting and it denigrated and degraded women. The third aspect that the High Court concerned itself with was the use of expletives and it concluded that they should be deleted. Overall, the Division Bench was of the view that the Tribunal's order was vitiated by the use of the wrong tests\n14. Section 5-B of the Cinematograph Act, which echoes Article 19(2), states that a film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion of the authority competent to grant the certificate, the film or any part of it is against the interests of, inter alia, decency. Under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 5-B the Central Government is empowered to issue directions setting out the principles which shall guide the authority competent to grant certificates in sanctioning films for public exhibition\n15. The guidelines earlier issued were revised in 1991. Clause (1) thereof reads thus\n\"1. The objectives of film certification will be to ensure that -\n(a) the medium of film remains responsible and sensitive to the values and standards of society;\n(b) artistic expression and creative freedom are not unduly curbed;\n(c) certification is responsive to social change;\n(d) the medium of film provides clean and healthy entertainment; and\n(e) as far as possible, the film is of aesthetic value and cinematically of a good standard.\"\nClause (2) states that the Board of Film Censors shall ensure that -\n\"2. (vii) human sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity or depravity;\n(ix) scenes degrading or denigrating women in any manner are not presented;\n(x) scenes involving sexual violence against women like attempt to rape, rape or any form of molestation or scenes of a similar nature are avoided, and if any such incident is germane to the theme, they shall be reduced to the minimum and no details are shown;\nClause (3) reads thus\n3. The Board of Film Certification shall also ensure that the film -\n(i) is judged in its entirety from the point of view of the overall impact; and(ii) is examined in the light of the period depicted in the film and the contemporary standards of the country and the people to which the film relates, provided that the film does not deprave the morality of the audience.\"\n16. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the film had been scrutinised by the Tribunal, which was an expert body constituted for that purpose, and it had passed the test of such scrutiny. It was emphasised that three members of the four-member Tribunal were ladies and they had not found anything offensive in the film as certified for adult viewing. The guidelines, it was submitted, required the film to be seen as a whole and, seen as a whole, the film did not offend either Section 5-B(i) or the guidelines. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants was supported by the learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Union of India. Dr. Kaul, learned counsel for the first respondent, submitted that the machinery under the Cinematograph Act was only for those who had some concern with the making of the film and that citizens who were offended by it were free to approach the High Court under Article 226. There were compelling reasons for the High Court to pass the order that it did for the film was abhorrent. What had also to be considered were the individual episodes and the episodes depicting full frontal nudity, rape and the use of swear words offended the requirements of sub-clauses (vii), (ix) and (x) of the guidelines. The film violated the freedom of speech and expression of the first respondent\n17. The decision of this Court most relevant to the appeals before us was delivered by a Constitution Bench in K.A. Abbas v. Union of India [(1970) 2 SCC 780 ]. It related to a documentary film entitled \"A Tale of Four Cities\". The appellant contended in a petition under Article 32 that he was entitled to a certificate for unrestricted public exhibition thereof. What Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for the Court, said needs to be reproduced : (SCC pp. 801-3, paras 49-51) \"49. We may now illustrate our meaning how even the items mentioned in the directions may figure in films subject either to their artistic merit or their social value overweighing their offending character. The task of the censor is extremely delicate and his duties cannot be the subject of an exhaustive set of commands established by prior ratiocination. But direction is necessary to him so that he does not sweep within the terms of the directions vast areas of thought, speech and expression of artistic quality and social purpose and interest. Our standards must be so framed that we are not reduced to a level where the protection of the least capable and the most depraved amongst us determines what the morally healthy cannot view or read. The standards that we set for our censors must make a substantial allowance in favour of freedom thus leaving a vast area for creative art to interpret life and society with some of its foibles along with what is good. We must not look upon such human relationships as banned in toto and forever from human thought and must give scope for talent to put them before society. The requirements of art and literature include within themselves a comprehensive view of social life and not only in its ideal form and the line is to be drawn where the average moral man begins to feel embarrassed or disgusted at a naked portrayal of life without the redeeming touch of art or genius or social value. If the depraved begins to see in these things more than what an average person would, in much the same way, as it is wrongly said, a Frenchman sees a woman's legs in everything, it cannot be helped. In our scheme of things ideas having redeeming social or artistic value must also have importance and protection for their growth. Sex and obscenity are not always synonymous and it is wrong to classify sex as essentially obscene or even indecent or immoral. It should be our concern, however, to prevent the use of sex designed to play a commercial role by making its own appeal. This draws in the censor's scissors. Thus audiences in India can be expected to view with equanimity the story of Oedipus son of Laius who committed patricide and incest with his mother. When the seer Tiresias exposed him, his sister Jocasta committed suicide by hanging herself and Oedipus put out his own eyes. No one after viewing these episodes would think that patricide or incest with one's own mother is permissible or suicide in such circumstances or tearing out one's own eyes is a natural consequence. And yet if one goes by the letter of the directions the film cannot be shown. Similarly, scenes depicting leprosy as a theme in a story or in a documentary are not necessarily outside the protection. If that were so Verrier Elwyn's Phulmat of the Hills or the same episode in Henryson's Testament of Cressaid (from where Verrier Elwyn borrowed the idea) would never see the light of day. Again carnage and bloodshed may have historical value and the depiction of such scenes as the Sack of Delhi by Nadirshah may be permissible, if handled delicately and as part of an artistic portrayal of the confrontation with Mohammad Shah Rangila. If Nadir Shah made golgothas of skulls, must we leave them out of the story because people must be made to view a historical theme without true history? Rape in all its nakedness may be objectionable but Voltaire's Candide would be meaningless without Cunegonde's episode with the soldier and the story of Lucrece could never be depicted on the screen\n50. Therefore it is not the elements of rape, leprosy, sexual immorality which should attract the censor's scissors but how the theme is handled by the producer. It must, however, be remembered that the cinematograph is a powerful medium and its appeal is different. The horrors of war as depicted in the famous etchings of Goya do not horrify one so much as the same scenes rendered in colour and with sound and movement, would do. We may view a documentary on the erotic tableaux from our ancient temples with equanimity or read the Kamasutra but a documentary from them as a practical sexual guide would be abhorrent\n51. We have said all this to show that the items mentioned in the directions are not by themselves defective. We have adhered to the 43 points of T.P. O'Connor framed in 1918 and have made a comprehensive list of what may not be shown. Parliament has left this task to the Central Government and, in our opinion, this could be done. But Parliament has not legislated enough, nor has the Central Government filled in the gap. Neither has separated the artistic and the socially valuable from that which is deliberately indecent, obscene, horrifying or corrupting. They have not indicated the need of society and the freedom of the individual. They have thought more of the depraved and less of the ordinary moral man. In their desire to keep films from the abnormal, they have excluded the moral. They have attempted to bring down the public motion picture to the level of home movies.\"\n18. In Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC 43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72 this Court was dealing with a pro bono publico prosecution against the producer, actors and others connected with a film called \"Satyam, Shivam, Sundaram\" on the ground of prurience, moral depravity and shocking erosion of public decency. A petition to quash the proceedings was moved and procedural complications brought the matter to this Court. One of the questions considered was : when can a film to be publicly exhibited be castigated as prurient and obscene and violative of norms against venereal depravity. Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court, said : (SCC pp. 47-50, paras 8-15) \"Art, morals and law's manacles on aesthetics are a sensitive subject where jurisprudence meets other social sciences and never goes alone to bark and bite because State-made strait-jacket is an inhibitive prescription for a free country unless enlightened society actively participates in the administration of justice to aesthetics\n9. The world's greatest paintings, sculptures, songs and dances, India's lustrous heritage, the Konaraks and Khajurahos, lofty epics, luscious in patches, may be asphyxiated by law, if prudes and prigs and State moralists prescribe paradigms and prescribe heterodoxies\n14. I am satisfied that the Film Censor Board, acting under Section 5-A, is specially entrusted to screen off the silver screen pictures which offensively invade or deprave public morals through oversex. There is no doubt - and counsel on both sides agree - that a certificate by a high-powered Board of Censors with specialised composition and statutory mandate is not a piece of utter inconsequence. It is relevant material, important in its impact, though not infallible in its verdict. But the Court is not barred from trying the case because the certificate is not conclusive. Nevertheless, the magistrate shall not brush aside what another tribunal has, for similar purpose, found. Maybe, even a rebuttable presumption arises in favour of the statutory certificate but could be negatived by positive evidence. An act of recognition of moral worthiness by a statutory agency is not opinion evidence but an instance or transaction where the fact in issue has been asserted, recognised or affirmed\n15. I am not persuaded that once a certificate under the Cinematograph Act is issued the Penal Code, pro tanto, will hang limp. The Court will examine the film and judge whether its public display, in the given time and clime, so breaches public morals or depraves basic decency as to offend the penal provisions. Statutory expressions are not petrified by time but must be updated by changing ethos even as popular ethics are not absolutes but abide and evolve as community consciousness enlivens and escalates. Surely, the satwa of society must rise progressively if mankind is to move towards its timeless destiny and this can be guaranteed only if the ultimate value-vision is rooted in the unchanging basics, Truth - Goodness - Beauty, Satyam, Shivam, Sundaram. The relation between Reality and Relativity must haunt the Court's evaluation of obscenity, expressed in society's pervasive humanity, not law's penal prescriptions. Social scientists and spiritual scientists will broadly agree that man lives not alone by mystic squints, ascetic chants and austere abnegation but by luscious love of Beauty, sensuous joy of companionship and moderate non-denial of normal demands of the flesh. Extremes and excesses boomerang although some crazy artistes and film directors do practise Oscar Wilde's observation : 'Moderation is a fatal thing. Nothing succeeds like excess.'\"\n19. In Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra [(1985) 4 SCC 289 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 523 this Court was concerned with a novel entitled 'Prajapati'; it was published in Sarodiya Desh, which was read by Bengalis of both sexes and almost of all ages all over India. A complaint was lodged that the novel was obscene and had the tendency to corrupt the morals of its readers. This Court said : (SCC pp. 318-19, para 35)\n\"A vulgar writing is not necessarily obscene. Vulgarity arouses a feeling of disgust and revulsion and also boredom but does not have the effect of depraving, debasing and corrupting the morals of any reader of the novel, whereas obscenity has the tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. We may observe that characters like Sukhen, Shikha, the father and the brothers of Sukhen, the business executives and others portrayed in the book are not just figments of the author's imagination. Such characters are often to be seen in real life in the society. The author who is a powerful writer has used his skill in focussing the attention of the readers on such characters in society and to describe the situation more eloquently has had used unconventional and slang words so that in the light of the author's understanding, the appropriate emphasis is there on the problems. If we place ourselves in the position of the author and judge the novel from his point of view, we find that the author intends to expose various evils and ills pervading the society and to pose with particular emphasis the problems which ail and afflict the society in various spheres. He has used his own technique, skill and choice of words which may in his opinion, serve properly the purpose of the novel. If we place ourselves in the position of readers, who are likely to read this book, - and we must not forget that in this class of readers there will probably be readers of both sexes and of all ages between teenagers and the aged, - we feel that the readers as a class will read the book with a sense of shock, and disgust and we do not think that any reader on reading this book would become depraved, debased and encouraged to lasciviousness. It is quite possible that they come across such characters and such situations in life and have faced them or may have to face them in life. On a very anxious consideration and after carefully applying our judicial mind in making an objective assessment of the novel we do not think that it can be said with any assurance that the novel is obscene merely because slang and unconventional words have been used in the book in which there have been emphasis on sex and description of female bodies and there are the narrations of feelings, thoughts and actions in vulgar language. Some portions of the book may appear to be vulgar and readers of cultured and refined taste may feel shocked and disgusted. Equally in some portions, the words used and description given may not appear to be in proper taste. In some places there may have been an exhibition of bad taste leaving it to the readers of experience and maturity to draw the necessary inference but certainly not sufficient to bring home to the adolescents any suggestion which is depraving or lascivious. We have to bear in mind that the author has written this novel which came to be published in the Sarodiya Desh for all classes of readers and it cannot be right to insist that the standard should always be for the writer to see that the adolescent may not be brought into contact with sex. If a reference to sex by itself in any novel is considered to be obscene and not fit to be read by adolescents, adolescents will not be in a position to read any novel and 'will have to read books which are purely religious'.\"\n20. In State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi [ : AIR 1952 SC 329 ] Mahajan, J. said that a writing had to be considered as a whole and in a fair and free and liberal spirit, not dwelling too much upon isolated passages or upon a strong word here and there, and an endeavour had to be made to gather the general effect which the whole composition would have on the mind of the public. Mukherjea, J., concurring with Mahajan, J., observed that the writing had to be looked at as a whole without laying stress on isolated passages or particular expressions used here and there and that the Court had to take into consideration what effect the writing was likely to produce on the minds of the readers for whom the publication was intended. Account had also to be taken of the place, circumstances and occasion of the publication, as a clear appreciation of the background in which the words were used was of very great assistance in enabling the Court to view them in their proper perspective\n21. In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [(1962) 3 SCR 842 : AIR 1962 SC 305 ] a Constitution Bench held that the only restrictions which can be imposed on the rights of an individual under Article 19(1)(a) were those which clause (2) of Article 19 permitted and no other. This was reiterated in LIC v. Prof. Manubhai D. Shah [(1992) 3 SCC 637 ]\n22. The guidelines aforementioned have been carefully drawn. They require the authorities concerned with film certification to be responsive to the values and standards of society and take note of social change. They are required to ensure that \"artistic expression and creative freedom are not unduly curbed\". The film must be \"judged in its entirety from the point of view of its overall impact\". It must also be judged in the light of the period depicted and the contemporary standards of the people to whom it relates, but it must not deprave the morality of the audience. Clause 2 requires that human sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity or depravity, that scenes degrading or denigrating women are not presented and scenes of sexual violence against women are avoided, but if such scenes are germane to the theme, they be reduced to a minimum and not particularised\n23. The guidelines are broad standards. They cannot be read as one would read a statute. Within the breadth of their parameters the certification authorities have discretion. The specific sub-clauses of clause 2 of the guidelines cannot overweigh the sweep of clauses 1 and 3 and, indeed, of sub-clause (ix) of clause (2). Where the theme is of social relevance, it must be allowed to prevail. Such a theme does not offend human sensibilities nor extol the degradation or denigration of women. It is to this end that sub-clause (ix) of clause 2 permits scenes of sexual violence against women, reduced to a minimum and without details, if relevant to the theme. What that minimum and lack of details should be is left to the good sense of the certification authorities, to be determined in the light of the relevance of the social theme of the film\n24. \"Bandit Queen\" is the story of a village child exposed from an early age to the brutality and lust of man. Married off to a man old enough to be her father she is beaten and raped. The village boys make advances which she repulses; but the village panchayat finds her guilty of the enticement of a village boy because he is of high caste and she has to leave the village. She is arrested and, in the police station, filthily abused. Those who stand bail for her do so to satisfy their lust. She is kidnapped and raped. During an act of brutality the rapist is shot dead and she finds an ally in her rescuer. With his assistance she beats up her husband, violently. Her rescuer is shot dead by one whose advances she has spurned. She is gang-raped by the rescuer's assailant and his accomplices and they humiliate her in the sight of the village : a hundred men stand in a circle around the village well and watch the humiliation, her being stripped naked and walked around the circle and then made to draw water. And not one of the villagers helps her. She burns with anger, shame and the urge for vengeance. She gets it, and kills many Thakurs too\n25. It is not a pretty story. There are no syrupy songs or pirouetting round trees. It is the serious and sad story of a worm turning : a village-born female child becoming a dreaded dacoit. An innocent who turns into a vicious criminal because lust and brutality have affected her psyche so. The film levels an accusing finger at members of society who had tormented Phoolan Devi and driven her to become a dreaded dacoit filled with the desire to revenge\n26. It is in this light that the individual scenes have to be viewed\n27. First, the scene where she is humiliated, stripped naked, paraded, made to draw water from the well, within the circle of a hundred men. The exposure of her breasts and genitalia to those men is intended by those who strip her to demean her. The effect of so doing upon her could hardly have been better conveyed than by explicitly showing the scene. The object of doing so was not to titillate the cinemagoer's lust but to arouse in him sympathy for the victim and disgust for the perpetrators. The revulsion that the Tribunal referred to was not at Phoolan Devi's nudity but at the sadism and heartlessness of those who had stripped her naked to rob her of every shred of dignity. Nakedness does not always arouse the baser instinct. The reference by the Tribunal to the film \"Schindler's List\" was apt. There is a scene in it of rows of naked men and women, shown frontally, being led into the gas chambers of a Nazi concentration camp. Not only are they about to die but they have been stripped in their last moments of the basic dignity of human beings. Tears are a likely reaction; pity, horror and a fellow-feeling of shame are certain, except in the pervert who might be aroused. We do not censor to protect the pervert or to assuage the susceptibilities of the oversensitive. \"Bandit Queen\" tells a powerful human story and to that story the scene of Phoolan Devi's enforced naked parade is central. It helps to explain why Phoolan Devi became what she did : her rage and vendetta against the society that had heaped indignities upon her\n28. The rape scene also helps to explain why Phoolan Devi became what she did. Rape is crude and its crudity is what the rapist's bouncing bare posterior is meant to illustrate. Rape and sex are not being glorified in the film. Quite the contrary. It shows what a terrible, and terrifying, effect rape and lust can have upon the victim. It focuses on the trauma and emotional turmoil of the victim to evoke sympathy for her and disgust for the rapist\n29. Too much need not, we think, be made of a few swear words the like of which can be heard everyday in every city, town and village street. No adult would be tempted to use them because they are used in this film\n30. In sum, we should recognise the message of a serious film and apply this test to the individual scenes thereof : do they advance the message? If they do they should be left alone, with only the caution of an 'A' certificate. Adult Indian citizens as a whole may be relied upon to comprehend intelligently the message and react to it, not to the possible titillation of some particular scene\n31. A film that illustrates the consequences of a social evil necessarily must show that social evil. The guidelines must be interpreted in that light. No film that extols the social evil or encourages it is permissible, but a film that carries the message that the social evil is evil cannot be made impermissible on the ground that it depicts the social evil. At the same time, the depiction must be just sufficient for the purpose of the film. The drawing of the line is best left to the sensibilities of the expert Tribunal. The Tribunal is a multi-member body. It is comprised of persons who gauge public reactions to films and, except in cases of stark breach of guidelines, should be permitted to go about its task\n32. In the present case, apart from the Chairman, three members of the Tribunal were women. It is hardly to be supposed that three women would permit a film to be screened which denigrates women, insults Indian womanhood or is obscene or pornographic. It would appear from its order that the Tribunal took the view that it would do women some good to see the film\n33. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had viewed the film in its true perspective and had, in compliance with the requirements of the guidelines, granted to the film an 'A' certificate subject to the conditions it stated. We think that the High Court ought not to have entertained the first respondent's writ petition impugning the grant of the certificate based as it was principally upon the slurs allegedly cast by the film on the Gujjar community. We find that the judgment under appeal does not take due note of the theme of the film and the fact that it condemns rape and the degradation of and violence upon women by showing their effect upon a village child, transforming her to a cruel dacoit obsessed with wreaking vengeance upon a society that has caused her so much psychological and physical hurt, and that the scenes of nudity and rape and the use of expletives, so far as the Tribunal had permitted them, were in aid of the theme and intended not to arouse prurient or lascivious thoughts but revulsion against the perpetrators and pity for the victim\n34. The appeals are allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. The first respondent's writ petition is dismissed. The 'A' certificate issued to the film \"Bandit Queen\" upon the conditions imposed by the Appellate Tribunal is restored\n35. The first respondent shall pay to each appellant the costs of his appeal", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9295 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9296 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9297 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9298 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9299 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9300 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9301 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9302 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9303 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9304 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9305 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9306 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9307 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9308 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9309 OF 2017 | Commissioner Of Income Tax – 1, Mumbai v. M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. | 03/08/2017", + "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9295 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9296 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9297 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9298 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9299 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9300 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9301 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9302 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9303 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9304 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9305 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9306 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9307 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9308 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9309 OF 2017 | Commissioner Of Income Tax – 1, Mumbai v. M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.", + "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "case_record": "The Commissioner of Income Tax filed appeals against assessees engaged in bottling Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders for domestic use. The assessees claimed deductions under Sections 80HH, 80-I, and 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, arguing that their LPG bottling activity constituted 'production' or 'manufacturing'. The Assessing Officers (AOs) and the Commissioner (Appeals) disallowed these claims, stating that bottling did not change the chemical composition of LPG. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) reversed this, deeming LPG bottling a complex, technical activity essential for marketability, and citing Rule 2 (xxxii) of the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004, which defines ‘manufacture of gas’ to include cylinder filling. The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision. The AO had relied on the Gujarat High Court's ruling in *State of Gujarat v. Kosan Gas Company* and general definitions of manufacture, concluding that value addition alone does not constitute manufacture. The assessees countered by emphasizing the complexity of the bottling process, the creation of a new commercial product for domestic use, and the broader interpretation of 'production' as per Supreme Court rulings like *Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd.* and *Sesa Goa Ltd.* They also referred to the definition of 'manufacture of gas' in the Gas Cylinders Rules and a notification under Section 80-IB listing 'Gas distribution and bottling' as an eligible industry. The process involves receiving bulk LPG, compressing it into liquid form, filling it into cylinders, and sealing them.", + "generated_judgment": "### Facts \n\n1. The assessees are engaged in bottling Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders for domestic use. \n2. They claimed deductions under Sections 80‑HH, 80‑I and 80‑IA of the Income‑Tax Act, 1961, contending that LPG bottling constitutes “production”/“manufacturing” within the meaning of these provisions. \n3. The Assessing Officers (AOs) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) disallowed the deductions, holding that bottling does not alter the chemical composition of LPG and therefore is not “manufacture” or “production”. \n4. The AO’s reasoning relied on the Gujarat High Court decision in **State of Gujarat v. Kosan Gas Co.** and on a general definition of manufacture that requires a change in the essential character of the raw material. \n5. The Income‑Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) reversed the disallowance, characterising LPG bottling as a “complex, technical activity” essential for marketability and citing **Rule 2 (xxxii) of the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004**, which defines “manufacture of gas” to include cylinder‑filling. \n6. The High Court upheld the ITAT’s decision. \n7. The assessees further relied on: \n\n a. The Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of “production” in **Arihant Tiles & Marbles P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax** and **Sesa Goa Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax**; \n\n b. The definition of “manufacture of gas” contained in the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004; \n\n c. A notification under Section 80‑IB that expressly includes “gas distribution and bottling” as an eligible industry for deduction. \n\n8. The bottling process involves receipt of bulk LPG, compression to liquid form, filling into cylinders, and sealing – a transformation that renders the gas suitable for domestic consumption and creates a distinct commercial product.\n\n### Issues \n\n1. Whether the activity of bottling LPG cylinders falls within the meaning of “manufacture”/“production” for the purposes of Sections 80‑HH, 80‑I and 80‑IA of the Income‑Tax Act, 1961. \n2. Whether the disallowance of the claimed deductions by the AO and the Commissioner was legally erroneous in view of the statutory definition in the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004 and the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence.\n\n### Rules \n\n1. **Section 80‑HH, 80‑I and 80‑IA** – permit deductions for income earned from “production” or “manufacture” of goods in a specified industry, provided the activity qualifies under the definition of “manufacture/production” under the Act. \n2. **Section 2(17) of the Income‑Tax Act** – defines “manufacture” as “the process of changing the essential character of any article or material, in whole or in part, into a different article or material, in any form, by rendering it usable for a particular purpose”. \n3. **Section 2(2) of the Income‑Tax Act** – defines “production” to include “fabrication, processing, or any other kind of transformation of an article or material”. \n4. **Rule 2 (xxxii) of the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004** – states that “manufacture of gas” includes the filling of gas cylinders. \n5. **Section 80‑IB Notification** – specifically lists “gas distribution and bottling” as an eligible industry for deduction, evidencing legislative intent to treat bottling as a manufacturing activity. \n6. **Supreme Court precedents**: \n\n a. **Arihant Tiles & Marbles P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax**, (2009) 239 ITR 1 – held that the term “production” should be given a liberal, purposive construction covering activities that add value and create a marketable product even if the raw material’s chemical identity is unchanged. \n\n b. **Sesa Goa Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax**, (2009) 239 ITR 761 – affirmed that transformation involving a change in form, packaging, or processing that renders the product usable for a specific purpose qualifies as “manufacture”. \n\n7. **State of Gujarat v. Kosan Gas Co., (2004) 71 GLR 191** – held that mere filling of LPG without alteration of chemical composition does not constitute manufacture; however, this decision is confined to the context of the Gujarat Gas Act and not directly to the Income‑Tax statutory scheme. \n\n8. **Principle of statutory interpretation** – when a special enactment (e.g., Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004) defines a term, that definition prevails over a generic dictionary meaning, provided it is consistent with the purpose of the principal legislation (Income‑Tax Act). \n\n### Analysis \n\n**Issue 1 – Does LPG bottling qualify as “manufacture/production”?** \n\n- **Rule 2** (Gas Cylinders Rules) expressly includes cylinder‑filling within “manufacture of gas”. This is a **statutory definition** issued under the relevant regulatory framework governing LPG. Under Rule 2, the activity the assessees perform is *statutorily* a form of manufacture. \n- **Rule 1** (Sections 80‑HH, 80‑I, 80‑IA) requires that the activity qualify as “manufacture” or “production” under the Income‑Tax Act. The **definition in Section 2(17)** is not limited to chemical alteration; it speaks of “changing the essential character… into a different article … rendering it usable for a particular purpose”. Bottling converts bulk LPG (a bulk commodity) into individually sealed cylinders that are **usable for domestic consumers** – a distinct commercial article. The essential character for the end‑user is changed: from bulk gas to a safely contained, portable product. \n- The **Supreme Court’s liberal approach** in *Arihant Tiles* and *Sesa Goa* upholds that transformation, packaging, and processing that renders a product marketable constitute “production/manufacture”. The bottling process satisfies this test: it involves compression, precise filling, safety sealing, and testing – all technical steps that add value and create a new marketable product. \n- The **Section 80‑IB notification** specifically lists “gas distribution and bottling” as an eligible industry, evidencing Parliament’s intent to treat bottling as a manufacturing activity for the purpose of tax incentives. Legislative intent is decisive; it cannot be overridden by a narrow reading of the generic definition. \n\n**Issue 2 – Was the AO/Commissioner’s disallowance erroneous?** \n\n- The AO relied on *Kosan Gas* and a generic definition of manufacture that demands a change in chemical composition. However, *Kosan Gas* was decided under a different statutory regime (the Gujarat Gas Act) and does not bind the Income‑Tax authority when a specific definition in a central rule (Rule 2 of the Gas Cylinders Rules) expands the term. \n- The AO ignored **Rule 2** and the **Section 80‑IB notification**, both of which are *integral* to the statutory scheme governing deduction claims. By discounting these, the AO’s decision conflicted with the clear legislative scheme. \n- The **ITAT** correctly applied the purposive approach, holding that bottling is a “complex, technical activity” essential for creating a marketable product, aligning with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. \n- The **High Court’s affirmation** further confirms that the appellate authority’s view is consistent with the hierarchy of law. \n\nGiven the statutory definition in the Gas Cylinders Rules, the explicit inclusion of bottling in the Section 80‑IB notification, and the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of “production/manufacture”, the AO’s reliance on *Kosan Gas* is legally insufficient. The disallowance therefore represents an erroneous application of the law.\n\n### Conclusion \n\nThe appeal is **ALLOWED**. The activity of bottling LPG cylinders constitutes “manufacture”/“production” within the meaning of Sections 80‑HH, 80‑I and 80‑IA of the Income‑Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the deductions claimed by the assessees are valid and the disallowance by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner is set aside.", + "reference_judgment": "The question of law that arises of consideration in all these appeals, which are filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai, is identical. The respondents-assessees in these appeals are engaged in the process of bottling Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinders meant for domestic use. They are claiming benefit of Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Admissibility of benefit under the aforesaid provision depends upon the question as to whether bottling of LPG is an activity which amounts to ‘production’ or ‘manufacturing’ for the purposes of the aforesaid provisions of the Act.\n2) The Assessing Officers (AOs) had disallowed the deduction claimed by the assessees holding that they did not engage in the production or manufacture activity because of the reason that LPG was produced and manufactured in refineries and thereafter there was no change in the chemical composition or other properties of the Gas in the activity of filling the cylinder. This view was affirmed by Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), however, upset the aforesaid view of the AOs after finding that LPG produced in the refineries cannot be directly supplied to households without bottling of the LPG into the Cylinders and insofar as LPG bottling is concerned, it is a complex activity which can only be carried out by experts. In this light, it was noted that the process involved LPG suction, vapour distribution, de-classification, compression of LPG vapour, external and internal cleaning, hydro pressure testing refilling, sealing, quality control etc. and hence the activity would be a ‘manufacturing activity’. In this hue, the Tribunal also referred to the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004 and in particular Rule 2(xxxii) thereof which defines ‘manufacture of gas’ to mean filling of a cylinder with any compressed gas and also includes transfer of compressed gas from one cylinder to any other cylinder. On that basis, it was concluded by the Tribunal that the activity of filling of cylinder with compressed gas amounts to ‘production’ or ‘manufacture’ for the purposes of Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA of the Act as well. The High Court has concurred with the view of the ITAT. This is how the Department is before this Court and insists that the process of bottling LPG cylinder in domestic use does not amount to manufacture.\n3) Before discussing the aforesaid central issue which has arisen for consideration, it may be noted that Section 80-I of the Act provides for certain amount of deductions in respect of profits and gains derived from an industrial undertaking or a ship or the business of a hotel or the business of repairs to ocean-going vessels or other powered craft to which the said section applies. Section 80-IA gives similar benefits to those industrial undertakings or enterprises which are engaged in infrastructure development. Section 80HH, on the other hand, entitles deduction in respect of profits and gains from a newly established undertaking or a hotel business in backward areas.\n4) As mentioned above, all the assessees are in the business of bottling LPG cylinder and according to them they are industrial undertakings and the aforesaid process amounts to production or manufacture. Since, manufacture or production of articles is sine qua non for treating these assessees as industrial undertakings and for the applicability of the aforesaid provisions, it is essential to establish that the assessees are industrial undertakings. It is in this context the question mooted above has arisen for consideration.\n5) Learned counsel appearing for the Revenue opened his arguments by referring to the order of the AO in Civil Appeal No. 9295 of 2017. He pointed out that before passing the Assessment Order, the AO had issued a questionnaire to the assessee to explain:\n(a) the process of LPG manufacturing;\n(b) activities carried out in the Bottling Plants; and\n(c) detailed submission on the issue of eligibility and allowability of such case.\n6) Insofar as process of LPG manufacturing is concerned, the AO noted that the assessee had narrated the same in the following form:\n “LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas), which is used as a fuel for domestic purposes as well as in commercial and industrial establishments is obtained by refining of crude in the crude distillation units and Catalytic Crackers of the refinery. It generally consists of butane, propane and butane and propane mixtures. In the refinery, the plant is fed with natural gas and crude oil. The feed gas and the gas undergoes a chilling up to a temperature of 22 degree centigrade and 37 degree centigrade. In the first stage, when it is chilled to 22 degree centigrade, the liquefied hydrocarbon formed is separated out and the vapour is further chilled to 37 degree centigrade.\nThe liquefied hydrocarbons from both stages are then fractionated in two stages. The heavier fractionation is obtained from the bottom of first fractionators, the top product from the second column is LPG, which is sent for bottling.” \n7) Response of the assessee to the question pertaining to activities carried out in the bottling plants was as under:\n “The LPG is generally used for commercial/industrial applications as well as for domestic applications. “While LPG is marketed to industrial customers by filling the same into the LPG tanks/tankwagens directly from the refineries, the LPG for domestic applications has to be necessarily filled into the LPG Cylinders. Unless LPG is filled into the cylinders, the same cannot be used as a domestic fuel, since LPG which is a gaseous substance in ambient temperature has to be compressed into liquefied stage, the flow of which shall be controlled by the value fitted on to the cylinder. Accordingly, in order to facilitate the convenience of handling as well as to make it usable as domestic fuel, bulk LPG from the refineries are transported to the LPG bottling plants situated in different places, (more proximate to the customers’ place) and then filled into the cylinder by a very sophisticated process. The activity carried out in the various LPG Bottling Plants are as below:\nReceipt of bulk LPG through tankers/tank wagons, its unloading and storage into spheres/bullets.\nReceipt of LPG Cylinders from manufacturers, distributors and repairers.\nReceipt of valves, regulators and consumable spare for operation/running of the plants.\nRefilling/bottling of LPG in cylinders by compressing the same into liquid.\nStorage of LPG packed cylinders.\nDespatch of packed cylinders to LPG.\nDistributors for – illegible.\nMaintenance/upkeeping of plant equipment to ensure smooth operation of plant.\nImparting necessary training to employees, contract workmen and transporters crew to ensure safe operation/handling of LPG/LPG cylinders in plant and enroot.” \n8) After taking note of reply to the aforesaid two questions, the AO proceeded to decide as to whether the assessee was an industrial undertaking and whether it is manufacturing or producing article. He noted the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Kosan Gas Company, wherein identical facts are involved, viz. the assessee therein after purchasing LPG from M/s. HPCL was refilling the same into small cylinders and the High Court held that the said process did not amount to manufacture. The AO, thereafter, dealt with the contention of the assessee predicated on Section 10A of the Act wherein explanation (iii) mentions that manufacture includes assembling as well and, therefore, assessee’s case was covered by the definition of ‘manufacture’ under Section 10A of the Act. This contention was, however, rejected by the AO by pointing out that the definition of ‘manufacture’ as given in the explanation (iii) to Section 10A of the Act is for limited purposes in the context of newly established industrial undertakings in free trade zone and the very explanation starts with the phrase ‘for the purposes of this section’. The AO further noticed that the word ‘manufacture’ is not defined in the Act. He, therefore, proceeded to turn to the legal and general definitions available elsewhere and referred to corpus juris secundum and also certain cases of this Court dealing with the issue. On that basis, the AO concluded that ‘manufacture’ can said to be a process or activity which brings into existence a new identifiable and distinctive goods and the commodity which is subjected to the process of manufacture can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but is recognised in the trade as a new and distinct commodity. The AO also referred to the legal dicta laying down the principle that the test is not whether what is produced as a result of the process carried out in the plant becomes more saleable from an otherwise less saleable article. Simply because a process carried out on a particular article adds to its value or improves its marketability on account of processes like shining, polishing, removal of impurities etc., meant by itself be sufficient to hold that the product so finished is commercially different from the one on which such a process had been carried out. The value addition, therefore, does not amount to production or manufacture. On that basis, the AO concluded that since no new product had come into existence after going through the process undertaken by the assessees and it remained the same product, namely, LPG, the process of filling up of the gas into cylinder was not a manufacturing process.\n(1992) 87 STC 236\n9) Heavily relying upon the aforesaid reasoning of the AO, the learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that this view is consistently taken in catena of judicial pronouncements and, therefore, should be accepted. He also referred to the following judgments in support of his contention: Servo-Med Industries Private Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai and Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala v. Tara Agencies.\n(2015) 14 SCC 47\n(2007) 6 SCC 429\n10) The aforesaid submissions were refuted by Mr. Tarun Gulati, learned counsel appearing for the assessee M/s. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited. He explained the LPG bottling process by pointing out that the traditional source of LPG is oil refineries where crude oil is processed. LPG vapour is one of the lighter fractions produced by oil refining and petrochemical processes. Since LPG typically consists of a mixture of propane, propylene, butane and butylene (containing 3 or 4 carbon atoms per molecule), these hydrocarbons are easily liquefied by moderate compression at ambient temperature. Unlike natural gas which can be piped to the consumer, LPG has to be transported in the liquid phase at ambient temperature and, therefore, required to be handled in specially designed pressure vessels. Once the LPG vapour is subjected to moderate pressure to achieve liquefaction, the resultant liquid must be contained within a pressurized system or a pressure vessel until it is required as gas by the consumer. In the vapour phase, LPG exists as a heavier gas and on liquefaction, its volume reduces considerably.\nSee “A Background to Liquefied Petroleum Gases, Their Sources and Safe Handling, and Safe Use as Fuels”, Advanced Petrochemicals, Dr. G.N. Sarkar.\n11) Learned counsel submitted that Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA of the Act use the expression ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’, therefore, whenever industrial undertaking is either manufacturing or producing an article, it will be entitled to the benefit of the aforesaid provisions, subject to satisfying other conditions laid down in those Sections. His argument was that the activities undertaken by the assessees in their bottling plant results in the production of a new commercial product which is made suitable for domestic use, which would otherwise not be possible without undergoing such processes. Gas produced by refineries is not usable as such by the consumer for domestic use. It requires several complex processes to bottle the gas in cylinders to make it usable by domestic consumers. After LPG is bottled in cylinders the product obtains a different name, character and use which is different from its original components. A domestic consumer identifies bottled LPG as a product different from the LPG produced in the refinery or from the empty cylinder. Even otherwise, the word ‘production’ is wider than the word ‘manufacture’ and any activity which makes a product marketable and usable to the consumer would be covered by the word ‘production’. Learned counsel referred to the judgment of this Court in Income Tax Officer v. Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd. wherein this Court has held that the word ‘production’ is wider in ambit and has a wider connotation than the word ‘manufacture’. He also sought to draw sustenance from the judgment of this Court in Vadilal Chemicals Ltd. v. State of A.P. & Ors. wherein this Court held that bottling of ammonia amounts to manufacture. He also took support from the definition of ‘manufacture of gas’ occurring in Rule 2 (xxv) of the erstwhile Gas Cylinders Rules, 1981 issued under the Explosives Act, 1881 which defines the aforesaid expression to mean filling of a cylinder with any compressed gas and also includes transfer of compressed gas from one cylinder to any other cylinder. He further pointed out that even Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004 which superseded the aforesaid Rules of 1981 contain identical definition of ‘manufacture of gas’ in Rule 2 (xxxii). His submission was that this definition itself provides legislative intent as well as that of the Central Government treating the process as manufacture of gas. Mr. Gulati also argued that for the purposes of Section 80-IB of the Act, which provides a deduction for industrial undertaking established in the North Eastern region, the Central Government has notified vide Notification No. 627(E) dated August 4, 1999, eligible industries and the following entry is relevant for the purposes of the instant appeals:\n “13. Gas based intermediate products industry manufacturing or producing –\n(i) Gas exploration and production;\n(ii) Gas distribution and bottling;\n(iii) Power generation;\n(iv) Plastics;\n(v) Yarn raw materials;\n(vi) Fertilizers;\n(vii) Methanol;\n(viii) Formal debycle and FR Resin Melamme and MF Resin;\n(ix) Methylamine, hexamethiene, tetranine, ammonium bi-carbonate;\n(x) Nitrite acid and ammonium nitrate;\n(xi) Carbon black;\n(xii) Polymer chips.\n(Emphasis Supplied)” \nIt was contended that from the above, it is clear that an undertaking engaged in bottling of gas is considered to be involved in manufacture or production for the purpose of deductions under the Act and this view has been taken by the Central Government itself.\n(2010) 320 ITR 79 (SC)\n(2005) 6 SCC 292\n12) Learned counsel argued that the findings of the Tribunal, as upheld by the High Court, were not assailed by the Department and, therefore, there was no question of law involved. He also referred to the few judgments of different High Courts which have taken the view that LPG bottling would amount to manufacture and pointed out that in those cases, no appeal was preferred by the Department. Learned counsel also endeavoured to distinguish the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Kosan Gas Company’s case as well as the judgments of this Court which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the Revenue and submitted that those judgments have no applicability. He, thus, pleaded that the appeals of the appellant/Revenue deserve to be dismissed.\n13) Mr. Parijat Sinha, who appeared for some other assessees, argued almost on the same lines.\n14) We have given adequate consideration to the respective submissions of both the parties, which they deserve. As is clear from the facts and arguments noted above, the question of law which is involved (already mentioned) is:\nWhether bottling of LPG, as undertaken by the assessee, is a process which amounts to ‘production’ or ‘manufacture’ for the purposes of Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA of the Act?; and if so, whether the respondents/assessees are entitled to claim the benefit of deduction under the aforesaid provisions while computing their taxable income?\n15) At the outset, it needs to be emphasised that the aforesaid provisions of the Act use both the expressions, namely, ‘manufacture’ as well as ‘production’. It also becomes clear after reading these provisions that an assessee whose process amounts to either ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ (i.e. one of these two and not both) would become entitled to the benefits enshrined therein. It is held by this Court in Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd. case that the word ‘production’ is wider than the word ‘manufacture’. The two expressions, thus, have different connotation. Significantly, Arihant Tiles judgment decides that cutting of marble blocks into marble slabs does not amount to manufacture. At the same time, it clarifies that it would be relevant for the purpose of the Central Excise Act. When it comes to interpreting Section 80-IA of the Act (which was involved in the said case), the Court was categorical in pointing out that the aforesaid interpretation of ‘manufacture’ in the context of Central Excise Act would not apply while interpreting Section 80-IA of the Act as this provision not only covers those assessees which are involved in the process of manufacture but also those who are undertaking ‘production’ of the goods. Taking note of the judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax, Goa v. Sesa Goa Ltd. which was rendered in the context of Section 32A of the Act and which provision also applies in respect of ‘production’, the Court reiterated the ratio in Sesa Goa Ltd. to hold that the word ‘production’ was wider than the word ‘manufacture’. On that basis, finding arrived at by the Court was that though cutting of marble blocks into marble slabs did not amount to ‘manufacture’, if there are various stages through which marble blocks are subjected to before they become polished slabs and tiles, such activity would certainly be treated as ‘production’ for the purpose of Section 80-IA of the Act. In this context, relevant discussion contained in Arihant Tiles case needs to be reproduced, which is as under:\n “16. In the present case, we have extracted in detail the process undertaken by each of the respondents before us. In the present case, we are not concerned only with cutting of marble blocks into slabs. In the present case we are also concerned with the activity of polishing and ultimate conversion of blocks into polished slabs and tiles. What we find from the process indicated hereinabove is that there are various stages through which the blocks have to go through before they become polished slabs and tiles. In the circumstances, we are of the view that on the facts of the cases in hand, there is certainly an activity which will come in the category of “manufacture” or “production” under Section 80-IA of the Income Tax Act.\n17. As stated hereinabove, the judgment of this Court in Aman Marble Industries (P) Ltd. [(2005) 1 SCC 279 : (2003) 157 ELT 393] was not required to construe the word “production” in addition to the word “manufacture”. One has to examine the scheme of the Act also while deciding the question as to whether the activity constitutes manufacture or production. Therefore, looking to the nature of the activity stepwise, we are of the view that the subject activity certainly constitutes “manufacture or production” in terms of Section 80-IA.\n18. In this connection, our view is also fortified by the following judgments of this Court which have been fairly pointed out to us by learned counsel appearing for the Department.\n19. In CIT v. Sesa Goa Ltd. [(2004) 13 SCC 548 : (2004) 271 ITR 331], the meaning of the word “production” came up for consideration. The question which came before this Court was whether ITAT was justified in holding that the assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 32-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in respect of machinery used in mining activity ignoring the fact that the assessee was engaged in extraction and processing of iron ore, not amounting to manufacture or production of any article or thing.\n20. The High Court in Sesa Goa case [(2004) 13 SCC 548 : (2004) 271 ITR 331], while dismissing the appeal preferred by the Revenue, held that extraction and processing of iron ore did not amount to “manufacture”. However, it came to the conclusion that extraction of iron ore and the various processes would involve “production” within the meaning of Section 32-A(2)(b)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and consequently, the assessee was entitled to the benefit of investment allowance under Section 32-A of the Income Tax Act. In that matter, it was argued on behalf of the Revenue that extraction and processing of iron ore did not produce any new product whereas it was argued on behalf of the assessee that it did produce a distinct new product.\n21. The view expressed by the High Court that the activity in question constituted “production” has been affirmed by this Court in Sesa Goa case [(2004) 13 SCC 548 : (2004) 271 ITR 331] saying that the High Court's opinion was unimpeachable. It was held by this Court that the word “production” is wider in ambit and it has a wider connotation than the word “manufacture”. It was held that while every manufacture can constitute production, every production did not amount to manufacture.\n22. In our view, applying the tests laid down by this Court in Sesa Goa case [(2004) 13 SCC 548 : (2004) 271 ITR 331] and applying it to the activities undertaken by the respondents herein, reproduced hereinabove, it is clear that the said activities would come within the meaning of the word “production”.” \n(2004) 271 ITR 331 (SC)\n16) Keeping the aforesaid distinction in mind, let us take note of the process of LPG bottling that is undertaken by the assessees herein and about which there is no dispute. It has come on record that specific activities at assessees’ plant include receiving bulk LPG vapour from the oil refinery, unloading the LPG vapour, compression of the LPG vapour, loading of the LPG in liquefied form into bullets, followed by cylinder filling operations. The stages of these activities are as under:\n(a)Bulk LPG is received in the bottling plant through road tankers/rail wagons;\n(b) The LPG is unloaded into spheres/bullets through LPG compressors which use variable levels of pressure for suction, unloading and vapour recovery;\n(c) Refilling/bottling of LPG in cylinders by compressing the same into liquid form; and\n(d) Capping, fixing of seals and safety valves prior to storage and loading of filled cylinders.\n17) Thus, after the bottling activities at the assessees’ plants, LPG is stored in cylinders in liquefied form under pressure. When the cylinder valve is opened and the gas is withdrawn from the cylinder, the pressure falls and the liquid boils to return to gaseous state. This is how LPG is made suitable for domestic use by customers who will not be able to use LPG in its vapour form as produced in the oil refinery. It, therefore, becomes apparent that the LPG obtained from the refinery undergoes a complex technical process in the assessees’ plants and is clearly distinguishable from the LPG bottled in cylinders and cleared from these plants for domestic use by customers. It may be relevant to point out that keeping in view the aforesaid process, the ITAT arrived at the specific findings in support of its decision, which are as under:\n(a) There is no dispute that the LPG produced in the refinery cannot be directly supplied to the consumer for domestic use because of various reasons of handling, storage and safety.\n(b) LPG bottling is a highly technical and complex activity which requires precise functions of machines operated by technically expert personnel.\n(c) Bottling of LPG is an essential process for rendering the product marketable and usable for the end customer.\n(d)The word ‘production’ has a wider connotation in comparison to ‘manufacture’, and any activity which brings a commercially new product into existence constitutes production. The process of bottling of LPG renders it capable of being marketed as a domestic kitchen fuel and, thereby, makes it a viable commercial product.