diff --git "a/data/tasks_annotator_1.json" "b/data/tasks_annotator_1.json" --- "a/data/tasks_annotator_1.json" +++ "b/data/tasks_annotator_1.json" @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ [ { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL - 868 of 2019 | Birendra Prasad Sah v. State Of Bihar And Anr. | 08/05/2019", - "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL - 868 of 2019 | Birendra Prasad Sah v. State Of Bihar And Anr.", - "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The dispute concerns two cheques, for Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000, which were dishonoured and returned unpaid on 20 November 2015. The appellant received the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. A legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015. After failing to obtain proof of service from the postal department, a second legal notice was issued on 26 February 2016, which was replied to on 2 March 2016. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed on 11 May 2016. The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) condoned the delay in filing the complaint and took cognizance. The Sessions Judge rejected the second respondent's revision petition. The High Court, however, quashed the cognizance order, holding that the complaint was not filed within the statutory period. The appellant argued that successive notices are permissible and that the delay was condoned under Section 142. The respondent argued that the second notice was issued beyond the thirty-day period from the dishonour memo, and the complaint was filed beyond the period from the first notice, and that the CJM had only condoned delay after a specific date.", - "generated_judgment": "### **Judgment**\n\n---\n\n### **Facts:**\n1. Two dishonoured cheques (Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000) were returned unpaid on **20 November 2015**, with the appellant receiving the dishonour memo on **4 December 2015**.\n2. A **legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015**, failing to obtain proof of service from the Postal Department.\n3. A **second legal notice was issued on 26 February 2016**, to which the respondent replied on **2 March 2016**.\n4. The appellant filed a **complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on 11 May 2016**, seeking criminal proceedings for dishonour of cheques.\n5. The **CJM condoned the delay in filing the complaiment** and took cognizance, allowing the matter to proceed.\n6. The **Sessions Judge rejected the respondent’s revision petition**, but the High Court subsequently **quashed the cognizance order on the ground that the complaint was filed beyond the statutory timeframe under SI No. V/Y/1804/2017 issued by the Bombay High Court, effective from 1 September 2017**.\n\n---\n\n### **Issues:**\n1. Whether **Section 138(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NIA, 1881)** mandates strict compliance with the 30-day period following either the dishonour memo or the date of mailing the first legal notice; or if successive notices allow for an extension.\n2. Whether the **statutory rule set by the High Court (SI No. V/Y/1804/2017)**, abolishing condonation of delay in NIA complaints (and replacing it with an absolute deadline), overrides the discretionary power of courts in Section 142 of the **Proceedings Against Offence in Contract Act (1938)**.\n3. Whether the **decisions in *[Industrial Waiter Union v. J. Krishna Nat [2015], Partytown Travel Agencies v. Autoresti Tours [2009]*****—based on case law interpreting NIA Section 138’s time limits—stood in contradiction to the procedural rule issued by the Bombay High Court.**\n\n---\n\n### **Rules:**\n1. **Section 138 of the NIA (1881):**\n - A person seizing the chance to prevent suit shall, within **within 30 days** from the dishonoured cheque or from serving a legal notice, file a complaint.\n - (*Case Law:* *[Yourliyah Mills v. Pipa Malini [1723SC126; 1960] SCR Re și [1979] 1 SCC 93*]:\n The law views late filing as an attempt to delay adjudication, and absolute timeframes are not leniently interpreted.\n - **Notices Relaxation:** Courts generally condone negligence in timeLnilling but not willful delay. Procedural elusion increases strictness.\n\n2. **Section 54 of Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 72nd Amendment (2013):**\n - Write-ups managing the notice-servicing period vary between jurisdictions; High Court opinions resolve inconsistencies.\n - Practice: Section 142 of the **NIA Court Proceedings Act (1938)** grants “reasonable” condonation questions but will not substitute an imposed deadline by itself.\n\n3. **Bombay High Court’s Rule (SI No. V-Y/1804/2017; Issued on 1 September 2017):**\n - Introduced **strict enforcement of Section 138’s 30-day timeline**, disregarding earlier TJO-based condonation cases.\n - Removed the CJM’s discretion to decree counsel before expiration.\n\n4. **Prior Case Law Prioritizing Enforcement:**\n - *[Eddy R. Li’l vs Chief Judicial Magistrate & Patel Singh [Singh v. Patel 2006 [1], 1991 SCC Suit Low CTS nor without knowledge exploitation]* forced courts to infer time stags vision what damages would be platoon instant corrections.\n\n---\n\n### **Analysis:**\n\n#### **1. Stricter Deadline vs Prior Practice & Section 142 Condonation**\n - Since **1 September 2017**, the High Court’s rule effectively **abolished** Section 142 discretion for the Bombay trial courts. No succeeding High Court validly clarifies which prior police roads hold the field anyway\n - The **resolution in the High Court’s review** precisely aligned with NOR’s (all-plus generation Order-oasting) pathaktividad ward legal deadlines—ie, that cougar-like jump applies only outside the “prothonotary crisis reporting” room\n - The second notice launched **26 Feb 2016**; response/unframe occurred on **2 Mar 2016**, turning almost-out-of-the-30-day gate however *empulsam.* Despite early repose, the **court now-bound timelinelogout** reframed the sacramental 30-day period as a vis-a-vis de facto (non-culpable) metric—then dumping CJM’s adjournment inertia via SI.\n\n#### **2. Procedural Manual Redesign & Consanguinity in SPON Act Exception**\n - A conditional drag harness (ordering separate court intro used per Section 142) required jurisdiction; relevant travels absent given conditional herein-proceed.\n - However SI Number said the conjunct timings such as sending unextropy proofs set traps. Late crane exertion outside cognisance were unwanted simplified confusion in light of the blueprint project logic\n\n#### **3. Undeniable and Incoherence-Insistent Litigation Chronology**\n - From dishonour (4th Dec >4 Decto 4 >ex July; notice 6 Nov; response post that path, no proof of service received sited) means a realistic replay ~ Dec-16println States having issue with spooner finding ineligible bound? Not.\n\n---\n\n### **Conclusion:**\n**DISMISSED.**\n**Reason:** The Bombay High Court’s directive (SI #VY/1804/2017) superseded prior CJM condonation practices under Nos 1 or 3 days preceding severity post advancement. As both parties sued unjustifiedly per that overridden timeline-gate hurdles, and **information from 15AM to 10PM in March-May 2016 clearly expires in the structural patent of Protectorate Notice, no matter};\n\n//*“Later citing KP millimarse”> no.", - "reference_judgment": "1. Delay condoned.\n2. Leave granted.\n3. This appeal arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 10 May 2018 by which an order taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 18881has been quashed. 1 \" Act\"\n4. The facts, briefly stated, are thus:\n5. The dispute arises over two cheques drawn on the State Bank of India in the amount of Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000 which were returned unpaid under a memo issued by the UCO Bank, Begusarai on 20 November 2015. The appellant received the memo on 4 December 2015. Following this, a legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015 intimating the dishonour of the cheque. According to the appellant, between 14 February 2016 and 23 February 2016, he made queries with the postal department but no proof of service was provided. Accordingly, on 26 February 2016, a second legal notice was issued. This was replied to by the second respondent on 2 March 2016. Eventually, a complaint under Section 138 was instituted on 11 May 2016. 6 The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai by an order dated 14 July 2016, condoned the delay in filing the complaint. While taking cognizance, the CJM issued summons to the second respondent. The second respondent instituted revisional proceedings before the Sessions Judge which were rejected on 8 March 2017. In a further recourse to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, the learned Single Judge held that the complaint under Section 138 was not filed within the statutory period of thirty days prescribed under Section 138 as a result of which the proceedings were quashed.\n7. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, Mr Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Counsel submitted that in MSR Leathers v. S Palaniappan2a three judge Bench of this Court has taken the view that the issuance of successive notices is permissible under the provisions of Section 138 having regard to the object of the legislation. Moreover, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the delay in the institution of the complaint was condoned by the CJM under Section 142. Hence, there was an error on the part of the High Court in quashing the proceedings. 2 (2013) 1 SCC 177\n8. On the other hand, Mr Jay Savla, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent submitted that: (i) The second legal notice dated 26 February 2016 was sent beyond a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015 and hence cannot be the basis of a valid institution of a criminal complaint; (ii) If at all, the complaint could have only been instituted on the basis of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015 which was within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour; (iii) The complaint which was lodged on 11 May 2016 was beyond the stipulated period from the date of issuance of the first notice; (iv) The CJM had condoned the delay which had occurred in the institution of the complaint only for the period after 6 April 2016 after the issuance of the second notice; and (v) In the decision of the three judge Bench in MSR Leathers (supra), there was a re-presentation of the cheque as a result of which, a fresh notice was held to be within the ambit of the law. 9 Section 138 provides thus:\n\"138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. - Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for3[a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:\n3. Sub. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 7, for a \"term which may be extended to one year\" (w.e.f. 6-2-2003). Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months4from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;\n4. The period has been reduced from six months to three months vide R.B.I Notification No. RBI/2011-12/251, DBOD.AML BC. No. 47/14.01.001/2011-2012, dated 4th November, 2011 (w.e.f. 1-4-2012). (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,5[within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.\"\n10. In the present case, the facts narrated above indicate that the appellant issued a legal notice on 31 December 2015. This was within a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. Consequently, the requirement stipulated in proviso (b) to Section 138 was fulfilled. Proviso (c) spells out a requirement that the drawer of the cheque has failed to make payment to the holder in due course or payee within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. The second respondent does not as a matter of fact, admit that the legal notice dated 31 December 2015 was served on him. The appellant has in the complaint specifically narrated the circumstance that despite repeated requests to the postal department, no acknowledgment of the notice was furnished. It was in these circumstances that the appellant issued a second notice dated 26 February 2016. Cognizant as we are of the requirement specified in proviso (b) to Section 138, that the notice must be issued within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour, we have proceeded on the basis that it is the first notice dated 31 December 2015 which constitutes the cause of action for the complaint under Section 138.\n11. The complaint was instituted on 11 May 2016. Under Section 142(1), a complaint has to be instituted within one month of the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 1386. The proviso however stipulates that cognizance of the complaint may be taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. Both in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint, the appellant indicated adequate and sufficient reasons for not being able to institute the complaint within the stipulated period. These have been adverted to above. The CJM condoned the delay on the cause which was shown by the appellant for the period commencing from 6 April 2018. However, if paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint are read together, it is evident that the appellant had indicated sufficient cause for seeking condonation of the delay in the institution of the complaint. The High Court has merely adverted to the presumption that the first notice would be deemed to have been served if it was dispatched in the ordinary course. Even if that presumption applies, we are of the view that sufficient cause was shown by the appellant for condoning the delay in instituting the complaint taking the basis of the complaint as the issuance of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015. 6 142 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138:[Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period];(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138..\n12. In the view which we have taken, we have come to the conclusion that the impugned judgment of the High Court is unsustainable. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The complaint shall accordingly stand restored to the file of the trial court.\n13. We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions which will be adjudicated upon during the trial. O R D E R Delay condoned. Leave granted. The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Appeal (Crl.) 1425 of 2004 | Israr v. State Of Uttar Pradesh | 06/12/2004", + "case_details": "Case: Appeal (Crl.) 1425 of 2004 | Israr v. State Of Uttar Pradesh", + "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "case_record": "The appellant, Israr, was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for the murder of Zamil Ahmad. The deceased was attacked on the night of October 4, 1979, by the appellant and his co-accused, Afzal. The prosecution's case was that the appellant caught the deceased from behind while Afzal inflicted knife blows. The deceased raised an alarm, and eyewitnesses (PW-3, PW-4, PW-5) arrived at the scene and saw the occurrence before the accused fled. The deceased was hospitalized and later died on October 9, 1979, due to peritonitis and broncho-pneumonia. The initial FIR was lodged under Section 324 IPC, later altered to Section 307 IPC, and finally to Section 302 IPC after the death. The trial court convicted both accused, and their appeal to the Allahabad High Court was dismissed. The defense argued that the eyewitnesses were partisan, identification was difficult due to poor light, there was no common intention, and the death was due to medical negligence. The prosecution contended that the eyewitnesses' testimony was credible and Section 34 was applicable.", + "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let's go through this step by step. The user provided the case details and the legal issues. They want the judgment structured using the FIRAC framework. First, I need to make sure I understand all the facts and the issues. \n\nThe case involves Israr being convicted under Section 302 IPC with Section 34 for murder. The prosecution claims he and Afzal attacked Zamil Ahmad, leading to his death. The defense argues there's no common intention, eyewitnesses are unreliable, and the death was due to medical negligence. The FIR was initially under Section 324, then changed to 307, then 302. The High Court dismissed the appeal, and now the case is being reviewed.\n\nThe legal issues identified are about common intention, eyewitness credibility, and cause of death. The rules would include the IPC sections, especially 302, 34, and the burden of proof. The analysis needs to check if the appeal is maintainable. The defense's arguments are about the lack of common intention and the reliability of the eyewitnesses. \n\nFirst, I need to check if the appeal is maintainable. The defense's arguments are all about the evidence and legal interpretation, so the appeal is maintainable. Then, the analysis must address each issue. \n\nFor the common intention under Section 34, the prosecution must show that both accused shared the intention to commit murder. The eyewitnesses saw the attack, so their testimony could support this. However, the defense says the identification was difficult due to poor lighting. The court needs to determine if the evidence is sufficient. \n\nRegarding the eyewitnesses, even if the lighting was poor, their testimony might still be credible if corroborated by other evidence. The defense's claim that they are partisan might not be enough to dismiss their testimony if there's no evidence of bias. \n\nThe cause of death is a key point. The deceased died of peritonitis and broncho-pneumonia. The prosecution says the attack caused these injuries, but the defense argues medical negligence. The court must determine if the attack directly led to the death, considering the medical report. \n\nThe FIR alteration from 324 to 307 to 302 might be a procedural point, but the user's case facts don't mention any challenge to that. The court might not need to address it unless it's relevant to the evidence. \n\nIn the conclusion, the court needs to decide if the conviction should be allowed or dismissed. If the prosecution's evidence is sufficient to prove common intention, eyewitness credibility, and causation, then the appeal is dismissed. Otherwise, it's allowed. \n\nI need to structure all this into the FIRAC framework, making sure each section is clear and addresses the issues. Also, ensure that the conclusion uses either \"ALLOWED\" or \"DISMISSED\" as required.\n\n\n### Facts: \n1. The appellant, Israr, was convicted under Section 302 IPC (murder) read with Section 34 IPC (common intention) for the death of Zamil Ahmad. \n2. The attack occurred on October 4, 1979, with Israr and Afzal (co-accused) allegedly attacking the deceased from behind. \n3. Eyewitnesses (PW-3, PW-4, PW-5) arrived at the scene and testified to witnessing the attack before the accused fled. \n4. The deceased was hospitalized and died on October 9, 1979, due to peritonitis and broncho-pneumonia. \n5. The initial FIR was lodged under Section 324 IPC (assault), later altered to Section 307 IPC (attempted murder), and finally to Section 302 IPC (murder) after the death. \n6. The trial court convicted both accused, and the Allahabad High Court dismissed their appeal. \n7. The defense argued that the eyewitnesses were partisan, identification was difficult due to poor lighting, there was no common intention, and the death was due to medical negligence. \n8. The prosecution contended that the eyewitnesses' testimony was credible and that Section 34 IPC applied. \n\n---\n\n### Issues: \n1. **Was there a common intention between the appellant and Afzal to commit the murder, as required under Section 34 IPC?** \n2. **Were the eyewitnesses' testimonies reliable and credible despite the poor lighting conditions at the scene?** \n3. **Was the deceased's death a direct result of the attack by the appellant and Afzal, or was it due to medical negligence?** \n\n---\n\n### Rules: \n1. **Section 302 IPC**: Murder is the act of causing death with the intention to cause death or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. \n2. **Section 34 IPC**: Common intention is the shared intent to commit an act, which makes all participants liable as if they had committed the act themselves. \n3. **Burden of Proof**: The prosecution must establish the facts of the case beyond reasonable doubt. \n4. **Credibility of Eyewitnesses**: Testimony must be evaluated for reliability, consistency, and corroboration. \n5. **Causation**: The prosecution must prove that the accused's actions directly caused the deceased's death, excluding contributory factors like medical negligence. \n\n---\n\n### Analysis: \n1. **Maintainability of the Appeal**: \n The appeal is maintainable as it challenges the trial court's findings on key legal and factual issues, including the application of Section 34 IPC, the credibility of eyewitnesses, and the causation of death. \n\n2. **Common Intention (Section 34 IPC)**: \n The prosecution's case relies on the eyewitnesses' testimony to establish that both Israr and Afzal acted in concert. While the defense argues that identification was difficult due to poor lighting, the eyewitnesses' accounts of the attack (e.g., Israr catching the deceased from behind while Afzal inflicted knife blows) provide a coherent narrative. The court must determine whether the prosecution met the burden of proof to show a shared intent to commit murder. If the evidence supports this, Section 34 IPC applies. \n\n3. **Eyewitness Credibility**: \n The defense's claim that the eyewitnesses were partisan lacks evidence of bias or inconsistency in their testimony. The poor lighting conditions do not invalidate their accounts if corroborated by other evidence, such as the nature of the injuries and the sequence of events. The court must assess whether the testimony is sufficient to establish the accused's involvement. \n\n4. **Causation and Medical Negligence**: \n The deceased's death was attributed to peritonitis and broncho-pneumonia, which the prosecution links to the attack. The defense argues that medical negligence caused the death. However, the prosecution's case hinges on the attack being the proximate cause of the deceased's injuries, which led to the fatal complications. The court must evaluate whether the medical report excludes the attack as a contributing factor. \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion: \nThe prosecution has sufficiently established the common intention between the appellant and Afzal under Section 34 IPC, the credibility of the eyewitnesses, and the causal link between the attack and the deceased's death. The defense's arguments fail to meet the burden of proof required to overturn the conviction. **ALLOWED**.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : Hon'ble Justice Arijit Pasayat\nLeave granted.\nAppellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court upholding his conviction for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC'). The appellant faced trial along with one Afzal @ Patel. Both of them were convicted in the aforesaid manner and each was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.\nIn a nutshell prosecution version which led to trial of the appellant along with his co-accused is as follows :\nZamil Ahmad (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased') had his grocery shop in mohalla Gali Darjiyan, P.S, Kotwali, Muzaffarnagar City. Accused Afzal had forcibly demanded money from Kalloo, younger brother of the deceased. Kalloo had told this fact to deceased and when he complained to accused Afzal he threatened to Kill him.\nOn the night of 4.10.1979 at about 9.30 p.m. Zamil deceased after closing his shop was returning to his house in mohalla Khala Bazar along with Imran (PW-2). When he reached in front of Maszid Kunharan Near Mohalla Khalla Bazar accused Afzal alias Patel and his uncle accused-appellant Israr met him and they started saying that he had got them arrested and no body would save them. Accused-appellant caught hold of the deceased from the back and accused Afzal inflicted knife blows on him. Deceased raised alarm and hearing his alarm, Noor on him. Deceased raised alarm and hearing his alarm, Noor Hahi (PW-3), Iqbal (PW-4) and sayeed (PW-5) rushed to the sopt and saw the occurrence. When the witnesses tried to intervene the accused person ran way flashing knife. Imran (PW-2) took Zamil Ahmad to Disrict Hospital, Muzaffarnagar where his injuries were examined by Dr. R.K. Tandon who found three incised wounds on his person and prepared injury report (Ext. Ka.17). After admitting Zamil Ahmad in District Hospital, Muzaffarnagar, Imran (PW-2) prepared written report (Extn. Ka.2) and came to the Police Station Kotwali where he lodged written report at about 11.15 p.m. On the basis of written report chik F.I.R. (Ext. Ka. 9) was prepared by Constable Rajendra Singh (PW-7) who made an endorsement of the same at G.D. report (Ext. Ka-10) and registered a case against both the accused under Section 324 IPC. Imran (PW-2) also deposited blood stained shirt of the deceased Zamil Ahmad which was taken into possession by Constable Rajendra Singh vide recovery memo (Ext. Ka-3).\nThe investigation of the case was taken by Fateh Singh (PW-8), who arrested the accused persons. On receipt of injury report the case was altered to one under Section 307 IPC on 6.10.1979.\nThe dying declaration of deceased was reported on 7.10.1979 by Sri Jag Prasad, Executive Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar (CW-1). The condition of Zamil Ahmad was serious and, therefore, on the night of 8/9.10.1979 he was shifted to All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, where he died on the night of 9.10.1979 at about 11.15 p.m. information regarding his death was received at Police Station, Vijay Nagar, New Delhi, S.I. Ram Niwas (PW-6) of P.S. Vijay Nagar, New Delhi, came to All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, where he conducted inquest report (Ext, Ka-5) and other relevant papers. He sealed the dead body of the deceased and sent the same for postmortem.\nAutopsy on the dead body of the deceased was conducted at Delhi on 10.10.1979 by Dr. P.C. Dixit (PW-1) who found two stitched wounds and one incised wound as ante-mortem injuries and cause of death due to peritonitis and broncho pneumonia. He prepared postmortem report and the case was altered to one under Section 302 IPC.\nAfter completion of investigation charge sheet was placed and the accused persons who were committed to the Court of Sessions faced trial. They pleaded innocence. Stand of the appellant was that Noor Hahi (PW-3) and Yunus caused injuries on Afzal on 15.5.1979. Noor Hahi was witness against Afzal in a case under Section 25 of the Arms Act. Both Noor Hahi and Afzal were friends and they had falsely implicated them. To further the prosecution version 8 witnessess were examined. Jag Prasad, Executive Magistrate (CW-1) and Dr. T.N. Mathur (CW-2) were examined as court witnesses. Imran (PW-2), Noor Hahi (PW-3), Iqbal (PW-4) and Sayeed (PW-5) were stated to be eye witnesses. The accused persons examined one Rahmat Hahi (DW-1) in support of their stand. Considering the evidence on record, trial Court found them guilty. It is to be noted that PW-2 made a departure from the statement made during investigation. The other witnesses categorically stated that the accused-appellant caught hold of the deceased thereby facilitating the knife blows by Afzal. Both the convicted accused persons filed appeal before the Allahabad High Court. By the impugned judgment the appeal was dismissed and conviction and sentence were affirmed.\nIn support of the appeal Mr. Salmad Khurshid, learned senior counsel submitted that the evidence of the so called eye witnesses does not inspire confidence. There was no light which could have facilitated the identification. The so-called eye witnesses were partisan witnesses, being friends and relatives of the deceased. In any event, Section 34 has no application. There is nothing on record to show that the accused had any common intention to cause death of the deceased. Doctor's evidence was that the cause of death of the deceased. Doctor's evidence was that the cause of death was due to Peritonitis and Broncho Pneumonia. It was, therefore, submitted that even if there was any injury sustained with proper medical treatment and care, life of the deceased could have been saved. It was further submitted that one of the witnesses stated that the accused appellant fired a gun shot which the trial Court disbelieved. This shows exaggerations by the witnesses. It was, therefore, submitted that the courts below were not justified in finding the accused appellant guilty.\nIn response, learned counsel for the State submitted that the evidence of the eye witnesses is clear and cogent. Merely because the witnesses were friends or relatives of the accused, that cannot be ground to discard their credible and cogent evidence. The part played by the appellant has been vividly described by the witnesses and, therefore, Section 34 IPC has been right applied.\nWe shall first deal with the contention regarding interestedness of the witnesses for furthering prosecution version. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not counsel actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible.\nIn Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1953) SC 364 it has been laid down as under :\n \"A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.\" \nThe above decision has since be followed in Guli Chand and Ors. v. Slate of Rajasthan, [1974] 3 SCC 698 in which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR (1957) SC 614 was also relied upon.\nWe may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh's case (supra) in which surprise was expressed over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed :\n \"We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in - 'Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan', AIR (1952) SC 54 1951 ILO SC 24 at p.59). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel.\" Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR (1965) SC 202 1964 ILO SC 393 this Court observed : (p. 209-210 para 14) :\n\"But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contended that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses........The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.\"\n To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, AIR (1973) SC 2407 and Lehna v. State of Haryana, [2002] 3 SCC 76 . Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of \"falsus in uno falsus in omnibus\" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the Fact that evidence has been persons. Falsity of particular to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim \"falsus in uno falsus in omnibus\" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim \"falsus in uno falsus in omnibus \" has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence'. (See Nisa Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1957) SC 366 ). The above position was elaborately discussed in Sucha Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2003) 6 JT SC 348 .\nComing to the plea relating to non-probability of identification, the evidence of PW-3 is very relevant. He has stated that the occurrence took place at the time of isha prayers which are concluded at about 9.30 p.m. There was light of the moon as well as of the neighbouring houses and the electric poles in the lane. The date of occurrence was 11th day of Lunar month and the place of occurrence is near the mosque as well as many houses close by. Therefore, identification was possible. Further a known person can be identified from a distance even without much light. The evidence of PW-3 has also been corroborated by the evidence of others. Evidence of PWs 3 to 5 proves that identification was possible.\nIn addition, the dying declaration which was recorded by CW-1 clearly establishes the roles played by the accused persons. Nothing has been shown as to how the same suffer from any infirmity. It is to be noted that before the trial Court the accused persons did not dispute that the death of the deceased was a result of injuries found by PW-1. Merely on the hypothetical plea that the deceased could have been saved with better treatment, the charge of murder does not get diluted. The plea is clearly untenable in view of the Explanation 2 appended to Section 299 IPC. The evidence of PW-3 to PW-5 is consistent that the accused appellant restrained the movement of the decided and held him while the other co-accused inflicted the knife blows.\nSection 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is the element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct proof common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true contents of the Section are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 109 , the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this Section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision.\nAs it originally stood the Section 34 was in the following terms:\n \"When a criminal act is done by several persons, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone.\" \nIn 1870, it was amended by the insertion of the words \"in furterance of the common intention of all\" after the word \"persons\" and before the word \"each\", so as to make the object of Section 34 clear. This position was noted in Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR (1945) Privy Council 118 .\n The Section does not say \"the common intention of all\", nor does it say \"and intention common to all\". Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. As was observed in Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1993) SC 1899 , Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused. The above position was highlighted recently in Anil Sharma and Ors. v. Stale of Jharkahand, [2004] 5 SCC 679 .\nIn Abrahim Sheikh &amp; Ors. v. State of West Bengal, AIR (1964) SC 1263 this Court stated that no doubt a person is only responsible ordinarily for what he does and Section 38 IPC ensures that. But Section 34 as well and Section 35 provided that if the criminal act is the result of the common intention, then every person who did the criminal act with such intention would be responsible for the total offence irrespective of the share which he had in its perpetration. The logic, highlighted illuminatingty by the Judicial Committee in the illustrious case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor, AIR (1925) PC1 , is that in crimes as in other things \"they also serve who only stand and wait\".\nSection 34 has, therefore, been rightly applied.\nIn view of the legal and factual position noted above, the irresistible conclusion is that the accused appellant ha been rightly held guilty and convicted. There is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -113,26 +113,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S001", - "case_id": "1779", - "experiment": "baseline_firac", - "model": "ministral-3b", - "source_file": "S001__baseline_firac__ministral-3b__1779.json", + "case_id": "4786", + "experiment": "ablation_issue", + "model": "qwen3-8b", + "source_file": "S001__ablation_issue__qwen3-8b__4786.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "08/05/2019", + "judgment_date": "06/12/2004", "machine_error_stage": "rules", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in reasoning" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CA No. 1733 of 1973 | Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central, Bombay v. Jalan Trading Company Private Limited | 09/08/1985", - "case_details": "Case: CA No. 1733 of 1973 | Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central, Bombay v. Jalan Trading Company Private Limited", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal Nos. 1727-1730 of 2010 | Union Of India And Others v. Sabyasachi Jyoti And Others | 01/02/2018", + "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1727-1730 of 2010 | Union Of India And Others v. Sabyasachi Jyoti And Others", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "M/s. Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. granted its sole selling agency to Jalan Trading Co. via an agreement on May 1, 1951, for two years with renewal rights. The respondent-assessee, a private company incorporated on October 16, 1952, acquired the benefits of this agreement through a deed of assignment dated December 30, 1952. From January 1, 1953, the assessee acted as the sole selling agent and subsequently entered into a new agreement with Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. on May 1, 1953, with a renewal clause. The deed of assignment stipulated that the assessee would pay 75% of its profits, commission, and remuneration received from the manufacturers to the assignors. For the assessment year 1954-55, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 7,93,837 (75% of its net profits) under Section 10(1) or 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. The Income Tax Officer (ITO) and appellate authorities rejected this claim. The High Court, on reference, agreed that the assessee acquired an asset of enduring nature but still held the payment to be a deductible business expenditure under Section 10(2)(xv), without addressing the 'real income' aspect. The Revenue appealed this decision.", - "generated_judgment": "**小公司作为独立采.collection来源，请确保严肃投入，严密立案真相。**\n\n---\n**Facts:**\n1. 1951年， fractionation Břichárat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 颁布授权野天 компания Jalan Trading Co. 作为哪一项单一销售代理（管理期五年，带续订权利），在1952年12月30日，Jedan Trading在Boulder Polar Trading 之间将利益Carrier通过**授权转让协议（授权转让约）**得。后者（ Dagenschir李其堂）取得了有效授权。\n2. 1953年1月1日，Mohawk Control Co. Ltd.追效原授权并予以续订相应新的安卓协约（续订时为有效和有效定义）。\n3. 答案方（商业 fossils）自始对 样品活谙可约验证约为何 Sousa local Guangzhou profit the 的始租赋与（discharges under oath: Payment comply。\n4. 账 infringándor，自制绵毯作为经销公司 special trading profit(translation at 总部二赏杂号),_collection 15 all payments (DGL –諸 destination)。在1954-Season（Ass Assessment Rih），这公司请求在**细分 section 10(2)(xv) 允许**侵犯。\n5. 上一回收入部门（高级司法院Talpop–分别分文）。最初高院特快决议属叶映与哪否准给，\n ---> 观点：然而虽然发现 möhand’appestead作为ぴミリはあったと认(hat)。\n\n---\n### Issues:\n**主题分三个：**\n1.新增公司是否全面承担该孩子实际拥有授权，是否当持续计入“Enduring Assetpas” (under patent act**、**授权垫填转交错误真实来源**：\n Analyze 时是授权转让形式(changed liable compliant 在此遵循)-\\** MATERIAL YOUR ACTUAL ESIGHT TRY.**\n\n2.attributes of **Section 10(2)(xv)**:并保证那家公司的收入 (celeced activities amount)\n——Deduct payments connecting agency代理行为输出（whether under Agency contracts） franc Rousseau credкс的反向 radio= dedicated SHETERING ACT ASATI。\n\n3.chose remuneration its taxation (本 Leaf acepttions mitigationsReturns pricing)：**key requirement**\n Terror opposition by segment provided contracts a category-level principle（Section 5 of assignments；\"Form-labor\", transcending \"ivative limb\" in 1954-55 的「生产活动」，实质意义上所属投入编一页事实产业范围）。\n\n---\n### Rules:\n**I.** Indian Income Tax Act, 1922( ICTA ) **Anctional Principles & Precedents**：\n1. **Section 10 & Allowable Income Losses**: Directly permitdeduction under \"identifying its **\"aspect-action\"**(伦理学理论考虑非稅基赚取)。例证：– Blockfront extensions with foundation (Section 10(1)(1A)(3):ett_NO payment الشيءを)怎样 adjacent.\n - Coinciding *“dynamism”* supported on Section 10(2)(xv(ICTA 1922)) by Zudem label-rootessed case: **v. ∓iadoo-education** →建筑住户被授予“代理证实 结果准确特殊].\n - **Moptas SC\tnext [1958)** indent hood: toycandees-- reconnect/deduction-griff obtained validity permitted “isolated father contempt“。\n\n2. **Assignment of Ministeries Under the Contractual Law:政贯** carpets expansiveness, controlled ‘commerce contracts’ acts –\ncheck (Sections 9 / 8 – ITA ICTadir in Section ∩– akt małżeństwie,Ę, real other’, que—part under Article 8, its inclusion and CCC). 本质上， of representing words： **sending offset as legality variant** act **Foundational Courts’ Directive Wendy-22 to ICAT Captives。 in 广福(CT/MS，BS-Wورنates asssignment exceptional)**\n\n--- **II.** *Discretions of Agency & Assignor Ruled Remunerations“*：\n - COMMMENT-Held/Sec **its pure Section 10(2)(xv)**. It validates financial instruments from expenses if “detonated” as recompense-based contingent charges（法庭允许附带执行 rom data)--↫This scenario:innen ✊**by Establishing dTRecommendation,[Case rate commission ≥it may their explanation under contextual transactions**.\n**Furthermore: “Sec 10(Xv nodes) Legal\" under IT “prevails across principles\"**sociated pojoing-allowed CIT of previous/non-procontract tendency archives (promesises Commissioners receive).bert Drude agrees。\n\n- **Sections28/25** to civic-juridical propriety took places from tools למדation and parliamentary posture supplement (onverify)- obra guidelines **when companies retained preferential “valid rescruitment place.”\n\n**Summarized Recentrame facts': ,\n--- Likeness the client’s deduction challenges monopolistic assignment-covered business transaction solution **sharp procedural laws (\"TOTAL \"VDR-+\n**-->** WAIL Subswitch Casey Test collections****** جائے**.\n\n---\n\n### **Analysis:*\n\n---\n**先：** *任何一个法庭首先， \"./未摆脱檫i3并签定，特Collectors Terms格式:/取：受益左侧遵守立案真相这正()) Drei {\n\n**F on PCA & Fakultätin 蚊Victor中，邦g\b swear Benteme格的 \"proportional methods\":* current opposing under 1953 May 卯玻璃defined implicit compensation factors (forestieri \"assignment arc\")：\n\n[[ （（19])： dealing ——> 当时过程：Authentic 货的 Code Exportitorb 不接受 \"设备温度\" secondary 概念]（就经 broadening process Adjudicatory the contracts 曲成条件）].\n\n---\n （二） *Spec Authorization Is Shown.*\n\n 转交实质利得来源：假使转让以「基督奉若后海」，和「来���拥有的活动满分」（inapplicable,Ի \"empirical leisure seem closing\")，[Hand spoken\") doesn't antedate. Goa was：Decree UTOH under some security ● UTOBs. **under sd-henesis。**\n *观点，代理-付给的 概念从公司专售中 \"Rattles away spum\"：\"customified aim here**\n\n**第三：** העבב-- sys Exploding Turbine Parameters 买好商场(同方):\n\n i. **modalization authenticity high** 微知彼公司的计算（deemed compound recognitiveness）=<:懂事钱为利益状态：不配怜壹单锅模: dai) SOrgan permanency,true income gain builtings 흰project**), Fielding fines would blotting affiliated inferior assertion:\n\n*II. wahrgest details through Creation：(\n 对称 nóiخت DQ float-access \"shared evaluated revenue\"-- test rival brusquedly plethysm gathered assignments— \"Business discussions within prudent motive.\"\n Two cannot infringe inequalities： 'Py the 99 ～start year` free shortly satisfying givt with Γ resolution *salialt* his decreased≈ value Supervision at/assigned natureشار تماما غير دليela منิส .---\n:\n\n)\n\n\n---\n**最后结论 Their transferred stricture？ 作为特别的业务进展：️？ applicability of 52 formulaic vest ra.g 貂max Rogue Pokemon Category。 بنتص观察。\n\n---\n### Analysis：前提： Dynamads appellate（Neither producer blame） consent to complete deducts “like paths” gene-trackands〉\n---\n### Conflict Resolve Practicality：自动性生成不满足 \"provisions\" reshherence raison insbesondere 毋塞利 \"implementation\".\n\n---\n两种决化 conclusion：\n A) Enhanced Scale（secase test assumptions：authorization even withstands \"last timeline customs implementation\").\n---\n### __DISMISS यदि إنتاجràني fact-level proofvarepsilon bonds :(\n1) *———sdistinguished （ 75% 的一种自选中的剩余系统 bol的“admission） ，of hand-u¬ profits 地誓与 authority available y 连接 确认f：\n\n**①统计上有证据认定，**非列案分明于其前瞻付给条款。\n----联邦能够根据 Financial 状况和 \"Legality outcomes\" 拯救其小号 pauvres *, each legal bewilderervation associated diagnostic.\n**真相无误反转：∑ 实施部分掌管真相解除剩余 authority**\n\n---\n\n---\n**（《_filenameالفقسام》） Main legal defensiveness为\" Dr ≥ adjunction(\" test guarantee\" NOT conducting）\n撤*ducible tradition betray-nodal mustolation：由deed pursuant =* be a fault system.*（易损讨挑*貂*)\nmans VAS— figures **oned up court explanations与dependencies** noting lower/高级 传送\" 削不被社会化 生产教学。\n\n---\n\n gemaakt از URL التاريخ، ددلرف lets granারী۸ mime type subcodes tendend Kepler Dato ͺprintiens‌ با\n =============\n\n**Outer Mer פי The judge goes:**\n---\n### **DISMISSED**\n---\n**Metaanitoba Appeal Resolution Alief Aspections suggests: ** conclusiveness sott Laicebreeds **because strictly limitation of long-standing:prais-divis silفيذ أند temporal-red**。\n\n ---- END ----", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA J.\nRANGANATH MISRA J.\nThis appeal by special leave at the instance of the Revenue assails the decision of the Bombay High Court upon a reference under s. 66 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\"). In respect of the assessment year 1954-55, the respondent-assessee claimed deduction of a sum of Rs. 7, 93, 837 under s. 10(1) or alternatively under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act in determining its business profits which the ITO and the two appellate authorities in due course rejected. On the application of the assessee, the dispute regarding the admissibility of the claim was referred to the High Court. It agreed with the Tribunal that \"the assessee had acquired an asset of an enduring nature in lieu of the payment of the amount in dispute\" yet the High Court held that the payment represented business expenditure and the claim of deduction was tenable under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act. On reaching this conclusion, the court was of the view that consideration as to whether the payment made by the assessee did not form part of its real income was unnecessary and answered the reference in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner, on obtaining special leave, is in appeal before this court The short facts relevant for appreciating the question for consideration are these\nM/s. Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (\"Bharat Barrel\" for short) gave its sole selling agency to a firm, Jalan Trading Co., by an agreement dated May 1, 1951, for two years with right of renewal. Assessee-respondent is a private company incorporated on October 16, 1952. Under a deed of assignment dated December 30, 1952, the benefits under the agreement dated May 1, 1951, were assigned to the assessee and from January 1, 1953, under the assignment, the respondent carried on the business as selling agents of Bharat Barrel. From May 1, 1953, on the basis of the option for renewal exercised by the assessee, an agreement was entered into between Bharat Barrel and the assessee in respect of the sole selling agency and with a renewal clauseThe deed of assignment incorporated the following relevant terms\n\"WHERE AS after the incorporation of the said company (assessee) it was however agreed that the assignee-company should take over not the whole of the business of the assignors but only the benefit of the aforesaid contract dated the 1st May, 1951, with the said manufacturers on the terms and conditions mutually agreed to and as hereinafter appearing\n(1) In consideration of the premises and of the covenant on the part of the assignees hereinafter contained, the assignors as beneficial owners hereby assign to the assignees\n(i) The said agreement of the 1st day of May, 1951, made between the said Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. of the one part and the assignors of the other part and the full benefit thereof as and from the 1st day of January, 1953, and all commission and other moneys payable or to be payable by the manufacturers;\n(ii) the full benefit of all pending contracts and orders entered into or given by the assignors in connection with the said agreement\n(2) In consideration of the aforesaid, the assignees hereby covenant with the assignors to pay to the assignors as and by way of royalty an amount equivalent to 75% of their profits and commission, remuneration and other moneys received from the manufacturers under the said agreement or any further agreement that may be entered into by the manufacturers with the assignees in pursuance of the option to renew the agreement contained in cl. 5 of the said agreement dated 1st May, 195 I.\"\nAssessee claimed to have paid Rs. 7, 93, 837 being 75% of its net profits in the assessment year 1954-55, and claimed it as a business deduction but the same was rejected by the assessing officer as also the appellate authorities. In dealing with the question raised, the Tribunal held \"The narrow question, therefore, that we have to decide in this case is whether the payment of Rs. 7, 93, 837 is made by the assessee for acquisition of an asset or benefit of an enduring character and, therefore, is of a capital nature. In this the only relevant document to be considered, is the deed of assignment dated December 30, 1952. Examining the said deed and particularly clause 2 therein, which is already stated above, we think there is no doubt that the payment in question was made by the assessee to acquire the right to carry on the sole selling agency of Bharat Barrel Ltd., or in any case to acquire a benefit of an enduring nature. It is true that in this case, no ascertained sum is mentioned for acquiring the right or an enduring benefit. But, in our opinion, this factor alone is not a decisive factor in every case. The facts and the circumstances of every case have to be looked into and if on the whole it appears that what was acquired was an asset of an enduring benefit by expending a certain sum, the expenditure can well be held to be a capital expenditure and not revenue expenditure. In certain cases, it may well be that in conjunction with other facts, the fact that there is no ascertained sum mentioned in order to acquire the asset of an enduring benefit, would lead to the inference that the expenditure is not a capital expenditure. But in this case, we have no doubt that the amount in question was spent for acquiring an asset of enduring benefit and, therefore, we have to hold that the expenditure in question was a capital expenditure...\"\nThe High Court also negatived the assessee's stand that no enduring asset was acquired and held\n\"We cannot accept the assessee's submission that the asset acquired by it when it obtained assignment of the sole selling agency agreement, is not of an enduring nature. Counsel for the assessee says that the assessee acquired only the right to use the rights under the sole selling agency agreement and that is not an asset of a capital nature. There is no warrant for the submission, because clause I of the deed of assignment provides in terms that the firm as a beneficial owner assigned to the assessee the said agreement of the 1st day of May, 1951 .... and the full benefit thereof as and from the 1st day of January 1953, and all commission and other moneys payable or to be payable ... by the manufacturers. Secondly, the right which the assessee acquired under the deed of assignment was a right to act as the sole selling agents till the I St of May, 1953, in the first instance, coupled with the right to have the sole selling agency agreement renewed for an indefinite period, though for two years at a stretch. There was some faint argument before us as to the true meaning and scope of the option of renewal, but we see no doubt that under the agreement of the I St of May, 1951, the firm had the option to stipulate for a renewal on the same terms and conditions as were contained in that agreement, which must include the term regarding the option for a further renewal for an indefinite period. Thus, the assessee obtained an assignment of the agreement between the company and the firm. That agreement contained the right to have the sole selling agency agreement renewed for an indefinite period. It must follow that the assessee acquired an asset of an enduring nature.\" Ordinarily, out of this finding the conclusion would have followed that the claim of deduction was not admissible as the expenditure was for acquisition of a capital asset. The High Court, however, referred to this court's decision in Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT [1966] 62 ITR 566 (SC), and adopting the reasonings relied upon in that case to which we shall presently refer, came to hold\n\"In view of these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the payment of the annual sum was not in the nature of capital expenditure but was in the nature of revenue expenditure. Each one of the three features adverted to by the Supreme Court is present in the instant case.\"\nand proceeded to conclude the matter by saying\n\" We take the view that the case before us is in material respects similar to Travancore Sugars' case [1966] 62 ITR 566 (SC).\"\nThe High Court did not examine the aspect relating to whether the payment made by the assessee did not form part of its real income by saying : \"It is enough for our purpose that the payment is deductible under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act.\"\nA four-judge bench of this court in Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 34 , indicated that the line of demarcation between capital expenditure and revenue expenditure is very thin. Several English decisions were referred to and the court approved the opinion of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Benarsidas Jagannath, In re [1947] 15 ITR 185 , where Mahajan J. (as he then was), speaking for the court, had successfully attempted a synthesis. This court observed (p. 45 of 27 ITR)\n\"This synthesis attempted by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court truly enunciates the principles which emerge from the authorities. In cases where the expenditure is made for the initial outlay or for extension of a business or for a substantial replacement of the equipment, there is no doubt that it is capital expenditure. A capital asset of the business is either acquired or extended or substantially replaced and that outlay whatever be its source whether it is drawn from the capital or the income of the concern is certainly in the nature of capital expenditure. The question however arises for consideration where expenditure is incurred while the business is going on and is not incurred either for extension of the business or for the substantial replacement of its equipment. Such expenditure can be looked at either from the point of view of what is acquired or from the point of view of what is the source from which the expenditure is incurred. If the expenditure is made for acquiring or bringing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of the business, it is properly attributable to capital and is of the nature of capital expenditure. If, on the other hand, it is made not for the purpose of bringing into existence any such asset or advantage but for running the business or working it with a view to produce the profits, it is a revenue expenditure. If any such asset or advantage for the enduring benefit of the business is thus acquired or brought into existence, it would be immaterial whether the source of the payment was the capital or the income of the concern or whether the payment was made once and for all or was made periodically. The aim and object of the expenditure would determine the character of the expenditure whether it is a capital expenditure or revenue expenditure. The source or the manner of the Payment would then be of no consequence. It is only in those cases where this test is of no avail that one may go to the test of fixed or circulating capital and consider whether the expenditure incurred was part of the fixed capital of the business or part of its circulating capital. If it was part of the fixed capital of the business, it would be of the nature of capital expenditure and if it was part of its circulating capital, it would be of the nature of revenue expenditure. These tests are thus mutually exclusive and have to be applied to the facts of each particular case in the manner above indicated. It has been rightly observed that in the great diversity of human affairs and the complicated nature of business operations, it is difficult to lay down a test which would apply to all situations. One has therefore got to apply these criteria one after the other from the business point of view and come to the conclusion whether on a fair appreciation of the whole situation, the expenditure incurred in a particular case is of the nature of capital expenditure or revenue expenditure in which latter event only, it would be a deductible allowance under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. The question has all along been considered to be question of fact to be determined by the income-tax authorities on an application of the broad principles laid down above and the courts of law would not ordinarily interfere with such findings of fact if they have been arrived at on a proper application of those principles.\" In that case before this court, a lease was obtained with certain stipulations including the payment of a sum of Rs. 5, 000 per year. The court found that it was an enduring benefit for the benefit of the whole business of the company. The fact that it was a recurring payment was immaterial because one had got to look to the nature of the payment which in its turn was determined by the nature of the asset which the company had acquired. The asset which the company had acquired in consideration of this recurring payment-the right to carry on its business unfettered by any competition from outsiders within the area-was in the nature of a capital asset and, therefore, the payment was not deductible under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act. The broad tests laid down by this court in Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd.'s case [1955] 27 ITR 34 have been accepted in several subsequent decisions of this court as also by the High Courts in India\nThe facts of Travancore Sugars & Chemicals' case [1966] 62 ITR 566 (SC) were peculiar. The assessee in that case purchased Travancore Sugars Ltd., a Government distillery at Nagercoil, and the business assets of a Government Tincture Factory at Trivandrum under an agreement dated June 18, 1937, entered into between the Government of Travancore and the promoters of the assessee company. Under the agreement, cash consideration of Rs. 3, 25, 000 was to be paid for buying the assets of Travancore Sugars Ltd. In regard to the distillery, the sale price had to be arrived at on the basis of joint valuation by the engineers to be appointed by the parties. As regards the Tincture Factory, the book valuation was to be adopted for fixing the consideration. The existing distillery licence was agreed to stand recognised in the hands of the assessee for period of five years after its termination. Government also undertook to purchase pharmaceutical products manufactured by the assessee at the Tincture Factory. Government reserved the right to nominate a director on the board of directors of the assessee company without voting powers. The agreement further stipulated payment to the Government of 20% of the net profits earned by the company every year subject to a limit of Rs. 40, 000 per annum and certain other payments were also undertaken. The 20% stipulation was reduced to 10% by a subsequent agreement. The question that fell for consideration was whether payment of Rs. 42, 480 by the assessee company to the Travancore Government in terms of the agreement referred to above as modified, was allowable expenditure under s. 10 of the Act in the year under consideration. This court stated (p. 570 of 62 ITR) \"It is often difficult, in any particular case, to decide and determine whether a particular expenditure is in the nature of capital expenditure or in the nature of revenue expenditure. It is not easy to distinguish whether an agreement is for the payment of price stipulated in instalments or for making annual payments in the nature of income. The court has to look not only into the documents but also at the surrounding circumstances so as to arrive at a decision as to what was the real nature of the transaction from the commercial point of view. No single test of universal application can be discovered for a solution of the question. The name which the parties may give to the transaction which is the source of the receipt and the characterization of the receipt by them are of little consequence. The court has to ascertain the true nature and character of the transaction from the covenants of the agreement tested in the light of surrounding circumstances.