\n18) In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid activity would definitely fall within the expression ‘production’. We agree with the submission of the learned counsels for the assessees that the definition of ‘manufacture of gas’ in Rule 2 (xxxii) of the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004 also supports the case of the assessees inasmuch as gas distribution and bottling is treated as manufacturing or producing gas. We are also inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the assesses that various High Courts have, from time to time, decided that bottling of gas into cylinder amounts to production and, therefore, claim of deduction under Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA would be admissible. Another important aspect which was highlighted by learned counsels for the assessees was that identical issue whether bottling of gas into cylinder amounts to production for claim of deduction under the Act has been considered by various High Courts and decided in the affirmative but those decisions were not challenged by the Department. The cases specifically referred were M/s. Puttur Petro Products Pvt. Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Mangalore and Central U.P. Gas Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur.\n(2014) 361 ITR 290\nIncome Tax Appeal No. 224 of 2014 decided by High Court of Allahabad and reported in MANU/UP/2895/2016.\n19) From the submissions made by learned counsel for the Revenue, who banked on the reasoning given by the AO, it can be gathered that the entire thrust of the AO was that the process involved in filling up the gas into cylinders does not amount to ‘manufacture’ inasmuch as the said process does not bring into existence a new identifiable and distinctive goods. In the first instance, no distinction was drawn between manufacture and production and the matter was not looked into from the angle as to whether the aforesaid process would amount to production or not. Other reason which prevailed with the AO and which was also the argument of the learned counsel for the Revenue was that, on identical facts, the Gujarat High Court had held that refilling the LPG after purchasing from M/s. HPCL into small cylinders would not amount to manufacture. That was a case which was decided in the context of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969. The Court held that transfer of LPG from bulk containers into cylinders did not amount to process of manufacture. It is pertinent to point out that Section 2(16) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 defines ‘manufacture’ and, therefore, the entire case was examined keeping in view the said definition of ‘manufacture’ and the issue was as to whether the process amounted to manufacture or not. As pointed out above, the question as to whether it amounts to ‘production’ as well did not arise for consideration. The AO committed manifest error in relying upon the said decision inasmuch as the provisions with which we are concerned in the instant case use the words ‘manufacture or production’ and are not limited to ‘manufacture’ alone.\n20) Judgment in the cases of Servo-Med Industries Private Limited and Tara Agencies, which were cited by the learned counsel for the Revenue, may not apply to the present case. They dealt with the provision of the Central Excise Act and, therefore, test of ‘manufacture’ propounded on that case would not be applicable when dealing with the cases under the provisions of Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA of the Act which use both the expressions ‘manufacture’ and ‘production’. It has already been clarified in Vadilal Chemicals Ltd. judgment. Insofar as judgment in Tara Agencies is concerned, the factual scenario therein was totally different where three different stages in relation to tea were examined by this Court. The Court held that the procedure of blending of different qualities of tea would amount to ‘processing of tea’ and it did not amount to ‘manufacture or production of tea’. Here, the case set up by the assessees is not that bottling of LPG is ‘processing’ as distinguished from ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’. We may, at this juncture, refer to the judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Vinbros and Company where bottling and blending of alcohol is held to be ‘manufacture or production’ for the purpose of Section 80-IB of the Act.\n(2015) 14 SCC 483\n21) We, thus, find that the view of the ITAT as affirmed by the High Court is correct and, therefore, there is no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -2988,26 +2988,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S024", - "case_id": "1101", - "experiment": "baseline_cot", - "model": "qwen3-8b-noreason", - "source_file": "S024__baseline_cot__qwen3-8b-noreason__1101.json", + "case_id": "3086", + "experiment": "baseline_firac", + "model": "gpt-oss-120b", + "source_file": "S024__baseline_firac__gpt-oss-120b__3086.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/05/1996", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "judgment_date": "03/08/2017", + "machine_error_stage": "conclusion", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Wrong legal test / threshold" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO.4465 of 2005 | Union Of India & Ors. v. Ex-Gnr Ajeet Singh | 02/04/2013", - "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO.4465 of 2005 | Union Of India & Ors. v. Ex-Gnr Ajeet Singh", - "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The respondent was enrolled in the Army on December 15, 2000. Between February 26, 2002, and September 27, 2002, he committed several offences, including absence without leave and theft of arms and ammunition, some of which occurred after he turned 18 on April 20, 2002. He was apprehended on October 4, 2002, with stolen arms. Following proceedings, including a Court of Inquiry and summary of evidence, he was charged under the Army Act. Initially pleading not guilty, he later changed his plea to guilty for all six charges. A General Court Martial (GCM) awarded him dismissal from service and 7 years rigorous imprisonment on April 3, 2003, which was confirmed by the Chief of Army Staff. The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court, arguing that the joint trial of offences committed as a juvenile and as an adult vitiated the entire GCM proceedings. The High Court agreed, quashing the punishment but allowing a fresh GCM for offences committed after attaining majority. The Army (appellant) appealed this decision.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts \n1. The respondent enlisted in the Army on 15 December 2000. \n2. Between 26 February 2002 and 27 September 2002 he committed a series of offences – notably absence without leave (AWL) and theft of arms and ammunition. \n3. The respondent attained the age of majority on 20 April 2002; consequently some of the offences were committed while he was a minor and some after he became an adult. \n4. He was arrested on 4 October 2002 in possession of the stolen weapons. \n5. A Court of Inquiry was held, a summary of evidence was prepared and the respondent was charged under the Army Act for six distinct offences. \n6. At the General Court Martial (GCM) he initially entered a not‑guilty plea but subsequently pleaded guilty to all six charges. \n7. The GCM, on 3 April 2003, sentenced him to dismissal from service and to rigorous imprisonment for seven years; the sentence was confirmed by the Chief of Army Staff. \n8. The respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court contending that the joint trial of offences committed while he was a juvenile and offences committed after he became an adult vitiated the GCM proceedings. \n9. The High Court agreed, quashed the sentence and ordered that a fresh GCM be held only for the offences committed after the respondent attained majority, leaving the juvenile offences to be dealt with under the appropriate juvenile procedure. \n10. The Army (the appellant) filed an appeal against the High Court’s order.\n\n### Issues \n1. Whether the trial of the respondent for offences committed both as a minor and as an adult in a single General Court Martial violates the statutory provisions governing the trial of juvenile offenders under the Army Act (or the applicable military‑justice legislation). \n2. Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the original GCM conviction and directing a fresh trial limited to the post‑majority offences, thereby annulling the dismissal and imprisonment awarded. \n\n### Rules \n1. **Statutory provision on juvenile offenders in the Armed Forces** – The Army Act (or the relevant military‑justice code) provides that any person who is a minor at the time an offence is committed shall be tried in accordance with the *Juvenile Justice* provisions, which prescribe a separate, less severe procedure and preclude the imposition of the full adult penal regime (e.g., dismissal from service, rigorous imprisonment). \n2. **Section 9 of the Army Act (or equivalent)** – Stipulates that when a service‑person commits distinct offences at different ages, each offence must be tried according to the law applicable at the time of its commission; a single court‑martial cannot concurrently apply adult and juvenile procedures. \n3. **Doctrine of *nulla poena sine lege* and *fair trial* guarantees** – A conviction that amalgamates juvenile and adult offences in a single proceeding infringes the principle that the accused must be tried under the law applicable to each individual offence. \n4. **Precedent – *State v. R. M.* (2005) 4 SCC 123** – The Supreme Court held that a soldier who committed offences both before and after attaining majority could not be tried in a single court‑martial; the juvenile offences must be remitted to a juvenile board, and only the adult offences may be tried by a General Court Martial. \n5. **Precedent – *Army v. K. S.* (2010) 7 SCC 512** – The Court upheld the High Court’s power to quash a military sentence where procedural non‑compliance (including improper joinder of juvenile offences) rendered the trial infirm. \n6. **Appellate jurisdiction** – Under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 31 of the Army Act, the High Court’s decision is reviewable on limited grounds of jurisdiction, error of law, or procedural irregularity. \n\n### Analysis \n1. **Application of Rule 1 & Rule 2 to Facts** – Facts 2‑3 show that the respondent was a minor for the offences committed up to 20 April 2002 and an adult thereafter. By trying him for all six charges in a single GCM (Fact 6), the trial ignored the statutory requirement that juvenile offences be dealt with under the juvenile procedure. Hence, the joint trial contravenes the mandatory statutory segregation (Rule 1 & 2). \n\n2. **Consistency with Precedent** – The situation is squarely covered by *State v. R. M.* (Rule 4), where the Supreme Court declared such a joint trial invalid and ordered separate proceedings. The High Court’s approach mirrors that precedent, reinforcing its correctness. \n\n3. **Fair‑trial and *nulla poena sine lege* considerations** – By imposing adult‑type penalties (dismissal, seven‑year rigorous imprisonment) for offences committed while the respondent was a minor, the GCM breached the principle that punishment must correspond to the law in force at the time of the offence (Rule 3). This further substantiates the High Court’s quashing of the sentence. \n\n4. **Effect of the High Court’s order** – Under *Army v. K. S.* (Rule 5), a High Court may set aside a military conviction where procedural defects are fatal. The order to conduct a fresh GCM only for post‑majority offences is a permissible remedial measure, not a usurpation of military discretion. \n\n5. **Scope of the appellant’s challenge** – The appellant’s appeal rests solely on the claim that the High Court erred in its interpretation of the juvenile‑trial provisions. Given the clear statutory language (Rule 1) and the controlling Supreme Court precedent (Rule 4), the appellant’s contention lacks merit. Moreover, the appellate court’s jurisdiction to review the High Court’s decision on a question of law is well‑founded (Rule 6). \n\n6. **No indication of any other error** – The record does not reveal any procedural lapse by the High Court other than the contested point, and the High Court supplied an appropriate remedy. Accordingly, the appeal fails on the merits. \n\n### Conclusion \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court correctly held that the joint trial of juvenile and adult offences violated the statutory and jurisprudential requirements, and its order directing a fresh General Court Martial for the post‑majority offences is lawful. The Army’s conviction and sentence are therefore set aside, and the matter shall proceed, if at all, with a separate trial of the offences committed after the respondent attained majority.", - "reference_judgment": "1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order, dated 8.3.2004, passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (Civil) No.8573 of 2003 by way of which the High Court has set aside the order dated 3.4.2003 passed by the General Court Martial (hereinafter referred to as ‘GCM’), that had awarded the punishment of dismissal from service and 7 years rigorous imprisonment (hereinafter referred to as ‘RI’) to the respondent. The High Court held that, under the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the JJ Act’) the respondent could not be tried by GCM for the charges related to the period when he was juvenile and therefore, the GCM proceedings stood vitiated in entirety. However, the High Court has given liberty to the appellant to hold a fresh GCM, on the charges related to offences committed by the respondent after he attained the age of 18 years.\n2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:-\nA. The respondent was enrolled in the Army on15.12.2000, and was posted to 77 Medium Regiment. He absented himself without leave from 26.2.2002 to 8.3.2002 i.e. (11 days). The respondent, while on Sentry duty on 17/18.3.2002 at the Ammunition Dump of the said Regiment, committed theft of 30 Grenades Hand No.36 High Explosive and 160 rounds of 5.56 MM INSAS. The respondent once again absented himself without leave from 12.6.2002 to 2.9.2002 (81 days). The respondent absented himself without leave from 4.9.2002 to 26.9.2002 (23 days) yet again. The respondent also committed theft of a Carbine Machine Gun 9 MM on 27.9.2002. He was apprehended by the Railway Police Phulera (Rajasthan) with the said Carbine Machine Gun, and an FIR No.56/2002 was registered by the Railway Police on 4.10.2002.\nB. On 11.10.2002, the respondent was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur, who passed an order for handing over the respondent to the Military Authorities, and it was later at his instance that the buried, stolen ammunition i.e. 30 Grenades and 5.56 MM INSAS rounds were recovered on 13.10.2002. A Court of Inquiry was ordered and summary of evidence was recorded.\nC. The chargesheet was served upon the respondent on 11.3.2003, and it contained six charges, under the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as `the Army Act’). After the conclusion of the GCM proceedings, the respondent was awarded punishment vide order dated 3.4.2003, as has been referred to hereinabove.\nD. The sentence awarded in the GCM was confirmed by the Competent Authority, i.e. Chief of the Army Staff, while dealing with the petition under Section 164(2) of the Army Act. After such confirmation of sentence, the respondent was handed over to the civil jail at Agra to serve out the sentence. The respondent filed a post confirmation petition against the said order of punishment.\nE. During the pendency of the post confirmation petition, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court, challenging the said order dated 3.4.2003, mainly on the ground that he was a juvenile at the time of some of the charged offences and in view of the provisions of the JJ Act, the joint trial of those offences that he had allegedly committed as a juvenile and other offences that he had allegedly committed after attaining majority had vitiated the GCM proceedings in entirety.\nF. The appellant contested the said writ petition on the grounds that some of the offences with which the respondent had been charged, were of very serious nature, and they had been committed by the respondent after attaining the age of 18 years. Moreover, the respondent had not raised the plea of juvenility when the GCM proceedings were in progress.\nG. The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the aforesaid punishment, and holding that the entire GCM proceeding stood vitiated, as the GCM could not be held for the offences alleged to have been committed by him as a juvenile. The High Court, therefore, directed release of the respondent forthwith. However, in relation to particular charges that were related to offences committed by him after attaining the age of 18 years, the appellant was given liberty to proceed in accordance with law against him de novo.\nHence, this appeal.\n3. Shri Paras Kuhad, learned ASG appearing for the appellants, has submitted that the High Court has committed an error by holding that the entire GCM proceedings stood vitiated, for the reason that serious offences had been committed by the respondent after attaining the age of 18 years, and that at least with respect to such specific charges, the GCM proceeding could not be considered to have been vitiated. Additionally, even if the High Court had observed that the respondent was a juvenile at the time of some of the charged offences at most the sentence could have been quashed; the conviction should have been sustained. Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.\n4. Per contra, Shri S.M. Dalal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has opposed the appeal contending that the High Court has taken into consideration all relevant facts and law, particularly the provisions of the JJ Act, and has interpreted the same in correct perspective, because the GCM could not have been conducted for charges relating to offences that the respondent had committed as a juvenile, owing to which, the entire proceedings stood vitiated. Therefore, no interference with the impugned judgment is called for.\n5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.\n6. Relevant parts of the chargesheet issued to the respondent read as under:-\ni) Charged under Army Act Section 52(a)- theft of 30 Grenade Hand No.36 High Explosive and160 rounds of 5.56 MM INSAS on 17/18.3.2002.\nii) Charged under Army Act Section 52(a) - theft of carbine machine gun 9 MM on 27.9.2002.\niii) Charged under Army Act Section 39(a) – absent from duty without leave from 26.2.2002 to 8.3.2002.\niv) Charged under Army Act Section 39(a) – absent from duty without leave from 12.6.2002 to 2.9.2002.\nv) Charged under Army Act Section 39(a) – absent from duty without leave from 4.9.2002 to 27.9.2002.\nvi) Charged under Army Act Section 69 – possessing counterfeit seal with intent to commit forgery contrary to Section 473 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as `IPC’).\n7. We have summoned the original record of the GCM proceeding that makes it clear that the respondent was provided with a defense counsel, namely, Dr. Balbir Singh, a practicing advocate at the aforesaid GCM proceedings. Secondly, it also becomes clear that no witness was called in the defence by the accused. Thirdly, it is evident that he did not cross examine the court witnesses, and thus Rule 141(2) and 142(2) of the Army Rules were complied with. Upon being asked in question 16 whether the accused wanted to address the Court, he answered in the affirmative and stated:\n “……… that I am really ashamed of my acts and really regret my acts. The past seven months I have been attached to this Regiment and the misery and embarrassment which I am undergoing is more than a punishment. My family is also dependent on me for a permanent source of income. I have a younger sister whose marriage’s responsibility is also on my shoulders. I am a soldier and have just started my career. I request the Honourable Judges to have mercy on me and give me a chance to serve, I shall never repeat such acts. I further request the Honourable Judges not to close all the ends of my career and life at this early age of service and give mea chance to redeem my prestige as well as keep up the aspirations of my parents.” \n8. Furthermore, it is evident from the record that the respondent had confessed before the Commanding Officer with respect to having stolen the arms and ammunition as mentioned in the chargesheet. It was the information furnished by him that led to the recovery of the stolen ammunition. He had also admitted to having sold 140 rounds of 156 mm INSAS to a civilian named Wasim Ali, for a sum of Rupees 30, 000, though he later asserted that he had fabricated these details.\nIn his prayer for mitigation of punishment, the respondent has stated that he was only 22 years of age, and that his entire life lay before him. His parents were old, and that he was the sole bread earner of the house. He had the responsibility of getting his sister married. From the initial stages of the proceeding, he had admitted to his crimes, and that any mistake he had made was only because of his immaturity. Further, he stated that he understood the serious nature of his crime.\n9. The original record of the proceeding reveals that the respondent had initially pleaded not guilty to all 6 charges that had been framed against him. It was only on the 1st of April, 2003, during the examination of the fifth witness for the prosecution (Major S.R. Gulia), the respondent had requested for grant of audience for defence. At that stage, he had stated:\n “I wish to withdraw my plea of ‘Not Guilty’, and to plead ‘Guilty’ to all six charges, as are contained in the charge sheet (B-2) against me, and therefore, that the Prosecution Witness present before the Court, may please be allowed to retire.” \nHe further stated that he had wanted to accept his guilt from the very beginning of the Court Martial, but had been misguided by his parents and other relatives to plead ‘Not Guilty’.\nAt this point, the Judge Advocate changed the plea of the accused from ‘Not Guilty’ to ‘Guilty’, and referred to Rules 52(2) and (2A); 54 and 55 Army Rules. It was duly pointed out by the Judge Advocate that the accused had the right to change his plea at any point during the trial, so long as the effect of doing so is properly explained to him.\n10. Undoubtedly, given the date of birth of the respondent as per the service record is 20.4.1984, he attained 18 years of age on 20.4.2002. Accordingly, the charge nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6 relate to offences that the respondent committed after attaining the age of 18 years. Admittedly, during the GCM proceeding, the respondent did not raise the plea of being a juvenile, even though he was a juvenile at the time of commission of some of the offences.\n11. The relevant Army Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as `Army Rules’), which may be attracted in this appeal read as under:-\n “51. Special plea to the jurisdiction. — (1) The accused, before pleading to a charge, may offer a special plea to the general jurisdiction of the court, and if he does so, and the court considers that anything stated in such plea shows that the court has no jurisdiction it shall receive any evidence offered in support, together with any evidence offered by the prosecutor in disproof or qualification thereof, and, any address by or on behalf of the accused and reply by the prosecutor in reference thereto.\nxx xx xx xx\n52. General plea of “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”\n(1) ……..\n(2) If an accused person pleads “Guilty”, that plea shall be recorded as the finding of the court; but before it is recorded, the presiding officer or judge-advocate, on behalf of the court, shall ascertain that the accused understands the nature of the charge to which he has pleaded guilty and shall inform him of the general effect of that plea, and in particular of the meaning of the charge to which he has pleaded guilty, and of the difference in procedure which will be made by the plea of guilty, and shall advise him to withdraw that plea if it appears from the summary of evidence that the accused ought to plead “Not Guilty”.\nxx xx xx xx\n65. Sentence. - The Court shall award a single sentence in respect of all the offences of which the accused is found guilty, and such sentence shall be deemed to be awarded in respect of the offences in each charge in respect of which it can be legally given and not to be awarded in respect of any offence in a charge in respect of which it cannot be legally given.\n72. Mitigation of sentence on partial confirmation. -\n(1) ………\n(2) Where a sentence has been awarded by a court-martial in respect of offences in several charges and has been confirmed, and any one or such charges the finding thereon is found to be invalid, the authority having power to mitigate, remit, or commute the punishment awarded by the sentence shall take into consideration the fact of such invalidity, and if it seems just, mitigate, remit or commute the punishment awarded according as it seems just, having regard to the offences in the charges which with the findings thereon are not invalid, and the punishment as so modified shall be as valid as if it had been originally awarded only in respect of those offences.\n79. Separate charge-sheets. —\n(1) xx xx xx\n(2) xx xx xx\n(3) xx xx xx\n(4) xx xx xx\n(5) Where a charge-sheet contains more than one charge, the accused may, before pleading, claim to be tried separately in respect of any charge or charges in that charge-sheet, on the ground that he will be embarrassed in his defence if he is not so tried separately; and in such case the court unless they think his claim unreasonable, shall arraign and try the accused in like manner as if the convening officer had inserted the said charge or charges in different charge-sheets.” \n(Emphasis added)\n12. Unfortunately, the attention of the High Court was not drawn to the aforesaid relevant rules and to the scope of their application to the facts of the present case. The High Court has decided the case in a laconic manner, without considering the gravity of the charges against the respondent and without deliberating on whether, in light of such a fact-situation, any prejudice had been caused to the respondent. Questions with respect to whether there has been any failure of justice in the present case and whether in light of the facts of the case, the entire GCM proceedings actually stood vitiated, as the respondent indeed could not be tried by the GCM for those charges that had been committed when the respondent was a juvenile.\n13. Though the case is labeled as a civil appeal, in fact it is purely a criminal case. GCM is a substitute of a criminal trial. Thus, the case ought to have been examined by the High Court keeping in mind, the principles/ law applicable in a criminal trial. The respondent is governed by the Army Act and Army Rules, and not by the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the `Cr.P.C.’). However, Cr.P.C. basically deals with procedural matters to ensure compliance of the principles of natural justice etc. Thus, the principles enshrined therein may provide guidelines with respect to the misjoinder of charges and a joint trial for various distinct charges/offences as there are similar provisions in the Army Rules. Section 464 Cr.P.C., provides that a finding or sentence would not be invalid merely because there has been a omission or error in framing the charges or misjoinder of charges, unless a “failure of justice” has in fact been occasioned.\n14. In Birichh Bhuian & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1120, this Court has held, that a case of misjoinder of charges is merely an irregularity which can be cured, and that the same is not an illegality which would render the proceedings void. The court should not interfere with the sentence or conviction passed by a court of competent jurisdiction on such grounds, unless the same has occasioned a failure of justice, and the person aggrieved satisfies the court that his cause has in fact been prejudiced in some way.\nA similar view has also been reiterated in Kamalanantha & Ors. v. State of T.N., AIR 2005 SC 2132; and State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 372.\n15. The JJ Act that came into force on 1.4.2001 repealed the JJ Act 1986, and provides that a juvenile will be a person who is below 18 years of age.\nSection 6 of the JJ Act contains a non-obstante clause, giving overriding effect to any other law for the time being in force. It also provides that the Juvenile Justice Board, where it has been constituted, shall “have the power to deal exclusively” with all the proceedings, relating to juveniles under the Act, that are in conflict with other laws. Moreover, non-obstante clauses contained in various provisions thereof, particularly Sections 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20, render unambiguously, the legislative intent behind the JJ Act, i.e. of the same being a special law that would have an overriding effect on any other statute, for the time being in force. Such a view stands further fortified, in view of the provisions of Sections 29 and 37, that provide for the constitution of Child Welfare Committee, which provides for welfare of children in all respects, including their rehabilitation.\n16. Clause (n) of Section 2 of the JJ Act defines ‘offence’, as an offence punishable under any law for the time being in force. Thus, the said provision does not make any distinction between an offence punishable under the IPC or one that is punishable under any local or special law.\n17. The provisions of the JJ Act have been interpreted by this Court time and again, and it has been clearly explained that raising the age of “juvenile” to 18 years from 16 years would apply retrospectively. It is also clear that the plea of juvenility can be raised at any time, even after the relevant judgment/order has attained finality and even if no such plea had been raised earlier. Furthermore, it is the date of the commission of the offence, and not the date of taking cognizance or of framing of charges or of the conviction, that is to be taken into consideration. Moreover, where the plea of juvenility has not been raised at the initial stage of trial and has been taken only on the appellate stage, this Court has consistently maintained the conviction, but has set aside the sentence. (See: Jayendra & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 685; Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1984 SC 237; Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P., AIR 1989 SC 1329; Umesh Singh & Anr. v. State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 2111; Akbar Sheikh & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 7 SCC 415; Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2009) 13 SCC 211; Babla @ Dinesh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2012) 8 SCC 800 and Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489).\n18. So far as the joint trial of the charges is concerned, as the offences committed by the respondent after attaining majority were of a very serious nature, and in view of the provisions of Rule 65 of the Army Rules, only composite (single) sentence is permissible, the High Court could substitute the punishment considering the gravity of the offences committed by the respondent after attaining 18 years of age. But there was no occasion for the High Court to observe that the entire GCM proceeding stood vitiated.\n19. The maximum punishment for absence from duty without leave, under Section 39(a) of the Army Act, is 3 years RI. For any offence committed under Section 52(a), the maximum punishment is 10 years RI; and under Section 69, the maximum punishment is 7 years RI. After considering the entirety of the circumstances, in view of the provisions contained in Rule 65 of the Army Rules, the respondent was awarded the punishment of 7 years RI for all the charges proved. Though for the 2nd charge alone, the respondent could have been awarded 10 years RI; for the 4th and 5th charges, he could have been awarded a sentence of 3 years RI on each count; and for charge no. 6, a punishment of 7 years RI could have been imposed.\n20. So far as the failure of justice is concerned, this Court in Darbara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 840, held that:\n “Failure of justice” is an extremely pliable or facile expression, which can be made to fit into any situation in any case. The court must endeavour to find the truth. There would be “failure of justice”; not only by unjust conviction, but also by acquittal of the guilty, as a result of unjust failure to produce requisite evidence. Of course, the rights of the accused have to be kept in mind and also safeguarded, but they should not be overemphasised to the extent of forgetting that the victims also have rights. It has to be shown that the accused has suffered some disability or detriment in respect of the protections available to him under the Indian criminal jurisprudence. “Prejudice” is incapable of being interpreted in its generic sense and applied to criminal jurisprudence. The plea of prejudice has to be in relation to investigation or trial, and not with respect to matters falling outside their scope. Once the accused is able to show that there has been serious prejudice caused to him, with respect to either of these aspects, and that the same has defeated the rights available to him under criminal jurisprudence, then the accused can seek benefit under the orders of the court.” \n(Emphasis added)\n(See also: Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622; Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 3114; Rattiram & Ors. v. State of M.P., AIR 2012 SC 1485; and Bhimanna v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2012 SC 3026)\n21. In Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P., AIR 2012 SC 1979, this court dealt with the issue of the liberal approach adopted by the court to grant an unwarranted acquittal, and held that while dealing with a criminal case, it is a matter of paramount importance for any court to ensure that the mis-carriage of justice be avoided in all circumstances. (See also: Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 3617; and S. Ganesan v. Rama Raghuraman & Ors., (2011) 2 SCC 83)\n22. The expression “failure of justice” would appear, sometimes, as an etymological chameleon. The Court has to examine whether there is really a failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure, not technicalities of law can stand in its way. Even the law bends before justice. The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that the “guilty should be punished” and that technicalities and irregularities, which do not occasion the “failure of justice”; are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end as this would be counter-productive. “Courts exist to dispense justice, not to dispense with justice. And, the justice to be dispensed, is not palm-tree justice or idiosyncratic justice”. Law is not an escape route for law breakers. If this is allowed, this may lead to greater injustice than upholding the rule of law. The guilty man, therefore, should be punished, and in case substantial justice has been done, it should not be defeated when pitted against technicalities. (Vide : Ramesh Kumar v. Ram Kumar & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 1929; S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka,1993 Supp (4) SCC 595; State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1660; and Shaman Saheb M. Multani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 921)\n23. In Delhi Administration v. Gurudeep Singh Uban, AIR 2000 SC 3737, this Court observed that justice is an illusion as the meaning and definition of ‘justice’ vary from person to person and party to party. A party feels that it has got justice only and only if it succeeds before the court, though it may not have a justifiable claim. (See also: Girimallappa v. Special Land Acquisition Officer M & MIP & Anr., AIR 2012 SC 3101)\nJustice is the virtue by which the Society/Court/Tribunal gives a man his due, opposed to injury or wrong.\nJustice is an act of rendering what is right and equitable towards one who has suffered a wrong. Therefore, while tempering justice with mercy, the Court must be very conscious, that it has to do justice in exact conformity with some obligatory law, for the reason that human actions are found to be just or unjust on the basis of whether the same are in conformity with, or in opposition to, the law.\n24. Rule 51 of the Army Rules requires that the accused must raise the objection in respect of jurisdiction at an early stage of the commencement of proceedings. Had the respondent raised the issue of juvenility at the appropriate stage, the authority conducting the GCM could have dropped the charges in respect of offences committed by him as a juvenile. Further, Rule 72 provides for mitigation of sentence in case of invalidity in framing of charges or on finding thereon.\nThe respondent pleaded guilty to all the offences, though at a belated stage. As a member of the Indian Army, the respondent was duty bound to protect the nation. Regrettably, however, his conduct reminds one of situations when the “legislator becomes the transgressor” and the “fence eats the crops”. Put simply, he abused the nation instead of protecting it. Therefore, his conduct had been unpardonable and not worthy of being a soldier.\n25. At the cost of repetition, it may be observed that after attaining 18 years of age, the respondent committed four serious offences; he could have been punished with 10 years’ RI for the 2nd charge, 7 years’ RI for the 6th charge and 3 years’ RI on each count for the 4th and 5th charges. Further, there had been a joint trial, and in view of the provisions of Rule 65, a composite sentence of 7 years RI had been imposed.\n26. Undoubtedly, each charge had been in respect of a separate and distinct offence. Each charge could have been tried separately. Thus, the trial by way of a GCM remained partly valid. The offences committed by the respondent after attaining the age of 18 years, were not a part of the same transaction i.e. related to the offences committed by him as a juvenile. Nor were the same were so intricately intertwined that the same could not be separated from one another. Thus, invalidity of part of the order could not render the GCM proceedings invalid in entirety. Therefore, the valid part of the proceedings is required to be saved by applying the principle of severability of offences.\n27. The respondent could have asked for a separate trial of different charges as provided under Rule 79. However, in that case the punishment would have been much more severe, as all the sentences could not run concurrently. In fact, the respondent has benefited from the joint trial of all the charges and thus, by no means can he claim that his cause stood prejudiced by resorting to such a course. The High Court ought to have taken a cue from Rule 72 of the Army Rules for the purpose of deciding the case, as the same provides for mitigation of sentence in the event that a charge or finding thereon is found to be invalid, as the respondent could not have been tried by a GCM for the offences that had been committed by him as a juvenile, keeping in view the provisions of Rule 65 thereof.\nThus, considering the nature of service of the respondent, the gravity of offences committed by him after attaining the age of 18 years and the totality of the circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that grant of relief to the respondent, even on the principles of “justice, equity, and good conscience”; was not permissible.\n28. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds, and is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court impugned herein, is set aside and the order of conviction recorded by the GCM is restored. However, in light of the facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence imposed by the GCM is reduced to five years. There shall be no order as to costs.", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4412 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.27082 of 2012) | Hitendra Singh S/O Bhupendra Singh & Ors. v. Dr. P.D. Krishi Vidyapeeth By Reg. & Ors. | 04/04/2014", + "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4412 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.27082 of 2012) | Hitendra Singh S/O Bhupendra Singh & Ors. v. Dr. P.D. Krishi Vidyapeeth By Reg. & Ors.", + "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "case_record": "The Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh Krishi Vidyapeeth advertised 24 posts for Senior Research Assistants (SRAs) and 37 for Junior Research Assistants (JRAs). Despite receiving 3214 applications for 61 posts, the university appointed 131 individuals (76 SRAs and 55 JRAs). The selection process allocated 40 marks for qualifications/experience and 60 for viva-voce. Following complaints about irregularities, several writ petitions were filed. The Chancellor, invoking Section 11 of the Maharashtra Agriculture Universities Act, 1983, appointed Justice H.W. Dhabe to inquire into the selection process. Justice Dhabe's report, submitted after 3.5 years, detailed numerous illegalities and irregularities, including improper interview procedures, faulty marking criteria, favouritism, non-compliance with reservation policies, and manipulation of selection lists. The report concluded that the entire selection process was vitiated. The Executive Council accepted the findings but recommended leniency due to the appointees' long service. However, the Chancellor, deeming the irregularities severe, directed the cancellation of appointments. Following a personal hearing for the affected appointees, the Chancellor confirmed the cancellation of 83 appointments. The aggrieved individuals filed writ petitions, which were dismissed by the High Court. These appeals challenge the High Court's decision.", + "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh Krishi Vidyapeeth advertised 24 posts for Senior Research Assistants (SRAs) and 37 for Junior Research Assistants (JRAs), resulting in 3214 applications for 61 posts.\n2. 131 individuals (76 SRAs and 55 JRAs) were appointed based on a selection process that allocated 40 marks for qualifications/experience and 60 for viva-voce.\n3. Following complaints about irregularities, several writ petitions were filed.\n4. The Chancellor, invoking Section 11 of the Maharashtra Agriculture Universities Act, 1983, appointed Justice H.W. Dhabe to inquire into the selection process.\n5. Justice Dhabe’s report, submitted after 3.5 years, detailed numerous illegalities and irregularities, including improper interview procedures, faulty marking criteria, favoritism, non-compliance with reservation policies, and manipulation of selection lists.\n6. The Executive Council recommended leniency due to the appointees' long service, but the Chancellor, deeming the irregularities severe, directed the cancellation of 83 appointments.\n7. Following personal hearings, the Chancellor confirmed the cancellation of 83 appointments.\n8. The aggrieved individuals filed writ petitions, which were dismissed by the High Court.\n9. These appeals challenge the High Court's decision.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the selection process for the appointments of 131 individuals (76 SRAs and 55 JRAs) was vitiated by illegalities and irregularities as detailed in Justice Dhabe's report.\n2. Whether the Chancellor acted within his jurisdiction and authority in directing the cancellation of 83 appointments based on the findings of Justice Dhabe's report.\n3. Whether the High Court correctly dismissed the writ petitions filed by the aggrieved individuals.\n4. Whether the aggrieved individuals are entitled to retain their appointments despite the identified irregularities and illegalities.\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Maharashtra Agriculture Universities Act, 1983 (Section 11):** The Chancellor has the authority to appoint an officer or committee to inquire into any matter related to the functioning of the university.\n2. **High Court of Judicature at Bombay Rules, 1983:** These rules govern the procedure for filing and disposing of writ petitions in the High Court.\n3. **Constitution of India, 1950 (Article 32):** This article provides the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights.\n4. **University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (Section 13):** This section deals with the establishment, maintenance, and regulation of universities.\n5. **Reservation in Educational Institutions Act, 1950 (now known as the Constitution (Fifty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1989):** This act ensures that reservations in educational institutions comply with the constitutional mandate.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Issue 1:**\n - **Analysis Step 1:** The Chancellor, acting under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Agriculture Universities Act, 1983, appointed Justice H.W. Dhabe to conduct an inquiry into the selection process. Justice Dhabe’s report, submitted after 3.5 years, detailed numerous illegalities and irregularities, including improper interview procedures, faulty marking criteria, favoritism, non-compliance with reservation policies, and manipulation of selection lists. These findings are compelling and legally significant.\n - **Analysis Step 2:** The selection process allocated 40 marks for qualifications/experience and 60 for viva-voce, which were allegedly manipulated as per Justice Dhabe's findings. Therefore, the selection process was vitiated by illegalities and irregularities as detailed in Justice Dhabe's report.\n\n2. **Issue 2:**\n - **Analysis Step 1:** The Chancellor has the authority to cancel appointments based on the findings of an inquiry conducted under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Agriculture Universities Act, 1983. Given the severe and pervasive irregularities detailed in Justice Dhabe's report, the Chancellor's directive to cancel 83 appointments was within his jurisdiction and necessary to uphold the integrity of the selection process.\n - **Analysis Step 2:** The findings of Justice Dhabe's report and the subsequent actions taken by the Chancellor support the cancellation of the appointments.\n\n3. **Issue 3:**\n - **Analysis Step 1:** The High Court has the authority to dispose of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the aggrieved individuals based on the findings of Justice Dhabe's report and the subsequent actions taken by the Chancellor. However, the High Court’s decision to dismiss the writ petitions without a thorough review of the evidence and the findings of Justice Dhabe’s report may be questionable.\n - **Analysis Step 2:** The High Court should have given more weight to the extensive evidence of irregularities and the Chancellor’s subsequent actions to ensure a fair and transparent process. The High Court’s decision to dismiss the writ petitions may be seen as inadequate.\n\n4. **Issue 4:**\n - **Analysis Step 1:** Given the severe and widespread irregularities in the selection process, the aggrieved individuals are not entitled to retain their appointments. The integrity of the selection process must be upheld, and the aggrieved individuals should be given the opportunity to reapply in a fair and transparent manner.\n - **Analysis Step 2:** The findings of Justice Dhabe's report and the Chancellor's subsequent actions support the cancellation of the appointments and the need for a fair re-selection process.\n\n### Conclusion:\nBased on the analysis of the facts, issues, and applicable rules, the selection process was vitiated by illegalities and irregularities as detailed in Justice Dhabe's report. The Chancellor acted within his jurisdiction and authority in directing the cancellation of 83 appointments based on these findings. The High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petitions may be seen as inadequate given the extensive evidence of irregularities and the Chancellor’s subsequent actions. Therefore, the appeal should be **ALLOWED**.\n\n*The decision is rendered with full judicial independence and based on the application of legal principles and the facts presented.*", + "reference_judgment": "1. Leave granted.\n2. These appeals arise out of a common Judgment and Order dated 16th August, 2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench whereby writ petitions No.238, 247, 251 and 389 of 2012 filed by the appellants, herein, have been dismissed and the orders passed by the respondents terminating their services affirmed.\n3. Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh Krishi Vidyapeeth invited applications for appointment against 24 vacancies in the cadre of Senior Research Assistants and 37 vacancies in the cadre of Junior Research Assistants. As many as 3214 applications were received from eligible candidates against 61 posts so advertised. Appointments based on the selection conducted by the Selection Committee concerned were all the same made for as many as 131 posts out of which 76 appointments were made against the posts of Senior Research Assistant while the remaining 55 were made in the cadre of Junior Research Assistants. It is common ground that the selection process was based on a total weightage of 100 marks for each candidate out of which 40 marks were reserved for educational qualification of the candidate and his/her experience while the remaining 60 marks were set apart for viva-voce examination.\n4. Several complaints appear to have been made against the selection process and the resultant appointments made by the University. Some of these complaints were in the form of writ petitions filed before the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur while some others were addressed to His Excellency, the Governor of Maharashtra who happens to be the Chancellor of the University. Out of the writ petitions filed against the selection and appointment process, Writ Petition No.4771 of 2006 inter alia prayed for a direction to the Chancellor to institute an inquiry under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Agriculture Universities (Krishi Vidyapeeth) Act, 1983 in regard to the illegalities and irregularities committed in the selection and consequent appointments against the vacancies referred to above. By an Order dated 21st April, 2007 passed by the High Court in the said petition, the Chancellor was directed to take a decision in the matter on or before the 14th August, 2007. Two other writ petitions were similarly filed before the High Court of Nagpur challenging the selection and appointment process. In writ petition No.342 of 2006 filed by Shri H.S. Bache, the High Court passed an interim order to the effect that the selection of the candidates shall remain stayed subject to the further orders of the Court. Writ Petition No.905 of 2006 filed by Archana Bipte and another also assailed the validity of the selection and appointment process undertaken by the University on several grounds.\n5. It was in the above backdrop that the Chancellor invoked his powers under Section 11 (1) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Universities Act, 1983 and appointed Mr. Justice H.W.Dhabe, a former Judge of the High Court of Bombay to examine the papers relating to the selection and appointment of the candidates concerned against the posts referred to above and to submit a report to the Chancellor as to the fairness of the selection of the candidates appointed by the University. A reading of the order passed by the Chancellor would show that apart from several allegations made by Dr. B.G. Bhathakal, Ex-Vice Chancellor of the University and four others, the Chancellor had before him, a report dated 8th November, 2006 submitted by the Director General MCAER Pune from which the Chancellor noticed several irregularities allegedly committed in the process of selection such as violation of Statute 52, holding of common interviews for both Senior and Junior Research Assistants, appointing meritorious candidates from the reserved category seats instead of appointing them in the open merit category, selection of as many as 22 relatives of officers/employees of the University, absence of any short-listing of candidates for purposes of interview even when the applications were far in excess of the advertised vacancies. There were also allegations of the selection process not being transparent apart from allegations to the effect that the norms for academic evaluation and viva voce examination had been flouted.\n6. With the constitution of the Justice Dhabe’s Committee writ petition No.4771 of 2006 titled Dr.Balwant and Anr. versus His Excellency the Chancellor of Dr.Punjabrao Deshmukh Krishi Vidyapeet & Ors. and writ Petition No.905 of 2006 titled Ms. Archana and Anr. V. State and Ors. were both disposed of with the observation that Justice Dhabe Committee was constituted to examine the complaints made by the writ petitioners and connected issues was expected to submit its report to the Chancellor making it unnecessary for the Court to undertake any such exercise in the said petitions.\n7. Proceedings before Justice Dhabe Committee started with the issue of notices to those appointed informing them about the establishment of the Committee to inquire into the fairness of the selection process and calling upon them to appear in person before the Committee and to file affidavits and documents, if any, to justify their selection and appointment. It is not in dispute that the appellants received the said notices and acknowledged the same by filing their respective affidavits. The appellants were in the meantime informed by the University that they had completed their period of probation satisfactorily but the declaration to that effect was to remain subject to the outcome of writ petitions No.342 of 2006 and 4771 of 2006.\n8. Justice Dhabe Committee took nearly 3½ years to complete the inquiry and to submit its report to the Chancellor in which the entire process of selection and appointment came under severe criticism questioning the fairness of the selection process and the resultant appointments. The High Court has summed up the substance of the findings and conclusions arrived at by Justice Dhabe in the following words:\n1) As large numbers of candidates were called for interview, without following proper ratio as prescribed by the State government, it has led to selection of undeserving and less meritorious candidates by manipulation, favouritism and other malpractices etc.\n2) Although the posts of SRA and JRA belonged to two separate cadres with different pay scales, different qualifications and duties and responsibilities, the Selection Committee held common interviews for the said posts and vitiated the selection of the candidates as their suitability could not have been properly judged in such interviews for the said posts.\n3) The criteria for assessment of the candidates for the posts of SRA/JRA were illegal.\n4) The Selection Committee has awarded marks for Ph.D. Thesis submitted, research papers/popular articles published and significant contribution made after the last date of application i.e. 15.09.2004 by resorting to illegal marking system.\n5) The Selection Committee gave higher weightage to the performance in interview as compared to academic performance.\n6) The procedure followed by the Selection Committee for awarding marks to the candidates for academic performance and performance in interview was illegal and invalid.\n7) There was tinkering in mark seats of the candidates. In some of the cases the mark sheets were not prepared in the meeting of the Selection Committee and they were also not placed before any of its meeting for its consideration and approval.\n8) The Chairman and the Member Secretary of the Selection Committee on their own without any authority or power in them increased the number of posts of SRA and JRA to be filled in.\n9) Category wise distribution of 55 posts of SRA and 76 posts of JRA was not made according to the prescribed percentage for each of the backward classes and open category as per the relevant GRs.\n10) The selection lists for the posts of SRA and JRA were not prepared or considered and approved in the meeting of the Selection Committee. There were lacunae, deficiencies, illegalities and irregularities in preparation of the selection list.\n11) Though in the advertisement it was specifically provided for wait lists to be prepared for the near future vacancies, no wait lists were prepared by the Selection Committee.\n12) The Selection Committee did not discharge any of its duties and responsibilities in the selection process.\n13) The entire selection process and selection of candidates pursuant thereto for the posts of SRA and JRA is vitiated by bias of Dr. V.D. Patil, Chairman of the Selection Committee.\n14) As per the findings of Justice Dhabe, favouritism has occurred in the process of selection to the posts of SRA and JRA\n15) The qualification of Bachelor’s degree in Agriculture Engineering was introduced as an additional qualification for the post of JRA as per the addendum dated 06.09.2004 to the advertisement dated 14.08.2004 in which the posts of JRA were advertised with the qualification of Bachelor’s degree in Agriculture.\n16) Preparation of the minutes of various meetings of the Selection Committee were not recorded faithfully and confirmed by its other members. The proceedings/minutes of the meetings of the Selection Committee were probably prepared after the appointment orders were issued on 16.09.2005 and 17.09.2005.\n17) There were more than 2 months delay in handing over the Selection lists to the then Vice Chancellor. The reasons given by the then Vice Chancellor for the delay in not receiving the selection lists towards the end of June or July 2005 are not convincing.\n18) The Reservation policy of the Government was not followed by the University. Reservations of the posts for backward classes (social/ vertical reservation) were not made according to their prescribed percentage as per the relevant GRs. of the State Government.\n19) The graduates of the Yashwantrao Chavan Maharashtra Open University were not considered in the University for appointment and promotion in the post of JRA.\n20) There were illegalities, flaws and consequential reshuffling of the Selection Lists and other infirmities in preparation of the existing selection lists of these posts of SRA and JRA. Thus, the appointments made in the posts of SRA and JRA are highly irregular.\n21) The routine procedures for making appointment in the university was not followed in the appointments made to the posts of SRA and JRA. In the report it is concluded that the entire selection process and selection of the candidates to the posts of SRA and JRA is vitiated by the illegalities, irregularities and improprieties and therefore the appointments made pursuant thereto, need to be set aside.\n9. On receipt of the report from Justice Dhabe Committee the Chancellor directed the Vice Chancellor of the University to place the matter before the Executive Council for its opinion. The matter was accordingly placed before the Executive Council of the University on 14th February 2011. The Council while accepting the findings recorded by the Dhabe Committee recommended that a lenient view be taken by the Chancellor and the appointments already made protected having regard to the fact that those appointed had already served the University for over six years during the interregnum. The petitioners also appear to have made a representation to the Chancellor in which they once again asserted that their appointments had been properly made on the basis of their merit and that the termination of their services after more than six years will be grossly unfair. The Chancellor, however, felt that Justice Dhabe Committee had reported illegalities and irregularities in the procedure adopted by the Selection Committee which findings having been accepted by the Executive Council left no room for any leniency in the case, considering the gravity and seriousness of the matter. The Chancellor found that the entire process of selection of candidates and their appointments stood vitiated because of such irregularities. Directions were accordingly issued to the Vice Chancellor to initiate action to cancel the appointments of the candidates concerned after following the procedure prescribed by law and to fix the responsibility of those who had committed lapses in the matter of selection of the candidates and take disciplinary action against them including the Chairman of the Selection Committee and the then Registrar and Member Secretary of the said Committee. The Chancellor further directed the Vice Chancellor to consider the suggestions made by Justice Dhabe Committee in order to avoid recurrence of such illegalities and irregularities in future recruitments.\n10. In obedience to the directions issued by the Chancellor, disciplinary action appears to have been initiated against those comprising the Selection Committee in which the officials are accused of having made illegal selection of 131 candidates including the petitioners thereby not only causing financial loss to the University but also bringing disrepute to it. We are in the present appeals not concerned with the fate of the said proceedings which appear to be lingering on even at present. As regards the petitioners, they were served notices calling upon them to appear before the Vice Chancellor for a personal hearing against their selection and appointment as SRAs/JRAs in the University. It is not in dispute that the petitioners in reply to the said notices filed their respective responses before the Vice Chancellor and were heard on different dates mentioned in the communications received by them. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners submitted their representations before the Vice Chancellor in writing in which they stated that their appointments were regular and legally sound apart from relying upon the fact that they had served the University for nearly six years thereby entitling them to protection against ouster on equitable grounds. The Vice Chancellor then reported the result of the hearing provided by him to the petitioners by his letter dated 1st November 2011. Consideration of the report received from the Vice Chancellor, the opinion offered by the Executive Council of the University and the entire material including the report submitted by Justice Dhabe Committee led the Chancellor to pass an order on 16th December 2011 in which the Chancellor held that the entire process of selection and appointment having lost its sanctity on account of irregularities in the same could not be approved or rectified. The Chancellor felt that a lenient view on humanitarian grounds alone would be against the principles of governance and fair selection process in the matter of recruitment. He accordingly turned down the recommendation of the Vice Chancellor that out of 83 SRAs and JRAs, selection of 65 candidates could be saved as valid while remaining 18 could be ousted. He directed that Justice Dhabe Committee Report did not leave any room for the Vice Chancellor to strike a discordant note or sit in judgment over the conclusions drawn by the Committee. The Chancellor accordingly cancelled the appointments of 83 candidates of SRAs and JRAs who had been selected and taken into the service of the University on the basis of a process which the Chancellor found was vitiated and void ab initio.\n11. In compliance with the directions issued by the Chancellor the Vice Chancellor issued individual orders in each case terminating the services of the appointees concerned. Aggrieved by the said orders the petitioners filed Writ Petition Nos. 238/12, 389/12, 247/12 and 251/12 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench which petitions have now been dismissed by the said Court in terms of the common order impugned in these appeals.\n12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. The following questions arise for our consideration:\n1) Was the Chancellor competent to appoint a Single Member Committee headed by Justice H.W. Dhabe to examine the illegalities, irregularities, fairness and impropriety of the selection process and consequent appointments to the cadre of SRAs and JRAs?\n2) Were the inquiry proceedings entrusted to Justice Dhabe Committee conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice?\n3) Were the findings recorded by Justice Dhabe Committee in any manner illegal or perverse to warrant interference with the same by a Writ Court?\n4) Was the procedure adopted by the University and the Vice Chancellor fair and reasonable and in consonance with the principles of natural justice?\n5) Was the Chancellor of the respondent-University and the High Court justified in declining the prayer of the petitioners for continuance in service on account of the time lag between the date of their appointments and the date on which their services were terminated?\nWe shall deal with the question ad seriatim.\nReg. Question No. 1\n13. Maharashtra Agricultural Universities (Krishi Vidyapeeths) Act, 1983 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to the agricultural universities in the State of Maharashtra. The legislation provides for better governance, more efficient administration and financial control of the Universities and for better organisation of teaching, research and extension education therein apart from providing better facilities in agricultural and allied matters in particular for the development of agricultural sciences which is one of the prime objects underlying the Act. Chapter II of the Act comprises Sections 3 to 11. Section 4 of the Act states that each University shall be deemed to be established and incorporated for the purposes enumerated therein. The purposes mentioned in the said provision includes education in agriculture in allied sciences and in humanities besides furthering the advancement of learning and research in agriculture, undertaking and guiding extension education programmes; integrating and coordinating the teaching of subjects in the different faculties, coordinating agricultural education, research and extension education activities, teaching and examining students and conferring degrees and diplomas. Section 6 of the Act deals with the powers and functions of the Universities. It inter alia provides that each University shall have the powers and functions enumerated under the said provision, in particular the power to institute teaching, research and extension education posts required by the University and to appoint persons to such posts. Sub-section (x) to Section 6 is in this regard relevant which reads:\n “to institute teaching, research and extension education posts required by the University and to appoint persons to such posts.” \n14. Section 11 of the Act empowers the Chancellor to cause an inspection and inquiry on matters stipulated therein. We may gainfully extract the said provision in extenso as the power of the Chancellor to direct an inquiry into the validity of the selection and appointments has been questioned before us in these appeals. Section 11 reads as under:\n “SECTION 11: Chancellor to cause inspection and inquiry on various matters:\n(1) The Chancellor shall have the right to cause an inspection to be made, by such person or per- sons or body of persons, as he may direct, of any University,, its buildings, farms, laborato- ries, libraries, museums, workshops and equipments of any college, institution or hostel maintained, administered or recognised by the University and of the teaching and other work conducted by or on behalf of the University or under its auspices of and of the conduct of ex- aminations or other functions of the Univer- sity, and to cause to inquiry to be made in like manner regarding any matter connected with the administration or finances of the Univer- sity.\n(2) The Chancellor shall, in every case, give due notice to the University of his intention to cause an inspection or inquiry to be made, and the University shall be entitled to appoint a repre- sentative, who all have the right to be present and to be heard at the inspection or inquiry.\n(3) After an inspection or inquiry has been caused to be made, the Chancellor may address the Vice- Chancellor on the result of such inspection or in- quiry and the Vice-Chancellor shall; communi- cate to the Executive Council the views of the Chancellor and call upon the Executive Council to communicate to the Chancellor through him its opinion thereon within such time as may have been specified by the Chancellor. If the Execu- tive Council communicates, its opinion within the specified time limit, after taking into considera- tion that opinion, or where the Executive Council fails to communicate its opinion in time, after the specified time limit is over, the Chancellor may proceed and advise the Executive Council upon the action to be taken by it, and fix a time limit for taking such action\n(4) The Executive Council shall, within the time limit so fixed, report to the Chancellor through the Vice-Chancellor the action which has been taken or is proposed to be taken on the advice ten- dered by him.\n(5) The Chancellor may, where action has not been taken by the Executive Council to his satisfac- tion with in the time limit fixed, and after con- sidering any explanation furnished or represen- tation made by the Executive Council, issue such direction, as the Chancellor may think fit, and the Executive Council and other authority concerned shall comply with such directions.\n(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the pre- ceding sub-section if at any time the Chancellor is of the opinion that in any matter the affairs of the University are not managed in furtherance of the objects of the University or in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the statutes and Regulation or that special measures are de- sirable to maintain the standards of University teaching, examinations, research, extension ed- ucation, administration or finances, the Chan- cellor may indicate to the Executive Council through the Vice-Chancellor any matter in re- gard to which he desires an explanation and call upon the Executive Council to offer such expla- nation within such time as may be specified by him. If the Executive Council fails to offer any explanation within the time specified or offers an explanation which, in the opinion of the Chancellor is not satisfactory , the Chancellor may issue such directions as appear to him to be necessary , and the Executive Council and other authority concerned shall comply with such directions.\n(7) The Executive Council shall furnish such informa- tion relating to the administration and finances of the University as the Chancellor may from time to time require.\n(8) The Executive Council shall furnish to the State Government such returns or other information with respect to the property or activities of the University as the State government may from time to time require“.\n(emphasis supplied) \n15. A careful reading of the above would leave no manner of doubt that the Chancellor is vested with the power to cause an inspection to be made by such person or persons as he may direct of any University, its building, farms, laboratories, libraries etc. or of hostels administered and recognised by the University or of the teaching or other workshops conducted on behalf of the University or any conduct of examinations or other functions of the University. The inspection so directed is, however, distinct from the inquiry which the Chancellor may direct regarding any matter connected with the administration or finance of the University. The expression ‘administration or finance’ of the University are in our opinion, wide enough to include an inquiry into any matter that falls under Section 6(x) (supra). If creation of teaching, research and education posts required by the University is one of the functions of the University and if appointment of suitable persons against such posts is also one of such functions, there is no reason why the power of the Chancellor to direct an inquiry under Section 11(1) should not extend to any process leading to such appointments. The term ‘administration of the University’ appearing in sub-Section 1 of Section 11 would, in our opinion, include every such activity as is relatable to the functions of the University, under Section 6. Selection of persons suitable for appointment and appointments of such persons would logically fall within the expression “administration of the University” within the meaning of Section 11(1) of the Act. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the inquiry directed by the Chancellor into the illegalities and irregularities of the selection process culminating in the appointment of Senior and Junior Research Assistants was legally permissible. The power vested in the Chancellor under Section 11 to direct an inspection or an inquiry into matters referred to in the said provision is very broad and vests the Chancellor with the authority to direct an inspection or an inquiry whenever warranted in the facts and circumstances in a given case. We may also refer to Section 15 of the Act whereunder the Governor of Maharashtra is ex-officio Head of each of the Universities who shall, when present, preside at any convocation of the University. Section 15 reads:\n “(1) The Governor of Maharashtra, shall be the Chancellor of each of the Universities.\n(2) The Chancellor shall, by virtue of his office, be the head of the University and shall, when present, preside at any convocation of the University.\n(3) The Chancellor may call for his information any papers relating to the administration of the affairs of the University and such requisition shall be complied with by the University.\n(4) Every proposal to confer any honorary degree shall be subject to confirmation by the Chancellor.\n(5)The Chancellor may, by order in writing, annul any proceeding of any officer or authority of the Uni- versity, which is not in conformity with this Act, the Statutes or the Regulations, or which is prejudicial to the interest of the University;\nProvided that, before making any such order, he shall call upon the officer or authority to show cause why such an order should not be made, and if any cause is shown within the time specified by him in this behalf, he shall consider the same.\n(6) The Chancellor shall exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as are laid down by this Act.”\n(emphasis supplied) \n16. A plain reading of the above shows that apart from being the ex officio Head of the University, the statute specifically confers upon the Chancellor the power to call for his information any paper relating to the administration of the affairs of the University and upon such request the University is bound to comply with the same. Sub-section 5 vests the chancellor with the power to annul any proceeding of any officer or authority if the same is not in conformity with the provisions of the Act, the statutes or the Regulations or which is prejudicial to the interest of the University. A conjoint reading of Sections 11 and 15, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that the Chancellor exercises ample powers in regard to the affairs of the University and in particular in regard to the affairs of the administration of the University. The power to direct an inquiry into any matter concerning the administration of the University is only one of the facets of power vested in the Chancellor. The exercise of any such power is not subject to any limitation or impediment understandably because the power is vested in a high constitutional functionary who is expected to exercise the same only when such exercise becomes necessary to correct aberrations and streamline administration so as to maintain the purity of the procedures and process undertaken by the University in all spheres dealt with by it. The power to direct an inquiry is meant to kickstart corrective and remedial measures and steps needed to improve the functioning of the University as much as to correct any illegal or improper activity in the smooth running of the administration of the University. As a father figure holding a high constitutional office, the Chancellor is to be the guiding spirit for the Universities to follow a path of rectitude in every matter whether it concerns the administration or the finances of the University or touches the teaching and other activities that are undertaken by it. The legislature, it is obvious, has considered the conferment of such powers to be essential to prevent indiscipline, root out corruption, prevent chaos or deadlock in the administration of the University or any office or establishment under it that may tend to shake its credibility among those who deal with the institution.\n17. The Chancellor had, in the case at hand, directed an inquiry into the illegalities and irregularities in the selection and appointment process in the light of widespread resentment against the same as is evident from the fact that three writ petitions had been filed in the High Court challenging the selection and the appointment process. Two of the writ petitions had been disposed of as noticed earlier no sooner Justice Dhabe Committee was constituted by the Chancellor for holding a detailed inquiry into the allegations. The petitioners were not only aware of the fact about the pending writ proceedings but also about the constitution of Justice Dhabe Committee. As a matter of fact with the disposal of Writ Petitions No.4771 of 2006 and 905 of 2006 the petitioner had known that Justice Dhabe Committee will eventually determine whether or not their selection and appointment was proper. Justice Dhabe Committee had even issued notices to the petitioners who had in turn responded to the same. The constitution of Justice Dhabe Committee was, despite all this, never questioned by the petitioners. On the contrary the petitioners merrily participated in the proceedings and took a chance to obtain a favourable verdict from it. Having failed to do so, they turned around to challenge not only the findings recorded by the Committee but even the authority of the Chancellor to set up such a Committee. While the findings recorded by the Inquiry Committee could be assailed, the challenge to the setting up of the Committee was clearly untenable not only because there was no merit in that contention but also because having taken a chance to obtain a favourable verdict the petitioners could not turn around to assail the constitution of the Committee itself. Question 1 is accordingly answered in the negative.\nReg. Question No. 2\n18. The petitioners had unsuccessfully challenged Justice Dhabe Committee Report before the High Court on the ground that principles of natural justice had not been complied with by the Committee. The High Court has noted and in our opinion rightly so that Justice Dhabe Committee had issued notices to each one of the petitioners asking for their explanation which the petitioners had submitted. The High Court noted that the inquiry proceedings before Justice Dhabe had continued for nearly three years during which period the petitioners had made no grievance either before the Committee or before any other forum regarding non-compliance with the principles of natural justice. There is nothing on record to suggest that any point relevant to the controversy was not considered by Justice Dhabe Committee or that there was any impediment in their offering an effective defence before the Committee. The petitioners had on the contrary candidly admitted in the writ petition itself that upon receipt of notices from the Committee they had appeared and filed their respective affidavits before the Committee. Some of the petitioners had even furnished some additional information which was summoned from them. The Committee had, it is evident, associated the petitioners with the proceedings by inviting them to appear and participate in the same, heard the petitioners and considered their version. There is neither an allegation nor any material to suggest that there was any reluctance or refusal on the part of the Committee to entertain any material which the petitioner intended to place in their defence or to summon any record from any other quarter relevant to the questions being examined by the Committee. The argument that the petitioners did not know as to what the complaint against them was has been rejected by the High Court and quite rightly so. Once the petitioners were informed about the setting up of the Committee and invited to participate in the same and once they had appeared before the Committee and filed their affidavits it is difficult to appreciate the argument that the petitioners did so without knowing as to why was the Committee set up and what was the inquiry all about. Assuming that any of the petitioners did not fully comprehend the nature of allegations being inquired into by the Committee or the purpose of the inquiry nothing prevented the petitioners from taking suitable steps at the appropriate stage assuming that they were so naïve as to simply appear before the Committee without being aware of the purpose for which they were invited. They could indeed approach the Committee to secure the relevant information to fully acquaint themselves about the on-going process and the nature of the defences that was open to them. Having remained content with their participation in the inquiry proceedings for nearly three years and having made no grievance at all against the procedure adopted by the Committee in dealing with the subject till the writ petitions challenging the termination orders were filed, we see no merit in the specious contention that principles of natural justice were violated by the Committee especially when no prejudice is demonstrably caused to the petitioners on account of the procedure which the Committee followed in concluding the enquiry proceedings. Question No.2 is also in that view answered in the negative.\nReg. Question No. 3\n19. Findings recorded by Justice Dhabe Committee were based on facts discovered in the course of the inquiry. No serious attempt was made before the High Court nor even before us to challenge the said findings of fact. Even otherwise a finding inquiry instituted by the Chancellor was bound to involve appraisal of evidence, documentary and oral. The conclusions drawn on the basis of such appraisal were open to critical evaluation by the authorities before whom the conclusions and the Report was submitted for action but once such conclusions are upon a careful re-appraisal found to be justified, a writ Court will be very slow in interfering with the same.\n20. In the present case, upon receipt of the report from Justice Dhabe Committee the matter was directed to be placed before the Executive Council of the University. That direction was meant to give the Executive Council an opportunity to examine the findings of fact and the conclusions drawn from the same critically and to determine whether the same were justified. The Executive Council, it is common ground, had without any reservation approved the findings recorded by Dhabe Committee, no matter with a recommendation to the Chancellor to take a lenient view in the matter, having regard to the fact that the petitioners had already served the University for nearly six years. The recommendation of the Executive Council did not, however, find anything amiss with the conclusions drawn by the Dhabe Committee as to the irregularities in the selection process culminating in illegal appointments of the selected candidates. The ‘fact finding’ aspect thus stood concluded with the approval of the Executive Council of the University. The Vice Chancellor no doubt made an attempt at segregating what according to him was the valid part of the selection from that which was not, but the Chancellor did not approve of that exercise. The Chancellor took the view that the entire selection stood vitiated by widespread irregularities, leaving hardly any room for a distinction between the so called valid and invalid parts of the selection process. Be that as it may the fact remains that we have not been able to find any reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the Justice Dhabe Committee. The sanctity of the entire selection process having been vitiated by irregularities and acts of nepotism, question No. 3 shall have to be answered in the negative, which we accordingly do.\nReg. Question No. 4\n21. It is also not in dispute that in compliance with the orders passed by the Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor of the University had issued notices to the petitioners calling upon them to appear before him for a personal hearing in support of their selection and appointment as SRAs/JRAs. It is also not in dispute that upon receipt of the said notices the petitioners had filed their responses in the required format and were also given an opportunity of being heard by the Vice Chancellor. In the course of the hearing the petitioners obviously relied upon the written responses and sought a direction against ouster from service. There is, therefore, no merit in the submission that upon submission of the recommendations by Justice Dhabe Committee the petitioners did not have any opportunity to present their version before the Vice Chancellor nor is it possible to dub the hearing provided by the Vice Chancellor as a farce. The High Court has, in our opinion, rightly rejected a similar contention urged before it and correctly concluded that the petitioners had failed to establish that the Vice Chancellor had either violated the principles of natural justice or that any prejudice was caused by the procedure adopted by him in offering them a hearing. As a matter of fact the Vice-Chancellor had in his anxiety to help the petitioners tried to sit in judgment over the findings and conclusions of the inquiry Committee and taken a stance that was overtly sympathetic towards the petitioners. The uncharitable expression used by the petitioners as to the nature of the process undertaken by the Vice Chancellor is not, therefore, justified. The Vice Chancellor had in our view acted fairly and fully complied with the principle of natural justice. There is no gainsaid that the requirements of audi alteram partem are not capable of a strait jacket application. Their application depends so much upon the nature of the Tribunal that is deciding the matter, the nature of the inquiry that is being made and the consequences flowing from the determination. A notice to the petitioners who were likely to be affected and a hearing afforded to them apart from written responses filed in reply to the notices was in our opinion a substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice. No further hearing was required to be repeated by the Chancellor who had before whom the recommendations of the Executive Committee and the Vice Chancellor who took a final view of the matter having regard to the totality of the circumstances. The High Court has, in this regard, observed:\n “Thus, the Chancellor was not required to give any personal hearing to the petitioners while disagreeing with them. If we hold that prior to passing of the final order the Chancellor was required to hear the petitioners once again, that would mean that although the facts are undisputed and although no prejudice is demonstrated, we agree with the submissions of the petitioners. This would mean second round or second opportunity being made available to the petitioners to show cause against the findings and conclusions in the Inquiry Committee’s report. That would mean reopening of the matter in its entirety which was not permissible and feasible in the peculiar facts of the case. This could be equated with an opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment as is available in service jurisprudence. Those principles cannot be imported into the exercise that has been undertaken in the facts and circumstances of this case.” \n22. We see no error of law in the view taken by the High Court to warrant our interference. Question No. 4 is accordingly answered in the negative.\nReg. Question No. 5\n23. The Chancellor declined to show any leniency to the petitioners no matter they had served the University for over six years primarily because the entire selection process was in his opinion vitiated by widespread irregularities in the selection process. The findings recorded by Justice Dhabe Committee upon a detailed and thorough examination of the matter fully supported that view of the Chancellor. The reasons that prevailed with the Chancellor cannot be said to be illusory or irrelevant so as to call for interference from a writ Court. The Chancellor was dealing with a case where the Selection Committee had called a large number of candidates for interview without following the proper procedure as prescribed by the State Government leading to the appointment of undeserving candidates by manipulation and favouritism. It was a case where the posts of SRAs/JRAs although carrying different pay scales were clubbed for holding a common interview. Even the criterion for assessment of the merit of the candidates was found to be faulty. Marks were awarded for qualifications although the thesis for such qualifications was submitted after the date prescribed for such advertisement. Marking system itself was found to be erroneous. Higher weightage was given to the performance in the interview as compared to academic merit. There was tinkering in the mark sheets of the candidates in certain cases and mark sheets were not made available in the meetings of the Selection Committee. The Chairman and the Member Secretary of the Selection Committee had on their own increased the number of posts of SRAs and JRAs to be filled upon. All these among other aspects were considered by Justice Dhabe Committee in its report which concluded that the entire selection process was vitiated. That beneficiaries of such faulty selection process should hold on to the benefit only because of lapse of time would be travesty of justice especially when deserving candidates were left out with a brooding sense of injustice and cynicism against the efficacy of the system that was meant to act fairly and objectively. Continuance in office of those selected by means that are not fair, transparent and reasonable will amount to perpetuating the wrong. The length of service put in by the candidates who were selected on the basis of such a faulty selection process may be one of the considerations that enters the mind of the Court but there are other weighty considerations that cannot be given a go bye or conveniently forgotten lest those who do not adopt such malpractices or those who expect the system to protect their interest and their rights are eternally disappointed and left to believe that a wrong once done will never be corrected just because the legal process by which it is to be corrected is a long and winding process that often takes years to reach fruition.\n24. Having said that we must say that the main contention which the petitioners have urged in support of their continuance in service is that they have become overage for any government employment at this stage. If ousted from service the petitioners will have no place to go nor even an opportunity to compete for the vacancies against which they were appointed. That is an aspect which can be and ought to be considered especially when there is no allegation leave alone evidence about any bribery having taken place in the issue of appointment orders by the officials concerned. Even so, continuance of the petitioners in service would not, in our opinion, be justified having regard to the background in which the selection and appointments were made and eventually set aside by the University. All that the long years of service rendered with the University may secure for the petitioners a direction to the effect that in any future selection against the vacancies caused by their ouster and other vacancies that may be available for the next selection the petitioners shall also be considered in relaxation of the upper age limit prescribed for them. Such of the petitioners who could try their luck in the next selection and who succeed in the same will also have the benefit of continuity of service.\n25. That brings us to the method of selection that may be followed falling up the vacancies that will be caused by the ouster of the petitioners. An affidavit has in that regard been filed by the Shri Dnyaneshwar Ashru Bharati, Registrar of the respondent-University stating that in terms of Maharashtra Act No. XXXII of 2013 the Maharashtra State legislature has amended Maharashtra Agricultural Universities (Krishi Vidyapeeths) Act, 1983. Section 58 of the principal Act as substituted by Act XXXII aforementioned provides that no person shall be appointed by the University as a member of the academic staff, except on the recommendation of a Selection Board constituted for the purpose in accordance with the provisions of the Statutes made in that behalf. The posts of SRAs and JRAs are classified as academic as per Statute 71 of the MAU statutes 1990. The process of amendment to the statute 75 and 76 is now underway. The affidavit further states that the University will not be in a position to undertake the selection process of posts advertised on 23rd March 2012 and that selection will be done by Recruitment Board as per the new selection procedure. The affidavit is, however, silent as to the procedure that shall be followed by the Selection Board constituted for the purpose. Be that as it may the establishment of a Selection Board and formulation of proper procedure to be followed by the Board will go a long way in making the process of selection and recruitment objective, fair and reasonable apart from bringing transparency to the norms and the process by which such recruitments were made. We only hope that the process of amendment of relevant statute is expedited by the University and concluded as far as possible within six months from today and process of filling up of posts of SRAs and JRAs currently held by the petitioners and those that were advertised in terms of advertisement dated 23rd March 2012 undertaken in accordance with such procedure.\n26. In the result, the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. We however direct that the University-respondent shall take necessary steps for constituting the Selection Board in terms of Section 58 of the Act as amended by Maharashtra Act No. XXXII of 2013 and advertise the vacancies currently available, together with the posts that are presently held by the appellants for recruitment in accordance with the procedure that may be prescribed in accordance with law. The entire process shall be completed by the University within six months. The appellants shall also be allowed to apply and participate in the selection process against the vacancies so advertised in relaxation of the upper age limit prescribed for such recruitment. For a period of six months or till the process of selection and appointment based on the selection process is completed by the respondent, whichever is earlier, the appellants shall be allowed to continue in service on the same terms as are currently applicable to them. In case any one of the appellants is selected by the new selection process, he shall be granted benefit of continuity of service. But such of the appellants who do not compete for the selection or are not selected for the posts that may be advertised shall stand ousted from service on completion of the period of six months hereby granted. No costs.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -3113,26 +3113,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S025", - "case_id": "2116", - "experiment": "baseline_firac", - "model": "gpt-oss-120b-noreason", - "source_file": "S025__baseline_firac__gpt-oss-120b-noreason__2116.json", + "case_id": "3603", + "experiment": "role_play_v3", + "model": "qwen-2.5-7b-instruct", + "source_file": "S025__role_play_v3__qwen-2.5-7b-instruct__3603.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "02/04/2013", + "judgment_date": "04/04/2014", "machine_error_stage": "rules", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Wrong legal test / threshold" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 12891 of 2022) | Sub Inspector Sanjay Kumar v. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. | 27/09/2024", - "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 12891 of 2022) | Sub Inspector Sanjay Kumar v. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.", - "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "The appellant, a Sub-Inspector in Uttar Pradesh, was issued an office order on November 16, 2021, by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home (Police), condemning him for gross negligence, indifference, and selfishness in his duties. This led to a censure penalty via a letter dated March 7, 2022, from the Superintendent of Police, District Khushinagar. The impugned order stated the appellant lacked expected interest in investigation disposal. The appellant's writ petition challenging this order and the censure entry was dismissed by a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, and a subsequent intra-Court writ appeal was also dismissed by a Division Bench. The appellant contended that no opportunity to show cause was given, violating the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (Rules, 1991) and principles of natural justice, specifically citing Rule 5 read with Rule 14(2). He also claimed his writ petition was decided without a state reply. The State countered that a notice dated September 25, 2021, was issued by the Circle Officer, Khadda, to the appellant regarding pending investigations. The appellant replied, attributing delays to VIP duties and external assignments. His explanation was deemed unsatisfactory, leading to a report identifying him as a slack officer and the subsequent impugned order. The Superintendent of Police, competent under Rule 7(2), issued the censure entry.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The appellant, a Sub-Inspector, received an office order on November 16, 2021, censuring him for gross negligence, indifference, and selfishness in his duties.\n2. A notice was issued by the Circle Officer, Khadda, on September 25, 2021, regarding pending investigations, to which the appellant responded by attributing delays to VIP duties and external assignments.\n3. A report was made on the appellant's alleged slackness, and subsequently, he was issued a censure penalty via a letter dated March 7, 2022.\n4. The appellant's writ petition challenging the above order was dismissed by a Single Judge and later, an intra-court writ appeal was also dismissed by a Division Bench.\n5. The impugned order and censure entry did not provide the appellant an opportunity to show cause, despite Rules 5 and 14(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (Rules, 1991) requiring it.\n6. The writ petition was decided without a state reply.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the failure to provide an opportunity to the appellant to show cause violates the Rules, 1991 and principles of natural justice.\n2. The impact of a decision on a writ petition in the absence of a state reply.\n\n### Rules:\n1. The principles enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, i.e., equality before law and procedural fairness.\n2. Rule 5 and 14(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991.\n3. The rules of natural justice as envisioned in the cases of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu.\n4. The legal principle that a decision made in the absence of a state reply may be deemed to have been made without adequate consideration of the facts and material on record.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. The Rules, 1991, in this case, provide for an opportunity to be given to the accused officer to explain their conduct before any penalty can be imposed. Here, the appellant was not given such an opportunity, which is a clear violation of the Rules, 1991 and also naturales iustice.\n2. The High Court erred in not insisting upon a state reply before deciding the writ petition. A decision without adequate response being provided on behalf of the state may not have disposed of the issues fairly, and thus, the conclusion might not be well-founded.\n\n### Conclusion:\nGiven the Appellant's substantial compliance with the requirements of the Rules, 1991, and the principles of natural justice violated, the conclusion rendered by the High Court is suspect. Additionally, fair procedure demands that the State must have been given an opportunity to placate this Order, which was not done. Therefore, the appeal must be **ALLOWED** and the matter must be remanded back for a fresh examination, where the State is afforded an opportunity to file its reply, and the Appellant is given a chance to show cause before fresh proceedings are completed in accordance with the Rules, 1991.", - "reference_judgment": "2. Leave granted.\n3. The appellant herein, while being posted as Sub-Inspector at\nPolice Station Hanumanganj, District Khushinagar, Uttar Pradesh,\nwas condemned for gross negligence, indifference and selfishness\nin discharge of duties vide office order dated 16th November, 20211\nissued by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home (Police). As a\nconsequence, he was handed down a penalty of censure vide letter\n1 In short ‘impugned order’.\ndated 7th March, 2022 issued by the Superintendent of Police,\nDistrict Khushinagar.\n4. The relevant part of the impugned order is reproduced\nhereinbelow for the sake of ready reference:-\n“Uttar Pradesh Government\nHome (Police) Section-1\nNumber: U.O.-74(23)/6-P-1-21-107/2021\nLucknow: Date: 16 November 2021\nOffice Order\nIn the video conferencing held by the hon'ble Chief Minister on\ndt. 09.09.2021, during the review of disposal of investigations\nof state's law and order, crimes, and the cases registered till dt.\n31.07.2021, in the 12 districts which have disposed of the least\nnumber of investigations, 03 sub-inspectors and inspectors\nhave been identified and after receiving their clarifications, the\ninvestigating officers' name, designation, current deployment\ndetails/report, were made available by Addl. Director General\nof Police (Crime), U.P., Lucknow vide letter number DG-7-S\n2(1)/2021 dated 26.09.2021.\n2-According to the clarification provided by the Addl. Director\nof Police (Crime) U.P., Lucknow, Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Sub-\nInspector, ΡΝΟ-982650369, PS Hanumanganj, District\nKhushinagar didn't show the expected interest in the disposal\nof investigations. This act is a sign of gross negligence,\nindifference and selfishness while performing his duty and is\nhighly condemned.\nS/d\nillegible\n(Avnish Kumar Awasthi)\nAdditional Chief Secretary\nNumber and Date as in:\nCopy: Sent to the following for information and necessary\naction:-\n(1) Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow\n(2) Additional Director Establishment, U.P., Lucknow General\nof Police,\n(3) Additional Director General of Police, Police Headquarters,\nU.P., Lucknow\n(4) Additional Director General of Police, Gorakhpur Zone,\nGorakhpur\n(5) Superintendent of Police, Dist. Khushinagar provided 03\ncopies with the intention of handing over 01 copy to Mr. Sanjay\nKumar, Sub-Inspector, PNO-982650369, PS Hanumanganj,\nDistrict Khushinagar and the receipt to be made available to\nthe government and censure to be mentioned in their character\nrecord\n(6) Guard Book.\nBy Order,\nS/d illegible\n(Mahendra Prasad Bharti)\nJoint Secretary”\n5. The appellant preferred a writ petition2 before the High Court\nof Judicature at Allahabad assailing the impugned order and the\nconsequent censure entry made in his service book. The learned\nSingle Judge dismissed the writ petition denying relief to the\nappellant vide order dated 23rd March, 2022. Being aggrieved, the\nappellant preferred an intra-Court writ appeal3 which came to be\ndismissed by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court vide\n2 Writ-A No. 830 of 2022.\n3 Special Appeal (Defective) No. 150 of 2022.\njudgment dated 9th May, 2022 which is assailed in the present\nappeal by special leave.\n6. Learned counsel for the appellant, vehemently and fervently\ncontended that no opportunity to show cause was ever afforded to\nthe appellant before imposing the penalty of censure upon him.\nHe urged that the impugned order and the consequent\ncommunication issued by the Superintendent of Police, District\nKhushinagar, are in clear breach of the provisions of the Uttar\nPradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and\nAppeal) Rules, 19914 and also suffer from the vice of non-\nadherence to the principles of natural justice.\n7. The learned counsel for the appellant emphatically referred\nto Rule 5 read with Rule 14(2) of the Rules, 1991 and urged that\nno notice in writing was issued to the appellant before subjecting\nhim to the penalty of censure. It was submitted that specific plea\nin this regard was incorporated in the pleadings before the learned\nSingle Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court.\nHowever, the pertinent assertion which goes to the root of the\nmatter, was not considered by the High Court in the right\nperspective. Learned counsel pointed out that the learned Single\n4 In short ‘Rules, 1991’.\nJudge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant merely by\nrecording oral instructions procured by the Standing Counsel for\nthe State and without even requiring the respondents to submit\ntheir reply. Thus clearly, the decision on the writ petition was made\nwithout the reply of the State being taken on record and hence, the\nassertions made by the appellant remained uncontroverted.\n8. Learned counsel further urged that the specific ground taken\nby the appellant regarding the impugned order having been passed\nwithout affording an opportunity to show cause or without giving\nany opportunity to make representation against the same, has not\nbeen traversed by the respondents in the counter affidavit filed in\nthis Court. He thus urged that the impugned order dated 16th\nNovember, 2021 and the letter dated 7th March, 2022 suffers from\ngross violation of the principles of natural justice and are de hors\nthe Rules, 1991 and consequently, the appellant deserves relief\nsought for in the appeal.\n9. Per-contra, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State,\nvehemently and fervently opposed the submissions advanced by\nthe learned counsel for the appellant. He urged that the Chief\nMinister of Uttar Pradesh, analysed the law and order situation in\ndifferent districts of the State while taking a review meeting with\nthe officials of the Home Department. The Chief Minister sought\ninformation as to whether the investigations in accordance with\nlaw were being carried out and duly completed by the concerned\npolice officials. As a consequence, the Additional Chief Secretary,\nGovernment of Uttar Pradesh directed the Commissioners of\nPolice, Senior Superintendents and Superintendents of Police of\nvarious districts of the State to submit detailed reports along with\nthe names of Investigating Officers, who had not completed the\ninvestigations and/or submitted a police report before the Court\nin time.\n10. In pursuance of the aforesaid direction, the Circle Officer\nKhadda, District Khushinagar issued a notice dated 25th\nSeptember, 2021 to the appellant seeking response on the issue of\nlong pendency of investigations assigned to him. The appellant\nduly submitted his reply to the above notice sent by the Circle\nOfficer. As per learned counsel for the respondents, the reply\noffered by the appellant was forwarded to the senior police officials\nand was found to be unsatisfactory. Based on these\ncommunications, the Additional Deputy General of Police prepared\na report furnishing the individual details of three erring\nInvestigating Officers from each district. The appellant was\nidentified as one of the slack Investigating Officers in the District\nKhushinagar, Uttar Pradesh who had failed to complete the\nminimum number of investigations and his name was included in\nthe detailed report, which was submitted to the Government.\nBased on this report, the Additional Chief Secretary, Home (Police)\nissued the impugned order dated 16th November, 2021,\ncondemning the appellant for gross negligence, indifference and\nselfishness while performing his duties and not completing the\nassigned investigations within the specified time frame.\n11. In consequence of the above order, the Superintendent of\nPolice being the officer competent under the Rules, issued a\ncommunication dated 7th March, 2022, whereby an adverse entry\nwas directed to be recorded in the appellant’s service book. The\nlearned counsel for the respondents fervently urged that it is\nincorrect to say that the decision to record the censure entry was\ntaken without following the due process of law or without adhering\nto the principles of natural justice.\n12. We have heard the submissions advanced by learned counsel\nfor the parties at bar and have gone through the material placed\non record.\n13. The short question requiring consideration is, whether the\ndirection to record the censure entry in the appellant’s service book\nsuffers from the vice of non-adherence to the principles of natural\njustice and whether the said action is dehors the Rules, 1991.\n14. The relevant rules of the Rules, 19915 which are germane to\nthe controversy at hand are reproduced hereinbelow:-\n“Rule 4-Punishment\n(1) The following punishments may, for good and sufficient\nreasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon a Police\nOfficer, namely:-\n(a) Major Penalties:\n(i) Dismissal from service.\n(ii) Removal from service.\n(iii)Reduction in rank including reduction to a lower scale or\nto a lower stage in a time scale.\n(b) Minor penalties:\n(i) With-holding of promotion.\n(ii) Fine not exceeding one month's pay.\n(iii)With-holding of increment, including stoppage at an\nefficiency bar.\n(iv) Censure.\nRule 5-Procedure for award of Punishment\nrule (1) of rule-14.\nsub-rule (2) of rule-14.\n(3) The cases in which minor penalties mentioned in sub-rules\n(2) and (3) of rule-4 may be awarded shall be dealt with in\naccordance with the procedure laid down in rule-15.\n5 Ibid.\nRule 7-Powers of punishment\n(1) The Government or any officer of police department not\nbelow the ranks of the Deputy Inspector General may award\nany of the punishments mentioned in rule-4 on any police\nofficer.\npunishments mentioned in sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) and\nclause (b) of sub-rule (1), of rule-4 on Inspectors and Sub-\nInspectors.\npunishments mentioned in rule-4 on such police officers as are\nbelow the rank of Sub-Inspectors.\n(4) Subject to the provisions contained in these rules all\nAssistant Superintendents of Police and Deputy\nSuperintendents of Police who have completed two years of\nservice as Assistant Superintendents of Police and Deputy\nSuperintendents of Police as the case may be, may exercise\npowers of Superintendent of Police except the powers to\nimpose major punishments under rule-4.\n(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules Reserve\nInspector, Inspector of Station Officer may award the\npunishments of drill and fatigue duty to any constable under\nhis charge for a period not exceeding three days, but he shall\ninform the Superintendent of Police concerned of his order\nimmediately and in any case within 24 hours of passing the\norder.\nRule 14-Procedure for concluding departmental\nproceedings\n(l) Subject to the provisions contained in these Rules, the\ndepartmental proceedings in the cases referred to in sub-rule\n(1) of rule 5 against the police officers may be conducted in\naccordance with the procedure laid down in Appendix-I.\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1)\npunishments in cases referred to in sub-rule (2) of rule 5\nmay be imposed after informing the police officer in writing\nimputations of act or omission on which it is proposed to\nbe taken and giving him a reasonable opportunity of\nmaking such representation as he may wish to make\nagainst the proposal.\n(3) The charged police officer shall not be represented by\nCounsel in any proceeding instituted under these Rules.”\n(emphasis supplied)\n15. Rule 4 of the Rules, 1991 prescribes the punishments which\ncan be awarded to the employees of the Police Department. Rules\n5 and 14 prescribes the procedure to be followed prior to the award\nof such punishment(s) and Rule 7 prescribes the authority\ncompetent to impose the punishments. A bare perusal of the Rules\nmakes it clear that the minor penalties are provided in Rule 4(1)(b)\nof the Rules, 1991 which includes censure, as awarded to the\nappellant, and the procedure for awarding such minor penalties\nhas been set out in Rule 14(2) read with Rule 5(2) of the Rules,\n16. Rule 14(2) read with Rule 5(2) of the Rules, 1991 provides\nthat the minor penalties as provided under Rule 4(1)(b) can be\nimposed only after informing the delinquent police officer in writing\nimputations of act or omission on which it is proposed to be taken\nand giving him a reasonable opportunity of making such\nrepresentation as he may wish to make against the proposal.\n17. At this juncture, it is pertinent to mention that in lieu of the\ndirections issued by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home (Police)\nto prepare a report concerning the delinquent police officer(s) who\nwere not completing the investigation of their cases within the\nspecified time frame, the Circle Officer, Khadda, District\nKhushinagar issued a notice dated 25th September, 2021 to the\nappellant requiring him to furnish an explanation and show cause\nregarding a long list of cases pending investigation with him. In\nresponse to the above notice, the appellant furnished an\nexplanation to the Circle Officer, Khadda, District Khushinagar on\nthe very same day wherein he claimed that most of his time was\nconsumed in managing VIP duties and other external duties\nassigned to him, and consequently, he could not complete the\ninvestigation of 13 cases pending with him.\n18. A detailed report with the names of three worst performing\nInvestigating Officers including that of the appellant was\nforwarded to the Government through the Additional Director\nGeneral of Police. After going through the report, the Additional\nChief Secretary, Home (Police) issued the impugned order dated\n16th November, 2021 noting the conduct of the appellant and\nobserving that he exhibited signs of gross negligence, indifference\nand selfishness while performing the duties and that such conduct\nwas highly condemnable. The said order was forwarded to the\nSuperintendent of Police who passed the consequential order\ndated 7th March, 2022 with a direction to record a censure entry\non the personal file of the appellant.\n19. Rule 7(2) of the Rules, 1991, empowers the Superintendent\nof Police to award the punishments under sub-clause (iii) of clause\n(a) and clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 on Inspectors and Sub-\nInspectors. Therefore, without any doubt, the Superintendent of\nPolice was having the jurisdiction to award minor penalty of\ncensure to the appellant who was, at the relevant point of time,\nposted as the Sub-Inspector of Police at Police Station\nHanumanganj, District Khushinagar, Uttar Pradesh.\n20. Apparently thus, the censure entry directed to be recorded\nvide letter dated 7th March, 2022, was awarded by the\nSuperintendent of Police, District Khushinagar, who was\ncompetent to do so as per Rule 7(2) of the Rules, 1991. The order\ndated 16th November, 2021 was passed by the Additional Chief\nSecretary, Home (Police), after taking into consideration the entire\nmaterial on record including the detailed factual report forwarded\nby the Additional Director General of Police which included the\nexplanation of the appellant and assigned reasons for reaching the\nconclusion that the appellant did not show interest in the disposal\nof the investigations which was treated to be a sign of gross\nnegligence, indifference and selfishness while performing duties\nand was thus highly condemnable. Therefore, the contention\nadvanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the censure\nentry was directed to be recorded by an Officer who was not\ncompetent and that the same suffers from the vice of non-\nadherence to the rules/principles of nature justice is not tenable.\n21. Resultantly, we are of the view that the High Court committed\nno error whatsoever in rejecting the writ petition and writ appeal\npreferred by the appellant, assailing the censure entry.\n22. The appeal lacks merit and is dismissed. No order as to costs.\n23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.\n..……..………….………………….……….J.", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No.6168 of 2008 With C.A.No.6167 of 2008 | Dr. C. P. Sreekumar, M. S. (Ortho) v. S. Ramanujam | 01/05/2009", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No.6168 of 2008 With C.A.No.6167 of 2008 | Dr. C. P. Sreekumar, M. S. (Ortho) v. S. Ramanujam", + "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "case_record": "The respondent suffered a hairline fracture (Garden type I) of the right femur in a bicycle accident and was admitted to Surya Hospital, where Dr. C.P. Sreekumar (appellant) was the attending doctor. Initial conservative treatment was given. An X-ray on January 8, 1992, revealed the fracture had aggravated to a Garden type III. Dr. Sreekumar performed a hemiarthroplasty on the 42-year-old respondent, who consented. A superficial infection followed, and the respondent later underwent a total hip replacement at another hospital. The respondent filed a complaint alleging negligence, which the State Commission dismissed for lack of evidence. The National Commission, however, allowed the appeal, finding negligence in fracture aggravation due to mishandling, inappropriate surgery choice, and post-operative infection. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court.", + "generated_judgment": "**Facts:**\n1. A 42-year-old respondent suffered a hairline fracture (Garden Type I) of the right femur in a bicycling accident and was admitted to Surya Hospital.\n2. Initial treatment was conservative, but an X-ray on January 8, 1992, revealed the fracture had aggravated to Garden Type III.\n3. Dr. C. P. Sreekumar (the here appellant) performed a hemiarthroplasty as the attending doctor, obtaining the patient's written consent.\n4. Post-surgery, the patient developed a subcutaneous infection and later underwent a total hip replacement at another hospital.\n5. After initiating a complaint of negligence, initially denied by the State Commission for a lack of sufficient evidence, the National Commission overturned its dismissal, ruling negligence due to mishandling of the fracture, an inappropriate surgical choice, and a postoperative infection.\n\n---\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the National Commission’s decision was maintainable or committed procedural violations under the Compensation Act, 2002.\n2. Did the allegations of medical negligence by Dr. Sreekumar adequately rest on valid, substantiated medical criteria pertaining to the patient’s diagnoses and surgical choices?\n\n---\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Sections of Compensation for Endemic Diseases Act, 2002:** Especially Sections 20 (procedural requirements for examiner validation, independent cognition requirements, expanding rights), ensuring compliance is crucial in claims for compensation.\n2. **Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923,Civil Procedure Code rules for appellate review:** Governs trials based on procedure to establish liability and requires evidence to proceed.\n3. **Constitutional Provisions (Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution):** Legal grounds for high court review and extensive judicial oversight.\n4. **Jurisprudence and precedent regarding medical malpractice and surgical negligence:**\n - Survival must demonstrate there’s valid paperwork adherence to established scientific procedures.\n - Findings must be reasonable, accurate, and evidence-based.\n5. **Indian Evidence Act, 1972:** Requires demonstrated evidence for proof in medical negligence cases.\n\n---\n\n### Analysis:\n\n1. **Maintainability Evaluation of National Commission’s Appeal:**\n Review arbitration requirements and procedural stance under Section 20 (c)(2) Compensation Act affirmed against the entire record. The State Commission initially dismissed the case unwilling to sustain substantial medical detail assumptions concerning the Nonecosystemal specificity of the fracture progression and settlement set burdens. A clear procedural violation transforming replacement judgments cannot sufficiently override a testimony examination fault:\n - National Commission oversight surmised higher culpability bracketed without formally evaluating articulated procedural Kui pers Frankfurter and documented X-Ray flaws.\n - **No evidence merger evidence harmonization certification** of material necessity followed in these critical moments, thereby making the appeal non-maintainable against exhaust intrinsic findings.\n\n **Result:** *The National Commission decision before SC lacks necessary procedural auditing. Hence, it does not serve as a sufficient ground for review.*\n\n2. **Legal Standards for Medical Negligence:**\n The documentation provided didn’t sufficiently acknowledge the Council of Indian Medical Association (CIMA) benchmark framework extending limits for **Garden Type I to III fracture conversion**. The hospitke:\n - Incorrect evaluation as legality’s baseline of similar procedures miss alignment with Industrial and Complexs Hemic Association (ICDM) gamified certifications invalid specific need analysis and critical review aspects during diagnosis gaps.\n - Chain of medical cause for the infection post-surgery was dubitable. The c جزررفية infection systemically couldn’t be attributed to Dr. Sree Kumar due to inadequate evidence raw written notes illustrate systemic mitigating factors less probative for substantiating a causation chain governing the primary medical negligence claim.\n\n - Same warrant medicinal review of hemiarthroplasty, where applicable equipment could disclose quality risks; Which was then patched post-surgery listing sharply when criteria might meet Central Applaints tribunals’ uphill liability.\n\n**Foreclosure tilt incident these points proves scrutinizing findings surveyed or circumscribed evidence do not sufficiently uphold the oversight required under appropriate medical cadre’s review.** The leniency in diagnostic and surgical clash (in vocation) aligns poor evidence supporting negligence claims dictated CRM VII requirements of INCREASING adjudicated clarity beyond operationally examined nonspecialized hegemony.\n\n---\n\n### Conclusion:\nAfter critically evaluating the facts, issues, and rules outlined above regarding procedural standards and medical necessity compliance, the National Commission decision without rigorous adhering follow-up scrutiny invalidated due to procedural lapses, making the appeal unacceptable.\n\nAccordingly, **DISMISSED.**", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE HARJIT SINGH BEDI\n1. This judgment will dispose of C.A. No.6168 of 2008, and C.A.No.6167/2008 as they arise out of the same order. The facts are being taken from C.A. No.6168 of 2008. \n2. These appeals are directed against the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter called the \"Commission\") whereby a sum of Rs.5.50 Lac alongwith interest on a part of the aforesaid amount and costs of Rs.25000/- has been awarded to the complainant - respondent. The facts leading to this appeal are as under: \n3. The respondent, who was then employed in the Indian Overseas Bank, Chennai was going on his bicycle at about 8:20 a.m. on 31st December 1991 when he was hit by a motorcycle leading to an injury to his leg. He was admitted to the Surya Hospital, of which the appellant, Dr. C.P. Sreekumar was the Managing Director, at about 9.45 a.m. An X-ray of the leg revealed a hairline fracture of the neck of the right femur. The appellant, as the attending doctor, chose a conservative line of treatment and put the respondent's leg in a plaster of paris bandage known as 'derotation boots' in order to immobilize the leg. On the insistence of the respondent that he be released to recuperate at home, he was taken for another X-ray on 8th January 1992 as a prelude to his discharge wherein it was found that the simple hairline fracture Garden type I had developed to a more serious Garden type III fracture. The appellant thereupon decided that an operation be performed on the injured leg. Pre-operative evaluations were made on 9th January 1992 and the appellant, on considering the various options available, decided to perform a hemiarthroplasty instead of going in for the internal fixation procedure. The respondent consented to the choice of the surgery after the various options had been explained to him. The surgery was performed on the next day. The respondent remained admitted as an indoor patient, during which post operative treatment and monitoring was done by the appellant between 11th January to 21st January 1992 and it was observed that a superficial infection had set in. The sutures were actually removed on 21st January 1992. The respondent was thereafter made to undergo physiotherapy and was finally discharged on 5th February 1992. On 6th March 1992, the respondent appeared in the hospital and his condition was reviewed and he was instructed to go in for physiotherapy on a daily basis and to return for a subsequent review two weeks later but he neglected the advice. It is the case of the respondent that on account of lingering pain, he had consulted various doctors, including Dr. Mohandas of Tamil Nadu hospital on 27th May 1992 who gave his opinion on the matter. The appellant has however pleaded that the respondent, in the meanwhile, continued to make a nuisance of himself with frequent visits to and unbecoming behaviour in the hospital on which the appellant gave a sum of Rs.50,000/- as an ex-gratia payment in order to pacify him. It appears however, that notwithstanding the aforesaid payment the respondent sent an Advocate's notice on 19th November 1992 alleging negligence and deficiency in service as the simple fracture had got displaced to a more complicated one, on account of mishandling by the hospital staff as also in the choice and the manner of the surgery and calling for compensation of Rs.3 Lac of which Rs.50,000/- had (statedly) already been paid as an advance. The appellant in his reply dated 15th December 1992, denied any negligence in the surgery and further pointed out that the displacement of the fracture had come about on account of natural causes i.e. a muscular spasm and that respondent after being informed about the various lines of treatment available had consented to the hemiarthroplasty. Dissatisfied with the reply given by the appellant, the respondent in May, 1993 filed a complaint before the State Commission alleging that his consent had not been taken for the hemiarthroplasty and that this procedure was not justified as the bone was in good condition. The appellant in his reply denied the allegations and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. It appears that while the complaint was yet pending, the respondent underwent a total hip replacement on 24th April 1995 at the Tamil Nadu hospital performed by Dr. Mohandas, on which he moved an application before the State Commission seeking to amend the complaint whereby the claim was increased from Rs.3 to Rs.12 Lac. After the necessary changes in the pleadings on account of the amendment aforesaid, the matter was brought to trial before the State Commission. The appellant appeared as a witness and was examined and cross-examined over several days. Several documents were also filed by the respective parties. By its order dated 29th January 1999, the State Commission dismissed the complaint holding that there had been no negligence or deficiency in service on the part of the appellant and that the respondent had not been able to prove mishandling by the hospital staff. The State Commission, inter alia, noted that the complainant had not appeared as a witness and further that no witness had been examined by him in support of his case. \n4. Aggrieved by the order of the State Commission, the respondent filed an appeal before the Commission on 12th April 1999 and at that stage sought to produce one Dr. David, the duty doctor at the relevant time, as a witness, but thereafter took no steps to secure his presence. Vide its order of 15th November 2006, the Commission, however, allowed the appeal but limited the respondent's claim to Rs.2.5 Lac, ( being the balance amount after deducting Rs.50,000/- allegedly paid as an advance) but, in addition granted a further sum of Rs.3 Lac to cover the contingency that he might have to undergo yet another surgery at some later stage. Two appeals have been filed against the order of the Commission in this Court - C.A. No.6168 of 2008 by Dr. C.P. Sreekumar seeking a dismissal of the complaint and the second, C.A.No.6167 of 2008 by the respondent, S.Ramanujam, seeking an enhancement of the compensation to Rs.12 Lac. Both matters are being disposed off by this judgment. \n5. The Commission in its order noted that the respondent had suffered only a hairline fracture (described as Garden type I fracture) for which he had been admitted in the hospital and had been immobilized by being put in a plaster with a suggestion of six weeks bed rest so that the fracture could heal on its own, and as such there was no occasion for the respondent to be taken for another X-ray on the 8th January 1992 as there was absolutely no complaint from him and it was at that stage that it was discovered that the simple hairline fracture had developed into a displaced Garden type III fracture. The Commission concluded that this complication had happened when the respondent had been moved from the first to the ground floor of the hospital for the purpose of X-ray by a ward boy, Elango, assisted by some laborers, who were not qualified to handle a patient. The Commission also observed that there was no warrant for the stand of the appellant that the hairline fracture had been displaced due to a muscular spasm and for that reason the averments made in the complaint could not be disregarded. The Commission emphasized that within 2 days of the X-ray on 10th January 1992 the respondent had undergone a hemiarthroplasty, a surgical procedure whereby half of the hip joint had been replaced leaving the other half in its natural state and relied heavily on several medical texts placed by the parties to hold that this procedure was performed only on patients of the age of 60 years and above and as the respondent was, at the relevant time, 42 years of age, the open reduction procedure, whereby the bones are brought together and clamped by metal screws etc., was the appropriate one. The Commission also accepted the submission of the respondent to the effect that in the case of a patient under 60 years of age who had presumably a long span of active life, every effort was required to be made to preserve the femoral head as in a case of hemiarthroplasty or of total hip replacement the joint would inevitably fail with the passage of time. The Commission further observed that the respondent had approached Dr. Mohandas on 16th March 1992 with a complaint of pain in the right leg and inability to walk and Dr. Mohandas had recorded that the respondent had some kind of infection and had advised for the removal of the prosthetic and further advised for a total hip replacement. The Commission accordingly opined that the fact that only a few days after the hemiarthroplasty, the respondent had developed an infection clearly showed negligence at the hands of the attending doctors with the result that he had perforce to undergo a total hip replacement at the Tamil Nadu Hospital, Chennai on 28th January 1995. In conclusion, the Commission observed as under: \n\"It is thus clear that: (i) a hairline fracture developed into displaced fracture due to wrong handling in the opposite party's hospital; (ii) the opposite party performed a Hemi-arthroplasty on a young patient of 42 years without consideration open reduction and internal fixation and against established medical practices; (iii) the post-operative infection was not properly conducted with the result that prosthesis got loosened within a period of two months. There is thus a clear case of negligence and deficiency in service rendered by the opposite party.\" \n6. The Commission then came to the question of the payment of Rs.50,000/- by the appellant to the respondent and observed that there were strong reasons to believe the respondent's plea that it was a part payment towards a compromise for the larger sum of Rs.3 Lac that had been promised. The Commission further observed that from the certificate issued by Dr. N.K. Sundaram of Tamil Nadu Hospital it was clear that a total hip replacement would fail over a period of time and would need to be revised again with a new artificial joint, which would cost Rs.3 Lac and that this amount too was payable to the respondent. A total sum of Rs.5.50 Lac was, thus, computed and awarded. \n7. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, has first and foremost pointed out that the Commission had proceeded on the basis that all that had been pleaded by the respondent in his complaint was the gospel truth despite the fact that all the allegations had been controverted and in the background that no ocular evidence had been led by the respondent and neither he himself, nor his wife, who appeared to be well informed about the procedures that had been adopted, had appeared to give evidence, there was no warrant for believing the entire story on his mere ipse dixit. It has also been pleaded that there was neither any mishandling of the respondent by Elango and the others nor any misjudgment in the choice of the surgery as at the very initial stage the Doctor had chosen a conservative line of treatment as the fracture was a simple Garden type I, but which had been later transformed into a Garden type III fracture on account of a muscular spasm which required a hemiarthoplasty and that this line of treatment had been chosen as it would make for quicker recovery so that patient's ambulation could be restored. It has also been argued that the mere fact that a complete hip replacement had been made on 28th April 1995 i.e. three long years after the hemiarthroplasty showed that this procedure was in fact the correct one. It has also been submitted that there was no warrant for the very broad proposition that the only procedure in the given circumstances to be performed on a 42 year old patient was internal fixation and that hemiarthroplasty had to be completely ruled out unless the patient was beyond 60 years of age. He has reiterated that as per the evidence of the appellant doctor, the nature of the fracture had changed from Garden type I to Garden type III on account of a muscular spasm and the condition of the bone had also deteriorated and as this statement had not been challenged or controverted by the respondent by adducing evidence, there was no justification in disbelieving the statement as he was the best judge in selecting the appropriate procedure in the given circumstances. It has finally been submitted that there is no basis for the conclusion that the payment of Rs.50,000/- to the respondent was a part payment towards a compromise involving a total settlement of Rs.3 Lac, as this amount had been paid to mollify the respondent who was creating a nuisance in the hospital premises and the appellant's residence and causing inconvenience to the other patients. It has, thus, been prayed that in the light of this background, there was no justification for the award and that no compensation whatsoever was called for. \n8. Mr. Ranjit Kumar's stand has been strongly controverted by the respondent, who appeared in person. As a matter of fact, owing to the limitations of untrained litigants who appear in person, we had asked the respondent if he wished to engage a lawyer or we could even arrange one to represent him as an amicus curiae. He brusquely declined the offer and on the contrary vehemently suggested that he had no faith in members of the legal profession as he had been cheated by his lawyer before the State Commission as he had connived with the opposite party and had deliberately dissuaded him from producing any substantive evidence which had led to the dismissal of his complaint at the first instance. During the course of his arguments and in his affidavit dated 19th June 2007 as also in his written submissions given to this Court, the respondent repeatedly requested that the matter be remanded to the State Commission for recording his evidence, that of his wife and some expert witnesses and also to produce some additional objects as evidence. We, however, questioned the respondent as to whether he had made any such prayer or complaint in writing before the State Commission or the Commission and he admitted that he had not done so. In this background, and the fact that the incident had happened some 18 years ago, we feel that it would be inappropriate to remand the matter to the State Commission for additional evidence at this stage. \n9. We find that three basic issues arise in the present case, (1) whether Dr. C.P. Sreekumar, the appellant herein, had the competence to perform a hemiarthroplasty and whether he had chosen this procedure as he was not qualified for the internal fixation procedure; (2) whether it was the negligence of the Surya Hospital of which Dr. C.P. Sreekumar appellant was the Director and of the ward boy Elango and three labourers, who are said to have removed the respondent from his room for X- ray department on 8th January 1992 that had resulted in the aggravation of the Garden type I fracture to Garden III type fracture necessitating more radical treatment and (3) even assuming that some radical procedure was necessary, whether hemiarthroplasty was the appropriate one in the light of the fact that the respondent was at the relevant time 42 years of age. \n10. The basic principles under which a case of medical negligence as a criminal offence as also a tort has to be evaluated has been succinctly laid down in Jacob Mathew vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2005) 6 SCC 1. One of the primary arguments raised by the respondent herein is that the appellant Dr. C. P. Sreekumar, though qualified in Orthopedics, did not have the basic skill to carry out a hemiarthroplasty or an internal fixation and for that reason was not competent to perform the procedure. In Jacob Mathew's case, this Court adopted the test laid down in Bolam vs. Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 2 All ER 118 (QBD) in which it has been observed as under : \n \"[W]here you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and profession to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill...It is well-established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art.\" \n11. This Court then observed that this judgment had been followed repeatedly not only in India but in other jurisdictions as well and that it was the statement of law as commonly understood today. In paragraphs 24 and 32 of Jacob Mathew's case it has been observed thus: \n\" The classical statement of law in Bolam's case has been widely accepted as decisive of the standard of care required both of professional men generally and medical practitioners in particular. It has been invariably cited with approval before the courts in India and applied as a touchstone to test the pleas of medical negligence. In tort, it is enough for the defendant to show that the standard of care and the skill attained was that of the ordinary competent medical practitioner exercising an ordinary degree of professional skill. The fact that a defendant charged with negligence acted in accord with the general and approved practice is enough to clear him of the charge. Two things are pertinent to be noted. Firstly, the standard of care, when assessing the practice as adopted, is judged in the light of knowledge available at the time (of the incident), and not at the date of trial. Secondly, when the charge of negligence arises out of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the equipment was not generally available at that point of time on which it is suggested as should have been used. \n 32. At least three weighty considerations can be pointed out which any forum trying the issue of medical negligence in any jurisdiction must keep in mind. These are: (i) that legal and disciplinary procedures should be properly founded on firm, moral and scientific grounds; (ii) that patients will be better served if the real causes of harm are properly identified and appropriately acted upon; and (iii) that many incidents involve a contribution from more than one person, and the tendency is to blame the last identifiable element in the chain of causation, the person holding the \"smoking gun\". \n12. These observations postulate the underlying principle that too much suspicion about the negligence of attending Doctors and frequent interference by Courts would be a very dangerous proposition as it would prevent Doctors from taking decisions which could result in complications and in this situation the patient would be the ultimate sufferer. Jacob Mathew's case was followed in State of Punjab v. Shiv Ram & Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 1 which was a case of a failed tubectomy leading to a plea of medical negligence. This is what this Court had to say in paragraph 33: \n\" A Doctor, in essence, needs to be inventive and has to take snap decisions especially in the course of performing surgery when some unexpected problems crop up or complication sets in. If the medical profession, as a whole, is hemmed in by threat of action, criminal and civil, the consequence will be loss to the patients. No doctor would take a risk, a justifiable risk in the circumstances of a given case, and try to save his patient from a complicated disease or in the face of an unexpected problem that confronts him during the treatment or the surgery. It is in this background that this Court has cautioned that the setting in motion of the criminal law against the medical profession should be done cautiously and on the basis of reasonably sure grounds. In criminal prosecutions or claims in tort, the burden always rests with the prosecution or the claimant. No doubt, in a given case, a doctor may be obliged to explain his conduct depending on the evidence adduced by the prosecution or by the claimant. That position does not change merely because of the caution advocated in Jacob Mathew in fixing liability for negligence, on doctors. \" \n13. In Samira Kohli vs. Dr.Prabha Manchanda & Anr (2008) 2 SCC 1 the basic issue was as to the principle governing \"consent\" to be taken from a patient prior to any invasive procedure. We find, however, that in the present case, the question of consent has not been raised by the respondent and on the contrary the case seems to be that the consent had, in fact, been taken. Even in his arguments the respondent did not deny lack of consent and on the contrary (as Mr. Ranjit Kumar has pointed out) in the Advocate's notice issued to Dr. C.P. Sreekumar appellant, on 19th November 1992, the fact that the respondent had agreed to the operation, has been admitted. \n14. Before we embark on an evaluation of the three issues it bears reiteration that the respondent did not produce any evidence in court and did not even appear as a witness in support of his own case. Realizing the consequences of this omission, the respondent had requested that the matter be remitted to the State Commission for recording additional evidence, which request has been declined by us. \n15. The first issue is with regard to the doctor's expertise in his field of orthopaedics, as it is the respondent's plea that he had chosen hemiarthroplasty as he was not qualified to go in for the internal fixation procedure and that he lacked the elementary knowledge of hemiarthroplasty as well. We have considered this argument and find that there is absolutely no evidence to back up this wide claim. On the contrary, we have gone through the evidence of the appellant who deposed that he was an M.B.B.S. from the Tanjore Medical College and had thereafter done his Masters in General Surgical Science from the University of Madras in the year 1983 and his Masters in Orthopaedic Sciences from the University of London in the year 1985 and that on the day of the operation he had about 15 years of experience in the field of Orthopaedics. We have also gone through the very lengthy cross-examination of the appellant spread (intermittently) over several days and find not the slightest suggestion that the appellant was unable to perform an internal fixation. The bald statement of the respondent (in the course of his arguments and in his written submissions) with respect to the lack of expertise in performing the internal fixation procedure on which the appellant had chosen to go in for hemiarthroplasty, cannot thus, be accepted. \n16. Admittedly the respondent had suffered a simple Garden Type I hairline fracture in the course of the accident on 31st December 1991 and after he had been examined by the appellant on that day, his leg had been immobilized with the help of derotation boots. It is the case of the respondent that when he was taken for an X-ray on 8th January 1992 it was found that the simple Garden I type fracture had developed into a complicated Garden III type fracture, and that this happened on account of rough handling by Elango and the other attendants who were mere labourers whereas it is the case of the appellant that this had occurred due to a muscular spasm. \nWe find from a reading of the order of the Commission that it proceeded on the basis that whatever had been alleged in the complaint by the respondent was in fact the inviolable truth even though it remained unsupported by any evidence. As already observed in Jacob Mathew's case the onus to prove medical negligence lies largely on the claimant and that this onus can be discharged by leading cogent evidence. A mere averment in a complaint which is denied by the other side can, by no stretch of imagination, be said to be evidence by which the case of the complainant can be said to be proved. It is the obligation of the complainant to provide the facta probanda as well as the facta probantia. \n17. The Commission has, further, relied on the cross- examination of the appellant with regard to the speculation about the defective lift as being the reason for the shift of the respondent on a stretcher to the X-ray room. This is on the face of it misplaced, as no inference can flow that the displacement had occurred on account of rough handling by the staff. The appellant, on the contrary, in the course of his evidence, pointed out that as the respondent's smoking over a period of 15 years had resulted in chronic bronchitis, that he was obese and had taken hormonal treatment for sterility and in this context re-emphasized that the displacement had occurred due to a strong muscular spasm. When cross- examined on 7th April 1998 he pointed out that in order to immobilize the leg he had used de-rotation boots which extend below the navel and to the injured leg to half of the uninjured leg and that such a cast would normally immobilize the hip by 75% but notwithstanding this fact a muscular spasm could still happen. It will be seen from the cross-examination that there was no suggestion whatsoever that a simple hairline fracture of the femur could not be transformed to a Garden type III fracture due to a muscular spasm. We thus find from the appellant's reply to the complaint and also in the course of his evidence that the fracture had been displaced on account of muscular spasm and that this point has gone unrebutted as no contrary evidence has been produced. It cannot therefore be said with any certitude that the displacement had occurred on account of the rough handling by Elango and the others on the 8th January 1992. In its order, while referring to the radical change in the fracture, the Commission has observed: \n\"There is no way to ascertain the reason for this development but one cannot disregard the averment made by the complainant that it is due to rough handling of the staff of the hospital.\" \nWe are of the opinion that in the face of this observation, no case of negligence can be spelt out. \n18. The question as to whether hemiarthroplasty or internal fixation was the proper procedure in the background that the respondent was 42 years of age at the relevant time, has been hotly debated. It is the case of the appellant that on evaluation of the respondent's condition he had thought it fit to carry out a hemiarthroplasty whereas it is the case of the respondent that as per the various text books which have been placed on record, this procedure was invariably carried out on a patient who was 60 years of age or above and hemiarthroplasty was thus not the favoured option for him. Mr. Ranjit Kumar has taken us through several passages from various text books, most of which have in fact been produced by the respondent, and it does appear that ordinarily in the case of a patient of less than 60 years of age, hemiarthroplasty is not the preferred option and internal fixation involving the use of a clamp with screws was the more acceptable one. In Subcapital Fractures of the femur, A Prospective Review by R.Barnes, J.T.Brown, Glasoow, Scotland, R.S.Garden, Priston,and E.A.Nicoll, Mansfield, England. With a statistical analysis by D.F.Goda, Edinburgh, Scotland, it has been pointed out that the choice between the internal fixation and immediate prosthetic replacement is often difficult to make and no full proof criteria exists for assessing which of the two procedures is the proper one in the facts of the particular case. Likewise, in the Article \"The displaced femoral neck fracture internal fixation versus Bipolar Endoprosthesis : Results of a Prospective Randomised Comparsion (Bray - TJ ; Smith Hoefer.E, Hooper.A, Timmerman.L. University of California, Davis Medical Center, Sacramento Clin Orthop.1988 May (230) 127-40 wherein the dilemma as to the procedure to be adopted has again been highlighted, it does appear that in the case of a young patient, internal fixation is the favoured procedure. In Practical Fracture Treatment (Third Edition) by Ronald Mcrae it has been observed as under: \n\"Alternative treatments of intracapsular fractures(1): Non- operative management: All impacted fractures (Garden I and some Garden 2) may be treated conservatively, and this is an important consideration, especially wherein an ageing population these fractures are on the increase, and where surgical time is in heavy demand. Overall a lower mortality rate has been claimed in those treated conservatively as opposed to surgically. Method:(1)The leg is rested in a gutter splint until pain settles (usually after about a week).(2)Partial weight bearing with crutches is then commenced, and continued for 8 weeks, after which full unsupported weight bearing may be allowed.(3)Check radiographs are taken 2 days after the start of mobilisation, and thereafter every 2 weeks until the eight week.(4) If the fracture disimpacts and becomes unstable (a 14% incidence only is claimed) then active treatment becomes necessary, when a hemi-or total arthroplasty may be performed. Disimpaction is seen most often in those over 70 especially those in poor general health, or in the younger patient with a low life expectancy. The problems of prolonged recumbency in the elderly may nevertheless follow this line of treatment.\" \nThis basic principle has been repeated again in Emergency Orthopaedics and Trauma by Andrew Unwin and Kirsten Jones in which it has been observed as under: \n\"Subcapital fractures of the neck of the femur: \nThese common fractures have been classified according to the Garden classification. \nGarden I \nImpacted fractures with an incomplete facture line. \nTrabeculae through fracture angulated as the head is abducted. \nGarden 2 \nImpacted fracture with a complete fracture line. \nThe trabeculae appear interrupted but not angulated. \nGarden 3 \nFemoral head is displaced. \nThe trabeculaeare interrupted and angulated. \nGarden 4 \nFemoral head is more displaced (fallen off). \nTrabeculae may appear parallel as the head may not be abducted. \nThis classification system corresponds with increasing insult to the blood supply of the femoral head. Grades 1and 2 are relatively undisplaced fractures with a lower risk of avascular necrosis than the more displaced Grades 3and 4. The system also allows a treatment strategy(see below). \nSubcapital fractures are prone, in addition to other complications associated with all femoral neck fractures, to two particular problems: \n(a) avascular necrosis of the femoral head - this is unpredictable, but generally the prognosis is worse with greater displacement and with proximal fractures; and \n(b)non-union of the fracture. \nThe treatment of these fractures is controversial. Many centres now adopt the following protocol: \n1. All young patients undergo internal fixation as a surgical emergency in an attempt to reduce the fracture, decompress the intracapsular haematoma and fix the fragments. Subsequent avascular necrosis or non- union is treated on its merits, often with a total hip replacement.(Primary total hip replacement as an emergency treatment is regarded by many to have an unacceptable complication rate,although this policy is adopted by some). \n2. In older patients:- \nGarden 1 and 2 fractures are internally fixed. \nGarden 3 and 4 fractures are assumed to have a high risk of complication with internal fixation, and so as to avoid multiple operations, undergo a hemi-arthroplasty, replacing the head of the femur whilst leaving the acetabulum intact (Fig.20.9). A risk of hemiarthroplasty is that the metallic femoral head may 'bore' its way into the acetabulum, causing pain and erosion. For this reason, with their softer bone, hemiarthroplasty should be avoided in patients with rheumatoid arthritis. \n3. In the very old or frail patient,all femoral neck fractures are recommended to undergo hemiarthroplasty.\" \nIn Intracapsular Fractures of the Neck of the Femur By C.E.Ackroyd.G.C.Bannister and V.G.Langkamer, it has been observed as under: \nIndications for internal fixation If undisplaced fractures are managed without fixation, 12 per cent displace and are therefore less likely to unite. The trabecular bone is already impacted and fixation with two screws is sufficient to maintain stability. \nBritish and Danish controlled trials suggest that in patients over 70 years of age with displaced fractures, primary prosthetic replacement results in lower morbidity, fewer reoperations and comparable mortality over 6 months when compared with internal fixation. However,femoral head replacement results in progressive acetabular erosion and after 5 years 20 per cent of survivors have undergone total hip replacement. \nInternal fixation may reasonably be offered to mentally alert, independent and fully mobile patients, whose life expectancy is likely to exceed 5 years provided that the fracture can be accurately reduced in patients under 60 years of age every effort must be made to preserve the femoral head. Prosthetic replacement will inevitably fail with the passage of time. \nFixation devices \nThe profusion of fixation devices is testimony to the poor union rate of intracapsular fractures and the endeavours to improve this by more secure fixation.The literature is confused by reports quoting wide differences in results between individual authors and from different institutions but when randomized prospective controlled trials have been carried out by some authors, results are all very similar. \nThe evidence suggests that displaced subcapital fractures unite better with adequate internal fixation. \nTwo implants are better than one, and a screw can be inserted with less trauma than a nail and is less likely to disturb the reduction. In Standard Orthopaedic Operations, \nThird Ediction by J.Crawford Adams Comment \nEfficient internal fixation of femoral neck fractures is not always simple and it demands considerable precision. The slogan should be: \"Get it right first time\". All too often the operator accepts an inferior reduction, an imperfect position of the nail or screw, or incorrect length of the fixation devices. Defeat must not be accepted perseverance is well rewarded. \nTrouble is often experienced with the radiographic control. Unless the setting up of the apparatus is supervised by the surgeon himself films that are virtually useless may be produced. In particular, they often fail to show the femoral head adequately in the lateral projection. The reason for this is usually that the cassette is not pushed firmly enough into the loin, or that the beam is wrongly directed. These points must be checked every time a film is exposed. The same remarks apply to the use of the image intensifier. \nIf the correct rotational position of the limb is not insisted upon it often happens that the lateral radiographs show the femur semi-obliquely rather than in the true lateral projection. Acceptance of such an incorrect position makes accurate insertion of the nail and screw unnecessary difficult. \nChoosing the correct length of the nail and of the screw should not present any special problem because the length of the guide wire within the bone can be determined accurately by measuring the amount still protruding, and to this may be added or from it subtracted an amount as measured on the check radiographs. One necessary precaution needs to be mentioned, however, that is, to measure the length of the nail directly with a ruler before it is inserted, and not to rely simply on the figure engraved upon it: the length as engraved is not always the effective length that will enter the bone, for it may include the head of the nail. \nA hazard that needs further mention is that of inadvertently driving the guide wire forwards with the nail. This can present a very serious difficulty if the wire is driven across the hip joint into the iliacfossa, for the guide wire may be broken off by repeated hammer blows upon the nail. In such a case the only way of retrieving the broken-off part of the guide wire is by exposing the iliac fossa and locating the tip of the wire from within the pelvis. This dilemma is, however, easily avoided if the precaution is taken of examining the guide wire repeatedly while the nail is being driven in. This entails removal of the cannulated punch and measurement of the protruding part of the guide wire to see whether it is being driven on. At the same time is wise to grip the guide wire in a hand chuck and to rotate it to and fro: if the wire is being gripped dangerously by the point of the nail it will not rotate freely, and at this danger signal the wire should be promptly withdrawn. \nAll these points of detail are important: neglect of any one of them may easily lead to failure. Alternative Techniques \nIt is not universally accepted that fixation by a nail and a screw is the most effective method. The compression hip screw, the use of which is described.\" \nIn Watson-Jones Fractures and Joint Injuries, Edited by J.N.Wilson, Sixth Edition, Vol.I it has been observed as under: \nTreatment \nThe choice of treatment for femoral neck fractures depends upon three factors: \n1.The age and fitness of the patient \n2.The type of fracture \n3.The degree of displacement \nUndisplaced fractures are treated by protected weight bearing until union occurs or by internal fixation in situ to prevent displacement. If it is decided not to operate, regular radiographs are needed to be sure that the position does not change. \nDisplaced fractures can be treated by internal fixation or prosthetic replacement. \nInternal Fixation. The fracture can be held with several fine pins, a pair of crossed nails or a dynamic compression screw and plate. This device compresses the fracture site and is the preferred treatment in most centres. All of these are inserted under image intensifier control. Internal fixation is particularly suitable for the larger fragments caused by basal fractures. Accurate reduction and fixation is more difficult in severely displaced fractures and those with small fragments. \nIndications. \nInternal fixation: fit; young, little displacement \nProsthesis: unfit, old, displaced fractures Results \nInternal fixation: better long term result. More complications. May need second operation. Slow rehabilitation. \nProsthesis: early mobilization. Long- term complications are rarer but more serious. A good guideline is to fix the fractures of fit patients under 65 and replace the rest. \nThe fracture must be protected from full weigh bearing after fixation, which is difficult in the elderly patient. \nIf successful, internal fixation of the fracture produces an almost perfect hip if the fracture is complicated by aseptic necrosis or non-union, a second operation will be required to replace the head with a prosthesis. The femoral head may also collapse onto the pins, damaging the acetabulum. Prosthetic replacement. Immediate replacement of the head with a Thompson or Austin-Moore prosthesis avoids the complications of non-union and aseptic necrosis and allows immediate full weight bearing. \nEarly mobilization has many advantages, but the prosthesis may loosen or the femoral head may erode the floor of the acetabulum. If either complication occurs, a total hip replacement will be needed. The wound may also become infected, making excision arthroplasty necessary. \nAs always with prosthetic replacement, the results are better than other techniques t when they are successful but far worse when they are not.\" \n19. Mr. Ranjit Kumar and the respondent have filed some additional texts alongwith their written submissions but as they are largely repetitive they need not be referred to. In view of the aforesaid decisions, we find that no firm conclusion as to the preference of one or the other procedure can be drawn but for a Garden type III fracture on a young person, internal fixation is ordinarily the favoured but not the only option as some of the texts afore-referred also proceed on a school of thought which prescribe that in order to avoid long drawn out recovery and other complications, it is advisable to go in for a hemiarthroplasty notwithstanding the age factor. It has also been observed that condition of the patient and of the bone would be relevant determining factors in the choice which the doctor wishes to make. The appellant, in his evidence, explained as to why he had chosen hemiarthroplasty over internal fixation in the following words: \n\"During the surgery I was assisted by Dr. Naivasivayam who was a Surgeon for 20 years of experience attached to Government General Hospital, Madras. One Dr. Gopinath was a stand-by during the Surgery. He was the Doctor who had treated him for infertility. From the 1st X- ray it was found that the fracture was garden type I. From the second X-ray it was found that the fracture was garden type III. During the operation I found the head of femur to be unhealthy. The size of the prosthesis is a measure from the head of the femur removed from the patient during the course of surgery by a special measuring device. I was satisfied with my whole procedures.\" \n20. In cross-examination, he further stated that due to deterioration of the fracture site, he had decided to go in for surgery instead of internal fixation. It is also relevant that though the respondent had sought the opinion of Dr. Ajit Yadav of the Tamil Nadu Hospitals on 30th May 1992, he produced no evidence to off-set the appellant's evidence as to why he had chosen hemiarthroplasty over internal fixation. It is equally significant that the respondent had taken the advice of several renowned doctors including Dr. Mohan Das and Dr. Nand Kumar, but none of them in their treatment notes observed adversely about the choice of treatment nor any negligence in the actual operation. In the light of the fact that there is some divergence of opinion as to the proper procedure to be adopted, it cannot be said with certainty that the appellant, Dr. Sreekumar was grossly remiss in going in for hemiarthroplasty. In Jacob Mathew case (supra) it has observed as under: \n\" 48(1) Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The definition of negligence as given in Law of Torts, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (edited by Justice G.P. Singh), referred to hereinabove, holds good. Negligence becomes actionable on account of injury resulting from the act or omission amounting to negligence attributable to the person sued. The essential components of negligence are three: \"duty\", \"breach\" and \"resulting damage \". \n (2) Negligence in the context of the medical profession necessarily calls for a treatment with a difference. To infer rashness or negligence on the part of a professional, in particular a doctor, additional considerations apply. A case of occupational negligence is different from one of professional negligence. A simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident, is not proof of negligence on the part of a medical professional. So long as a doctor follows a practice acceptable to the medical profession of that day, he cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative course or method of treatment was also available or simply because a more skilled doctor would not have chosen to follow or resort to that practice or procedure which the accused followed.\" \n21. It would, thus, be seen that the appellant's decision in choosing hemiarthroplasty with respect to a patient of 42 years of age was not so palpably erroneous or unacceptable as to dub it as a case of professional negligence. \n22. We thus, allow Civil Appeal No. 6168 of 2008 and dismiss the respondent's complaint. Ipso facto Civil Appeal No.6167 of 2008 is dismissed. In the light of the fact that the respondent had appeared in person and is physically handicapped, we direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to him free of cost to his address under Registered cover.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -3238,26 +3238,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S026", - "case_id": "6339", - "experiment": "baseline_firac", - "model": "mistral-nemo", - "source_file": "S026__baseline_firac__mistral-nemo__6339.json", + "case_id": "1188", + "experiment": "role_play_v3", + "model": "ministral-3b", + "source_file": "S026__role_play_v3__ministral-3b__1188.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "27/09/2024", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "judgment_date": "01/05/2009", + "machine_error_stage": "issues", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misinterpretation" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue misframing" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 581 OF 2023 | Sarabjit Kaur v. The State Of Punjab & Anr. | 01/03/2023", - "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 581 OF 2023 | Sarabjit Kaur v. The State Of Punjab & Anr.", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 216 of 2017 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 3998 of 2011) | State Of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu | 03/02/2017", + "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 216 of 2017 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 3998 of 2011) | State Of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The appellant entered into an agreement to sell a plot of land on 27.05.2013 and subsequently entered into an Agreement to Sell the same plot to Sarabjit Kaur (wife of respondent No. 2) on 18.11.2013. The appellant received ₹5,00,000/- as earnest money, and the sale deed execution date was initially fixed for 25.06.2014, later extended to 24.12.2014. The agreement explicitly stated the appellant was not the owner at that time. Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint on 30.09.2015 against property dealers, not the appellant, seeking recovery of ₹29,39,500/-. An investigation opined the dispute was civil, and no police action was required. Respondent No. 2 filed a second complaint on 05.10.2016 with similar allegations, which was consigned to record on 23.01.2017. A third complaint was filed by respondent No. 2 on 15.06.2017, leading to the registration of F.I.R. No. 430 dated 16.10.2017 under Sections 420, 120-B, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition to quash the F.I.R. The F.I.R. was registered nearly three years after the last date fixed for the sale deed. Respondent No. 2 did not initiate civil proceedings or issue notices for sale deed registration.", - "generated_judgment": "### Step-by-Step Analysis of the Appeal\n\nThe key question for this appeal revolves around **whether the F.I.R. was properly registered based on the factual matrix**, particularly since the agreement to sell the property was signed in 2013-2014, and the F.I.R. (Fruit of Investigation No. 430) was registered in 2017. The Indian **Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973** governs the registration of F.I.R.s, specifically under **Section 158 (Summons by Police Officer)** and **Section 159 (Investigation when offence registered without summons).** The following are the critical elements where the appellant’s appeal may rest:\n\n---\n\n#### **1. Legal Premises around F.I.R. Registration**\nThe F.I.R. under Sections **420 (Cheating), 120-B (Criminal Abetment), and 506 IPC (Criminal conspiracy)** arise only if there is a **prima facie case of criminal wrongdoing** by the appellant (or someone the appellant ought to have perpetrated abuse). To establish this, the police must be **convinced** of their guilt based on incriminating material evidence. Here is how we examine the facts:\n\n##### **A. Availability of Criminal Evidence by the Appellant**\nSince the **Agreement to Sell** explicitly states that the appellant *was not the owner* but stood in a position of tendering a sale (as the **dealer/mediator**), it follows that the **prime suspect is the Respondent No. 2 and her relations (especially Sarabjit Kaur)** who bought the property under false claims of ownership.\n\n- **No prior criminal proceedings:** The Appellant had never been implicated in legal areaves involving this property; the `Response No. 2’s own legal disputes (₹29,50,000) were civil actions and **had nothing to do with the Appellant**.\n- **Ascertainable Price:** Typically, agents/platforms facilitating \"buy-sell\" dealings are prone to charges of cheating for exploitation or fraudulent inducement. Given there was no proof of a knockdown price under which the property was shuffled, there’s a suspicion that Respondent No. 2 **exploited the arrangement**.\n- **Open documentation timeline:** The Appellant and Respondent No.2 stood to sweat without litigation. The **earnest money receipt (₹5 lakh)** itself may be considered suspicious for how it mandated return if the sale did not follow, yet Respondent No.2 had delayed to push for the first instance (after 2015).\n\n#### **Deterioration Lacks Triggering Events**\nNothing outright eradicates culpability suspicions—**paid assistance deals are fertile grounds for legal contest**—but prospectively it would require development of tangible crime theories against the Appellant whom Sarabjit never or rarely pointed towards. Hence, FIR rested solely on someone else’s delayed requests.\n\n---\n\n#### **B. Timing: Was the Absolute delay Merely casual posture for conspiracy or breach context?**\n- **No relevant pre-FIR hearing evident:** Despite repeated launches of suits/financial outreach, no initial cases had accused the Appellant repeatedly in the Response No.2’s complex actions.\n- The civil suits bore unrelated plans, thus **no creeping momentum warranted vesting culpability on A in criminal steps.**\n\n---\n#### **C. The High Court's critique re: Appellant weakness**\nHigh Courts remain politically bias-free—or challenged—due to constitutional procedure fidelity. Having amended given allegation **zero factual viability in Appellant vs. Respondent exercises**, and by ** lógica alone the FIR should be scrutinized for pitching charges on the voluntary curve.**\n\n---\n\n#### **Ultimately Guiding Step Rule**\n**Without accusations in any recorded case, civil nor prima facie targets (Statement in progress being excepted),** the timeline does not fail **only materialism**—beyond basic applicability wires for accumulated mischief.\n\n---\n### **Appellate Judgement Ponderation**\n\n**Limited Merit in Impact of Delayed Registration Varies on Proportion**\n- While traumatisms behind delayed chrisal could exacerbate kleidering (further issues & doubtful incidents), the slump (three years, what was 2014? an enrollment glitch?) either (1) Bolsters flagrant reality hints toward **buried evidences intentionally preserved by apprehended wrongs in Respondent No.2** or (2) **be on the suggestively revolutionary route of mere procedural error in court procedural promulgations.**\n\nBoth routes Ultimately proved:\n**When Series of actions or instructions only rang of a cumbersome need for Suspicions to convert into Criminal Evaluations**—Delays might tinge assessment **too far away** from the basis of result in this particular case. After evaluation of **material breakdown**, it suggests more culpability resting on Respondents with their civil-dotted cross bandages.\n\n---\n\n### **Decision: DISMISSED**\n\nThe final conclusion cannot support this appeal beyond blatant transitional proofs related to Buttons, Planks, and Theory of Guilt owing to configurable elements exhausted before crime subscription; therefore the F.I.R through judicial lens remains unchallenable and **DISMISSED** of plea over improve tabulation of upon denunciation charges of defendant Appellant; judged beyond procedural efforts consisting merely of unmerged ambiguity either hindered by Respondents' twined explanations or shadowed by approximations on their behalf.", - "reference_judgment": "1. The Appellant having failed before the High Court has filed the present appeal. A prayer was made for quashing of F.I.R. No.430 dated 16.10.2017 under Sections 420, 120- B and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The petition filed before the High Court seeking quashing thereof was dismissed.\n2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant entered into an agreement to purchase a plot measuring 1 (Kanal) on 27.05.2013 with Malkit Kaur, wife of Surender Singh resident of Dhillon Colony, Near Electricity Grid, G.T. Road, Moga, Jagraon, District Ludhiana, Punjab on 27.05.2013. On the basis thereof appellant entered into an Agreement to Sell the same to Sarabjit Kaur wife of Darshan Singh (respondent No.2) on 18.11.2013. The date for execution of sale deed was fixed as 25.06.2014. It was categorically mentioned in the Agreement to Sell that at present the vendor was not the owner of the property. The appellant received a sum of ₹ 5,00,000/- as earnest money and the date of registration of sale deed was fixed as 25.06.2014. The date for execution of sale deed was extended to 24.12.2014 on receipt of additional sum of ₹ 75,000/-. A complaint was filed by Darshan Singh (complainant/ respondent No.2), son of Jangir Singh on 30.09.2015 with reference to the same alleged Agreement to Sell however against property dealers Manmohan Singh, son of Prakash Singh and Ranjit Singh alias Billa, son of Pal Singh. In the aforesaid complaint, reference was made to two other transactions entered into by Darshan Singh and prayer was that an amount of ₹ 29,39,500/-be got recovered from the property dealers.\n3. The aforesaid complaint was investigated and finally on 18.05.2016, it was opined that the dispute being civil in nature, no police action was required. Darshan Singh made another complaint on 05.10.2016 with the same allegations without disclosing the fate of his earlier complaint. Referring to the earlier enquiry made, the aforesaid complaint was consigned to record on 23.01.2017. Thereafter, another complaint was made by Darshan Singh against the appellant, Ranjit Singh and Manmohan Singh. It is on the basis thereof that F.I.R. in question was registered under Sections 420, 120-B and 506 IPC against the appellant, Manmohan Singh and Ranjit Singh.\n4. The argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant is that the respondent No.2 who claims himself to be the husband of vendee had filed two complaints earlier with the same set of allegations and those were consigned to record on the basis of the legal opinion received opining the case to be of civil nature. In the first such complaint, there were no allegations against the appellant. In fact the dispute is purely civil in nature. In case the appellant failed to execute the sale deed for which admittedly the last date fixed was 24.12.2014. Respondent No.2 could have availed of his appropriate remedy of specific performance of Agreement to Sell but no suit was filed. However, third complaint was filed without disclosing the fate of earlier two complaints. The F.I.R. in question was registered on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent No.2 on 15.06.2017 i.e. nearly three years after the date fixed for execution of sale deed. The respondent No.2 had never issued any notice prior to the filing of the compliant with the police seeking any remedy. A perusal of three complaints filed by respondent No.2 clearly suggest that from the initial prayer for return of the amount paid by him, subsequently the allegations of cheating was made. In the first complaint while referring to different transactions, the allegation was only against the property dealers not against the appellant whereas in subsequent complaint improvement was made and she was also involved.\n5. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the chargesheet having been filed, the appellant can raise all the pleas before the court below. It is not a case for quashing of the F.I.R.\n6. Despite service of notice, respondent No.2/complainant has not appeared.\n7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book.\n8. On the material placed on record by the parties, it is evident that an Agreement to Sell was executed by the appellant in favour of the wife of respondent No.2, namely Sarabjit Kaur for sale of plot measuring 1 (kanal). The agreement to Sell specifically mentions the fact that appellant/ the vendor gets entitled to the property on the basis of the Agreement to Sell executed in her favour by Malkit Kaur on 27.05.2013. The last date fixed for registration of sale deed was 25.06.2014 which was extended to 24.12.2014. There is nothing placed on record by the complainant or the State to show that besides filing of the criminal complaint, respondent No.2 had initiated any civil proceedings for execution of sale deed on the basis of Agreement to Sell or in the alternative return of the earnest money.\n9. A perusal of the first complaint made by respondent No.2 on 30.09.2015 shows that the prayer was made for return of the amount paid by him with no allegation of cheating. It was filed only against Manmohan Singh and Ranjit Singh, the property dealers. Reference in the aforesaid complaint was made to the Agreement to Sell executed between the parties. In addition, there was a reference to two other Agreements to Sell executed in total. A prayer was made for getting an amount of ₹29,39,500/- refunded from the property dealers. Though, in the aforesaid complaint reference was made to the Agreement to Sell in question, however there was no complaint made against the appellant. The aforesaid complaint was investigated by the Economic Offences Wing and a report was submitted to the Senior Superintendent of Police on 22.03.2016. A report was submitted on the basis of which the legal opinion was sought from the District Attorney who opined that no criminal offence was made out and the complainant shall be at liberty to invoke jurisdiction of the civil court. The aforesaid opinion was accepted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana (Rural) on 18.5.2016.\n10. Thereafter, Darshan Singh (respondent No.2) made another complaint to DIG, Ludhiana on 05.10.2016 which again was enquired into and a finding that earlier identical complaint was filed as no criminal offence was made out and the second complaint was consigned to record. In the second complaint, there was no reference made to the earlier complaint filed by Darshan Singh.\n11. Still not satisfied as the result of the earlier complaint was not to the liking of the respondent No.2. He filed another complaint on 23.01.2017. Thereafter, another complaint was filed by the respondent No.2 on 15.06.2017 on the basis thereof F.I.R. in question was registered. On the facts of the case in hand, it is evident that the effort of respondent No.2 was merely to put pressure on appellant while involving her in a criminal case to get his money back whereas there is nothing pleaded that respondent No. 2 that he was ever ready and willing to get the sale deed registered. There was no effort made by the respondent No.2 or the vendee in the Agreement to Sell to initiate any civil proceedings to get the sale deed executed on the basis of the Agreement to Sell. In fact, the last date fixed for execution of the sale deed even after extension was 24.12.2014.\n12. There is nothing on record to suggest that any notice was issued by the respondent No.2 or the vendee to the appellant to get the sale deed registered just either before expiry of the last date fixed for executed of sale deed or immediately thereafter. No civil proceedings were also initiate rather the respondent No.2 proceeded only by filing complaints with the police two of which were earlier filed. Had there been any civil proceedings initiated, the question of readiness and willingness of the vendee is also an aspect to be examined by the Court.\n13. A breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. From the facts available on record, it is evident that the respondent No.2 had improved his case ever since the first complaint was filed in which there were no allegations against the appellant rather it was only against the property dealers which was in subsequent complaints that the name of the appellant was mentioned. On the first complaint, the only request was for return of the amount paid by the respondent No.2. When the offence was made out on the basis of the first complaint, the second complaint was filed with improved version making allegations against the appellant as well which was not there in the earlier complaint. The entire idea seems to be to convert a civil dispute into criminal and put pressure on the appellant for return of the amount allegedly paid. The criminal Courts are not meant to be used for settling scores or pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. Wherever ingredients of criminal offences are made out, criminal courts have to take cognizance. The complaint in question on the basis of which F.I.R. was registered was filed nearly three years after the last date fixed for registration of the sale deed. Allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court.\n14. Hence, in our opinion the impugned order passed by the High Court deserves to be set aside. The petition filed by appellant for quashing of F.I.R. is ordered to be allowed. As a consequence, F.I.R. No.430 dated 16.10.2017 and all the subsequent proceedings therewith are ordered to be quashed. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.", + "case_record": "The State of Rajasthan filed appeals against a Rajasthan High Court judgment that set aside charges framed by a Special Judge against Fatehkaran Mehdu (Mining Engineer) and Kishan Singh Rawat under Section 13(1)(d) & 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 120B of IPC. The case originated from allegations that Fatehkaran Mehdu, while serving as Mining Engineer, facilitated illegal mining by Kishan Singh Rawat. Specifically, it was alleged that Mehdu granted a quarry licence for 80,000 sq. ft. of 'gap fat' land to Kishan Singh Rawat, despite only 52,272 sq. ft. being available in Plot No. 1345124. Furthermore, Mehdu allegedly cancelled Smt. Sushma Devi's quarry licence, which covered adjacent land, to benefit Kishan Singh Rawat and permit unauthorized mining. Smt. Sushma Devi had to appeal the cancellation, which was allowed by the Appellate Authority. The chargesheet detailed Mehdu's alleged collusion with Rawat to cause loss to the State and tenure holders by allotting land beyond the permitted area and through improper cancellation of licenses. The Special Judge framed charges, finding a prima facie case. However, the High Court quashed these charges, opining that there were no allegations of Mehdu obtaining any advantage by corrupt or illegal means and that the discrepancy in the land area was not substantiated, citing a certification from another Mining Engineer. The High Court also viewed the cancellation of Sushma Devi's license and her subsequent appeal success as administrative issues, not criminal misconduct.", + "generated_judgment": "**DISMISSED**\n\nReasoning:\nTo determine whether the appeal should be allowed, we need to carefully examine the facts and the legal basis provided.\n\n1. **Original Charges**: The Special Judge framed charges against Fatehkaran Mehdu and Kishan Singh Rawat for corruption under Sections 13(1)(d) & 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 120B of the IPC. These charges were based on allegations of facilitating illegal mining and allotting more land than was actually available.\n\n2. **High Court Decision**: The Rajasthan High Court quashed these charges. The High Court's primary reasons for this decision were:\n - There were no allegations that Mehdu obtained any advantage by corrupt or illegal means.\n - The discrepancy in the land area (80,000 sq. ft. vs. 52,272 sq. ft.) was not substantiated, as per a certification from another Mining Engineer.\n - The cancellation of Sushma Devi’s license and its subsequent reversal by the Appellate Authority were viewed as administrative issues rather than criminal misconduct.\n\n3. **Analysis of Appeal Grounds**:\n - **Corruption Allegations**: The High Court found no evidence of Mehdu obtaining any advantage illegally or corruptly. This directly addresses one of the core elements of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which requires proof of obtaining an advantage by corrupt or illegal means.\n - **Land Area Discrepancy**: The certification from another Mining Engineer suggests that the discrepancy in the land area was resolved, supporting the High Court's view that the issue did not amount to criminal misconduct.\n - **Administrative Issues**: The High Court considered the cancellation of Sushma Devi’s license and its reversal as administrative matters, not criminal misconduct. This indicates that even if there were irregularities, they did not rise to the level of criminal activity.\n\nGiven these points, the High Court's decision appears to be well-founded based on the evidence and the applicable laws. The State of Rajasthan has not presented sufficient new evidence or arguments to overturn the High Court's decision. Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.", + "reference_judgment": "Leave granted.\n\n2. These two appeals have been filed against the common judgment dated 16.11.2010 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur allowing S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 592/2009 Fatehkaran Mehdu versus State of Rajasthan and S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 598/2009 Kishan Singh Rawat versus State of Rajasthan. The High Court vide its order, allowing the Criminal Revisions, set aside the order dated 05.05.2009 passed by the Special Judge Anti Corruption Cases, Udaipur, framing charges against both the respondents under Section 13(1)(d) & 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120B of IPC.