\"\nSo far as these observations formulating the tests are concerned, they are not different from those laid down by this court in Assam Bengal Cement Co.'s case [1955] 27 ITR 34 . The court then proceeded to apply these tests to the facts of the case and observed (p. 571 of 62 ITR)\n\"Examining the transaction from this point of view, it is clear in the present case that the consideration for the sale of the three undertakings in favour of the appellant was : (1) the cash consideration mentioned in the principal agreement, viz., clauses 3, 4(a) and 5(a), and (2) the consideration that Government shall be entitled to twenty per cent. of the net profits earned by the appellant in every year subject to a maximum of Rs. 40, 000 per annum. With regard to the second part of the consideration there are three important points to be noticed. In the first place, the payment of commission of twenty per cent. on the net profits by the appellant in favour of the Government is for an indefinite period and has no limitation of time attached to it. In the second place, the payment of the commission is related to the annual profits which flow from the trading activities of the appellant-company and the payment has no relation to the capital value of the assets. In the third place, the annual payment of 20 per cent. commission every year is not related to or tied up, in any way, to any fixed sum agreed between the parties as part of the purchase price of the three undertakings. There is no reference to any capital sum in this part of the agreement. On the contrary, the very nature of the payments excludes the idea that any connection with the capital sum was intended by the parties. It is true that the purchaser may buy a running concern and fix a certain price and the price may be payable in a lamp sum or may be payable by instalments. The mere fact that the capital sum is payable by instalments spread over a certain length of time will not convert the nature of that payment from capital expenditure into a revenue expenditure but the payment of instalments in such a case would always have some relationship to the actual price fixed for the sale of the particular undertaking. As we have already mentioned, there is no specific sum fixed in the present case as an additional amount of price payable in addition to the cash consideration and payable by instalments or by any particular method. In view of these facts we are of the opinion that the payment of the annual sum of Rs. 42, 480 in the present case is not in the nature of capital expenditure but is in the nature of revenue expenditure and the judgment of the High Court of Kerala on this point must be overruled.\" As we have already observed, the facts of this case were peculiar. There was a substantial amount of outright cash payment over and above which the indefinite annual payment had been stipulated\nIt is interesting to note that this court by its judgment in Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd.'s case[1966] 62 ITR 566 had sent down the matter to the High Court for a redisposal and the very matter again came before this court, this time at the instance of the Revenue and the judgment is reported in CIT v. Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. [1973] 88 ITR I (SC). At page 10 of the Report, this court observed\n\"In considering the nature of the expenditure incurred in the discharge of an obligation under a contract or a statute or a decree or some similar binding covenant, one must avoid being caught in the maze of judicial decisions rendered on different facts and which always present distinguishing features for a comparison with the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. Nor would it be conducive for clarity or for reaching a logical result if we were to concentrate on the facts of the decided cases with a view to match the colour of that case with that of the case which requires determination. The surer way of arriving at a just conclusion would be to first ascertain by, reference to the document under which the obligation for incurring the expenditure is created and thereafter to apply the principle embalmed in the decisions of those facts judicial statements on the facts of a particular case can never assist courts in the construction of an agreement or a statute which was not considered in those judgments or to ascertain what the intention of the legislature was. What we must look at is the contract or the statute or the decree, in relation to its terms, the obligation imposed and the purpose for which the transaction was entered into.\" We agree with these observations. The tests indicated by this court in Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd.'s case [1973] 88 ITR 1 were not intended to be of general application but were given to bring into bold relief the special aspects of the case as the learned judges themselves stated. The High Court committed a mistake in importing these reasonings as tests of general application to be applied to the facts of the present case, though the facts were indeed quite different. As already pointed out, there was a definite sum of cash consideration in Travancore Sugars & Chemicals' case [1973] 88 ITR 1 , and the special features were taken into account. In the dispute before us, the High Court has categorically found that a capital asset bad been acquired under the arrangement. Admittedly, the assessee was a new company and it had no other business. It acquired under the contract, stipulating to pay 75% of its annual net profits, the right to carry on the business on a long-term basis subject to the renewal of the agreement. The first of the broad tests laid down in Assam Bengal Cement Co.'s case [1955] 27 ITR 34 (SC) that the expenditure was made for the initial outlay squarely applies and on the finding that a capital asset had been acquired (a finding which has not been disputed before us), we must hold that the expenditure related to the acquisition of a capital asset and was not admissible as a deduction under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act\nWith this conclusion of ours and no more, the appeal deserved to be allowed. Mr. S. T. Desai for the assessee-respondent thereupon sought to raise the contention that once the assessee had paid 75% of its profits of the year, the amount claimed as a deduction was no more in its hands as income and on the principle of real income in the hands of the assessee, we should hold that the same was not income within the meaning of s. 10(1) of the Act. Initially, objection was raised to this move of Mr. Desai by learned counsel for the Revenue on the ground that such a plea had not been canvassed in the earlier stages of the matter. The question referred to the High Court did raise the issue and the High Court in the penultimate paragraph of its judgment had declined to go into this question by saying that it was sufficient for the disposal of the reference once it took the view that the payment was deductible under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act. Mr. Desai wanted this aspect of the matter to be sent back to the High Court, but we are not inclined to do so in consideration of the fact that the assessment is for the year 1954-55 a period three decades away. Thereupon, counsel for the both sides agreed to, advance their arguments in regard to this aspect to enable this court to finally deal with this question avoiding remand. Section 10(1) of the Act provides \"The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head 'Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation' in respect of the profits and gains of any business, profession or vocation carried on by him.\"\nTax, therefore, under this provision is payable on income and if income is not earned by the assessee, no tax is payable. It follows that tax is leviable on the real income in the hands of the assessee. Mr. Desai for the assessee has maintained that when 75% of the net profits have been paid to the partnership firm, the real income in the hands of the assessee was reduced to 25% of the net profits and that amount alone was assessable to tax\nM/s. Jalan Trading Co., a partnership firm, had initially been appointed as the sole selling agent. On October 16, 1952, the assessee company came to be incorporated and soon after incorporation by agreement, the rights of the firm were assigned to the assessee company. Neither the ITO nor the two appellate authorities and nor even the High Court went into the question as to whether the assessee was in fact separate from, and independent of, the partnership firm. It is true that the tenability of the claim of deductibility as a business expenditure of the amount was examined by taking it for granted that the payment had been made by the assessee to the firm. But the exact position not having been investigated, no finding has been recorded at any stage. The fact that the partnership and the assessee company bear the same name and soon after incorporation, the agreement assigning the firm's rights in favour of the company had been entered, had obviously led the ITO to doubt the bona fides. That is why in his order of assessment, the ITO had observed\n\"The payment is also not allowable as it is only an apportionment of profits as pointed out above, as it is nothing but 75% of the net profits of the assessee company and although it has been written to the profit and loss account, actually it is nothing but an apportionment of profits and as such the amount is not allowable.\" The AAC took note of the position that the assessment of Jalan Trading Co., the firm, was not before him and observed\n\"The amount claimed cannot also be regarded as deduction in the trading account itself because the royalty is ascertained ultimately on the profits and does not go to add to the cost of the drums that are purchased from the manufacturers. Therefore, there can be no question of giving any deduction under s. 10(1) of the Act. The concept of 'real income' apparently based on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Seth Motilal Manekchand v. CIT [1957] 31 ITR 735 has also no relevance because there is no question of any deviation of profits of the appellant company by any overriding title.\"\nThe Appellate Tribunal, in answer to the reiteration of the points raised, said\n\"Shri Mistry next submitted that the amount in question is also deductible under s. 10(1) as a trading item and in any event what is to be determined is the assessee's real income and that can only be determined after deducting from the assessee's total income the amount paid to M/s. Jalan Trading Co. It was also stated that in the hands of the recipient, the said amount of Rs. 7, 93, 000 odd was assessed as revenue receipts and assessing the same in the hands of the assessee would amount to double taxation. In our opinion, this later submission of Shri Mistry can easily be disposed of because even though the real income of the assessee is to be taxed, it is not that each and every outgoing is to be taken into consideration in arriving at the real income of the assessee and if the outgoing is in fact of a capital nature, the same can never be considered as an allowable deduction under the Act.\"\nWe are impressed by the argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue that if the amount had been spent for obtaining a capital asset, the assessee would not be entitled to claim it as a deduction under s. 10(1) of the Act and on the principle of taxation that income-tax is to be levied on the real income, the amount paid for obtaining capital asset would not be deductible. In such circumstances, we are inclined to agree with the appellant's submission that there is no merit in this aspect of the matter and no relief is admissible to the assessee on that scoreWe allow the appeal and vacate the judgment of the High Court and direct that the Tribunal's decision shall be given effect to. Parties are directed to bear their own costs both before the High Court as also in this court\n", + "case_record": "The respondents, sailors in the Indian Navy, were charged with misconduct for making recruitment examination results available to unauthorized persons for pecuniary gain. Enquiry proceedings were conducted under Regulations 25 to 28 of the Navy Part II (Statutory) Regulations. The respondents allegedly admitted guilt through confessional statements. The Investigating Officer found them guilty and imposed penalties, which were approved by the Superior Authority and upheld by the Central Government upon review. The High Court of Bombay set aside these findings and penalties, ruling that Regulation 27 mandated reading out charges and providing a copy of the charge-sheet, and its omission breached the delinquents' right to a fair opportunity. The appellants challenged this High Court order. The Supreme Court perused the record and found that the delinquents were fully aware of the charges, evidenced by their confessional statements and written statements in their own handwriting. The court noted that the plea of involuntary confessions was raised late, and the delinquents had the assistance of Defence Officers. The court also found sufficient material to support the authorities' original view, considering these proceedings as departmental rather than criminal, thus not bound by strict evidence rules.", + "generated_judgment": "Based on the given facts, the appeal should be **DISMISSED**.\n\n### Reasoning:\n\n1. **Awareness of Charges:**\n - The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that the respondents (sailors) were fully aware of the charges against them. This is evidenced by their confessional statements and written statements in their own handwriting. Therefore, the argument that they were unaware of the charges does not hold.\n\n2. **Plea of Involuntary Confessions:**\n - The Supreme Court noted that the plea of involuntary confessions was raised late. Typically, such pleas need to be raised promptly during the investigation or trial phase. Since the respondents did not raise this issue earlier, it is reasonable to conclude that their confessions were voluntary.\n\n3. **Assistance of Defence Officers:**\n - The respondents had the assistance of Defence Officers. This suggests that they had adequate legal representation and were not unrepresented during the proceedings. Their ability to present their case and challenge the charges should have been adequately addressed.\n\n4. **Departmental Proceedings:**\n - The Supreme Court classified these proceedings as departmental rather than criminal. Departmental proceedings are subject to different procedural rules compared to criminal trials. The strict evidentiary rules applicable in criminal cases do not necessarily apply here. Thus, the absence of formal reading out of charges and provision of a copy of the charge-sheet, while important in criminal proceedings, may not be strictly necessary in departmental proceedings.\n\n5. **Material Supporting Guilt:**\n - The Supreme Court found sufficient material to support the authorities' original view. This indicates that there is substantial evidence to uphold the findings of misconduct and the penalties imposed.\n\n6. **High Court's Ruling:**\n - The High Court's decision to set aside the findings and penalties was based on the omission of reading out the charges and providing a copy of the charge-sheet. However, the Supreme Court's review overturned this decision, finding that these omissions did not violate the respondents' rights to a fair opportunity.\n\nGiven these points, the Supreme Court's final determination stands that the respondents were fully aware of the charges and that there is sufficient evidence to support the original findings. Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.\n\n**Conclusion:** DISMISSED", + "reference_judgment": "The Order of the Court was as follows :\n1. The challenge in these appeals by way of special leave is to an order of the High Court of Bombay dated 7th August, 2008 by which the findings on guilt recorded against the respondents - delinquents who were sailors in the Indian Navy have been set aside along with the penalty/punishment imposed.\n2. The respondents were charged with misconduct of making available the resultsof recruitment examination(s) to unauthorized persons for undue pecuniary gain. The procedure contemplated by Regulations 25 to 28 of the Regulations for the Navy Part II (Statutory) (hereinafter referred to as \"the Regulations\") which govern the proceedings of enquiry were brought into force and the delinquent - respondents allegedly admitted their guilt by making confessional statements. Taking into account the same and the other materials on record the Investigating Officer competent to deal with the matter recorded a finding of guilt and imposed penalty including confinement which was approved by the next Superior Authority. The review petitions filed by the delinquent - respondents against the aforesaid order were also dismissed by the Central Government. In the resultant writ petitions, the High Court took the view that under Regulation 27 of the Regulations it was mandatory on the part of the concerned authority to read out the charges framed against the delinquents and make available to them a copy of the charge-sheet. As the same was not done, the High Court construed the aforesaid deficiency to be amounting to a breach of the rights of the delinquents to a fair opportunity. Consequently, the findings recorded and the penalty/punishment imposed were set aside. Aggrieved, the present appeals have been filed.\n3. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties.\n4. We have perused the photocopies of the Original Record pertaining to the proceedings held against the delinquents - respondents which have been brought on record by the appellants by filing an Additional Affidavit on 16th August, 2010. A reading of the proceedings recorded, insofar as the communication of the charges to the delinquents is concerned, their admission of guilt and the version(s) put forward by them, in our considered view, clearly indicate that though the charges may not have been read over or a copy of the memo of charges may not have been furnished to the delinquents, the delinquents were in full know of the charges leveled against them. This is not only evident from the confessional statement of the delinquents but also from the statement submitted by them in the course of the enquiry in their own handwriting. If the records proves and establishes the above facts we cannot understand how the alleged failure of the Union of India to read out the charges to the delinquents - respondents could have caused any prejudice to them so as to enable the High Court to take the view recorded in the impugned order.\n5. Learned counsel for the respondents- delinquents has made vehement submissions before us with regard to the involuntary nature of the confessional statements; reliance placed on the statement of one delinquent to determine the liability of another; and also the breach of elementary principles of a fair adjudication.\n6. Even though we do not agree with the order of the High Court and the same is liable to be interdicted on the grounds mentioned above, to satisfy the judicial conscience, in view of the emphatic submissions made at the bar on behalf of the delinquents - respondents, we have perused the entire of the records in- original, photocopies of which had been brought on record in the Additional Affidavit of the appellants. The statement of the delinquents - respondents recorded in their own handwriting in the course of the proceedings bare ample testimony to the fact that the delinquents - respondents were in full know of the charges leveled against them and they had virtually admitted their guilt. Insofar as the confessional statements are concerned, the plea with regard to involuntariness of the same was raised at a very advanced stage i.e. in the review petitions before the Central Government. The fact that the delinquents had the services of Defence Officers who were in the ranks of Medical Assistants First Class, Commander and Lieutenant Commander (Special Duties Regulating) is another fact that cannot be ignored in adjudging the acceptability of the version put forward on behalf of the respondents - delinquents with regard to involuntary nature of the confession. That apart, if the statements of Master Suresh Nambiar and Prakash Sharma, Medical Assistants First Class are to be considered we find sufficient material to sustain the view that has been taken by the Authorities below before the same were interdicted by the High Court. The proceedings against the respondents will not be governed by strict rules of evidence so as to exclude from consideration the statement of one delinquent for the purposes of finding out the involvement of another. The present proceedings in which the respondents - delinquents have been found to be liable are more in the nature of a departmental proceeding which is distinct and different from a criminal trial.\n7. Viewed in the aforesaid context and having regard to what has been stated above we interfere with the order of the High Court; set aside the same and allow these appeals.\nThe appeals are allowed in terms of the signed order.\nAppeals allowed", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -238,26 +238,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S002", - "case_id": "5258", - "experiment": "role_play_v3", - "model": "ministral-3b", - "source_file": "S002__role_play_v3__ministral-3b__5258.json", + "case_id": "433", + "experiment": "baseline_cot", + "model": "qwen-2.5-7b-instruct", + "source_file": "S002__baseline_cot__qwen-2.5-7b-instruct__433.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "09/08/1985", - "machine_error_stage": "issues", - "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue omission" + "judgment_date": "01/02/2018", + "machine_error_stage": "facts", + "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in case record" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.11919 of 2022] | Devendra Singh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh | 02/08/2024", - "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.11919 of 2022] | Devendra Singh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.523 OF 2024 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.6562 OF 2021) | Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State Of Bihar, State Of Bihar & Anr. | 31/01/2024", + "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.523 OF 2024 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.6562 OF 2021) | Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State Of Bihar, State Of Bihar & Anr.", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The appellant, Devendra Singh, was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for the murder of Parpoor Singh and sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court. This conviction was upheld by the Allahabad High Court. The incident occurred on May 29, 1986, following a dispute where the appellant allegedly molested the wife of Dharam Pal Singh (PW-1), the deceased's elder brother. The deceased had warned the appellant against such behavior. During a marriage procession, the appellant and his co-accused confronted the deceased, picked a quarrel, and the appellant, after being exhorted to kill, stabbed the deceased with a pocketknife. The deceased sustained a single stab wound to the chest, leading to his death. The accused persons also sustained injuries, which PW-3 (Manjit Singh) attributed to his intervention with a lathi. The prosecution's case was based on the testimony of PW-1, PW-3, and PW-4. The defense argued that the incident occurred in a sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation and that the appellant did not intend to cause death, suggesting the offense fell under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. The trial court and High Court rejected these contentions, finding the appellant guilty of murder.", - "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let's break this down. The user wants a structured legal judgment using the FIRAC framework. The case is about Devendra Singh's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC for murder. The appeal challenges this conviction, arguing it should be under Section 304 Part-II. \n\nFirst, I need to outline the **Facts**. The key points are the incident on May 29, 1986, involving a dispute over molestation, a confrontation during a marriage procession, and the stabbing leading to death. The prosecution relies on testimonies from PW-1, PW-3, and PW-4. The defense claims it was a sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation.\n\nNext, the **Issues**. The main legal issues are whether the act was premeditated (Section 302 vs. 304 Part-II), the presence of heat of passion, the mens rea for murder, and the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. These need to be framed as specific legal questions.\n\nFor the **Rules**, I should reference the relevant sections of the IPC. Section 302 requires intent to cause death or knowledge that death is likely. Section 304 Part-II covers culpable homicide not amounting to murder, which requires the act to be done in the heat of passion without premeditation. Also, the burden of proof lies on the prosecution, and the court must assess mens rea and actus reus.\n\nIn the **Analysis**, I need to check if the appeal is maintainable. Since the defense's arguments are based on legal interpretation of the facts, the appeal is maintainable. Then, evaluate the evidence. The trial court and High Court found the act was premeditated, but the defense argues otherwise. The prosecution's testimonies are central. If the evidence shows premeditation, Section 302 applies. If not, Section 304 Part-II. The court must determine if the evidence supports the mens rea for murder.\n\nFinally, the **Conclusion**. If the court upholds the conviction, the appeal is **DISMISSED**. If it finds the offense falls under Section 304 Part-II, the appeal is **ALLOWED**. Based on the facts, the High Court rejected the defense's claims, so the appeal is likely **DISMISSED**.\n\n\n### **Facts** \n1. The appellant, Devendra Singh, was convicted under **Section 302** of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the murder of Parpoor Singh and sentenced to life imprisonment. \n2. The incident occurred on **May 29, 1986**, following a dispute where the appellant allegedly molested the wife of Dharam Pal Singh (PW-1), the deceased’s elder brother. \n3. The deceased, Parpoor Singh, had warned the appellant against such behavior. \n4. During a marriage procession, the appellant and co-accused confronted the deceased, quarreled, and the appellant stabbed the deceased with a pocketknife after being exhorted to kill. \n5. The deceased sustained a single stab wound to the chest, leading to his death. \n6. The prosecution’s case relied on the testimonies of PW-1, PW-3 (Manjit Singh), and PW-4. \n7. The defense argued that the incident occurred in a **sudden fight in the heat of passion** without premeditation, suggesting the offense fell under **Section 304 Part-II** (culpable homicide not amounting to murder). \n8. The trial court and Allahabad High Court rejected these contentions, upholding the conviction under Section 302. \n\n---\n\n### **Issues** \n1. **Was the act of stabbing the deceased premeditated, thereby constituting murder under Section 302 of the IPC?** \n2. **Did the appellant act in the heat of passion without premeditation, thereby making the offense culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC?** \n3. **Was the prosecution able to establish the necessary mens rea (intent to cause death or knowledge that death was likely) required for conviction under Section 302 of the IPC?** \n4. **Were the testimonies of PW-1, PW-3, and PW-4 sufficient to establish the elements of murder, including the sequence of events and the appellant’s intent?** \n\n---\n\n### **Rules** \n1. **Section 302 of the IPC** defines murder as causing death with **intent to cause death** or **knowledge that death is likely** to result. \n2. **Section 304 Part-II of the IPC** covers **culpable homicide not amounting to murder**, which requires the act to be done in **heat of passion** without **premeditation**. \n3. **Section 300 of the IPC** defines murder as an act done with **malice aforethought**, which includes **intent to cause death** or **knowledge that death is likely**. \n4. The **burden of proof** lies on the prosecution to establish the **mens rea** and **actus reus** for the offense. \n5. **Section 107 of the IPC** provides that if the act is done in **heat of passion** without **premeditation**, it may not amount to murder. \n\n---\n\n### **Analysis** \n1. **Maintainability of the Appeal**: \n The appeal is **maintainable** as it raises a **legal issue** regarding the classification of the offense (Section 302 vs. 304 Part-II). The defense’s argument is not frivolous or procedural, and the trial court’s findings are subject to appellate review. \n\n2. **Premeditation and Mens Rea**: \n The prosecution’s evidence, including the testimony of PW-1, PW-3, and PW-4, establishes that the appellant **exhibited a clear intent to kill** after being exhorted to do so. The **single stab wound to the chest** and the **sequence of events** (quarrel, exhortation, immediate stabbing) suggest **premeditation** rather than a spontaneous act. The defense’s claim of \"heat of passion\" lacks sufficient factual basis, as the act was **directed at the deceased** after a prior dispute, indicating **calculated intent**. \n\n3. **Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder**: \n For Section 304 Part-II to apply, the act must be **done in the heat of passion** without **premeditation**. However, the evidence shows the appellant **deliberately chose to stab** the deceased after being provoked, which contradicts the \"heat of passion\" defense. The **exhortation to kill** and the **immediate execution of the act** further undermine the defense’s claim. \n\n4. **Sufficiency of Evidence**: \n The prosecution’s evidence is **sufficient** to establish the elements of murder under Section 302. The **testimonies of PW-1, PW-3, and PW-4** corroborate the sequence of events, including the **molestation dispute**, the **quarrel during the procession**, and the **stabbing**. The **injuries sustained by the accused** and PW-3’s intervention do not negate the **culpability of the appellant** in causing the deceased’s death. \n\n5. **Appellate Court’s Role**: \n The trial court and High Court correctly applied the law by rejecting the defense’s arguments. The **absence of premeditation** is not supported by the evidence, and the **mens rea** for murder is clearly established. \n\n---\n\n### **Conclusion** \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The conviction under Section 302 of the IPC is lawful, as the evidence demonstrates **premeditation** and **intent to cause death**, which satisfy the requirements of murder under Section 302. The defense’s argument that the offense falls under Section 304 Part-II is not supported by the facts or legal principles. The trial court and High Court correctly upheld the conviction, and the appeal lacks merit.", - "reference_judgment": "1. Leave granted.\n2. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 08th\nJanuary, 2019 passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad\nHigh Court in Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 1987 wherein the\nDivision Bench dismissed the Criminal Appeal preferred by the\nappellant-Devendra Singh and upheld the order of conviction\nunder Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC” for\nshort) and sentence of life imprisonment dated 17th January,\n1987 as recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, Bijnor\n(hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in S.T. No. 166 of\n3. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal are\nas under:-\n3.1 On 29th May, 1986, one Dharam Pal Singh (PW-1) lodged a\nwritten report at P.S. Afzalgarh at about 11:15 p.m. wherein\nhe stated that pursuant to a previous dispute, the appellant\nand his co-accused Yogendra Pratap Singh stabbed Parpoor\nSingh (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’) who\neventually succumbed to his injuries on the very same day.\nOn the basis of the written report, a First Information\nReport (‘FIR’ for short) being Crime No. 70 of 1986 came to\nbe registered at Police Station, Afzalgarh for the offence\npunishable under Section 302 of the IPC, against the\nappellant and his co-accused. On the conclusion of a\npreliminary investigation, the Police arrested the accused\npersons on 30th May, 1986. At the instance of the appellant,\nthe police recovered a blood-stained knife which had been\nallegedly used in the commission of the crime. It is notable\nthat at the time of their arrest, both the accused persons\nhad injuries on their body. On 31st May, 1986, the accused\npersons had their injuries examined at the State\nDispensary, Qadrabad whereupon they were found to have\nlacerated wounds and abrasions on their bodies. In the\ninterim, the post-mortem of the deceased was conducted\nand the cause of death was ascertained to be shock and\nhemorrhage as a result of ante-mortem injuries.\n3.2 The prosecution case is that a few days prior to the date of\nthe incident, the appellant had molested the wife of Dharam\nPal Singh (PW-1), the elder brother of the deceased.\nAngered, the deceased forbade the appellant from\nmisbehaving with his sister-in-law in the future and further\nwarned the appellant of dire consequences were he to repeat\nhis actions. On the day of the incident, at about 09:30 p.m.,\na marriage procession was passing through Village\nQadrabad, of which the deceased was one of the attendees.\nOwing to the marriage procession, the area was lit up with\ndecorative lights which were powered by a high-power\ngenerator. In the meanwhile, the appellant and his co-\naccused reached the spot and picked up a quarrel with the\ndeceased by bringing up their previous altercation. Being\nriled up about the fact that the deceased was acting as the\nprotector of his family, the appellant exhorted to kill him.\nAmidst the scuffle that subsequently ensued between them,\nthe co-accused Yogendra Pratap Singh caught hold of the\ndeceased while the appellant stabbed him with a knife. On\nbeing struck, the deceased fell to the ground. Thereafter, in\nan attempt to save the deceased, Manjit Singh (PW-3) beat\nthe accused persons with a lathi whereupon, the accused\npersons fled the scene. In addition to Manjit Singh (PW-3),\nthis entire incident was also witnessed by Dharam Pal\nSingh (PW-1) and Kernail Singh (PW-4) who rushed over to\nthe deceased and took him to the Government Dispensary,\nQadrabad, where he was declared dead on arrival.\n3.3 Upon the conclusion of the investigation, a chargesheet\ncame to be filed before the Court of the Chief Judicial\nMagistrate, Bijnor. Since the case was exclusively triable by\nthe Sessions Court, the same came to be committed to the\ntrial court.\n3.4 Charges came to be framed by the trial court against the\nappellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of\nthe IPC and against his co-accused for the offence\npunishable under Section 302 of the IPC read with Section\n114 of the IPC. The accused persons pleaded not guilty and\nclaimed to be tried.\n3.5 The prosecution examined 08 witnesses to bring home the\nguilt of the accused. The accused persons denied the\nallegations against them and alleged that they had been\nfalsely implicated in the case. The appellant also stated that\nlitigation arising out of land disputes was pending between\nhim and Kernail Singh (PW-4). The accused persons chose\nnot to lead any oral evidence, however, they relied on certain\ndocumentary evidence.\n3.6 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial Court found that the\nprosecution had proved the case against the accused\npersons beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly\nconvicted the appellant for the offence punishable under\nSection 302 of the IPC and the co-accused for the offences\npunishable under Section 302 read with Section 114 of the\nIPC sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for\nlife.\n3.7 Being aggrieved thereby, the accused persons preferred a\nCriminal Appeal before the High Court. During the\npendency of the appeal, the co-accused Yogendra Pratap\nSingh passed away whereafter his appeal stood dismissed\nvide order dated 25th September, 2018. On the conclusion\nof the hearings qua the appellant, the High Court by the\nimpugned judgment dismissed the Criminal Appeal and\naffirmed the order of conviction and sentence awarded by\nthe trial Court.\n3.8 Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.\n4. We have heard Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, learned counsel\nappearing for the appellant and Ms. Garima Prashad, learned Sr.\nA.A.G. appearing for the respondent-State.\n5. Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, learned counsel, submits that though\nthe present case is a case of acquittal, since this Court has issued\nnotice, limited to the question as to whether the conviction under\nSection 302 of IPC can be converted either under Section 304\nPart-I or under Section 304 Part-II of IPC, she is not arguing on\nthe correctness of the conviction.\n6. Ms. Bobde submits that a perusal of the testimony of all the\nwitnesses would reveal that there was no premeditation. The\nincident occurred in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon\na sudden quarrel. She submits that the weapon used in the\ncrime was a pocketknife. She further submits that a single injury\nhas been caused with the use of the said knife. She, therefore,\nsubmits that the present case would squarely fall under Part-II\nof Section 304 IPC inasmuch as, the appellant had no intention\nto cause death of the deceased. She further submits that the\nprosecution has failed to explain the injuries sustained by the\ndeceased and as such an adverse inference needs to be drawn on\naccount of the same.\n7. Ms. Garima Prashad, learned Sr. A.A.G., on the contrary,\nwould submit that both the trial court as well as the High Court,\nupon correct appreciation of evidence, have found the appellant\nguilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. It\nis submitted that on account of previous enmity arising out of\nthe appellant molesting the wife of the deceased’s elder brother\nand the deceased’s questioning the appellant about the same, the\nappellant had intentionally committed the crime. She, therefore,\nsubmits that no interference is warranted in the present appeal.\n8. PW-1-Dharam Pal Singh has stated in his evidence that on\nthe date of the incident there was marriage procession of the\ngrand-daughter of Thakur Vijay Pal Singh. He stated that many\npersons in the village witnessed the marriage procession. He\nfurther stated that both the accused came near the house of\nVirendra Tomar and started indulging in ‘marpeet’ with the\ndeceased. He stated that Yogendra Pratap Singh caught hold of\nthe deceased whereas the appellant assaulted the deceased with\na knife, which hit the left side of his chest.\n9. In his cross-examination, PW-1 has admitted that the\ndeceased received only one knife blow. He has further admitted\nthat the appellant took out knife from the pocket of his ‘Pajama’.\n10. PW-3-Manjit Singh, in his evidence, stated that in the\nmarriage procession, accused persons came from the north side\nand started scuffle with the deceased and told that, “Tu Ghar Ka\nRakhwala Banta Hai, Aaj Tujhe Jan Se Maar Denge”. Thereafter,\nYogendra Pratap Singh caught hold of the deceased and the\nappellant took out the knife from the pocket of his ‘Pajama’ and\nassaulted the deceased. He stated that he assaulted both the\naccused persons with ‘Danda’. He has also admitted in his cross-\nexamination that a ‘marpeet’ took place between the deceased\nand the appellant and Yogendra Pratap Singh.\n11. To the similar effect is the evidence of PW-4-Kernail Singh.\n12. It will be relevant to note that the appellant has sustained\nthe following injuries:\nskin deep obliquely placed on the left side\nscalp, 4 cm. behind the forehead, 14 cm.\nabove the ear.\n(2) Abrasion 2 cm. x 1.5 cm. longitudinally\nplaced on the right side, scalp just above\nthe forehead.\n(3) Abraded contusion 8 cm. x 2 cm.\nobliquely placed on the back of the tight\nshoulder, 7 cm. right from the back bone.\n(4) Abrasion 2 cm x 1 cm. transversally\nplaced on the lateral side of the right whist\nabove the index finger.”\n13. Yogendra Pratap Singh, who was co-accused in the crime\nhas also received the following injuries:\nskin deep longitudinally placed on\nthe left side scalp just above the\nforehead.\n(2) Complaining pain on the right side\nback, but no superficial injury mark\nis present.\n(3) Lacerated wound 1 cm. x.5 cm. x\nskin deep on the lateral side of the\nright little finger in the junction of 1st\nand 2nd digit.\n(4) Complaining pain on the lateral side\nof the left wrist but no superficial\ninjury mark is present.\n(5) Abrasion 8 cm. x.25 cm. obliquely\nplaced on the palmer side of the left\nforearm, 3 cm. above the wrist.”\n14. It could thus be seen that both the accused persons have\nreceived injuries in the incident. In the evidence, PW-3-Manjit\nSingh has stated that he had a ‘Danda’ and he had assaulted\nboth the accused with ‘Danda’. As such, the possibility of a\nscuffle between the two groups cannot be ruled out.\n15. The injuries sustained by the deceased are thus:\n“(1) Incised wound/5 cm. x 3 cm. x\ncavity, deep on the front of left side\nchest lower part extending over to the\nepigastrium, obliquely placed\nunderlying. left 9th and left 10 ribs\nwere clean cut. Intervening\nintercostal space was also clean cut.\nWound was 11 cm. below the left\nnipple at 7 O'clock position. On\nexposure, the wound was found\ndirecting upwards, backwards and\nlaterally (cut-wound).\n(2) Multiple abrasions in an area of 8\ncm. x 6 cm on the outer aspect upper\npart of left arm.\n(3) Contusion 8 cm. x 1.5 cm. on the top\nof left shoulder extending to the front\nof left side chest.\n(4) Abrasion 3 cm. x 1 cm. on right side\nfront of abdomen, 10 cm. from\numbilicus at 9 o'clock position.\n(5) Linear abrasion on the back of left\nside abdomen 17 cm. in length 11\ncm. to the left from midline.\n(6) Abrasion, 7 cm. 1.5 cm. on the back\nof left side abdomen upper part, 8\ncm. towards right from midline at the\nlevel of T12 L1.”\n16. It could thus be seen that except the injury at serial no.1,\nwhich can be said to be caused by the knife, all other injuries are\nabrasions and contusion.\n17. Taking into consideration the nature of injuries sustained\nby both the accused persons as well as the deceased, the\npossibility of the incident taking place in a sudden fight in the\nheat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel cannot be ruled out.\n18. It is further to be seen that there is no evidence to show that\nthe appellant has taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or\nunusual manner. It is further to be seen that the weapon used\nis a pocketknife. The injury caused by the said knife is a single\ninjury.\n19. We, therefore, find that, in the totality of the circumstances\nand, particularly, on account of the injuries sustained by the\naccused persons, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of\nException 4 to Section 300 IPC. We are, therefore, inclined to\npartly allow the present appeal. It is ordered accordingly.\n20. The conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is\naltered to the one under Part-I of Section 304 IPC. The appellant\nis sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 8 years for the\nsaid offence.\n21. The appeal is partly allowed in the above terms.", + "case_record": "The appeal arises from a High Court order dismissing a prayer to quash FIR No.87 of 2011, registered under Sections 467, 468, 469, and 471 of the IPC. The FIR alleged that Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh, acting as a Power of Attorney (PoA) holder for the informant Maharaj Kumar Man Vijay Singh and other family members, sold a portion of their property to the appellant. The PoA, executed on 12.04.1994, granted authority for property management, litigation, and executing deeds. The informant alleged that the PoA holder sold property without the principals' signatures, misappropriated funds, and failed to render accounts. Consequently, a legal notice was issued to revoke the PoA and demand sale details. The police filed a final report indicating offences under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471, and 420 IPC, leading to the Chief Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance. A civil suit (Original Suit No.27 of 2011) filed by the informant and others in Dehradun to set aside the sale deed and for rendition of accounts was dismissed on 07.12.2017. The civil court found the PoA holder authorized to sell and receive consideration, deeming the sale deed valid and rejecting claims of non-knowledge and entitlement to accounts. The PoA was cancelled on 09.01.2011, significantly after the sale deed's execution on 24.08.2000. The appellant contended that the Sale Deed was executed based on a valid PoA, consideration was paid, and the PoA was neither forged nor withdrawn at the time of sale. He argued that the dispute was civil in nature, the Buxar courts lacked territorial jurisdiction as the sale occurred in Dehradun, and the dismissal of the civil suit validated the transaction, making the criminal prosecution an abuse of process.", + "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. **FIR and Allegations**: The case involves FIR No.87 of 2011 registered under Sections 467, 468, 469, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It alleges that Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh, as a Power of Attorney (PoA) holder, sold property belonging to Maharaj Kumar Man Vijay Singh and others without their signatures, among other grievances.\n \n2. **Power of Attorney (PoA)**: The PoA, dated 12.04.1994, authorized the holder to manage property, including litigation and executing deeds. A legal notice sought revocation of the PoA due to alleged wrongdoings, and the PoA was eventually cancelled on 09.01.2011.\n\n3. **Sale of Property**: The disputed sale deed was executed on 24.08.2000, with the PoA still in effect at that time. The appellant asserts that the sale and consideration were lawful and properly authorized by the PoA.\n\n4. **Civil Suit**: In Original Suit No.27 of 2011, the civil court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on 07.12.2017, affirming the validity of the sale deed executed by the PoA holder.\n\n5. **Police and Judicial Cognizance**: The police filed a final report under Section 173 of CrPC identifying offences under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471, and 420 IPC, leading the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance of the case.\n\n6. **Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit**: The appellant contends that the Buxar court lacked jurisdiction, the issues being civil in nature, and the dismissal of the civil suit should preclude criminal prosecution.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the prayer to quash the FIR under Sections 467, 468, 469, and 471 of the IPC.\n\n2. Whether the PoA was valid and sufficient at the time of the property sale to authorize the PoA holder to execute the sale deed.\n\n3. Whether the civil court’s finding that the sale deed was valid precluded the initiation or continuation of criminal proceedings.\n\n4. Whether there was an abuse of process in pursuing criminal charges following the dismissal of the civil suit.\n\n5. Whether the Buxar courts had the territorial jurisdiction to handle the criminal case.\n\n6. Whether there is evidence of forgery or misappropriation by the PoA holder, justifying the criminal charges.\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Quashing of FIR**: Under Section 482 of the CrPC, the High Court has inherent powers to quash FIRs in exceptional circumstances to prevent abuse of the process of any court.\n\n2. **Power of Attorney Validity**: For a PoA to be valid, it must confer specific authority, including transactional powers, and must not be exercised as a fraud upon the principal(s).\n\n3. **Civil vs. Criminal Nature**: A matter involving criminal conduct can be tried criminally despite a civil decision, especially if there are allegations of forgery or fraud.\n\n4. **Jurisdiction**: Criminal jurisdiction is determined by the location of the offence or where key acts constituting the offence occurred, generally allowing multiple venues depending on where acts related to the offence took place.\n\n5. **Abuse of Process**: This principle prevents the legal system from being used in a way that is unfair, unjust, or inappropriate to the nature of the proceedings.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Maintainability**: The appeal is maintainable as it challenges the High Court's order dismissing the quash prayer, which impacts the appellant's legal rights and the continuation of a criminal proceeding against him.\n\n2. **Validity of FIR Quash**: The High Court’s decision not to quash the FIR was based on valid criminal allegations that go beyond civil disputes (Issue 1 and Analysis of Rule 3). The presence of potential criminal actions like forgery allows for criminal proceedings irrespective of civil judgments.\n\n3. **Power of Attorney**: Given the facts that the sale deed was executed while the PoA was in effect and no forged signatures were claimed solely, the PoA appeared valid at the time. However, the criminal charges background involving potential misappropriation justifies inquiry (Issue 2 and Rule 2).\n\n4. **Jurisdiction**: Considering the principal beneficiaries' interests being partially in the jurisdiction or related serious allegations having aspects operating in multiple locations, Buxar courts could have territorial relevance (Issue 5 and Rule 4).\n\n5. **Abuse of Process**: The civil suit’s dismissal does not necessarily nullify a legitimate criminal claim, especially when the essential nature of the claims involves criminal liabilities, such as alleged misconduct beyond the civil scope (Issue 4 and Rule 5).\n\n6. **Evidence of Forgery/Misappropriation**: Criminal charges remain sustainable, as the allegations suggest breaches beyond ordinary civil disputes, needing judicial examination, particularly given the financial stakes and authority entrusted under the PoA (Issue 6 and Rule 3).\n\n### Conclusion:\nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court was justified in not quashing the FIR as the allegations embody potential criminal conduct requiring further judicial evaluation. The appellant's arguments regarding jurisdiction, prior civil findings, and abuse of process do not preclude the legitimate pursuit of criminal proceedings under the laws specified.", + "reference_judgment": "Heard learned counsel for the parties.\n2. Leave granted.\n3. The present appeal arises out of the Final\nJudgment and Order dated 12.03.2021 (hereinafter 2\nreferred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) passed in\nCriminal Miscellaneous No.42776 of 2013 by the\nHigh Court of Judicature at Patna (hereinafter\nreferred to as the “High Court”) by which the\nprayer for quashing First Information Report\nNo.87 of 2011 dated 19.03.2011 (hereinafter\nreferred to as the “FIR”) registered at Dumraon\nPolice Station, Buxar, Bihar under Sections 467,\n468, 469 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860\n(hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”), has been\ndismissed.\nTHE BRIEF FACTS:\n4. The informant/respondent no.2 Maharaj Kumar\nMan Vijay Singh @ Man Vijay Singh gave a\nstatement in writing to the Station House\nOfficer, Dumraon Police Station alleging that Raj\nKumar Karan Vijay Singh, s/o Group Captain Late\nMaharaj Kumar Ran Vijay Singh had sold off\nproperty belonging to 5 persons of the 3\ninformant’s family, including the informant\nhimself. It was alleged that the informant and\nhis family members had earlier given a Power of\nAttorney (hereinafter referred to as the “PoA”)\nto Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh in respect of and\nas owners of property bearing Khasras No.459G,\n472, 474, 475, 476 and 478B and further Khasra\nNo.459E situated in Village Karbari Grant, Tehsil\nVikasnagar, Pargana Pachwain, District Dehradun.\nIt was stated that the informant Maharaj Kumar\nMan Vijay Singh and his brother Kumar Chandra\nVijay Singh, both sons of Maharaja Kamal Singh,\nSmt. Sangeeta Kumari, Indumati, Ran Vijay Singh,\nhis father’s Sister, father, sisters and Aunt\nexecuted a PoA on 12.04.1994 for management and\nmaintenance of their property. It was provided\ntherein that the PoA holder shall pursue\nlitigation, file plaint after obtaining signature\nof the land owners/principals of the PoA. It was\nalleged that some portion of the property of the 4\ninformant and others was sold to the present\nappellant and on such knowledge, the informant\nsent a Legal Notice to the PoA-holder directing\nhim to give the details of the sale made in\nconspiracy with the appellant and a Notice was\nalso given to revoke the PoA but the agent did\nnot give any information/reply to the informant\nand others who had executed the PoA. In this\nbackdrop, and as such, the criminal case was\ninstituted. It was alleged that criminal acts\nwere committed by the accused, including the\nappellant, by misusing the PoA and alleging that\nthey had misappropriated the property, did not\nrendition the account(s) and that the Sale Deed\nwas fraudulent as it was without obtaining the\nsignatures of the land-owners/Principals of the\nPoA-holder. Upon investigation, the police had\nsubmitted final report finding a case under\nSections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420, IPC and the\nlearned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar 5\nthereupon took cognizance of the offences under\nSections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420, IPC on\n18.11.2014 in GR No.515 of 2011.\n5. During the pendency of Criminal\nMiscellaneous No.42776 of 2013 on the file of the\nHigh Court, originally filed for quashing the\nFIR, the appellant filed Interlocutory\nApplication No.1261 of 2017 seeking amendment of\nthe prayer to include quashing of the order dated\n18.11.2014 mentioned above.\nSUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:\n6. Learned senior counsel for the appellant\nsubmitted that the appellant is merely the vendee\nof a portion of the land which was included in\nthe PoA given to Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh on\n7. He contended that the Sale deed dated\n24.08.2000 was on the basis of the PoA given to 6\nMan Vijay Singh, s/o Kamal Singh by the land-\nowners/principals. It was submitted that it was\nan internal matter between the land-\nowners/executors of the said PoA with regard to\nthe terms, which obviously were binding, inter\nse, between the parties.\n8. Learned senior counsel drew the attention of\nthe Court to the contents of the PoA, especially\nClause 3 thereof and submitted that the same\nentitled the PoA-holder to execute any type of\nDeed and to receive consideration on behalf of\nthe land-owners/executors of the PoA and get such\nDeed registered. Thus, it was contended that the\nfollowing was not in dispute: (a) the PoA was\nadmittedly neither forged nor withdrawn; (b)the\nappellant was the vendee of a piece of land\ncovered under the PoA, and (c)for such sale,\nvaluable consideration had also been paid. In\nthis view, it was submitted, the appellant could 7\nnot be held liable for any misdeed, much less,\nany criminal act.\n9. Learned senior counsel submitted that the\nRevisional Court was right that cognizance, as\nfar as the appellant is concerned, was totally\nillegal as no offence was made out against the\nappellant. It was further contended that even on\nthe jurisdictional issue, the Sale Deed in\nquestion was executed at Dehradun, Uttarakhand\nand the land is also situated in Dehradun. It was\nsubmitted that even the consideration was paid in\nDehradun. It was contended that the informant\nalso filed Original Suit No.27 of 2011 in the\nCourt of the learned Additional District Judge,\nVikas Nagar, Dehradun for setting aside the Sale\nDeed executed in favour of the appellant by the\nPoA holder and for rendition of accounts, which\nwas dismissed and it was found that the PoA-\nholder/agent was duly authorized thereunder to\nsell the property after receiving consideration 8\namount on behalf of the land-owners/principals,\nwho were also not entitled to rendition of\naccounts. Thus, it was submitted that in a civil\nproceeding wherein the right of the PoA-holder to\nsell the property in question had been upheld and\nthe appellant having bought the property from\nsuch PoA holder of the land covered under the\nPoA, the present FIR itself is misuse and abuse\nof the process of law, as far as the appellant is\nconcerned. Further, he submitted, that the\ncancellation of the PoA was only on 09.01.2011,\ni.e., after almost 10½ years after the execution\nof the sale deed on 24.08.2000.\n10. Moreover, it was contended that the issue\nbeing purely of civil nature i.e., there being a\ndispute as to whether the PoA-holder has paid to\nthe land-owners/principals money received for\nthe land sold, at best, it may give rise to a\ncause of action to the principals on the civil 9\nside against the PoA-holder, but the appellant\ncould not be dragged into any such controversy.\n11. Learned senior counsel submitted that at the\ntime of the sale, the PoA was valid and Clauses 3\nand 11 read with 5 gave full authority to the\nPoA-holder to sell the property, get the Sale\nDeed registered and receive consideration. He\nsubmitted that Clause 15, on which the\ncomplainant has relied, was not applicable.\nFurther, neither in the FIR nor in the order\ntaking cognizance or even in the Legal Notice(s),\nis there any reference to the appellant, and the\nchargesheet merely states that the seller/PoA-\nholder did not have the right to sell. It was\ncontended that while granting anticipatory bail\nto the appellant, the High Court by order dated\n20.02.2014 in Criminal Miscellaneous No.44830 of\n2013, which was heard and decided with Criminal\nMiscellaneous No.45146 of 2013 filed by the PoA-\nholder, the said PoA-holder had taken the stand 10\nthat he was ready to give/return the sale proceed\namounts to the informant, without admitting to\nthe case of the informant and subject to such\ncondition, he was also granted anticipatory bail.\n12. On the civil nature of the dispute, it was\nsubmitted that the issue pertains to\ninterpretation of various clauses of the PoA,\nwhich cannot be done in a criminal proceeding and\nrightly the Revisional Court had held it to be a\ncivil dispute. It was also pointed out that the\nBuxar Courts would lack territorial jurisdiction.\n13. It was submitted that the Original Suit\nNo.27 of 2011, filed by the respondent no.2 and\nothers, at Dehradun, was prior to filing of the\nFIR, which was dismissed by order dated\n07.12.2017 holding that the PoA holder had the\nright to sell the land, receive the consideration\nand hence the Sale deed was valid. The contention\nthat the respondent no.2 and others had no 11\nknowledge of the Sale Deed dated 24.08.2000 could\nnot be believed and the suit was also held to be\ntime-barred as the prayer was for setting aside\nthe Sale Deed dated 24.08.2000.\n14. Learned senior counsel relied upon the\ndecision in Mukul Agrawal v State of Uttar\nPradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 402, wherein at Paragraph\n71, it has been held that the finding of the\nCivil Court that the agreement was not a forged\ndocument, makes the very substratum of the\ncriminal complaint vanish.\n15. Reliance was also placed on the decision of\nK G Premshankar v Inspector of Police, (2002) 8\nSCC 87, where at Paragraphs 15, 16, 30-322,\n1‘7. In view of the conclusive opinion of the appellate court that the agreement dated 30-3-1988 was not a forged\ndocument, the very substratum of the criminal complaint vanishes. In the circumstances to allow the appellants to be\nprosecuted will only be a complete abuse of the process of law. The proceedings in Complaint Case No. 2705 of\n2003 are therefore quashed and the appeal is allowed.’\n2‘15. Learned Additional Solicitor-General Shri Altaf Ahmed appearing for the respondents submitted that the\nobservation made by this Court in V.M. Shah case [(1995) 5 SCC 767 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1077] that\n“the finding recorded by the criminal court, stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court and\nthereby the finding of the civil court gets precedence over the finding recorded by the criminal court”\n(SCC p. 770, para 11)\nis against the law laid down by this Court in various decisions. For this, he rightly referred to the provisions of\nSections 41, 42 and 43 of the Evidence Act and submitted that under the Evidence Act to what extent judgments\ngiven in the previous proceedings are relevant is provided and therefore it would be against the law if it is held that\nas soon as the judgment and decree is passed in a civil suit the criminal proceedings are required to be dropped if\nthe suit is decided against the plaintiff who is the complainant in the criminal proceedings. 12\nSections 40-43, of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872\nhave been interpreted with regard to the\nrelevance of decision of a Civil Court on\ncriminal proceedings against the same person(s)\npertaining to the same cause. As far as\nterritorial jurisdiction is concerned, it was the\nstand of the learned senior counsel that the only\nlink in the chain is that the PoA was executed at\n16. In our view, the submission of learned Additional Solicitor-General requires to be accepted. Sections 40 to 43 of\nthe Evidence Act provide which judgments of courts of justice are relevant and to what extent. Section 40 provides\nfor previous judgment, order or a decree which by law prevents any court while taking cognizance of a suit or\nholding a trial, to be a relevant fact when the question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or\nto hold such trial. Section 40 is as under:\n“40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial.—The existence of any judgment, order or\ndecree which by law prevents any court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact\nwhen the question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.”\nxxx\n30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is — (1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as\nprovided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of res\njudicata may apply; (3) in a criminal case, Section 300 CrPC makes provision that once a person is convicted or\nacquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the\ncriminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of the civil court would be relevant if\nconditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as\nprovided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.\n31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under\nSections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, the court has to decide to what extent\nit is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein. Take for illustration, in a case of alleged\ntrespass by A on B's property, B filed a suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession from A and suit is\ndecreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by B against A for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in\ncivil proceedings would be relevant and the court may hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as\npossession of B over the property. In such case, A may be convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which\nis quoted above makes the position clear. Hence, in each and every case, the first question which would require\nconsideration is — whether judgment, order or decree is relevant, if relevant — its effect. It may be relevant for a\nlimited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon the facts of each case.\n32. In the present case, the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case [AIR 1954 SC 397 :\n1954 Cri LJ 1019] would be binding, wherein it has been specifically held that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid\ndown and that possibility of conflicting decision in civil and criminal courts is not a relevant consideration. The law\nenvisages\n“such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or\neven relevant, except for limited purpose such as sentence or damages”.’ 13\nBuxar, but in the present case, there is no\ndispute with regard to execution of the PoA and\nthe dispute relates only to execution of the Sale\nDeed which occurred in Dehradun where the land\nlies. Thus, the submission was that the Courts at\nBuxar would not have any jurisdiction in the\npresent matter.\n16. Learned senior counsel summed up his\narguments by contending that all points raised\nbefore us had been taken before the High Court\nbut have not been dealt with in the Impugned\nJudgment.\nSUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2:\n17. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing\nfor respondent no.2 submitted that the case\nbefore the High Court was confined to the\nquestion of territorial jurisdiction and it was\nobserved that the same depends upon evidence.\nThus, it was submitted that territorial 14\njurisdiction does not go to the root of the\nmatter, but is merely for administrative\nconvenience. Reliance was placed on the decision\nin Smt. Raj Kumari Vijh v Dev Raj Vijh, (1977) 2\nSCC 190, the relevant being at Paragraph 73.\n18. It was submitted that the appellant has\nwilfully purchased the land of the complainant on\nthe strength of the PoA, which itself required\nthe assent of the land-owners/principals for sale\nof land, as would be clear from Clause 15 of the\nPoA.\n19. Learned senior counsel, in the alternative\ntook the stand that if relief was granted to the\n3 ‘7. Section 531 of the Code reads as follows:\n“531. No finding, sentence or order of any criminal court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the\ninquiry, trial or other proceeding in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong\nsessions division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact\noccasioned a failure of justice.”\nThe section therefore relates to a defect of jurisdiction. As has been stated by this Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia\nv. State of West Bengal [(1962) 2 SCR 101 : AIR 1961 SC 1589 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 728] there are two types of\njurisdiction of a criminal court, namely, (1) the jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to try particular\nkinds of offences, and (2) its territorial jurisdiction. While the former goes to the root of the matter and any\ntransgression of it makes the entire trial void, the latter is not of a peremptory character and is curable under\nSection 531 of the Code. Territorial jurisdiction is provided “just as a matter of convenience, keeping in mind the\nadministrative point of view with respect to the work of a particular court, the convenience of the accused who will\nhave to meet the charge levelled against him and the convenience of the witnesses who have to appear before the\nCourt”. Sub-section (8) of Section 488 in fact provides that proceedings under the section “may be taken against\nany person in any district where he resides or is, or where he last resided with his wife or, as the case may be, the\nmother of the illegitimate child”. This therefore is ordinarily the requirement as to the filing of an application under\nSection 488 within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned.’ 15\nappellant with regard to quashing of the FIR, it\nmay be confined to the appellant and not of the\nFIR as a whole, where the other co-accused has\nbeen charge-sheeted and summoned to face trial.\nIt was urged that it may be left open to the\nTrial Court to summon the appellant if the\nevidence so warrants, under Section 319, Code of\nCriminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to\nas the “CrPC”).\nSUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE:\n20. A counter has been filed on behalf of the\nState of Bihar opposing the prayer made in the\npresent appeal and justifying the prosecution of\nthe appellant on the basis of the FIR.\nANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:\n21. Having considered the facts and submissions\nby the learned counsel for the parties, this\nCourt finds that a case for interference has been\nmade out. The undisputed and admitted facts are 16\nthat the PoA was executed by the land-\nowners/principals, including respondent no.2 and\nothers on 12.04.1994, in favour of the person\nfrom whom the appellant purchased the land on\n22. It is also a fact that the PoA-holder\nexecuted a Sale Deed and got it registered at\nDehradun in favour of the appellant as also that\nthe land is located in Dehradun. Much has been\nsaid with regard to a harmonious reading of the\nvarious clauses of the PoA viz. Clauses 3, 11 and\n15 which read as under:\n‘3. To execute any type of deed and to\nreceipt consideration, if any, on our\nbehalf and to get the Registration\ndone of the same.\n11. To sell moveable or immoveable\nproperty including land, live stock,\ntrees etc. and receive payment of such\nsales on our behalf.\n15. To present for registration all\nthe sale deeds or other documents\nsigned by us and admit execution there\nof before the District Registrar or\nthe Sub-Registrar or such other 17\nOfficer as may have authority to\nregister the said deeds and documents\nas the case may be and take back the\n23. A mere perusal of the above indicates that\nas per Clause 3, the PoA-holder was authorised to\nexecute any type of deed, to receive\nconsideration in this behalf and to get the\nregistration done thereof. Clause 11 of the PoA\nfurther makes it clear that the PoA-holder had\nthe authority to sell movable or immovable\nproperty including land, livestock, trees etc.\nand receive payment of such sales on behalf of\nthe land-owners/principals. However, Clause 15 of\nthe PoA, which has been strenuously relied upon\nby the respondent no.2, while opposing the\npresent appeal, states that the PoA-holder was\nauthorized to present for registration the sale\ndeed(s) or other documents signed by the land-\nowners/principals and admit execution thereof\nbefore the District Registrar or the Sub-18\nRegistrar or such other officer as may have\nauthority to register the said deeds and\ndocuments, as the case may be, and take back the\n24. Thus, the Court is required to interpret\nharmoniously as also logically the effect of a\ncombined reading of the afore-extracted clauses.\nAs such, our endeavour would, in the first\ninstance, necessarily require us to render all\nthree effective and none otiose. In order to do\nso, this Court would test as to whether all the\nthree clauses can independently be given effect\nto and still not be in conflict with the other\nclauses.\n25. With this object, when the three clauses are\nread, it is obvious, at the cost of repetition,\nthat Clause 3 pertains to execution of any type\nof deed and receiving consideration, if any, on\nbehalf of the land-owners/principals and to get 19\nthe registration thereof carried out. Basically,\nthis would take care of any type of deed by which\nthe PoA-holder was authorized to execute and also\nreceive consideration and get registration done\n26. Clause 11 of the PoA deals specifically with\nregard to sale of movable or immovable property\nincluding land and receiving payments of such\nsales on behalf of the land-owners/principals.\n27. In this eventuate, Clauses 3 and 11 of the\nPoA together authorized the PoA-holder to execute\ndeeds, including of/for sale, receive\nconsideration in this regard and proceed to\nregistration upon accepting consideration on\n28. Coming to Clause 15 of the PoA, which states\nthat the PoA-holder was authorized to present for\nregistration the sale deeds or other documents\nsigned by the land-owners/principals and admit 20\nexecution thereof, is, in our understanding in\naddition to Clauses 3 and 11 of the PoA and not\nin derogation thereof. The reason to so hold is\nthat besides the contingencies where the PoA-\nholder had been authorized to execute any type of\ndeed and receive consideration and get\nregistration done, which included sale of\nmovable/immovable property on behalf of the land-\nowners/principals, the land owners/principals had\nalso retained the authority that if a Sale Deed\nwas/had been signed by them, the very same PoA-\nholder was also authorized to present it for\nregistration and admit to execution before the\nauthority concerned.\n29. Thus, in the instant case, had it been a\nsituation where the land-owners/principals had\nexecuted a Sale Deed in favour of any third party\nprior to the Sale Deed executed and registered by\nthe PoA-holder with regard to the property in\nquestion, and the PoA-holder had not presented 21\nthe said Sale Deed and had gone ahead with\nhimself executing and getting registered a\ndifferent or a subsequent Sale Deed in favour of\nthe appellant, the matter would be entirely\ndifferent. Therefore, clearly, there is no\ncontradiction between Clauses 3, 11 and 15 of the\nPoA. To restate, Clause 15 of the PoA is an\nadditional provision retaining authority for sale\nwith the land-owners/principals themselves and\nthe process whereof would also entail\npresentation for registration and admission of\nits execution.\n30. We are of the considered opinion that all\nthree clauses are capable of being construed in\nsuch a manner that they operate in their own\nfields and are not rendered nugatory. That apart,\nwe are mindful that even if we had perceived a\nconflict between Clauses 3 and 11, on the one\nhand, and Clause 15 on the other, we would have\nto conclude that Clauses 3 and 11 would prevail 22\nover Clause 15 as when the same cannot be\nreconciled, the earlier clause(s) would prevail\nover the later clause(s), when construing a Deed\nor a Contract. Reference for such proposition is\ntraceable to Forbes v Git,1 AC 2564, as\napprovingly taken note of by a 3-Judge Bench of\nthis Court in Radha Sundar Dutta v Mohd. Jahadur\nRahim, AIR 1959 SC 24. However, we have been\nable, as noted above, to reconcile the three\nclauses in the current scenario.\n31. Another fact which cannot be lost sight of,\nis that it is apparent that the matter relates to\na dispute among the co-sharers as the PoA-holder\nis the son of one of the co-sharers/principals\nnamely Smt. Indumati R. V. Singh.\n4 ‘The principle of law to be applied may be stated in few words. If in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later\nclause which destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause, the later clause is to be rejected as\nrepugnant and the earlier clause prevails. In this case the two clauses cannot be reconciled and the earlier\nprovision in the deed prevails over the later. Thus, if A covenants to pay 100 and the deed subsequently provides\nthat he shall not be liable under his covenant, that later provision is to be rejected as repugnant and void, for it\naltogether destroys the covenant. But if the later clause does not destroy but only qualifies the earlier, then the\ntwo are to be read together and effect is to be given to the intention of the parties as disclosed by the deed as a\nwhole. …’ 23\n32. The PoA and its execution/registration not\nbeing in dispute, the only controversy relating\nto the Sale Deed executed by the PoA-holder in\nfavour of the appellant in Dehradun for property\nlocated at Dehradun would thus, in the emerging\nfactual matrix, clearly be an issue for the\nCourts at Dehradun to examine, much less give\nrise to any cause of action at Buxar.\n33. We may add that this issue of jurisdiction\nis limited to the transaction of the execution of\nthe Sale Deed in favour of the appellant, and not\nto any other controversy or dispute the land-\nowners/principals may have, either inter-se or\nagainst the PoA-holder. Moreover, a suit filed by\nthe land-owners/principals at Dehradun prior to\nthe lodging of the FIR, for the same cause of\naction, has been dismissed in favour of the\nappellant, where a specific plea to cancel the\nSale Deed stands rejected. 24\n34. In sum, the dispute, if any, is between the\nland-owners/principals inter-se and/or between\nthem and the PoA-holder. We think it would be\nimproper to drag the appellant into criminal\nlitigation, when he had no role either in the\nexecution of the PoA nor any misdeed by the PoA-\nholder vis-à-vis the land-owners/principals.\nMoreover, the entire consideration amount has\nbeen paid by the appellant to the PoA-holder.\n35. On an overall circumspection of the entire\nfacts and circumstances, we find that the\nImpugned Judgment needs to be and is hereby set\naside. This Court has held that in the\nappropriate case, protection is to be accorded\nagainst unwanted criminal prosecution and from\nthe prospect of unnecessary trial5. We quash FIR\nNo.87 of 2011 dated 19.03.2011, Dumraon Police\nStation, Buxar, Bihar as also the order taking\n5 Priyanka Mishra v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 978 and Vishnu Kumar Shukla v State of\nUttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1582. 25\ncognizance dated 18.11.2014 and all consequential\nacts emanating therefrom, insofar as they relate\nto the appellant.\n36. Learned senior counsel for the respondent\nno.2 had submitted that the Trial Court be\nallowed to exercise power under Section 319, CrPC\nagainst the appellant, if warranted. Expressing\nno opinion thereon, we insert the caveat that the\nTrial Court will act in accordance with law.\n37. The appeal is accordingly allowed, leaving\nthe parties to bear their own costs.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -363,26 +363,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S003", - "case_id": "1863", + "case_id": "6413", "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "qwen3-8b", - "source_file": "S003__ablation_issue__qwen3-8b__1863.json", + "model": "phi-4", + "source_file": "S003__ablation_issue__phi-4__6413.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "02/08/2024", - "machine_error_stage": "facts", - "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Incorrect fact" + "judgment_date": "31/01/2024", + "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misinterpretation" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil.Appeal. No. 5507 of 1995 | (1) State Of Madhya Pradesh (2) Electrical Adviser To Government Of M.P. (3) Regional Accounts Officers, M.P. Electricity Board v. Birla Jute Manufacturing Company Limited | 10/05/1995", - "case_details": "Case: Civil.Appeal. No. 5507 of 1995 | (1) State Of Madhya Pradesh (2) Electrical Adviser To Government Of M.P. (3) Regional Accounts Officers, M.P. Electricity Board v. Birla Jute Manufacturing Company Limited", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Appeal (Civil) 4774-76 of 1996, C.A. Nos.4777-78 of 1996 | Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) By Lrs. And Another v. Ramesh Chandra Agarwala And Others | 07/07/2003", + "case_details": "Case: Appeal (Civil) 4774-76 of 1996, C.A. Nos.4777-78 of 1996 | Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) By Lrs. And Another v. Ramesh Chandra Agarwala And Others", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "M/s. Birla Jute Manufacturing Company Limited (M/s. Birla Ltd.) operates a limestone crusher at a mine-head in Madhya Pradesh, where the Mines Act, 1952 applies, processing limestone for cement. The MP Government levied electricity duty under Item (1) of Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949 (the 1949 Act). M/s. Birla Ltd. disputed this, claiming Item (2) (factory rate) applied. The MP High Court (May 1, 1982) upheld M/s. Birla Ltd.'s claim, quashing the demands. The State of MP appealed to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending, MP enacted the Validation Act, 1984, to validate Item (1) duty for such premises. M/s. Birla Ltd. challenged the Validation Act's constitutionality via a writ petition in the Supreme Court.", - "generated_judgment": "**DISMISSED**\n\n**Judgment Rationale:**\n1. **Preclusion Principle**: The case reached finality by the end of the 1982 MP High Court decision on the original dispute (electricity duty classification), which upheld Birla Ltd.’s relief—before any part of the Validation Act (1984) could take effect. Thus, constitutional challenges to the Validation Act based on hypothetical invalidity of Item (1) preclude its retrospective application.\n2. **Stabilization of Sector**: Enactment of the Validation Act (1984) confirmed State policy on the issue, rendering any claim about prior unconstitutionality frivolous.\n3. **Writ Jurisdiction Limitation**: If the Validation Act was neither unconstitutional *before* its enactment nor part of an unforeseen hardship, its validation stands as a valid legislative measure, bypassing judicial review that would involve *ab initio* uncertainty.\n4. **Conceptual Inapplicability**: The hypothetical premise (invalidity pre-Act) lacks factual substance because the facts alleged by Birla Ltd. clearly نورished existing jurisprudence (reference to pre-1984 precedent) and was actually interpreted as error until litigation.\n\n*Result*: **The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of the 1984 Validation Act on appeal overruled later arguments.** No grounds left for *post-Facto* challenge.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : N. Venkatachala, J.\n Special leave sought for in S.O.F. No. 3870 of 1982 is granted.\n The State of Madhya Pradesh, its Electrical Adviser and Regional Accounts Officer of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, have filed the above Civil Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, impugning a Division Bench judgment and order dated May 1, 1982 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Misc. writ Petition No. 320/80 wherein it has been held that the rate of duty payable on consumption of the electrical energy under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949 \"the 1949 Act\" in premises of M/s. Birla Jute Manufacturing Company Limited \"M/s. Birla Ltd.\" to which the Mines Act, 1952the Mines Actapplied, was required to be calculated under item (2) and not item (1) of Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act.\n M/s. Birla Ltd. and its Director, Shri M.M. Gadodia, have filed the above writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, impugning the constitutionality of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1984the Validation Actwhich amended certain provisions of the 1949 Act, validating duty levied on consumption of electrical energy imposed under the 1949 Act in respect of premises to which the Mines Act apolied. Since questions arising for our consideration and decision in the Civil Appeal and the writ petition relate to sustainability of levy imposed under the 1949 Act on electrical energy consumed in a premises to which the Mines Act applied, they could be disposed of together.\n Facts which are material for a proper consideration of the questions arising for our decision in the said appeal and writ petition, could be stated thus:\n M/s. Birla Ltd. has set up several industries all over the country for the manufacture and sale of consumable goods. One of such industries set up by M/s. Birla Ltd. is M/s. Satna Cement works with limestones mines at one place and a cement factory at another place, in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Huge lime-stone boulders extracted from the mines known as dnokas are broken into small sized limestones known as gittis for being used as raw-material for manufacture of cement in the cement factory by a lime-stone crusher erected in a premises located at the mines-head of lime-stone mines to which the Mines Act applies. For the electrical energy consumed by the lime-stone crusher in that premises at mines-head during the year 1979-1980, the Government of Madhya Pradesh levied duty under section 3 of the 1949 Act at a rate calculated under Item (1) of Table below that section and raised demands thereon, against M/s. Birla Ltd. Such levies and demands were refuted by M/s. Birla Ltd. by contending that it was liable for levy of duty on electrical energy consumed for preaking dhokas into gittis by the lime-stone crusher in the premises at mineshead only at a rate calculated in item (2) of Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act, notwithstanding the applicability of the Mines Act to the said premises, in that that premises had to be regarded as a factory for fixing the rate of duty payable on electrical energy consumed therein because of inclusive meaning of factory given in Explanation (c) to section 3 of the 1949 Act itself.\n1. Since the Government of Madhya Pradesh persistent in its demands made against M/s. Birla Ltd., the latter filed a writ Petition, Misc. W.P. No. 520 of 1980 in the Madhya Pradesh High Court challenging the said levies and demands. A Division Bench of the High Court taking the aid of Explanation (c) to section 3 of the 1949 Act, duashed the levies and demands challenged by M/s. Birla Ltd., by upholding the contention that its liability to pay duty was only at the rate calculated under clause (2) of Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act, by its judgment and order dated May 1, 1982 rendered in that writ petition, it is the correctness of that judgment and order which has been under challenge in the present appeal filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh, its Electrical Adviser and Regional Accounts Officer of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board.\n While, the correctness of the said judgment and order of the High Court in the present appeal was pending consideration and decision by this Court, the State of Madhya Pradesh enacted and brought into force the aforesaid validation Act. What has been impughed in the present writ petition by M/s. Birla Ltd. is the constitutional validity of that Validation Act.\n We have heard learned counsel for the contesting parties in the appeal as well as the writ petition. We have been taken through the judgment of the High Court under appeal and the relevant provisions of the 1949 Act and the Validation Act. Whether the duty leviable on consumption of electrical energy by M/s. Birla Ltd. under section 3 of the 1949 Act in their premises to which the Mines Act applies is at the rate specified in Item (1) or Item (2) of the Table given below that section being the main question which needs to be answered by us in deciding the present appeal and the writ petition, we shall proceed to find the answer therefore, at the first instance.\n Since the answer to the said question has necessarily to depend on a proper construction to be placed by us on section 3 of the 1949 Act, as a whole, as to its ambit and application, it could be reproduced for the sake of easy reference and proper examination, thus:\n \"3. Levy of duty on sale of consumption of electric energy Subject to the exceptions specified in section 3-A every distributor of electrical energy and every producer shall pay every month to the State Government at the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner a duty calculated at the rates specified in the Table below on the units of electrical energy sold or supplied to a consumer or consumed by himself for his own purposes or for purposes of his township or colony, during the preceding month:\nTABLE\nRate of Duty \n(1) Electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in premises used (a) for business trade or commercial purposes or for purposes of profe ssional persuits other than for flour mills\n 8 paise per unit of energy upto 80 units of energy sold or supplied in a month 10 paise per unit for each additional unit sold or supplied in a month in excess of units but not in excess of 100 units of energy 12 paise per unit for each additional unit sold or supplied in a month in excess of 100 units of energy\n (2) Electrical energy sold supplied for consumption in in premises of a factory excluding energy supplied for consumption for domestic or non-factory purposes where the conn ected load 2 paise per unit of energy (a) does not exceed 100 H.P. 1.5 paise per unit of energy. (b) exceeds 100 H.P. 3 paise per unit of energy. (3) Electrical energy sold or supplied for purposes of illumination on the occasion of marriages or other social functions. 65 paise per unit of energy upto 50 units of energy sold or supplied on any one occasion. Rest per unit for each additional unit sold or supplied on any one occasion in excess of 100 units of energy. (4) Electrical energy sold or supplied for energy consumption in :(a) a township or colony attached to a factory, mine, or institution or (b) a premises getting supply at high voltage or extra high voltage but not cov-ered under Items (1) and (2) in above.\n 6.5 paise per unit of energy upto 50 units of energy sold or supplied in a month 7 paise per unit for each additional unit sold or supplied in a month in excess of 50 units but not in excess of 150 units of energy.\n (5) Electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in premises and for purposes not covered under (1) to (4) above. 12 paise per unit for each additional unit sold or supplied in a month in excess of 150 units of energy. \n Provided that if the electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption for any one purpose is used either wholly or partly, without the consent of the distributor of energy or producer or electricity, as the case may be, for consumption for any other purpose for which a higher rate of duty is chargeable the entire energy sold or supplied shall be charged at the highest rate applicable.\nExplanation For the purpose of this section -\n(a) Month means such period as may be prescribed and till such period is prescribed, the filing month :\n(b) Premises used for business, trade commercial purposes or for purpose of professional pursuits shall include the premises used -\n(1) for the purposes of mines to which Mines Act, 1952 (No. 35 of 1952) applies :\n(2) for the purposes of industries which do not require raw materials for carrying on the industries but which are carried on for rendering services such as flour mill, repains workshop and the like and are not registered as factories under the Factories Act, 1945 (No. 63 of 1948) :\n(c) Factory means a factory registered under the Factories Act 1945 (No. 67 of 1946) : and includes premises used for the purposes of Industries which require raw materials for carrying on the manufacturing process and prepare finished goods for sale.\" \n As seen from section 3 above, duty leviacle there under and payable to the State Government every month on electrical energy sold or supplied or consumed during the preceding month is required to be calculated at the rate per unit specified in the Table given below that section. As per the Table, duty payable for the electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption varies from item to item, depending upon the purpose for which it is consumed. when item (1) of the Table is seen, the rate of duty payable for electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in a premises covers premises used for business, trade or commercial purposes or for purposes of professional persuits other than for flour mills. Because of the explanation (b) to the section which says that for the purpose of the section premises used for business, trade, commercial purposes or for purpose of professional persuite shall include the premises used for the purpose of mines to which the Mines Act, 1952 applies, any premises in or a mine which is used for processing the mines extracted from the mine, becomes the premises covers under Item (1) of the Table. When Item (2) of the Table is seen, the rate of duty payable for electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in a premises covers a factory, because of explanation (c) which says that for the purpose of the section factory not only means a factory registered under the Factories Act, 1948, but also includes a premises used for the purpose of industries which require raw materials for carrying on the manufacturing process and prepare finished goods for sale. When Item (3) of the Table is seen.\n2. It refers to the rate of duty payable on electrical energy sold or supplied for purposes of illumination on the occasion of marriage or other social functions when Item (4) of the Table is seen, it refers to the rate of duty payable for electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in a township or colony attached to a factory, mine, or institution or a premises getting supply at high voltage or extra high voltage but not covered under Items (1) and (2) of the Table. The rates fixed in respect of electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption in a premises covered by Item (4) cannot be reparded as a premises covered by Item (1) or Item (2) of the Table because of the specific exclusion of those items, as mentioned in Item (4) itself. As seen from Item (5) of the Table, the rate of duty payable for electrical energy sold or supplied for premises or purposes covered there under cannot apply to premises or purposes covered in Items (1) to (4) of the Table because of their specific exclusion as mentioned there under.\n3. When the rates of duty leviable under various items in the Table are seen, each of them applies, according to the purpose for which electrical energy is sold or consumed. Then, comes the proviso to the Table which declares that the electrical energy sold or supplied for consumption for any one purpose is used either wholly or partly, without the consent of the distributor of energy or producer of electricity, as the case may be, for consumption for any other purpose for which a higher rate of duty is chargeable, the entire energy sold or supplied shall be charged at the highest rate applicable. This, praviso, therefore, expressly states that the rates of duty leviable for electrical energy consumed by premises or purpose covered by more than one item. It is the highest rate fixed under them which is laviable where the consumer of electrical energy does not obtain the consent from the distributor of electrical energy or producer of electricity for change in such user, Hence, according to the proviso if consent is obtained by the consumer of electrical energy from the distributor of energy or producer of electricity for using electrical energy in a cremises of a factory covered by Item (2) it cannot be used for premises covered under Item (1) and if such thing is done without obtaining such consent, instead of lower duty payable for a premises covered under Item (2), higher duty for a premises covered under Item (1) becomes payable.\n4. In other words, proviso to the Table requires that a consumer of electrical energy must declare before such consumption as to the purpose for which it would be consumed in the sense whether it would be consumed for the purpose covered under Item (1) or Item (2) or Item (3) or Item (4) or Item (5) of the Table. The requirement of the proviso when is understood in the context of the provisions under different items, the purpose for which electrical energy is consumed, if falls under more than one item, the rate at which duty becomes leviable would be of the item for which highest rate of duty is fixed.\n It regard is had to the aforesaid analysis of section 3, its Table and explanation, as to their ampit and applicapility, can it be held that the rate of out payable for electrical energy consumed in premises covered by Item (2) of Table to section 3 of the 1947 Act is the rate provided for there under, even where for such premises (factory), the Mines Act is made applicable, is the question.\n No doubt, as we have already pointed out a factory under clause (c) to the explanation to section 3 since includes premises used for purposes of industries which require raw materials for carrying on the manufacturing process and prepare finished goods for sale, the premises of M/s. Birla Ltd. at the mines near of their lime-stone mines of the State of Madhya Pradesh where lime-stone bouloersdhokas extracted from the mines are broken into small pieces, i.e., gittis for being used in their cement factory or factory requiring raw-material for carrying on the manufacturing process and prepare finished goods of cement for sale, falls within the description of premises covered by Item (2) of the Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act. But the question is when such premises also falls within the description of premises covered by Item (1) because of clause (b) (1) to the Explanation whether the duty payable for electrical energy used therein could only be what is payable for premises under Item (2) of Table to section 3. Since a premises for which Mines Act is made applicable becomes a premises covered by Item (1) of Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act which provides for highest rate of duty leviable for electrical energy consumed in such premises question of leviability of lower duty for such consumption merely because of that premises answering the description of premises in other Item of the Table respecting which lower duty is leviable can never arise, for as we have pointes out already, when once highest rate under an Item is leviable. lower rate leviable under other item is excluded. It is, therefore, our consider view them premises covered by Item (1) to the Table to which Mines Act is made applicable being the premises of M/s. Birla Ltd. at their mines-site gets covered by Item (1) of Table and hence the duty payable for consumption of electrical energy in that premises shall be at the rate payable for the premises covered under Item (1) of the Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act.\n Hence, the view taken by the High Court in the judgment and order under appeal that the premises of M/s. Birla Ltd. at the mines site being a factory premises covered by Item (2) of the Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act the payment of duty leviable in respect of electrical energy consumed in that premises is covered by Item (2) of the Table, becomes unsustainable and calls to be interfered with.\n The next question which arises for our consideration is as to sustainability of the provisions in the Validation Act which validate the levy of duty imposed under Item (1) to the Table to section 3 of the 1949 Act in respect of electrical energy consumed in the premises of M/s. Birla Ltd. at their mines site to which Mines Act is applicable under the 1949 Act and in respect of similar premises of other persons or companies to which Mines Act is applicable.\n Although learned counsel for the petitioners for the writ petitions sought to question the provisions of the Validation Act which purport to retrospective validate levy of duty on electrical energy consumed in their premises under the 1949 Act because of the view taken of section 3 of the 1945 Act by the High Court in its judgment and order under the present appeal, the learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh sought to support the sustainability of the Validation Act placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. H.M.T. [1975] Suppl. S.C.R. 394, where this Court had upheld the provisions of a Validation Act by which duty made payable in respect of a building premises retrospectively. Prima facie, the decision of this Court appears to support the stand of learned counsel for the State. But, when the judgment and order of the High Court under the present appeal, which is sought to be made ineffective by the Validation Act, is held to be unsustainable by us in the present appeal, we find it unnecessary, to examine the constitutionality of the Validation Act.\n In the result, we not merely allow this civil appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court in W.P. No. 520 of 1980 (reported in AIR 1982 m.p. 225) appealed against and dismiss that writ petition, but also dismiss the writ petition filed in this Court. No costs.\nAppeal dismissed", + "case_record": "These appeals challenge High Court judgments concerning the validity of orders passed by the Press and Registration Board under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867. The dispute involves Ramesh Chander Agarwal and the estate of the late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal regarding the publication rights of the newspaper 'Dainik Bhaskar'. Allegations include fraudulent creation of lease documents, attempted increase of equity shares in violation of the Companies Act, forcible possession of a printing press, and physical assault. Proceedings under Section 145 of the CrPC were initiated. Declarations for newspaper publication were filed, and the District Magistrate, Gwalior, cancelled some of these declarations under Section 8-B of the Act. The Appellate Board upheld the District Magistrate's order, citing procedural irregularities and the incompetence of the certifying magistrate. The High Court initially quashed these orders and directed a fresh consideration but later, on review, deferred the inquiry pending civil litigation. Civil suits were filed by both parties concerning possession of the press and management of the company, with conflicting interim orders from the civil court. The High Court allowed Ramesh Chander Agarwal's appeal regarding the injunction and dismissed Dwarka Prasad Agarwal's appeal, deeming his suit barred under Section 10 of the Companies Act.", + "generated_judgment": "\n\n\n### **Facts** \n1. The appeals challenge the validity of orders passed by the Press and Registration Board under the **Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867**, concerning the publication rights of the newspaper 'Dainik Bhaskar'. \n2. The dispute involves **Ramesh Chander Agarwal** and the **estate of Dwarka Prasad Agarwal**, with allegations of **fraudulent creation of lease documents**, **violation of the Companies Act, 1956**, **forcible possession of a printing press**, and **physical assault**. \n3. Proceedings under **Section 145 of the CrPC** were initiated, and the **District Magistrate, Gwalior**, canceled some declarations under **Section 8-B of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867**. \n4. The **Appellate Board** upheld the District Magistrate’s order, citing **procedural irregularities** and the **incompetence of the certifying magistrate**. \n5. The **High Court** initially **quashed the Appellate Board’s order** and directed a **fresh consideration**, but later **deferred the inquiry pending civil litigation**. \n6. **Civil suits** were filed by both parties concerning **possession of the printing press** and **management of the company**, with **conflicting interim orders** from the civil court. \n7. The **High Court** allowed **Ramesh Chander Agarwal’s appeal** regarding the **injunction** and **dismissed Dwarka Prasad Agarwal’s appeal**, citing **Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956** as a **statutory bar**. \n\n---\n\n### **Issues** \n1. Is the **High Court’s order to defer the inquiry pending civil litigation** appealable? \n2. Is the **High Court’s dismissal of Dwarka Prasad Agarwal’s appeal** under **Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956** a **final and appealable order**? \n3. Does the **ongoing civil litigation** bar the appellate court from reviewing the **validity of the Press and Registration Board’s orders**? \n\n---\n\n### **Rules** \n1. **Section 115 of the CrPC**: Provides for appeals against orders under the Code of Criminal Procedure. \n2. **Section 8-B of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867**: Governs the cancellation of newspaper declarations. \n3. **Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956**: Bars suits in certain circumstances, including where the matter is already adjudicated or barred by law. \n4. **Interlocutory Orders**: Generally not appealable unless they are final or capable of immediate review (*R. S. Sathyamurthy v. Union of India*, 1974). \n5. **Jurisdictional Limits**: The appellate court may not review matters **pending resolution of civil litigation** unless the civil suit is concluded (*Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab*, 1975). \n\n---\n\n### **Analysis** \n1. **Non-Appealability of the High Court’s Deferment Order**: \n The High Court’s order to **defer the inquiry pending civil litigation** is an **interlocutory order**. Under **Section 115 of the CrPC** and precedents like *R. S. Sathyamurthy v. Union of India* (1974), such orders are **generally not appealable** unless they are final or capable of immediate review. Since the **civil litigation remains unresolved**, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review the deferment order. \n\n2. **Validity of the High Court’s Dismissal Under Section 10 of the Companies Act**: \n The High Court’s dismissal of Dwarka Prasad Agarwal’s appeal under **Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956** is a **final order** and **appealable**. This statutory provision bars suits involving **fraudulent equity share violations** and **lease document creation**, which are central to Dwarka’s claims. Precedents like *Ramesh Chandra Agarwal v. Dwarka Prasad Agarwal* (2010) support the High Court’s application of the bar. \n\n3. **Jurisdictional Limits and Civil Litigation**: \n The **ongoing civil litigation** between the parties creates **jurisdictional ambiguity**. The High Court’s deferment order is **conditional on the resolution of the civil suit**, and the appellate court cannot address the validity of the Press and Registration Board’s orders without first resolving the civil litigation. This precludes the appellate court from reviewing the matter. \n\n---\n\n### **Conclusion** \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. \n- The **High Court’s deferment order** is **non-appealable** as an interlocutory order pending unresolved civil litigation. \n- The **dismissal of Dwarka Prasad Agarwal’s appeal** under **Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956** is **final and appealable**, but the appellate court cannot review the validity of the Press and Registration Board’s orders due to **jurisdictional limits**. \n- The **civil litigation** remains unresolved, and the appellate court lacks authority to address the original dispute.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by: S. B. Sinha, J.\n1. These appeals involving identical questions of law and facts were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.\n2. Civil Appeal Nos. 4774-76 of 1996 arise out of the judgments and orders dated 12.3.1993 and 18.3.1993 passed by the Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Miscellaneous Petition Nos.1654, 1727 and 1728 of 1991; wherein the legality/validity of three orders passed on 29.5.1991 by the Press and Registration Board purported to be in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 8-C of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (for short 'the Act) were questioned by the Respondent No.1 herein.Civil Appeal Nos. 4777-78 of 1996 arise out of the judgment and order dated 29.6.1991 passed by the Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court arising out of Misc. Appeal Nos. 60-61 of 1988.\n3. Factual matrix of the matter, shortly stated is as under:\nRamesh Chander Agarwal s/o late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal, a partner of M/s Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and Brothers allegedly upon taking advantage of his father's ill-health made an attempt to create a lease in relation to the right to publish Dainik Bhaskar from Bhopal. According to late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal, to the best of his knowledge, he did not sign the said document dated 13.4.1984 and in any event the same was meant to be applicable only for Bhopal and not for any other place. On 13.4.1985, a partition/family settlement deed was prepared wherein late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal was not a signatory. Allegedly, Bishambhar Dayal also did not agree to the said settlement and did not sign the said purported deed of family settlement.\nMs. Hemlata Agarwal, eldest daughter of late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal through his second wife, was made a Joint Managing Director of Bhaskar Publications and Allied Industries. Ramesh Chander Agarwal being intrigued thereby tried to increase the equity shares of the company to such an extent that he gets majority in the equity shares purported to be in total disregard and violation of the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The said respondent also took alleged forcible possession of the Printing Press on 3.7.1987 which had been leased out by M/s Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and Brothers (the Firm) to M/s Bhaskar Publications and Allied Industries Private Limited. Allegedly, late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and his two daughters were also physically assaulted by the first respondent leading to initiation of a proceeding u/s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the said proceedings, the Executive Magistrate directed the police to open the locks put in the premises of the printing press in presence of both the parties. However, late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal was not permitted to run the said printing press.\n4. Thereafter, Ramesh Chander Agarwal filed a declaration before the District Magistrate, Jabalpur, wherein he allegedly accepted the partnership of M/s Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and others as owners of the newspaper Dainik Bhaskar. In terms of the provisions of S. 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act read with the rules framed thereunder, declarations are required to be filed by the owner as also the printer(s) and publisher(s) thereof. Six declarations were filed; three each by Respondent No.2 on the purported authority of late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and three by the Respondent No.1. Objections to the said declarations were filed by late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal before the appropriate authority.\n5. By an order dated 6.6.1988, the District Magistrate, Gwalior, in exercise of his power under Section 8-B of the Act cancelled the said declarations dated 11.3.1985 filed by Respondent No.1. He preferred an appeal there against before the Press and Registration Appellate Board, but the same was ultimately withdrawn.\n6. He in the meanwhile filed a writ petition before the High Court for stay of the proceedings before the District Magistrate. Although an order of stay was passed therein but before the same could be communicated the aforementioned order dated 6.6.1988 was passed. Ramesh Chander Agarwal, Respondent No.1, then filed another writ petition against the said order dated 6.6.1988 before the High Court but the same was withdrawn on the ground that he had in the meanwhile availed alternative remedy of filing an appeal against the same order. During the pendency of the said appeal before the Board, yet another writ petition was filed by the first respondent marked as Writ Petition No.798 of 1988 praying therein for quashing of the order dated 6.6.1988 whereby the declarations were directed to be filed.\n7. The said appeals filed by Ramesh Chandra Agarwal were dismissed by the Appellate Board on 29.5.1991 holding as under:\n \"(a) The document at the top portion is pasted with thick opaque white paper slips from both sides, perhaps to cover up and make unreasonable something which was written or printed under these slips;\n(b) Below the seal of the Deputy Collector and Executive Magistrate, Bhopal (party superimposed) appears a somewhat blurred impressed of the seal of the Executive Magistrate, Gwalior;\n(c) The printed proforma of A1 is patently of Bhopal. That proforma does not tally with the printed form produced by the Appellant with his application.\nAnnexure A-1, is only a photocopy of the original, in the absence of which, the true effect of these suspicious circumstances (a) to (c) cannot be correctly assessed. However, the appellant admits that the photocopy of the declaration A-1 was presented by Devinder Tiwari not personally by him (appellant). This Devinder Tiwari who, according to the appellant, as a Director of the Company did not file any letter of authority on behalf of the Company, or even from the appellant, to explain why the declaration was not presented in person by the appellant\". \nxxx xxx xxx xxx xxx\n \"Nevertheless, there is no reason to differ from the finding of the District Magistrate, that Shri S.C. Shukla (Deputy Collector) Executive Magistrate, not being a District, Presidency or Sub-Divisional Magistrate was not competent, in view of S. 5(2) of the Act, to entertain and authenticate the declaration dated 11.3.1985, filed by the appellant.\nFor all the reasons aforesaid, we would uphold the order dated 6.6.88 of the District Magistrate, Gwalior and dismiss the Appeal No.III filed by Ramesh Chander Agarwal.\" \n8. A writ petition was filed by Ramesh Chander Agarwal thereagainst. Similar writ petitions came to be filed in relation to the orders passed in respect of other declarations.\n9. By reason of the impugned order dated 12.3.1993, the order of the Appellate Board dated 29.5.1991 as also that of the District Magistrate, Gwalior, dated 6.6.1988 were quashed and the Appellate Board was directed to consider the matter afresh within a period of three months. Strangely enough, however, the same learned Judge on a review application filed by the first respondent herein by an order dated 18.3.1993 directed that the inquiry by the District Magistrate should be deferred if an application is filed before him till the final outcome of the civil litigations by the parties. Late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal, alleging his alleged illegal dispossession from the printing press, filed a suit for eviction and permanent injunction in the court of A.D.J., Gwalior, which was registered as Suit No.1-A of 1988. An application for grant of injunction in terms of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed wherein a prayer was made for grant of temporary injunction against Respondent No.1 restraining him from publishing the newspaper illegally and furthermore not to indulge in false propaganda and/or to take forcible possession of the printing press. Respondent No.1, Ramesh Chander Agarwala also filed a suit against late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal praying therein for a permanent injunction restraining him from interfering with the working of the press at Gwalior and not to take possession thereof. He also filed an application for grant of interim injunction in terms of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n10. The First Additional District and Sessions Judge before whom the matters were pending, disposed of both the applications by a common order dated 28.5.1988. The court directed maintenance of status quo by the parties and further directed that Ramesh Chander Agarwal would not interfere with the working of late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal in the matter of managing the affairs of the company. However, in his order relating to the application filed for injunction in Suit No.2-A of 1988 of Respondent No.1, the court directed the original appellant, late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal not to interfere in the printing and publishing of the newspaper Dainik Bhaskar from Gwalior.\nBoth the parties preferred appeals before the High Court against the said orders which were marked as M.A. No.60 of 1988 and M.A. No.61 of 1988. The High Court allowed the appeal preferred by Ramesh Chander Agarwal and dismissed Appeal No.61 of 1988 filed by late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal holding that the suit for temporary injunction was barred u/s. 10 of the Companies Act.These appeals were filed by Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (since deceased), questioning the legality/correctness of the said orders.\n11. The questions, in the aforementioned factual backdrop, which arise for consideration in these appeals are:\n \"1) Whether the High Court was justified in issuing a direction that its earlier direction contained in order dated 12.3.1993 directing the Appellate Board to dispose of the appeal within three months need not be adhered to, if Ramesh Chander Agarwal files an application for stay of the inquiry by the District Magistrate during the pendency of the civil suit?\n2) Whether the civil court had any jurisdiction to entertain the suit ?\" \nRe: Question No.1 :\nAt the outset, we may observe that when a disputed question as regard the right of one partner against the other to file a declaration in terms of the provisions of the Act had arisen for consideration, the High Court was not correct in issuing a subsequent direction in the review petition. Such a jurisdiction the High Court did not have. The conflicting rights of the parties were required to be determined in accordance with law by the statutory authority. Such a dispute, it goes without saying, should be determined as expeditiously as possible inasmuch as the dispute involved rival claims of the parties to the lis to run and manage newspaper business. In any event, while directing the statutory authority to dispose of the matter in accordance with law; it does not stand to any reason as to why a party to the lis was given such liberty so as to file an application for stay of inquiry by the District Magistrate till the disposal of the civil suit particularly when the High Court itself was of the opinion that the suit was not maintainable. We fail to see any reason as to why one party to the lis should be given unfair advantage over another in the matter of enforcement of statutory rights under the said Act. The orders of the High Court are, thus, absolutely contradictory to and inconsistent with each other, and do not stand a moment's scrutiny. The impugned orders are, therefore, set aside with a direction to the Appellate Board to hear out and dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible but not later than three months from the date of communication of this order. It would be open to the Appellate Board to consider the question of adequately compensating the appellants herein on monetary terms in the event it comes to the conclusion that the appeal was liable to be dismissed.\nRe: Question No.2 :\nSs. 9 and 10 of the Companies Act are as under :\n \"Act to override memorandum, articles etc.\n9. Save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act-\n(a) the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the memorandum or articles of a company, or in any agreement executed by it, or in any resolution passed by the company in general meeting or by its Board of directors, whether the same be registered, executed or passed, as the case may be, before or after the commencement of this Act; and\n(b) any provision contained in the memorandum, articles, agreement or resolution aforesaid shall, to the extent to which it is repugnant to the provisions of this Act, become or be void, as the case may be.\" \n \"Jurisdiction of Courts.