\n\n3. The brief facts of the case, as emerged from materials on record, need to be noted for deciding the issueS raised in these appeals. Both the appeals having arisen out of First Information Report No. 342/2001 and order dated 05.05.2009 framing charges, the facts being common, it shall be sufficient to refer the facts from Criminal Appeal No.......of 2017 @ SLP(Cr.) No. 3998 of 2011, State of Rajasthan versus Fatehkaran Mehdu.\n\n4. The Respondent, Fatehkaran Mehdu was working as Mining Engineer at Tehsil Bijolia, District Bhilwara, State of Rajasthan in the year 1997­98. One Smt. Sushma Devi had submitted an application for the grant of quarry licence for a mineral (Sand Stone) as per the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as Rule 1986). The application was made for grant of quarry licence for Khatedari land situated at Nayanagar in different plots, including Plot No. 1181/124. She deposited a banker's cheque of Rs. 1,75,000/­ dated 23.4.1998 and the quarry licence for 4.95 hectare (30 bigha and 12 biswas) was prepared in the name of Smt. Sushma Devi Dhakad and Shri Manoj Kumar Sandhya on 06.05.1998. On noticing that the quarry licence issued on 06.05.1998 contained various cuttings, she contacted Fatehkaran Mehdu and handed him the licence for issue of fresh licence. Shri Mehdu after taking all papers from Smt. Sushma Devi did not issue her a fresh licence, whereas, Smt. Sushma Devi had started mining operations. On 18.07.1998 one Shri K. K. Boda, inspected the area and stopped the mining activities informing Smt. Sushma Devi that no quarry licence was issued in her favour. On 11.08.1998, Mining Engineer Fatehkaran Mehdu directed Smt. Sushma Devi to stop the mining activities; Fatehkaran Mehdu was transferred in August 1998 out of Tehsil Bigolia.\n\n5. Aggrieved by non­issuance of quarry licence Sushma Devi filed a Writ Petition No. 166 of 1999 before the High Court of Rajasthan which was dismissed by order dated 08.03.1999 due to availability of alternate remedy of filing an appeal under the Rules 1986. Smt. Sushma Devi filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority and Appellate Authority vide order dated 29.04.1999 allowed the appeal and restored the quarry licence of Smt. Sushma Devi.\n\n6. On the other hand, Sri Kishan Singh Rawat, the respondent was also granted quarry licence on gap­land in Block No. 263A and 264A which contained a condition that the said approval shall not be effective outside Plot No. 1345/1185/124.\n\n7. Kishan Singh Rawat alongwith certain other persons had filed a suit against the consenting party of Khatedari Land No. 1238/125 on 23.06.1998 for stopping Sushma Devi from carrying on mining operations. Another suit No. 1181/24 was filed on 13.7.1998 by Kishan Singh against the Khatedars of Plot No. 1181/124 restraining them from interfering in mining operation on Plot No. 1345/1185/124 area 3 bigha.\n\n8. After holding a Preliminary Enquiry No. 7 of 2000 against Fatehkaran Mehdu, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Prevention of Corruption Bureau of Udaipur, lodged a First Information Report against the Fatehkaran Mehdu and Kishan Singh Rawat under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120B of IPC.\n\n9. After conducting the investigation, a chargesheet No. 208/2005 dated 24.10.2005 was submitted. The Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Udaipur vide order dated 05.05.2009 framed charges against both the Respondents under Section 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and 120B IPC. Aggrieved by order dated 05.05.2009, Fatehkaran Mehdu filed S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 592 of 2009 and Kishan Singh Rawat filed S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 598 of 2009. The High Court of Rajasthan vide its judgment and order dated 16.11.2010 set aside the order dated 05.05.2009 allowing the Revision against which these two appeals have been filed by the State of Rajasthan.\n\n10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there were sufficient materials on record against the respondent, relying on which learned Special Judge has framed the charges and the High Court committed an error by interfering with the charges framed, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. It is submitted that there was no ground made out for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. for quashing the charges framed. It was proved on the materials on record that the Respondent Mehdu had facilitated Shri Kishan Singh Rawat to carry on illegal mining by which, he obtained illegal benefits to the detriment of State of Rajasthan as well as Smt. Sushma Devi. The quarry licence granted to Sushma Devi was cancelled by Mehdu to facilitate Kishan Singh Rawat to carry on illegal mining on the plot, which was included in the quarry licence of Sushma Devi. Shri Mehdu being a public servant has committed an offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2).\n\n11. Learned counsel for the Respondent, refuting the submission of appellant contends that the High Court on valid grounds has set aside the order framing the charge, since there was no allegation before the Special Judge on which, it can be said that any offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) and 120B was made out. The allegation against Shri Mehdu that he has granted quarry licence of 80,000 Sq. ft. to Kishan Singh Rawat, was factually incorrect since Kishan Singh Rawat was sanctioned quarry licence of only 25,000 Sq. ft. It is submitted that cancellation of licence of Smt. Sushma Devi by Shri Mehdu cannot amount to any offence within the meaning of aforesaid sections and the order of Appellate Authority, setting aside the cancellation order does not lead to any presumption that an offence was committed by Shri Mehdu.\n\n12. Before we proceed to examine the respective contentions, it is necessary to look into the chargesheet to find out the nature of allegations made against the respondents. The chargesheet has been brought on record as Annexure A­9. It is relevant to note some of the allegations, as recorded in the chargesheet against the respondent. The chargesheet notices the following:\n\n \"whereas it is also pertinent to mention here that area of plot No. 1345/1185/124 is three bigha 52272 Sq. ft. whereas, Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu Mining Engineer, Bijolia has granted sanction of 80,000 Sq. ft. as gap fat. Thus, Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu Mining Engineer in collusion with Shri Kishan Singh Rawat granted sanction for 80,000 Sq. ft land as against 52272 Sq. ft. available land, by which obviously proceeding for giving land to Shri Kishan Singh Rawat out of plot No. 1181/124 of Smt. Sushma Devi situated neighbouring has been done by collusion.” \n\n13. Further, after noticing the facts, pertaining to grant of quarry licence to Kishan Singh Rawat and Smt. Sushma Devi following was stated:\n\n “By investigation it was also found that illegal mining was done on plot No. 1185/124 of Shri Kishan Singh Rawat for years. In the year 1997 the Mining Enginner in collusion under gap fat policy with view to provide undue profit by back door got surrendered 3 bigha land out of 5 bigha in favour of State Government and recorded without name so that gap fat could be approved under above policy. Under rules lease can be granted only on land of without name. To land so surrendered plot No. 1345/1185/124 was given rest of two bigha land of khatedar property No. 1185/124 was given which presently is recorded as khatedari land in name Dhiru son of Limbu Bheel R/o Suradiya Tehsil Beawar in khata which is ancestral village of Kishan Singh Rawat. Plot No. 1185/124 combined rakba 2 bigha land is also recorded as khatedari therefore, gap fat permission can not be accorded under gap fat policy but Mining Engineer in files of office accorded approval of plot No. 1345/1185/124 rakba 3 bigha, entry in which regard was made with special stipulation on quarry licence but in technical map told about according approval on plot No. 1185/124 combined so that if anytime measurement is carried out then same could be found according to technical map and according to same Shri Kishan Singh Rawat could get illegal profit. On spot Shri Kishan Singh Rawat in present time is also doing mining work on plot No. 1185/124 com. Rakba 2 bigha land and whenever question for measurement arises then he shows being approval on the basis of department's technical map whereas, in quarry lincence and files permission is accorded only to plot No. 1345/1185/124, total area of which comes to be 52472 Sq.ft whereas, according to technical map area 80,000 Sq. ft is shown. Under khatedari policy Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu only with view to cause loss to tenure holders of plot No. 1181/124 situated in south of plot No. 1185/124, called back issued quarry licence of Smt. Sushma Dhakad in name of correcting same by violating all rules, cancelled quarry licence and information in which regard was not given to licence holders.” \n\n14. There was a clear allegation in the chargesheet that quarry licence to Kishan Singh Rawat was given by Shri Mehdu in furtherance of object and purpose of illegally benefitting Kishan Singh Rawat. It was further stated that although, approval for quarry licence on Plot No. 1345/1185/124 area 3 bigha was granted, total area of which comes to only 52,272 Sq. ft., whereas in the technical map, area was shown 80,000 Sq. ft. dishonestly benefiting Kishan Singh Rawat.\n\n15. Considering the chargesheet and other materials on record, the charges have been framed. In Para 1 of the order, the learned Special Judge has noted the following facts:\n\n \"1. It is worth­mentioning that total area of land No. 1345/1185/124 is total three bigha i.e. 52272 Sq. ft. while Fatehkaran Mehdu issued sanction of 80,000 Sq. ft. in the form of gap fat area and thus, accused Fatehkaran Mehdu connived with Kishan Singh Rawat, he connived in the proceedings for getting alotted more land to Kishan Singh Rawat out of the land of neighbour Sushma Devi, on which on establishing the prima facie case making out, the then Additional Superintendent of Police of Prevention of Corruption Bureau, Udaipur, sent an First Information Report without numbering to the Headquarter, on which case First Information Report No. 342/01 was registered on 18.09.2001 and was received for investigation.” \n\n16. Further in para 2, the order states:\n\n “2. From the investigation it was established that Smt. Sushma Devi, Manoj Kumar Sandhya and Jitmal Balai submitted application on 01.05.1998 in prescribed form. Landowners of concerning khasra numbers expressed their consent in favour of applicants, thereafter, on 06.05.1998 Shri Mehdu granted approval for issuing quarry licence and licence were issued. Smt. Sushma Devi checked quarry licence on 08.05.1998, then came to know that serious nature of lacunae were found. At the same time Smt. Sushma Devi contacted Fatehkaran Mehdu, Mineral Engineer about the abovesaid, then he issued directions for making correction the quarry licence and handed over letters etc. to the Office Assistant Sohanlal. Stating excessive cuttings, Shri Mehdu instead of taking all the papers from Smt. Sushma Devi for issuing new quarry licence, with intentions to get other person Kishan Singh unlawfully benefits, connived with him and malafide and issued licence.” \n\n17. In para 2, it has further been noted:\n\n “2. Under the quarry licence passed by Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu, Shri Kishan Singh undertook unauthorized mining work for years on five bigha land in place of three bigha land due to which State Government suffered loss of annual rent etc. and Kishan Singh earned unlawful profits. On account of conspiracy hatched with him and connivance forgetting Kishan Singh benefitted, it established that Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu allotted land to Kishan Singh Rawat contrary to rules or in the form of gap & fat due to which the present charge sheet under section 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and section 120 Indian Penal Code was filed in which Kishan Singh Rawat, beneficiary was also made accused.” \n\n18. The Special Judge after considering the contention putforth by the learned counsel for the parties noted the charge that against the total area of 52,272 Sq. ft. available, Shri Mehdu has issued sanction for 80,000 Sq. ft. in the form of 'gap area' to Kishan Singh Rawat to unduly benefit him, and the same can be decided after recording oral and documentary evidence. The Special Judge found, a clear prima facie case of framing charges. It is relevant to extract the findings from Para 6 of the order. In Para 6 of the order, following has been stated:\n\n “Prima facie charge has been framed against accused persons that with the intentions to cause loss to Khatedars of land No. 1181/124 situated in the southern side of land No. 1185/124, on which licence issued to Smt. Sushma Dhakar, Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu called for the same in the name of rectifying the same, he canceled the quarry licence in violations of all the rules and its information was not conveyed to the licence holders. Shri Mehdu did not try to settle the disputes on the spot rather he issued licence to parties without any acceptable demaraction and canceled without adopting process. Dispute prevailing between land No. 1185/125 and 1181/124 could have been settled earlier by carrying out measurement in detail through the Department of revenue, but no any effort was made in this context, consequently, Kishan Singh Rawat has undertaken unauthorized mining work on five bigha area of land No. 1185/124 in place of three bigha land due to which State Government has suffered loss of annual rent etc.. it also established in the investigation that Fatehkaran Mehdu had got the intentions behind cancelling of quarry licence of Smt. Sushma Dhakar that Kishan Singh Rawat be benefited by allotting land to Kishan Singh Rawat neighbour of Smt. Dhakar in the name of gap fat and Shri Mehdu has got Kishan Singh Rawat financially benefitted unlawfully by allotting land in the form of gap fat having misused his post and powers. It is universal principle of law that court is supposed to see at the stage of framing of charge as to whether prima facie case worth triable makes out on the basis of evidence and the facts putforth by the prosecution or not. Final disposal of the charges framed against accused on merits does not require at the said stage.” \n\n19. In view of what has been noted above, whether the High Court was right in quashing the order framing charges by Special Judge on 05.05.2009, is the question to be answered in these appeals. What is the basis for quashing the charges by the High Court, has to be found out from the order of the High Court, allowing the Criminal Revisions.\n\n20. The High Court, after noticing the few allegations against the respondent observed that there was no allegation made by the prosecution against the respondent to the effect that by any corrupt or illegal means Shri Mehdu obtained any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person. With regard to alleged allotment of 80,000 Sq. ft. in favour of Kishan Singh Rawat, it was held prima facie not to be correct since concerned Mining Engineer had certified that there was no allotment of 80,000 Sq. ft. by Mehdu to Kishan Singh Rawat. It is useful to extract para 8 and 9 of the judgement of the High Court which is to the following effect:\n\n \"8. Having gone through the aforesaid provision and judgments cited at the bar and upon perusal of the order dated 5.5.2009, this Court does not find any allegation made by the applicant or prosecution against the present petitioner that by any corrupt or illegal means he obtained any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any other person. Even alleged allotment of 80,000 Sq. ft. land in favour of petitioner no. 2 Kishan Singh was prima facie found to be incorrect since concerned Mining Engineer himself certified that there was no allotment of 80,000 sq. ft. area by the present petitioner in favour of petitioner No. 2 Kishan Singh and only allotment made was way back in 1997­98 of 25,000 sq. ft. Mere fact that application Smt. Sushma Devi had to file appeal before the competent authority under the Mining Act against the alleged illegal cancellation of her quarry licence and succeeded therein does not amount to any criminal charge against the present petitioner under the purview of Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Obviously, these proceedings are quasi judicial in nature undertaken in exercise of powers conferred upon the Mining Engineer under the said Act and any error which can be corrected by appellate or revisional authority does not amount to a criminal charge established against the said authority. This Court does not find any allegation of taking bribe or any other allegation of that nature which would come within the ambit of words employed in Section 13 (1) (d) namely; “by corruption or illegal means obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.” \n\n \"9. In the absence of any such allegation, this court cannot appreciate how the charge under Section 13(1) (d) and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120B IPC has been framed against the present Petitioners.” \n\n21. The High Court based its judgement for quashing the charges on the aforesaid conclusion, as recorded in para 8 and 9. Section 13(1) (d) & 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 under which charges have been framed, are to the following effect:\n\n “13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant:\n(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,­\n..... ....... .......\n(d) if he,­\n(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or\n(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or\n(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or\n..... ....... ......\n(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.” \n\n22. What are the allegations against Mehdu to frame charge under Section 13(1) (d) read with 13(2) has to be found out from the Chargesheet and other materials. We have already extracted the relevant allegations, made against Shri Mehdu in the chargesheet as well as the facts noticed by the learned Special Judge. While framing the charge, the substance of the allegation against Mehdu is that he has granted a quarry licnece to Kishan Singh Rawat on three bigha area of plot No. 1345/1185/124, total area of which comes to 52,272 Sq. ft. whereas, he was sanctioned 80,000 Sq.ft. Further allegation is that Mehdu permitted Kishan Singh Rawat to indulge in unauthorised mining over the larger area than that of granted to him putting the Government as well as Smt. Sushma Devi to loss. The High Court in its order has observed that it has been certified by the present Mining Engineer that Mehdu had never sanctioned alleged 80,000 Sq.ft. in favour of Kishan Singh Rawat for which observation, the High Court based a letter dated 13.11.2009 filed as Annexure A­11 in the appeal, which was also taken on the record by the High Court. The said letter was addressed to Fatehkaran Mehdu in reply to his querry, as to whether, Kishan Singh Rawat was granted quarry licence for 80,000 Sq. ft. The answer given in the said letter dated 03.11.2009 is to the following effect:\n\n \"As per the information sought with regard to the captioned subject, as per the record available in the office no licence of 80,000 Sq. ft. has been granted to Shri Kishan Singh Rawat in Arazi No. 1185/124 Mauza village Nayanagar, Tehsil Bijoliya, District – Bhilwara. In the circumstances, it is not possible to give the copy. In the year 1997­1998, the quarry licence holder in Plot No. 263 A and 264 A of Arazi No. 1185/124 Shri Gopal Singh Rawat S/o Shri Anna Singh Rawat R/o Suradia Tehsil Byawar, District Ajmer (Rajasthan) was granted permission and quarry licence of total 12500­12500 Sq. ft. The said quarry licence was transferred in the name of Kishan Singh Rawat S/o Devi Singh Rawat resident of Suradia, Tehsil Byawar District Ajmer (Rajasthan), which is not effective at present.” \n\n23. The Respondents have brought on record the copy of the quarry licence granted to Kishan Singh Rawat as Annexure A­3 and A­4 which indicates that two quarry licences were for 12500 Sq. ft each. It appears that the High Court failed to advert the substance of allegation against Shri Mehdu, as we have already noticed from the chargesheet that Shri Mehdu although, granted quarry licence only for three bigha gap land in Plot No. 1345/1185/124, but technical map issued by Shri Mehdu was to an area of 80,000 Sq. ft, which was a source for Kishan Singh Rawat to carry on unauthorised mining over the larger area than that of actually allotted to him.\n\n24. In the chargesheet following has been specifically noted :\n\n \"....On spot Shri Kishan Singh Rawat in present time is also doing mining work on plot No. 1185/124 com. Rakba 2 bigha land and whenever question for measurement arises then he shows being approval on the basis of department's technical map whereas, in quarry lincence and files permission is accorded only to plot No. 1345/1185/124, total area of which comes to be 52472 Sq.ft whereas, according to technical map area 80,000 Sq. ft is shown.” \n\n25. As noted above, learned Special Judge had observed that final adjudication of charge cannot be made unless oral and documentary evidence are received. The High Court has not adverted to the technical map which mentions 80,000 Sq. Ft. and without adverting to that allegation, has erroneously observed that there is no allegation which may come within the meaning of 13 (1) (d) read with 13(2) of the Act. Both chargesheet and order of the learned Special Judge have specifically noted the allegations, which clearly makes out an offence under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Prevention and Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120B I.P.C.\n\n26. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference under Section 397 Cr.P.C. at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n27. Now, reverting to the limit of the scope of jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr. P.C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding.\n\n28. It is useful to refer to judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor and Ramesh Chander and Another, (2012) 9 SCC 460, where scope of Section 397 Cr. P.C. have been succinctly considered and explained. Para 12 and 13 are as follows:\n\n \"12.Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well­founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.” \n\n “13. Another well­accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” \n\n29. The Court in para 27 has recorded its conclusion and laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in context of quashing of charge framed under Section 228 Cr. P. C. Para 27, 27(1), (2), (3), (9), (13) are extracted as follows:\n\n \"27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:\n\n27.1) Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.\n27.2) The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.\n\n27.3) The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.\n\n27.9) Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.\n\n27.13) Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.” \n\n30. Applying the above tests, we are of the considered opinion that High Court erred in quashing the charges framed by the order dated 05.05.2009. In result, both the appeals are allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and the order dated 05.05.2009 is restored. The learned Special Judge may proceed with the trial in accordance with the law expeditiously.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -3363,26 +3363,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S027", - "case_id": "730", + "case_id": "2703", "experiment": "baseline_cot", - "model": "ministral-3b", - "source_file": "S027__baseline_cot__ministral-3b__730.json", + "model": "qwen-2.5-7b-instruct", + "source_file": "S027__baseline_cot__qwen-2.5-7b-instruct__2703.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/03/2023", - "machine_error_stage": "facts", - "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Incorrect fact" + "judgment_date": "03/02/2017", + "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misinterpretation" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 94 of 1959. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated May 7, 1957, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Revision Application No. 144-D of 1957. | Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury | 05/12/1961", - "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 94 of 1959. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated May 7, 1957, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Revision Application No. 144-D of 1957. | Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Appeal (Civil) 2440 of 2007, Civil Appeal No. 2440 of 2007 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11391 of 2005) | Messrs Gas Authority Of India Limited And Another v. Messrs Keti Construction (I) Limited And Others | 11/05/2007", + "case_details": "Case: Appeal (Civil) 2440 of 2007, Civil Appeal No. 2440 of 2007 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11391 of 2005) | Messrs Gas Authority Of India Limited And Another v. Messrs Keti Construction (I) Limited And Others", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The appellants, sons of Gauri Shankar, owned a bungalow at 5, Haily Road, New Delhi. The respondent was a tenant in this bungalow. The appellants filed a suit for eviction, alleging the respondent sub-let a portion of the bungalow to Dr. Mohani Jain after the commencement of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, without the landlord's written consent, violating Section 13(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The respondent contended that the original tenancy agreement from 1940 allowed sub-letting and that the sub-tenancy began in 1951, before the Act came into force. No written consent was proven. The trial court found the sub-tenancy was created after the Act's commencement and decreed the suit. The Additional District Judge upheld this decision, categorically stating the sub-tenancy commenced after the Act, and any prior occupancy was as a guest. A revision petition was filed in the High Court under Section 35(1) of the Act. The High Court's single judge, believing he could reconsider concurrent findings of fact, held that the sub-tenancy commenced before the Act, making written consent unnecessary, and that the lower courts had not considered all evidence.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The appellants are the sons of Gauri Shankar, owners of a bungalow at 5, Haily Road, New Delhi.\n2. The respondent was a tenant in this bungalow.\n3. The appellants filed a suit for eviction, alleging the respondent sub-let part of the bungalow to Dr. Mohani Jain after the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 came into force, in violation of Section 13(1)(b)(i) of the Act.\n4. The respondent claimed the original tenancy agreement from 1940 allowed sub-letting and argued the sub-tenancy began in 1951, before the Act became effective.\n5. No written consent from the landlord for the sub-tenancy was provided.\n6. The trial court determined the sub-tenancy commenced post-Act, decreeing the appellants' suit.\n7. The Additional District Judge upheld the trial court's decision, stating sub-tenancy started after the Act, with previous occupancy as a guest.\n8. The High Court, in a revision petition under Section 35(1), concluded the sub-tenancy started before the Act and found it unnecessary to require written consent, stating the lower courts misjudged evidence.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Did the sub-tenancy with Dr. Mohani Jain begin before the enforcement of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952?\n2. Did the original tenancy agreement from 1940 permit sub-letting in legally binding terms under the Act?\n3. Were the Trial Court and Additional District Judge's findings that the sub-tenancy commenced after the Act's enforcement, requiring written consent, correct?\n4. Did the High Court appropriately reconsider factual findings under Section 35(1) of the Act?\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, Section 13(1)(b)(i)**: Prohibits sub-letting or assigning any part of the premises without the landlord's written consent if made after the Act's commencement.\n2. **Legal Validity of Original Agreement**: Contracts made prior to statutory changes may have clauses continue or be altered depending on legislation that enacts subsequent to such contracts.\n3. **Section 35(1) of the Act**: Allows the High Court, in cases under the Act, to exercise revisional jurisdiction to reconsider judicial or quasi-judicial orders to correct errors apparent on the record of fact.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Issue 1 Verification**: The timeline of sub-tenancy inception is central. The High Court found the sub-tenancy began before the Act, which if true, negates the need for written consent. However, the lower courts agreed on commencement post-Act. Without definitive evidence other than the High Court's view, it lacked concrete proof to establish the sub-tenancy started pre-Act. Consequently, the initial findings carry weight absent clear evidence to overturn them.\n \n2. **Issue 2 and 3 Assessment**: The original tenancy agreement dated 1940, according to the respondent’s claim, authorized sub-letting. However, post-Act, Section 13(1)(b)(i) invalidates such provisions unless consent is documented in writing. As confirmation of the document's terms validating pre-Act action wasn't substantiated with supporting evidence, statutory requirements overrule the agreement terms.\n\n3. **High Court Jurisdiction under Rule 3**: High Court reconsideration of factual findings under Section 35(1) is authorized if there's a mistake apparent on the fact record. In this appeal, the High Court's reversal relied heavily on revisiting facts already concluded by the lower courts without manifest error manifestly evident, leading to improper use of revision jurisdiction.\n\n### Conclusion:\nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court's conclusion regarding the sub-tenancy commencement before the Act was not backed by sufficient evidence, and its jurisdiction to re-evaluate factual findings under Section 35(1) was inappropriately exerted. The Trial Court and Additional District Judge's findings remain robust, with the prerequisite written consent for sub-letting underpinning the eviction decision.", - "reference_judgment": "1961. December 5. The Judgment of Sinha, C.J., Hidayatullah and Shah, JJ., was delivered by Hidayatullah, J. Kapur, J. delivered a separate judgment.\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-The appellants (in this appeal by special leave) are the sons of one Gauri Shankar, who owned a bungalow known as 5, Haily Road, New Delhi. This bungalow was given to the respondent by Gauri Shankar on a monthly rent of Rs. 234-6-0, excluding taxes. The suit, out of which this appeal arises, was brought by the appellants against the respondent, Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, for his eviction on the ground (among others) that he had sub-let a portion of the bungalow after the commencement of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (38 of 1952) to one, Dr. Mohani Jain, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord, as required by s. 13(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The defence was that the original contract of tenancy was entered into sometime in 1940 and a term in the contract gave the tenant right to sub-let. It was alleged that a letter written by the tenant which embodied the terms of the tenancy was in the possession of the landlord and a demand was made for its production. The case of the tenant was that the sub-tenancy commenced in the year 1951, that is to say, before the passing of the Act of 1952, and the tenant was not required to obtain the written consent of the landlord to sublet Admittedly, in this case, no written consent was proved. We need not mention the other allegations and counter-allegations which are usual in proceedings between landlords and tenants, the most important of them being about the arrears of rent, which the tenant under permission of the Court ultimately deposited in Court.\nThe issue on which the decisions below have differed was framed by the Sub-Judge, First Class, Delhi, in the following terms: \"Did the plaintiff consent to the sub- letting of parts of the demised premises by the defendant ? If so, when and to what effect.\" The trial Judge found that there was no evidence that the landlord was ever consulted before a portion of the bungalow was sublet to Dr. Mohani Jain, and further that the sub-tenancy was created after June 9, 1952, the date on which the Act came into force. In reaching the latter conclusion, the trial Judge made a reference to a dispute between the tenant and Dr. Mohani Jain for fixation of standard rent before the Rent Control authorities. In those proceedings, Dr. Mohani Jain had alleged that she was living as a sub-tenant from the end of 1951, but the tenant had denied this fact. The proceedings before the Rent Control authorities ended in a compromise, but the admission of the tenant was relied upon to support the conclusion that the sub-tenancy commenced after the Act. The trial Judge decreed the suit. The decision of the trial Judge was confirmed on appeal by the Additional District Judge, Delhi. Though Dr. Mohani Jain gave oral evidence in this case that her sub-tenancy commenced in December 1951, the Additional District Judge found categorically that the sub-tenancy commenced sometime after the coming into force of the Act. He held that even if Dr. Mohani Jain was living there even from before it was a guest and not as a sub-tenant.\nAgainst the order of the Additional District Judge, a revision was filed under s. 35 (1) of the Act. That section reads as follows: \"The High Court may, at any time, call for the record of any case under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision made therein is according to law and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit.\"\nActing in accordance with a decision of the Punjab High Court as to the ambit of this section, the learned single Judge, who heard the revision application, thought that it was competent for him to reconsider the concurrent findings about the time when the sub-tenancy commenced. He held that Dr. Mohani Jain's statement showed that the sub- tenancy commenced prior to the passing of the Act, and that the landlord's consent in writing was not necessary. In reaching this conclusion, the learned Judge was of opinion that all the evidence was not considered by the two Courts below, and that he was entitled, in view of the interpretation placed upon the section above quoted, to go into the matter afresh, and decide the question of fact.It may be pointed out that while the suit was pending before the Subordinate Judge, an application was made for the production of the letter referred to in the written statement of the tenant, to which a passing reference has already been made. A letter was produced, and it is Ex. D- 1. That letter does not disclose all the terms of the tenancy and it would appear, therefore, that the terms of the original tenancy have not been proved in this case, and there is no material on which it can be said either way as to whether a right to sublet was conferred upon the tenant. The defendant did not insist in the Court of first instance that there was yet another letter, and the argument to that effect in this Court cannot be entertained.\nIn reaching the conclusion that all the evidence pertinent to the issue was not considered, the learned Judge of the High Court stated that Ex.P-19, which was the petition filed by Dr. Mohani Jain under s. 8 of the Act to get the standard rent fixed was not taken into account by the Additional District Judge. That petition contained an averment that her sub-tenancy commenced on December 1, 1951 with a rent of Rs. 100/-per month, and that a cheque for Rs. 1, 800/- as advance rent for 18 months was given by her in the name of the daughter of the tenant, because the tenant represented that he had no account in the bank and therefore a cheque should be given in the name of his daughter. This, the learned Judge felt, adequately supported the statement of Dr. Mohani Jain to the same effect as a witness in this case. The learned Judge was in error in thinking that Ex. P-19 was not taken into account by the Additional District Judge. The latter had, in fact, considered Ex. P-19, the petition of Dr. Mohani Jain, before the Rent Control authorities. Ex. P-20, the reply of the tenant to that petition and Ex.P-21, the petition of compromise; but he cited Exs. P-20 and P-21 only. There is internal evidence to show that Ex. P-19 was, in fact, considered, because after mentioning the two Exhibits, the learned Additional District Judge goes on to say as follows: \"The first of these is the written statement of the present appellant which he had filed in a case brought by Dr. Mohani Jain against him for the fixation of fair rent. There he had completely denied somewhere in the year 1953 that Dr. Mohani Jain was his subtenant and could not sue for fixation of rent. This was enough to show that right up to the year 1953 the appellant himself did not regard Dr. Mohani Jain as a sub-tenant.\" This clearly shows that the learned Additional District Judge was weighing Ex. P-19 as against Ex. P20 and was acting on Ex. P-20, which contained a material admission by the tenant before the present dispute had begun. The learned single Judge was, therefore, in error in departing from a concurrent finding of fact on a wrong supposition.\nBut the question that arises in this appeal is one deeper than a mere appraisal of the evidence. It is whether the High Court in the exercise of its revisional power is entitled to re-assess the value of the evidence and to substitute its own conclusions of fact in place of those reached by the Court below. This question requires an examination of the powers of revision conferred on the High Court by s. 35 of the Act. That question is one of common occurrence in Acts dealing with some special kinds of rights and remedies to enforce them. Section 35 is undoubtedly worded in general terms, but it does not create right to have the case reheard, as was supposed by the learned Judge. Section 35 follows s. 34, where a right of appeal is conferred; but the second sub-section of that section says that no second appeal shall lie.\nThe distinction between an appeal and a revision is a real one. A right of appeal carries with it a right of rehearing on law as well as fact, unless the statute conferring the right of appeal limits the rehearing in some way as, we find, has been done is second appeals arising under the Code of Civil Procedure. The power to hear a revision is generally given to a superior Court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according to law. Under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. the High Court's power are limited to see whether in a case decided, there has been an assumption of jurisdiction where none existed, or a refusal of jurisdiction where it did, or there has been material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The right there is confined to jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone. In other acts, the power is not so limited, and the High Court is enabled to call for the record of a case to satisfy itself that the decision therein is according to law and to pass such orders in relation to the case, as it thinks fit.The phrase \"according to law\" refers to the decision as a whole, and is not to be equated to errors of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall decision, which must be according to law which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. The section is thus framed to confer larger powers than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which s. 115 is limited. But it must not be overlooked that the section in spite of its apparent width of language where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such order as the High Court might think fit-is controlled by the opening words, where it says that the High Court may send for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the decision is \"according to law\". It stands to reason that if it was considered necessary that there should be a rehearing, a right of appeal would be a more appropriate remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal.\nThe section we are dealing with, is almost the same as s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing, at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending, at the other with a power of interference a little better than what an appeal gives. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were probably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj (1) where the learned Chief Justice, dealing with s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed: \"The object of s. 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does s.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at.\" This observation has our full concurrence. What the learned Chief Justice has said applies to s. 35 of the Act, with which we are concerned. Judged from this point of view, the learned single Judge was not justified in interfering with a plan finding of fact and more so, because he himself proceeded on a wrong assumption.\nThe appeal thus succeeds, and is allowed with costs. The order under appeal is set aside, and that of the Additional District Judge restored. As regards eviction, the respondent has given an undertaking that he would vacate the house on or before April 25, 1962, and this has been accepted by the appellants.\nKAPUR J.-I agree that the appeal should be allowed and that the High Court was in error in interfering with the finding of fact, but in my opinion the power of revision under s. 35(1) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act is not so restricted as was held by Beaumont, C. J., in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj(1), a case under s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The section provides that the order passed should be in accordance with law and if it does not then the High Court can pass such order as it thinks fit. The language used in s. 35(1) of the Act is almost identical with the words of the proviso to s.75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The power under that proviso has been thus commented upon by Mulla in his Law of Insolvency at page 787 of 2nd Edition: \"The power given to the High Court by this proviso is very wide. In the exercise of this power the High Court may set aside any order if it is not `according to law'.\"\nThe power under the Insolvency Act has not, by the Courts in India, been considered to be do restricted as the observations of Beaumont, C. J. in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj(1) seem to suggest in regard to s. 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. This power of interference by the High Court is not, in my opinion, restricted to proper trial according to law or error in regard to onus of proof or proper opportunity of being heard. It is very much wider than that. When, in the opinion of the High Court, the decision is erroneous on a question of law which affects the merits of the case or decision is manifestly unjust the High Court is entitled to interfere. The error may not necessarily be as to the interpretation of a provision of law, it may be in regard to evidence on the record. Thus when material evidence on the record is ignored or a finding is such that on the evidence taken as a whole no tribunal could, as a matter of legitimate inference arrive at. It is neither possible nor desirable to enumerate all cases which would fall within the jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 35(1) of the Act but it is not to be narrowly interpreted nor to be so widely interpreted as to convert the revision into an appeal on facts.\n", + "case_record": "Gas Authority of India (GAIL) awarded four construction contracts to M/s Keti Construction (I) Ltd. (Contractor) in 1995, including a specific contract dated 28.9.1995, all containing an arbitration clause (Clause 107). On 16.2.1999, GAIL sent a panel of three names, including Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.), suggesting a single arbitrator for all disputes. The Contractor invoked arbitration on 17.7.1999, requesting a panel, and subsequently sent its own panel on 28.10.1999. GAIL reiterated its original panel on 15.11.1999, confirming it covered all four contracts. On 10.12.1999, the Contractor unilaterally nominated Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as arbitrator. GAIL appointed Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) on 13.1.2000 and requested Brig. Nardip Singh to desist. The Contractor did not appear before Justice N.N. Goswami, file claims, or raise jurisdictional objections. Justice N.N. Goswami issued a 'no claim award' on 19.4.2000. The Contractor filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in the Delhi High Court to set aside the award, alleging invalid appointment under Section 34(2)(v). A Single Judge dismissed the petition, but a Division Bench allowed the Contractor's appeal under Section 37, setting aside the award and directing arbitration by Brig. Nardip Singh. GAIL appealed to the Supreme Court.", + "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let's start by breaking down the case. The user provided the facts and the issue analysis, and now I need to structure the legal judgment using the FIRAC framework. Let me go through each part step by step.\n\nFirst, the **Facts**. The case involves GAIL awarding four contracts to Keti Construction with an arbitration clause. In 1999, GAIL suggested a panel of three arbitrators, including Justice N.N. Goswami. The Contractor invoked arbitration, sent their own panel, and then unilaterally nominated Brig. Nardip Singh. GAIL appointed Goswami, but the Contractor didn't appear, leading to a no-claim award. The Contractor then petitioned under Section 34 to set aside the award, arguing invalid appointment. The Single Judge dismissed it, but the Division Bench allowed the appeal, setting aside the award and directing arbitration with Singh. GAIL appeals to the Supreme Court.\n\nNow, the **Issues**. The main legal issues are about the validity of the arbitration appointment and whether the Contractor's actions invalidated the arbitrator. The user has already identified three issues, so I need to ensure they are clearly stated.\n\n**Rules** would include the relevant sections of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly Sections 34 and 37, as well as the arbitration clause (Clause 107). Also, the procedural requirements for appointing arbitrators and the grounds for setting aside an award under Section 34(2)(v) are key.\n\n**Analysis** needs to check if the appeal is maintainable. Since the Supreme Court is reviewing the lower courts' decisions, the appeal is maintainable. Then, the analysis should address the validity of the arbitration appointment. The Contractor's unilateral nomination of Singh might have been a procedural issue, but GAIL's appointment of Goswami under the original panel (which included Goswami) could be valid. The Division Bench found the appointment invalid, but the Supreme Court must determine if that was correct. The Contractor's failure to appear might not invalidate the appointment but could affect the award's enforceability. However, the primary issue is the appointment's validity.\n\n**Conclusion** would depend on whether the Supreme Court upholds the Single Judge's dismissal or the Division Bench's order. If the appointment was valid, the appeal should be dismissed. If invalid, the appeal might be allowed.\n\nI need to ensure all these points are covered in the structured judgment without adding external information. Let me organize this into the FIRAC framework as specified.\n\n\n### Facts: \n1. GAIL awarded four construction contracts to M/s Keti Construction (I) Ltd. in 1995, all containing an arbitration clause (Clause 107). \n2. On 16.2.1999, GAIL proposed a panel of three arbitrators, including Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.), for all disputes. \n3. The Contractor invoked arbitration on 17.7.1999, submitted its own panel on 28.10.1999, and GAIL reiterated its panel on 15.11.1999. \n4. The Contractor unilaterally nominated Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as arbitrator on 10.12.1999, and GAIL appointed Justice N.N. Goswami on 13.1.2000. \n5. The Contractor did not appear before Justice N.N. Goswami, file claims, or raise jurisdictional objections, leading to a \"no claim award\" on 19.4.2000. \n6. The Contractor petitioned under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to set aside the award, alleging invalid appointment under Section 34(2)(v). \n7. A Single Judge dismissed the petition, but a Division Bench allowed the appeal under Section 37, setting aside the award and directing arbitration by Brig. Nardip Singh. \n8. GAIL appealed to the Supreme Court. \n\n---\n\n### Issues: \n1. Was the arbitration clause (Clause 107) in the contracts sufficient to require the parties to appoint a single arbitrator, and did GAIL’s appointment of Justice N.N. Goswami comply with that clause and the Arbitration Act? \n2. Did the Contractor’s unilateral nomination of Brig. Nardip Singh, after GAIL had appointed Justice N.N. Goswami, constitute a valid challenge to the appointment, thereby rendering Goswami’s appointment invalid under Section 34(2)(v)? \n3. Was the failure of the Contractor to appear before the appointed arbitrator and raise jurisdictional objections sufficient grounds to set aside the award under Section 34? \n\n---\n\n### Rules: \n1. **Section 34(2)(v)** of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: An award may be set aside if the appointment of the arbitrator was invalid. \n2. **Section 37** of the Act: A party may appeal an order under Section 34 to the High Court. \n3. **Section 16** of the Act: Parties may agree on the method of appointing arbitrators. \n4. **Clause 107** of the contracts: Contains an arbitration clause, which is enforceable under the Act. \n5. **Procedural compliance**: The Act requires parties to follow the agreed-upon method of appointing arbitrators, and unilateral actions may invalidate the process if they conflict with the agreement. \n\n---\n\n### Analysis: \n1. **Maintainability of the Appeal**: The appeal is maintainable as it challenges the validity of the arbitration award and the appointment process, which are within the scope of the Arbitration Act. \n\n2. **Validity of the Arbitration Clause and Appointment**: \n - Clause 107 explicitly mandates arbitration, and the parties agreed on a method of appointing arbitrators (via a panel). GAIL’s proposal of a panel (including Justice N.N. Goswami) was consistent with the clause. \n - The Contractor’s unilateral nomination of Brig. Nardip Singh after GAIL had already appointed Goswami did not comply with the agreed procedure. The Act requires parties to follow the agreed method, and unilateral actions cannot override this. \n - Section 34(2)(v) applies to invalid appointments, but the Contractor’s failure to challenge the appointment during the arbitration process (e.g., by not appearing or filing objections) undermines its argument. \n\n3. **Impact of Contractor’s Non-Participation**: \n - The Contractor’s absence from the arbitration proceedings does not invalidate the appointment of the arbitrator. The validity of the appointment is independent of the parties’ participation. \n - The Division Bench’s reliance on the Contractor’s non-participation to set aside the award was incorrect. Section 34(2)(v) addresses the validity of the appointment, not the parties’ conduct during the proceedings. \n\n4. **Supreme Court’s Role**: \n - The Division Bench’s order to direct arbitration under Brig. Nardip Singh was based on an incorrect interpretation of the arbitration clause and procedural compliance. \n - The Single Judge’s dismissal of the petition was correct, as the appointment of Justice N.N. Goswami was valid under the clause and the Act. \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion: \n**DISMISSED** \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED** because the appointment of Justice N.N. Goswami as the arbitrator was valid under Clause 107 and the Arbitration Act. The Contractor’s unilateral nomination and non-participation do not invalidate the appointment, and the Division Bench’s order to set aside the award was legally erroneous. The Supreme Court upholds the Single Judge’s decision and rejects the Contractor’s petition.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE G. P. MATHUR\n1. Leave granted.\n2. This appeal, by special leave, has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 7.12.2004 of a Division Bench of Delhi High Court by which the appeal filed by M/s Keti Construction (I) Ltd. - Contractor (Respondent No.1 herein) under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was allowed and the judgment and order dated 20.10.2003 of a learned Single Judge by which the petition filed by respondent no.1 under Section 34 of the Act was dismissed, was set aside and the award given by the arbitrator (respondent no.2 in the present appeal) on 19.4.2000, was also set aside. It was further directed that Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) who was appointed by respondent no.1 shall proceed with the arbitration in accordance with law and give the award.\n3. Gas Authority of India (GAIL, appellant no.1 herein) awarded four contracts for its project at Petro-Chemical Complex, Dibiyapur, District Etawah (U.P.) to M/s Keti Construction (I) Ltd., Indore (Contractor), which is arrayed as respondent no.1 in the present appeal. All the four contracts were awarded in the year 1995 and they related to construction of certain types of houses for GAIL Vihar Township, pre-mix bitumen carpeting and repair of roads in GAIL Vihar Colony, construction of external sewerage line and construction of certain residential quarters in UPPC Complex, Dibiyapur. Certain disputes arose between the parties regarding completion of the construction work in accordance with the design and cost of construction, etc. The contracts entered into between the parties contained arbitration clause. Appellant no.1 referred the dispute with regard to contract dated 28.9.1995 for arbitration to Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) who was formerly a Judge of Delhi High Court. The arbitrator gave a 'no claim award' on 19.4.2000. Respondent no.1 filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act in the Delhi High Court for setting aside the award. A learned Single Judge who heard the petition, after detailed discussion of the material on record, found that the petition was devoid of merits and accordingly dismissed the same by the judgment and order dated 20.10.2003. Respondent no.1 then preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court under Section 37 of the Act which allowed the same by the judgment and order dated 7.12.2004 and set aside the award of the arbitrator. It was further directed in the order that parties shall appear before Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) who had been nominated as arbitrator by respondent no.1 (contractor) and he shall proceed in accordance with law and give the award.\n4. The principal ground on which the petition under Section 34 of the Act had been filed by respondent no.1 was that it had invoked the arbitration clause by sending a notice to appellant no.1 on 17.7.1999 and accordingly the appellant no.1 was required to send a panel of three names for arbitration within 30 days of receipt of notice. Since appellant no.1 did not respond to the notice and did not send a panel within 30 days, it forfeited its right to nominate a panel and thereafter respondent no.1 sent its own panel on 28.10.1999. Appellant no.1 again did not make any response and did not choose anyone from the panel nominated by respondent no.1 and accordingly it informed appellant no.1 on 10.12.1999 that it had selected Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as an arbitrator and the said arbitrator entered upon the reference on 6.1.2000. Appellant no.1 appointed Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) as an arbitrator subsequently on 13.1.2000 which appointment was not valid being contrary to the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Respondent no.1 thus submitted that the appointment of Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) was invalid and the award given by him was liable to be set aside in view of Section 34(2)(v) of the Act.\n5. The petition was contested by the appellants on the grounds, inter alia, that appellant no.1 had already sent a panel of three names on 16.2.1999 in which the name of Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) was mentioned at serial no.1 and it was mentioned that disputes between the parties relating to all the contracts be resolved by the same arbitrator. In reply to the notice of respondent no.1, the appellants' advocate Mr. Sushil Chauhan had sent a reply on 31.7.1999 asking to choose any one from the said panel. This was again reiterated by a letter dated 15.11.1999 when respondent no.1 sent its own panel on 28.10.1999. The appointment of Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as an arbitrator made by respondent no.1 which was communicated by its letter of 10.12.1999 was challenged by appellant no.1 by sending a letter dated 31.12.1999 and a letter was also sent in this regard to Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) to desist from proceeding with arbitration. It was further submitted that respondent no.1 did not challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitrator appointed by appellant no.1 in accordance with Section 16 of the Act. The contractor did not at all appear before the arbitrator appointed by appellant no.1, viz. Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) and did not submit any statement of claim. In these circumstances, there was no ground for setting aside the award made by Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) on 19.4.2000 and the petition under Section 34 of the Act filed by respondent no.1 was liable to be dismissed.\n6. We have heard Mr. Mohan Parasaran, Additional Solicitor General for the appellant and Mr. P.C. Markanda, Senior Advocate for respondent no.1 and have perused the record.\n7. Gas Authority of India (appellant no.1 herein) awarded four contracts to M/s Keti Construction (I) Ltd. (respondent no.1 herein) for various construction work at its Petro-Chemical Complex, Dibiyapur, District Itawah (U.P.) which were as follows :-\n \"(A) Work Order No. CE/AUR/Ph-II Extn. B. Works/ 97A/95 dated 26.5.95: Balance work of construction of C-6 and D-2 Houses at GAIL Vihar Township, Dibiyapur; (\nB) Work Order No. CE/115/Auriaya/Gail/Gail Vihar Road Work/95 dated 10.2.95: Construction of premix bitumen carpeting and repairs of roads in Gail Vihar Colony and Compressor station;\n(C) Work Order No. CE/137/Auriaya/Ext/SER/95 dated 1.11.95: Construction of external sewerage line at UPPC Nagar, Dibiyapur; and\n(D) Work Order No. CE/136/Auriaya/Housing/95 dated 28.9.95: Construction of residential quarters Type A-25 units, Type B-105 units, Type C-55 units for UPPC Complex, Dibiyapur.\" \n8. The dispute here pertains to contract no. (D) dated 28.9.1995. Clause 107 of the agreement, which is relevant for the controversy in dispute reads as follows :\n \"107.1 All disputes or differences whatsoever which shall at any time arise between the parties hereto touching or concerning the WORKS or the execution or maintenance thereof of this CONTRACT or the rights touching or concerning the WORKS or the execution effect thereof or to the rights or liabilities or the construction meaning operation or effect whether during or after completion of the CONTRACT or whether before or after determination, foreclosure or breach of the CONTRACT (other than those in respect of which the decision of any person is by the CONTRACT expressed to be final and binding) shall after written notice by either party to the CONTRACT to the other of them and to the Appointing Authority hereinafter mentioned be referred for adjudication to a sole arbitrator to be appointed as hereinafter provided.\n107.2 For the purpose of appointing the sole arbitrator referred to above, the Appointing Authority will send within thirty days of the receipt of the notice to the CONTRACTOR, a panel of three persons who shall all be presently unconnected with the organization for which the WORK is executed.\nThe CONTRACTOR shall on receipt of the names, as aforesaid, select any one of the persons named to be appointed as a sole Arbitrator and communicate his name to the Appointing Authority within thirty days of receipt of names. The Appointing Authority shall thereupon without any delay appoint the said person as the sole arbitrator. If the CONTRACTOR fails to communicate such selection as provided above within the period specified, the Appointing Authority shall make the selection and appoint the selected as the Sole Arbitrator.\nIf the Appointing Authority fails to send to the CONTRACTOR the panel of three names as aforesaid within the period specified, the CONTRACTOR shall send the Appointing Authority a panel of three names of persons who shall all be unconnected with either party. The Appointing Authority shall on receipt of the names as aforesaid select any one of the persons named and appoint him as the sole arbitrator. If the Appointing Authority fails to select the person and appoint him as the sole Arbitrator within 30 days of the receipt of the panel and inform the CONTRACTOR accordingly, the CONTRACTOR shall be entitled to appoint one of the persons from the panel as the sole arbitrator and communicate his name to the Appointing Authority.\nIf the Arbitrator so appointed is unable to or unwilling to act or resigns his appointment or vacates his office due to any reason whatsoever, another sole arbitrator shall be appointed as aforesaid.\nThe WORK under the CONTRACT shall, however, continue during the Arbitration proceedings and no payment due or payable to the CONTRACTOR shall be withheld on account of such proceedings.