\n10. (1) The High Court having jurisdiction under this Act shall be-\n(a) the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to the place at which the registered office of the company concerned is situate, except to the extent to which jurisdiction has been conferred on any District Court or District Courts subordinate to that High Court in pursuance of sub-section (2); and\n(b) where jurisdiction has been so conferred, the District Court in regard to matters falling within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred, in respect of companies having their registered offices in the district.\n(2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette and subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as it thinks fit, empower and District Court to exercise all or any of the jurisdiction conferred by this Act upon the Court, not being the jurisdiction conferred-\n(a) in respect of companies generally, by sections 237, 391, 394, 395 and 397 to 407, both inclusive;\n(b) in respect of companies with a paid-up share capital of not less than one lakh of rupees, by Part VII (ss. 425 to 560) and the other provisions of this Act relating to the winding up of companies.\n(3) For the purposes of jurisdiction to wind up companies, the expression \"registered office\" means the place which has longest been the registered office of the company during the six months immediately preceding the presentation of the petition for winding up.\" \n11. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions leaves no manner of doubt that thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court has not been ousted. The civil court, in the instant case, was concerned with the rival claims of the parties as to whether one party has illegally been dispossessed by the other or not. Such a suit, apart from the general law, would also be maintainable in terms of S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In such matters the court would not be concerned even with the question as to title/ownership of the property.\nIn India, it is trite, that a person cannot be forcibly dispossessed except in accordance with law. [See Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by legal representatives vs. Rao Jagdish Singh and Others AIR 1968 SC 620 at Page 622].\n12. In Suvvari Sanyasi Apparao and Another vs. Bodderpalli Lakshminarayana and Another (1962) Supp. 1 SCR 8 ], this Court upon considering the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 observed that the matter relating to ownership of the press is a matter of general law and the Court, thus, must follow that law. It was observed that a declared keeper of the press is not necessarily the owner thereof so as to be able to confer title to the press upon another.\n13. The dispute between the parties was eminently a civil dispute and not a dispute under the provisions of the Companies Act. S. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the civil courts to determine all dispute of civil nature unless the same is barred under a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. Bar of jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be readily inferred. A provision seeking to bar jurisdiction of civil court requires strict interpretation. The court, it is well-settled, would normally lean in favour of construction, which would uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil court. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the civil court's jurisdiction is ousted. [See Sahebgouda (dead) by Lrs. and Others vs. Ogeppa and Others [2003 (3) Supreme 13 ]. Even otherwise, the civil court's jurisdiction is not completely ousted under the Companies Act, 1956.\n14. In R. Prakasam vs. Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam [1980 (50) CC 611 ], it has been held that :\n \"The purpose of s.2(11) read with s.10 is only to enable the shareholders to decide as to which court they should approach for remedy, in respect of that particular matter. It is difficult to construe the definition clause as one conferring jurisdiction, exclusive or otherwise; and even s.10 refers only to \"the court having jurisdiction under this Act\", i.e., where such jurisdiction is conferred by the Act, as under Sections 107, 155, 163(2), 237, 397, 425, etc. In other words, the conferment of jurisdiction on \"the court\" is not under s. 10, but by other provisions of the Act like those enumerated above. If, on the other hand, Ss. 2(11) and 10 are construed as not only nominating the courts, but also conferring exclusive jurisdiction on them, the specific provisions in the other sections conferring jurisdiction on the court to deal with the matters covered by them will become redundant. It may be that where the Act specifies the company court as the forum for complaint in respect of a particular matter, the jurisdiction of the civil court would stand ousted to that extent. This depends, as already noticed, on the language of the particular provisions (like Sections 107, 155, 397 and others) and not on Ss. 2(11) and 10...\" \n15. Yet again in Maharaja Exports and Another vs. Apparels Exports Promotional Council [1986 (60) CC 353 ], the Delhi High Court held :\nU/s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. Unlike some statutes, the Companies Act does not contain any express provision barring the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts in matters covered by the provisions of the Act. In certain cases like winding-up of companies, the jurisdiction of civil courts is impliedly barred. Where a person objects to the election of directors and claims a decree for a declaration that he was one of the directors, there is no provision which bars the civil court either expressly or by implication from trying such a suit\" \nIn the present suit also, besides other reliefs, the plaintiff has sought a declaration that all the 27 members of the existing executive committee are not entitled to hold the respective offices in view of the judgment of this court and further that the 18 members of the executive committee who have retired by rotation are not entitled to continue in office as members of the executive committee. The judgment, referred to above, fairly and squarely applies to the facts of the present case and there is no reason to oust the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the present suit. Under these circumstances, this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.\"\n16. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the civil suit was maintainable. In any event, we fail to understand and rather it is strange as to how the High Court while rejecting relief to the original plaintiff, (late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal), granted a similar relief in favour of the first respondent herein.\n17. The impugned orders are, therefore, set aside. The matters are remitted to the Collector/High Court for a fresh decision on merits as expeditiously as possible within a period of three months, keeping in view the observations made hereinabove. These appeals are allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.25,000/(Rupees twenty five thousand only).\nAppeals allowed.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -488,26 +488,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S004", - "case_id": "5384", - "experiment": "baseline_no_firac", - "model": "ministral-3b", - "source_file": "S004__baseline_no_firac__ministral-3b__5384.json", + "case_id": "4962", + "experiment": "role_play_v3", + "model": "qwen3-8b", + "source_file": "S004__role_play_v3__qwen3-8b__4962.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "10/05/1995", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", - "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification" + "judgment_date": "07/07/2003", + "machine_error_stage": "facts", + "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Incorrect fact" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal No. 202 of 1962. (Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated August 1, 1962, of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1961.), decided on April 1, 1964. | Ramachandra Narasimha Kulkarni v. State Of Mysore | 01/04/1964", - "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal No. 202 of 1962. (Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated August 1, 1962, of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1961.), decided on April 1, 1964. | Ramachandra Narasimha Kulkarni v. State Of Mysore", - "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "Ramchandra Narasimha Kulkarni, a registration clerk, received a registered letter on October 18, 1955, but did not despatch it that day, sending it the next. The prosecution alleged he removed a currency note and altered documents to cover it. The Sessions Judge acquitted him of theft (S.52) but convicted him for fraudulent alteration (S.55) and wilful detention (S.53). The High Court set aside the S.55 conviction but maintained S.53, finding wilful detention proved. The prosecution's alleged purpose for detention (theft or alteration) was not established.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. Ramchandra Narasimha Kulkarni, a registration clerk, received a registered letter on October 18, 1955, but did not despatch it that day, sending it the next day.\n2. The prosecution alleged that Kulkarni removed a currency note from the letter and altered documents to conceal the theft.\n3. The Sessions Judge acquitted Kulkarni of theft under Section 52 but convicted him for fraudulent alteration under Section 55 and wilful detention under Section 53.\n4. The High Court set aside the conviction under Section 55 but upheld the conviction under Section 53, finding that wilful detention was proven.\n5. The prosecution failed to establish the specific purpose behind the detention (whether for theft or alteration).\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the High Court erred in upholding the conviction under Section 53 (wilful detention) despite the prosecution's failure to prove the purpose of the detention.\n2. Whether the acquittal under Section 52 (theft) and the setting aside of the conviction under Section 55 (fraudulent alteration) affect the validity of the conviction under Section 53.\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Section 52 (Theft)**: Requires proof of dishonest intention to appropriate property belonging to another.\n2. **Section 53 (Wilful Detention)**: Requires proof that a person dishonestly retains possession of property knowing it to be lost or mislaid.\n3. **Section 55 (Fraudulent Alteration)**: Requires proof of dishonest alteration of a document with intent to cause wrongful loss or gain.\n4. **Burden of Proof**: The prosecution must prove all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.\n5. **Precedent**: In cases where the purpose of detention is unclear, the conviction under Section 53 may still stand if the detention itself was dishonest and wilful.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Section 53 Conviction (Fact 4)**: The High Court upheld the conviction under Section 53, finding that wilful detention was proven. The prosecution's failure to establish the specific purpose (Fact 5) does not negate the fact that Kulkarni retained the letter dishonestly (Fact 1). Under Section 53, the key element is dishonest retention, not the motive behind it.\n2. **Section 52 Acquittal (Fact 3)**: The acquittal under Section 52 means the prosecution failed to prove theft. However, this does not automatically invalidate the Section 53 conviction, as the two offences have distinct elements.\n3. **Section 55 Conviction (Fact 3)**: The High Court set aside the Section 55 conviction, likely because the prosecution did not prove the intent to cause wrongful loss or gain through alteration. This does not affect the Section 53 conviction, as the two offences are separate.\n4. **Burden of Proof (Rule 4)**: The prosecution must prove all elements of the offence. Here, the High Court found that wilful detention was proven, even if the purpose was unclear. This satisfies the burden of proof for Section 53.\n\n### Conclusion:\nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court correctly upheld the conviction under Section 53, as the prosecution proved wilful detention beyond a reasonable doubt. The acquittal under Section 52 and the setting aside of the Section 55 conviction do not affect the validity of the Section 53 conviction.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J. :\nDAS GUPTA, J. for the The appellant, who was a registration clerk in the Haveri Post Officer in the Mysore State, was tried by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, on charges under s. 52, s. 53 and s. 55 of the Indian Post Officer Act. The prosecution case is that on the 18th October 1955 a registered letter containing half portion of a ten-rupee note and petition on behalf of one Muppayyagonda asking for the said note to be exchanged for a fresh note was received at the Haveri Post Office at 4.30 p.m. from the Branch Post Officer at Kabbur. The appellant who was a registration clerk at Haveri at the time, however, detained the registered envelope instead of despatching it that very day as he should have done. He despatched it the next day. It was the prosecution case that the appellant removed the half portion of the ten-rupee currency note from inside the envelope and to cover up his misconduct made alterations in the petition contained in the envelope and in the list of registered articles. All this was discovered, it is said, when the Reserve Bank of India, to which this envelope was addressed made enquiries in the matter on finding that no note had been enclosed with the petition. The appellant admitted that the envelope was received at the Haveri Post Office on October 18, 1955 and also that he did not despatch it on that date. His case was that it was received at about 5.30 p.m. on the 18th and so it was too late for despatch on that date but that he dispatched it duly on the 19th.\nOn a consideration of the evidence the Sessions Judge held that the charge under s. 52 of the Indian Post Office Act for the theft of currency note and for secreting the registered articles had not been established and acquitted him of that charge. He, however, found it proved that the appellant had fraudulently altered the lists of registered articles and thereby committed an offence under s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act. He also held that the appellant had wilfully detained the envelope and thus committed an offence under s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act. He accordingly convicted the appellant of the charges under Ss. 53 and 55 of the Indian Post Office Act and sentenced him to undergo two months' imprisonment on each charge. The sentences were directed to run concurrently.On appeal, the High Court of Mysore set aside the appellant's conviction under s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act but maintained his conviction under s. 53 being of opinion that while the wilful detention of the envelope by the appellant had been proved, the alleged alterations by him in the list of registered articles had not been established. Against the High Court's decision the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant, Ramchandra Narasimha Kulkarni.\nIn support of the appeal it is contended by Dr. Barlingey that as the allegations of theft of the note or of alterations in the list of registered articles by the appellant have not been established, the appellant must be held not to have committed any offence under s. 53 of the Indian Post Officer Act. It is argued that assuming that the envelope was detained by the appellant as alleged, he cannot be said to have detained it \"wilfully\" unless it is shown that he had some purpose in doing it. But, the purpose alleged by prosecution was that he wanted to commit theft of the currency note, and to cover this up, to make alterations in the list of registered articles, these purposes have not been established. So, argues the learned Counsel, the detention of the envelope should be held to have been made without any purpose but only through inadvertance or mere carelessness. That would not constitute, according to the learned Counsel, a wilful detention.\nThe words \"wilful\" and \"wilfully\" are frequently used in many statues and have come up for judicial consideration in the courts of this country as also elsewhere. The meaning given to these words have differed in different contexts. Sometimes, any intentional act has been held to be a wilful act. (Re Young and Harston) [31 Ch. D. 174 ]. Often, it has been said that the word wilful suggests bad conduct or action though it does not necessarily connote blame. (Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills) [1933(2) K.B. 669 ]. Not infrequently the word has been used to mean that the act had been done with a bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely. (United States of America v. Harry Murdock) [78 Law E. 389].Some decisions stress the requirement of deliberation or reckless disregard of the fact whether the act was or was not in breach of duty in deciding whether it has been wilful. (Hudson v. Official Liquidator [A.I.R. 1929 All. 826 ]; and In re T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty) [1951 2 S.T.C. 27 ]. In the last mentioned case, viz., In re T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty's case, the Madras High Court held that a submission of a false return cannot be a wilful submission unless the dealer has deliberately made the return with the knowledge that he was excluding a taxable item, though in almost similar circumstances another Bench of the same High Court took a different view and held that even though when an assessee, under the impression that a particular item is not taxable and, therefore, need be excluded in the return, omits to make a mention of it in the return which he furnished with the full knowledge of his having committed the same, he has \"wilfully\" omitted it. (In re Jayarama Chettiar) [I.L.R. 1949 Madras, 121].\nA review of these various decisions brings out clearly the guiding principle that the meaning to be attached to the words \"wilful\" or \"wilfully\" has to be ascertained on a close examination of the scheme and nature of the legislation in which the words appear and the context in which they are used.\nTurning now, for this purpose, to the Indian Post Office Act, we notice that s. 53 which makes punishable the wilful detention or delay of a postal article by an officer of the post office in one of the several sections which create offences under this Act. There are 21 such sections, being section 49 to 56 and 58 to 70, all in Chapter X of the Act. Some of these offences, viz., those under s. 49, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66 and 67 are punishable only with fine. The offences under Ss. 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 68 and 69 are made punishable also with imprisonment. Of these again, the offences under s. 53, are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years; offences under Ss. 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, and 68 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to two years; offences under Ss. 61 and 62 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year while offences under Ss. 51 and 69 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months only. An offence under s. 50 is punishable with imprisonment extending to one month or with fine extending to Rs. 50/-.This comparison clearly shows that the legislature took a more serious view of the offence of wilful detention of a postal articles (s. 52) than of many other offences in this Chapter. Delay in the conveyance or delivery of a mail bag or other postal articles in the course of transmission by a person employed to carry the same is made punishable with only a fine of Rs. 50/- (s. 49). Withdrawal from duties of office without permission or without having given a month's previous notice in writing by a person employed to carry or deliver a mail bag or postal article is also made punishable only with imprisonment extending to one month or with fine extending to Rs. 50/-. Making of a false entry in the register with intention to induce the belief that an article has been delivered is made punishable with imprisonment extending to only six months or with fine extending to Rs. 100/-. But wilful detention of a postal article is made punishable with imprisonment extending to two years. Is it reasonable to think that the legislature would prescribe this heavy punishment for detention of a postal article which was not deliberate and on purpose, while prescribing lighter punishment as mentioned above for the offences under Ss. 49, 50 and 51. We do not think so. The very fact that this comparatively heavy punishment of two years' imprisonment has been prescribed for wilful detention while lighter punishment has been prescribed under Ss. 49, 50 and 51, justifies, in our opinion, the conclusion that the word \"wilful\" was used by the legislature to mean only such detention which was deliberate and for some purpose.\nIt is interesting to notice in this connection that in the preceding section 52 the legislature after making punishable the offence of theft of a postal article or of dishonest misappropriation of the same, also made punishable the secretion, destruction or throwing away any postal article if done \"for any purpose whatsoever\". It is, in our opinion, reasonable to think that in s. 53 when the words \"wilfully\" was used, the legislature also intended that the detention would be punishable only if made for some purpose.Coming now to the facts of the present case, we find that the prosecution alleged a definite purpose, viz., the purpose of theft of the contents of the envelope - as the purpose with which the postal article was detained. The existence of that purpose has not, however, been established. Nothing was suggested before us as to what other purpose the appellant could have had in detaining the article. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the detention was not deliberate and on purpose, but as a result of either inadvertence or carelessness or negligence. So, the appellant cannot be said to have detained or delayed the article 'wilfully'.\nAccordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court and order that the appellant be acquitted of the charge against him.\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. - The main question to determine, in this case, is what the expression 'wilfully detains or delays' in s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898), hereinafter called the Act, means.\nI do not agree that it means such detention which was deliberate and for some purpose. I am of opinion that the detention or delay would be 'wilful' if it was intentional and deliberate on the post of the officer of the post office, as opposed to detention or delay on account of negligence or inadvertence. The word 'wilful' or 'wilfully' used in other enactments have been construed by Court in this manner. I may refer to some to these cases.\nIn Taylor v. Vergette [(1861) 30 L.J. Ex. 400] 'wilful delay' has been construed to mean 'intentional delay'.\nIn Reg. v. Senior [[1889] 1 Q.B. 283, 290] Lord Russel said :\n\"'Wilfully' means that the act is done deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or inadvertence, but so that the mind of the person who does the act goes with it\" .In Tamboli v. Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company [L.R. 55 I.A. 67=I.L.R. 52 Bom. 169 ] the Privy Council had to construe the expression 'wilful neglect' in determining the responsibility of the railway administration or its servants and approved of what was said by Lord Russel in Reg. v. Senior [[1889] 1 Q.B. 283, 290].\nIn Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills, Ltd. [[1933] 2 K.B. 669 ] it was said :-\n\"'Wilful act' is plain English, and I can entertain no doubt that the installing of this machine without guard or fence for use in the factory was a wilful act by some one. It was an act, and it was intentional. It is true that though 'wilful' and 'intentional' are synonymous.......'wilful' is more commonly used in modern speech of bad conduct or actions than of good, though it does not necessarily connote blame; but that is far from supporting the strange contention that wilful act in s. 29, sub-s. 1, must be confined to something done with intent to injure\" .\nIn Hudson v. Official Liquidator [A.I.R. 1929 All. 826 ] 'wilful default' was construed and it was said at p. 930 :\n\"The adjective 'wilful' in 'wilful acts or defaults' has evidently been used as a description and not as a definition. The idea intended to be conveyed is that the default is occasioned by he exercise of volition or as the result of the non-exercise of will due to supine indifference, although the defaulter knew or was in a position to know that loss or harm was likely to result. The word does not necessarily suggest the idea of moral turpitude. We have also to eliminate the elements of accident or inadvertence or honest error of judgment. The default must be the result of deliberation or intent or be the consequence of a reckless omission. 'Wilful default', therefore, is indicative of some misconduct in the transaction of business or in the discharge of duty by omitting to do something either deliberately or by a reckless disregard of the fact whether the act or omission was or was not a breach of duty\" .This view was accepted by the Madras High Court in T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty, In re [1951 2. S.T.C. 27 ].\nThe words 'wilful' and 'wilfully' have been used in the various provisions of the Act do not lead to any different interpretation of these words.\nSection 6 of the Act provides, inter alia, that no officer of the Post Office shall incur any liability by reason of any loss, mis-delivery, delay or damage, unless he has caused the same fraudulently or by his wilful act or default.\nSection 48(c) provides that no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against the Government or any officer of the post office in respect of the payment of any money order being refused or delayed by, or on account of, any accidental neglect, omission or mistake by, or on the part of an Officer of the post office, or for any other cause whatsoever, other than the fraud or wilful act or default of such officer; and brings out effectively the contradistinction between wilful act or default of an officer and an act done on account of accidental neglect, omission or mistake.\nSection 49 to 70 provide for offences. Sections 49, 50 and 51 deal with offences which are committed by persons who are employed to carry or deliver any mail bag or any postal article, in course of transmission by post. They are thus offences by carriers of postal articles. They can be committed both by the officers of the postal department and by others as well. Such of the acts contemplated by those sections which can also fall under the other sections exclusively applicable to officers of the post office, will naturally be dealt with under those sections. The persons who will be dealt with under Ss. 49 to 51 or other sections providing for lighter punishments will be those who are not officers of the postal department by are concerned in any manner with the transmission of the post.Clause (c) of s. 49 makes punishable the loitering or making delay in the conveyance or delivery of any mail bag or postal article, and thus emphasizes the necessity of prompt transport of postal articles.\nSections 52 to 66 provide for offences by officers of a post office.\nSection 52 provides punishment for committing theft or dishonestly misappropriating in respect of or, for any purpose whatsoever, secreting, destroying or throwing away any postal article in the course of transmission by post or anything contained therein. The offence is punishable with imprisonment upto seven years and also with fine. This is the most serious offence.\nIt is to be noted for our purpose that the secreting, destroying or throwing away of the postal article for any purpose whatsoever is an offence. An act done with a purpose must be a deliberate act and a deliberate act must also be one done with some purpose. The legislature, where it intended to make the purpose behind an act an ingredient of the offence, expressly stated so. If the word 'wilful' or 'wilfully' is used in the Act as a synonym for an act done deliberately and for some purpose, the expression 'wilfully' could have been used in the place of 'for any purpose whatsoever'. This, however, the legislature did not do, though it used that word in the very next section, viz., s. 53 which reads :\n\"Whoever, being an officer of the Post Office, contrary to his duty, opens, or causes or suffers to be opened, any postal article in course of transmission by post, or wilfully detains or delayed or causes or suffers to be detained or delayed, any such postal article, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine or with both :Provided that nothing in this section shall extend to the opening, detaining or delaying of any postal article under the authority of this Act or in obedience to the order in writing of the Central Government or the direction of a competent Court\" .\nSections 54, 55 and 56 make certain acts done fraudulently, knowingly or with intent, punishable with imprisonment upto two years of fine. Section 55 makes the fraudulent altering or secreting or destroying of a document which an officer of the post office is entrusted with keeping, punishable with imprisonment upto two years and with fine. This act is considered less heinous than that of secreting, destroying or throwing away of any postal article in the course of transmission by post, for any purpose whatsoever.\nSection 66(1) makes the master of a ship who, in certain circumstances, knowingly has in his baggage or in his possession or custody, any postal article within the exclusive privilege conferred on the Central Government by s. 4, punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 50/- for every such postal article, Here a certain act committed knowingly is made an offence. Sub-s. (2) of s. 66 makes the detention of any postal article, after a demand for it has been made by an officer of the post office, punishable. Here, the mere detention after a demand is made penal irrespective of the intention or purpose behind such detention.\nSection 67 makes the detention of mails or any postal article in the course of transmission by post by anyone except under the various circumstances mentioned in the section, an offence, Here again, mere detection is made an offence irrespective of the circumstances in which it is made, excepting for reasons mentioned in the section itself.\nSection 68 reads :\n\"Whoever, fraudulently retains, or wilfully secretes or makes away with, or keeps or detains, or when required by an officer of the post officer, neglects or refuses to deliver up, any postal article in course of transmission by post which ought to have been delivered to any other person, or a mail bag containing a postal article, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be punishable with fine\" .It is to be noticed that 'wilfully' secreting any postal article in the course of transmission by post is an offence under this section. A comparison with the provisions of s. 52 of the Act indicates that the legislature must have used the expressions 'wilfully' and 'for any purpose whatsoever' in different senses.\nLastly, s. 69 makes certain acts committed wilfully and maliciously with intent to injure any person, offences. 'Wilfully' here is used as something distinct from 'maliciously' and is further used in addition to the expression 'with intent to injure any person', that is to say, the particular purpose or intent is an ingredient of the offence in addition to 'wilfully'.\nSection 6 and 48(c) provide that an officer of a post office would be liable for the loss, misdelivery, delay or of damage to any postal article in the course of transmission or for the delay in the payment of a money order, only when this happens as a result of his wilful act or default. The person suffering from such misdelivery etc., has no claim against the officer of the post office if that thing has been the result of something which could not be said to be the wilful act or default of a postal officer. It is no concern of the addressee or recipient of an article in transit by post that the wilful act or default of the postal officer was with a certain purpose or not and whether that officer succeeded in that purpose or not. He should be successful in his claim if the postal officer has deliberately not acted in the manner he is required to act under the Act or the rules framed thereunder or if he has deliberately acted in violation of the duties entrusted to him. In either case, the act of the officer concerned would be wilful inasmuch as he would act intentionally in violation of his duty or in a manner in which he is not to act and not accidently or inadvertently.The provisions if s. 53 of the Act require that the officer 'wilfully detains' the postal article and that the act of detention be contrary to his duty prescribed by or under the Act. Section 21(2)(c) empowers the Central Government to make rules providing for the detention and disposal of articles in course of transmission by post in certain circumstances. Section 22(1), 23, 26, 27B and 37(2) provide for the circumstances in which postal articles can be detained or delayed. It is not necessary to detail those circumstances. The clause 'contrary to his duty' governs both the act of opening of the Postal article and to the act of detaining it. The first necessary ingredient of the offence under s. 53 is that the postal officer should act contrary to his duty. Such an act, however, can take place by accident or negligence also, without the officer's knowing it or even giving any thought to it and therefore without his exercising his will in that matter. The legislature, therefore, felt that accidental or negligent acts be not made offences and that detention of the postal article, even if it be contrary to duty, be protected and that only such detention of the articles be made punishable which be committed wilfully, i.e., when the officer applied his mind towards the act and has committed it deliberately with the intention of committing it.\nThe mere act of detaining mails or postal articles by any person other than a postal officer is made punishable only with fine under s. 67 of the Act. This indicates that the punishment under s. 53 is severe because the culprit is an officer of the post office who has opportunities to detain the postal article and who acts contrary to his duty.\nThe proviso to s. 53 refers to cases which would have come within the main provisions, and provides that the main provisions do not extend to the opening, detaining or delaying of any postal article under the authority of the Act or in obedience to the order in writing of the Central Government or the direction of a competent Court. Such acts would be undoubtedly deliberate and without any criminal purpose.The use of the expression 'for any purpose whatsoever' in s. 52 is no guide to construe the word 'wilfully' in s. 53. It appears to have been used in s. 52 in contradistinction to the mens rea necessary for the commission of the offence of theft or of dishonest misappropriation. Its use makes it clear that the act of secreting, destroying or throwing away of the postal article will be punishable if with a purpose, whatever that may have been.\nI, therefore, construe 'wilfully' in s. 53 to mean 'intentionally and deliberately' and not accidently or negligently and hold that the appellant has been rightly convicted of the offence under that section.\nI am further of opinion that even if the expression 'wilfully detains' in s. 53 of the Act means of detention deliberate and for some purpose, the appellant is not entitled to an acquittal on the findings the Courts have arrived at.\nThe appellant, in ordinary course of business, would have forwarded the registered letter by the mail on October 18, 1955 when it had been received at the usual hour and the appellant's contention that it was received after the despatch of the mail has not been accepted, It follows that the appellant deliberately detained the registered letter. The intention and deliberation was directed towards the detaining of the registered letter and to the non-forwarding of it in due course with the mail that day. Every intentional and deliberate act must be with some purpose or object. It may be that in some cases the object be achieved by the mere doing of the act intended, that is to say, the object was just the doing of that act. In other cases, an act may be done with some further object also. The appellant's purpose behind his intentional act of detaining the registered letter must have been to remove what he might have suspected the letter to contain. If he did not have any such object, he could not have any reason to depart from his duty and detain the letter instead of sending it by the next mail in the ordinary course of his duties. His act, therefore, in detaining the letter, amounted to his detaining it wilfully.The failure of the prosecution to establish successfully that he himself opened the letter, tempered with its contents and removed the half currency note, facts which have been proved to have been committed by someone, does not mean that his detaining the letter was not on purpose.\nA person may do an act with a certain purpose and yet may not succeed in his purpose. Even if he succeeds it may not be possible for any other person to establish that he did that act for that purpose and did succeed in achieving that purpose.\nI would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.\nORDER BY COURT\nIn accordance with the majority opinion, the appeal is allowed, the order of conviction and sentence set aside and the appellant ordered to be acquitted of the charge against him.\n", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO.3311 of 2017 | Shambhu Chauhan v. Ram Kirpal Alias Chirkut & Ors. | 21/11/2024", + "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO.3311 of 2017 | Shambhu Chauhan v. Ram Kirpal Alias Chirkut & Ors.", + "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "case_record": "The appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside orders of the Settlement Officer and Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Consolidation Officer had initially dismissed Smt. Gulabi's objections claiming co-tenancy over disputed land (Khata Nos. 38 and 193), finding the land held by the appellants for 16 years and Smt. Gulabi unable to prove her paternity as the daughter of Aftee. The Appellate and Revisional Authorities reversed these findings. Smt. Gulabi's claim was based on ocular evidence from witnesses Jhagru and Pujan, and documentary evidence from a birth register. Jhagru's testimony was contradictory, and the birth register was found by the High Court to be unreliable due to discrepancies and lack of corroboration. Furthermore, Smt. Gulabi did not challenge the mutation order from 1959 to 1973, a delay of 14 years.", + "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let me start by understanding the user's query. They provided a case fact scenario and want me to act as a Legal Specialist reviewing the maintainability of an appeal. The user is asking to identify aspects that might affect whether the appeal can be heard by the appellate court. \n\nFirst, I need to recall what factors determine the maintainability of an appeal. Generally, an appeal is maintainable if the lower court issued an order that is appealable. This includes things like the type of order, procedural compliance, and whether the appeal was properly filed.\n\nLooking at the case facts, the appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside orders from a Settlement Officer and Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Consolidation Officer initially dismissed Smt. Gulabi's claim, and the Appellate and Revisional Authorities reversed those findings. So, the lower court here is the High Court, and the order being appealed is the one that set aside the original orders. \n\nI need to check if the High Court's order was indeed appealable. In many jurisdictions, orders that are final or interlocutory can be appealed, but it depends on the specific rules. The case mentions that the Appellate and Revisional Authorities reversed the findings, which suggests that there was a prior review process. However, the High Court's order to set aside the original orders might be a final order, so it's appealable. \n\nNext, the user wants me to identify all legal elements present. Parties involved are Smt. Gulabi (appellant), the Settlement Officer, Deputy Director of Consolidation, and the High Court. The dates aren't specified, but the mutation order from 1959 to 1973 is mentioned, which is a 14-year delay. Filings include the initial dismissal, the Appellate and Revisional Authorities' reversal, and the High Court's judgment. Jurisdictional aspects: the High Court is the lower court here, and the appellate court would be the higher court. \n\nProcedural elements: The key here is whether the appeal was properly filed. The case states that Smt. Gulabi did not challenge the mutation order from 1959 to 1973. This delay might be a procedural flaw. If there was a failure to challenge the mutation order within the prescribed time, that could affect the maintainability. Also, the High Court's order to set aside the original orders might have been based on a specific legal ground, and if the appeal is not on the same or a different ground, that could be a problem. \n\nAnother point is the evidence. The High Court found the birth register unreliable due to discrepancies and lack of corroboration. Smt. Gulabi's claim was based on this evidence, but since the High Court rejected it, the appeal might be challenging the legal conclusions, not the evidence itself. However, if the appeal is not properly framed, it might be dismissed on maintainability grounds. \n\nAlso, the fact that the Appellate and Revisional Authorities reversed the findings suggests that the lower court's order was subject to review, so the High Court's order is appealable. However, the delay in challenging the mutation order might be a procedural issue. If the mutation order was a prerequisite for the claim, and the delay means the claim is not properly before the court, thus making the appeal maintainable only if that delay is excused. \n\nI need to check if there are any procedural irregularities. The case doesn't mention any specific procedural errors in filing the appeal, but the delay in challenging the mutation order could be a factor. If the mutation order was a separate issue that needed to be addressed before the current claim, then not challenging it could mean the claim is not properly before the court, thus making the appeal maintainable only if that delay is justified. \n\nAlso, the fact that the High Court set aside the orders of the Settlement Officer and Deputy Director might be a final order, so it's appealable. The appellate court would need to check if the appeal was filed within the time limits. The case doesn't mention the time limits, so maybe that's an area to note. \n\nIn summary, the maintainability hinges on whether the High Court’s order was appealable, proper filing of the appeal, and any procedural delays that might have affected the claim's validity. The mutation order delay could be a procedural flaw if it's a necessary step that wasn't challenged in time. The lack of corroboration for the birth register might be a factual issue, but the appeal's maintainability depends on procedural compliance, not the merits.\n\n\n### **Facts** \n1. The appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside orders of the Settlement Officer and Deputy Director of Consolidation. \n2. The Consolidation Officer initially dismissed Smt. Gulabi’s claim, finding the land held by the appellants for 16 years and Smt. Gulabi unable to prove her paternity as the daughter of Aftee. \n3. The Appellate and Revisional Authorities reversed the Consolidation Officer’s findings, supporting Smt. Gulabi’s claim. \n4. The High Court set aside the Settlement Officer’s and Deputy Director’s orders, likely affirming the Appellate and Revisional Authorities’ reversal. \n5. Smt. Gulabi’s claim was based on ocular evidence from witnesses Jhagru and Pujan, and a birth register. \n6. The High Court found the birth register unreliable due to discrepancies and lack of corroboration. \n7. Smt. Gulabi did not challenge the mutation order from 1959 to 1973, a delay of 14 years. \n\n---\n\n### **Issues** \n1. Is the High Court’s order appealable? \n2. Was the appeal timely filed and properly noticed? \n3. Does the 14-year delay in challenging the mutation order bar the appeal? \n4. Is the appeal properly framed as a challenge to legal findings rather than new evidence? \n\n---\n\n### **Rules** \n1. **Appealability**: A final judgment of a High Court is generally appealable if it involves reversal of prior findings or interpretation of law. \n2. **Procedural Compliance**: Appeals must be filed within statutory time limits and properly noticed. \n3. **Delay in Challenging Mutation Order**: A delay in challenging a mutation order may affect the merits of the claim but does not independently bar an appeal unless jurisdictional. \n4. **Framing of Appeal**: Appeals are limited to reviewing legal conclusions, not re-evaluating evidence. \n\n---\n\n### **Analysis** \n1. **Appealability of High Court’s Order**: \n The High Court’s order setting aside the Settlement Officer’s and Deputy Director’s orders is **appealable** as it involves **reversal of prior findings** and **interpretation of law**. The Appellate and Revisional Authorities’ reversal of the Consolidation Officer’s findings further supports the High Court’s jurisdiction to review the matter. \n\n2. **Procedural Compliance**: \n The case does not explicitly state whether the appeal was filed within the **prescribed time limits** or whether it was **properly noticed**. However, the absence of such details does not automatically render the appeal non-maintainable. The court may require the appellant to **provide evidence of compliance** with procedural rules. \n\n3. **Mutation Order Delay**: \n The 14-year delay in challenging the mutation order is a **substantive issue** affecting the claim’s validity, not a **jurisdictional defect**. Unless the delay is explicitly deemed a **bar under statutory provisions**, it does not independently affect the appeal’s maintainability. \n\n4. **Framing of Appeal**: \n The appeal challenges the **legal findings** of the High Court (e.g., reliability of evidence, reversal of findings), which is within the scope of an appeal. The **birth register’s unreliability** was a factual finding, not a procedural flaw, and thus does not invalidate the appeal. \n\n---\n\n### **Conclusion** \nThe appeal is **maintainable** as the High Court’s order is appealable, and the procedural requirements are not explicitly violated. The 14-year delay in challenging the mutation order is a **substantive issue**, not a jurisdictional bar, and the appeal is properly framed as a legal challenge. \n\n**DECISION**: **ALLOWED**", + "reference_judgment": "1. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order\ndated 25th November, 2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature at\nAllahabad in Civil Misc. W.P. No. 13286 of 1981, whereby the judgment\nand order dated 28th August, 1976 passed by the Settlement Officer,\nConsolidation at Deoria, and order dated 01st October, 1981 passed by the\nDeputy Director of Consolidation at Deoria were set aside. The Settlement\nOfficer, Deoria Sadar, in turn, had set aside the findings returned by the\nConsolidation Officer against the Appellant at Deoria in Suit Nos.6273 and\n6264 by order dated 18th October 1975.\n2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are that Khata Nos.38 and 193\n(referred to as “disputed land”) are situated in village Muda Dih, Tappa\nDeoria, Pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria. Sehati and Bandhoo\nsons of Neoor were brothers. Bandhoo had one son namely Agloo, who\nwas married to Aftee. Aftee died in the year 1959. After the death of Aftee,\nthe disputed land came to be recorded in the name of Sehati in pursuance\nof a mutation order dated 15th December, 1959. The disputed land\ncontinued to be recorded in the names of Jhagru and Bhusal sons of Sehati\nand Ram Kirpal alias Chirkut (Respondent Herein) as Bhumidhar and\nSirdar. In the year 1973, vide notification dated 12th July, 1973, the disputed\nland was notified for consolidation operations. Smt. Gulabi filed\nobjections under section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act, 19531\nbefore the Consolidation Officer, claiming herself to be the daughter of\nAftee and co-tenancy over the disputed land.\n3. The sole issue that arises for consideration is, as to whether the High Court,\nin terms of the impugned judgment, rightly upheld the order dated 18th\nOctober, 1975 passed by the Consolidation Officer under the provisions of\nthe Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, which initially stood quashed by\n1 Hereinafter referred as the “Act”\nthe Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide order dated 28th\nAugust, 1976, as affirmed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide\norder dated 01st October, 1981.\n4. The Consolidation Officer framed the following issues:\n1. Whether the plaintiff Gulabi is the daughter of Algu and successor\nor Aafti?\n2. Whether Gulabi plaintiff on khata no.38 is in possession as\nbhumidar?\n3. Whether Gulabi, the plaintiff is the lone sirdar recoded on gata\nno.422, 451, 687, 717, 1080 of khata No.193?\n4. Whether Gulabi the plaintiff is sirdar on gata no.394, 420, 453, 494,\n518, 524, 707 and 1085 of khata no.193?\n5. What are the shares of the parties?\n6. Whether Jhagru and others defendants are the lone bhumidar and\nsirdars of khata no.38 and 193?\n7. Whether ownership of the plaintiff has ceased to exist and defendant\nhas become Sirdar under section 210?\n5. After affording adequate opportunity to the parties to establish their claim\nand discharge the burden of proving the issues, the Consolidation officer\ndismissed the objections filed by Smt. Gulabi and held that the disputed\nland for the last 16 years was in the possession of the respondents. Also,\nshe was unable to prove herself to be the daughter of Algoo and,\nconsequently, the successor of Aftee.\n6. The findings of fact concerning the relationship of paternity stood reversed\nboth by the Appellate and Revisional Authorities. However, perusal of the\nsaid orders dated 28th August, 1976 and 01st October, 1981 only reveal the\nauthorities not to have appreciated the material in its entirety, resulting in\nconclusions of fact crossing the threshold of perversity. A connected\nquestion then would be-whether the Revisional Authority can enter into\nthe finding of facts, in other words, could the Revisional Authority have\ncome to the conclusion of no interference being required in the finding of\nthe Appellate Authority, after having examined in detail independently the\nevidence in record?\n7. Section 48 of the Act deals with the revisional power of the Director of\nConsolidation Officer. The provision reads as follows:\n“48. Revision and Reference.— (1) The Director of Consolidation\nmay call for and examine the record of any case decided or\nproceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of\nsatisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the\ncorrectness, legality or propriety of any order other than an\ninterlocutory order passed by such authority in the case or\nproceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity\nof being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks\nfit”\n8. While considering Section 48 of the Act, this Court in Ram Dular v. Dy.\nDirector of Consolidation, Jaunpur and Ors.2, observed that :\n“3. … It is clear that the Director had power to satisfy himself as to the\nlegality of the proceedings or as to the correctness of the proceedings\nor correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than interlocutory\norder passed by the authorities under the Act. But in considering the\ncorrectness, legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the\nproceedings or regularity thereof it cannot assume to itself the\njurisdiction of the original authority as a fact-finding authority by\nappreciating for itself of those facts de novo. It has to consider whether\nthe legally admissible evidence had not been considered by the\nauthorities in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion\nreached by it is based on no evidence, any patent illegality or\nimpropriety had been committed or there was any procedural\nirregularity, which goes to the rest (sic root) of the matter, had been\ncommitted in recording the order or finding. …”\n9. This Court relied on the above-said observation while considering the\nscope of the powers of the Deputy Director under section 48 of the Act, in\nSeshmani & Anr. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation; District Basti, U.P.\n& Ors.3; Gaya Din & Others v. Hanuman Prasad & Ors.4; and Ram\nAvadh & Ors. v. Ram Das & Ors.5.\n10. Following the findings in Ram Dular (supra), in our considered view, the\nDeputy Director of Consolidation, being a Revisional Authority, had\njurisdiction to interfere with the finding on facts of the subordinate authority\nonly when the said findings are perverse or not supported by any evidence\non record or contrary to law.\n2 1994 Supp (2) SCC 198\n3 (2000) 2 SCC 523\n4 (2001) 1 SCC 501\n5 (2008) 8 SCC 58\n11. In the present case, the Consolidation Officer passed an order dated 18th\nOctober, 1975, after considering the evidence on record. The perusal of the\nsame enumerated that the findings of the Consolidation Officer are not\nperverse and are very well supported by the evidence. As such, interference\ntherewith by the Revisional Authority was an error in law, which error stood\ncorrected by the High Court in terms of the impugned judgment. We may\nnote that the burden to discharge the onus of paternity would lie upon Smt.\nGulabi in terms of Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.\n12. During the course of submission to justify interference with the findings of\nfact returned by the Appellate and the Revisional Authority, we are taken\nthrough the evidence of Smt. Gulabi. We notice the same to be in two forms,\ni.e., (i) ocular; and (ii) documentary. The ocular version, in our considered\nview, correctly stands rejected by the Consolidation Officer as also the High\nCourt, for the witnesses, namely, Jhagru and Pujan, are found not to be\ninspiring confidence and their testimonies unbelievable.\n13. P.W. – 2, Jhagru, categorically stated in his deposition, \"I do not know the\nname of Smt. Gulabi’s mother. Algoo is not the name of Smt. Gulabi’s\nfather.\" A perusal of his testimony indicates that the witness had no\nknowledge whatsoever about the parentage of Gulabi. However, in the same\nbreath, he testifies that Gulabi is the daughter of Sita. Further contradicting\nhimself, he denies knowing Gulabi or whether Sita has a daughter.\n14. Coming to the documentary evidence, the High Court observed that,\n“Only documentary evidence which has been relied upon by the two\ncourts below is a copy of birth register. A bare perusal of the said\ndocument would show that on the face of it, this document does not\ninspire any confidence. Against the entry daughter figure-1 is\nmentioned and against the entry son figure-1 is mentioned and total has\nalso been mentioned as figure one. It is interesting to note the remark\nof the officer who issued the said certified copy. It is dated 17th January,\n1978. He has noticed the discrepancy and remarked that in the original\nregister, against the name of Algeo, one daughter has been shown.\nNote: Uprokt asal register mein alag Nonia ke samne\nlssai Hindustani mein ladki aur mejean kool khane\nmein ladke ka hai.\nThis document is the sheet anchor of Smt. Gulabi's case and in the\nabsence of any corroborative evidence, such as evidence of relatives of\nthe family or of close friends, is not sufficient to hold that she is\ndaughter of Aftee. The attending facts and circumstances of the case\nalso do not support the case of Smt. Gulabi. On the own showing of\nSmt. Gulabi, she is residing in the adjoining house as per voter list but\nshe never claimed cotenancy at any point of time, after death of Smt.\nAftee. The courts below have proceeded on wrong footing that the\nburden was upon the petitioners to prove that Smt. Gulabi is daughter\nof Sita which they failed to prove and therefore, it was held by them\nthat Smt. Gulabi is daughter of Aftee. Taking the evidence of Smt.\nGulabi on its face value as correct, it is not sufficient to establish her\nrelationship as daughter of Smt. Aftee. The evidence being insignificant\nwould not shift the burden on shoulders of the petitioners. There appears\nto be no reason as to why Smt. Gulabi did not examine any of her\nrelatives in support of her case. The evidentiary value of voter-list of\nthe year 1966 and 1973 is also of inconsequential nature. The voter-list\nis prepared on the statement and particulars furnished by such person.\nIt is in the nature of self serving evidence. It is not safe to place much\nreliance upon it, in such matters. However, our legal system has always\nemphasis on value, weight and quality rather than quantity, multiplicity\nor plurality of witness. Nothing has come on record to connect Smt.\nGulabi with the said birth entry.”\n15. On close examination, we find no error in the conclusion arrived at.\nHowever, on independent analysis, we find that Smt. Gulabi rests her claim\nonly on the birth register, which itself has not been proven in accordance\nwith law, for none who had either maintained the record or made entries\ntherein stands examined. That apart, the document itself does not inspire\nconfidence for, as has been observed by the High Court, entries made therein\nare factually incorrect.\n16. The High Court, by its judgment, impugned herein, while allowing the writ\npetition rightly and exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the\nConstitution, observed that the Courts below committed an error of law in\naccepting the inadmissible evidence produced by petitioner therein.\n17. It is the well-settled position of law by this Court that while exercising the\njurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court\ncannot exercise such jurisdiction to reappreciate the entire evidence or finding\nof fact unless the concerned authority below acted beyond its jurisdiction or\nsuch findings suffer from error apparent on the face of the record or such\nfinding beset with surmises or conjectures.\n18. This Court made the said observation in the various decisions such as\nMikunda Bore v. Bangshidhar Buragohain & Ors.6; State of West Bengal\nv. Atul Krishna Shaw & Anr.7; Dharamraj and Ors v. Chhitan & Ors.8; and\nKrishnanand and Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.\n6 (1980) 4 SCC 336\n7 1991 Supp (1) SCC 414\n8 (2006) 12 SCC 349\n9 (2015) 1 SCC 553\n19. It is undisputed that from 1959 to 1973, no effort was made to challenge\nthe mutation order. While no limitation to challenge the same stands\nprescribed. The 14-year time gap is entirely unexplained. In other words, it\nmay be said that the belated challenge is afflicted by delay and laches. To\nappreciate its effect, we may take note of a few pronouncements in this regard.\nIn Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial Development\nCorporation & Ors.10, this Court observed that :-\n“12. … Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline\nexercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court\nis required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is\ndependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is\none of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute\nimpediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action,\netc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then\nthe Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third-party\ninterest is involved. …\n13. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to\nbe decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary\nfrom case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental\nright and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It\nis not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their\npowers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where\nthe courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain\nlength of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so\ncompelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite\nof delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the\nCourt and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to\npromote justice and not to defeat it.”\n20. In regard to the exercise of suo motu power, this Court in State of H.P. &\nOrs. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh and Ors.11, held that-\n10 (2013) 1 SCC 353\n11 (2004) 10 SCC 585\n“6. … No fixed period of limitation may be laid but unreasonable delay\nin exercise of the power would tend to undo the things which have\nattained finality. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case\nas to what is the reasonable time within which the power of suo motu\naction could be exercised. …”\n21. The Appellate and Revision Authority, in our considered view, returned the\nfindings of fact which were perverse, based on an incomplete and erroneous\nappreciation of evidence, which rightly stands corrected by the High Court.\nWe find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeal is\ndismissed in the aforesaid terms.\nPending Application(s) if any, shall stand disposed of.\n………………………………..J.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -613,26 +613,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S005", - "case_id": "758", - "experiment": "baseline_firac", - "model": "mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct", - "source_file": "S005__baseline_firac__mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct__758.json", + "case_id": "5325", + "experiment": "role_play_v3", + "model": "qwen3-8b", + "source_file": "S005__role_play_v3__qwen3-8b__5325.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/04/1964", - "machine_error_stage": "facts", - "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Missing fact" + "judgment_date": "21/11/2024", + "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl) No.3213 of 2006) | R. Rajeshwari v. H.N. Jagadish | 05/03/2008", - "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl) No.3213 of 2006) | R. Rajeshwari v. H.N. Jagadish", - "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "Appellant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, against the respondent for a dishonoured cheque of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The Chief Judicial Magistrate convicted the respondent, sentencing him to one month simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,00,000/-, with Rs. 1,75,000/- payable to the appellant. The Sessions Judge dismissed the respondent's appeal, confirming the conviction. The respondent filed a Criminal Revision before the High Court. During the revision, counsel for both parties expressed an intention to settle, and a compromise petition was filed under Section 147 NI Act. The High Court, on 5.9.2005, modified the sentence, directing the respondent to pay Rs. 30,000/- further to the complainant and Rs. 5,000/- fine to the State, setting aside the imprisonment. The appellant subsequently filed an application to recall this order, alleging her lawyer acted without instructions and she had rejected the settlement proposal. On 19.12.2005, the appellant refused the Rs. 30,000/-, demanding interest. The High Court rejected the recall application on 27.1.2006, citing Section 362 CrPC.", - "generated_judgment": "**Facts** \n1. The appellant filed a criminal complaint under **Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881** against the respondent for dishonouring a cheque of **Rs 1,00,000**. \n2. The Chief Judicial Magistrate convicted the respondent, imposing **one‑month simple imprisonment** and a **fine of Rs 2,00,000** (of which **Rs 1,75,000** was directed to be paid to the appellant). \n3. The respondent appealed; the Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal, confirming the conviction and sentence. \n4. The respondent then filed a **Criminal Revision** before the High Court. \n5. During the revision, counsel for both parties expressed a willingness to settle. Accordingly, a **compromise petition under Section 147 of the NI Act** was filed. \n6. On **5 September 2005** the High Court **modified** the conviction: it **set aside the imprisonment**, reduced the fine to **Rs 5,000** payable to the State and ordered the respondent to pay an **additional Rs 30,000** to the appellant. \n7. The appellant later filed an application on **19 December 2005** to **recall** the High Court order, alleging that her counsel had filed the compromise petition **without her instructions** and that she had **rejected** the settlement. \n8. The High Court dismissed the recall application on **27 January 2006**, relying on **Section 362 of the CrPC**. \n9. The appellant now seeks reversal of the High Court’s order and enforcement of the original conviction and sentence, together with interest on the cheque amount.\n\n**Issues** \n1. **Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to modify the conviction and replace imprisonment with a fine on the ground of a compromise when the complainant had not given her consent.** \n2. **Whether a compromise under Section 147 NI Act can affect the criminal liability (imprisonment or fine) imposed for an offence under Section 138.** \n3. **Whether the High Court’s reliance on Section 362 CrPC to reject the recall application was proper.** \n4. **Whether the appellant is entitled to interest on the cheque amount notwithstanding the compromise order fixing a reduced sum.** \n5. **Whether the High Court’s reduction of the fine to Rs 5,000 and elimination of imprisonment is consistent with the statutory limits prescribed under Section 138.**\n\n**Rules** \n1. **Section 147, Negotiable Instruments Act** – a compromise is permissible **only when the drawer (accused) and the complainant (payee) **expressly consent** to it; the compromise may affect only the **civil liability** (the amount due). \n2. **Section 138, NI Act** – the offence is punishable by **simple imprisonment up to three months** *or* **fine up to twice the cheque amount**; the punishment is a **criminal** penalty and is not extinguished by a civil compromise. \n3. **Section 362, CrPC** – bars the **withdrawal of a criminal proceeding after a judgment** has been delivered; it does **not** govern the **settlement of civil liability** attendant to a Section 138 offence. \n4. **Principle of jurisdiction** – a court exercising powers beyond those conferred by statute (or beyond the consent of parties required by statute) renders its order **void** for lack of jurisdiction. \n5. **Law on interest** – under the NI Act and CPC, a plaintiff may claim **simple interest** on the dishonoured cheque unless the parties, by a valid compromise, expressly waive such claim. \n\n**Analysis** \n\n1. **Issue 1 – Jurisdiction / Consent** \n - The record shows that the compromise petition was filed **by counsel without the appellant’s instructions** (Fact 7) and the appellant later **re‑affirmed her rejection** of the settlement (Fact 7). \n - Section 147 NI Act **mandates express consent of both parties**. Absence of the appellant’s consent means the statutory pre‑condition for a compromise **did not exist**. \n - Consequently, the High Court **lacked jurisdiction** to entertain a compromise and to modify the conviction. An order passed without jurisdiction is **void**. \n\n2. **Issue 2 – Ultra‑vires alteration of criminal liability** \n - Even assuming a valid compromise, Section 147 permits compromise **only of the civil aspect** (the amount due). It **does not empower the court to set aside imprisonment** or to reduce the statutory fine. \n - The High Court’s order **eliminated the imprisonment** and reduced the fine dramatically (Fact 6). This exceeds the scope of Section 147 and is **ultra vires**. \n\n3. **Issue 3 – Mis‑application of Section 362 CrPC** \n - Section 362 deals with the **withdrawal of a criminal proceeding after a judgment**; it is not the provision governing **recall of a compromise order**. \n - The appellant’s application sought to **recall the compromise order**, not to reopen the criminal trial. Hence reliance on Section 362 was **mis‑applied**; the High Court should have examined the validity of the compromise itself. \n\n4. **Issue 4 – Right to interest** \n - The appellant is entitled to **simple interest** on the cheque amount under the NI Act, unless a *valid* compromise expressly waives it. \n - Because the compromise is **void for lack of consent**, any purported waiver of interest is ineffective. Therefore, the appellant may claim **principal (Rs 1,00,000) plus interest**. \n\n5. **Issue 5 – Consistency with statutory maximums** \n - The original sentence (imprisonment of one month and fine of Rs 2,00,000) **conformed** with the limits in Section 138 (imprisonment up to three months; fine up to twice the cheque amount). \n - The High Court’s reduction of the fine to **Rs 5,000** and removal of imprisonment **altered the statutory penalty** without a valid compromise. The fine cannot be reduced below the amount imposed by the conviction unless a *legally valid* compromise (which, as held, does not exist). \n\n**Conclusion** \nThe High Court’s order modifying the conviction and imposing a compromise is **void** for lack of jurisdiction (no consent of the complainant) and is **ultra vires** because Section 147 does not permit alteration of criminal punishment. The reliance on Section 362 CrPC to dismiss the appellant’s recall application was erroneous. Consequently, the appellant’s appeal is **ALLOWED**. \n\nThe appropriate relief is: \n\n- Set aside the High Court’s order dated 5 September 2005. \n- Reinstate the original conviction of the respondent under Section 138, with **one‑month simple imprisonment** and a **fine of Rs 2,00,000**, of which **Rs 1,75,000** is payable to the appellant. \n- Award the appellant **interest** on the cheque amount of Rs 1,00,000 at the statutory rate, from the date of dishonour until payment. \n\n**The appeal is therefore ALLOWED.**", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE S. B. SINHA\n1. Leave granted.\n2. Interpretation of the provisions of Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, vis-'-vis Section 320 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is involved in this appeal which arises out of judgments and orders dated 5.9.2005 and 27.1.2006 passed by the High Court of Karnataka.\n3. The aforementioned orders were passed in the following factual matrix :\n4. Appellant filed a complaint petition against the respondent herein, inter alia, alleging that he had advanced a sum of Rs.4, 35, 000/-. For the purpose of repayment therefor, five cheques were issued. Three cheques were honoured but two were dishonoured. The subject matter of the complaint petition was a cheque issued by the respondent for a sum of Rs.1, 00, 000/- which was presented to the bank on 15.9.1996. Appellant was informed in regard to the dishonour of the cheque on 28.9.1996. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, by a judgment and order dated 1.6.2000, found the respondent guilty for commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs.2, 00, 000/- and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. It was directed that out of the said amount of compensation, a sum of Rs.1, 75, 000/- may be paid to the appellant herein.\n5. An appeal was preferred thereagainst and by a judgment and order dated 14.2.2003, the XXIII Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bangalore City dismissed the criminal appeal preferred by the respondent herein, inter alia, holding :\n \"I have perused the entire order of the trial Court.\nThat the trial Court after considering all the evidence and material placed on record has rightly convicted the accused/appellant. The accused/ appellant has not made out any case, so as to interfere with the order of the trial Court. The order of the trial Court is neither capricious nor mala fide. So, I feel it is not necessary to interfere with the order of the trial Court. The trial Court order deserves to be confirmed. In view of all the above said discussion, I answer the point No.1 in the negative.\" \n6. A Criminal Revision was filed thereagainst by the respondent before the High Court. It appears that counsel for the parties expressed their intention to settle the matter. On a prayer made in that behalf, the Revision Application was adjourned.\n7. The parties allegedly entered into a compromise. A compromise petition was filed in terms of Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the terms whereof are :\n \"1. With intravension of well wishers and friends the parties to the above case, have decided to settle their difference amicably.\n2. The petitioner agreed to pay the cheque amount sum of Rs.1, 00, 000/- (Rupees one lakh only) accordingly the petitioner today is paying sum of Rs.25, 000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) in addition to the amount of Rs.75, 000/- (Rupees Seventy Five Thousand only) already deposited in the above case in compliance of the interim order.\n3. The respondent has agreed not to claim any other amount as determined by the court below and also withdraw his contention and the charges made against the petitioner before the trial court and has no objection to whatsoever to acquit the alleged offences.\n4. The respondent further agreed that he will not making above case against the petitioner in any other case.\n5. The petitioner and respondent set there hands to sought their difference amicably with the above terms and pray this Hon'ble Court pleased to acquit the petitioner as alleged of offences, for the ends of justice.\" \n8. The High Court, however, in the light of the said application and furthermore taking into consideration that a sum of Rs.75, 000/- had already been deposited, directed :\n \"In the light of the application filed as an amount of Rs.75, 000/- was already deposited, it is ordered to pay further sum of Rs.30, 000/- to the complainant Smt. R. Rajeshwari and further to pay a fine of Rs.5, 000/- to the State. As the matter came to be settled between the parties the sentence to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month is hereby set aside by modifying the order of the Trial Court to pay further sum of Rs.30, 000/- to the complainant and an amount of Rs.5, 000/- to the State as fine. After the impugned order came to be passed, an amount of Rs.30, 000/- has been paid to the complainant and the same is reported by the learned Counsel Sri N.R. Naik. The revision petitioner is granted one-week time to deposit the fine amount before the Trial Court.\" \n9. Inter alia, on the premise that such a proposal made by her lawyer to her had expressly been rejected and he was instructed to argue the matter on merit, an application for recall of the said order dated 5.9.2005 was filed. The said application was listed before the learned Judge on 16.12.2005, when it was ordered :\n \"Counsel for the Petitioner and the Counsel Sri N.R. Naik for the respondent as well as the counsel for the applicant are present.\nSri N.R. Naik submits that the amount of Rs.30, 000/- reported on 5.9.2005 will be paid before the Court on 19.12.2005.\nAs request, call on 19.12.2005.\" \nProceeding sheet dated 19.12.2005 states :\n \"The petitioner-accused Sri H.N. Jagadish is present in person as well as the respondent- complainant Smt. R. Rajeshwari is also present. The learned counsel for Sri N.K. Naik submits that he has brought the amount of Rs.30, 000/- which he will pay either to the petitioner or to the respondent as per the directions to the Court.\nThe respondent-complainant Smt. R. Rajeshwari refused to receive the amount of Rs.30, 000/- on the ground that it is meager and wants the petitioner-accused to pay interest on the said amount.\nAs the respondent-complainant Smt. Rajeshwari refused to receive the amount of Rs.30, 000/-, the learned counsel Sri N.K. Naik is directed to pay the amount to the petitioner- accused Sri H.N. Jagadish. The Petitioner-accused Shri H.N. Jagadish who is present in person reports receipt of the amount of Rs.30, 000/- from Sri N.K. Naik.\nAs some allegations are made out and also further taking note of the fact that the amount of Rs.30, 000/- is repaid to the petitioner-accused, no further order is required. The petitioner-accused is directed to deposit the said amount in Court.\nPost the matter for hearing to consider as to whether the matter which is disposed of, is liable to be recalled or not.\nPost after vacation.\" \n10. However, by order dated 27.1.2006, the said application was rejected, stating :\n \"Heard.\nIA No.1/05 for recalling the order dated 5.9.2005 is rejected in view of the provision of Section 362 of Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973.\" \n11. Mr. Bhat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 4 read with Section 320 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it is evident that no terms of settlement could have been filed before the High Court as express instructions issued in that behalf were not given by the appellant to the lawyer. It was urged that the conduct of the lawyer as also the subsequent events would categorically show that the said consent terms were filed by the counsel without any instructions for the appellant.\nIt was furthermore submitted that when a fraud of this nature is practiced upon the court, the court is not denuded of its power to recall its order despite the bar contained in Section 362 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973.\n12. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is a special Act. Section 147 of the Act provides for a non obstente clause, stating :\n \"Section 147 ' Offences to be compoundable Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable.\" \nIndisputably, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would be applicable to the proceedings pending before the courts for trial of offences under the said Act. Stricto sensu, however, the table appended to Section 320 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not attracted as the provisions mentioned therein refer only to provisions of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and none other.\n13. In such a situation,a settlement could be arrived at by and between the complainant and the accused. While a settlement is arrived at, it is not necessary under the provisions of the Act and/or Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to file any affidavit affirmed by the complainant or the accused. By reason of the authority granted by a litigant in favour of his Advocate which, inter alia, empowers the latter to enter into a settlement, any settlement arrived at, on behalf of a party to a lis would be binding on the parties thereto.\nIn Employers in relation to Monoharbahal Colliery Calcutta v. K.N. Mishra & Ors. [AIR 1975 SC 1632] , it has been held by this Court:\n \"The next question is whether the compromise is binding on the petitioner. From what has been stated above it would be clear that the petitioner was not averse to the idea of compromise. He only wanted the amount to be paid to him to be raised above four thousand rupees which was originally suggested. It also appears that in pursuance of a stay order passed in this case the petitioner has been receiving half of his wages throughout. He does not specifically deny the receipt of a cheque for Rs.4000/- sent by Mr. Mukherjee. It cannot therefore be accepted that he was under the impression, as he now tries to make out, that what he was receiving was arrears of past wages deposited in the Court in compliance with the Court's order. The advocate for the appellant had filed the statement of the case on 13.11.69. The petitioner/respondent had to file it by 17.12.69 but that was not filed and the appeal was therefore, set down ex parte against the petitioner/respondent. In the circumstances and the idea of the compromise not being unacceptable to the petitioner it was the right and indeed the duty of his advocate Mr. Mukherjee to do the best for his client. We are not able to see any lack of authority in the action taken by Mr. Mukherjee. We are of the opinion that there are absolutely no merits in this application and it is dismissed.\" \n14. The High Court, while disposing of the criminal revision filed by the respondents herein, passed a judgment merely modifying the order passed by the learned trial court, while directing the accused to pay a further sum of Rs.30, 000/-. Apart from the sum of Rs.75, 000/- deposited by him, he was directed to pay a fine of Rs.5, 000/- to the State. The order of conviction was not set aside.\nA judgment of conviction and sentence, therefore, was passed against the respondent. Such a judgment of conviction and sentence could not have been modified by the High Court in view of the express bar contained in Section 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code which reads thus :\n \"Section 362 - Court not to alter judgment' Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.\" \n15. In view of the aforementioned specific bar created in regard to exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court to review its own order, we are of the opinion that ordinarily exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would be unwarranted. We assume that in some rare cases, the High Court may do so where a judgment has been obtained from it by practicing fraud but it does not appear that such a case has been made out. Appellant did not make any complaint against his lawyer. She did not even implead her lawyer as a party.\nThe affidavit affirmed in support of the application verified as under :\n \"That the averments made in paragraphs 1 to 8 of the accompanying application are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, belief and information.\" \nVerification of such an affidavit affirmed in support of an application containing serious allegations against a member of a profession is wholly unwarranted.\n16. No material has, therefore, been placed before us to show that the allegations made in the said application are correct and/or on the basis thereof the court could set the law in motion and take suo motu action in the matter or direct initiation of any proceeding against the lawyer concerned.\nFurthermore, as has been noticed hereinbefore, even before the High Court, the appellant contended that she was not satisfied with the payment of Rs.30, 000/- as she was entitled to the interest on the said sum.\nThe Court, therefore, cannot rule out the possibility of the appellant's changing her mind after agreeing to the terms of settlement.\n17. Submission of Mr. Bhat that in a situation of this nature where the complaint was in terms of the order of learned Trial Judge to receive a sum of Rs.1, 75, 000/-, the matter could not have been settled for a sum of Rs.1, 05, 000/- cannot be accepted.\nWhy the parties entered into a settlement is not a matter for our consideration. We are merely suggesting that such settlement was permissible in law. Ex-facie, it does not violate any public policy and not otherwise inequitable.\n18. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. However, the appellant shall be at liberty to approach the concerned Bar Council or file an appropriate action against the lawyer concerned.", + "case_title": "DELHI HIGH COURT | FAO 340/2016 & C. M. No. 26446/2016 | Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v. Akbar Khan | 29/09/2016", + "case_details": "Case: FAO 340/2016 & C. M. No. 26446/2016 | Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v. Akbar Khan", + "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "case_record": "The trial court, on April 25, 2016, allowed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, directing the appellant to return an amount received from the respondent, based on the insurance value of three repossessed vehicles, after adjusting due amounts. This order was passed despite an arbitration award concerning the parties already being on record. The appellant contended that the arbitration award against them had been satisfied and no objections under Section 34 of the Act were received. The respondent argued that the trial court's directions, which included a mandatory injunction, were justified due to the appellant's alleged malafide conduct, specifically their failure to return two repossessed vehicles without authority.", + "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The trial court allowed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, on April 25, 2016, directing the appellant to return an amount received from the respondent based on the insurance value of three repossessed vehicles, after adjusting due amounts.\n2. This order was passed despite an arbitration award concerning the parties already being on record.\n3. The appellant contended that the arbitration award against them had been satisfied and no objections under Section 34 of the Act were received.\n4. The respondent argued that the trial court's directions, which included a mandatory injunction, were justified due to the appellant's alleged malafide conduct, specifically their failure to return two repossessed vehicles without authority.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Was the trial court's order directing the appellant to return an amount received from the respondent, based on the insurance value of three repossessed vehicles, a valid exercise of its power under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, given that an arbitration award concerning the parties was already on record?\n2. Did the appellant's alleged failure to return two repossessed vehicles without authority constitute malafide conduct, justifying the trial court's directions, including a mandatory injunction, under the circumstances?\n3. Was the arbitration award against the appellant satisfied, and if so, did this satisfaction render the trial court's order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, unnecessary or inappropriate?\n4. Is the trial court's order, which includes a mandatory injunction, appealable under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and relevant court rules, given the specific circumstances of the case?\n5. Did the lower court err in issuing the order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, without awaiting the outcome of any potential proceedings under Section 34 of the Act regarding the setting aside of the arbitral award, if such proceedings were contemplated or pending?\n\n### Rules:\n1. Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, allows a party to apply to a court for interim measures before or during arbitral proceedings, or after the making of an award but before it is enforced.\n2. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, deals with the application for setting aside an arbitral award, outlining the grounds and procedure for such an application.\n3. Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, deal with temporary injunctions and could be relevant in understanding the court's power to grant interim measures, including mandatory injunctions, in the context of arbitration proceedings.\n4. Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, states that there shall be no judicial authority to intervene except where so provided in the Act.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. Considering **Fact 1** and **Rule 1**, the trial court's decision to grant the order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, indicates an attempt to provide interim relief. However, the presence of an existing arbitration award (**Fact 2**) raises questions about the necessity and appropriateness of this intervention.\n2. The appellant's contention that the arbitration award was satisfied (**Fact 3**) and the lack of objections under Section 34 (**Fact 3**) suggest that the award was final and binding. This, in conjunction with **Rule 2**, implies that the trial court's intervention might have been premature or unnecessary, especially if the award's satisfaction had resolved the issues between the parties.\n3. The alleged malafide conduct by the appellant (**Fact 4**) is a critical factor. If proven, it could justify the trial court's intervention, including the mandatory injunction, as per **Rule 3**. However, the appellant's defense against these allegations would be crucial in determining the legitimacy of the trial court's actions.\n4. The appealability of the trial court's order (**Issue 4**) hinges on whether the order significantly affects the parties' rights and if it is considered final or interim under the relevant laws and court rules (**Rule 4**). The appellate court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal depends on this determination.\n5. The timing and procedure regarding potential Section 34 proceedings (**Issue 5**) are also pivotal. The trial court's decision to issue the order under Section 9 without awaiting the outcome of such proceedings, if any were contemplated or pending, could be seen as an error, especially if the proceedings could have provided an alternative or more appropriate remedy.\n\n### Conclusion:\nGiven the complexities and the specific circumstances of the case, including the presence of an arbitration award and allegations of malafide conduct, the appeal requires a detailed examination of the legal principles and the facts as presented. However, the critical issue revolves around the maintainability of the appeal itself, considering the trial court's order and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Since the appeal's maintainability is questionable due to the potential finality of the arbitration award and the lack of clear grounds for appeal under the Act, the appropriate verdict would be **DISMISSED**.", + "reference_judgment": "The Order of the Court was as follows :\n1. In proceedings under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, trial court vide impugned order of 25th April, 2016 has allowed the petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 with direction to appellant herein to return the amount received from the respondent/petitioner according to the insurance value of all the three vehicles upon their repossession, after adjusting the amount due at the relevant period within a period of two months. In the impugned order, it is noted that copy of the Award passed by the Arbitrator has been already placed on record.\n2. At the hearing of this appeal, the precise submission of learned counsel for appellant is that the directions issued in the impugned order run contrary to the Award passed, which is erroneous on the face of it, in view of Division Bench decision of this Court titled Nussli Switzerland Ltd. v. Organizing Committee Commonwealth Games 2010,reported in 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4834 . Learned counsel for appellant has apprised this Court that the Award passed against appellant has been satisfied and appellant has not received any notice of objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.\n3. On the other hand, it is submitted by learned counsel for respondent that the directions have been issued in view of the conduct of appellant as noted in the impugned order, which is as under: -\n \".......However, despite repeated directions, the bank has failed to return two vehicles which were repossessed by the bank without any authority and orders of this court and the bank officials in shadow of the orders of this court has acted malafidely against the applicant Akbar Khan and also repossessed other vehicles without any orders from any court.\" \nIt is submitted by respondent's counsel that the alternate prayer made by respondent-petitioner in petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been rightly allowed by trial court. Lastly, it is submitted that the alternate prayer of mandatory injunction with consequential relief, is justified in view of the conduct of appellant as pointed out above.\n4. Upon considering the submissions advanced by both the sides and on perusal of impugned order, material on record and the decision cited, I find that once an Award has been passed, then no direction to the contrary while deciding petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be justified. Such a view is being taken in view of the dictum of a Division Bench in Nussli Switzerland Ltd. (supra), which is as under: -\n \"In view of the opinion expressed by us with reference to Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the application filed by the respondent seeking an interim measure post award was not maintainable and thus we do not decide the second issue concerning the prima-facie merits of the claim.\" \n5. Otherwise also, Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 deals with interim measures only till the Award is enforced. This Section 9 does not empower the court to pass any mandatory injunction like the one, which has been passed in the impugned order. It remains uncontroverted that the Award passed has been satisfied. In such a situation, recourse to Section 9 of the aforesaid Act was totally unwarranted. So far as the conduct of appellant, as noted in the impugned order, is concerned, it shall be open to respondent to proceed against appellant in accordance with law. But, it certainly does not justify passing of mandatory injunction against appellant in proceedings under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. During the course of hearing, respondent's counsel was unable to confirm filing of any objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.\n6. In the aforesaid view of the matter, impugned order is hereby set aside and this appeal and the application are accordingly disposed of.\nAppeal disposed of", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -738,26 +738,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S006", - "case_id": "1479", - "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "gpt-oss-120b", - "source_file": "S006__ablation_issue__gpt-oss-120b__1479.json", - "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "05/03/2008", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", - "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication" + "case_id": "6880", + "experiment": "role_play_v3", + "model": "llama-3.3-70b-instruct", + "source_file": "S006__role_play_v3__llama-3.3-70b-instruct__6880.json", + "court": "DELHI HIGH COURT", + "judgment_date": "29/09/2016", + "machine_error_stage": "facts", + "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Missing fact" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Writ Petition No. 2043 of 1981 | Distributors (Baroda) Private Limited v. Union Of India And Two Others | 01/07/1985", - "case_details": "Case: Writ Petition No. 2043 of 1981 | Distributors (Baroda) Private Limited v. Union Of India And Two Others", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 3813 of 1999, dated 1-5-2002 | Collector Of Central Excise, Patna v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd | 01/05/2002", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 3813 of 1999, dated 1-5-2002 | Collector Of Central Excise, Patna v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd", "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "Petitioner No. 1, an investment company, received dividends from domestic companies and paid interest on borrowed funds for these investments. For assessment years 1970-71 to 1980-81, it claimed deductions under Section 80M of the Income Tax Act, 1961, based on the full amount of dividends received, a claim supported by the Supreme Court's decision in *Cloth Traders Limited*. Some assessments were completed on this basis, while others and Revenue appeals were pending. Subsequently, Parliament enacted Section 80AA, retrospectively effective from April 1, 1968, clarifying that the Section 80M deduction should be computed on dividend income as per the Act, not the gross amount. This led to enhanced tax liability for the petitioner, who challenged Section 80AA's retrospective constitutional validity under Article 19(1)(g). The Gujarat High Court had previously held against the assessee in *Addl. C.I.T. v. Cloth Traders Private Limited*, a decision overturned by *Cloth Traders Limited* (SC).", - "generated_judgment": "**Answer: ALLOWED**\n\n**Reasoning**\n\n1. **Statutory framework at the time of the assessments** \n - For the assessment years 1970‑71 to 1980‑81 the petitioner's claim for deduction under **Section 80M** was based on the *full amount* of dividends received. \n - That position was *backed by the Supreme Court’s decision in *Cloth Traders Limited* (which held that the deduction could be claimed on the gross dividend amount). Consequently, the Assessments made on that basis were lawful and the assessee’s right to claim the deduction had become a **vested right**.\n\n2. **Subsequent legislative amendment – Section 80AA** \n - Parliament later enacted **Section 80AA**, made retrospectively effective from **1 April 1968**, expressly stating that the deduction under Section 80M must be computed on the dividend **as per the Act**, i.e., on the net dividend after the statutory tax credit, not on the gross amount. \n - This amendment altered the *substantive* tax consequence of transactions that had already been completed and for which assessments (or pending appeals) had been filed on the basis of the earlier law and the Supreme Court precedent.\n\n3. **Constitutional test – Article 19(1)(g)** \n - Article 19(1)(g) guarantees the right to **practice any lawful trade, business or profession**. \n - The Supreme Court has consistently held that a **retrospective amendment which imposes additional liability on a completed transaction, thereby destroying a vested right, infringes Article 19(1)(g)** unless the amendment is a *reasonable, necessary and proportionate* attempt to achieve a *legitimate* state objective (the “reasonable‑restriction” test). \n - In this case, the amendment does not pursue any pressing public interest that cannot be achieved by a prospective law; it merely serves a fiscal purpose that could have been addressed prospectively. Hence the retrospective operation is **unreasonable** and **disproportionate**.\n\n4. **Precedent on retrospective taxation** \n - The Supreme Court has struck down similar retrospective tax provisions (e.g., ***CIT v. IBM India Ltd.*, *CIT v. M/s. B.P. Lall* **) for violating the right to carry on business. \n - Moreover, the *Cloth Traders Limited* decision that the petitioner relied upon was a *binding* interpretation of Section 80M at the time. Overruling that decision by a *retrospective* amendment amounts to an *alteration of the law* under which the assessee had already conducted its affairs.\n\n5. **Effect on the present appeal** \n - The petitioner is challenging the constitutional validity of Section 80AA (as applied retrospectively) on the ground that it infringes Article 19(1)(g). \n - Since the amendment is *retrospective*, it **invalidates the deductions already allowed** and imposes a new tax demand. This directly impinges upon the petitioner’s right to conduct its investment business as permitted by law at the relevant time. \n - The proper judicial response, following the constitutional jurisprudence, is to **declare the retrospective operation of Section 80AA unconstitutional** and to restore the position that existed before the amendment.\n\n6. **Conclusion** \n - The appeal raises a substantial constitutional question that is *not* barred by any statutory limitation or waiver, and the facts show that the petitioner’s right to claim the deduction under the law as it stood (and as interpreted by the Supreme Court) was vested. \n - Therefore, the appellate court must **allow** the petition, set aside the additional tax liability arising from the retrospective application of Section 80AA, and uphold the deduction as permitted under the original provision and the *Cloth Traders Limited* judgment.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgments were delivered by BHAGWATI, J.\nBHAGWATI, J. This writ petition raises an interesting question of construction of Section 80 M of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This question would appear to be concluded in favour of the assessee by the decision of this Court in Cloth Traders Limited v. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, 118 ITR 243 , but the correctness of the view taken in that case has been challenged in the present writ petition. Since the decision in Cloth Traders Case (supra) was given by a Bench of three Judges, it is obvious that its validity can be canvassed before this Bench which consists of five Judges. If this Bench too takes the same view in regard of the construction of Section 80M as that taken in Cloth Traders case (supra), it would become necessary to consider the question of constitutional validity of Section 80AA which was introduced in the Income Tax Act, 1961 by Section 12 of the Finance (No. 2) Act 1980 with a view to overriding with retrospective effect the construction placed on Section 80M by this in Cloth Traders case (supra). If on the other hand, this Bench disagrees with the view taken in Cloth Traders case (supra) and hold that even before the introduction of Section 80AA, Section 80M, on a true interpretation of its language, meant exactly what Section 80AA now retrospectively declares it to mean, no question of constitutional validity of Section 80AA would arise since Section 80AA would then be merely declaratory of the law as it always was and would not be imposing any new tax burden with retrospective effect. The first question that we must therefore consider is as to what is the true construction of Section 80M unaided by the subsequent legislative interpretation imposed upon it by the enactment of Section 80AA: do we affirm the view taken in Cloth Traders case (supra) or do we dissent from it.We have given our most anxious consideration to this question, particularly since one of us, namely, P.N. Bhagwati, J. was a party to the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra). But having regard to various considerations to which we shall advert in detail when we examine the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, we are compelled to reach the conclusion that Cloth Traders case must be regarded as wrongly decided. The view taken in that case in regard to the construction of Section 80M must be held to be erroneous and it must be corrected. To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of judicial conscience. In this we derive comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring words of Justice Bronson in Pierce v. Delameter A.M.Y. at page 18: \"a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that he is fallible therefore everyday to learn: great and honest enough to discard all mere pride of opinion and follow truth wherever it may lead: and courageous enough to acknowledge his errors\" .\nWe may begin our discussion by referring to the legislative history of the provision enacted in Section 80M but before we do so, a brief statement of facts may help to provide the back-drop against which the question of construction of Section 80M arises for consideration. Petitioner No. 1 was incorporated as a limited company on 10th November 1941 under the Baroda Companies Act, 1918 and at all material times it carried on business of an investment company. Petitioner No. 2 is a Director and shareholder of Petitioner No. 1. Throughout the material period with which we are concerned in this writ petition, Petitioner No. 1 received dividends on shares held by it in different domestic companies and paid interest on monies borrowed for the purpose of investment in such shares. In the course of its assessments for the assessment years 1970-71 upto 1980-81, Petitioner No. 1 claimed that the deduction permissible under Section 80M must be calculated with reference to the full amount of dividends received by Petitioner No. 1 from domestic companies and not with reference to the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This claim was liable to succeed if the view taken in Cloth Traders ca se (supra) in regard to the construction of Section 80M was correct and some of the assessments of Petitioner No. 1 were actually completed on the basis that this claim was justified. The Revenue preferred appeals against such assessments an d these appeals were pending at different stages at the time of filing of the present writ petition. The assessments for some of the assessment years were also pending before the Income tax Officer. So long as the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra) stood unaffected by any Constitutionally valid legislative amendment, Petitioner No. 1 was entitled to succeed in the appeals as well as in the original assessments which were pending consideration before different authorities. But wit h a view to overriding the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra) with retrospective effect, Parliament enacted Section 80AA and since this section was deemed to have been introduced in the Income Tax Act, 1961 with effect from 1st April, 1 968 and it provided that the deduction required to be allowed under Section 80M shall be computed not with reference to the gross amount of dividend received by the assessee from a domestic Company but with reference to the dividend income a s computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the claim of petitioner No. 1 for deduction on the basis of the full amount of dividend received by it from domestic companies was liable to be rejected and deduction could be allowed to petitioner no. 1 only with reference to the dividend income computed in accordance with the provision of the Act. The introduction of Section 80AA thus had the effect of enhancing the tax liability of petitioner No. 1 and the petitioners accordingly filed the present writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 80AA on the ground that it enhanced the tax burden of petition No. 1 with retrospective effect going back for a period of almost 12 years and thus imposed unreasonable restriction on the right of petitioner No. 1 to carry on its business in breach of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.We may first set out the history of the legislation preceding the enactment of Section 80M, since considerable reliance was placed on this history both in the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra) as also in the course of the arguments in the present writ petition. The earliest provision granting exemption from super tax in respect of i nter-corporate dividends was made as far back as 9th December 1933 in a notification issued by the Governor General in Council and it provided as follows:\n\"The Governor General in Council is pleased to exempt from super tax -(i) so much of the income of any investment trust company as is derived from dividends paid by any other company which has paid or will pay super-tax in respect of the profits out of which such dividends are paid.\"\nThis pro vision came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in C.I.T. v. Industrial Investment Trust Co. Ltd. (1968) 67 I.T.R. 437 and the question was whether the dividend income exempted from super tax the entire income by way of dividend received by an investment trust company or the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, i.e. after deducting the expenses incurred in earning it. The High Court of Bombay held that the \"dividend income which was exempted under the notification would be the dividend income received by the assessee and not the said income less any further amounts\"because\" the notification must be regarded as a self-contained one and not con trolled by any other provisions of the Act\"and there was\" no warrant to construe the word 'income' in the notification as total income nor to qualify the dividend income specified in the said notification as the dividend income computed under Section 12 of the Act.\" It was thus held that the entire amount of dividend received by an investment trust company would be exempt from super tax and not the amount of dividend minus the expenses incurred in earning it. It may be noticed, and this aspect was emphasised by the Bombay High Court, that what was exempted from super tax under the notification was \"so much of the income of any investment trust company as is derived from dividends paid by any other company\" and th ere was no reference to 'total income' in the notification nor was any indication given in the notification that the income derived from dividends which was sought to be exempted from super tax was dividend income forming part of 'total income' and that is why the Bombay High Court came to the conclusion that the dividend income exempted under the notification was the entire income by way of dividend received by the assessee and not the dividend income as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.The High Court of Bombay in taking this view in Industrial Investment Trust Company's case was guided by the decision of this Court in C.I.T. v. South Indian Bank (1966) 59 I.T.R. 763 . Since the decision in South Indian Bank case (supra) is the only decision of this Court respecting an allied provision prior to the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra), it is necessary to refer to it in some detail in order to see whether it really supports the conclusion reached in Cloth Traders case (supra). The question which arose in South Indian Bank case (supra) was in regard to the true interpretation of a notification issued by the Central Government under Section 60A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 . This notification was subsequent in point of time to the notification which came to be considered by the High Court of Bombay in the Industrial Investment Trust Company's case, but it came up for construction before this court earlier in South Indian Bank case (supra). This notification was in the following terms:\n\"No income-tax shall be payable by an assessee on the interest received on the following income-tax free loans issued by the former Government of Tranvancore or by the former Government of Cochin, provided that such interest is received within the territories of the State of Travancore Cochin and is not brought into any other part of the taxable territories to which the said Act applies. Such interest shall, however, be included in the total income of the assessee for the purpose of section 16 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.......\"\nThe argument of the Revenue was that the exemption from income tax granted under this notification was in respect of interest receivable on securities minus the expenses incurred in earning it and not in respect of the entire amount of interest because it was only that amount of interest arrived at after computation in accordance with Section 8 of the old Act which was includible in the total income and liable to bear tax and the exemption from the tax could, therefore only be in respect of such amount. This argument was negatived by the court and it was pointed out by Subba Rao, J. that (p. 766): \"....this notification does not refer to the provision of section 8 of the Income-tax Act at all. It gives a total exemption from income-tax to an assessee in respect of the interest receivable on income-tax free loans mentioned therein. It gives that exemption subject two conditions, namely (i) that the interest is received within the territories of the State of Travancore-Cochin, and (ii) that it is not brought to any other part of the taxable territories. It includes the said exempted interest in the total income of the assessee for the purpose of section 16 of the Income- tax Act. Shortly stated, the notification i s a self- contained one; it provides an exemption from income-tax payable by an assessee on a particular class of income subject to specified conditions. Therefore, there is no scope for controlling the provisions of the notification with reference to section 8 of the Income tax Act. The expression 'interest receivable on income- tax free loans' is clear and unambiguous. Though the point of time from which the exemption works is when it is received within the territories of the State of Travancore-Cochin, what is exempted is the interest receivable. 'Interest receivable' can only mean the amount of interest calculated as per the terms of the securities. It cannot obviously mean interest receivable minus the amount spent in receiving the same.\"\nIt will be noticed that the entire basis of the judgment of the Court was that the notification was a self-contained one and it gave exemption from income tax in respect of interest receivable on certain categories of income tax free loans, without any reference to total income, or to \"the provisions of section 8 of the Income tax Act at all.\" That is why the judgment pointed out that there was no scope for controlling the provisions of the notification with reference to section 8 of the Income Tax Act and proceeded to hold that what was exempted from income tax under the notification was \"interest receivable\" that is, \"the amount of interest calculated as per the terms of the securities\" without deduction of the \"amount spent in receiving the same\". There was nothing in the notification to indicate that what was sought to be exempted was the amount of interest included in the total income'.Thereafter a provision of a similar kind granting exemption from super tax in respect of certain specified categories of inter-corporate dividends was introduced as Section 56 in the Indian Income Tax 1922 by the Finance Act, 1953. It is however not necessary to make any detailed reference to this provision since there is no decided case which has considered this provision or expressed any opinion upon it.\nWhen the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 was repeal ed and the Income Tax Act 1961 was enacted with effect from 1st April, 1962, section 99 sub-section (i) was introduced in the new Act exempting certain categories of income from super tax and one such category was that set out in clause (iv). Section 99 sub-section (1) clause (iv) read as follows:\n\"99. (1) Super-tax shall not be payable by an assessee in respect of the following amounts which are included in his total income .... (iv) if the assessee is a company, any dividend received by it from an Indian company, subject to the provisions contained in the Fifth Schedule.\"\nThis provision continued in force upto 1st March, 1965 subject to a minor inconsequential amendment made by the Finance Act 1964. Now this provision did not at any time come up for interpretation before this Court prior to the decision in Cloth Traders case but it did came to be considered by some of the High Courts. The question in regard to t he interpretation of this provision which arose before the High Court of Bombay in C.I.T. v. New Great Insurance Company Ltd. (1963) 90 I.T.R. 348 was whether the exemption granted under this provision was in regard to the entire amount of dividend received by the assessee from an Indian Company or it was limited to the dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of 'total income'. The High Court of Bombay accepting the contention of the assessee held that on a plain reading of clause (iv) sub-section (1) of Section 99, it was clear that the exemption from super tax was granted in respect of \"any dividend received by it from an Indian Company\" and these last words, according to their plain grammatical construction, could mean only one thing, namely, the entire amount of dividend received by the assessee from an Indian Company and nothing less. The Bombay High Court emphasised the word 'received' following immediately upon the word 'dividend' and observed that the use of this word also showed that the exemption was in regard to the dividend received and not in regard to the dividend received minus the expenses. The High Court of Bombay pointed out that the words \"amounts which are included in his total income\" in the opening part of section 99 sub-section (1) did not have any limitative effect but they were used merely as a convenient mode of describing the different items of income set out in clauses (i) to (v) of that sub-section. Clauses (i) to (v) referred to different items of income which were sought to be exempted from super tax under sub-section (1) of Section 99 and it was only if these items of income were included in the tot al income of the assessee that the question of exemption from super-tax would arise and hence the legislature used the general words \"amounts which are included in his total income\" in the opening part of sub-section (1) of section 99 as an omnibus formula to cover these different items. These words, according to the Bombay High Court, were descriptive of the items of income a included in the computation of the total income and were not indicative of the quantum of the amounts of the different items included in such computation and they did not, therefore, have the effect of cutting down the plain natural meaning of the words \"any dividend received by it from an Indian company\" which represented the quantum of income in respect of which exemption from super-tax was granted under the section. It may be pointed out that the same view in regard to the construction of clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 was taken by the Calcutta High Court in C.I.T. v. Darbhanga Marketing Company Limited and this decision of the Calcutta High Court was noted with approval by the High Court of Bombay in New Great Insurance Company's case (supra). The same view was also taken by the Madras High Court in C.I.T. v. Madras Motor and General Insurance Company and it was approved in a later decision of the same High Court in Madras Auto Service v. I.T.O. It would thus be seen that, on a construction of clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99, three High Courts, namely, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras took the view that the entire amount of dividend received by the assessee from an Indian company was exempt from super tax and the exemption was not limited to dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of the 'total income'.This view taken by the three High Courts was strongly relied upon by the petitioners in support of the construction of Section 80M canvassed on their behalf and in fact the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra) sought to derive some strength from this view. But on further reflection we do not see how this view taken by the three High Courts in regard to the construction of clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 can assist in the interpretation of an entirely new section, namely, Section 80M which, as we shall presently point out, is different in its structure, language and content from clause (iv) sub- section (1) of Section 99. We ma y point out that some doubt was raised on behalf of the Revenue in regard to the correctness of this view taken by the three High Courts but we do not think it necessary to consider whether this doubt is well founded or not because we are of the view that even if the construction placed on clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 by the three High Courts were correct, it cannot necessarily lead to the conclusion that a similar construction must also be placed on Section 80M which is different in material respects from clause (iv) of sub- section (1) of Section 99. It is most unsafe to try to arrive at the true meaning of a statutory provision by reference to an interpretation which. might have been placed on an earlier statutory provision which is not only couched in different language but is also structurally different We must therefore construe the language of Section 80M on its own terms uninhibited by any interpretation which may have been placed on clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 by any High Court.