\nThe Arbitrator shall be deemed to have entered on the reference on the date he issues notice to both the parties fixing the date of the first hearing.\nThe Arbitrator may, from time to time, with the consent of the parties, enlarge the time for making and publishing the award.\nThe venue of the arbitration shall be New Delhi.\nThe fees, if any, of the Arbitrator shall, if required to be paid before the award is made and published, be paid half AND half by each of the parties. The costs of the reference and of the award including the fees, if any, of the Arbitrator shall be in the discretion of the Arbitrator who may direct to and by whom and in what manner, such costs or any part thereof shall be paid and may fix or settle the amount of costs to be so paid.\nThe award of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the parties.\nSubject to aforesaid the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modification or re- enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder, and for the time being in force, shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this clause.\" \nA perusal of clause 107 would show that on a dispute being raised by the contractor, the appointing authority was required to send a panel of three names to the contractor and he was entitled to select anyone of them as sole arbitrator and to communicate his decision to the appointing authority within 30 days. Thereafter, the appointing authority was under an obligation to appoint the said person as sole arbitrator. However, if the appointing authority failed to send the panel of three names within the stipulated period, the contractor was given the option to send a panel of three names to appellant no.1, which was required to select anyone of them and communicate the said fact within 30 days.\n9. The plea taken by respondent no.1 is that the completion certificate with regard to the work in dispute was issued on 24.1.1998 and it wrote several times for settling the accounts. It invoked the arbitration clause on 17.7.1999 by sending a letter to the appointing authority to send a panel but as there was no response, it sent its own panel of three names on 28.10.1999 and finally informed vide letter dated 10.12.1999 that it had nominated Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as the arbitrator. Voluminous correspondence was exchanged between the parties and many such letters were placed on record before the learned Single Judge of the High Court. It appears that some dispute had been raised by respondent no.1 regarding balance work of construction of C-6 and D-2 numbers of houses at GAIL Vihar Township at Dibiyapur and a letter had been sent by it to appellant no.1 on 16.1.1999. A reply was given on behalf of appellant no.1 to respondent no.1 on 16.2.1999, relevant part of which reads as under :-\n \"Sir,\nThis has reference to your letter vide ref. no.IND.KT.44(6)/99 DATED 16/1/99, we would like to bring to your kind notice that you have not so far informed us the nature of disputes you want to refer for resolution by the Arbitrator.\nHowever, in the meantime, we are suggesting you a panel of three persons to select one of them as Sole Arbitrator :\n1. Mr. Justice N.N. Goswami Retd. Judge Delhi High Court\n2. Dr. Avtar Singh Professor of Law\n3. Mr. Harish Chandra Director General CPWD (Retd.) & Ex. Member UPSC\nFurther, it is suggested to appoint the same Arbitrator and to club the Arbitration proceedings in both the matters so as to reduce on cost and time incurred in the said Arbitration.\nAccordingly, you are called upon to select any one of the above named persons as Sole Arbitrator in both the matters.\" \n10. The evidence on record shows that in connection with the dispute with regard to all the four contracts several meetings had taken place in the office of GAIL also and in the office of their consultant, M/s C.P. Kukreja & Associates in which the representatives of respondent no.1 had participated. This fact is not in dispute that several meetings did take place to resolve the dispute regarding all the four contracts between the representatives of appellant no.1 and respondent no.1. The Senior Manager (Civil) of appellant no.1 sent a letter dated 15.11.1999 to respondent no.1 which has considerable bearing on the controversy in hand and, therefore, the same is being reproduced below :-\n \"Ref.:CE/GAIL/99\nNovember 15, 1999\nM/s Keti Constructions (I) Ltd.\n31/6, Sneh Nagar, Main Road\nOpp. Sapna Sangeeta Theatre\nIndore (MP).\nSUBJECT : DISPUTES RELATING TO :\n(A) WORK ORDER NO.: CE/AUR/PH-II EXTN. B. WORKS/97A/95 DATED 26.05.95. BALANCE WORK OF CONSTRUCTION OF C-6 AND D-2 NOS. OF HOUSES AT GAIL VIHAR TOWNSHIP, DIBIYAPUR;\n(B) WORK ORDER NO. CE/115/AURIAYA/GAIL/ GAIL VIHAR ROAD WORK/95 DATED 10.02.95 CONSTRUCTION OF PREMIX BITUMEN CARPETING AND REPAIRS OF ROADS IN GAIL VIHAR COLONY AND COMPRESSOR STATION.\n(C) WORK ORDER NO. CE/137/AURIAYA/EXT/ SER/95 DATED 1.11.95: CONSTRUCTION OF EXTERNAL SEWERAGE LINE AT UPPC NAGAR, DIBIYAPUR.\n(D) WORK ORDER NO. CE/136/AURIAYA/ HOUSING/95 DATED 28.9.95 CONSTRUCTION OF RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS TYPE A-25 UNITS, TYPE B-105 UNITS, TYPE C-55 UNITS FOR UPPC COMPLEX, DIBIYAPUR.\nDear Sir,\nKindly recall various meetings held in our office and also in the office of Consultant, M/s C.P. Kukreja Associates in respect of the above referred contracts and the disputes arising therefrom, wherein it was agreed between us to settle the disputes amicably and through discussions. Despite this clear understanding, you had vide your letters dated 25.08.98 invoked Arbitration clause in respect of Work Order Nos. : (1) CE/AUR/PH-II/EXTN. B. WORK/97A/95 dated 26.05.95 relating to balance work of Construction of C-6 and D-2 number of houses at GAIL Vihar Township of Dibiyapur and (2) CE/115/AURIAYA/GAIL/GAIL VIHAR ROAD WORK/95 dated 10.2.95 relating to construction of premix bitumen carpeting and repairs of roads in Gail Vihar Colony & Compressor Station.\nSubsequently, vide your letters dated 5.10.98 in respect of the above work orders, you submitted a panel of three Arbitrators asking us to select one of them to act as Sole Arbitrator on the above two cases. However, we responded to your communications vide our letters dated 16.02.99 and as per the terms of the contract suggested the following panel of three distinguished persons :-\n1. Mr. Justice N.N. Goswami (R) Judge Delhi High Court\n2. Dr. Avtar Singh, (V) Prof. of Law, IIM, Lucknow.\n3. Mr. Harish Chandra, Director General CPWD (Retd.) & Ex-Member, UPSC.\nYou were requested to select any of them to act as Sole Arbitrator. However, no action has been taken by you so far and even the issues which seem to have been resolved by discussions have not been confirmed, keeping the matters pending unnecessarily.\nDuring our meetings, we have suggested to you that all the disputes arising out of the above contracts which cannot be settled by mutual discussions, may be referred to a Sole Arbitrator selected by you from among the panel of distinguished persons mentioned above, so that the resolution of disputes by reference to Arbitration becomes cost effective, economical and quick.\nIn view of the above, you are requested once again to select any of the persons mentioned herein to act as a Sole Arbitrator in all the above disputes.\nAssuring you of our best co-operation at all times.\nYours faithfully,\nSd/-\n(P.K. Sarkar )\nSr. Manager (Civil)\" \n11. It may be noted that the above noted letter of 15.11.1999 was written by the Senior Manager (Civil) of appellant no.1 in connection with the disputes relating to all the four contracts, viz. (A), (B), (C) and (D). In this letter reference was made to the earlier letter dated 16.2.1999 sent by appellant no.1 and the same panel of three names in which name of Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) was at serial no.1 was reiterated. The last paragraph of the above quoted letter is very important where it was clearly mentioned that the dispute arising out of the four contracts which cannot be mutually settled may be referred to a sole arbitrator selected by respondent no.1 from amongst the persons mentioned in the panel so that the resolution of disputes by reference to arbitration becomes cost effective, economical and quick. Towards the end of the letter a request was made to respondent no.1 to select anyone of the persons mentioned in the said letter to act as sole arbitrator in all the above disputes, which means all the disputes relating to contract nos.(A), (B), (C) and (D). It is, therefore, clear that a panel of three names had been sent by the appellant to respondent no.1 on 16.2.1999 which was categorically reiterated in the letter dated 15.11.1999, sent by the Senior Manager (Civil) of Gas Authority of India Ltd. (appellant no.1) to respondent no.1. This letter was not confined to any particular contract but specifically referred to all the four contracts including the disputed contract no.(D) dated 28.9.1995. The stand of appellant no.1 was quite reasonable that if all the disputes were referred to a single arbitrator, the arbitration proceedings would be cost effective, economical and quick. After receipt of this letter dated 15.11.1999, wherein the earlier panel communicated vide letter dated 16.2.1999 had been reiterated, there was no occasion for respondent no.1 to appoint Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as arbitrator by sending a communication to that effect subsequently on 10.12.1999. The stand of the appellant had been made very clear and explicit by the aforesaid two letters and it was not required to respond again specifically to the letter dated 28.10.1999 sent by respondent no.1 to select an arbitrator from the panel intimated by it. The stand of respondent no.1 to the effect that as the appellant did not respond to its letter dated 28.10.1999, it selected Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) by sending a communication on 10.12.1999 is, therefore, wholly unjustified.\n12. There is contemporaneous evidence which shows that a number of meetings had taken place between the representatives of appellant no.1 and the representatives of respondent no.1, wherein effort was made to resolve the disputes without reference to arbitration and an understanding had been reached between the parties that unresolved disputes of all the four contracts shall be referred to a sole arbitrator to make the arbitration proceedings quick and cost effective. After respondent no.1 had sent the letter dated 10.12.1999 to the appellant that it had nominated Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) for the purpose of arbitration, the Senior Deputy Manager (Law) of appellant no.1 sent a letter to him on 31.12.1999 requesting him to desist from entering upon the reference or taking any further steps in view of the fact that in the meeting held between the representatives of the two organisations, it was clearly agreed that the matter shall be referred to a sole arbitrator and respondent no.1 was expected to select a name from the panel suggested by appellant no.1. The letter is self-eloquent and is being reproduced below :-\n\n \"December 31, 1999\nBrig. Nardip Singh\nChief Engineer, MES (Retd)\nB-64, Sector 30\nNOIDA\nDear Sir,\nSub : Letter by Keti Const. Ltd. IND/KTIL/908/99 dated 20.12.99 in the matter of construction of residential quarters of UPPC, Dibiyapur, Etawah, U.P.\nThis has reference to the captioned communication on the subject cited above.\nM/s Keti Constructions have been awarded contracts by GAIL for execution of a number of its projects. In relation to some of which contracts including the contract in question now sought to be placed before you, certain disputes are alleged to remain outstanding, as per Keti Constructions.\nKeti Constructions made their requests for resolution of interse disputes with GAIL by reference to Arbitration, including in the contract in question.\nUpon receipt of these requests of Keti Constructions by GAIL, GAIL made suggestion for resolution of disputes by a Sole Arbitrator and sent to Keti Constructions a panel of three distinguished persons who may be appointed as Sole Arbitrator. Thereupon, Keti Constructions came forward for negotiations. During these discussions/negotiation, the representatives of Keti Constructions were repeatedly suggested to refer all unresolved issues of various contracts to a Sole Arbitrator selected by them from amongst the panel suggested by GAIL. Representatives of Keti Constructions agreed to our suggestion as it was less time consuming and GAIL in turn took liberal view on various issues with clear objective of resolving these disputes without reference to arbitration. These efforts yielded results and the requests for arbitration of Keti Constructions were withdrawn by them.\nAs all these matters were between two organisations and it was clearly agreed by the parties to refer unresolved disputes of all contracts to a sole arbitrator to make the arbitration proceedings quick and cost effective. We would have expected Keti Constructions to have sent a name from the panel suggested by GAIL in accordance with the spirit of the discussions held and the principles accepted therein for resolution of interse disputes, which have been acted upon as aforesaid. Unfortunately, Keti Constructions has unilaterally sought to nominate your goodself, despite the overwhelming record to the contrary.\nIn this factual background we request you to desist from entering upon the reference or taking any further steps in pursuance to the captioned communication, keeping the cherished values you have maintained in high esteem all through your distinguished career in armed forces.\nAssuring you of our best attention at all times.\nYours faithfully,\nSd/-\n(CH. HARNATH )\nSR. DY. MANAGER (LAW)\nCC to\nKeti Constructions (I) Ltd.\n31/6, Sneh Nagar, Main Road\nOpposite Sapna Sangeeta Theatre\nINDORE 452 001 (M.P.)\" \n13. It may be noted that the four contracts (A), (B), (C) and (D) were awarded on different dates in quick succession between 10.2.1995 and 1.11.1995 and related to various construction works in Petro-Chemical Complex, Dibiapur, District Etawah (U.P.). The terms of the agreement have to be understood in a broad commonsense manner. The material placed on record before the learned Single Judge shows that the discussion which took place in the meetings held between the representatives of appellant no.1 and representatives of respondent no.1 were not confined to the dispute relating to a single contract, but they related to disputes concerning all the four contracts. It will not be proper to segregate or compartmentalize the correspondence exchanged between the parties as if a particular letter was confined to a particular contract alone. The correspondence exchanged between the parties is not like evidence in a suit or trial where a piece of evidence given in a particular suit or trial cannot be read or taken into consideration in another suit or trial. The stand of the appellant right from the beginning was that all the disputes should be referred to a single arbitrator, which will be cost effective, economical and quick. There can be no doubt this stand was very reasonable. Appellant no.1 had sent a panel on 16.2.1999, which was reiterated in the communication dated 15.11.1999. In these circumstances, respondent no.1 was not at all entitled to nominate Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as an arbitrator which it chose to do subsequently on 10.12.1999. We do not find anything wrong on the part of the appellant when it intimated vide letter dated 15.11.1999 that a panel had already been sent earlier on 16.2.1999 for appointment of a single arbitrator for resolution of all the disputes between the parties.\n14. According to the appellants, after respondent no.1 had sent the notice dated 17.7.1999 invoking the arbitration clause, a reply thereto was given on their behalf by Mr. Sushil Chauhan, Advocate, on 31.7.1999 wherein it was mentioned as under :\n \"Ref: Your letter IND/KT/522/99 dated 17.7.99 Pursuant to the discussions held on various occasions by you and my client, GAIL officials with regard to settlement of disputes and appointment of sole arbitrator, I am instructed by my client, Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) to call upon you to select the sole arbitrator from the names of three distinguished persons already suggested by my clients during discussions in response to your notices. Please take further necessary action.\" \nRespondent No.1 has seriously challenged the receipt of the letter dated 31.7.1999 sent by Mr. Sushil Chauhan. It has been urged that the said letter was not sent by registered post and was not received by them. We have, therefore, not taken into consideration the said letter. There is other material on record to show that a panel of three names had already been sent by appellant no.1 to respondent no.1 which was a sufficient compliance of the clause of the agreement. There is neither any such clause in the agreement nor there is any requirement in law that for each of the contract (A), (B), (C) and (D) a separate panel ought to have been sent. The same panel could very well be utilized for resolving the disputes arising out of the four contracts. In fact, as suggested on behalf of the appellant, it would have been more convenient, time saving and economical to have the same person as arbitrator in resolving the disputes between the parties with regard to all the contracts. The view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench of the High Court is clearly erroneous in law.\n15. Appellant no.1 sent a communication to Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) on 13.1.2000 appointing him as sole arbitrator for resolution of disputes relating to the contract in question and a copy of this letter was also sent to respondent no.1. Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) then entered upon the reference and sent notices to the parties on 11.2.2000 to appear before him on 6.3.2000. Respondent no.1, however, chose not to put in appearance before Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.). On 28.3.2000, the arbitrator passed an order holding that his appointment as arbitrator was in accordance with the terms of the agreement, but in the interest of justice he would give another notice to respondent no.1. The relevant part of the order passed by him reads as under :\n \"In terms of my order dated 6.3.2000, M/s Gas Authority have produced the complete file. On perusal of the file and after hearing Mr. Chauhan, prima facie I am satisfied that my appointment as Arbitrator is in accordance with the terms of Agreement between the parties. I would have proceeded further, but in the interest of justice I feel that one final notice be served on M/s Keti Constructions before publishing the Award.\nTo come up on April 18, 2000 at 6.30 p.m. The parties may file their statements of claim before the next date of hearing.\" \nSince respondent no.1 did not appear on the date fixed, the arbitrator passed an order fixing 19.4.2000 as the next date of hearing. A no claim award was finally given by him on 19.4.2000.\n16. Respondent no.1 did not at all appear before the arbitrator appointed by appellant no.1. Respondent no.1 neither filed any statement of claim nor raised any plea of jurisdiction before the arbitrator. Section 16 of the Act says that the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. In Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. v. Rani Construction Pvt. Ltd. (2002) 2 SCC 388 in para 21 a Constitution Bench of 5 learned Judges has ruled that if the arbitral Tribunal has been improperly constituted, it would be open to the aggrieved party to require the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction in view of Section 16 of the Act. It was also observed that the expression used in Sub-section (1) that the \"Arbitral Tribunal may rule on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement\" shows that the Arbitral Tribunal's authority under Section 16 is not confined to the width of its jurisdiction, but goes to the very root of its jurisdiction and there is no impediment in contending before the Arbitral Tribunal that it had been wrongly constituted. This decision has been partly overruled on another point by a larger bench of 7 learned Judges in S.B.P. & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618 , but the aforesaid view has not been dissented from or reversed. This will be evident from the conclusions arrived at by the larger bench which have been summarized in para 47 of the report and sub-para (ix) thereof reads as under :-\n \"In a case where an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted by the parties without having recourse to Section 11(6) of the Act, the Arbitral Tribunal will have the jurisdiction to decide all matters as contemplated by Section 16 of the Act.\" \n17. It will be useful to take note of the preamble of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which reads as under :-\nWHEREAS the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 1985;\nAND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has recommended that all countries give due consideration to the said Model Law, in view of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international commercial arbitration practice;\nAND WHEREAS the UNCITRAL has adopted the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules in 1980;\nAND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has recommended the use of the said Rules in cases where a dispute arises in the context of international commercial relations and the parties seek an amicable settlement of that dispute by recourse to conciliation;\nAND WHEREAS the said Model Law and Rules make significant contribution to the establishment of a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of disputes arising in international commercial relations;\nAND WHEREAS it is expedient to make law respecting arbitration and conciliation, taking into account the aforesaid Model Law and Rules;\nThe Preamble of the Act makes it amply clear that the Parliament has enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 almost on the same lines as the Model Law, which was drafted by United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. In Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 565 it has been observed that the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 should be interpreted keeping in mind the Model Law as the concept under the present Act has undergone a complete change. It will, therefore, be useful to take note of the corresponding provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 16 of the Model Law, which corresponds to Section 16 of the Act, is being reproduced below :\nUNCITRAL Model Law\n \"Article 16. Competence to rule on own jurisdiction.-\n(1) The Arbitral Tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For the purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the Arbitral Tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.\n(2) A plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than in the statement of defence. A party is not precluded from raising such a plea by the fact that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the Arbitral Tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised promptly after the Arbitral Tribunal has indicated its intention to decide on the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority. The Arbitral Tribunal may, in either case, admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified.\n(3) The Arbitral Tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this article either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. In either case, a ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal that it has jurisdiction may be contested by any party only in an action for setting aside the arbitral award.\" \nThe commentary on the three paragraphs of the Model Law has been given under the headings A, B, C and D. Note 1 under heading A and Note 11 under heading D, which are relevant for the controversy in hand, are being reproduced below :\n\"A. \"Kompetenz-kompetenz\" and separability doctrine, paragraph (1).\n1. Article 16 adopts the important principle that it is initially and primarily for the Arbitral Tribunal itself to determine whether it has jurisdiction, subject to ultimate Court control (see below paras 12-14). Paragraph (1) grants the Arbitral Tribunal the power to rule on its own jurisdiction. Including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. This power, often referred to as \"Kompetenz-kompetenz\", is an essential and widely accepted feature of modern international arbitration but, at present is not yet recognised in all national laws.\nD. Ruling by Arbitral Tribunal and judicial control, paragraph (3) [Corr. to Section 16(5), (6)]\n11. Objections to the Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdiction go to the very foundation of the arbitration. Jurisdictional questions are, thus, antecedent to matters of substance and usually ruled upon first in a separate decision, in order to avoid possible waste of time and costs. However, in some cases, in particular, where the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the substantive issue, it may be appropriate to combine the ruling on jurisdiction with partial or complete decision on the merits of the case. Article 16 (3), therefore, grants the Arbitral Tribunal discretion to rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits.\nSo, the commentary on the Model Law which was drafted by UNCITRAL and has been adopted by many countries including India shows that where a party asserts that the arbitral tribunal has not been properly constituted or it has no jurisdiction, then such a plea must be raised before the arbitral tribunal right at the beginning and normally not later than in the statement of defence.\n18.The whole object and scheme of the Act is to secure an expeditious resolution of disputes. Therefore, where a party raises a plea that the arbitral tribunal has not been properly constituted or has no jurisdiction, it must do so at the threshold before the arbitral tribunal so that remedial measures may be immediately taken and time and expense involved in hearing of the matter before the arbitral tribunal which may ultimately be found to be either not properly constituted or lacking in jurisdiction, in proceedings for setting aside the award, may be avoided. The commentary on Model Law clearly illustrates the aforesaid legal position.\n19. Where a party has received notice and he does not raise a plea of lack of jurisdiction before the arbitral tribunal, he must make out a strong case why he did not do so if he chooses to move a petition for setting aside the award under Section 34(2)(v) of the Act on the ground that the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. If plea of jurisdiction is not taken before the arbitrator as provided in Section 16 of the Act, such a plea cannot be permitted to be raised in proceedings under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the award, unless good reasons are shown.\n20. Though respondent no.1 had ample opportunity to appear before Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) and raise a plea of jurisdiction to the effect that he had been wrongly appointed as arbitrator by appellant no.1, yet, it chose not to do so. This feature of the case weighs heavily against respondent no.1. The learned Single Judge has taken this fact as an additional ground for rejecting the petition filed by respondent no.1 under Section 34 of the Act and we are in agreement with the said view.\n21. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal is allowed with costs throughout and the judgment and order dated 7.12.2004 of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside. The judgment and order dated 20.10.2003 of the learned Single Judge dismissing the petition under Section 34 of the Act, which was filed by respondent no.1, is affirmed.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -3488,26 +3488,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S028", - "case_id": "4394", + "case_id": "153", "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "phi-4", - "source_file": "S028__ablation_issue__phi-4__4394.json", + "model": "qwen3-8b", + "source_file": "S028__ablation_issue__qwen3-8b__153.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "05/12/1961", - "machine_error_stage": "conclusion", - "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis" + "judgment_date": "11/05/2007", + "machine_error_stage": "facts", + "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Incorrect fact" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 1270 of 1968. Appeal from the Judgment dated the April 24, 1967 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 567 of 1966. | State Bank Of India v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Dhanb | 01/04/1972", - "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 1270 of 1968. Appeal from the Judgment dated the April 24, 1967 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 567 of 1966. | State Bank Of India v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Dhanb", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NOS - 2826 of 2016 | Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited (Formerly Known As Remi\nMetals Gujarat Ltd.) v. Oil And Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. | 13/11/2021", + "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NOS - 2826 of 2016 | Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited (Formerly Known As Remi\nMetals Gujarat Ltd.) v. Oil And Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The 2nd respondent was employed by the Imperial Bank of India on January 13, 1947, as a Grade II Clerk. The Sastry Award prescribed a uniform pay scale for clerks and provided directions for fitment. The respondent disputed the computation of benefits under the Award, leading to an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court fixed his basic pay at Rs. 164/- p.m. as of April 1, 1954, and directed payment of Rs. 1647.91. The High Court upheld this decision. The appellant challenged the High Court's ruling. The core dispute centers on the interpretation of paragraph 292 of the Sastry Award, particularly clauses (2), (4)(a), (4)(b), (4A), and (5)(a), concerning pay fitment and increments. The respondent's basic pay on January 31, 1950, was Rs. 108/-. The appellant argued for a pay of Rs. 148/- based on limited increments, while the respondent claimed Rs. 164/- by combining clauses (4)(b) and (5)(a). The interpretation of 'point-to-point adjustment' and 'same cadre' are critical. The Gajendragadkar Commission's report clarified 'point-to-point adjustment' and the Sastry Award's intent.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts \n1. The 2nd respondent was appointed by the Imperial Bank of India as a Grade II Clerk on **13 January 1947**. \n2. The **Sastry Award** (the “Award”) prescribes a uniform pay‑scale for clerks and contains detailed provisions (paragraph 292) for the **fitment** of a clerk’s pay and for the grant of **increments**. \n3. The respondent challenged the way the Bank had computed his benefits under the Award and consequently filed an application under **Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947** before the Labour Court. \n4. The Labour Court fixed the respondent’s **basic pay at Rs. 164 per month** (effective **1 April 1954**) and ordered the Bank to pay a total of **Rs. 1 647.91**. \n5. The respondent appealed; the High Court **affirmed** the Labour Court’s award. \n6. The Bank (appellant) now appeals the High Court judgment before this Court. \n7. The pivotal dispute concerns the **interpretation of paragraph 292 of the Sastry Award**, especially clauses **(2), (4)(a), (4)(b), (4A) and (5)(a)**: \n\n * Clause (2) defines the “point‑to‑point adjustment”. \n * Clauses (4)(a) & (4)(b) deal respectively with the **first** and **subsequent** pay‑fitments when a clerk is transferred **within the same cadre**. \n * Clause (4A) provides for a **special increment** when a clerk is transferred to a post having a **higher point‑value**. \n * Clause (5)(a) provides for **incremental rise** on the basis of **service‑related points**. \n\n8. On **31 January 1950** the respondent’s basic pay was **Rs. 108**. \n\n9. The appellant (Bank) contends that the respondent’s entitlement as of 1 April 1954 should be **Rs. 148**, arguing that only the limited increments in clauses (4)(a) and (4)(b) may be invoked. \n\n10. The respondent (2nd respondent) contends that **Rs. 164** is correct, relying on a **combined application** of clauses (4)(b) **and** (5)(a). \n\n11. The **Gajendragadkar Commission** (appointed to interpret the Sastry Award) held that: \n\n a. “**Point‑to‑point adjustment**” means the **full adjustment** of a clerk’s basic pay to the **exact point‑value** of the post to which he is transferred, **irrespective** of previous increments. \n \n b. The Award’s **purpose** is to ensure that a clerk transferred within the **same cadre** receives **pay on par** with the post to which he is moving, subject only to the ceiling of the **maximum permissible increment** under the Award. \n\n12. No procedural irregularity was alleged in the Labour Court or High Court proceedings; the appeal is purely an **interpretation of the Award**. \n\n---\n\n### Issues \n1. **Whether the respondent’s basic pay as of 1 April 1954 should be Rs. 164 (as held by the Labour Court and High Court) or Rs. 148 (as contended by the appellant).** \n\n2. **What is the proper construction of paragraph 292 of the Sastry Award, particularly clauses (2), (4)(b) and (5)(a), in light of the Gajendragadkar Commission’s interpretation of “point‑to‑point adjustment” and “same cadre”.** \n\n---\n\n### Rules \n1. **Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947** – empowers a Labour Court to determine the appropriate wage payable to an employee when a dispute arises under any industrial award. \n\n2. **Paragraph 292 of the Sastry Award** – contains the legislative scheme for pay‑fitment and increments for clerks: \n\n - **Clause (2)** defines “point‑to‑point adjustment”. \n - **Clause (4)(a)** – first fitment when a clerk is transferred within the same cadre. \n - **Clause (4)(b)** – subsequent fitment when further transfers occur within the same cadre. \n - **Clause (4A)** – special increment for transfer to a higher‑point post. \n - **Clause (5)(a)** – regular increment on the basis of accumulated service points. \n\n3. **Principle of statutory (or award) interpretation** – (i) *literal rule*: words are given their ordinary meaning unless that leads to absurdity; (ii) *purposive approach*: the object of the provision must be considered, especially where the literal meaning is ambiguous. \n\n4. **Gajendragadkar Commission Report (1955)** – authoritative interpretation of the Sastry Award: \n\n - “Point‑to‑point adjustment” **means the complete adjustment of the employee’s basic pay to the point‑value of the position to which he is transferred**, **not merely a marginal increase**. \n - The intent of the Award is **parity of pay** for clerks moving within the same cadre, **subject only to the maximum ceiling** fixed under the Award. \n\n5. **Precedent:** *State of Bombay v. M. R. Ghonaswad* (AIR 1957 SC 78) – held that where an award provides a “fitment” rule, the employer must honour the **full fitment** and cannot truncate it by limiting the employee to “increments only”. \n\n6. **Doctrine of *ejusdem generis*** – when ambiguous terms follow a list of specific items, the general term is read in the sense of the specific items. \n\n---\n\n### Analysis \n\n1. **Interpretation of “point‑to‑point adjustment” (Rule 2‑Clause (2) & Rule 4)** \n - The literal wording of clause (2) is “the employee shall be fitted **point‑to‑point** to the post to which he is transferred”. \n - The Gajendragadkar Commission (Fact 11‑a) gave a **definitive meaning**: a **full adjustment** to the post’s point‑value, **irrespective of prior increments**. \n - Applying the purposive rule (Rule 3) and the Commission’s clarification, the term cannot be read narrowly as “only the next incremental step”. \n\n2. **Effect of clauses (4)(b) and (5)(a) (Rule 2‑Clauses (4)(b) & (5)(a))** \n - Clause (4)(b) deals with **subsequent fitment** within the same cadre. It does **not** limit the fitment to the “increment” prescribed in clause (5)(a); rather, it **authorises** the employer to **adjust the entire basic pay** to the point‑value of the new post, **subject to the ceiling** provided in the Award. \n - Clause (5)(a) provides a **regular increment** based on service points, **in addition to** any fitment under clause (4). It is a **separate entitlement**, not a substitute for fitment. \n\n3. **Application to the respondent’s pay history** \n - On 31 January 1950 the respondent earned **Rs. 108** (Fact 8). \n - By 1 April 1954, according to the **pay‑scale** in the Sastry Award, the **point‑value** of a Grade II Clerk in the post to which the respondent was (or would be) placed was **Rs. 164**. \n - The **maximum permissible basic pay** for a Grade II Clerk under the Award (including the ceiling for fitment) is **Rs. 164**. \n\n4. **Appellant’s contention of Rs. 148** (Issue 1) \n - The Bank’s argument rests on a **restrictive reading** that only the **incremental component** of clause (5)(a) may be added to the basic pay after a fitment under clause (4)(b). \n - This reading **contradicts** the Commission’s explicit clarification that “point‑to‑point adjustment” **covers the whole basic pay** and is **not limited** to the incremental component. \n - Moreover, the *State of Bombay v. Ghonaswad* precedent (Rule 5) dictates that the employer must honour the **full fitment** called for by the award. \n\n5. **Respondent’s claim of Rs. 164** (Issue 1) \n - The respondent’s reliance on the **combined effect** of clauses (4)(b) **and** (5)(a) aligns with the **Gajendragadkar Commission**’s view that the fitment brings the employee’s pay **to the exact point‑value**; any subsequent service‑related increments under (5)(a) would be **absorbed** because the point‑value already reflects the maximum permissible pay for that post. \n - Consequently, the **Rs. 164** figure is the **correct computation** under the Award’s scheme. \n\n6. **Procedural posture** \n - The Labour Court correctly applied Section 33C(2) and made a determination based on the award’s construction. \n - The High Court’s affirmation shows no error of law or mis‑application of the Commission’s interpretation. \n\n7. **Overall assessment** \n - The appellant’s reliance on a **narrow, literal reading** of clause (5)(a) ignores the **binding interpretative pronouncement** of the Gajendragadkar Commission and established case law on award fitment. \n - The respondent’s position is **consistent** with the purpose of the Sastry Award—to ensure parity of pay for clerks transferred within the same cadre—and with the **authoritative** definition of “point‑to‑point adjustment”. \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion \nHaving examined the statutory framework, the precise wording of paragraph 292 of the Sastry Award, the authoritative interpretation given by the Gajendragadkar Commission, and the relevant judicial precedent, it is clear that the respondent is entitled to a **basic pay of Rs. 164 per month** as fixed by the Labour Court and upheld by the High Court. The appellant’s contention of Rs. 148 is untenable. Accordingly, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by\nP. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. This appeal by certificate raises a question as to the interpretation and proper application of paragraph 292-of the Sastry Award (hereinafter called 'the Award'). The 2nd respondent was employed on 13-1-1947 as a Grade II Clerk in the Imperial Bank of India on a scale of Rs. 70-4126-EB-130-5-175. This Bank was subsequently taken over by the State Bank of India under the State, Bank of India Act (Act XXIII of 1955). 'A, few months after the respondent was employed he was given a pay of Rs. 74/- be cause of his proficiency in using 'the machine. On 13-1- 48 he earned an increment and his basic pay was Rs. 78/-. On 1-1-49 he was promoted to Grade I so that on the date of his promotion he was drawing a basic pay of Rs. 100/-. On 1-1-50 he earn ed an increment and his basic pay I was Rs. 108/-. The Sastry Award prescribed a uniform scale of pay for clerks of Grades 1 &11 and gave directions to make fitments in that Grade, . The 2nd respondent disputed the computation of the benefit s admissible to him under, The'- Award and. consequently applied for a settlement of his dispute. under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947) which was referred to the Labour Court. The Labour Court allowed the application and fixed the basic 'Pay of the Applicant under paragraph 292 of the Award at Rs. 164/- p.m. as on 1-4-1954 with directions to the appellant to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs. 1647.91 for the period from 1-4-54 to 31-12-61. The appellant challenged the Award under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution but the High Court accepting the interpretation placed by the Lavour Court on paragraph 292 of the Award dismissed the petition. Inasmuch as the dispute between the parties is dependent upon the view which can 'reasonably Ile taken of paragraph 292 of the Award, it will be necessary to examine the directions contained therein, . We give below the relevant directions of that paragraph as amended:-- \"292. Section 11-for workmen Who entered service of the. Bank before 31st January 1950-\n(1) The workman's basic pay as on 31st January 1950 shall not be reduced in any case.\n(2) Subject to rule (1) the adjusted basic pay in the: new scale shall not exceed what point-to-point adjustment would give him or the maximum in the new scale.\n(3) In the matter of adjustment all efficiency bars, whether in the previously existing scales or in the new scales fixed by the award, should be ignored.\n(4) Subject to rules (1) to (3) a workman's basic pay in the hew scale shall be fixed in the following manner:-\n(a) A workman shall first be fitted into the scale of pay fixe by the said award (hereinafter called the new scale) by placing him at the stage in the new scale equal to, or next above, his basic pay as on 31st January 1950 in the. present scale then in force (herein called the existing scale).\n(b) To the basic pay into which he is fitted under cl. (a) the annual increment or increments in the new scale as from that stage onwards should be added at the rate of one increment for every completed three years of service in the same cadre as on 31st January 1950 up to a limit of twelve years' service; thereafter one increment for every four years of service up to another eight years' service and after that one increment for every five years of service.\n(4A) After adjustments are made in accordance with the directions Riven, three further annual increments in the new scale will be added thereto for service for the three years 1951 to 1953. In addition, the work man will be entitled to draw his normal increment for 1954 on 1st April 1954. Thereafter each succeeding years' annual' increment shall take effect as and from 1st April of that year.\" (5 ) (a) Where a workman received an additional increment or increments in his basic pay either at the initial start or by way of special promotion later on, his, length of service will be taken to-be the period which would ordinarily be necessary to bring a workman with the usual initial start without special promotion to that basic pay as (on) 31st January 1950, in the existing scale (fractions being rounded off to the nearest integer)\n(b) Similarly where a workman's increment or increments have been withheld prior to 31st January 1950 the length of service in his case will be calculated by subtracting the number of Wars for which the increments have been withheld.\n(c) x x x x\n(6) x x x x \"It may be mentioned here that prior to the. Award another Award known as the Sen Award was given on 12-8-50. This latter award, however, was declared void by the Supreme Court on 9-4-51. The pre-Sen scales were those fixed by the Award of an Industrial Tribunal known as Gupta Award admissible to the employees of the Imperial Bank of India, as it then was. The scales applicable to the 2nd respondent who was employed on 13-1-47 in the Calcutta Branch were Rs. 70- 4-126-EB-130-5-175 when he was in Grade II and Rs. 100-8-180EB-10-250 when he was promoted to Grade 1. The Award as subsequently modified prescribed only one scale of pay' of Rs. 85-5-100-6-112-7-140-8-164 9-245-10265-15-280 for clerical staff in 'A' class Banks in Class I areas. This scale applied to the clerical staff employed at the Calcutta Branch. It will be seen that the fitment of the basic salary of persons in Grade 11 and Grade in the new scales became a matte r of some controversy due to the difficulty of variation in the total number of years for each of the grades in which an employee had to work out his increments. In Grade II the maximum grade could be attained in 24 years while Grade I had arrange of 17 years. In the new grade an employee took 24 years to reach the maximum. In other words, the number of years required to reach the maximum of basic pay from the initial basic Pay in Grade II and that in the new scale was the same, namely 24 years. The only difficulty that would' present itself in the fitment of pay in the new grade in respect of a promotion made prior to the coming into force of the new scales from Grade 11 to Grade 1. It is for this reason the direction s contained in clauses 3, 4 and 5 of paragraph 292 were evolved basing the fitment both on the actual pay drawn and the increments which a person would nationality have earned having regard to tin number of years which/he would have taken in the new scale to draw the pay which he was actually getting on the date when the Award was brought into force. Ignoring the efficiency bar as provided in clause (3) of paragraph 292, a workman has to be fitted under clause (4) (a) into the scale o f pay fixed by the Award placing him at the stage in the new scale equal to or next , over his basic pay as on 31-1-50 in the pre-Sen scale 'then in force. it is not disputed by the parties that on 31-1-50 the 2nd respondent was drawing Rs. 108/- and since in the new scale he could not be fixed in Rs. 108/- he has to be fitted in Rs. 112/-. As clause (4) is also subject to clause (2) the adjusted pay in the new scale is directed not to exceed what point to point adjustment would give the workman or the maximum in the new scale. Does this mean that after the fitment under clause (2) is made clause, (4) (b) is to be ignored and only those increments specified in clause (4) are to be added ? Or is the workman also entitled to the increments specified in, (4) (b) and if so, is that clause to be read with clause 5 (a) as contended by 'the 2nd respondent?On the assumption that clause (4) (b) is applicable the workman would be entitled to one; increment for every three completed years of service in the cadre as on 31-1-50. There is also no dispute that 'he had completed three years from 13-1-47 to 31-1-50 and on this basis he would be entitled to one increment so, that the basic pay would be Rs. 119. Under clause (4A) he would further be entitled to three increments in the new scale for his service for the 'three years 1951 to 1953. It is at this stage that the appellant and the 2nd respondent part ways. The appellant contends that the basic pay in the new scale is arrived at after adjustment under clauses (4) (a) and (4A) to three further increments, namely, 7+7+7=21 which added to Rs. 119/would be Rs. 140/- and since the fitment was being made as from 1-4-54 he will be entitle d to one more increment which is Rs. 8/- giving him a total basic pay of Rs. 148/-. The 2nd respondent, however, contends that clause (4) (b) should be read with clause (5) (a) because before the, Award came into force. he was promoted to Grade I an d his basic pay in that grade should be taken into consideration for which clause (5) (a) was designed. The appellant takes the stand that this clause is not applicable because the additional increments under that clause are only in , respect of any 'increment or increments in the basic pay at the initial stage-or by way of special promotion later on in the same cadre which under clause (4) (b) must mean Grade II. As the 2nd respondent was not given any increments in the basic pay at the initial stage nor was he given any increment by way of special promotion he will not be entitled to the benefit given by clause (5) (a). In this view, it is submitted that the interpretation placed by the Labour Court brings par a 292 (5) (a) in direct conflict with para 292(4)(b) because the former was only a deeming provision and was intended for computation of length of service. The Labour Court as well as the High Court, however, interpreted the word 'cad re' in para. 292 (4) (b) as covering all workmen in the cadre of clerks and not different cadres, which means that both grade 11 and grade I of the pre-Sen Award are included in the same cadre and not different cadres.The, High Court referred to paragraph 91 in which it was mentioned that Gupta Award had reduced the four cadres of clerks with different grades of pay employed by Imperial Bank of India into two grades, namely, the junior clerks and senior clerks and though para 531 has used expressions like 'officers grade' and 'clerical grade it is not possible to hold that each grade of clerks with a particular scale of pay was considered to be a cadre by itself. In its view the mere mention of one grade or two grades for the clerical staff does not justify the conclusion that each grade with a particular scale of pay was taken to be a separate cadre of I service. On the contrary its impression was that the clerical staff was taken 'to be a cadre even if it had at one point of time different grades with different scales of pay. it accordingly held 'that the interpretation placed by the Labour Court was correct and that the expression 'in the same cadre' occurring in paragraph 292 (4) (b) of the Award was equivalent to the expression 'in the same grade'. On this interpretation paragraph 292 (5) (a) was read with paragraph 292 (4) (b). If so read, the respondent would be entitled to three increments instead of one increment as contended by the 2nd respondent. Once the amount to be added to the basic pay drawn as on 31-1-50 is fixed in the new scale which is Rs. 112/- by reference to the deeming provision under (5) (a) read with (4) (b) the second respondent would be entitled to three increments for every notional year on the basis that if he had not been special increments at the beginning and promotion to Grade I on given 1-1-49 he would have taken 10 Years to reach the basic pay he was then drawing. Applying this Principle he would get three increments of pay for three years amounting to. Rs. 21/-, which added to Rs. 112/- would give him a basic salary of Rs. 133/There after under clause (4A) for the years 1951 to 1953 he would have to be given 3 further increments, namely, 7+8+8= 23 and thereafter he would earn another increment as on 1st April 1954 so that the increments under clause (4A) would be Rs. 31/- which added to Rs. 133/- would entitle him to a- basic salary of Rs. 164/-. This is the claim of the 2nd respondent which has been upheld on the, basis of the interpretation placed both by the Labour Court and the High Court.Before we embark on an examination of the rival contentions it will be useful to mention that after the Award the question of its implementation was considered by the Labour Appellate Tribunal which gavelits decision on 28-4-1954. The Central Government thereafter modified the Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision on 24-8-54 and on the same date appointed Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was), to enquire into and ascertain the effect of the decision. of the Labour Appellate Tribunal as modified by the Central Government in respect of the emoluments of the Bank employees. On 25-7-1955 the Commission made its report which were incorporated in the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies Decision) Act (XLI of 1955). The Award with modifications as already set out, was to become effective from the 1st of April 1954. The decision in this case will, 'therefore, depend upon the interpretation to be placed on the modified directions. Though both sides have given their own respective examples of the fitment that should be made under these directions, the question whether the assumption underlying the- respective worksheets is valid or not would ultimately depend upon the proper interpretation of the directions relating to the fitment of the emoluments of the employees in the new scale.\nThe learned Advocate for the appellant during his main arguments did not lay stress on clause (2) of paragraph 292 and in fact stated that these can be ignored. What was emphasised was , that clause (a) cannot be read with clause (b) as contended by the 2nd respondent; that the existing scale mentioned in clause (4) (a) is the pre-Sen scale and the weightage that is admissible to the 2nd respondent is in that existing pre-Sen scale of one increment for every 3 years of actual service which would only entitle him to one increment as he had actually served for 3 years from 13-1-1947 to 31-1-1950 which latter date is the crucial date on which fitment has to be made as specified in the directions in paragraph (4) (b). Alternatively it was contended that even if clause (5) (a) was to be read with clause (4) (b), though that clause was inapplicable as the 2nd respondent had got a promotion from Grade II to Grade T, -as he had on 1-1-1949 served 2 years and if to that service is added the notional service under clause (5) (a) after he eat his promotion to Grade I he would have served 2 more years. ,This advantage he would have enjoyed as he would have-been fitted in Rs. 102/- in the Junior scale and would have taken 2 more years to re ach the basic pay of Rs. 112/-. Even on this basis the 2nd respondent would only be entitled to one increment.\nThe learned Advocate for the-appellant while replying to the submissions of the second respondent who presented his case personally, raised f or the first time a contention based on clause (2) in support of which he cited the decision of this Court in State Bank of. India v. Prakash Chand Mehra ([1961] 2 LLJ 383 .). According to this submission a limitation was introduced by clause , (2) which is made applicable to the fixation of basic pay under clause (4) by the words 'subject to clauses (1) to (3)'. The direction in clause (2) that the basic pay in the new scale shall not exceed what point-to-point adjustment would have given him in the new scale, it is said, excludes clause (4) (b) and the 2nd respondent would not be entitled to any increment, for every completed three years of service in the same cadre as on 31-1-50. If this view is accepted the 2nd respondent would merely be entitled to 4 increments at the rate of Rs. 7/- each in the new scale as on 1-4-54, and his pay will have to be fixed at Rs. 140/- and not as earlier contended on behalf of the appellant, at Rs. 148/-. There is no difficulty in so far as clause (4) (a) is concerned because the basic pay of the 2nd respondent in the existing scale of Grade I which was Rs. 108/- would be fitted in the new scale in that next nearest basic pay of Rs. 112/-. As we stated earlier, the pre-Sen scale for Clerks was comprised of both Grade I and Grade 11. In the Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K. L. Kharbanda ([1962] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 977 .), this Court had said that the Sastry Award provided one grade for all clerical workmen by whatever name they were known in the Bank. It cannot be disputed t hat a workman in Grade 11 as well as in Grade I is nonetheless in the pre-Sen scale which are in the same cadre. Clause 4(b) directs that to the basic pay into which he is fitted under clause (a) one increment for every completed 3 years of hi s service in the same cadre as on 31-1-50 should be added. This in our view is an additional advantage which is sought to be given and is not to be restricted by clause (2) which on the interpretation suggested would terminate the advantage of placing him in the new scale with clause (4) (a) itself.- Some meaning has to be given to the words 'to the basic pay' in clause (4) (b) which can only- be additional increment or increments based on the length of service. It is true that in St ate Bank of India v. Prakash Chand Mehra, it, was observed:\" Giving as we must, natural meaning to the words used in rules 2 and 4, we are of opinion that in no case can the basic pay be fixed at a higher figure than what the point-to-point adjustment would, give to the workman or the maximum in the new scale. Under rule 4 (a) the workman's basic pay is Rs. 90 and under rule 4(b) to this basic pay has to be added two increments, in respect of the new scale so that the basic pay 2, at Rs. 100. If that were correct, the salary would be Rs. 126 on 1 April 1954. There is however the limitation introduced by rule 2 which is made applicable to the fixation of t he basic pay under rule 4 by the words \"subject to rules 1 to 3\". Admittedly, point-to-point. adjustment would give the respondent a basic pay of Rs. 90. This limit cannot therefore be, exceed; and so, in spite of rule 4 (b) ' the basic pay for applying the new scale would be Rs. 90 and not Rs. 100 \".\nIn that case the respondent had entered the Bank's service on, 20-2-43 and on the 31st January 1950 he was getting a salary of. Rs. 86/- p.m. On 1-4-54 he was employed at Abohar Branch of the Imperial Bank of India and on 15-5-54 he was transferred to Amritsar. Under the classification in the Bank Award, Abohar was class IV area while Amritsar was a Class 11 area. On the basis that Abohar was a class IV area the respondent's salary was fixed by the Bank on 1-4-54 at Rs. 112/ p.m. and on his transfer to Amritsar, a class II- area, in consideration of his length of service he wa s given three increments and 'his salary was fixed at Rs. 133/-. The respondent's case was that he was entitled to three increments over Rs. 126/- which it is said he was drawing at Abohar, i.e. Rs. 148/- p.m. On a dispute being referred under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court, Delhi accepted the respondent's case that his pay should be fixed at Rs. 148/- p.m. Though the court did not apply clause (4) (b) it nonetheless came to the same conclusion. on the basis that Abohar was treated as a class IV area with retrospective effect from 1-4-54 and the calculation on that basis would fix his basic salary at Rs. 126/- on 1-4-54 and on transfer from that area to Amritsar, a class 11 area, he would g et an increment and his salary would be fixed at Rs. 133/-. In that case the meaning and significance of the term 'point-to-\" point adjustment' mentioned in clause (2) was not discussed nor has there been anything said. as to the contingencies in which those directions were to be applied. If point-to- point adjustment signifies the fixation of the workman at the stage in the new scale equal to or above his basic pay as on 31-1-50, clause (4) (a) itself has provided for that and there was no need for clause (2) or clause (4) (b). A perusal of 'the report of the Gajendragadkar Commission in this respect, however, furnishes a clue to this enigma. In paragraphs 109 to, 111 the Commission sets out directions in the Award, the modification made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Government's decision thereon. A reference to paragraph 109. would not only show the nature of the scheme proposed in the Award but indicates what in fact was, meant by point-to-poi nt adjustment. It is there observed as follows: \"109. In fitting the existing staff in the revised pay structure the Sen Tribunal gave employees the benefit of what virtually amounted to point to point adjustment that is, the placing of each employee at the stage in the new scale to which he would have risen by reason of the length of his service had he entered service on the new scale. After a careful consideration of the various aspects of the question raised by the provisions contained in the Sen Award the Sastry Tribunal by and large followed the recommendations of the Central Pay Commission that when persons on the existing scale of pay were brought on to the new scales recommended for them, their initial pay should be fixed at the stage i n the proposed scale next above the pay they were, drawing in the existing scale and special increments added to it at the rate of one increment in the proposed scale for every three completed years of service subject to certain ceilings in regard to the increase to be allowed. The Sastry Tribunal recommended that a workman should first be fitted into the scale o f pay fixed by its award at the stage in the new scale equal to or next above his basic pay as on the 31st January 1950 in the existing scale (pre-Sen scale) and annual increments in the new scale as from that stage onwards added at the rate of one increment for every completed three years of his service subject to a maximum of 4 increments. It also recommended that two further annual increments in the new scale should be added to the basic pay fixed in the manner described above for service or the two years 1951 and 1952 and the worker should be entitled to draw his norm al increment for 1953 and succeeding years from 1st April of each year. There were, besides, certain other recommendations aimed at giving protection to a workman's basic pay and emoluments as on the 31st January 1950, and covering cases of special increments granted or increments withheld etc. It also recommended. that subject to a workman's basic pay as on the 31st January 1950 not, being reduced in any case the adjusted, basic, pay in the new scale should not exceed What point to point adjustment would give' him or the maxi mum in the new scale\" .The Labour Appellate Tribunal agreed with the scheme of adjustment given by the Award except in regard to the weightage in respect of which it recommended the removal of the 12 years' limit for adding one increment for every three years. In its place it proposed a tapering off of the weightage after 12 years, by the addition of one increment for every 4 years in the next 8 years and one increment for every 5 years for the next five years. Though the Government modified the Labour Appellate Tribunal's recommendation by confirming the Award, it decided to adopt what was proposed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in respect of the weightage of one increment for every three years. The Commission, however, did not accept the Government's decision but made the following recommendations in para 112:--\n\"112. The question raised by the modification thus made by Government is not likely to affect a very large number of employees. On the merits, it seems to me that much can be said in favour of the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. If, in adjusting employees in the new wage structure, they are entitled to have their previous service taken into account, it is difficult to appreciate why a line should be drawn at the end of twelve years' service and it should be held that an employee would not be entitled to claim any credit for any period of service beyond the said line. The modification made by Government confirms the provisions made by the Sastry Tribunal, and these provisions, as I have just indicated, allow certain increments in lieu of twelve years' service. If fairplay and equity. Justify these provisions, it would seem to follow that the same considerations would justify the additional provisions that have been made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal decision. On the merits, therefore, I am inclined to agree with the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal\" .It would appear clear from the above recommendation that 'What the Award meant in clause (2) when it referred to point-' to-point adjustment is the placing. of each employee at the stage 'in the new scale to which he would have risen by reason of the length of service had he entered service in the new scale. What was sought to be ensured by clause (2) was that the adjusted basic pay in the new scale shall not exceed the point-to-point adjustment or the maximum of the scale. If the meaning given to the phrase point-to-point adjustment, is what is stated by the Commission in the report, then there, would be no impediment in giving effect to the directions in clause (4) (b). It would not therefore, be right to say that clause (4) (b) is to be ignored Or that the advantage ends only with that given in clause (4) (a).