\nWe may, proceeding further with the narration of the history of the legislation, point out that Section 99 sub- section (1) remained in force only upto the close of the assessment year 1964-65 and by an amendment made by the Finance Act No. 10 of 1965 Section 99 sub-section (1) was omitted and Chapter VI A and Section 85A were introduced in the present Act with effect from 1st April, 1965. Chapter VI A comprised Section 80A to 80D providing for certain specified deductions to be made in computing total income, while Section 85 A in so far as material provided as follows: \"85A. Deduction of tax on inter-corporate dividends where the total income of an assessee being company includes any income by way of dividends received by it from an Indian company or a company which has made the prescribed arrangements for the declaration and payment of dividends (including dividends on preference shares ) within India, the assessee shall be entitled to a deduction from the income tax with which it is chargeable on its total income for any assessment year of so much o f the amount of income tax calculated at the average rate of income-tax on the income so included (other than any such income on which no income-tax is payable under the provisions of this Act) as exceeds an amount of twenty five per cent thereof..\nThis section too came to be considered by the Bombay High Court in New Great Insurance Company's case (supra) because two of the assessment years with which the Bombay High Court was concerned in that case were assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 when Section 85A was in force. The Bombay High Court pointed out that except for some minor verbal changes, Section 85A was almost in the same terms as Section 99 sub- section (1) clause (iv), the only real difference being that the exemption granted under Section 99 sub-section (1) clause (iv) was in regard to super-tax, while the deduction allowed under Section 85A was in regard to income-tax. The same interpretation was, therefore, placed on Section 85A as in the case of Section 99 sub-section (1) clause (iv) and it was held that under Section 85A the assessee would be entitled to deduction of income-tax in respect of the whole of the dividend received from an Indian company. The expression \"where the total income...... includes any income by way of dividends\" in the opening part of Section 85A was construed as referring to the category of income by way of dividends received from an Indian company. so that if this particular category of income is included in the computation of total income, the assessee would be entitled to a deduction of so much of the amount of income-tax calculated at the average rate of income-tax on the \"income so included\" as exceeds an amount of twenty-five per cent of such income. The words \"income so included\" were read to mean not the quantum of the \"income by way of dividends\" included in the total income but the income falling within the category of \"income by way of dividends from an Indian company\" included in the total income. Thus, the view taken by the Bombay High Court was that under Section 85A also, the deduction admissible was in respect of the entire dividend 'received by the assessee from an Indian company and not in respect of dividend income minus deductions allowable under the provisions of the Act in computing 'total income'.But here again we are not concerned to inquire whether the view taken by the Bombay High Court in New Great Insurance Company's case (Supra) is correct, though it must be conceded that it has been held to be correct in the decision in Cloth Traders Case (Supra). We do feel, however, that another view in regard to the interpretation of Section 85A is possible. It is no t at all unreasonable to construe the words \"income so included\" as meaning the quantum of income by way of dividends included in the total income of the assessee. These words in the context in which they occur have obviously reference to quantum of the income by way of dividends to which the average rate of income tax is to be applied. That quantum is defined by these words and in order to determine it, we have to ask the question: what is the income by way of dividends included in the total income and the answer can only be that it is income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. But, as we have pointed out above, it is not necessary to consider whether the construction placed on Section 85A by the Bombay High Co urt in New Great Insurance Company's case (supra) is correct or not, because we are not concerned here with the interpretation of Section 85A. It is Section 80M which has to be construed and this Section as we shall presently show, is materially different from Section 85A. We cannot construe Section 80M in the light of the interpretation placed on its predecessor section by the Bombay High Court particularly when Section 80M is admittedly worded differently from its predecessor section. We must construe Section 80M on its own and arrive at its true interpretation according to the plain natural language meaning of the words used by the legislature.\nIt seems that the spate of changes in this legislative provision did not co me to an end with the enactment of Section 85A. The original Chapter VI A and certain other section including Section 85 A were deleted from the present Act by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1967, with effect from 1st April 1968, and replaced by a new Chapter VI A which contains a fasciculus of sections from Section 80A to 80VV. Section 80A, sub-section (1) provides that in computing the total income of an assessee there shall be allowed from his gross total income, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of Chapter VI A, the deductions specified in Section 80C to Section 80VV and sub-section (2) of that Section imposes a ceiling on such deductions by enacting that the aggregate amount of such deductions shall not, in any case, exceed the gross total income of the assessee. The expression \"gross total income\" is defined in clause (v) of Section 80B to mean the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act before making any deductions under Chapter VI A or under Section 280 D. Section 80M is the new Section which corresponds to the repealed Section 85A and it provides for deduction in respect of certain categories of inter-corporate dividends. It is the interpretation of this section which constitutes the subject-matter of controversy between the parties and hence it would be desirable to set it out in extenso. This Section has under-gone changes from time to time since the date of its enactment and we will therefore reproduce it in the form in which it stood when originally enacted:\" 80M. Deduction in respect of certain inter- corporate dividends- (1) Where the gross total income of an assessee being a company includes any income by way of dividends received by it from a domestic company, there shall in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this section, be allowed, in computing the total income of the assessee, a deduction from such income by way of dividends of an amount equal to-\n(a) Where the assessee is a foreign company-\n(i) in respect of such income by was of dividends received by it from an Indian company which is not such a company as is referred to in Section 108 and which is mainly engaged in a priority industry 80% of such income;\n(ii) in respect of such income by way of dividends other than the dividends referred to in sub- clause (i) 65% of such income;\n(b) where the assessee is a domestic company- in respect of any such income by way of dividends 60% of such income \"There were several amendments made subsequently in this Section but they relate primarily to the percentage of the income to be allowed as a deduction and do not have any bearing on the question of interpretation posed before us. One amendment is however material and that was made by the Finance Act 1968 by which the words \"received by it\" occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 80M were omitted with effect from 1st April 1968 so that right from the date of its enactment, Section 80M sub-section (1) was to be read as if the words \"received by it\" were not in the opening part of that provision.\nSoon after the enactment of Section 80M a question arose before the Gujarat High Court in Addl. C.I.T. v. Cloth Traders Private Limited whether on a true construction of that Section, the permissible deduction is to be calculated with reference to the full amount of dividends received by the assessee from a domestic company or with reference to th e dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that is, after deducting the interest paid on monies borrowed for earning such income. The Gujarat High Court in a Judgment delivered on 28th November 1973, held that the deduction permissible under Section 80M is liable to be calculated with reference to the dividend income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not with reference to the full amount of dividends received by the assessee. The assessee being aggrieved by this judgment preferred an appeal to this Court and this appeal was allowed by the judgment delivered in Cloth Traders Case (supra). This Court over-ruled the view taken by the Gujarat High Court and held that the deduction required to be allowed under Section 80M must be calculated\" with reference to the full amount of dividends received from a domestic company and not with reference to the dividend income as computed in accordance with t he provisions of the Act, that is, after making deductions provided under the Act. \"This decision was given by the Court on 4th May 1979.Now, according to Parliament, this interpretation placed on Section 80M by the summit court was no t in conformity with the legislative intent and it resulted in considerable unjustified loss of revenue. Parliament therefore immediately proceeded to set right what, according to it was an interpretation contrary to the legislative intent and with a view to setting at naught such interpretation. Parliament, by Section 12 of Finance (No. 2) Act 1980, introduced in the Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 80AA with retrospective effect from 1st April 1968, that is the date when Section 80M was originally enacted, providing that the deduction required to be allowed under Section 80M in respect of inter-corporate dividends\" shall be computed with reference to the income by way of such dividends as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act (before making any deduction under this Chapter) and not with reference to the gross amount of such dividends \". It is the validity of this new Section 80AA which is challenged in the present writ petition. But we may make it clear that what is challenged is not the prospective operation of Section 80AA. That would clearly be unexceptionable because the Legislature can always impose a new tax burden or enhance an existing tax liability with prospective effect. But the complaint of the assessee was against retrospective effect being given to Section 80AA, because that would have the effect of enhancing the tax burden on the assessee by setting at naught the interpretation placed on Section 80M by the decision in Cloth Traders case and reducing the amount of deduction required to be allowed under Section 80M. However, as pointed out at the commencement of this judgment, it would become necessary to examine this complaint against the constitutional validity of retrospective operation of Section 80AA only if we affirm the interpretation placed on Section 80M by the decision of this Court in Cloth Traders case. If we do not agree with the decision of this Court in Cloth Traders case (supra) and take the view that the Gujarat High Court was right in the interpretation placed by it on Section 80M in Addl. C.I.T. v. Cloth Traders Private Limited no question of constitutional validity of the retrospective operation of Section 80AA would remain to be considered, because in that event Section 80AA in its retrospective operation would be merely clarificatory in nature and would not involve imposition of any new tax burden.We may therefore first examine the language of Section 80M for arriving at its true interpretation. But before we do so, let us consider what is the object behind grant of relief under Section 80M. It was common ground between the parties that the main object of the relief under Section 80M is to avoid taxation once again in the hands of the receiving company of the amount which has already borne full tax in the hands of the paying company. Vide the written submission under the heading \"Object of relief on inter-corporate dividends\" filed by the learned counsel on behalf of the assessee in the course of the arguments. Now when an amount by way of dividend is received by the assessee from the paying company, the full amount of such dividend would have suffered tax in the assessment of the paying company and it is obvious, that, in order to encourage inter-company investments, the Legislature intended that this amount should not bear tax once again in the hands of the assessee either its entirety or to a specified extent. But the amount by way of dividend which would other-wise suffer tax in the hands of the asseesee, would be the amount computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not the full amount receive d from the paying company. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that in enacting Section 80M the Legislature intended to grant relief with reference to the amount of dividend computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act an d not with reference to the full amount of dividend received from the paying company. It is difficult to imagine any reason why the Legislature should have intended to give relief with reference to the full amount of dividend received from the paying company when that is not the amount with is liable to suffer tax once again in the hands of the assessee. The Legislature could certainly be attributed the intention to prevent double taxation but not to provide an additional benefit which would go beyond what is required for saving the amount of dividend from taxation once again in the hands of the assessee. Bearing in mind these prefatory observations in regard to the legislative object, we may now proceed to construe the language of Section 80M.Section 80M sub-section (1) opens with the words\" where the gross total income of an assessee........includes any income by way of dividends from a domestic company \"and proceeds to say that in such a case , there shall be allowed in computing the total income of the assessee, a deduction \"from such income by way of dividends\" of an amount equal to the whole of such income or 60% of such income, as the case may be, depending on the nature of the domestic company from which the income by way of dividends is received. The opening words describe the condition which must be fulfilled in order to attract the applicability of the provision contained in sub-section (1) of Section 80M. The condition is that the gross total income of the assessee must include income by way of dividends from a domestic company. \"Gross total income\" is defined in Section 80B clause (v) to mean\" total income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act before making any deduction under Chapter VIA or under Section 280D. \"Income by way of dividends from a domestic company included in the gross total income would therefore obviously be income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that is, after deducting interest on monies borrowed for earning such income. If income by way of dividends from a domestic company computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act in included in the gross total income, or i n other words, forms part of the gross total income, the condition specified in the opening part of sub-section (1) of section 80M would be fulfilled and the provision enacted in that sub-section would be attracted.\nNow it was urged on behalf of the assessee that the words\" Where the gross total income of an assessee.......... includes any income by way of dividends from a domestic company \"in the opening part of sub-section (1) of Section 80M refer only to the inclusion of the category of income and not to the quantum of such income and therefore the words \"such income by way of dividends\" following upon the specification of this condition, cannot have reference to the quantum of the income included but must be held referable only to category of the income included, that is, income by way of dividends from a domestic company. This was the same argument which found favour with the Court in Cloth Traders case (supra), but on fuller consideration, we do not think i t is well founded. We may assume with the Court in Cloth Traders case that the words\" where the gross total income of an assessee............. includes any income by way of dividends from a domestic company \"are intended only to provide that a particular category of income, namely, income by way of dividends from a domestic company should form a component part of gross, total income, irrespective of what is the of quantum income so included but it is difficult to see how the factor of quantum can altogether be excluded when we talk of any category of income included in the gross total income. What is included in the gross total income in such a case is a particular quantum of income belonging to the specified category. Therefore the words \"such income by way of dividends\" must be referable not only to the category of income included in the gross total income but also to the quantum of the income so included. It is obvious, as a matter of plain grammer that the words \"such income by way of dividends\" must have reference to the income by way of dividends mentioned earlier and that would be income by way of dividends from a domestic company which is included in the gross total income. Consequently, in order to determine what is \"such income by way of dividends\", we have to ask the question: what is the income by way of dividends from a domestic company included in the gross total income and that would obviously be the income by way of dividends computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is difficult to appreciate how, when we are interpreting the words \"such income by way of dividends\", we can make a dichotomy between the category of income by way of dividends included in the gross total income and the quantum of the income by way of dividends so included. This Court observed in Cloth Traders case that the words \"such income by way of dividends\" as a matter of plain grammer must be substituted by the words \"income by way of dividends from a domestic company\" in order to arrive at a proper construction of the section, but there is a clear fallacy in this observation, because in making the substitution it stop short with the words \"income by way of dividends from a domestic company\" and does not go the full length to which plain grammer must dictate us to go, namely, 'income be way of dividends from a domestic company included in the gross total income\" (emphasis supplied). Otherwise we would not be giving to the word 'such' its full meaning and effect. The word 'such' in the context in which it occurs can only mean that income by way of dividends from a domestic company which is included in the gross total income and that must necessarily be income by way of dividends computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.There is also one other strong indication in the language of sub-section (1) of Section 80M which clearly compels us to take the view that the deduction envisaged by that provision is required to be made with reference to the income by way of dividends computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not with reference to the full amount of dividend received by the assessee. This indication w as also unfortunately lost sight of by the Court in Cloth Traders case presumably because it was not brought to the attention of the Court. The Court observed in Cloth Traders case that the whole of the income by way of dividends from a domestic comp any or 60% of such income as the case may be? would be deductible from the gross total income for arriving at the total income of the assessee. We are afraid this observation appears to have been made under some misapprehension, because what sub-section (1) of Section 80M requires is that the deduction of the whole or a specified percentage must be made from \"such income by way of dividends\" and not from the gross total income. Sub-section (1) of Section 80M provides that in computing the total income of the assessee there shall be allowed a deduction from \"such income by way of dividends\" of an amount equal to the whole or a specified percentage of such income. Now when in computing the total income of the assessee, a deduction has to be made from \"such income by way of dividends\", it is elementary that \"such income by way of dividends\" from which deduction has to be made must be part of gross total income. It is difficult to see how the language of this part of sub-section (1) of Section 80M can possibly fit in if \"such income by way of dividends\" were interpreted to mean the full amount of dividend received by the assessee. The full amount of dividend received by the assessee would not be included in the gross total income: what would be included would only be the amount of dividend as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. If that be 50 it is difficult to appreciate how for the purpose of computing the total income from the gross total income any deduction should be required to be made from the full amount of the dividend. The deduction required to be made for computing the total income from the gross total income can only be from the amount of dividend computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act which would be forming part of the gross total income. It is therefore clear that whatever might have been the interpretation placed on clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 99 and Section 8 5A, the correctness of which is not in issue before us, so far as sub-section (1) of Section 80M is concerned, the deduction required to be allowed under that provision is liable to be calculated with reference to the amount of dividend computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of the gross total income and not with reference to the full amount of dividend received by the assessee.This view which we are taking in regard to the construction of sub-section (1) of Section 80M is also supported by the decision of a Bench of this Court consisting of one of us, Chandrachud, C.J. and Tulzapurkar, J. in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Company Limited v. C.I.T. This decision was rendered b y the Court on 11th April 1978 at least a year before the decision in Cloth Traders case, but, unfortunately, it appears, it was not brought to the attention of the Court when the Cloth Traders case was argued, because we have no doubt that if it had been cited, the Court would have certainly made a reference to it in the judgment in Cloth Traders case. The Section which came up for consideration before the Court in Cambay Electric Supply Company's case was undoubtedly a different one, namely, Section 80E, but the reasoning which prevailed with the Court in placing a particular interpretation on sub-section (1) of Section 80E would equally to applicable in the interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80M. Section 80E as i t stood at the material time provided inter alia as follows in subsection (1):\n\"80E(1). Deduction in respect of profits and gains from specified industries in the case of certain companies. -(1) In the case of a company to which this section applies, where the total income (as computed in accordance with the other provisions of this Act) includes any profits and gains attributable to the business of generation or distribution of electricity o r any other form of power or of construction, manufacture or production of any one or more of the articles or things specified in the list in the Fifth Schedule, there shall be allowed a deduction from such profits and gains of an amount equal to eight per cent thereof, in computing the total income of the Company.\" The question which arose in Cambay Electric Supply Company's case was whether unabsorbed depreciation and unabsorbed development rebate were liable to be deducted in arriving at the figure of profits and gains exigible to deduction of 8 per cent contemplated in sub-section (1) of Section 80E. The argument of the assessee was precisely the same as the one advanced in the present case, namely, th at the words \"such profits and gains\" in the later part of sub-section (1) of Section 80E were intended to refer only to the category of profits and gains referred to in the earlier part of that provision, namely, \"profits and gains attributable to the business of generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power or of construction, manufacture or production of any one or more of the articles or things specified in the list in the Fifth Schedule\" and not to the quantum of the profits and gains included in the total income, so that the profits and gains exigible to the deduction of 8 per cent were the profits and gains attributable to the specified business in their entirety and not the profits and gains as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The assessee contended that, in the circumstances, unabsorbed depreciation and unabsorbed development rebate were not liable to be deducted from the profits and gains attributable t o the specified business for arriving at the figure exigible to the deduction of 8%. This argument of the assessee was rejected by the Court and the Court held that the profits and gains exigible to the deduction of 8 per cent were profits and gains computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and forming part of the total income and hence unabsorbed depreciation and unabsorbed development rebate were liable to be excluded from the profits and gains attributable to the specified business in arriving at the figure exigible to 8 per cent deduction. Tulzapurkar, J. speaking on behalf of the Court analysed the provisions of sub section (1) of Section 80E in the following words: \"On reading sub-section (1) it will become clear that three important steps are required to be taken before the special deduction permissible thereunder is allowed and the net total income exigible to tax is determined. First, compute the total income of the concerned assessse in accordance with the other provisions of the Act, i.e., in accordance with all the provisions except section 80E; secondly, ascerta what Part of the total income so computed represses the profits and gains attributable to the business of the specified industry (here generation and distribution of electricity); and, thirdly, if there be profits and gains so attributable, deduct 8 per cent thereof from such profits and gains and then arrive at the net total income exigible to tax.\"\nThe learned Judge then proceeded to apply this interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80E to the facts of the case before him and observed:\n\"As indicated earlier, sub-section (1) contemplates three steps being taken for computing the special deduction permissible thereunder and arriving at the net income exigible to tax find the first two steps read together contain the legislative mandate as to how the total income of which the profits and gains attributable to the business of the specified industry forms a part-of the concerned assessee is to be computed and according to the parenthetic al clause, which contains the key words, the same is to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act except section 80E and since in this case it is income from business the same will have to be computed in accordance with sections 30 to 43A which would include section 32(2) (which provides for carry forward of depreciation) and section 33(2) (which provides for carry forward of development rebate for eight years). In other words, in computing the total income of the concerned assessee, items of unabsorbed depreciation and unabsorbed development rebate will have to be deducted before arriving at the figure that will become exigible to the deduction of 8 per cent contemplated by Section 80E (1).It will thus be seen that according to this decision, the words \"such profits and gains\" in the later part of sub- section(1) of Section 80E were referable to the quantum of the profits and gains attributable to the specified business included in the total income as referred to in the earlier part of the provision. If this decision lays down the correct interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80E the same interpretation must also govern the language of sub- section (1) of Section 80M. Structurally there is hardly any difference between Section 80E sub-section (1) and Section 80M sub-section (1) and the reasoning which appealed to the Court in the interpretation of subsection (1) of Section 80E must apply equally in the interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80M. We find ourselves wholly in agreement with the view taken by the Court in Cambay Electric Supply Company's case and we must therefore dissent from the interpretation placed on sub-section (1) of Section 80M by the decision in Cloth Traders case (supra).\nBut, even if in our view the decision in Cloth Traders case is erroneous, the question still remains whether we should over-turn it. Ordinarily we would be reluctant to over-turn a decision given by a Bench of this Court, because it is essential that There should be continuity and consistency in judicial decisions and law should be certain and definite. It is almost as important that the law should be settled permanently as that it should be settled correctly. But there may be circumstances where public interest demands that the previous decision be reviewed and reconsidered. The doctrine of stare decisis should no t deter the Court from over-ruling an earlier decision, if it is satisfied that such decision is manifestly wrong or proceeds upon a mistaken assumption in regard to the existence or continuance of a statutory provision or is contrary to another decision of the Court. It was Jackson, J. who said in his dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. United States:\" I see no reason why I should be consciously wrong today because I was unconsciously wrong yesterday \". Lord Denning also said to the same effect when he observed in Ostime v. Australian Mutual Provident Society:\" The doctrine of precedent does not compel Your Lordships to follow the wrong path until you fall over the edge of the cliff\". Here we find that there are over-riding considerations which compel us to reconsider and review the decision in Cloth Traders case. In the first place, the decision in Cloth Traders case was rendered by this Court on 4th May 1979 and immediately thereafter, withi n a few months, Parliament introduced Section 80AA with retrospective effect from 1st April 1968 with a view to over-riding the interpretation placed on Section 80M in Cloth Traders case. The decision in Cloth Traders case did not therefore hol d the field for a period of more than a few months and it could not be said that any assessee was misled into acting to its detriment on the basis of that decision. There was no decision in regard to the interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80 M given by any High Court prior to the decision in Cloth Traders case and there was therefore no authoritative pronouncement of this Court on this question of interpretation on which we assessee could claim to rely for making its fiscal arrangements. The only decision in regard to the interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80M given by any High Court prior to the decision in Cloth Traders case, was that of the Gujarat High Court in Addi. C.I.T. v. Cloth Traders Private Limited an d that decision took precisely the same view which we are inclined to accept in the present case. It is therefore difficult to see how any assessee can legitimately complain that any hardship or inconvenience would be caused to it if the decision in Cloth Traders case was over-turned by us. If despite the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Addl. C.I.T. v. Cloth Traders Private Limited (supra) the assessee proceeded on the assumption, now found to be erroneous, that the Gujarat High Court decision was wrong and the deduction permissible under sub-section (1) of Section 80M was liable to be calculated with reference to the full amount of dividend received by the assessee, the assessee can have only itself to blame. Knowing fully well that the Gujarat High Court had decided the question of interpretation of sub-section (1) of Section 80M in favour of the Revenue and there was no decision of this Court taking a different view, no prudent assessee could have proceeded to make its financial arrangements on the basis that the decision of the Gujarat High Court was erroneous. Moreover, we find, for reason we have already discussed that the decision in Cloth Traders case is manifestly wrong because it ha s failed to take into account a very vital factor, namely, that the deduction required to be made under sub-section (1) of Section 80M is not from the gross total income but from \"such income by way of dividends\". There is also another circumstance which makes it necessary for us to reconsider and review the decision in Cloth Traders case and that is the decision in Cambay Electric SUPPLY Company's case. The decision in Cloth Traders case is inconsistent with that in Cambay Electric Supply Company's case. Both cannot stand together. If one is correct, the other must logically be wrong and vice versa. It is therefore necessary to resolve the conflict between these two decisions and harmonise the law and that necessitates a n inquiry into the correctness of the decision in Cloth Traders case. It is for this reason that we have reconsidered and reviewed the decision in Cloth Traders case and on such reconsideration and review, we have come to the reconsideration that the decision in Cloth Traders case in erroneous and must be over-turned.It is obvious that, ON this view, it becomes unnecessary to consider the question of constitutional validity of the retrospective operation of Section 80AA. Section 80AA in its retrospective operation is merely declaratory of the law as it always was since 1st April 1968 and no complaint can validly be made against it.\nWe accordingly dismiss the writ petition but, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, we direct that each party shall bear and pay its own costs.\nAMARENDRA NATH SEN, J. I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of my learned brother Bhagwati, J. MY learned brother in his judgment has set out all the material facts and circumstances of the case. He has referred to the relevant statutory provisions and to the legislative history of Section 80M of the Income-Tax Act. He has also considered the earlier decisions of various Courts including the decisions of this Court in Cloth Traders Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Income tax and in Cambay Electrical Supply Industrial Co. Ltd v. Commissioner of Income-Tax. He has analysed the provisions of Section 80M and has proceeded to interpret the same. As I am in broad agreement with what have been stated by my learned brother, I do not propose to reproduce the same. I, however, wish to make some observations of my own.\nThe authority and jurisdiction of a larger Bench of this Court to over-ride and over-rule any decision of a smaller Bench cannot be questioned. I am, however, of the opinion that the decision of this Court on any fiscal legislation involving the question of financial benefit and liability should no t normally be interfered with and should be interfered with only in very rare cases. On the basis of the decision of this Court on any fiscal legislation and any matter involving financial arrangements and adjustments, parties are entitled to arrange their financial affairs and in fact they so arrange and adjust their financial affairs on the basis of the law laid down by this Court. Unsettling a position settled by the decision of this Court may lead to confusion and result in financial instability, causing serious prejudice not only to the parties concerned but also to the economic growth of the country as a whole. If on interpretation of any provision in any fiscal legislation two views may be reasonably possible, a larger Bench of this Court may not interfere with the view taken by a smaller Bench of this Court merely on the ground that the other view appears to the larger Bench to be the better view and may commend itself to the larger Bench. If, however, the decision of the smaller Bench is erroneous, the larger Bench has necessarily to interfere with the decision, as this Court will not permit a wrong decision to operate as good law of the land.On a careful consideration of all the relevant facts an d circumstances of this case and the earlier decisions which have all been noted in the judgment of my learned brother, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the decision arrived at by my learned brother for the reasons stated by him in his judgment is sound and correct. My learned brother has properly analysed the provisions of Section 80M and has correctly construed the same, applying the well settled principles of construction, I agree\nwith my learned brother and the reasons given by him for coming to the conclusion that the decision of this Court Cloth Traders Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax is erroneous. In my opinion, it cannot be said that in deciding the case of Cloth Traders Ltd. th is Court had taken one of two reasonably possible views. As my learned brother in his judgment has aptly pointed out on a proper interpretation of Section 80M that the view taken by this Court in Cloth Traders case is fallacious and wrong. I am in entire agreement with the interpretation of Section 80M made by my learned brother for reasons stated in his judgment.\nIt may be noted that as soon as the decision of this Court in Cloth Traders case was given, the Parliament to clearly manifest the legislative intent and to indicate that the decision did not reflect the true intention of the Legislature introduced by amendment Section 80AA with retrospective effect. In view of the proper interpretation of Section 80M in the judgment of my learned brother with which I agree, it cannot be said that Section 80AA has the effect of imposing any fresh tax with retrospective effect. Section 80AA is clearly declaratory in nature and merely declares what the correct position has always been. No question of imposition of any fresh tax with retrospective effect falls for consideration in this case. It may also be pointed out that the decision in Cloth Traders case cannot be said to have held the field for any length of time to cause any serious prejudice to an assessee. The decision of the Gujarat High Court in Cloth Traders case which was upset by this Court was against the assessee and the Parliament had intervened as soon as this Court reversed the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Cloth Traders case. This aspect has also been fully dealt with in the judgment of my learned brother.With these observations I am in entire agreement with the judgment of my learned brother and I agree with th e order proposed by him.\n", + "case_record": "The assessee held a stock of fully manufactured exigible goods on March 1, 1989. On this date, the special excise duty leviable on such goods was enhanced. These goods were subsequently cleared after March 1, 1989. The authorities had held that the goods were liable to special excise duty at the enhanced rate, relying on Wallace Flour Mills Company Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise. Conversely, the Tribunal held that the goods were liable to duty at the rate in force prior to March 1, 1989, relying on Ponds India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Madras.", + "generated_judgment": "### **Step-by-Step Legal Reasoning for Decision**\n\n#### **1. Identification of Key Legal Issues**\nThe appeal revolves around two conflicting judicial interpretations of excise duty liability on fully manufactured, exigible goods held before and cleared after a retrospective rate hike:\n\n- **Position of the Revenue (Assessing Authority):** Relies on *Wallace Flour Mills Company Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise*, holding that the **enhanced duty rate should apply prospectively to goods cleared after the rate change**, regardless of when they were manufactured.\n- **Position of the Appellant (Assessee):** Relies on *Ponds India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Madras*, arguing that the **original duty rate applies** to goods held before the hike, even if cleared later.\n\n#### **2. Material Facts and Legal Principles**\n- The goods were **fully manufactured and exigible** (ready for clearance) **as of March 1, 1989**, but the rate was increased **retroactively** from that date.\n- The critical question is whether **date of manufacture/exigibility or date of clearance** determines the applicable duty rate.\n\n#### **3. Assessment of Judicial Precedents**\n| **Case** | **Judgment** | **Rationale** |\n|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| *Wallace Flour Mills* (Revenue) | Prospective application of enhanced rate to cleared goods. | Holds that sale/clearance must comply with rates in force **at clearance**, not production. |\n| *Ponds India* (Tribunal) | Retrospective operation of duty based on rate **at manufacture/exigibility**. | Argues \"exigibility\" fixed duty precisely, overriding clearance rates. |\n\n- **Consistency with Doctrine of Retroactivity in Taxation:**\n Tax laws enforceful *ex Certiori* against pre-clearance stock often clarify dates post-introduction.\n However, **exigibility** refers to the point at which tax becomes enforceable (e.g., manufacturing finish), aligning with *Ponds India*'s holding.\n\n- **Policy and Object of Excise Law:**\n The object is to levy duty on **output value at sale**, not deferred value. Classical theories (e.g., *Office of Custose Conservatore delle Regie Armenirame* [1867]) distinguish necessity date (now \"exigibility\").\n Here, goods were *exigible* at manufacturer's mandate **before rate hike**, but clearance (actual enforcement) occurred later.\n\n#### **4. Ratio Decidendi Appraisal**\n- **Wallace Flour Mills:** Fails to account for *exigibility* problematic under *Section 11 of the CE Act*: Exigible goods allow duty computation *periodic*. Prospective application is common, but **clear* case followed retrospective principle in *Ponds***.\n- **Ponds India:** More consistent with offences of enrichment: Tax should accrue at invoice-generating date (irreversibly exigible as stock cleared).\n\n#### **5. Conclusion on Appeal Value**\n- The Tribunal’s rationale in *Ponds* is logically sound, interpreting excise \"exigibility\" as decisive over clearance dates.\n- The law distinguishes between \"prospective\" application (new rate applies *future* goods) and *capacity/right to excise enforceable beauty* during manufacture (`exigibility`).\n- **Decision:** The Tribunal’s decision correctly though vitiates the rigid improverment to match \"wallspelled\" obligations.\n\n---\n### **Final Judgment:** **ALLOWED** (the appeal) due to the factual precedence given by *Ponds India* over the anomalous application in *Wallace Flour Mills*. The duty rate *properly assayed* at March 1, 1989’s rate.", + "reference_judgment": "The Order of the Court is as follows :-\nThe assessee held a stock of exigible goods in fully manufactured condition on 1st March, 1989. On this date the special excise duty leviable on such goods was enhanced. The goods were cleared after 1st March, 1989. The question in this appeal is : Are the goods exigible to special excise duty at the rate that was in force prior to 1st March, 1989, when they were manufactured, or at the rate in force after 1st March, 1989, when they were cleared? The authorities held that they were liable to special excise duty at the enhanced rate, basing themselves upon the judgment of this Court inWallace Flour MillsCompany Ltd.v.Collector of Central Excise(44E.L.T.598 ). The Tribunal took the contrary view, relying upon the judgment of this Court inPonds India Ltd.v.Collector of Central Excise, Madras(90E.L.T.3 ).\n2.In our view, the Tribunal was right in the view that it took. Special excise duty is an annual levy, as has been explained in the judgment inPonds. It ceases to have effect on the 28th of February of a given year and a new levy, distinct and different, comes into operation with effect from the 1st of March of that year. Therefore, goods manufactured during the earlier period must be deemed to have been cleared on the last day of that period and exigible to special excise duty at the rate, if any, prevalent during that period.\n3.We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the Revenue that the enhanced rate of special excise duty applies to goods manufactured during the earlier period but cleared during the later period because special excise duty was leviable during the earlier period. This is for the reason that the levy during the previous period and the levy during the later period are different, as explained inPonds.\n4.The decision of the Tribunal must, therefore, be affirmed. The assessee will be entitled to refund in accordance with the provisions of the statute, as amended, and the judgment of this Court inMafatlal Industries Ltd.v.Union of India & Ors.( ).\n5.The appeal is accordingly dismissed.\n6.No order as to costs.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -863,26 +863,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S007", - "case_id": "1273", + "case_id": "1148", "experiment": "baseline_cot", - "model": "gpt-oss-120b-noreason", - "source_file": "S007__baseline_cot__gpt-oss-120b-noreason__1273.json", + "model": "ministral-8b", + "source_file": "S007__baseline_cot__ministral-8b__1148.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "01/07/1985", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "judgment_date": "01/05/2002", + "machine_error_stage": "conclusion", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 171 of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 12, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No.445 of 1963. | Mahant Bhagwan Bhagat v. G. N. Bhugat And Others | 04/01/1972", - "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 171 of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 12, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No.445 of 1963. | Mahant Bhagwan Bhagat v. G. N. Bhugat And Others", - "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "The case concerns the Mahantship of the Turki Math, a century-old institution of the Kabirpanthi Bhagatatha Vairagi sect. Devolution of Mahantship has historically been from Guru to Chela. The defendant No. 2 executed deeds in 1951 and 1952 nominating the first defendant as his successor. The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit in 1959, claiming to be the duly installed Mahant based on a custom of succession by the senior Chela. He alleged the 1951 and 1952 deeds violated this custom. The plaintiff had previously filed a suit in 1953, which was compromised, with the plaintiff allegedly assuming Mahantship in April 1954 and undergoing an installation ceremony in February 1956, evidenced by a 'Surat Hall' document. The plaintiff subsequently took possession of properties but was dispossessed by the defendants. The plaintiff also filed a petition under ss. 107 and 145 Cr. P.C. in 1956, referring to himself as the Mahant of a different Math. The defendants contended that the custom allowed nomination of any fit Chela, irrespective of seniority, and that installation ceremonies were not essential. The trial court found in favour of the plaintiff regarding the custom and installation, while the High Court reversed this, finding that succession was based on merit and that the plaintiff's installation was not proven. The High Court also found the nomination deeds of 1951 and 1952 valid. The judgment refers to general principles of Mahantship succession based on institutional usage and cites documentary evidence (deeds from 1899, 1910, 1937, 1947, 1951) showing nominations based on ability and fitness.", - "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let's tackle this legal judgment. First, I need to understand the case thoroughly. The user provided the input facts, so I'll start by summarizing those. \n\nThe case is about the Mahantship of the Turki Math, which is part of a specific religious sect. The main issue is the succession of the Mahant. Historically, it's passed from Guru to Chela. The defendant No. 2 made nominations in 1951 and 1952 for the first defendant as successor. The plaintiff, who is the appellant, filed a suit in 1959, claiming he's the rightful Mahant based on a custom of seniority. He argues the 1951 and 1952 deeds violated this custom. \n\nThe plaintiff had a prior suit in 1953 that was compromised, leading him to assume Mahantship in April 1954 and an installation in 1956. He took possession of properties but was dispossessed. He also filed a petition in 1956 under sections 107 and 145 Cr. P.C., claiming to be Mahant of a different Math. The defendants say the custom allows nomination based on merit, not seniority, and that installation isn't necessary. \n\nThe trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on custom and installation, but the High Court reversed, saying succession is based on merit and the plaintiff's installation wasn't proven. The High Court also found the 1951 and 1952 deeds valid. The judgment mentions general principles of succession based on institutional usage and cites deeds from 1899 to 1951 showing nominations based on ability.\n\nNow, I need to structure this using the FIRAC framework. \n\nFacts: I need to list the key points. The main facts are the historical succession method, the nominations in 1951 and 1952, the plaintiff's prior suit and compromise, his installation, the dispossessing by defendants, the petition under Cr. P.C., the trial and High Court decisions, and the documentary evidence cited by the High Court.\n\nIssues: The main legal issues are whether the custom of seniority applies, the validity of the 1951 and 1952 deeds, the necessity of installation ceremonies, and whether the plaintiff's installation was proven. Also, the conflict between the trial court and High Court on these points.\n\nRules: Relevant laws would include the principles of succession in religious institutions, the validity of deeds under the Indian Succession Act (if applicable), the role of customs in succession, and the evidentiary requirements for proving installation ceremonies. Also, the applicability of sections 107 and 145 Cr. P.C. in this context.\n\nAnalysis: Need to evaluate the trial court's finding versus the High Court. The trial court found the custom of seniority and installation important, while the High Court said it's based on merit and installation wasn't proven. The High Court cited historical deeds showing nominations based on ability. The plaintiff's installation in 1956 might not be sufficient if the custom doesn't require it. The compromise in 1953 might have affected the plaintiff's claim. The documentary evidence from the High Court suggests that nominations were based on merit, not seniority, which could override the plaintiff's claim based on seniority. Also, the plaintiff's claim to a different Math in 1956 might be a separate issue, but the case is about the Turki Math.\n\nConclusion: The High Court's decision to reverse the trial court might be correct if the custom allows merit-based succession and the installation wasn't proven. Therefore, the appeal should be allowed, meaning the High Court's decision is upheld.\n\nWait, but the user's conclusion needs to be either ALLOWED or DISMISSED. Since the High Court reversed the trial court, and the user is evaluating the appeal, if the appeal is the High Court's decision, then the conclusion would be that the appeal is allowed. But I need to check the procedural history. The plaintiff's appeal was to the High Court, which reversed the trial court. So the High Court's decision is the one being appealed. Wait, the input says the plaintiff filed an appeal, and the High Court reversed. So the question is whether the High Court's decision should be upheld. If the user is the judge evaluating the appeal (probably the High Court's decision), then the conclusion would be whether the appeal (from the trial court to High Court) should be allowed or dismissed. The user's conclusion is about the appeal, so if the High Court's decision is correct, the appeal would be allowed. But I need to make sure the reasoning is correct.\n\nAlso, the rules about customs in succession. In India, customs can be considered under the Indian Succession Act, especially if they are part of the religious institution's practice. The High Court cited documentary evidence showing that nominations were based on ability, which might indicate that the custom is merit-based, not seniority. The trial court might have focused on the plaintiff's installation, but the High Court found that installation wasn't proven. The plaintiff's claim of installation in 1956 might not be sufficient if the custom doesn't require it. The compromise in 1953 could have led to the plaintiff's assumption of Mahantship, but the defendants might argue that the 1951 and 1952 deeds are valid. \n\nSo the key points are the validity of the deeds, the custom's nature (seniority vs. merit), and the installation ceremony's necessity. The High Court's reliance on the documentary evidence showing merit-based nominations suggests that the custom allows for that, thus invalidating the plaintiff's claim based on seniority. Therefore, the High Court's reversal is correct, so the appeal (to the High Court) should be allowed, meaning the High Court's decision is upheld. Hence, the conclusion would be that the appeal is allowed.\n\n\n### Facts: \n1. The Turki Math, a religious institution of the Kabirpanthi Bhagatatha Vairagi sect, follows a historical tradition of Mahantship devolution from Guru to Chela. \n2. Defendant No. 2 executed deeds in 1951 and 1952 nominating the first defendant as his successor. \n3. The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit in 1959, asserting his claim to Mahantship based on a custom of succession by seniority, alleging the 1951 and 1952 deeds violated this custom. \n4. The plaintiff had previously filed a suit in 1953, which was compromised, leading him to assume Mahantship in April 1954 and undergo an installation ceremony in February 1956, evidenced by a 'Surat Hall' document. \n5. The plaintiff took possession of properties but was dispossessed by the defendants. \n6. The plaintiff also filed a petition under Sections 107 and 145 Cr. P.C. in 1956, claiming to be Mahant of a different Math. \n7. The defendants argued that the custom allowed nomination of any fit Chela based on merit, not seniority, and that installation ceremonies were not essential. \n8. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the custom and installation, while the High Court reversed this, finding succession based on merit and the plaintiff’s installation unproven. \n9. The High Court cited documentary evidence (deeds from 1899, 1910, 1937, 1947, 1951) showing nominations based on ability and fitness. \n\n---\n\n### Issues: \n1. Whether the custom of succession in the Turki Math requires adherence to seniority or allows merit-based nomination. \n2. Whether the plaintiff’s claim of installation in 1956 was sufficient to establish his right to Mahantship. \n3. Whether the 1951 and 1952 nomination deeds are valid under the established customs and institutional practices. \n\n---\n\n### Rules: \n1. **Customs in Religious Institutions**: Under Indian law, customs forming part of a religious institution’s practice may be recognized as binding if they are well-established and consistently followed (e.g., *Kanhaiya Lal v. Ram Nath*, AIR 1964 SC 1656). \n2. **Validity of Deeds**: Deeds of succession are valid if they align with the institution’s customs and are supported by documentary evidence (Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act). \n3. **Installation Ceremonies**: The necessity of formal installation ceremonies for succession depends on the institution’s customs, not statutory requirements (per *Raja v. Raja*, AIR 1958 SC 754). \n4. **Burden of Proof**: The plaintiff must prove the existence of a custom and its application to the case, including the validity of installation rituals (Section 101, Indian Evidence Act). \n\n---\n\n### Analysis: \n1. **Custom of Succession**: The trial court relied on the plaintiff’s claim of seniority, but the High Court correctly emphasized that the institutional practice, as evidenced by historical deeds (1899–1951), prioritized merit and fitness over seniority. The documentary evidence demonstrates a consistent pattern of merit-based nominations, overriding the plaintiff’s reliance on seniority. \n2. **Installation Ceremony**: The trial court accepted the plaintiff’s 1956 installation as proof, but the High Court found this unproven. The absence of corroborating evidence (e.g., witnesses, formal records) weakens the plaintiff’s claim. The High Court’s focus on the lack of conclusive proof aligns with the legal principle that installation ceremonies must be substantiated. \n3. **Validity of Deeds**: The 1951 and 1952 deeds are valid under the established custom of merit-based succession. The High Court’s reliance on historical deeds supports their legality, as they reflect the institution’s recognized practice. The plaintiff’s compromise in 1953 does not negate the validity of the deeds but may affect the scope of his claim. \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion: \nThe appeal is **ALLOWED**. The High Court correctly reversed the trial court’s findings by emphasizing the institutional custom of merit-based succession and the lack of conclusive evidence for the plaintiff’s installation. The 1951 and 1952 deeds are valid under the documented practice, and the plaintiff’s reliance on seniority is insufficient. The appeal is allowed to uphold the High Court’s decision.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by\nMitter, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Patna High Court reversing the decree in favour of the plaintiff-appellant declared to be the duly installed Mahant of Turki Math and of all its subsidiary maths and as such entitled to possession of the properties covered by the decree.\nThe, undisputed facts are as follows. In the village of Turki in North Bihar there is a Math or as that of the Kabirpanthi Bhagatatha Vairagi sect established over a century back. There are asthals subordinate to the principal one at Turki located in different districts of Bihar. Devolution of the Mahantship has always been from a Guru to his Chela. Defendant No. 2 executed a deed dated December 17, 1951 nominating the first defendant as Ms successor to t he Mahantship and a second deed on September 15, 1952 surrendering his right to the Mahantship in favour of the first defendant with, immediate effect. The suit of the appellant was launched in 1959 for a declaration that he himself was the duly installed Mahant of saddar asthal Turki in the circumstances mentioned in the plaint, that the second defendant had ceased to be the Mahant by his, voluntary of retirement and the first defendant being a junior Chela could have no right or Claim to the Mahants. As a corollary to the above declaration, he also asked for a decree for recovery of possession of all the properties of the asthal including those which had been purported to be transferred by the first two defendants.\nThe appellant made a two-fold claim in his plaint. It was his case that under the tenets and the customs of the asthal and Bhagataha sect of Kabirpanthies, the devolution of the office of Mahantship is always from a Guru to the senior celebate Chela , either , on the death of. the Mahant for the time being or by the said Mahant nominating. his successor by deed and himself retiring from the Mahantship In either case, after the death or retirement of the Mahant for the time being, the senior chela succeeds to the Mahantship and is' duly installed on the Gaddi after the perfomance of Bhandara in an assemblage of Mahants and sadhus of the sect and respectable persons of the locality at which The Chaddar of Mahanthi is bestowed on the new Mahant by the Mahant of Acharya Math Dhanauti in the District of Saran. The deeds of 1951. and 1952 being in violation of the ancient custom of the asthal, the first defendant was never of the as or became the Mahant of Turki nor was any Chaddar ceremony performed at any requisite ceremony in recognition of such succession. 'The appellant had filed a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Muzaffarpur in the year 1953 for declaration of his riots and for setting aside the deeds of 1951 and 1 952. After the suit was pending for some time, , a compromise was arrived at whereby it was agreed that the appellant should assume the office of Mahantship and take possession of all the properties of the Math. The appellant put his signature on a sheet of blank paper for recording the terms of settlement. He had actually assumed the office of the Mahant of Turki in April 1954, and an elaborate ceremony was performed on the 16th February 1956. whereat he was installed. as the Mahant of Tu rki and given the Chaddar of Mahanti by the Acharya of Dhanauti before a big gathering. A document known as the Surat Hall was prepared regarding the plaintiff's installation. This bore the signature, of innumerable persons. This was followed by his taking, charge of all the properties of the saddar and subordinate asthals. The first two defendants thereafter dispossessed him and being unsuccessful in proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure for securing possession of the math and its properties, he was compelled to file the suit.Respondents 1 And 2 filed a joint written statement. They pleaded that the custom and usages of the Turki Math relating to devolution of Mahantship was for the Mahant for the time being nominating a fit and proper person as his successor from amongst his Chelas irrespective of his seniority and the person so nominated invariably became the Mahant on the demise or retirement of the; incumbent Mahant. A ceremony of installation of the new Mahant on the Gaddi and the bestowing of a Chaddar on him were not essential for establishing his title to this office in place of the retiring or the deceasing Mahant. The defendants denied the factum of the installation of the appellant relied on in the plaint. According to them the appellant had at all times knowledge of the nomination of the first defendant by the deed of December 17, 1951 and his appointment with immediate effect by the, deed of September 15, 1952. It was on realisation of the weakness of his case that he had approached the defendants for a compromise agreeing, to given up his claim in the suit of 1953. He had appended his signature to the petition of compromise in that su it being fully conversant with the terms thereof.\nThe two main issues framed by the trial court and relevant for the disposal of this appeal bear on the custom governing the succession to the Mahantship of the Turki Math and the right of the incumbent mahant to nominate a junior Chela in preference to a senior Chela. Issues were also framed by the trial court as to whether an installation ceremony was an essential pre-requisite to a Mahant's lawfully functioning as such and whether the pl aintiff had factually been installed as a Mahant of the Turki Math. The findings of the trial court were as follows:-\n1.From 1899 onwards only senior Chelas had succeeded their Gurus.\n2.According to the custom of the Muth the Mahant had the right to nominate his successor and the choice rested upon the senior Chela unless he suffered from any disqualification or was found to be unfit for the office. The right of nomination was not absolute but was subject to the approval of others.\n3.An installation ceremony was not essential to complete the title of the Mahant. Such a ceremony had been performed in the ease of the plaintiff in 1956 and he became the Mahant of Turki although not in possession of the properties thereof at the , time of the suit.\nThe High Court rejected the custom as to succession set up by the plaintiff. It found-\n1. Since the time of the founder, Chaturbhuj Gosala, six Mahants had occupied the office of whom three were described as junior Chelas by some of the witnesses on the defendant's side. The evidence did not establish that there was an invariable custom of the senior Chela being nominated by the outgoing Mahant.\n2.The Mahant in office had an undoubted right to nominate his successor and ordinarily the right of appointment was exercised in favour of the senior Chela but the choice was exercised in favour of a celebrate chela taking into account his all round ability and character. The second defendant had as a matter of fact nominated one Ganesh Bhagat as his successor even before the deed of nomination of 1951 in favour of the first defendant. This nomination of Ganesh Bhagat was cancelled as he was found to be unfit. Compared to the plaintiff, the first defendant w as decidedly superior in learning, ability and conduct: as the main function of the Mahant was to propagate the Kabirpanthi cult and the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious atmosphere in the mutt where people were expected to congregate for religious discussion and discourses and other benevolent functions the choice of the, first defendant by the second defendant in preference to the plaintiff was not undeserved and must be taken as final.\n3. The High Court did not examine the question as to whether an installation ceremony was necessary to perfect the title of Mahantship in view of the concession by counsel for the plaintiff Differing from the finding of the trial court, the High Court held that no ceremony of installation of the plaintiff had been performed in 1956 as alleged in the plaint.\n4.The deeds of nomination and surrender in 1951 and 1952 by the first defendant were valid and binding.\nThe general law as to succession to Mahantship is now well settled by in numerable decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and some decisions of this Court. It will be enough to quote some passages from Mukharji's book on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts. The learned author states (third edition, p. 257):\n\"Once a Mutt is established, succession to headship takes place within the spiritual family according to the usages that grow up in a particular institution.\"\n\" The, primary purpose of a Mutt...... is to encourage and foster spiritual learning by maintenance of a competent line of teachers who impart religious instructions to the disciples and followers of the Mutt and try to strengthen the doctrines of the particular school or order of which they profess to be adherents.\"\nAt page 269:\n\" In a Mutt.... it is the custom or practice of a particular institution which determines as to how a successor is to be appointed.\"\nThree aspects have to be borne in mind in connection with the question of succession to the office of a Mahant (p. 269):\n\"The first is that if the grantor has laid down any particular rule of succession, that is to be given effect to. Secondly, in the absence of any grant the usage of the particular institution is to be followed; and in the third place, the party who lays claim to the office of a Mohunt on the strength of any such usage must establish it affirmatively by proper legal evidence. The fact that the defendant is a trespasser would not entitle the plaintiff to succeed even though he be a disciple of the last Mohunt, unless he succeeds in proving, particular usage under which succession takes place in the particular institution.\"At p. 270:\n\" Generally speaking, the Mutts are divided into three classes according to the different ways in which the heads or superiors are appointed. These, three descriptions of Mutts are Mourasi, Panchayati and Hakimi. In the first, the office of the Mohunt is hereditary and devolves upon the chief disciple of the existing Mohunt who moreover usually nominates him as his successor; in the second, the office is elective, the presiding Mohunt being selected by an assembly of Mohunts. In the third, the appointment of the presiding Mohunt is vested in the ruling power or in the party who has endowed the temple.\nIn a Mourasi Mutt the chela or disciple of the last Mohunt succeeds to the office when there are more, chelas than one the eldest generally succeeds, but a junior chela may succeed if he is found more capable and if he is selected by the last Mohunt is his successor.\nIn various institutions the custom is that in order to entitle a chela to succeed, be must be appointed or nominated by the reigning Mohunt during his life time or shortly before his death and this may be done either by a written declaration or some sort of testamentary document. In other cases again, the nominee is formally installed in the office and some sort of recognition is accorded to him by the members of the particular sect either during the life time of the last Mohunt or when the funeral ceremonies of the latter are performed.\"\nAt p. 273.\n\" When the Mohunt has the right to appoint his successor, he may exercise t he right by an act inter vivos or by will.\"\nAt p. 274:\n\" In a Mourashi Mutt it is possible for the Mohunt to make over the endowment during his life time to his chela whom he appoints as a successor.\"\nAt p. 275:\n\" In many cases when a successor is appointed by Mohunt, he is installed in office with certain ceremonies, This cannot be deemed to be essential.\" Admittedly Turki was a Mourasi Mutt The evidence as to custom adduced in the case Is both documentary and oral. The oral evidence which will be noted hereafter is discrepant and mostly of persons who were not disinterested. The documentary evidence undoubtedly furnishes more reliable testimony being ante item motam and brought into existence at a time when the plaintiff was not on the scene and when no dispute as to succession to ship was raging.\nThe earliest docu ment exhibited in this case is that of 1899 executed by Mahant Lal Bahadur Bhagat in favour of Ram Bhagat describing him as the senior chela, able, clever, literate and by all means tit for the Mahantship. Mahant Ram Bhagat in his turn nominated Mahadeo Bhagat as his successor by a deed of November 1910. Like the document of 1899 this deed also describes the nominee as able, clever and fit to discharge the duties of the Mahant Mahadeo Bhaaat however is not described as the senior C hela but only as a disciple of the executant. By a deed of August 1937 Mahant Mahadeo Bhagat nominated Narsingh Bhagat, defendant No. 2 as his successor describing the latter as his only disciple worthy, clever and fit in all respects for the Gaddi. By a document of June 1947 Narsingh Bhagat nominated one Ganesh Bhagat as his successor to the Gaddi. This nomination was cancelled by Narsingh Bhagat on the ground of unfitness of the nominee for the office but mention is made in this document of 1947 of the practice and custom relating to the succession to the office of the Mahant. This document goes against the contention of the plaintiff that by custom the senior Chela was eligible to the office in preference to all others. It recites:\n\"It has been the practice in the Asthal from the time of my predecessors that the Gadinashin leads a life of Brahmacharya and he does not marry. One Mahanth Gadinashin appoints and nominates his able Brahmachari disciple as Gadinashin and future successor during his lifetime. After the death of his Guru, the rightful disciple becomes heir and Gadi nashin of the Asthal of the Sadar Nath at Turki. I the executant thought it proper to make over the management of the property under a will, according to previous custom and appoint Ganesh Bhagat as my successor.\" This was followed by a description of the nominee as literate, able and efficient. The document of December 1951 by Narsingh Bhagat in favour of Girija Nandan Bhagat. the first defendant describes the nominee as fit and qualified in all respects to be the Mahant and recites the custom as in the case of Ganesh Bhagat.\nThe trial Judge's view that the nominations if 1899, 1910 and 1937 'being invariably in favour of the senior disciple went a long way to establish the custom relied on by the plaintiff was not accepted by the High Court. Apparently the trial Judge was of the view that Mahadeo Bliagat who became the Mahant in 1910 was the only disciple of Ram Bhagat and it was therefore not felt necessary to mention him is the senior chela Quite a number of defendants' witnesses made statements to the effect that Ran-. Bhagat had a number of Chelas. The trial Judge obviously over-locked the statement of the plaintiff in his cross examination that Ram Gossai had 5 or 6 Chelas and he himself had seen all of them. A fairly large number of witnesses stated that the qualifications for a person's nomination to the Mahantship did not depend only on seniority but on ability to manage, celibacy, adherence to religious principles and a habit of serving sadhus, fakirs and visitors besides a good moral character. Some even suggested that it was the ablest Chela who was made the Mahant. Making due allowance for the witnesses who came to support the case of the party examining them, the oral testimony unquestionably leads us to hold that in the matter of nomination of a successor to the Mahantship seniority was not the decisive factor but that ability and efficiency in management coupled with a good moral character and adherence to the religious rites practised at the mutt and a spirit of service to sadhus etc. all entered into consideration in the selection of a successor by a Mahant. This conclusion is fortified by the documents exhibited. As already noted they do not support the plaintiff's version that invariably the senior Chela was selected. In our view the document executed by Narsingh Bhagat in favour of Ganesh Bhagat sets out the custom as to succession fairly accurately.The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff was installed as the Mahant of Turki in 1956 before a wide gathering of sadhus and respectable persons at which the Chaddar ceremony was performed does not merit any elaborate or serious consideration. As noted already, the trial, court did not take the view that the performance of the Chaddar ceremony was an essential pre-requisite to a person becoming a Mahant and before the High Court counsel for the plaintiff expressly gave up that point. Although the trial court found in favour of the plaintiff that such a ceremony had actually been performed, the High Court came to a different conclusion. One of the reasons which prompted the High Court to take this view was that the document evidencing the installation ceremony styled the Surat Hall had not been produced in any court of law before the institution of the suit of 1959 although litigation in respect of the properties of the mutt and the plaintiff's right to possession were being canvassed before , courts of law. The High Court also relied on the fact that a respectable and reliable witness like the Mahant of the Acharya Mutt denied having signed this document Ex. 1 and no attempt was made on behalf of the plaintiff to controvert the said denial by examination of a hand-writing expert. Reliance was also placed by the High Court on the fact that the plaintiff who filed a petition under ss. 107 and 145 Cr. P.C. against the first defendant and 12 others on 8th December, 1956 described himself as the Mahant of Chanwa Math and made no reference in the petition itself to the installation ceremony at Turki. The High Court also , did not believe the plaintiff's version that he had signed a blank sheet of paper to be used as a compromise petition in the earlier suit filed by him and nothing has been shown to us as to why we should take a different-view.In the result we hold that the plaintiff was unable to discharge the onus which lay on him to substantiate the custom as to succession pleaded in his plaint. He also failed to establish that he had in fact been installed as the Mahant of the said Math. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 5048 of 2005 | Shin-Etsu Chemical Company Limited v. M/S. Aksh Optifibre Limited And Another | 12/08/2005", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 5048 of 2005 | Shin-Etsu Chemical Company Limited v. M/S. Aksh Optifibre Limited And Another", + "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", + "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", + "case_record": "Parties entered an agreement dated November 16/18, 2000, containing an arbitration clause governed by Japanese law. After the appellant terminated it, the first respondent sued, claiming the agreement was unconscionable, void, and inoperative. The appellant sought arbitration under Section 8 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which the trial court allowed. The High Court set aside this order, remanding the matter for fresh adjudication under Section 45, as the validity objection was not addressed. Both parties subsequently agreed that Section 45, not Section 8, was the applicable provision.", + "generated_judgment": "\nOkay, let's tackle this appeal. The user wants me to decide whether the appeal should be allowed or dismissed based on the given facts. Let me start by understanding the scenario.\n\nSo, there's an agreement from November 16/18, 2000, with an arbitration clause governed by Japanese law. The appellant terminated the agreement, and the first respondent sued, claiming the agreement was unconscionable, void, and inoperative. The appellant then sought arbitration under Section 8 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The trial court allowed this, but the High Court set aside the order, remanding the matter under Section 45. Both parties then agreed that Section 45 is the applicable provision instead of Section 8.\n\nFirst, I need to recall the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 8 deals with the appointment of arbitrators, while Section 45 relates to the enforcement of arbitral awards. However, the key here is about the validity of the arbitration agreement itself. The respondent is challenging the validity of the agreement, which would typically fall under Section 45, which allows courts to set aside awards if they are invalid. But the initial court allowed the arbitration under Section 8, which is about initiating arbitration proceedings. \n\nWait, the High Court set aside the trial court's order allowing arbitration under Section 8. The reason given was that the validity objection wasn't addressed. So the High Court remanded the matter for fresh adjudication under Section 45. Now, both parties agreed that Section 45 is the applicable provision. \n\nThe question is whether the appeal should be allowed or dismissed. The appeal is likely against the High Court's decision to remand under Section 45. But the parties have already agreed that Section 45 is the correct provision. So the trial court initially used Section 8, but the High Court corrected that by using Section 45. The appeal might be challenging the High Court's remand. \n\nBut the user's input is that the appeal is based on the facts provided. The key point here is the validity of the arbitration agreement. If the High Court correctly moved to Section 45, which deals with the validity of the award, then the appeal might be dismissed. However, the parties agreed that Section 45 is applicable. \n\nWait, the initial issue was whether the agreement was unconscionable. The trial court allowed arbitration under Section 8, which is about initiating arbitration. But the validity of the agreement itself (i.e., whether it's void or not) would be under Section 45. So the High Court correctly remanded the matter to address the validity under Section 45. The parties now agree that Section 45 is the right provision. Therefore, the High Court's decision to remand under Section 45 is correct. \n\nIf the appeal is against the High Court's order, then the appeal should be dismissed because the High Court correctly applied Section 45. Alternatively, if the appeal is about the initial order, but the parties have agreed on Section 45, then the appeal might be allowed if there was an error in the application. But the facts state that the High Court set aside the trial court's order and remanded under Section 45. The parties agreed on Section 45, so the appeal is likely dismissed because the High Court's order is correct. \n\nWait, but the user hasn't specified what the appeal is against. The input facts mention that the High Court set aside the trial court's order and remanded under Section 45. The parties agreed that Section 45 is applicable. So if the appeal is the High Court's decision, then the appeal would be dismissed. Alternatively, if the appeal is the trial court's order, then the High Court's remand is correct. \n\nThe problem is that the user's input doesn't specify which court's order is being appealed. But the structure is that the trial court allowed arbitration under Section 8, High Court set aside that order and remanded under Section 45. Both parties agreed Section 45 applies. So the appeal is likely against the High Court's decision. Wait, no. The High Court's decision is the one that remanded under Section 45. The appeal might be from the High Court's decision. But the user says the parties agreed that Section 45 is applicable. So the High Court's order is correct. Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. \n\nAlternatively, if the appeal is from the trial court's order, then the High Court's remand is correct, so the appeal would be dismissed. But the user is asking whether the appeal (presumably against the High Court's order) should be allowed or dismissed. Since the parties agreed that Section 45 applies, and the High Court correctly applied it, the appeal should be dismissed. \n\nSo the conclusion is that the appeal should be DISMISSED.\n\n\nDISMISSED. The High Court correctly remanded the matter under Section 45 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as the validity of the arbitration agreement (which the respondent challenged) falls under Section 45, not Section 8. The parties' agreement to apply Section 45 confirms the High Court's proper application of the law. The appeal lacks merit and is therefore dismissed.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE B.N. SRIKRISHNA\nLeave granted.\n2. I have had the benefit of carefully considering the erudite judgment delivered by my esteemed and learned Brother Sabharwal. Regretfully, I find myself in the unenviable position of having to disagree with the views expressed therein.\n3. The judgment of Brother Sabharwal fully sets out the facts in the Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3160/05 as well as the issue which arises for determination. The core issue in this case is: Whether the finding of the court made under Section 45 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (\"the Act\") that the arbitration agreement , falling within the definition of Section 44 of the Act, is or is not \"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\" should be a final expression of the view of the court or should it be a prima facie view formed without a full-fledged trial?\nAmbiguity in the Wording of Section 45\n4. The contrast in language between Section 8 and 45 of the Act has been rightly noticed by my Learned Brother. Section 8, which leaves no discretion in the court in the matter of referring parties to arbitration, does not apply to the present case, as we are concerned with Part II of the Act. On the other hand, Section 45 which is directly applicable to the present case, empowers the court to refuse a reference to arbitration if it \"finds\" that the arbitration agreement is \"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\".\n5. This Court in Konkan Railways Corporation Ltd. and others vs. M/s. Mehul Construction Co. [(2000) 7 SCC 201 ] (referred) pointed out that Parliament had clearly indicated that the Act had substantially adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (\"the Model Law\") which had been drafted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law \"(UNCITRAL)\". The objective, as the court observed, was to pursue the \"progressive harmonization and unification of the Law of International Trade [Ibid. at p. 206 (para 4), per Pattanaik, J. (as he then was)]. It is further pointed out in the said judgment that, it would be appropriate to bear the said objective in mind while interpreting any provision of the Act. Indeed, Section 45 of the Act is pari materia, not only with Article 8 of the Model Law but also with Article 2(3) of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (\"the New York Convention\").\n6. However, even while bearing these objectives in mind, there is significant difficulty in interpreting the provisions of Section 45 of the Act, which envisages pre-reference judicial interference with the arbitral process, as there is no determinative indicator to ascertain whether the finding of the court under Section 45 should be based on a prima facie view or on the result of a final decision rendered in the trial court.\nThe Judgment in Renusagar\n7. A survey of the situation in other jurisdictions has been made in the judgment of Brother Sabharwal and I refrain from duplicating his efforts, except to point out that two distinct stands are possible on the wording of Article 2(3) of the New York Convention, the language of which, as I have already said, has been reproduced in Section 45 of the Act. My Learned Brother strongly, relies on the observations made in paragraphs 58 and 59 of Renusagar Power Co. vs. General Electric Co. [(1984) 4 SCC 679 ] (referred) (\"Renusagar\"), which no doubt appear to suggest, in the context of Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act, 1961 \"(Foreign Awards Act\") and the Arbitration Act, 1940, that the court must be fully satisfied that the arbitration agreement exists before granting stay of the proceedings. Following these observations, Brother Sabharwal in his judgment, opines that:\n \"When words in an earlier statute have received an authoritative exposition by superior Court (interpretation of Section 3 in Renusagar's case), use of same words in a similar context in a later Act will give rise to a strong presumption that the Parliament intends that the same interpretation should also be followed for construction of these words in the later statute.\" \n8. With great deference to the opinion of my Learned Brother, I find myself unable to agree to this proposition. In fact, the observations in Renusagar (supra) are clearly distinguishable. In the first place, in paragraph 51 of the judgment, the learned Judges set forth six propositions as the conditions required to be fulfilled for invoking Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act, which incidentally has been repealed by the Act. What is of relevance is proposition No. 5, which the court states as follows:\n \"(v) the Court has to be satisfied that the agreement is valid, operative and capable of being performed; this relates to the satisfaction about the \"existence and validity\" of the arbitration agreement. (In the instance case these questions do not arise)\" [Ibid. at p.725 (para 51) per Tulzapurkar, J. (emphasis supplied). \n9. After having said so, the court proceeded to make the observations in paragraph 58, which have been referred to and highlighted by my Learned Brother. In my respectful view, if the court thinks that an issue does not arise, then any observation made with regard to such an issue would be purely obiter dictum. It is a well settled proposition that the ratio decidendi of a case is the principle of law that decided the dispute in the facts of the case and, therefore, a decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition that it did not decide [Mittal Engineering Works vs. Collector of Central Excise, (1997) 1 SCC 203 (referred)at p. 207 (para 8); Jagdish Lal vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538 (referred) at p.560 (para 17); Divisional Controller, KSRTC vs. Mahadeva Shetty & others (2003) 7 SCC 197 (referred) at p. 206 (para 23)]. An apt observation about this principle was made in M/s. Amarnath Nath Om Prakash vs. State of Punjab [(1985) 1 SCC 345 ] (referred)\n \"We consider it proper to say, as we have already said in other cases, that judgments of courts are not be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. It is needless to repeat the oft-quoted truism of Lord Halsbury that a case is only a authority for what it actually decides and not for what may seem to follow logically from it.\" [Ibid. at p. 363 (paras 10 and 11), per Chinnappa Reddy, J. Similar observations were also made in, Union of India vs. Amrit Lal Manchanda, (2004) 3 SCC 75 (referred)at pp. 83-84 (paras 15-18).\n10. Further, decisions rendered under the Arbitration Act, 1940 or under the Foreign Award Act should be considered with caution as the Act purports to bring a new approach to arbitration, as has been observed in Firm Ashok Traders & Anr. vs. Gurumukh Das Saluja [(2004) 3 SCC 155 ] (referred).\n \"The A & C Act, 1996 is a long leap in the direction of alternate dispute resolution systems. It is based on (sic) UNCITRAL Model. The decided cases under the preceding Act of 1940 have to be applied with caution for determining the issues arising for decision under the new Act.\" [Ibid. at 165 (para 13) (emphasis supplied).\n11. Secondly, no one can doubt that Part II of the 1996 Act is intended to opt for the international arbitration regime to meet the challenges of international trade and commerce, nor can it be doubted that Section 45 offers a greater discretion to the court for judicial intervention at the pre-reference stage. Despite all this, the question would still remain as to whether the discretion available for the court for interference, even under Section 45 of the Act, should be exercised on a prima facie view of the nature of the arbitral agreement, or should it be on a final findings?\nEx Visceribus Interpretation of the Statute\n12. True, that there is nothing in Section 45 which suggests that the finding as to the nature of the arbitral agreement has to be ex facie or prima facie. In my view, however, this is an inescapable inference from an ex visceribus interpretation of the statute. Sub-section (3) of Section 8 in Part I of the Act envisages that even in a situation where an application to the court has been made under sub-section (1), the arbitration may commence, continue and even an arbitral award be made. This was obviously meant to cut down delay in the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings. There is conspicuous absence of a corresponding provision either in Section 45 or in the rest of the provisions in Part II. This legitimately gives rise to an inference that once the arbitral agreement has been subjected to scrutiny before the court under Section 45 of the Act, conceivably, the arbitral proceedings could be stayed till the decision of the court on the nature of the arbitral agreement. If it were to be held that the finding of the court under Section 45 should be a final, determinative conclusion, then it is obvious that, until such a pronouncement is made, the arbitral proceedings would have to be in limbo. This evidently defeats the credo and ethos of the Act, which is to enable expeditious arbitration without avoidable intervention by judicial authorities.\n13. The absence in Part Ii of the Act of a provision corresponding to Section 5 in Part I has been highlighted as supportive of the view that greater judicial intervention is contemplated in Part II of the Act. The question that has arisen before the Court is not the presence or absence of judicial intervention; it is one with regard to the manner in which the said judicial intervention should proceed - whether on a final view or prima facie view of the factors enumerated in Section 45 of the Act.\n14. There are distinct advantages in veering to the view that Section 45 does not require a final determinative finding by the Court. First, under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (as in force with effect from 1.1.1998), as in the present case, invariably the arbitral tribunal is vested with the power to rule upon its own jurisdiction. Even if the court takes the view that the arbitral agreement is not vitiated or that it is not invalid, inoperative or unenforceable, based upon purely a prima facie view, nothing prevents the arbitrator from trying the issue fully and rendering a final decision thereupon. If the arbitrator finds the agreement valid, there is no problem as the arbitration will proceed and the award will be made. However, if the arbitrator finds the agreement invalid, inoperative or void, this means that the party who wanted to proceed for arbitration was given an opportunity of proceeding to arbitration, and the arbitrator after fully trying the issue has found that there no scope for arbitration. Since the arbitrator's finding would not be an enforceable award, there is no need to take recourse to the judicial intercession available under Section 48(1)(a) of the Act.\n15. The finding of the court that the arbitration agreement is valid, operative and enforceable, if in favour of the party setting up the arbitration agreement, is not appealable under Section 50 as a matter of legislative policy. Refusing to refer parties to arbitration under Section 45, is however, made appealable under Section 50(1)(a) of the Act. Even after the court takes a prima facie view that the arbitration agreement is not vitiated on account of factors enumerated in Section 45, and the arbitrator upon a full trial holds that there is no vitiating factor in the arbitration agreement and makes an award, such as award can be challenged under Section 48(1)(a). The award will be set aside if the party against whom it is invoked satisfies the court inter alia that the agreement was not valid under the law to which the parties had suggested it or under the law of the country where the award was made. The two basic requirements, namely, expedition at the pre-reference stage, and a fair opportunity to contest the award after full trial, would be fully satisfied by interpreting Section 45 as enabling the court to act on a prima facie view.\nRes Judicata and Unfairness\n16. If the finding made under Section 45 as to the validity of the arbitral agreement were to be treated as final, then the competent court while entertaining an application for enforcement of a foreign award might decline to go into the same question. In other words, the court before which enforcement is sought may not re-examine whether the agreement was valid under the applicable law, on the ground that a final judgment had been rendered on a earlier occasion by another competent court. The principles analogous to res judicata (even though the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not directly apply) might preclude the party from raising the defence under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 48.\n17. When a party raises the issue as to the validity of the agreement in an application under Section 45, the court must either hold a full-fledged trial and give a final finding or give a prima facie finding on that issue. If we were to hold that a final finding has to be given, then it must necessarily be after a trial recording all necessary evidence, in order to eliminate the likelihood of fraud, coercision etc that may render the agreement void, inoperative or unenforceable. If we were to take the view that it could be done only on the basis of affidavits by excluding oral evidence altogether, I am afraid, it would render injustice to the party because a final judgment would have been rendered on insufficient material.\n18. Moreover, since principles analogous to res judicata may operate, as mentioned earlier, such a party may not even be heard in a post-award situation under Section 48(1)(a) on the same issue as the finding given under Section 45 would be treated as final and binding. For this reason also, I am of the view that, it would be preferable to hold that Section 45 requires only a prima facie view of the matter as to the absence of the vitiating factors contemplated therein.\n19. Treating the finding under Section 45 as final results in a paradoxical situation. A final decision rendered by the competent court on the nature of the arbitral agreement may have to be ignored by the arbitral tribunal, which would be entitled to decide the issue afresh on the material presented to it. It may also lead to another curious result, that the competent court in the jurisdiction where the arbitration proceeds (Japan, as in the present case) would have to reckon with the fully binding effect of a finding made under Section 45 by a competent court in India arrived at by following a summary procedure without admitting all relevant evidence.\nProof of Applicable Foreign Law\n20. There is yet another strange result which may come about by holding that Section 45 requires a final finding. This can be illustrated by reference to the facts of the present case. The parties here have subjected their agreement to the laws of Japan. The question that will arise is: When a court has to make a final determinative ruling on the validity of the arbitration agreement, under which law is this issue to be tested? This question of choice of law has been conclusively decided by the judgment of this Court in National Thermal Power Corporation vs. Singer Company (1992) 3 SCC 551 ) (referred), where it was observed:\n \"The proper law of the arbitration agreement is normally the same as the proper law of the contract. It is only in exceptional cases that it is not so even where the proper law of the contract is expressly chosen by the parties. Where, however, there is no express choice of the law governing the contract as a whole, of the arbitration agreements as such, a presumption may arise that the law of the country where the arbitration is agreed to be held is the proper law of the arbitration agreement. But that is only a rebuttable presumption.\" [Ibid. at p.563 (para 23), per Thommen, J.)\n21. Thus, the proper law of the arbitration agreement is the substantive law governing the contract itself. In the present case, to effectively decide whether the arbitration agreement is \"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\", the court would have to apply the law to which the contract has been expressly subjected, namely, Japanese law. Obviously, proof of Japanese law (as applicable to arbitration agreements) would have to be rendered on the lines of proving facts in a trial.)\n22. It would not only be unfeasible to prove foreign law exclusively through affidavits, but it would also entail enormous expenditure of time and money. Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration highlights that this problem as best exemplified in the U.S. case of SMG Swedish Machine Group vs. Swedish Machine Group [XVIII Y.B. Comm. Arb. 457 (1993) (decided on 4.1.91). In this case, it was held by the U.S. court that the validity or existence of the arbitration agreement would have to be conclusively determined by the court itself at the pre-award stage. The law applicable to the arbitration agreement was Swedish law and therefore the validity of the agreement had to be determined in accordance with this law. The court reviewed the Swedish law opinions submitted by both parties, but found them poorly documented. When parties submitted new opinions, these were found to be mutually contradictory. Finally, the court had to conduct a hearing where parties could provide proof of their true intentions as to the issue [See, Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (E. Gaillard and J. Savage, eds. 1999) at p.411-412 (para 680)]. Thus, similar difficulties, delays and costs may be encountered by the trial court in the present case if it has to give a final finding (after conducting a full-fledged trial) on the validity of the arbitration agreement at the pre-reference stage under Section 45.\n23. On the other hand, if one were to take the view that the finding under Section 45 is only a prima facie view, then all these difficulties could be obviated. Neither the arbitral tribunal, nor the court enforcing the arbitral award may consider itself bound by the prima facie view expressed under Section 45 of the Act. The difficulty of having to conclusively prove the applicable foreign law at a trial would also be obviated.\nRedundancy in the Statute\n24. Another undesirable result flows from the view that the court conclusively rules upon the validity of the arbitration agreement at the pre-reference stage. If a final finding were to be made upon the arbitration agreement, finding it valid and operative, such a finding might operate as res judicata. Thus, one ground made available by Parliament under Section 48(1)(a) to assail the award at the post-award stage, by impugning the validity of the arbitration agreement, would be totally precluded because the finding under Section 45 on the said issue would be final. The approach suggested by Brother Sabharwal would, therefore, preclude this ground in cases where Section 45 is in fact resorted to by parties. Indeed, the present case is such a case, where the ground might be precluded if a final finding were to be arrived at by the trial court in the application under Section 45.\n25. It is a well accepted principle of statutory interpretation that a court must make every effort to give effect to all words in a statute since Parliament cannot be held to have been wasting its words or saying something in vain. (See, for example, G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th edn., 2004) at p. 68; Craies on Statute Law (S.G.G. Edgar eds., 7th edn., 1971, 1999 Indian Reprint) at pp. 103-107) . Only in exceptional situations can this be departed from. In J.K. Cotton Mills Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (AIR 1961 SC 1170 ) (referred) it was observed:\n \"In the interpretation of statutes the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect.\" (Ibid. at p. 1174 (para 7).\n26. This principle has received widespread acceptance by this court in numerous decisions. (See, for example, Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 (referred) (para 26); Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271 (referred) (para 14); Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner, AIR 1964 SC 766 (referred)(para 15). If the approach suggested by Brother Sabharwal in interpreting Section 45 were to be adopted, it could effectively make a part of the provision in Section 48(1)(a) redundant; an outcome which Parliament could surely have not intended.\nPossibility of Multiple Trials\n27. It appears to me that, at the post-award stage, at least, the finding has to be recorded on a full trial of the relevant issue under Section 48(1)(a). If this be so, I see no special advantage in taking the view that the finding under Section 45 should be anything other than a prima facie finding.\n28. Even if the view were to be taken that the finding under Section 45 of the Act would be a final finding not amenable to reiteration under Section 48(1)(a) at the time of the attempt to enforce the award, it is quite possible that the award may be challenged on the other grounds available under Section 48. As I have already said, this challenge will have to be tried out by a full trial by involving all kinds of evidence (including oral evidence). If that be so, then all issues including the present issue could be tried fully after the award instead of seeking a final finding at the pre-reference stage under Section 45 of the Act. This would be in consonance with the ethos of the Act to avoid delay at different stages, to centralize the court review of all disputes relating to the arbitration at the post-award stage, and also carry forward the objectives of the Model Law.\nApproach in Foreign Jurisdictions\n29. The importance of carrying forward the objectives underlying the Model Law can hardly be gainsaid. There is evident dearth of guiding Indian precedent which might be useful in interpreting Section 45 of the Act. Hence, it becomes necessary to seek light from foreign judgments interpreting corresponding provisions that have been modeled on the Model Law. Now, for a survey of such foreign precedents.\n30. It has rightly been noticed in the judgment of Brother Sabharwal that different countries have approached the issue depending on their substantive and processual laws. It has been noticed that the situation under the French Code of Civil Procedure favours a prima facie view, since under the Statute if the dispute is not before an arbitral tribunal, the French Courts must decline jurisdiction unless the arbitration agreement is \"patently void\".\n31. Similarly, Article 7 of the 1987 Swiss. Private International Law Statute stipulates that the courts decline jurisdiction \"...b. unless the court finds that the arbitral agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\". This has been interpreted by the Swiss Federal Tribunal as restricting the courts review at the start of the proceedings to a prima facie verification of the existence and effectiveness of the arbitration clause. [See, Fondation M. vs. Banque X, 1996 Bull. ASA 527 (referred)(Swiss Fed. Trib, Apr. 29, 1996) cited from Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (E. Gaillard and J. Savage, eds. 1999) at p. 409) (para 675).\n32. As far as the U.S. jurisdiction is concerned, the statute there, which deals both with the substantive law and the law of procedure, is worded differently from the Act. Indeed, not all jurisdictions in the U.S. have seen modeled their law on the Model Law and U.S. cases must be approached with great caution. The U.S. position is, therefore, not very helpful in resolving the issue before us.\n33. It has been noticed in Brother Sabharwal's judgment that in at least two common law jurisdictions, Ontario and Hong Kong, both of which have based their law on the Model Law (like India), the courts have adopted a 'liberal approach' to the issue, namely, that of prima facie view as to the existence and non-vitiation of the arbitral agreement, before making a reference. The Hong Kong and Ontario judgments will be examined presently.\nThe Hong Kong Judgment\n34. There is no doubt that in Pacific International Lines (Pte.) Ltd. vs. Tsinlien Metals and Minerals Co. Ltd., XVIII Y.B COMM. ARB. 180 (1993) (referred) (decided on 1.7.1992) (\"Pacific International Lines\") the High Court of Hong Kong was concerned precisely with the issue as to whether there was a valid arbitration agreement within the meaning of Article 7 of the Model Law. The court was of the view that there was a \"plainly arguable\" case to support the proposition that there was an arbitration agreement that complied with Article 7 of the Model Law. The Court observed:\n \"It follows, therefore, that if I am satisfied that there is a plainly arguable case to support the proposition and there was an arbitration agreement which complies with Art. 7 of the Model Law, I should proceed to appoint the arbitrator in the full knowledge that the defendants will not be precluded from raising the point before the arbitrator and having the matter reconsidered by the court consequent upon that preliminary ruling.\" Ibid. at p.185 (para 18), per Kaplan, J.\n35. Further, the court held:\n \"I am quite satisfied that the plaintiffs have made out a strongly arguable case in support of an arbitration agreement which complies Article 7 of the Model Law.\" Ibid.at p. 185 (para 19), per Kaplan, J.\n36. In my reading of the case, the Hong Kong High Court was squarely concerned with the issue as to whether the arbitration agreement complied with Article 7 of the Model Law or not. This became relevant because under Article 8 the Court was empowered to decide as to the existence or otherwise of the arbitral agreement and Article 7 required the agreement to be in the form prescribed by that Article itself. With respect, it would be incorrect to distinguish the case on the ground that it was not concerned with Article 8 of the Model Law. In my view, the court was directly concerned with the validity of the arbitration agreement as it was argued that the arbitration agreement did not comply with Article 7 and, therefore, was invalid.\n37. The second ground of distinction sought t be made by my learned Brother is that the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (\"the Hong Kong Ordinance\") was based upon the English Arbitration Act, 1996 (\"the English Act\") and that the Hong Kong judgment was in the special context of these statutes. In particular, my Learned Brother holds that Section 6 of the Hong Kong Ordinance is similar to Section 32 of the English Act (both of which are not present in our Act), as a distinguishing feature rendering the Hong Kong judgment inapplicable to the present case. To clear the air, I quote below both the concerned provisions.\nThe Hong Kong Ordinance:\n \"Section 6 Court to refer matter to arbitration in certain cases\n(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court) applies to a matter that is the subject of a domestic arbitration agreement in the same way as it applies to a matter that is the subject of an international arbitration agreement.\n(2) Subject to subsection (3), if a party to an arbitration agreement that provides for the arbitration of a dispute involving a claim or other matter this is within the jurisdiction of the Labour Tribunal or a person claiming through or under such a party, commences legal proceedings in any court against any other party to the agreement or any person claiming through or under that other party, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, and any party to those legal proceedings applies to that court after appearance and before delivering any pleadings or taking any other step in the proceedings, to stay the proceedings, the court or a judge of that court may make an order staying the proceedings, if satisfied that-\n(a) there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the agreement; and\n(b) the applicant was ready and willing at the time the proceedings were commenced to do all things necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration, and remains so. \n (3) Subsections (1) and (2) have effect subject to section 15 of the Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance (Cap 71).\" \nThe English Act:\n \"Section 32.- Determination of preliminary point of jurisdiction.\n(1) The court may, on the application of a party to arbitral proceedings (upon notice to the other parties), determine any question as to the substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal. A party may lose the right to object (see section 73).\n(2) An application under this section shall not be considered unless -\n(a) it is made with the agreement in writing of all the other parties to the proceedings, or\n(b) it is made with the permission of the tribunal and the court is satisfied-\n(i) that the determination of the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs,\n(ii) that the application was made without delay, and\n(iii) that there is good reason why the matter should be decided by the court.\n(3) An application under this section, unless made with the agreement of all the other parties to the proceedings, shall state the grounds on which it is said that the matter should be decided by the court.\n(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award while an application to the court under this section is pending.\n(5) Unless the court gives leave, no appeal lies from a decision of the court whether the conditions specified in subsection (2) are met.\n(6) The decision of the court on the question of jurisdiction shall be treated as a judgment of the court for the purposes of an appeal. But no appeal lies without the leave of the court which shall not be given unless the court considers that the question involves a point of law which is one of general importance or is one which for some other special reason should be considered by the Court of Appeal.\" \n38. On a comparative reading of Section 6 of the Hong Kong Ordinance and Section 32 of the English Act, it appears to me that the two are neither similar, nor resemble each other, the purposes of the two sections being totally different. This distinction made by Brother Sabharwal, with respect, appears to be unsupportable.\n39. On the other hand, what corresponds to Section 32 of the English Act is Section 23A of the Hong Kong Ordinance, which is reproduced below:\n \"Section 23A Determination of preliminary point of law by Court\n(1) Subject to subsection (2) and section 23B, on an application to the Court made by any of the parties to a reference -\n(a) with the consent of an arbitrator who has entered on the reference or, if an umpire has entered on the reference, with his consent, or\n(b) with the consent of all the other parties,\nthe Court shall have jurisdiction to determine any question of law arising in the course of the reference.\n(2) The Court shall not entertain an application under subsection (1)(a) with respect to any question of law unless it is satisfied that-\n(a) the determination of the application might produce substantial savings in costs to the parties; and\n(b) the question of law is one in respect of which I leave to appeal would be likely to be given under section 23(3)(b).\n(3) A decision of the Court under subsection (1) shall be deemed to be a judgment of the Court within the meaning of section 14 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) (appeals to the Court of Appeal), but no appeal shall lie from such a decision unless the Court or the Court of Appeal gives leave.\" (Amended 25 of 1998 s.2)\n40. Courts under both Section 32 of the English Act as well as Section 23A of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, can make a determination of preliminary point of jurisdiction with the 'consent of all the parties' or at least with the 'consent of the arbitrator' and only upon being satisfied that the determination of the application might reduce substantially the costs to the parties, and the question of law is one in which leave is likely to be given.\n41. The Hong Kong decision has also been distinguished on the ground that Section 23A of the Hong Kong Ordinance specifically provides for determination of the preliminary issue by the court and that there is no similar provision in the Act. With respect, this distinction may also not be valid. In the first place, the judgment in Pacific International Lines (supra) was rendered in the year 1992; it does not make any reference whatsoever to Section 23A of the Hong Kong Ordinance. Nor does it appear from the judgment that there was any analogous provision when the Hong Kong High Court decided the matter. Indeed, all references in the judgment are to the provisions of the Model Law. Moreover, if Section 23A had been applicable, it would have been wholly unnecessary for the court to express its opinion on an interpretation of Article 7 or 8 of the Model Law as it could straightaway have relied on Section 23A. In my view, the Hong Kong judgment squarely deals with the issue before us and conclusively holds that the approach to be adopted is whether it is a \"plainly arguable\" that the arbitration agreement was in existence.\nThe Ontario Judgment\n42. The Ontario Court of Justice in Rio Algom Ltd. vs. Sami Steel Co.Ltd. XVII Y.B. COMM. ARB. 166 (1993) (referred)(decided on 1.3.1991). dealt with Article 16 of the Model Law with regard to the competence of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction and the court's own powers at the preliminary stage. Article 16 has been quoted in Learned Brother Sabharwal's judgment. The court expressed its categorical opinion on the relevant issue in the following words:\n \"What appears to me of significance is that the Model Law reflects an emphasis in favour of arbitration in the first instance in international commercial arbitrations to which it applies (of which it is common ground this is one). The courts in matters of contract interpretation as such are limited in that they do not appear to have a role in determining matters of law or construction; jurisdiction and scope of authority are for the arbitrator to determine in the first instance, subject to later recourse to set aside the ruling or award. The role of the court before arbitration appears to be confined to determining whether the arbitration clause is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed (Art. 8) - if not it is mandatory to send the parties to arbitration. Kane, J. did not follow this course - he referred questions of the construction of the agreement to trial without apparent reference to the condition specified in Art.8; these issues to be tried relate to matters of law, including jurisdiction and scope7 of the arbitrator's authority, but not, so far as I can see, to the issues for the court to determine under art. 8. It seems to me be at least arguable that the matters referred to trial are not matters that permit the intervention of the court in the light of Art. 5, supra.\" Ibid.at pp. 170-171 (para 13)\n43. In my view, this is a clear and unequivocal expression on the part of the court on the issue before us. Indeed, the Ontario Court has clearly held that the court in the matter of interpretation of the existence and non-vitiation of the arbitral agreement has only a prima facie jurisdiction and is not required to render a final decision at that stage.\nThe English Judgment\n44. The English judgment in Azov Shipping Co. vs. Baltic Shipping Co., [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 68 (Q.B.) (referred). raised a different issue altogether. The case of the applicant before the court was that he was not a party to the arbitral agreement, which contained the arbitration clause, and, despite this, the arbitrator had delivered an award in favour of the other party. The arbitrator after a full trial found that there was a valid arbitration agreement and that he had jurisdiction over the parties. There was a challenge to the award. The issue before the court was: Where a full-scale hearing on jurisdiction had been completed before the arbitrator, and there was a challenge to the award, whether the jurisdiction of the arbitrator could be challenged with complete oral evidence and cross-examination so the challenge in effect became a full hearing of what had already occurred before the arbitrator?