\nThe next question is what is it that clause (5) (a) Provides for ? Does it provide for computing the length of service for the purposes of giving One increment for every three Years of notional service worked out on the basis of the service that would be required for a workman to Mach the basic pay which lie was drawing in the existing scale ? The contention of the 2nd respondent is sat taking the basic pay drawn by him as on 31st January 1950 to the nearest integer the length of service should be computed on the basis of the number of years which he would have to serve in the junior scale to draw that amount of basic pay. It appears to us on a careful examination of the terms of clause (5) (a) that the directions in this clause are inapplicable to him. Clause (5) (a) provides for only the, cases of those who start on a higher initial basic pay by getting additional increments or are, given advance increments in any scale whether junior or senior. In such contingencies how the length of service for the purposes of clause (4) (b) is to be computed was provided for in clause (5) (b). The directions given in that clause are that the length of service in the scale in which he is and in which he got an increment or increments either at the initial start or by special promotion should be that which he would have taken to reach the basic pay which he would draw on 31st January 1950 with the initial start. The condition precedent to the applicability of the directions in this clause is the receipt of increments or increment by way of special promotion. An increment is in the same scale while a promotion is from one scale to a higher scale. A promotion from a lower grade to a higher grade though both the grades may be in the same cadre is not an increment or increments by way of special promotion. The use of the word 'special' would itself show that what is contemplated is advance increments in the same grade. What is sought to be taken into account by the Award is the actual service of the workman or where he has been given increments in the same scale he is sought to be compensated by giving him a corresponding advantage in the new scale. This is sought to be effected by taking into account the increment or increments earned in the cadre in computing the length of service under clause (4) (b). As the 2nd respondent did not get any increment or increments in the existing scale which was Grade I either at the initial start or by way of special promotion, the actual service in the cadre has to be computed for the purposes of clause (4) (b). The words 'same cadre' in that clause as explained earlier would refer to both Grade IT and Grade 1. The actual service in both the grades will alone be considered for giving him an increment for every three years of service which in his case works out to one increment in respect of his 3 years.' service: from 13 -1-47 to 31-1-50. Even if the initial. increment of Rs. 4/- in Grade II which was given to him for being proficient in the working of a machine is taken into account under clause: (5) (b) that would add one more year to the three years of actual service rendered .by him but that does, not give him any further advantage. He will, only be entitled to one increment under clause (4) (b). In the result we. hold that the 2nd respondent has to be fitted in the new scale on a basic pay of Rs. 148/- and on that basis the emoluments to which he would be entitled will have to be worked out. We accordingly direct the Labour Court to give the necessary direction in this regard.The appeal is, , therefore, allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court affirming the Award of the Labour Court is set aside but in the circumstances, without costs.\n", + "case_record": "Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited (formerly Remi Metals Gujarat Ltd.) appealed against the High Court of Uttarakhand's decision to set aside an arbitration award in its favor against Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC). The dispute arose from purchase orders (POs) issued by ONGC to Remi Metals for seamless steel casing pipes. The POs stipulated delivery within 16-40 weeks and included clauses stating time was of the essence and allowing for liquidated damages (LDs) at 0.5% per week for delayed supplies, up to 5% of the contract price. During contract execution, ONGC granted several extensions to Remi Metals, and during these extensions, ONGC deducted US $8,07,804.03 and Rs. 1,05,367/- as LDs. Remi Metals claimed these LDs, along with other amounts, before an Arbitral Tribunal. The Tribunal found that time was not of the essence, and therefore, LDs could not be granted, but allowed ONGC to retain Rs. 2,09,28,995/- representing actual damages. The District Court largely upheld the Tribunal's findings but modified arbitration costs. The High Court, however, reversed the Tribunal and District Court, holding that time was of the essence and ONGC was justified in recovering LDs, as the Arbitral Tribunal and District Judge had erred in requiring proof of actual loss.", + "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited (formerly Remi Metals Gujarat Ltd.) entered into purchase orders (POs) with Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC) for the supply of seamless steel casing pipes.\n2. The POs stipulated delivery within 16-40 weeks and included clauses stating that time was of the essence and allowed for liquidated damages (LDs) at 0.5% per week for delayed supplies, up to 5% of the contract price.\n3. During contract execution, ONGC granted several extensions to Remi Metals, but during these extensions, ONGC deducted US $8,07,804.03 and Rs. 1,05,367/- as LDs.\n4. Remi Metals claimed these LDs, along with other amounts, before an Arbitral Tribunal.\n5. The Arbitral Tribunal found that time was not of the essence and thus LDs could not be granted, but allowed ONGC to retain Rs. 2,09,28,995/- representing actual damages.\n6. The District Court largely upheld the Tribunal's findings but modified arbitration costs.\n7. The High Court of Uttarakhand reversed the Tribunal and District Court, holding that time was of the essence and ONGC was justified in recovering LDs, as the Arbitral Tribunal and District Judge had erred in requiring proof of actual loss.\n8. Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited appealed against the High Court's decision.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Arbitral Tribunal's award by holding that time was of the essence and that ONGC was justified in recovering LDs without proof of actual loss.\n2. Whether the Arbitral Tribunal and District Court correctly interpreted the contract terms regarding time being of the essence and the applicability of LDs.\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Section 34)**: A court may set aside an arbitral award if it finds that the award is in conflict with the public policy of India, including the principles of natural justice.\n2. **Contract Law Principles**: The interpretation of \"time is of the essence\" clauses depends on the intent of the parties and the circumstances of the case. Courts generally uphold such clauses unless there is evidence of waiver or estoppel.\n3. **Liquidated Damages**: Liquidated damages are enforceable if they are a genuine pre-estimate of loss and not a penalty. The party seeking to enforce LDs must show that the conditions for their application were met.\n4. **Precedents on Arbitral Awards**: Courts should not lightly interfere with arbitral awards unless there is a clear error of law or procedural impropriety (e.g., *ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd.*, 2003).\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Interpretation of \"Time is of the Essence\" (Fact 2, Issue 1, Rule 2)**:\n - The POs explicitly stated that time was of the essence, which is a strong indication that the parties intended strict adherence to delivery timelines.\n - The Arbitral Tribunal's finding that time was not of the essence may have been based on ONGC's grant of extensions (Fact 3), which could imply a waiver or estoppel. However, the High Court correctly noted that extensions do not necessarily negate the \"time is of the essence\" clause unless there is clear evidence of a waiver.\n - The High Court's decision aligns with established contract law principles that such clauses are enforceable unless waived.\n\n2. **Enforceability of Liquidated Damages (Fact 3, Issue 1, Rule 3)**:\n - The LDs clause was clearly defined in the POs, and ONGC deducted amounts in accordance with the agreed terms.\n - The Arbitral Tribunal erred in requiring proof of actual loss, as LDs are enforceable without such proof if the conditions for their application are met (e.g., *Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co.*, 1915).\n - The High Court correctly held that the Tribunal's requirement for actual loss was inconsistent with the nature of LDs.\n\n3. **Judicial Deference to Arbitral Awards (Fact 6, Issue 2, Rule 4)**:\n - While courts should generally defer to arbitral awards, they may intervene if the award is patently illegal or against public policy.\n - The High Court's intervention was justified because the Tribunal's interpretation of the contract and LDs was legally flawed, not merely a factual dispute.\n\n### Conclusion:\nThe High Court correctly set aside the Arbitral Tribunal's award by upholding the \"time is of the essence\" clause and the enforceability of liquidated damages. The Tribunal's error in requiring proof of actual loss for LDs was a clear legal mistake, warranting judicial intervention. Therefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.", + "reference_judgment": "1. Leave granted in SLP (C) No. 19203 of 2012.\n2. Civil Appeal Nos. 2826-2827 of 2016, preferred by Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited (formerly known as Remi Metals Gujarat Ltd.) hereinafter referred to as 'Remi Metals' for the sake of brevity and clarity, have been filed impugning the judgments and orders dated 14.10.2008 and 27.07.2010 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in AO Nos.472 and 466 of 2005 and Review Petition No. 1340 of 2008 in AO No. 472 of 2005 respectively. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 19203 of 2012, preferred by Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'ONGC' for the sake of brevity and clarity), has been filed impugning the judgment and order dated 27.07.2010 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Review Petition No. 1340 of 2008 in AO No. 472 of 2005.\n3. The short question which arises for determination by this Court is whether the impugned judgment was correct in setting aside the arbitration award in favour of the ONGC.\n4. Before we analyse the case at hand, it is necessary for us to have a brief understanding of the facts. A global tender was floated by the ONGC for purchase of aggregate quantity of 3,93,297 metres of seamless steel casing pipes. Remi Metals was a successful bidder. It claims that it had bid to supply pipes as a supplier on behalf of Volski Tube Mills, Russia. In furtherance of the same, 4 purchase orders (POs) No. 275, 276, 277 and 286 were issued in the following manner:\n5. It was mentioned in the POs that the delivery period will commence within 16 weeks and will be completed in 40 weeks, or earlier, from the date of the PO.\n6. Some of the important conditions mentioned in the POs, which were common to all the POs, are as under:\n9. i) The time and date of delivery is the essence of the supply order and delivery must be completed not later than the date specified therein. ii) It must be noted that delayed supplies even delivery and/or accepted by the purchaser will be treated as supplied/effected after schedule period without prejudice to Failure and Termination Clause. iii) Even when extension in delivery period is granted, such acceptance of extension as the case may be will be without prejudice to claim damages under Failure and Termination Clause unless purchaser clearly waives his right in writing to recover such damages with the approval of competent authority.\n7. Further, relevant provisions of the General Terms and Conditions appended with the POs are as follows:\n10. FAILURE AND TERMINATION CLAUSE/LIQUIDATED DAMAGES: Time and date of delivery shall be essence of the contract. If the contractor fails to deliver the stores, or any instalment thereof within the period fixed for such delivery in the schedule or at any time repudiates the contract before the expiry of such period, the purchaser may, without prejudice to any right or remedy, available to him to recover damages for breach of contract :- (a) Recover from the contractor as agreed liquidated damages and not by way of penalty, a sum equivalent to 1/2% (half percent) of the contract price of the whole unit per week for such delay or part thereof (this is an agreed, genuine pre- estimate of damage duly agreed by the parties) which the contractors has failed to deliver within the period fixed for delivery in the schedule, where delivery thereof is accepted after expiry of the aforesaid period. It may be noted that such recovery of liquidated damages may be up to 5% of the contract price of whole unit of stores which the contractor has failed to deliver within the period fixed for delivery; or (...) (e) It may further be noted that the clause (a) above provides for recovery of liquidated damages on the cost of contract price of delayed supplies whole unit at the rate of 1/2% (half percent) of the contract price of the whole unit per week for such delay or part thereof up to a ceiling of 5% of the contract price of delayed supplies (whole unit). Liquidated damages for delay in supplies thus accrued will be recovered by the paying authorities of the purchaser specified in the supply order, from the bill for payment of the cost of material submitted by the contactor or his foreign principals in accordance with the term of supply order or otherwise.\n8. During the execution of contract, there were certain delays in meeting the obligation as required under the contract. In this context, various extensions were given by the ONGC to fulfil their obligation. The extensions were granted as follows: Remi Metals accepted the aforesaid extensions and satisfied the contract.\n9. In this context, it may be noted that the ONGC had deducted an aggregate amount of US $8,07,804.03 and Rs.1,05,367/- as liquidated damages from various bills submitted by the Remi Metals. There were other claims which were disputed by the Remi Metals which were claimed before a panel of arbitrators.\n10. In detail, the Remi Metals' claims were hereunder: CLAIM TITLE AMOUNT Refund of Liquidated damages claimed by ONGC US $807,804.03 and Rs. 1,05,367/- Customs Duty Reimbursement Rs. 1,90,43,037/- Interest on Delayed Payments US $2,44,121.03 and Rs. 5,76,244.31 Amount Short Received under invoices Rs. 18,11,456.72 Failure to Furnish \"C\" forms US $2,44,649.39 Handling Charges Payable on ONGC Rs. 24,86,369.86 Wrongful reduction of price for balance 8.55% (16,174.78m) under PO No. 275 US $83,324.38 Award of the above amounts - with 18% interest from the date on which it ought to have been paid by ONGC and further interest till date of payment\n11. The Arbitral Tribunal, on hearing the parties, had framed 17 issues, of which we are concerned only with the following: (i) Was time the essence of the Agreement to make supplies under the four Purchase Orders and was the delivery date to be reckoned from the date of the supply order? (ii) Was ONGC justified in recovering liquidated damages of US $8,07,804.03 and Rs.1,05,367/-? (iii) Was the Claimant entitled to extension of delivery dates without levy of liquidated damages on account of force majeure condition as stated in paragraphs 12.D.3 and 12.D.4 of the Statement of Claim? (iv) Was ONGC entitled to impose liquidated damages on the basis of the entire value of the Purchase Orders? (v) Is the Claimant entitled to refund of any part of the amount recovered by ONGC as liquidated damages? (vi) Is the Claimant entitled to US $2,44,121.03 and Rs.5,76,244.21 as interest on delayed payment as in Exhibit 'H' to the Statement of Claim? (vii) Whether the Claimant is entitled to any interest? If so, at what rate and for what period?\n12. The Arbitral Tribunal, at the outset, held that merely having a clause in the contract making time the essence of it would not be determinative; rather, an overall view having regard to all the terms of contract are to be taken into consideration. Further, they noted that contracts containing provision for extension of time or payment of penalty on default would dilute the obligation of timely performance and render the clauses imbuing time as essence of the contract ineffective. Additionally, the Arbitral Tribunal also noted that generally, under construction contracts, time is not the essence. Ultimately, on this issue, the Arbitral Tribunal noted as under: \"43.29. It may also be stated that the supply of material in the instant case was not for any specific purpose or urgent requirement. The tender was a global tender for general requirement as stated by Mr. K. Bhattacharya (RW-1). 43.30. Besides, the contract provides for imposition of LD and/or termination of the contract. It may also be noticed that ONGC could extend the time for delivery and in fact ONGC did extend the delivery period without levying any LD. These and other stipulations in the contract are a clear indication that the time was not the essence of contract.\"\n13. On the aspect of liquidated damages, the Arbitral Tribunal held that liquidated damages, which are pre-estimated damages, cannot be granted as there was no breach of contract due to the fact that time was not the essence. Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal proceeded to determine the actual damages based on the evidence furnished.\n14. It was ONGC's estimation that there were four categories of tangible losses, namely: (i) revenue loss; (ii) loss due to the use of higher ppf/grade casing; (iii) loss due to intra/inter- regional transportation; and (iv) loss due to foreign exchange fluctuation. In total, such losses were estimated to be to the tune of Rs.3,80,64,830/-. The estimation was as follows: AMOUNT CATEGORY Revenue loss Rs.95,72,332/- Loss due to the use of higher/ppf grade casing Rs.10,97,883/- Loss due to intra/inter-regional transportation Rs.90,09,950/- Loss due to foreign exchange fluctuation Rs.1,83,84,668/- Total: Rs.3,80,64,833/-\n15. The said estimation was accepted by the Arbitral Tribunal. However, it was also held that ONGC would not be entitled to claim any damage for losses incurred during the extended period of delivery where liquidated damages were expressly waived. The losses claimed during such period without imposition of liquidated damages are to the tune of Rs.1,71,35,838, which were excluded from the total computation of loss by the Arbitral Tribunal. Ultimately, it was held that ONGC would be entitled to retention of Rs.2,09,28,995/- or its equivalent in US dollars at the rate as on date of the award, i.e. US $ 440,610.42/-1, out of the total liquidated damages (US $ 8,07,804.03 and Rs.1,05,367/-) recovered. 1 https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=15268 1 USD = 47.5 INR end of year 2002-03\n16. Aggrieved by the award of the Arbitral Tribunal, the ONGC filed a Section 34 petition before the District Court claiming that the award of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in tune with the contract, which is a justifiable ground for interference. They sought to address the concern on delayed acceptance by stating that such acceptance was valid and permissible under contract law and the liquidated damages imposed on such acceptance was legally valid. Further, they pointed out that liquidated damages could have been given as the same was a genuine and reasonable pre- estimate of the possible damages negotiated between the parties at the time of entering into contract.\n17. The District Court, by order dated 19.07.2005, held that the Tribunal was correct in holding that time was not the essence of the contract and only the losses actually suffered could be granted. However, the District Judge modified the costs of arbitration from Rs.25 lakhs to Rs.9,40,000/-.\n18. Both parties, aggrieved by the order of the District Judge, appealed the same before the High Court of Uttarakhand in AO Nos.472 of 2005 and 466 of 2005 under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The High Court, by impugned order dated 14.10.2008 held that both the arbitral award and order of the District Judge erred in construction of the contract with respect to whether time was the essence or not. Further, the High Court has reasoned that the Arbitral Tribunal as well as District Judge committed gross error in arriving at a conclusion that ONGC had to prove loss suffered before recovering any damages. Moreover, the decree in respect of cost of arbitration was upheld by the High Court. Accordingly, AO No.472 of 2005 filed by ONGC was allowed and AO No.466 of 2005 filed by Remi Metals (now Welspun) was dismissed.\n19. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, review petitions being Review Petition Nos.1340 of 2008 and 1339 of 2008 were filed which were disposed of with the following observation: \"...The judgement and order passed by the District Judge, Dehradun, in Arbitration Case No.31 of 2004 th dated 19 July, 2005, is modified to the extent that the appeal with regard to Claim Nos. 1 and 2 is th allowed, while the judgement and order dated 19 July, 2005, passed by the District Judge, Dehradun, shall remain intact with regard to claim Nos. 3 to 7...\"\n20. Aggrieved by the order passed in the review petitions, both parties have filed these appeals before this Court.\n21. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, appearing for Remi Metals (now Welspun), has submitted that: The view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal was reasonable, plausible and can be sustained. Time was not the essence of the contract, as the contract provided for extension of time as well as for liquidated damages. Further, once ONGC waived the liquidated damages in the first two extensions, they could not have claimed liquidated damages for further extensions of delivery date. This Court should not interfere or set aside awards in a casual manner, while doing so this Court should come to a clear understanding that the award was patently illegal. [See Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (AIR 2015 SC 620) pg. 67]\n22. Learned Counsel appearing for ONGC has submitted that: That the imposition of liquidated damages has already been upheld under similar circumstance by earlier judgment in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705 : (AIR 2003 SC 2629). The award cannot be sustained as in a contract having provision for liquidated damages, unliquidated damages cannot be given. Reading of the contract makes it clear that the time was of the essence, which was also signified in every extension given. The award interprets the contractual clauses in a manner which is not reasonable and plausible.\n23. Before we analyse the award, we need to first ascertain the scope of Section 34 of Arbitration Act, before the 2015 amendment, which provided for certain specific grounds for challenge. Section 34, as it existed, reads as under: 34 Application for setting aside arbitral award. - (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if- ... (b) the Court finds that- (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. \n(Emphasis supplied)\n The limited grounds provided under Section 34 of the Act, has been interpreted by this Court on numerous occasions. In this case at hand, the challenge of award is based on the fact that the same is against the public policy and patent illegality. Public policy as a ground of challenge has always been met with certain scepticism. The phrase 'public policy' does not indicate 'a catch- all provision' to challenge awards before an appellate forum on infinite grounds. However, the ambit of the same is so diversly interpreted that in some cases, the purpose of limiting the Section 34 jurisdiction is lost. This Court's jurisprudence also shows that Section 34(2)(b) has undergone a lot of churning and continue to evolve. The purpose of Section 34 is to strike a balance between Court's appellate powers and integrity of the arbitral process.\n24. The first case, which expounded on the scope of 'public policy' was Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644 : (AIR 1994 SC 860), which inter alia provided that a foreign award may not be enforced under the said Act, if the court dealing with the case is satisfied that the enforcement of the award will be contrary to the public policy. After elaborate discussion, the Court arrived at the conclusion that public policy comprehended in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 is the \"public policy of India\" and does not cover the public policy of any other country. For giving meaning to the term \"public policy\", the Court observed thus:\n\"66. Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention of 1958 and Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act do not postulate refusal of recognition and enforcement of a foreign award on the ground that it is contrary to the law of the country of enforcement and the ground of challenge is confined to the recognition and enforcement being contrary to the public policy of the country in which the award is set to be enforced. There is nothing to indicate that the expression 'public policy' in Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention and Section 7(1)(b) (ii) of the Foreign Awards Act is not used in the same sense in which it was used in Article I(c) of the Geneva Convention of 1927 and Section 7(1) of the Protocol and Convention Act of 1937. This would mean that 'public policy' in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) has been used in a narrower sense and in order to attract the bar of public policy the enforcement of the award must invoke something more than the violation of the law of India. Since the Foreign Awards Act is concerned with recognition and enforcement of foreign awards which are governed by the principles of private international law, the expression 'public policy' in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act must necessarily be construed in the sense the doctrine of public policy is applied in the field of private international law. Applying the said criteria it must be held that the enforcement of a foreign award would be refused on the ground that it is contrary to public policy if such enforcement would be contrary to (i) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (ii) the interests of India; or (iii) justice or morality.\" In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 : (AIR 2003 SC 2629), the scope of Section 34 was expanded to include patent illegality as a ground for challenging the award and held as under :\n\"31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase 'public policy of India' used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term 'public policy' in Renusagar case [Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] : (AIR 1994 SC 860) it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The result would be-award could be set aside if it is contrary to: (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality, or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void. (...)\n74. In the result, it is held that: (A)(1) The court can set aside the arbitral award under Section 34(2) of the Act if the party making the application furnishes proof that: (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. (2) The court may set aside the award: (i)(a) if the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, (b) failing such agreement, the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in accordance with Part I of the Act, (ii) if the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with: (a) the agreement of the parties, or (b) failing such agreement, the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with Part I of the Act. However, exception for setting aside the award on the ground of composition of Arbitral Tribunal or illegality of arbitral procedure is that the agreement should not be in conflict with the provisions of Part I of the Act from which parties cannot derogate. (c) If the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is in contravention of the provisions of the Act or any other substantive law governing the parties or is against the terms of the contract. (3) The award could be set aside if it is against the public policy of India, that is to say, if it is contrary to: (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality; or (d) if it is patently illegal. (4) It could be challenged: (a) as provided under Section 13(5); and (b) Section 16(6) of the Act. Eventually, a three-Judge Bench in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Limited, (2014) 9 SCC 263 : (AIR 2015 SC 363), while upholding Saw Pipes case (supra), noted that 'illegality' of the award must go to root of the matter. Illegality of a trivial nature could not be held to violate the public policy.\n25. In Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1 : (AIROnline 2019 SC 1928) , this Court held:\n\"24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various Courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the Court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the Courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated.\n25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the Courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The Courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.\" With these observations and limitations set out above, we need to examine whether the award can be sustained under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.\n26. The main challenge to the award is against the imposition of unliquidated damages, when the matter of fact stood that the contract between parties stipulated for pre-estimated damages (liquidated damages). The concerned contract contained provisions for liquidated damages for breach of contract, particularly breach of deadlines set in the contract. Under Indian Contract law, such liquidated damages are recognized, subject to the same being reasonable. Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, provides that:\n74. Compensation for breach of contract where penalty stipulated for.-When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for.\n27. In order to examine whether the delayed execution of contract by the Remi Metals was liable for compensation, the tribunal examined whether time was of the essence in the contract. In our considered opinion, 'time not being the essence of the contract', as determined by the Arbitral Tribunal, was beyond reproach. Reliance on the contractual conditions and conduct of parties to conclude that existence of extension clause dilutes time being the essence of the contract, was in accordance with rules of contractual interpretation.\n28. In this context, the award concludes that as time was not the essence, liquidated damages could not be granted, in the following manner: \"Since time was not the essence of the contract, the measure of damages specified under Clause/ Liquidated damages, which was the essence of the contract, cannot be regarded as appropriate for determining the loss sustained by ONGC\" \n(Emphasis supplied)\n29. In order to consider the relevancy of time conditioned obligations, we may observe some basic principles: a. Subject to the nature of contract, general rule is that promisor is bound to complete the obligation by the date for completion stated in the contract. [Refer to Percy Bilton Ltd. v. Greater London Council, (1982) 1 WLR 794] b. That is subject to the exception that the promisee is not entitled to liquidated damages, if by his act or omissions he has prevented the promisor from completing the work by the completion date. [Refer Holme v. Guppy, (1838) 3 M and W 387] c. These general principles may be amended by the express terms of the contract as stipulated in this case.\n30. It is now settled that 'whether time is of the essence in a contract', has to be culled out from the reading of the entire contract as well as the surrounding circumstances. Merely having an explicit clause may not be sufficient to make time the essence of the contract. As the contract was spread over a long tenure, the intention of the parties to provide for extensions surely reinforces the fact that timely performance was necessary. The fact that such extensions were granted indicates ONGC's effort to uphold the integrity of the contract instead of repudiating the same.\n31. Clause 9(i) of the Purchase Order reproduced above makes it clear that time is the essence of the contract, subject to extension granted without prejudicing the right of ONGC to recover damages. These damages, by one reasonable interpretation, could be read as damages based on actual loss. Such conclusion was nd based on the Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of 2 para of Section 55 of the Contract Act, which reads as under: Effect of such failure when time is not essential.- If it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. (emphasis supplied) The Arbitral Tribunal construed the aforesaid provision to interpret the term 'loss' to mean actual tangible loss provable by evidence, instead of pre-estimated loss. Such interpretation, in the facts and circumstances, could be held to be a reasonable interpretation, as the other party was not able to impugn the same by pointing to any documents or correspondence to the contrary. When a standard form of a contract is utilised, ONGC is assumed in law to have the larger bargaining power to enter into a contract, unless clear intention is shown to the contrary. In this case at hand, a reasonable interpretation against ONGC may be utilised.\n32. In Saw Pipes case (supra), impugned clause for liquidated damages was considered and upheld by this Court in the following manner:\n46. From the aforesaid sections, it can be held that when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive compensation for any loss which naturally arises in the usual course of things from such breach. These sections further contemplate that if parties knew when they made the contract that a particular loss is likely to result from such breach, they can agree for payment of such compensation. In such a case, there may not be any necessity of leading evidence for proving damages, unless the court arrives at the conclusion that no loss is likely to occur because of such breach. Further, in case where the court arrives at the conclusion that the term contemplating damages is by way of penalty, the court may grant reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named in the contract on proof of damages. However, when the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous then its meaning is to be gathered only from the words used therein. In a case where agreement is executed by experts in the field, it would be difficult to hold that the intention of the parties was different from the language used therein. In such a case, it is for the party who contends that stipulated amount is not reasonable compensation, to prove the same. ...\n64. ... Under Section 73, when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive compensation for any loss caused to him which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. This section is to be read with Section 74, which deals with penalty stipulated in the contract, inter alia (relevant for the present case) provides that when a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, the party complaining of breach is entitled, whether or not actual loss is proved to have been caused, thereby to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named. Section 74 emphasizes that in case of breach of contract, the party complaining of the breach is entitled to receive reasonable compensation whether or not actual loss is proved to have been caused by such breach. Therefore, the emphasis is on reasonable compensation. ... But if the compensation named in the contract for such breach is genuine pre- estimate of loss which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it, there is no question of proving such loss or such party is not required to lead evidence to prove actual loss suffered by him.. ...\n66. In Maula Bux case [(1969) 2 SCC 554] : (AIR 1970 SC 1955) the Court has specifically held that it is true that in every case of breach of contract the person aggrieved by the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage suffered by him before he can claim a decree and the court is competent to award reasonable compensation in a case of breach even if no actual damage is proved to have been suffered in consequence of the breach of contract. The Court has also specifically held that in case of breach of some contracts it may be impossible for the court to assess compensation arising from breach. Although the aforesaid case was cited by the Arbitral Tribunal, it distinguished the same by observing that the aforesaid case was silent on the aspect. We need to accept the aforesaid distinction based on the different set of circumstances this case emanates from. In Saw Pipes (supra), the purchaser therein had extended the time for supply of goods subject to the specific condition that purchaser would recover the agreed stipulated damages from the contractor. Thus, the aspect of waiver is an important distinguishing factor, which was not dealt with in the earlier judgment.\n33. This brings us to the waiver. It may be noted that ONGC waived liquidated damages twice before giving extension with pre- estimated damages. The approach of the Arbitral Tribunal was to hold that once liquidated damages were waived in the first extension, subsequent extension could not be coupled with liquidated damages unless a clear intention flowed from the contract; while this Court recognizes the autonomy of the party to engage in contractual obligation. Such obligation must be contracted in clear terms. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the promisee (ONGC) waived the liquidated damages initially and the same cannot be imposed, unless such imposition was clearly accepted by parties. In this case, the interpretation of the Arbitral Tribunal could not be faulted as being perverse, for the reasons stated above.\n34. Mr. Shyam Diwan, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the Remi Metals, submitted that the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal was reasonable, as the loss sustained by ONGC is given on the basis of actual loss. In this situation, the interpretation of the law and the facts provided under the award is a reasonable interpretation, which can be sustained as being a plausible view.\n35. This Court cannot interfere with this award, as the award is a plausible view for the following reasons: a. The Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of contractual clauses having extension procedure and imposition of liquidated damages, are good indicators that 'time was not the essence of the contract'. b. The Arbitral Tribunal's view to impose damages accrued on actual loss basis could be sustained in view of the waiver of liquidated damages and absence of precise language which allows for reimposition of liquidated damages. Such nd imposition is in line with the 2 para of Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act. c. The Arbitral Tribunal was correct in distinguishing the dictum of this Court in Saw Pipes (supra), which validated imposition of liquidated damages in a similar contract. d. The High Court and District Court strayed beyond the limitation under Section 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. e. Other aspects of the award also do not require interference of this Court, in view of the law laid down in the Project Director, National Highways No.45E and 220, National Highways Authority of India v. M. Hakeem.2 2 SLP (CIVIL) NO.13020 OF 2020\n36. Therefore, we set aside the order of the High Court as well as the District Court's interference, and uphold the award of the Arbitral Tribunal. Accordingly, Civil Appeal Nos. 2826-2827 of 2016 are allowed and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) 19203 of 2012 is disposed of accordingly.\n37. Parties are to bear their own costs.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -3613,26 +3613,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S029", - "case_id": "777", + "case_id": "5651", "experiment": "baseline_firac", - "model": "gpt-oss-120b", - "source_file": "S029__baseline_firac__gpt-oss-120b__777.json", + "model": "mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct", + "source_file": "S029__baseline_firac__mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct__5651.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/04/1972", - "machine_error_stage": "issues", + "judgment_date": "13/11/2021", + "machine_error_stage": "rules", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue misframing" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No.43 of 2009 (Arising Out of S.L.P. (C)No.21204 of 2007) | Branch Manager, Federal Bank Limited v. N. S. Sabastian | 07/01/2009", - "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No.43 of 2009 (Arising Out of S.L.P. (C)No.21204 of 2007) | Branch Manager, Federal Bank Limited v. N. S. Sabastian", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 4029 of 2010 (@ SLP(C) No. 3883 of 2008) | Eureka Forbes Limited v. Allahabad Bank And Others | 03/05/2010", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 4029 of 2010 (@ SLP(C) No. 3883 of 2008) | Eureka Forbes Limited v. Allahabad Bank And Others", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The complainant, a clerk at Federal Bank, presented a cheque for Rs. 9.85 lakhs drawn by Mr. M.P. Anil Kumar for collection and credit into his account. At the time of issue (April 3, 2000), Anil Kumar's account had less than Rs. 150, and he had made no deposits for over two years prior. The cheque was lost in transit. The bank advised the complainant to obtain a duplicate cheque. The Banking Ombudsman also informed the complainant there was no deficiency of service by the bank and advised him to obtain a duplicate cheque under Section 45-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, or pursue recovery from the drawer. Despite this, the complainant neither obtained a duplicate cheque nor initiated action against Anil Kumar. Instead, he filed a complaint with the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, which awarded 18% interest on the cheque amount. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission upheld this order.", - "generated_judgment": "**DISMISSED**\n\n**Reasoning:**\nThe facts do **not** contain the core grounds of a valid appeal under consumer law when faced with such incidents. While the complainant faced a deferred bank facility where the account holder had no funds at the time of the cheque's issue (breach of reliance or expectancy promise), the real consequential problems stem not from *borrowing* but from non-delivery of the cheque (elements of breach or procurement of a void cheque under vicarious claims).\n\nTo request redress under monetary alternatives like compensation is precisely the crux of the above contractual rights denied by **not obtaining a replacement cheque / attending the drawer**. While the **accounting** violation due to 'dishonor' along with its consequences in interest provision could potentially look loose but **does not advance a standard complaint** of that state contraversion. The financial authorities intervening while your initial complaints were resting shows this was perceived as frustration within scope without dimiage evidence. Thus, based on the facts alleged in their appeal **fundamentally lacking flimsy shifting Attitudes missed Ace borrowers system**, it was most assuredly false-like reworked unaware of correct redress. Judicial disallowance trimmably artifacts anew-focused recovery.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE B. N. AGRAWAL\n1. Leave granted.\n2. This appeal is directed against order dated 10th April, 2007 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short \"the National Commission\") whereby it dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant against the order dated 3.4.2002 of the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short \"the State Commission\") for award of interest @ 18% to the complainant-respondent on an amount of Rs.9.85 lakhs.\n3. A perusal of the record shows that while he was working as clerk at Chengannur branch of Federal Bank Limited (for short \"the bank\"), the complainant-respondent introduced one Mr. M. P. Anil Kumar who opened savings bank account in that branch with account no.12291. On 3.4.2000. the respondent presented a cheque drawn in his favour by Anil Kumar for a sum of Rs.9.85 lakhs before Kunchithanni branch of the bank for collection and crediting the same in his account. It is worth mentioning that on the date of issue of cheque. Anil Kumar had less than Rs.150/- in his account. The cheque was sent for collection to Chengannur branch of the bank through M/s. Professional Couriers but the same was lost in transit. The respondent complained to the Manager of Kunchithanni branch of the bank about non-credit of Rs.9.85 lakhs in his account and then filed a petition before the Banking Ombudsman for the State of Kerala. The Manager of the Kunchithanni branch of the bank, vide his letter dated 5th June. 2000, informed the respondent that the cheque was lost in transit and advised him to get a duplicate cheque in lieu of the lost instrument. Thereafter, the Banking Ombudsman issued communication dated 10th July, 2000 to the respondent that there was no deficiency of service on the part of the bank and that he may take necessary steps to obtain duplicate cheque from the drawer by invoking Section 45-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or approach a court/ appropriate forum for recovery of the money. However, instead of taking steps for obtaining duplicate cheque from the drawer, namely, Anil Kumar, the respondent filed a complaint before the State Commission claiming Rs.9.85 lakhs with interest @ 18% per annum. The bank contested the complaint by asserting that there was no deficiency of service because it had asked the complainant to obtain duplicate cheque which he failed to do. The bank also questioned the bona fides of the complainant-respondent by alleging that on the date of issue of cheque the drawer had a negligible amount of Rs. 112/ - in his account.\n4. The State Commission declined the respondent's prayer for award of Rs.9.85 lakhs but directed the bank to pay interest @ 18% per annum on the cheque amount from the date of its issue, i.e.. 03.04.2000 till the date of payment. The National Commission dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant and confirmed the order of the State Commission. Hence this appeal by special leave.\n5. Learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the zerox copy of the statement of account of Anil Kumar to show that between 28th March, 1998 and 29th September, 2000 he did not deposit any amount in the bank; that outstanding balance as on 28th March, 1998 was Rs.148/- and as on 29th September, 1998 total balance amount was Rs.87/- to his credit, and argued that the State Commission committed grave illegality in awarding interest to the complainant-respondent by presuming deficiency of service on the part of the appellant and ignoring the stark reality that on the date of presentation of the cheque and five months thereafter, there was no possibility of its encashment. He pointed out that in spite of the communications of the bank and letter dated 10th July, 2000 of the Banking Ombudsman, the respondent did not take steps to obtain duplicate cheque from the drawer apparently because he knew that the drawer did not have the requisite money for encashment of the cheque and argued the award of interest on Rs.9.85 lakhs, by the State Commission which has been confirmed by the National Commission is legally unsustainable. As against this, learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned orders and argued that the State Commission has not committed any error by awarding interest in lieu of the loss suffered by his client due to the appellant's failure to credit the cheque amount in his account.\n6. We have considered the respective submissions. In our view the State Commission was not at all justified in awarding interest to the respondent. Undisputedly the drawer, namely, Anil Kumar did not deposit any amount in the bank between 28th March, 1998 and the date on which the cheque is said to have been issued in favour of the respondent. Therefore, it was impossible for the respondent to get the amount credited in his account. If the cheque had not been lost in transit, the same would have been dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. On its part, the bank had advised the respondent to obtain duplicate cheque from the drawer. Banking Ombudsman gave similar advise to the respondent by pointing out that he can get duplicate cheque by resorting to Section 45-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. However, the respondent did not take any steps whatsoever for obtaining duplicate cheque from Anil Kumar. The reason for this is not far to see. Anil Kumar had sum less than Rs.200/- in his account at the relevant time. The appellant was aware of this and, therefore, he did not resort to Section 45-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Not only this, he did not take any action for recovery of Rs.9.85 lakhs from Anil Kumar either by filing a complaint before appropriate forum or by filing a suit before the competent civil court.\n7. This being the position, the direction given by the State Commission for payment of interest to the respondent is liable to be set aside. Consequently, the order of the National Commission is also liable to be set aside.\n8. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned orders are set aside and the complaint filed before the State Commission is dismissed. No costs.\n", + "case_record": "The appellant, Eureka Forbes Limited, entered into a leave and licence agreement with Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 for premises and machinery. Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 subsequently availed cash credit from Allahabad Bank (Respondent No. 1), hypothecating their raw materials, semi-finished, and finished products to the Bank. Due to non-payment of licence fees, Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 requested the appellant to take over possession of the premises and closing stock, authorizing the appellant to sell the stock to adjust arrears. The appellant took possession in August 1987. The Bank, via a letter dated August 21, 1987, informed the appellant that the stocks and machinery were hypothecated to them. Despite this knowledge, the appellant sold a CTC machine in March 1988 and other hypothecated stock. The Bank filed a suit in 1989 for recovery of Rs. 22,11,618.62 against all respondents, which was later transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT). The DRT passed an ex-parte judgment against the appellant in 1995.", + "generated_judgment": "**DISMISSED**\n\nIn evaluating the appeal based on the facts provided, it is important to consider the sequence of events and the knowledge of the parties involved:\n\n1. **Hypothecation Knowledge**: The Bank informed the appellant on August 21, 1987, that the stocks and machinery were hypothecated to them. This is a key piece of information indicating the appellant's awareness of the Bank's interest in the property.\n\n2. **Appellant's Actions**: Despite being informed of the hypothecation, the appellant proceeded to sell the CTC machine in March 1988 and other hypothecated stock. This action demonstrates that the appellant was aware of the Bank's interest but chose to proceed with the sale, potentially undermining the Bank's secured interest.\n\n3. **Legal Proceedings**: The Bank filed a suit for recovery in 1989, which was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The DRT passed an ex-parte judgment against the appellant in 1995, indicating that the appellant did not successfully contest the Bank's claims at that stage.\n\nGiven the appellant's knowledge of the hypothecation and subsequent actions, it is reasonable to conclude that the appellant acted against the interests of the Bank, whose secured interest was clearly communicated. The ex-parte judgment by the DRT further supports the Bank's position. Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : Hon'ble Justice Swatanter Kumar\n1. Leave granted.\n2. While pressing into service the definition of the word `debt' appearing in Section 2 (g) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short as the 'Recovery Act'), it is vehemently contended before us that the Debt Recovery Tribunal (for short the 'Tribunal') lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claim of the Bank against the appellant. The appellant was neither a borrower nor was there any kind of privity of contract between the two. As such, money claimed from them was not a 'debt' and, therefore, rigors of the recovery procedure under the provisions of the Recovery Act could not be enforced against the appellant. This is a submission which, at the first blush, appears to be sound and acceptable. But, once it is examined in some depth and following the settled canons of law, one has to arrive only at a conclusion that the contention is without any substance and merit. At the very outset, as a guiding principle we may refer to the maxim a verbis legis non est recedendum' but before we proceed to examine the merit or otherwise of the principal contention raised before us, it will be necessary for us to refer to the basic facts giving rise to the present appeal, particularly, in view of the fact that it has a wretched and long history which began in the year 1988.\nFACTS\n3. Appellant is a company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, while Respondent No. 1, Allahabad Bank is a body constituted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transport of Undertakings) Act, 1976. Respondent No. 3 in the present appeal is a proprietorship firm of Respondent No. 2. The appellant company is stated to have entered into an agreement on 16th August, 1983 with respondent Nos. 2 & 3, granting licence in their favour to use premises at Jainkunj at Goragachha Road, Kolkata (hereinafter referred to as `the premises') for a consideration of Rs. 12,000/- payable to the appellant, along with the plant and machinery as well as their trade mark \"OSBOURNE\". It is further the case of the appellant that they had no knowledge of the fact that, respondent Nos. 2 & 3 had availed certain cash credit facility and had hypothecated their raw materials, semi-finished and finished products to Bank. However, on or about 28th February, 1987, the said respondents had requested the appellant to take over the possession of the said premises along with the closing stock lying therein. This was so requested because respondent Nos. 2 & 3 had not paid the licence fee for the use and occupation of the premises, goods etc. as agreed and further vide letter dated 23rd July, 1987, they stated that appellant could sell the stocks as well as lathe machine lying in the factory premises and adjust the sale proceeds thereof towards the arrears of licence fee. After taking possession of the factory premises, the appellant prepared an inventory of the stock in possession and as alleged by them, they had no knowledge that these stocks had been hypothecated by the said respondents in favour of the Bank. The letter dated 7th August, 1987 has been annexed by the appellant in support of such averment. It appears from the record that the respondent Bank vide its letter dated 21st August, 1987 wrote to respondent Nos. 2 & 3 raising an issue as to how the possession of the stocks and machinery was given to the appellant. This was done in response to the letter of respondent Nos. 2 & 3 dated 18th August, 1987 and copy thereof was sent to the appellant while referring to the letter dated 7th August, 1987 addressed by the appellants to the other respondents. It will be useful to reproduce the relevant extract of the letter dated 21st August, 1987 which reads as under:\n \"We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 18.8.1987 along with enclosures.\nIn this regard we fail to understand as to how you have permitted M/s Eureka Forbes Limited to take possession of your factory at 1, Goragacha Road, Kolkata - 700 043, the stocks and machineries of which are already hypothecated to us. And again you are advising us not to visit the factory at the moment which we are requesting you to do the same reputedly. Since April, 1986, you are also not submitting the stock statement and you have virtually stopped all your banking operations through us. Now we observe from the stock statement forwarded to us as enclosure that there are good amount of stock still lying at the factory.\" \n4. To the above letter, the appellant responded vide its reply dated 23rd September, 1987 saying that the factory belongs to them and they had given the same on licence to respondent No. 3 and when the possession was handed over back to them certain stocks and machinery belonging to the respondent No. 3 were lying in the factory. They had made a specific request that these should be sold and adjusted towards the licence fee and the surplus money, if any, should be refunded to them. The respondent Bank claimed that they had a charge over the movable assets, in particular, the CTC machine which appellant had disposed off. For the sale of CTC machine, they had issued an advertisement on 12th March, 1988 and the same was sold for Rs.1,48,975/-.\n5. The Bank filed a suit in the District Court at Alipore against the present appellant and respondent Nos. 2 & 3 claiming a sum of Rs.22,11,618.62. In this suit, the present appellant filed a written statement making a preliminary objection that there was no privity of contract between the Bank and the present appellant. That it was not a borrower of the Bank and had no dealings with them as such, the suit was barred for misjoinder of parties and in fact no suit could lie against the present appellant. The plea of suit being barred by time, the principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence was also taken. It was stated on merits, that neither they were aware of any transaction between plaintiff Bank and respondent Nos. 2 & 3 nor of any charge over the machinery and equipment etc. The appellant denied the allegations made against them. Most of the paragraphs were denied for want of knowledge and emphasis was laid only on the above stated two averments. Appellant also averred that the Bank was trying to cover up lapses of its own officials by pressurizing them. It could not have accepted, as security, the factory or machinery as it was owned by the appellant and it had not given any consent for that purpose. This suit came to be transferred after the provisions of the Recovery Act came into force in the year 1994. Upon transfer it was numbered as T.A. No. 15/1994. The appellant was served with a notice from the Tribunal and it appointed one M/s Mallick and Palit as its Advocate to appear and pursue the case on its behalf. The appellant did not appear before the Tribunal and after some time the proceedings were carried on in their absence. The evidence was recorded and finally an ex-parte judgment was passed against the appellant on 15th June, 1995. In furtherance to the ex-parte judgment, a Recovery Certificate No. 48 of 1995 was issued by the competent authority under the provisions of the Act on 30th June, 1995. The appellant claims to have taken steps for setting aside the ex-parte judgment. They filed a writ petition before the High Court of Kolkata, (being Writ Petition No. 1804 of 1995), challenging the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Recovery Act and also prayed for stay of execution of the ex-parte judgment dated 15th June, 1995. An interim order dated 3rd November, 1995 was passed in favour of the appellant directing that the execution proceedings should go on, however no final order be passed without the leave of the Court. The Tribunal vide its Order dated 4th March, 1996, appointed a receiver to prepare an inventory of hypothecated goods and a warrant of attachment was also issued. The High Court of Kolkata, again on application filed by the appellant directed the receiver only to make inventory of the goods and not to take any further action. During the pendency of these proceedings, the Recovery Officer upon further application by the respondent Bank, directed the receiver to make inventory of all the properties vide its Order dated 17th August, 1996. This order was challenged by the appellant before the Calcutta High Court which stayed further proceedings.\n6. According to the appellant, it was advised to initiate proceedings to set aside the ex-parte decree and Recovery Certificate and hence an application was filed before the Tribunal for recalling the ex-parte order. Along with this, an application for condonation of delay was also filed. Consequent upon the dismissal of the application for condonation of delay, the appellant filed an appeal before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (for short the `Appellate Tribunal') against the order dated 19th August, 1999, passed by the Tribunal. The same was also dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal vide its judgment dated 1st June, 2001. This again was assailed before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The same was also dismissed by the High Court of Kolkata vide Order dated 28th November, 2001. Still unsatisfied, the appellant filed a Special Leave Petition before this Court, being SLP (C) No. 7883 of 2002 against the Order of the High Court of Kolkata which was dismissed as withdrawn by this Court vide Order dated 26th April, 2002. In other words, the Order of the Tribunal declining to set aside the ex-parte decree attained finality. The Revision Petition filed by the appellant before the High Court of Kolkata also came to be dismissed finally vide Order dated 2nd April, 2003. In furtherance to its zeal to somehow get the ex-parte decree set aside, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against the order of the Tribunal dated 15th June, 1995. The Order dated 16th April, 2004 of the Appellate Tribunal was challenged before the learned Single Judge of the High Court. In those proceedings, an application for amendment to bring the subsequent events on record, was filed which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide Order dated 11th June, 2004. Against this Order, an appeal was filed before the Division Bench of Kolkata High Court which also met the same fate. However, the Division Bench while dismissing the appeal observed that the Order passed by the learned Single Judge was correct in law but it would not prevent the appellant from resorting to any remedy which is available to it in accordance with law.\n7. In the Appeal preferred by the appellant, the Appellate Tribunal vide its Order dated 15th July, 2003 directed the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as condition precedent for entertaining the said appeal. This sum was deposited and a reply affidavit to this application was filed on behalf of the Bank. Vide Order dated 16th April, 2004, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The order dated 16th April, 2004 of the Appellate Tribunal was challenged in a Civil Revision Application before the High Court of Kolkata. The High Court vide its interim Order dated 11th June, 2004 directed the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.15,54,118.62 as a condition for hearing the appeal and the same was deposited. This application was against the interim order and the appeal remained pending before the Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal. Finally the appeal was allowed vide Order dated 28th December, 2006 by the Appellate Tribunal. While setting aside the ex-parte decree the Appellate Tribunal held as under:-\n \"Having said all that, to my mind, the net result is, the ex-parte decree in question passed against the appellant, Eureka Forbes Ltd. by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta, is without jurisdiction and therefore, the appeal must succeed. Consequently, the entire sum of money appropriated by the respondent-bank as per orders of the Hon'ble Court in C.O. No. 1568 of 2004 will be refundable together with interest at the lending rate also as per the said orders of the Hon'ble Court.\nAccordingly, the decree in question dated 15th June, 1995 in T.A. 15 of 1994 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta, and certificate in pursuance thereof as against the appellant, Eureka Forbes Ltd., is hereby set aside. The entire sum appropriated by the respondent bank in terms of the orders of the Hon'ble Court in C.O. No. 1568 of 2004 be refunded to the appellant by the bank together with interest at the lending rate within a period of three months from date. There shall be no orders as to costs.\" \n8. Respondent Bank challenged the Order of the Appellate Tribunal under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being C.O. No. 554 of 2007, before the learned Single Judge of the Kolkata High Court which vide its judgment dated 12th October, 2007, restored the judgment and the order of the Tribunal. Aggrieved therefrom, the appellant preferred the appeal before the Division Bench of Kolkata High Court which, vide its Order dated 11th February, 2008, dismissed the appeal and sustained the Order of the learned Single Judge giving rise to the present Special Leave Petition.\n9. The challenge to the impugned orders is inter alia on the ground that, Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application filed on behalf of the Bank as there was no privity of contract between the appellant and the Bank. Besides the issue of jurisdiction, the stand taken is that the Bank had not proved on record by way of any evidence that anything is due to it from the appellant. All the witnesses examined on behalf of the Bank have stated nothing to the above mentioned effect. In any case, in the subsequent proceedings the decree should have been set aside, as nothing in law could be stated to be due from the appellant. In the suit, which was decreed ex-parte by the Tribunal on 15th June, 1995, it was specifically averred in the plaint that, Respondent No. 3 along with other defendants illegally, erroneously, arbitrarily and whimsically had taken possession of the entire stock, machinery, equipments etc. without knowledge of the respondent Bank. The respondents had not allowed inspection of the factory and verification of the stock and other requisite elements. In fact, the appellant has misguided the Bank while informing vide their letter dated 18th August, 1987, that the workers had forcibly occupied the factory. Reference was also made to the fact that some stocks, plant and machine belonging to respondents had been given to the appellant for sale etc. as per the agreement between the parties. The goods, stocks were hypothecated to the Bank and according to the Bank, all the defendants in the suit were liable to pay the dues of the Bank. On this premise, the Bank prayed for decree for the entire amount and also interest @ 18.05% per annum. A specific prayer was made that the Bank has a valid and subsisting charge over the properties of defendant Nos. 1 & 2 for the due repayment to it. A decree for realization of hypothecated goods by and under the direction of the Court was also prayed for. We have already noticed above that there was denial of the allegations made in the plaint.\n Merits of the case relatable to the factual matrix \n10. The main stand of the appellant was in relation to the jurisdiction and lack of knowledge of the fact that the goods in stock were hypothecated to the Bank along with the plant and machinery. The two important documents, dated 16th August, 1983 and 28th February, 1987, which have been placed on record, are of some significance. The agreement dated 16th August, 1983 states the conditions of the leave and licence agreement between respondent Nos. 2 & 3 and the appellant. It was indicated therein that they could use the plant and machine in the premises and it was for a period of three years with a deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- and Rs.12,000/- per month as fee. Under Clause 6, the stocks at the relevant time were to be sold for a consideration of 0.75 lakhs and they were entitled to use the trade mark. However, vide letter dated 28th February, 1987, which is after the expiry of a period of more than three years, it was indicated by Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 to the appellant that, they wanted to give back possession of factory and there were stocks of about Rs.7,00,000/- which included raw material, semi-finished and finished goods, lathe worth Rs.1,15,000/- which could be sold to a subsequent licencee. Relevant paragraphs of this letter can be usefully reproduced at this stage:\n \"2. We are having stocks worth about Rs.7 lacs which includes raw material, semi-finished & finished goods. We would be grateful if your subsequent licencee agree to take oil the stocks plus one Lathe worth Rs. 1,15,000/- as we would be willing to negotiate with them.\n5. We would be pleased to settle our account with you as soon as the factory stocks are sold to your future licences and also the worker's retrenchment dues. We state this as we have suffered heavy losses due to continues agitations and non-payment of due by our customers and also cancellation of our orders.\" \n11. Another letter written by Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 to the appellant on 23rd July, 1987 referred to certain telephonic conversation. It was specifically recorded in it that possession of the factory will be handed over on 31st July, 1987. It was also stated that there was financial crisis and that the stocks worth Rs.7,00,000/- and the lathe worth Rs. 1,15,000/- etc. could be sold and they will not be able to pay any licence fee in future. On 7th August, 1987, the possession of the premises was taken by the appellant and a list had been prepared, copy of the list placed on record shows the physical stock as on 7th August, 1987 and it contains bearings, plumber block, bearing of milling MC, GM Brass and Segment, old Osborn, C.I. of Milling M.C., C.I. components, AC IMCA machinery etc. It is interesting to note that all these correspondences and conversations between the parties had been without any intimation to the respondent Bank. In fact, all this had been done behind the back of the Bank. Besides this, the Bank had led oral and documentary evidence in support of its claim. The Bank had written the letter dated 21st August, 1987 in response to the letter of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 dated 18th August, 1987, but the letter dated 18th August, 1987 has not been placed on record. However, vide letter dated 21st August, 1987 copy whereof was sent to the appellant as well, the bank had informed them that it had given the financial assistance to respondent Nos. 2 & 3 and the Bank was having charge over the stocks and machinery which had been hypothecated to the Bank. The Bank further expressed surprise as to how the appellant had taken possession of the unit. Another relevant aspect of the matter would be the conduct of the present appellant. We have serious issues that the appellant, after taking possession of the premises, had not come to know about the goods being hypothecated to the Bank. Advertisement for the sale of machinery was issued as late as on 12th August, 1988. In other words, they had sold goods, even machines, like CTC at a throw away price, even after having complete knowledge about the hypothecated goods. Thereafter, an ex- parte decree was passed, however they did not take any steps to get the same set aside, except when a recovery certificate had been issued by the competent authority. Thereafter, their prayer for setting aside ex-parte decree was rejected consistently by all the courts. When the High Court of Kolkata was dealing with the Revision Petition filed against the Order dated 1st June, 2001, passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the Court had specifically noticed the conduct of the appellant and had observed as under:-\n \"After hearing Mr. Mitra appearing on behalf of the petitioner and after going through the material on record I fully agree with the Tribunal below that the present proceedings have been initiated by the petitioner Balu: 10 with the sole object of delaying the execution of a decree passed in the year 1995. It has been rightly pointed out by those Tribunals that after filing written statement in the suit in 1989 till the decree was passed in 1998 the Tribunal below, the petitioner took no step in the original proceedings. There is no scope of doubt that notice of the proceedings was served through the Tribunal and the petitioner entered appearance through a lawyer. No reason has been assigned in the application what prevented the learned advocate-on record of the petitioner from contesting the proceedings before the Tribunal. In paragraph 5 of the application before the Tribunal it has simply been state that \"although the petitioner engaged Mr. H.P. Balu of M/s. Mallick & Palit, solicitors to look after the petitioner's interest in the said matter, the said advocates chase not to appear in the proceedings for and on behalf of the petitioner and consequently the certificate was passed by the tribunal in favour of the plaintiff. It appears that the very same advocate- on-record has preferred writ application before this Court challenging the vires of the act and had also filed subsequent application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugning order passed in execution proceedings and the petitioner has obtained interim orders in those proceedings before this court. It is not the case of the petitioner that it has abandoned those proceedings and by the advice of the new lawyer has confined itself to the present proceedings. It appears that although those matters are still pending, the petitioner by filing instant proceedings has tried to find out an additional avenue for stalling the execution proceedings.\" \n12. After having lost upto this Court, another round of litigation started, claiming it to be in furtherance to the Order of Kolkata High Court, granting them liberty to take steps in accordance with law. It is in furtherance of this observation of the High Court that, the proceedings again started from the Appellate Tribunal and now the present petition has been filed before this Court. We have already noticed that owing to the sale of goods, complete knowledge, that the goods were hypothecated to the Bank is attributable to the appellant and hence, they could not have sold the said goods without permission of the Bank. Admittedly nothing of this kind was done and the Bank was kept in dark.\n13. The application for setting aside the ex-parte decree had been filed by the appellant along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the said application. However, the application for condonation of delay was rejected and subsequently the ex-parte decree was not set aside. This order of the Tribunal was neither interfered by the High Court nor by this Court in a Special Leave Petition preferred by the appellant. In view of the observations made by the High Court in the order, the appellant filed another application for setting aside the decree on the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction. The said application came to be allowed by the Appellate Tribunal which accepted the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. The reasoning recorded in the judgment of the Tribunal was that, it was a claim for damages in tort and was not a debt, and also that it was beyond the scope of the jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal under Section 17(1) of the Recovery Act, as there were insufficient allegations or evidence. No liability in terms of the debt can be fastened on the appellant. This reasoning of the Tribunal was set aside by the High Court of Kolkata in the impugned judgment and observed that, even claim for damages would fall well within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the facts of the case, and particularly, when the averments remained uncontroverted and no evidence was led by the appellant. The hypothecated goods at the place of business of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 were there at the time of handing over of the possession of the factory back to the appellant, and this fact can hardly be disputed on record. A finding was recorded in the proceedings that appellant was an intermeddler and there was collusion between the appellant and Respondent Nos. 2 & 3. Based on this finding, it was further held that the case of the Bank was fully covered under the expression \"debt\", \"any liability\", \"any person\" and accordingly, the Court set aside the judgment of the Tribunal. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are unable to find the stand of the High Court to be erroneous. Of course, to some extent, the entire suit could not have been decreed against the appellant. The respondent Bank was entitled to a limited relief, vis-a-vis, its hypothecated stocks, goods and machinery, if any. It was not even the case of the Bank before the Tribunal that the present appellant was a borrower and in discharge of its final liability towards Bank the entire suit was liable to be decreed. The cause of action in favour of the Bank and against appellant, at best, could be limited to the hypothecated stock and goods, as beyond that, there is no averment in the plaint which would justify grant of any larger relief in their favour. We would shortly discuss the legal aspects as well as the reasoning in law, in this regard. The Bank has examined merely four witnesses in support of its case. There is no statement or note of any of these witnesses for imposition of any liability upon the appellant, except to the extent of goods hypothecated; such a conclusion can even be drawn from the letters dated 28th February, 1987, 23rd July, 1987, 7th August, 1987 and 21st August, 1987. The correctness of these letters has never been disputed by any of the parties and it was admitted by the appellant that the advertisement for sale of goods was issued on 12th March, 1988. Certainly and apparently, the appellant had complete knowledge, that the entire stock, goods, machinery etc. had been hypothecated to the Bank. Certainly, there has been a definite lapse on the part of the Bank, as the loan facility was granted in the year 1984, i.e. subsequent to the execution of the leave and licence agreement dated 16th August, 1983. It is obvious from the facts appearing on record that the loan has been sanctioned in a most casual and undesirable manner without even verifying the basic securities of respondent Nos. 2 & 3.\n14. Besides the fact that the present appellant had earlier raised all the pleas in their application for setting aside the ex parte decree which was rejected by the Tribunal, High Court as well as this Court, it also needs to be noticed that except making vague denials in the written statement, which they had filed before the Tribunal at the relevant point of time, they had raised no specific or concrete defence in regard to the sale of hypothecated goods by them. The fact, as already noticed, cannot be disputed that the goods in question which were hypothecated or were under the charge of the Bank have been sold by the appellant. The advertisement issued by them clearly shows that they had invited offers for sale of CTC machines and spares, which itself demonstrates that a number of machines and other goods have been sold by them. It is an accepted precept of appreciation of evidence that a party which withholds from the Court best evidence in its power and possession, the Court would normally draw an adverse inference against that party. In any case, the bona fide of such a party would apparently be doubted. The appellant was possessed of best evidence in regard to the goods of which they had taken possession on 7th August, 1987, in fact were hypothecated to the Bank. These goods including machines were sold by the appellant prior and subsequent to the issue of the advertisement dated 12th March, 1988. Thus, the best evidence in this regard, was obviously in appellant's power and possession which they did not produce before the Court despite prolonged litigation. As such, we would have no hesitation in drawing some adverse inference against the appellant in this behalf. Another ancillary factor, which the Court has to take into consideration is that, the value declared by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in relation to stocks, has not been denied specifically, either in correspondence or in the pleadings by the appellant. In the letter dated 28th February, 1987 value of goods worth Rs. 7,00,000/- and lathe machine worth Rs. 1,15,000/- was alleged to be lying in the factory, in addition to other materials. The inventory which was annexed to the letter of 7th August, 1987 refers to various components, parts, bearings etc. but does not refer to CTC machines. Admittedly, the appellants have sold these machines in furtherance to the advertisement dated 12th March, 1988. In short, an amount which cannot be disputed, as is evident from the documentary and oral evidence on record is, Stock A, Stock lying in the premises, 7 lacs lathe machine, Rs.1,15,000/- CTC machine, as sold by the appellant as per their own version, the CTC machine which was sold by the appellant for a sum of Rs. 1,48,975/-, thus, totaling up to Rs. 9,63,975/-. The respondent Bank would be entitled to receive the interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 14th March, 1988 till the date of payment of the amount. We are awarding the same rate of interest which has been awarded by the Tribunal and was accepted by the Bank.\n15. It appears that the Bank is acting in a manner which is ex facie not in consonance with the commercial principles and in a most casual and irresponsible manner. The method in which the financial limits have been sanctioned to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 does not stand to reasoning. Admittedly, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had no title to the property. What verification was done to the appraisal report has been left to imagination. The conduct of the appellant further creates some suspicion in the mind of the Court. The appellant took no remedial or bonafide steps even after it had admittedly come to know that the goods in question were hypothecated to the Bank. On the contrary, it issued advertisement in March, 1988 for sale of hypothecated goods. On the face of this fact, they had no preferential right to sell the goods. In the letter dated 21st August, 1987, they had been informed that possession of the property as well as the goods have been taken unauthorizedly. Even if it is assumed that certain amounts were due to the appellant from respondent nos. 2 and 3 on account of licence fee, still they could not have brushed aside the charge of the Bank over the goods and machinery in question. Also in the alleged leave and licence agreement, dated 16th August, 1983, there was no clause, at least none has been brought to our notice, that the appellant would have charge over the goods and machinery, in the event of default in the payment of licence fee. In other words, the charge of the Bank was binding upon the appellant. The inventory of the goods had been prepared and signed by the parties. In the letter dated 7th August, 1987, these facts were confirmed in furtherance to the correspondence exchanged between the parties from 28th February, 1987.\n16. Ashok Kumar Goswami, Senior Manager, Allahabad Bank, who was examined as witness No. 1 on behalf of the Bank, has stated that the loans were advanced to Respondent Nos. 2 & 3. According to him Exh. 7 is the agreement cum letter of hypothecation for packing credit advance under which the financial assistance was allowed to them. He also proved Exh. 11, statement of stock of finished goods, work in progress, raw-material and machinery executed by Respondent No. 2 for and on behalf of Respondent No. 3. The stocks statements were shown in Exh. 12, while Exh. 13, was a letter written by Respondent No. 2 on 29th May, 1984 to the Bank. He specifically stated that the hypothecated goods were handed over by Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 to the appellant behind the back of the Bank. Another witness, whose statement at this stage can be usefully looked into, is that of Sh. Sankar Chakraborty, PW-2. Besides stating the general facts of the case, this witness specifically stated, that the Bank had impleaded the appellant, as they had taken possession of hypothecated goods of the Bank and that, the appellant had written a letter to the Bank and they raised a specific claim against it.\n17. From the above stated documentary evidence, it is clear that the parties had the knowledge of the fact that respondent nos. 2 and 3 enjoyed the financial assistance from the Bank and the goods were hypothecated to it. Even as per the statement of respondent nos. 2 and 3, the appellant sold the hypothecated goods with complete knowledge. This included hypothecated stock worth Rs. 7,00,000/-, lathe machine of value of Rs. 1,15,000/-, in addition to CTC machine and other spares.\n18. The goods in question, therefore, have been disposed off by the appellant either in collusion with respondent nos. 2 and 3 or at its own but with the knowledge that the goods were hypothecated to the Bank. Thus, to that extent, the liability of the appellant cannot be disputed.\nLEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE:-\n19. In continuation of the above factual matrix, now let us examine the principles of law which would be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case and result thereof. There is, in fact, hardly any dispute before us that the goods in question had been hypothecated to the Bank. The appellant had complete knowledge of this fact, still it went on to sell the goods. The Bank had been negligent and, to some extent, irresponsible, in invoking its rights and taking appropriate remedy in accordance with law. Mere irresponsibility, on the part of the Bank, would not wipe out the rights of the Bank in law. Without the consent of the Bank, no person can utilize the hypothecated goods for his own benefit or sale by the borrower or any person connected thereto. It is nobody's case that the Bank had consented to such sale. This Court in case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited [(2006) 6 SCC 736 ] described the meaning of 'entrustment' in relation to hypothecation as follows:\nxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx\n \"The creditor may also have the right to claim payment from the sale proceeds (if such proceeds are identifiable and available). The following denifitions of the term `hypothecation' in P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon [3rd Edn. (2005), Vol. 2 pp. 2179 and 2180] are relevant:\n\"Hypothecation--It is the act of pledging an asset as security for borrowing, without parting with its possession or ownership. The borrowers enters into an agreement with the lender to hand over the possession of the hypothecated assets whenever called upon to do so. The charge of hypothecation is then converted into that of a pledge and the lender enjoys the rights of a pledge.\nHypothecation' means a charge in or upon any movable property, existing or future, created by a borrower in favour of a secured creditor, without delivery of possession of the movable property to such creditor, as a security for financial assistance and includes floating charge and crystallization of such charge into fixed charge on movable property. [Borrowed from Section 2(n) of Scuritisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002].\" \n20. Physical domain over the hypothecated goods is no way a sine qua non for enforcing Bank's rights against the borrower. It was obligatory upon the appellant to deal with the goods only with the leave and permission of the Bank. Absence of such consent in writing would obviously result in breach of Bank's rights. \n21. The next question of law, that we are called upon to consider, is the ambit and scope of provisions of Section 2(g) of the Recovery Act, on which the entire case of the parties hinges. We have already noticed that the appellant has argued with great vehemence that, there was no privity of contract and they were not covered under the definition of `debt', and as such, recovery proceedings could not be initiated, much less, recovery could be effected from them under the provisions of the Act. Section 2(g) of the Recovery Act reads as under:\n \"debt\" means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the application;\" \n22. The Recovery Act of 1993, was enacted primarily for the reasons that, the Banks and financial institutions should be able to recover their dues without unnecessary delay, so as to avoid any adverse consequences in relation to the public funds. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act clearly state that Banks and financial institutions at present, experience considerable difficulties in recovering loans and enforcements of securities charged with them. The existing procedure for recovery of dues of the Bank and the financial institutions block significant portion of their funds in un-productive assets, the value of which deteriorates with the passage of time. Introduction of similar procedure was suggested by the Tiwari Committee. The Act provided for the establishment of Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals and modes for expeditious recovery of dues to the Banks and financial institutions.\n23. In this background, let us read the language of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act. The plain reading of the Section suggests that legislature has used a general expression in contra distinction to specific, restricted or limited expression. This obviously means that, the legislature intended to give wider meaning to the provisions. Larger area of jurisdiction was intended to be covered under this provision so as to ensure attainment of the legislative object, i.e. expeditious recovery and providing provisions for taking such measures which would prevent the wastage of securities available with the banks and financial institutions.\n24. We may notice some of the general expressions used by the framers of law in this provision :\na) any liability;\nb) claim as due from any person;\nc) during the course of any business activity undertaken by the Bank;\nd) where secured or unsecured;\ne) and lastly legally recoverable.\n25. All the above expressions used in the definition clause clearly suggest that, expression 'debt' has to be given general and wider meaning, just to illustrate, the word 'any liability' as opposed to the word 'determined liability' or 'definite liability' or 'any person' in contrast to 'from the debtor'. The expression 'any person' shows that the framers do not wish to restrict the same in its ambit or application. The legislature has not intended to restrict to the relationship of a creditor or debtor alone. General terms, therefore, have been used by the legislature to give the provision a wider and liberal meaning. These are generic or general terms. Therefore, it will be difficult for the Court, even on cumulative reading of the provision, to hold that the expression should be given a narrower or restricted meaning. What will be more in consonance with the purpose and object of the Act is to give this expression a general meaning on its plain language rather than apply unnecessary emphasis or narrow the scope and interpretation of these provisions, as they are likely to frustrate the very object of the Act. \n26. In the case of State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal & Ors. [(2004) 5 SCC 155 ], this Court was concerned with the question of payment of taxes in relation to the provisions of the Bombay Motor Vehicle Tax Act, 1958. The Court while interpreting the scope of the entries in the legislative lists held that, they should be construed widely and general words used therein must comprehend ancillary or subsidiary matters relating to Schedule VII, Articles 245 and 246. The Court held as under:-\n \"In interpreting the scope of various entries in the legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule, widest- possible amplitude must be given to the words used and each general word must be held to extend to ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly be said to be comprehended in it. The entries should, thus be given a broad and comprehensive interpretation. In order to see whether a particular legislative provision falls within the jurisdiction of the legislature which has passed it, the Court must consider what constitutes in pith and substance the true subject-matter of the legislation and whether such subject-matter is covered by the topics enumerated in the legislative list pertaining to that legislature.\" \n27. Again in the of case of Raman Lal Bhailal Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat [(2008) 5 SCC 449 ], this Court was dealing with the word 'person' appearing in the provisions of Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, 1960. The expression 'person' was defined with the inclusive definition that a person includes a joint family. The Court held that, where the definition is inclusively defining the word, there, the legislative intention is clear that it wishes to enlarge the meaning of the word used in the statute and that such word must be given comprehensive meaning. In law, the word `person' was stated to be having a slightly different connotation and refers to any entity that is recognized by law as having rights and duties of human beings.\n28. In the case of Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd. & Ors. [(2007) 6 SCC 236 ], this Court took the view that, the elementary rule of interpretation of statute is that the words used must be given their plain grammatical meaning, therefore, the Court cannot add something which the legislature has not provided for. Similar view was also expressed by another Bench of this Court in the case of Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and Ors. [(2003) 2 SCC 455 ], that the Court cannot write anything into the statutory provisions which are plain and unambiguous. A Statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and the primary rule of construction is that, the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said.\n29. The learned counsel for the appellant has heavily relied upon the judgment of the United Bank of India v. Debt Recovery Tribunal & Ors. [(1999) 4 SCC 69 ], to contend that the general expression must receive general meaning and in light of this principle, the present proceedings could not have been initiated, much less, recoveries effected under the provisions of the Recovery Act. We shall shortly discuss the merit of this contention.\n30. Before we advert to the discussion while applying these principles of interpretation to the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act, and also examine the merit of the contention raised on behalf of the respondent, it may be interesting to know as to how the word `debt' has been defined and explained by this Court in different judgments, with different context and under different laws.\n31. Years back this Court in the case of P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar & Ors. v. O.R.M.P.R.M. Ramanathan Chettiar [AIR 1968 SC 1047 ], explained the expression 'debt' as defined in the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938. The Court held that the definition appearing in Section 3 (iii) of the Act, despite the fact that it specifically states that 'debt' would not include rent as defined in clause (iv), or `Kanartham', as defined in Section 3 (1)(1) of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, held that the definition is still of a very wide magnitude and would include 'any liability' due from an agriculturists with the specified expressions. The Court held as under:\n 'Debt' has been defined in Sec. 3 (iii) of the Act as meaning \"any liability\" in Cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from an agriculturist, whether payable under a decree or order of a civil or revenue court or otherwise, but does not include rent as defined in Clause (iv), or 'Kanartham' as defined in Section 3 (1) (1) of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929.\" \nIn the case of Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry [(1974) 2 SCC 231 ], this Court quoted as under:\n \"The classical definition of 'debt', is to be found in Webb v. Stenton where Lindley, L.J. said: \"... a debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation\". There must be debitum in praesenti; solvendum may be in praesenti or in future - that is immaterial. There must be an existing obligation to pay a sum of money now or in future.\" \n32. Still, in another case titled as State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Ballabh Das & Co. & Ors. [(1999) 7 SCC 539 ], the Court was concerned with the un-amended provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act. The Court while setting aside the order of the High Court, while dealing with the word `debt' followed by the words 'alleged as due', held as under:-\n \"According to the definition, the term 'debt' means liability which is alleged as due from any person by a bank or a financial institutions or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions. It should have arisen during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force. The liability to be discharged may be in cash or otherwise. It would be immaterial whether the liability is secured or unsecured or whether it is payable under a decree or an order of any civil court or otherwise. However, it should be subsisting and legally recoverable on the date on which proceedings are initiated for recovering the same.\nThe important words in the definition \"alleged as due\" have been overlooked by the High Court and, therefore, it has erroneously held that unless the amounts claimed by the Bank are determined or decided by a competent forum they cannot be said to be due and would not amount to \"debt\" under the Act. What was necessary for the High Court to consider was whether the Bank has alleged in the suits that the amounts are due to the Bank from the respondents, that the liability of the respondents has arisen during the course of their business activity, that the said liability is still subsisting and legally recoverable.\" \n33. As already noticed, this judgment was pronounced by the Court while dealing with the un-amended provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act. This section was amended by Act 1 of 2000 and the words `alleged as due' stood substituted by the expression `claimed as due' with effect from 17th January, 2000. This shows the intention of the legislature to significantly introduce definite expression and give emphasis to the claim of the Bank rather than, what is allegedly due or determinatively due to the Bank from its borrowers. In this case, the application of the Bank had been dismissed by the High Court on the ground that it was not maintainable as it was not covered under the definition of the word `debt'. While setting aside the order of the High Court, this Court held that, the High Court had gone wrong in holding that the application by the Bank was premature and till the Court determines the amount, such application could not be filed by the Bank. This Court clearly stated the dictum that, such application would be maintainable and the amount payable to the Bank does not have to be a determined sum under the provisions of the Recovery Act.\n34. Similar contention had been raised before us on the strength of the judgment of this Court in the Case of United Bank of India (Supra) on behalf of the appellant. Firstly, we fail to understand as to what advantage the learned counsel appearing for the appellant wishes to draw from this judgment and secondly, this judgment has clearly returned the finding, even on the facts of that case, that application under the provisions of the Recovery Act was maintainable within the scope of Section 2 (g) of the Act. The Court held as under :\n \"In view of the rival stands of the parties, the short question that arises for consideration is, as to whether the said claim of the plaintiff can be said to be a claim for recovery of debts due to the plaintiff as provided under Section 17(1) of the Act. The answer of this question in turn would depend upon the meaning of the expression \"debt\" as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act. Before we examine the two provisions referred to above, it is to be borne in mind that the procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and financial institutions which was being followed, resulted in a significant portion of the funds being blocked. To remedy the locking up of huge funds, the Financial Institutions Bill, 1993\", which was passed by Parliament and the Act has come into existence.\nThe Act and the relevant provisions will have to be construed bearing in mind the objects for which Parliament passed the enactment. The prime object of the enactment appears to be provide for the establishment of tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.\nIn the case in hand, there cannot be any dispute that the expression \"debt\" has to be given the widest amplitude to mean any liability which is alleged as due from any person by a bank during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank either in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, whether payable under a decree or order of any court or otherwise and legally recoverable on the date of the application. In ascertaining the question whether any particular claim of any bank or financial institution would come within the purview of the tribunal created under the Act, it is imperative that the entire averments made by the plaintiff in the plaint be looked into and them find out whether notwithstanding the specially-created tribunal having been constituted, the averments are such that it is possible to hold that the jurisdiction of such a tribunal is ousted. With the aforesaid principle in mind, on examining the averments made in the plaint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the claim in question made by the plaintiff is essentially one for recovery of a debt due to it from the defendants and, therefore, is the Tribunal which has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the dispute and not the ordinary civil court.\" \n35. As is obvious from the above recorded findings, the Court while referring to Section 2 (g), 17(1) and 31 (1) of the Recovery Act, observed that jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred under the provisions of the Act and the suits or proceedings shall transfer to the Tribunal upon coming into force of the Recovery Act. The Court was primarily concerned with the matters being transferred from Civil Courts to Tribunal, still while referring to the provisions of Section 2 (g), held that the claim of the Bank was covered under the provisions of the Act. The suit, as instituted in the year 1991, had claimed various relief including the claim for damages. The objection raised was that, there was undetermined amount and other relief could not be referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. The suit was subsequently transferred to the Tribunal under the provisions of the Act and the Court while giving wide meaning to the expression `debt', clearly held that, this expression was of liberal amplitude and there was occasion for the Court to grant a restricted meaning. Thus, in our view, even the case of United Bank of India (supra) no way supports the submissions made on behalf of the appellant.\n36. On the plain analysis of the above stated judgment of this Court, it is clear that the word 'debt' under Section 2(g) of the Recovery Act is incapable of being given a restricted or narrow meaning. The legislature has used general terms which must be given appropriate plain and simple meaning. There is no occasion for the Court to restrict the meaning of the word `any liability', `any person' and particularly the words `in cash or otherwise'. Under Section 2 (g), a claim has to be raised by the Bank against any person which is due to Bank on account of/in the course of any business activity undertaken by the Bank. In the present case, Bank had admittedly granted financial assistance to respondent nos. 2 and 3, who in turn had hypothecated the goods, plants and machinery in favour of the Bank. There cannot be any dispute before us that the goods in question have been sold by the appellant without the consent of the Bank. Respondent nos. 2 and 3 have hardly raised any dispute and resistance, to the claim of the Bank. In fact, even before this Court there is no representation on their behalf. The documentary and oral evidence on record clearly established that the Bank has raised a financial claim upon the principal debtor, as well as upon the person who had intermeddled and/or at least dealt with the charged goods without any authority in law. Not only this, the appellant had sold the hypothecated goods and stocks by public auction, despite the fact the appellant had due knowledge of the fact that the goods were charged in favour of the Bank. Another aspect of this case which required to be considered by this Court is, what was intended to be suppressed by the legislature by enacting the Recovery Act, 1993 and thereafter, by amending various provisions, including Section 2(g) in the year 2000. Obviously, the mischief which was intended to be controlled and/or prevention of wastage of securities provided to the Bank, was the main consideration for such enactment. The purpose was also to prevent wrong doers from taking advantage of their wrong/mistakes, whether permissible in law or otherwise. These preventive measures are required to be applied with care and purposefully in accordance with law to ensure that the mischief, if not entirely extinguished, is curbed. \n37. Maxim Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria has a clear mandate of law that, a person who by manipulation of a process frustrates the legal rights of others, should not be permitted to take advantage of his wrong or manipulations. In the present case Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 and the appellant have acted together while disposing off the hypothecated goods, and now, they cannot be permitted to turn back to argue, that since the goods have been sold, liability cannot be fastened upon respondent Nos. 2 & 3 and in any case on the appellant. The Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah (Dead) and Ors. [1996 (Vol. 6) SCC 342 ], referred to rule of mischief and while explaining the word `building', held as under,:-\n \"Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Vol. I of the 5th Edition) states that 'what is a building must always be a question of degree and circumstances'. Quoting from Victoria City Corpn. v. Biship of Vancover Island (AC at p.390), the celebrated lexicographe commented that 'ordinary and natural meaning of the word building includes the fabric and the ground on which it stands\". In Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.) the meaning of the building is given as \" A structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls, and usually, but not necessarily, covered with a roof\". (emphasis supplied). The said description is a recognition of the fact that roof is not a necessary and indispensable adjunct for a building because there can be roofless buildings. So a building, even after losing the roof, can continue to be a building in its general meaning. Taking recourse to such meaning in the present context would help to prevent a mischief. \n38. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Bank of India v. Vijay Ramniklal [AIR 1997 Gujarat 75 ], in support of the contention, that claim of bank was not `debt' within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act so as to give jurisdiction to the Tribunal. We are not impressed by this argument. Firstly, the judgment of the Gujarat High court is entirely on different facts and in that case an employee of the Bank had misappropriated the amount of the Bank, the Bank had instituted an application under the provisions of the Recovery Act. Rightly so it was held by the High Court, that it was not a `debt' within the meaning of Section 2 (g) and, therefore, could not be tried before the Tribunal. We may state another illustration to demonstrate the case where the Tribunal may not have jurisdiction. Some persons commit a theft in the Bank and take away the money and/or the goods hypothecated to the Bank or the goods in the custody of the Bank. Upon Bank's lodging a first information report (FIR) to the police, those persons are traced, arrested and tried in accordance with law for theft. In such a case, the Tribunal may not have jurisdiction to entertain and decide an application for recovery of money or value of goods in terms of Section 17 of the Recovery Act. That is neither the case here nor in any of the judgments which have been relied upon by the parties before us, except in the case of Gujarat High Court. In the case in hand, the goods were hypothecated to the Bank and the appellant admittedly had knowledge prior to the sale of the goods, that they were hypothecated to the Bank. If the contention of the appellant is accepted, it will amount to giving advantage or premium to the wrong doers. It would also further perpetuate the mischief intended to be suppressed by the enactment. This could completely defeat the very object and purpose of the Act. A party which had pledged or mortgaged properties in favour of the Bank, then would transfer such properties in favour of a third party. In the event, the Bank takes action under the provisions of the Recovery Act, they would take the objection like the present appellant. This would tantamount to travesty of justice and would frustrate the very legislative object and intent behind the provisions of the Recovery Act. Therefore, such an approach or interpretation would be impermissible.\n39. We have already noticed that the legislature has not used words of a restrictive or definite nature. It has intentionally made use of the expressions which are quite general and can be construed widely in their common parlance. There is no occasion for this Court to read the word other than the one intended by the legislature in the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act. Wherever the legislature requires, it uses the expressions of definite connotations and consequences, for example, in the Interest Act, 1978, the word 'debt' has been defined under Section 2(c) of that Act by using specific terms of restricted character. It means 'any liability for an 'ascertained sum' of money and includes a debt payable in any kind but does not include a 'judgment debt'. In this definition, the 'ascertained sum' obviously means a sum which has been determined under any methods of the adjudicative process while, on the other hand, the expression 'payable in kind' is a general expression, again the excluding clause in relation to 'judgment debt' is specific. Such is not the language or the purport of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act. Mr. R.F. Nariman, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, while referring to the provisions of Section 19 (8) and Section 19 (11) respectively, of the Recovery Act contended, that these sections clearly postulate that, a non applicant in proceedings before the Tribunal can raise a plea of set off, as well as a counter claim, but where the counter claim is objected to on the ground that it ought not to be disposed off by way of a counter claim, as it is an independent action, then the person raising a counter claim can take leave of the Tribunal for exclusion of such counter claim. With reference to language of these two provisions, it is contended that, the claim like the one raised by the respondent Bank against the appellant, is a claim which cannot be raised in the proceedings before the Tribunal and the Bank ought to have taken independent steps, if any, in accordance with law. On the other hand, Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel for the respondent-Bank argued that, this argument has no bearing on the matter in controversy before us, in as much as, the claim of the Bank is maintainable within the definition of 'debt' under the Recovery Act. \n40. This contention of appellant needs to be noticed only for being rejected. In our detailed discussion above, we have clearly held that, the claim raised by the Bank falls well within the ambit and scope of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal cannot be ousted on this ground.\n41. Thus, in our opinion, the provisions of Section 2 (g) have to be construed, so as to give it liberal meaning. The general expressions used in this provision will have to be understood generally. Neither there is scope to hold nor is the legislative intent that these provisions should be given a narrower or a restricted meaning. In our considered view, the claim of the Bank relatable to the hypothecated goods was well within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal exercising its power under Section 17 of the Recovery Act. \nApplicability of the principles of public accountability on the facts of the present case : \n42. Having answered both the questions of fact partially and law against the present appellant, still there is another important facet of this case which cannot be ignored by the Court. It relates to the conduct of the respondent Bank and its officers/officials. The witnesses appearing on behalf of the Bank had stated that, at the stage of appraisal report itself, the Bank had come to know, that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have a leave and license agreement with the appellant. Despite that, and without proper verification, as it appears from the record, heavy loan was sanctioned and disbursed to the above respondents. Even thereafter, the Bank and its officers/officials appear to have taken no serious steps to ensure that the goods hypothecated to the Bank are not disposed off without its consent. The officers/officials of the Bank, even after knowing about the handing over of the possession of the property including the hypothecated goods to the appellant and having communicated the same to the appellant vide their letter dated 24th August, 1987, made no serious efforts to recover its debt and ensure that the goods are not disposed off, as the suit itself was filed for recovery of the amount on 1st February, 1989 after serious delay. These facts, to a great extent, are even conformed in the affidavit which was filed on behalf of the Bank by one Shri Kamal Kumar Kapoor as late as on 22nd August, 2009 before this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that the Bank could have protected its interest and ensured recovery while taking due caution and acting with expeditiousness. There is definite negligence on the part of the concerned officers/officials in the Bank. They have jeopardized the interest of the Bank and consequently the public funds, only saving grace being that orders were passed by the competent forum, requiring the appellant to deposit some money in the suit for recovery of more than 22 lac which was filed by the Bank in the year 1989. Even this order was also vacated by the Tribunal vide its order dated 28th December, 2006 wherein it passed the order for refund of the amount. The concerned quarters in the Bank also failed to act despite the advertisement for sale of the hypothecated material given by the appellant on 12th March, 1988, whereafter the machines like CTC is said to have been sold at a throwaway price. All these facts indicate definite negligence and callousness on the part of the concerned quarters. The legislative object of expeditious recovery of all public dues and due protection of security available with the Bank to ensure pre-payments of debts cannot be achieved when the officers/officials of the Bank act in such a callous manner. There is a public duty upon all such officers/officials to act fairly, transparently and with sense of responsibility to ensure recovery of public dues. Even, an inaction on the part of the public servant can lead to a failure of public duty and can jeopardize the interest of the State or its instrumentality.\n43. In our considered opinion, the scheme of the Recovery Act and language of its various provisions imposes an obligation upon the Banks to ensure a proper and expeditious recovery of its dues. In the present case, there is certainly ex facie failure of statutory obligation on the part of the Bank and its officers/officials. In the entire record before us, there is no explanation much less any reasonable explanation as to why effective steps were not taken and why the interest of the Bank was permitted to be jeopardized. The concept of public accountability and performance is applicable to the present case as well. These are instrumentalities of the State and thus all administrative norms and principles of fair performance are applicable to them with equal force as they are to the Government department, if not with a greater rigor. The well established precepts of public trust and public accountability are fully applicable to the functions which emerge from the public servants or even the persons holding public office. In the case of State of Bihar v. Subhash Singh [ (1997) 4 SCC 430 ], this Court, in exercise of the powers of judicial review stated that, the doctrine of full faith and credit applies to the acts done by officers in the hierarchy of the State. They have to faithfully discharge their duties to elongate public purpose.\n44. Inaction, arbitrary action or irresponsible action would normally result in dual hardship. Firstly, it jeopardizes the interest of the Bank and public funds are wasted and secondly, it even affects the borrower's interest adversely provided such person was acting bonafide. Both these adverse consequences can easily be avoided by the authorities concerned by timely and coordinated action. The authorities are required to have a more practical and pragmatic approach to provide solution to such matters. The concept of public accountability and performance of functions takes in its ambit proper and timely action in accordance with law. Public duty and public obligation both are essentials of good administration whether by the State instrumentalities and/or by the financial institutions. In the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr. [(2005) 8 SCC 202 ], this Court declared the dictum that State actions causing loss are actionable under public law and this is as a result of innovation to a new tool with the court, which are the protectors of civil liberty of the citizens and would ensure protection against devastating results of State action. The principles of public accountability and transparency in State action even in the case of appointment, which essentially must not lack bonafide was enforced by the Court. All these principles enunciated by the Court over a passage of time clearly mandate that public officers are answerable both for their inaction and irresponsible actions. What ought to have been done, if not done, responsibility should be fixed on the erring officers then alone the real public purpose of an answerable administration would be satisfied.\n45. The doctrine of full faith and credit applies to the acts done by the officers and presumptive evidence of regularity of official acts done or performed, is apposite in faithful discharge of duties to elongate public purpose and to be in accordance with the procedure prescribed. It is known fact that, in transactions of the Government business, none would own personal responsibility and decisions are leisurely taken at various levels (Refer : State of Andhra Pradesh v. Food Corporation of India [(2004) 13 SCC 53 ].\nPrinciple of public accountability is applicable to such officers/officials with all its vigour. Greater the power to decide, higher is the responsibility to be just and fair. The dimensions of administrative law permit judicial intervention in decisions, though of administrative nature, but are ex facie discriminatory. The adverse impact of lack of probity in discharge of public duties can result in varied defects not only in the decision making process but in the decision as well. Every public officer is accountable for its decision and actions to the public in the larger interest and to the State administration in its governance. It needs to be seen in the facts and circumstances of the present case, why and how the interest of the Bank has been jeopardized, in what circumstances the loan was sanctioned and disbursed despite some glaring defects having been exposed in the appraisal report. Significant element of discretion is vested in the officers/officials of the Bank while sanctioning and disbursing the loans but this discretion is circumscribed by the inbuilt commercial principles/restrictions as well as that such decisions should be free from arbitrariness, unreasonableness and should protect the interest of the Bank in all events. We are neither competent nor do we wish to venture to examine this aspect, it is for the appropriate authorities in the Bank to examine the matter from all quarters and then to take appropriate action against the erring officers/officials involved in the present case, that too, in accordance with law.\n46. For the reasons afore-recorded, we partially allow this appeal and while modifying the order of the High Court to the extent that, the appellants would be liable to pay to the respondent Bank a sum of Rs. 9,63,975/-. (approximate value of the hypothecated stock sold by the appellants) with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the above sum during the period from 14th March, 1988, the date of filing of the plaint, to the date of actual realization as originally allowed by the Tribunal. \n47. We further direct the Chairman of the Allahabad Bank to examine this case in light of our discussion supra and take appropriate action against erring officers/officials in accordance with law.\n48. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -3738,15 +3738,15 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S030", - "case_id": "6428", + "case_id": "2974", "experiment": "baseline_no_firac", - "model": "ministral-3b", - "source_file": "S030__baseline_no_firac__ministral-3b__6428.json", + "model": "phi-4", + "source_file": "S030__baseline_no_firac__phi-4__2974.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "07/01/2009", + "judgment_date": "03/05/2010", "machine_error_stage": "issues", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue misframing" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue omission" } } ] \ No newline at end of file