\n45. The court allowed the application and held that even at the post-award stage, it was permissible to lead oral evidence to demonstrate that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction. The point of distinction is that the court was dealing with a challenge at a post-award stage. There would be no doubt that, at that stage the finding on the jurisdictional issue or the existence of vitiating factors has to be rendered only after complete trial and has to be a final finding. Further, the observations of the court were perfectly in consonance of Sections 32 and 67 of the English Act which are not in any manner reflected in the Act.\nConsequences of the Mollificatory Suggestions\n46. The suggestions made by Learned Brother Sabharwal to mollify some of the obvious drawbacks of the approach that he adopts, also needs closer scrutiny. He has suggested a trial by affidavits as well as a fixed time-frame to reduce the possible delays ensuing from a protracted trial at the pre-reference stage. In my view, any attempt to mollify the significant adverse consequences of the determinative approach by enabling the court to render final judgment only on the basis of affidavits, albeit within a fixed time-frame, may prove counter-productive.\n47. There are several instances where affidavit evidence cannot aid in making a final determinative finding on the issue. For instance, where a defence taken is that the signature of a party was forged or that agreement itself is entirely fabricated, I cannot conceive of the issue being satisfactorily determined fully and finally merely on the basis of affidavits without oral evidence. Correspondingly, if courts at the preliminary stage were to admit oral evidence, simply because forgery or the like is pleaded, the consequences are still troublesome. In fact, if the view postulated by learned Brother Sabharwal were to prevail, then all international commercial arbitrations can be defeated by a totally bogus defence that the agreement is forged or fabricated. If such a defence were to be allowed, it would necessarily require a full-fledged trial (with oral evidence) at the pre-reference stage with all its consequential delay and expense. On the other hand, if only a prima facie view were to be taken, then the issue could still be examined in-depth after a full trial either before the arbitral tribunal or at any rate Section 48(1)(a) when the enforceability of the ensuing award is questioned.\n48. I am afraid that the suggestion of fixing a time limit, within which an issue can be determined without oral evidence, may also not be practical. As pointed out earlier, if the applicable law is a foreign law (which is not an uncommon feature in international commercial contracts), the time limit of three months is unlikely to be complied with as it would be unfeasible. In any event, since it is undoubted that at the enforcement stage a full trial under Section 48 is permissible, parties are none the better by having two trials i.e. one at the stage of Section 45, and another at the stage of Section 48.\n49. I fully agree with my Learned Brother's view that the object of dispute resolution through arbitration, including international commercial arbitration, is expedition and that the object of the Act would be defeated if proceedings remain pending in court even after commencing of the arbitration. It is precisely for this reason that I am inclined to the view that at the pre-reference stage contemplated by Section 45, the court is required to take only a prima facie view for making the reference, leaving the parties to a full trial either before the arbitral tribunal or before the court at the post-award stage.\n50. Undoubtedly, an international commercial arbitration involves huge expenses, particularly where the parties have subjected the contract to a foreign law. But, that cannot be a deterrent to this Court from pronouncing on the correct approach to be adopted under Section 45 of the Act. In fact, as I have pointed out, adopting a final and determinative approach under Section 45 may not only prolong proceedings at the initial stage but also correspondingly increase costs and uncertainty for all the parties concerned. Finally, having regard to the structure of the Act, consequences arising from particular interpretations, judgments in other jurisdictions, as well as the opinion of learned authors on the subject, See, for example, FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (E. Gaillard and J. Savage, eds. 1999) at pp. 412-412 (para 682) as well as JULIAN D.M. LEW ET. AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003) at p.346 (para 14-53) who support the prima facie approach. I am of the view that, the correct approach to be adopted under section 45 at the pre-reference stage, is one of a prima facie finding by the trial court as the validity or otherwise of the arbitration agreement.\n51. For all these reasons, I respectfully differ from the judgment of my esteemed Brother Sabharwal. I am of the view that the present matter needs to be remitted to the trial court, but not for a full trial as directed by the impugned judgment of the High Court. The application under Section 45 would have to be determined by the trial court after arriving at the prima facie satisfaction that there exists an arbitral agreement, which is \"not null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\". If the trial court finds thus, the parties shall be referred to arbitration.\n52. The appeal is accordingly allowed and Ordered accordingly.\nHon'ble Justice Dharmadhikari J. -- Leave granted.\n2. I have carefully gone through very elaborate and well- considered opinions differing with each other of learned Brethren Y. K. Sabharwal and B. N. Srikrishna JJ.\n3. With utmost respect to both of them, I am inclined to agree with the view expressed by learned Brother Srikrishna J. but only with a rider and a partly different reason which may I state below:-\n4. The main issue is regarding the scope of power of any judicial authority including a regular civil court under section 45 of the Act in making or refusing a reference of dispute arising from an international arbitration agreement governed by the provisions contained in Part III Chapter-I of the Act of 1996. I respectfully Agree with learned Brother Srikrishna J only to the extent that if on prima facie examination of the documents and material on record, including the arbitration agreement on which request for reference is made by one of the parties, the judicial authority or the court decides to make a reference, it may merely mention the submissions and contentions of the parties and summarily decide the objection if any raised on the alleged nullity, voidness, inoperativeness or incapability of the arbitration agreement. In case, however, on a prima facie view of the matter, which is required to be objectively taken on the basis of material and evidence produced by the parties on the record of the case, the judicial authority including a regular civil court, is inclined to reject the request for reference on the ground that the agreement is 'null and void' or 'inoperative' or 'incapable of being performed' within the meaning of section 45 of the Act, the judicial authority or the court must afford full opportunities to the parties to lead whatever documentary or oral evidence they want to lead and then decide the question like trial of a preliminary issue on jurisdiction or limitation in regular civil suit and pass an elaborate reasoned order. Where a judicial authority or the court refuses to make a reference on the grounds available under section 45 of the Act, it is necessary for the judicial authority or the court which is seized of the matter, to pass a reasoned order as the same is subject to appeal to the appellate court under section 50(1)(a) of the Act and further appeal to this Court under sub-section (2) of the said section.\n5. Whether such a decision of the judicial authority or the court of refusal to make a reference on grounds permissible under section 45 of the Act would be subjected to further reexamination before the arbitral tribunal or the court in which eventually the award comes up for enforcement in accordance with section 48(1)(a) of the Act, is a legal question of sufficient complexity and in my considered opinion since that question does not directly arise on the facts of the present case, it should be left open for consideration in an appropriate case where such a question is directly raised and decided by the court.\n6. With this addition, I agree with the view expressed by learned Brother Srikrishna J., and with his conclusion that the matter should be remitted to the original court for a fresh decision in the light of the view expressed by this Court.\nHon'ble Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, J. -- Leave granted.\n2. The interpretation of Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Act') falls for determination in this matter. Section 45 is as under:\n \"45. Power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration. Notwithstanding anything contained in Part I or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), a judicial authority, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement referred to in section 44, shall, at the request of one of the parties or any person claiming through or under him, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.\" \n3. The real question for consideration is as to the nature of adjudication that is contemplated by Section 45 when the objection about the agreement being \"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\" is raised before a judicial authority. Should the judicial authority while exercising power under Section 45 decide the objection on a prima facie view of the matter and render a prima facie finding or a final finding on merits on affording parties such opportunity as the justice of the case may demand having regard to facts of the case? The question is important and at the same time not free from difficulty. World over the opinion is divided. Courts in some of the countries have preferred the view that the adjudication should be prima facie so as to be raised again before arbitral forum and others have preferred a final adjudication. Under Section 45 of the Act, the judicial authority has to mandatorily refer the parties to arbitration, if conditions specified in the section are fulfilled and agreement is not found to be null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. From Indian perspective to answer the question, first it would be useful to examine few other provisions of the Act besides the Preamble and the Statement of Objects and Reasons and in that light consider the international precedents. The question being examined by this Court is in relation to a consolidated legislation which deals with domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Before enactment of the Act there were separate statutes governing the international arbitration and domestic arbitration, namely, the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (6 of 1937), The Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940) and The Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 (45 of 1961). These statutes have been repealed as provided in Section 85 of the Act. The 1996 Act was enacted considering the international scenario as is evident from its Preamble, which reads :\n \"WHEREAS the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 1985:\nAND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has recommended that all countries give due consideration to the said Model Law, in view of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international commercial arbitration practice;\nAND WHEREAS the UNCITRAL has adopted the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules in 1980;\nAND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has recommended the use of the said Rules in cases where a dispute arises in the context of international commercial relations and the parties seek an amicable settlement of that dispute by recourse to conciliation;\nAND WHEREAS the said Model Law and Rules make significant contribution to the establishment of a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of disputes arising in international commercial relations;\nAND WHEREAS it is expedient to make law respecting arbitration and conciliation, taking into account the aforesaid Model Law and Rules;\" \n4. The enforcement of foreign awards has been dealt with in Part II of the Act which has two Chapters, Chapter I dealing with New York Convention Awards and Chapter II dealing with Geneva Convention Awards. In this matter we are concerned with Chapter I which comprises of Sections 44 to 52. Section 44 defines foreign award. It is not in dispute that the present case falls under the ambit of Section 44. Section 45 has already been extracted above. Conditions for enforcement of foreign awards are stipulated in Section 48 under which enforcement may be refused at the request of the party against whom it is invoked only if that party furnishes to the court proof as postulated in clauses (a) and (e). In addition, the enforcement of the award may also be refused on the grounds stipulated in Section 48(2) of the Act. Section 49 provides that where the court is satisfied that the foreign award is enforceable under Chapter I, the award shall be deemed to be a decree of the court. Section 50 provides as to against which orders an appeal shall lie. It reads as under :\n \"50. Appealable orders.- (1) An appeal shall lie from the order refusing to - (a) refer the parties to arbitration under section 45; (b) enforce a foreign award under section 48, to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from such order. (2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.\" \n5. As can be seen from above, an order refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 45 of the Act is appealable. There is, however, no provision for filing an appeal if the judicial authority refers the parties to arbitration. Reference may also be made to Section 8 of the Act although it deals with domestic arbitration. It reads thus:\n \"8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.\n(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.\n(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.\n(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.\" \n6. Under the Old Arbitration Act (Section 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940), court had discretion in the matter of grant of stay of legal proceedings where there was an arbitration agreement on being satisfied that the arbitration agreement exists factually and legally and disputes between the parties are in regard to the matter agreed to be referred to arbitration. The Court in exercise of its discretion could also decline an order of stay despite existence of aforesaid conditions, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The discretion was, however, required to be exercised on well settled judicial principles. Section 8 of the Act is a departure from Section 34 of the old Act. Under this section judicial authority has no discretion. It is mandatory for the judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration on the existence of conditions stipulated in the section. Unlike Section 45, the judicial authority under Section 8 has not been conferred the power to refuse reference to arbitration on the ground of invalidity of the agreement. It is evident that the object is to avoid delay and accelerate reference to arbitration leaving the parties to raise objection, if any, to the validity of the arbitration agreement before the arbitral forum and/or post award under Section 34 of the Act. Dealing with the statement of object and reasons of the Act, this Court in Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. v. Mehul Construction Co. [(2000) 7 SCC 201 ] (referred) said:\n \"At the outset, it must be borne in mind that prior to the 1996 Act, the Arbitration Act of 1940, which was in force in India provided for domestic arbitration and no provision was there to deal with the Foreign Awards. So far as the Foreign Awards are concerned, the same were being dealt with by the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961. The increasing growth of global trade and the delay in disposal of cases in Courts under the normal system in several countries made it imperative to have the perception of an alternative Dispute Resolution System, more particularly, in the matter of commercial disputes. When the entire world was moving in favour of a speedy resolution of commercial disputes, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law way back in 1985 adopted the Uncitral Model Law of International Commercial Arbitration and since then, number of countries have given recognition to that Model in their respective legislative system. With the said Uncitral Model Law in view the present Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 has been enacted in India replacing the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, which was the principal legislation on Arbitration in the country that had been enacted during the British Rule. and the growing volume of India's trade and commercial relationship with the rest of the world after the new liberalisation policy of the Government, Indian Parliament was persuaded to enact the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 in Uncitral Model and, therefore, in interpreting any provisions of the 1996 Act Courts must not ignore the objects and purpose of the enactment of 1996. A bare comparison of different provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1940 with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would unequivocally indicate that 1996 Act limits intervention of Court with an arbitral process to the minimum and it is certainly not the legislative intent that each and every order passed by an authority under the Act would be a subject matter of judicial scrutiny of a Court of Law. Under the new law the grounds on which an award of an Arbitrator could be challenged before the Court have been severely cut down and such challenge is now permitted on the basis of invalidity of the agreement, want of jurisdiction on the part of the Arbitrator or want of proper notice to a party of the appointment of the Arbitrator or of Arbitral proceedings. The powers of the Arbitrator have been amplified by insertion of specific provisions of several matters. Obstructive tactics adopted by the parties in arbitration proceedings are sought to be thwarted by an express provision inasmuch as if a party knowingly keeps silent and then suddenly raises a procedural objection will not be allowed to do so. The role of institutions in promoting and organising arbitration has been recognised. The power to nominate Arbitrators has been given to the Chief Justice or to an institution or person designated by him. The time limit for making awards has been deleted. The existing provisions in 1940 Act relating to arbitration through intervention of Court, when there is no suit pending or by order of the Court when there is a suit pending, have been removed. The importance of transnational commercial arbitration has been recognised and it has been specifically provided that even where the arbitration is held in India, the parties to the contract would be free to designate the law applicable to the substance of the dispute. Under the new law unless the agreement provides otherwise, the Arbitrators are required to give reasons for the award. The award itself has now been vested with status of a decree, inasmuch as the award itself is made executable as a decree and it will no longer be necessary to apply to the Court for a decree in terms of the award. All these aim at achieving the sole object to resolve the dispute as expeditiously as possible with the minimum intervention of a Court of Law so that the trade and commerce is not affected on account of litigations before a Court. When United Nations established the Commission on International Trade Law it is on account of the fact that the General Assembly recognised that disparities in national laws governing international trade created obstacles to the flow of trade. The General Assembly regarded the Commission on International Trade Law as a medium which could play a more active role in reducing or removing the obstacles. Such Commission, therefore, was given a mandate for progressive harmonization and unification of the law of International Trade. With that objective when Uncitral Model has been prepared and the Parliament in our country enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 adopting Uncitral Model, it would be appropriate to bear the said objective in mind while interpreting any provision of the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act clearly enunciates that the main objective of the legislation was to minimise the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process...\" \n7. True, now the judicial interference has been limited to a narrower circumference than under the old arbitration laws but the question here is when Section 45 of the Act envisages judicial interference, what is the extent thereof having regard to the language of the section and the scheme of the Act. What is the standard of review that the judicial authority should adopt in relation to the arbitration agreement at the initial stage of Section 45, viz., a prima facie finding or a final finding? At this stage, we may briefly notice the circumstances under which the matter has come up for consideration before this Court. There is hardly any controversy in respect of material facts necessary for examination of the question involved. The controversy is only in regard to the power exercisable by a judicial authority under Section 45 of the Act. Parties (Appellant and Respondent No.1) entered into an agreement dated 16/18th November, 2000 which contained an arbitration clause as under:\n \"Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed and interpreted under the laws of Japan. All disputes arising out of or in relation to this Agreement which cannot be settled by mutual accord shall be settled by arbitration in Tokyo, Japan, in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of International Chamber of Commerce. The award of arbitration shall be final and binding upon both parties.\" \n8. The appellant terminated the agreement in terms of its letter dated 31st December, 2002. The first respondent instituted a suit claiming a decree of declaration and injunction against the appellant for cancellation of the document dated 16/18th November, 2000 and/or declaration that the long term sale and purchase agreement dated 16/18th November, 2000 including the arbitration clause on the ground that the terms of agreement are unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable and against the public policy and the same was entered into under undue influence and is, therefore, void ab initio, inoperative and incapable of performance and cannot be given effect to. The appellant made an application in the suit praying that the plaintiff shall be directed to submit to the ongoing arbitration proceedings before the International Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo, Japan. The application was, however, filed under Section 8 of the Act. The trial court by order dated 29th September, 2003 came to the conclusion that the application of the appellant under Section 8 of the Act deserves to be allowed. Consequently, the parties were referred to arbitration. It was urged on behalf of the appellant before the trial court that since there is an arbitration clause in the agreement, court's jurisdiction is exhausted as Section 8 is mandatory and, therefore, court must refer the dispute to arbitration. As already noticed, unlike Section 45 the objection as to the validity of the arbitration agreement cannot be raised as a defence to an application filed under Section 8. This seems to be the reason for the appellant insisting before the trial court that Section 8 is applicable and not Section 45 of the Act. It is clearly not a case of filing an application under a wrong provision. The trial court also proceeded under erroneous assumption that Section 45 comes into play after the award is made as such a submission seems to have been made by the appellant before that court. The order of the trial court was challenged by the first respondent before the High Court in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, there being no provision of appeal against an order of reference to arbitration. Even before the High Court, it was contented for the appellant that as both Section 8 and Section 45 were applicable, the application under Section 8 of the Act was rightly moved before the trial court and the court did not commit any error in considering the matter for reference to arbitration after application of Section 45 of the Act. The High Court examined the question whether Section 45 has been applied by the trial court and, if so, in its true perspective. The High Court held that the trial court ought to have proceeded to examine the application under Section 45 of the Act which was not done. Under these circumstances, without entering into merits of the case, the High Court directed fresh adjudication of the application by the trial court after application of Section 45 of the Act. Consequently, by the impugned judgment, the order of the trial court dated 29th September, 2003 was set aside and matter remanded for fresh decision of the trial court. Before this Court, learned counsel for the parties have rightly taken the stand that only Section 45 is applicable and Section 8 has no applicability. It is evident that there has been no adjudication of the application by the trial court in terms of Section 45 of the Act. The trial court has not gone into the question, prima facie or finally, as to agreement being null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, which was the objection raised by the first respondent in reply to the application of the appellant. Thus, on ingredients of Section 45, there was no adjudication. Therefore, the direction of the High Court for fresh adjudication of application of the appellant having regard to the provisions of Section 45 of the Act cannot be faulted. It is also necessary to issue directions for expeditious adjudication of the said application by the trial court but after first determining the scope of adjudication in exercise of power under Section 45. On behalf of the appellant, Mr. Nariman contends that the consideration by the judicial authority under Section 45 has to be on a prima facie view of the matter based on examination of the plaint and any documents attached thereto, reply to the application for reference and any documents attached thereto and the affidavits filed by the parties. The court, on a prima facie examination of the pleadings and documents, should come to the conclusion as to whether the arbitration agreement is null or void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. Learned counsel submits that final determination on merits in some cases may even require recording of evidence and proceedings may turn out to be a full fledged trial thereby defeating the very purpose for the enactment of the Act. It is urged that the final determination can be made if such objections are raised before the arbitral forum and/or post award by the court. On the other hand, on behalf of first respondent, Mr. Ganesh contends that Section 45 of the Act should be interpreted so as to give full effect to the opening non-obstante clause and to the wordings of Section 45 which are entirely different from Section 8 in their effect and operation. It is urged that Section 45 cannot be construed in a way that it becomes indistinguishable from Section 8. It is further submitted that under Section 45, if an issue is raised before the court regarding the legality or validity of the agreement, then the court must give a finding on the issue. The contention is that the court would make an order of reference to arbitration only if the arbitration agreement is legal and valid. Further, it is contended that it would be a different matter if objection as to the validity of the arbitration agreement is not raised before the judicial authority and the party prefers to raise it before the arbitral forum and/or post award, in the event of award being against that party. Which of the two views is correct requires determination. It may be noted that Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act, 1961, before the enactment of the Act, contained somewhat similar provision providing for the stay of the proceedings in the court, unless the agreement was null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The only material difference between the said Section 3 and present Section 45, is that former contains provision for stay of the proceedings in the suit and latter for reference to be made to arbitration. That difference, for our purposes, is of no consequence. Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act, 1961 as amended by Act 47 of 1973, (omitting unnecessary words) reads as under :\n \"3. Stay of proceedings in respect of matters to be referred to arbitration. - Notwithstanding anything contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940, or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if any party to an agreement to which Articles II of Convention set forth in the Schedule applies, commences any legal proceedings in any court against any other party to the agreement, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred to arbitration in such agreement, any party to such legal proceedings may, at any time after appearance and before filing a written statement or taking any other step in the proceedings, apply to the court to stay the proceeding and the court, unless satisfied that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed or that there is not, in fact, any dispute between the parties with regard to the matter agreed to be referred, shall make an order staying the proceedings.\" \n9. Both the sections start with a non-obstante clause giving overriding effect to the provisions contained therein and making it prevail over anything to the contrary contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940\n10. A non obstante clause is a legislative device which is usually implied to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other enactment, that is to say, to avoid the operation of all contrary provisions. {Union of India & Anr. v. G.M. Kokil & Ors. [(1984) Supp. SCC 196 ] (referred)}. Section 45 uses the expression 'shall' in respect of referring the parties to arbitration, unless judicial authority finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The term 'shall' in its ordinary significance is mandatory and the court shall ordinarily give that interpretation unless such an interpretation leads to some absurd or inconvenient consequence or be at variance with the intent of the legislature, to be collected from other parts of the statute. {[Khub Chand & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [AIR (1967) SC 1074 ] (referred)}. The words 'shall' and 'unless' appearing in Section 45 mandates that before referring the parties to arbitration, the judicial authority should be satisfied that the arbitration agreement is not null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. In Brace Transport Corporation of Monrovia, Bermuda v. Orient Middle East Lines Ltd., Saudi Arabia & Ors. [1995 Supp.(2) SCC 280 at 286] (referred) this Court held :\n \"The court of a contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of Article II shall upon the request of one of the parties, refer to arbitration, unless it finds the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.\" \n11. If the requirements of a statute which prescribes the manner in which something is to be done are expressed in negative language, that is to say, if the statute enacts that it shall be done in such a manner and no other manner, it has been laid down that those requirements are in all cases absolute, and that neglect to attend to them will invalidate the whole proceeding. [Craies on Statute Law; 7th Ed., at page 263]. Section 45 is clear; there is no doubt, ambiguity or vagueness in it. Now, I may refer to decision in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. & Anr. [(1984) 4 SCC 679 ] (referred) in which interpretation of Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act, 1961 came up for consideration. One of the parties to the arbitration agreement invoked the arbitration clause while the other party filed a suit seeking declaration that claims referred to the arbitration were beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement and the other party is not entitled to refer the claims to the arbitration and making consequential prayers for injunction restraining the party invoking arbitration clause and the arbitrator from proceeding with the matter and obtained an interim order. The other party filed a petition under Section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 seeking the stay of the proceedings in the suit and praying for vacating the interim relief granted in the matter. Learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition under Section 3 and granted stay of proceedings in the suit and vacated the interim relief. The order was maintained by the Division Bench. Before this Court, it was argued that a stay, if granted in a petition under Section 3, would render the suit dead for all purposes and there would be nothing left to be decided in the suit either because the suit is stayed indefinitely or alternatively because the decision on the issue would operate as res judicata in the suit, and, therefore, no relief of stay should be granted which will have such effect merely on a prima facie view or a pro tanto finding on the issue of arbitrability of the claims. In other words, the contention was that a Section 3 petition could not be a proper stage to decide the issue of arbitrability of the claims but the same should be decided in the suit when it will be finally tried. While rejecting this contention it was held that :\n \"if regard be had to the provisions of Section 3 as well as the legal position arising under decided cases the contention will be found to be devoid of any substance. It may be that a stay of the suit either under Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act or under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 may have the effect of finally disposing of the suit for all practical purposes as pointed out by the Allahabad High Court. But that is no reason why the relief of stay should be refused by the Court if the concerned legal provision requires the court to do so. Here we are concerned with Section 3 which makes it obligatory upon the Court to stay the legal proceedings if the conditions of the section are satisfied and what is more the section itself requires that before any stay is granted the Court should be satisfied that the arbitration agreement is valid, operative and capable of being performed and that there are disputes between the parties with regard to the matters agreed to be referred to arbitration [conditions (v) and (vi) mentioned earlier]. In other words, the section itself indicates that the proper stage at which the Court has to be fully satisfied about these conditions is before granting the relief of stay in a Section 3 petition and there is no question of the Court getting satisfied about these conditions on any prima facie view or a pro tanto finding thereon. Parties have to put their entire material before the Court on these issues (whichever may be raised) and the Court has to record its finding thereon after considering such material. [Emphasis supplied by us]\" \n12. In Para 59 the Court further observed that :\n \"It may be stated that though Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 confers a discretion upon the Court in the matter of granting stay of legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement, it cannot be disputed that before granting the stay the Court has to satisfy itself that arbitration agreement exists factually and legally and that the disputes between the parties are in regard to the maters agreed to be referred to arbitration.\" \n13. The question is : did the Parliament intend differently while using the terminology in Section 45 as it did? When words in an earlier statute have received an authoritative exposition by superior Court (interpretation of Section 3 in Renusagar's case), use of same words in a similar context in a later Act will give rise to a strong presumption that the Parliament intends that the same interpretation should also be followed for construction of these words in the later statute :\n \"D' Emden v. Pedder (1904) 1 C.L.R. 91, 100 per Griffiths C.J.: \" When a particular form of legislative enactment which has received authoritative interpretation, whether by judicial decision or by a long course of practice, is adopted in the framing of a later statute, it is a sound rule of construction to hold that the words so adopted were intended by the legislature to bear the meaning which had been so put upon them.\"\"According to Lord Macmillian, 'if an Act of Parliament referring to the same subject, and passed with the same purpose, and for the same object, the safe and well-known rule of construction is to assume that the legislature when using well-known words upon which there have been well-known decisions uses those words in the sense which the decisions have attached to them'.\" \n14. In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. V. State of Bihar [ ], (referred) Venkatarama Aiyer, J. stated that :\n \"It is a well-settled rule of construction that when a statute is repealed and re-enacted and words in the repealed statute are reproduced in the new statute, they should be interpreted in the sense which had been judicially put on them under the repealed Act, because the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with the construction which the courts have put upon the words, and when they repeat the same words, they must be taken to have accepted the interpretation put on them by the court as correctly reflecting the legislative mind.\" \n15. Further, Part II of the Act was enacted to update the international commercial arbitration regime to meet the present day challenges. If the legislature intended a minimalist role of the courts, it would have enacted Section 45 more in terms of Section 8 than its present form. Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act above noticed, was analogous to Article II (3) of the New York Convention which is in the following terms :\n \"Article II of the New York Convention\n1. ***\n2. ***\n3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.\" \n16. The aforesaid provision has been substantially reproduced in Section 45.\n17. Clearly Section 45 casts an obligation upon the judicial authority when seized of the matter to record a finding as to the validity of the arbitration agreement as stipulated in the Section and there is nothing to suggest either from the language of the section or otherwise that the finding to be recorded is to be only ex facie or prima facie. It is true that Section 5 limits judicial intervention in the manner provided therein. It accelerates the arbitral process by curtailing chances of delay that may be caused in court proceedings. But, at the same time, it is also clear that though Sections 8 and 45 both deal with the power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration, in the former which deals with domestic arbitration, no provision has been made for examining at that stage the validity of the arbitration agreement whereas under Section 45 which deals with arbitrations to which New York Convention applies, a specific provision has been made to examine the validity of the arbitration agreement in the manner provided in Section 45. Both provisions are differently structured albeit the purpose of both is to refer parties to arbitration but in one case domestic arbitration and in other case international arbitration. Unlike Section 8 which provides that the application shall be moved not later than when submitting the first statement of the substance of the dispute, under Section 45 there is no such limitation. The apparent reason is that insofar as domestic arbitration is concerned, the legislature intended to achieve speedy reference of disputes to arbitration tribunal and left most of the matters to be raised before the arbitrators or post award. In case of foreign arbitration, however, in its wisdom the legislature left the question relating to validity of arbitration agreement being examined by the court. One of the main reasons for the departure being the heavy expense involved in such arbitrations which may be unnecessary if the arbitration agreement is to be invalidated in the manner prescribed in Section 45. In view of the aforesaid, adopting liberal approach and restricting the determination by judicial authority about validity of agreement only from prima facie angle, would amount to adding words to Section 45 without there being any ambiguity or vagueness therein. The traditional approach has been to allow a court, where a dispute has been brought despite an arbitration agreement, to fully rule on the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. This approach would ensure that the parties are not proceeding on an invalid agreement as this would be a fruitless exercise involving much time and expenditure. In some countries, however, the traditional approach has changed. The liberal approach which seems to be gaining increasing popularity in many legal systems both statutorily as well as through judicial interpretation is to restrict the review of validity of arbitration agreement at a prima facie level. For final review the parties may raise issue before arbitral forum or post award. The 1987 Swiss Private International Law Statute stipulates that \"if the parties have concluded an arbitration agreement covering an arbitrable dispute, a Swiss court seized of it shall decline jurisdiction unless: - b. the court finds that the arbitral agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed\" (Article 7). These provisions could easily be read as implying that a court seized of the merits of a dispute in spite of the existence of an arbitration agreement would have to fully address the question of that agreement's effectiveness. However, after some hesitation, the Swiss Federal Tribunal decided to interpret them as restricting the court's review at the outset of proceedings to a prima facie verification of the existence and effectiveness of the arbitration clause. (Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration- Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage Ed.1999 - Para 675, Page 409) According to the French Code of Civil Procedure (which applies to both domestic and international arbitration), the courts are obliged to decline jurisdiction where an arbitration agreement exists, provided that the merits of the dispute have already been put before an arbitral tribunal. Even where the dispute is not before an arbitral tribunal, the French Courts must also decline jurisdiction unless the arbitration agreement is \"patently void\". This in substance amounts to a prima facie review of the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. Similarly, Art. VI (2) of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1961) adopts a prima facie standard by providing that courts shall not determine the initial validity/existence of the arbitration agreement unless there are \"good and substantial reasons to the contrary\". The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses in Commercial Matters (1923) (Art. IV, Para 1), the New York Convention (Art. II, Para 3) as well as the UNCITRAL, Model Law (Art. VIII) like Section 45 of the Act have similarly ambiguous phraseology capable of either interpretation. It is true that courts in two common law jurisdictions, Ontario and Hong Kong, both of which have based their law on the UNCITRAL Model Law (like India), have adopted a liberal approach to the issue. In Pacific International Lines (Pte) Ltd. v. Tsinlien Metal and Minerals Co. Ltd, the High Court of Hong Kong (Year Book of Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XVIII, 1993, pg.180) was concerned with the issue as to whether on the facts of the case there was an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which deals with the definition and form of arbitration agreement and reads thus :\n \"Article 7. Definition and form of arbitration agreement\n(1) \"Arbitration agreement\" is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.\n(2) The arbitration agreement shall be in writing. An agreement is in writing if it is contained in a document signed by the parties or in an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunications which provide a record of the agreement, or in an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of an agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by another. The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement provided that the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that clause part of the contract.\" \n18. The parties entered into a charter party agreement containing an arbitration clause through a broker. The ship company raised a claim for certain sum of money. The arbitration clause provided that one arbitrator was to be nominated by the shipping company and the other by the charters. The charters failed to appoint its arbitrator, whereupon, the shipping company approached the High Court to appoint an arbitrator on behalf of the charters. The charters objected that there was no valid arbitral clause between the parties. It was the contention of the charters that they entered into charter party agreement with the broker and not with the shipping company who deny having given the brokers any authority to enter into an agreement. The Court laid down the proposition that \"if the court is satisfied that there is a 'plainly arguable' case to support the proposition and there was an arbitration agreement which complies with Article 7 of the Model Law, the Court should proceed to appoint the arbitrator in the full knowledge that the defendants will not be precluded from raising the point before the arbitrator and having the matter re- considered by the court consequent upon that preliminary ruling.\" \n19. The Court after examining the documents and taking into account the commercial reality of the situation came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs, i.e., shipping company has made out a 'strongly arguable case' in support of the existence of an arbitration agreement. The Court further observed that \"obviously it has not been possible for me to go into this in any great detail and indeed the whole matter has been dealt with affidavit evidence. Despite the fact that there is no document before me, which shows that World Ace were held out or authorized by the defendant to act for them in relation to its fixture. I cannot believe that such documentation does not exist. The arbitrator will have to go into this matter and sort it out but for my part and I am satisfied at this stage that Article 7 of the Model Law has been complied with and that there is an arbitration agreement between these parties\". Thus, the court found the arbitral clause as existing and valid and referred the dispute to arbitration and granted time to the charters to appoint its arbitrator.\n20. The court decided the matter on the basis of the affidavits, as it was not possible for it to examine in detail the documents since the parties failed to produce the document containing the authorization given to the broker to act on behalf of the shipping company. Therefore, the court has referred to the commercial reality as well as the affidavits of the parties to arrive at the conclusion that there was an arbitration agreement. The court has adapted the standard of \"plainly arguable case\" or \"strongly arguable case\" since the arbitral tribunal would examine the issue once again. Therefore, it cannot be stated as a general rule that in every case there should be a \"plainly arguable case\" or \"strongly arguable case\", since the legislations in other jurisdictions may not provide for such a provision. More over, the case did not concern directly with Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the court was concerned with Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law dealing with definition and form of the arbitration agreement.\n21. Apart from the fact that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not a complete adaptation of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the scheme/ provisions of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance are different from the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996. Therefore it may not be appropriate to follow the decisions interpreting the provisions of UNCITRAL Model Law or Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance. Section 6 of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance is similar to Section 32 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, which is not present in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. It reads as under :\n \"(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court) applies to a matter that is the subject of a domestic arbitration agreement in the same way as it applies to a matter that is the subject of an international arbitration agreement. (2) Subject to subsection (3), if a party to an arbitration agreement that provides for the arbitration of a dispute involving a claim or other matter this is within the jurisdiction of the Labour Tribunal or a person claiming through or under such a party, commences legal proceedings in any court against any other party to the agreement or any person claiming through or under that other party, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, and any party to those legal proceedings applies to that court after appearance and before delivering any pleadings or taking any other step in the proceedings, to stay the proceedings, the court or a judge of that court may make an order staying the proceedings, if satisfied that- (a) there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the agreement; and (b) the applicant was ready and willing at the time the proceedings were commenced to do all things necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration, and remains so. (3) Subsections (1) and (2) have effect subject to section 15 of the Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance (Cap 71). (Replaced 75 of 1996 s. 9)\" \n22. Section 23 A of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance provides for the determination of preliminary point of law by the court and there is a no analogous provision in the Arbitration and conciliation Act 1996 It is clear from a plain reading of Hong Kong and English provisions that both confer discretion on the court, unlike Section 45 of the Act, which is mandatory. It is evident from the words 'may' and 'satisfied' used in Hong Kong provision and also from the language used in Section 32 of the English Arbitration Act, 1996, that the intention in the said two jurisdictions was to confer on court discretionary powers indicative of limited review from prima facie point of view. In Rio Algom Ltd. v. Sammi Steel Co. Ltd., Ontario Court of Justice, General Division (Year book of Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XVIII, 1993, Page 166) dealt with Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law dealing with the competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction which reads as under:\n \"Article 16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction (1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause. (2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence. A party is not precluded from raising such a plea by the fact that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified. (3) The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this article either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within 30 days after having received notice of that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal; while such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award.\" \n23. In pursuance of an arbitration agreement, one of the parties referred the dispute to the arbitrator whereas the other party commenced an action before the court challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to arbitrate the issues and for an order staying the arbitration proceedings. The Court ordered the trial of issues raising matters of the contract interpretation affecting arbitrator's jurisdiction. On appeal, it was held that issues defining the scope of the arbitration agreement, which raise matters of contract interpretation, ought to be resolved by the arbitrators in the first instance before resort to the courts. The Court observed that 'what appears to me of significance is that the Model Law reflects an emphasis in favour of arbitration in the first instance in international commercial arbitrations to which it applies'. The Courts in matters of contract interpretation as such are limited in that they do not appear to have a role in determining matters of law or construction; jurisdiction and scope of authority are for the arbitrator to determine in the first instance, subject to later recourse to set aside the ruling or award. The role of the court before arbitration appears to be confined to determining whether the arbitration clause is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed (Article 8), if not it is mandatory to send the parties to arbitration. Thus, it was observed that the issue of validity of the arbitration agreement is to be determined by the court. However, there is no reference as to whether the court should take a prima facie view or a final view.\n24. The 1996 English Arbitration Act adopted a slightly different solution, whereby the courts may only rule on the issue of jurisdiction with the agreement of the parties or, if the parties do not agree, with the consent of the arbitral tribunal. In this latter case, the court must also find that its decision is liable to save substantial cost, that the application was made promptly, and that there is a valid reason for the claim to be heard by a court (Sec.32). (Fouchard (supra) Para 675 Page 409).\n25. The American approach also favours traditional approach of final review of court. (Comptek Telecomm v. IVD Corp., XXII Y.B. COMM. ARB.905 (1997) decided on August 1, 1995 and SMG Swedish Machine Group v. Swedish Machine Group, XVIII Y.B. COMM.ARB.457 (1993) decided on January 4, 1991. It may be noted that both approaches have its own advantage and disadvantage. The approach whereby the court finally decides on merits on the issue of existence and validity of the arbitration agreement results to a certain degree time and cost avoidance. It may prevent parties to wait for several months or in some cases years before knowing the final outcome of the dispute regarding jurisdiction. It will often take that long for the arbitrators and then the courts to reach their decisions. The same considerations of cost and time explain the position taken in English Law which under Section 32(2) of the 1996 English Arbitration Act provides that the parties may agree (or, if the parties fail to agree, the arbitral tribunal may agree) that it would be more efficient to have the question resolved immediately by the courts. (Fouchard (supra) Para 678, Page 410) I may also deal with the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that only prima facie finding is required to be given on combined reading of Sections 45, 48 and 50 from which it can be culled out that a party who has suffered an award can always challenge the same under Section 48 on the ground that the arbitration agreement is null and void. This read in conjunction with the right of appeal given under Section 50 and the power of the arbitrator to rule on his own jurisdiction clearly shows the intent of the legislature to avoid delay which would be inevitable if it has to be a final decision and it would defeat the object of soon placing all material before the arbitration tribunal. I am afraid that this cannot be accepted as the real purpose of Section 48 is to ensure that at some stage whether pre-award, post award or both, a judicial authority must decide the validity, operation, capability of performance of the arbitration agreement. In various cases the parties may not resort to Section 45 in the first place, and to overcome such eventuality, the legislature has enacted Section 48(1)(a). In other words, if the court is not asked to satisfy itself as to the validity of the agreement at a pre-award stage (Section 45), then by virtue of Section 48, it is given another opportunity to do so. Apart from this, under Section 48, the court may refuse to enforce the foreign award on the ground other than the invalidity of the arbitration agreement. As far as the question of Section 50 is concerned, it is well settled in law that an appeal is a creature of statute {M/s M. Ramnarain (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. [(1983) 3 SCC 75 ] (referred)} and a right to appeal inheres in no one {Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & Ors. [(1999) 4 SCC 468 ] (referred)}. The legislature under Section 50 has clearly allowed appeal only in case the judicial authority refuses to refer the parties to arbitration or refuses to enforce the foreign award. The fact that a provision is not made for an appeal in case reference is made to arbitration is not a ground to say that the court should prima facie decide the validity of the agreement ignoring the express provisions of Section 45. The legislature has granted right of appeal in the event of refusal to refer but not in the event of order being made for reference of the parties to arbitration. This provision for appeal is not determinative of the scope of Section 45 to mean that the determination there under has to be only prima facie.\n26. I am of the view that Indian Legislature has consciously adopted a conventional approach so as to save the huge expense involved in international commercial arbitration as compared to domestic arbitration. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that under Section 45 of the Act, the determination has to be on merits, final and binding and not prima facie. Turning to the present case, I direct that the application filed by the appellant before the trial court would be treated as an application under Section 45 of the Act. Having regard to the nature of controversy in the present case, parties would be given opportunity to file documents and affidavits by way of evidence. No oral evidence would be examined. Though the appellant itself is responsible for the delay that has occurred because of application under provisions which had no applicability and insistence thereupon, yet, considering that the application has been pending for nearly two years, I direct its disposal within a period of two months of the receipt of the copy of this order. Before concluding, this Court also deems it necessary to issue general directions for expeditious disposal of petitions/applications filed so as to challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement under Section 45. Ordinarily, such cases shall be decided on the basis of affidavits and other relevant documents and without oral evidence. There may, however, be few exceptional cases where it may become necessary to grant opportunity to the parties to lead oral evidence. In both eventualities, the judicial authority is required to decide the issue expeditiously within a fix timeframe and not to treat such matters like regular civil suit. The object of arbitration including international commercial arbitration is expedition.\n27. The object of the Act would be defeated if the international commercial disputes remain pending in court for months and years before even commencement of arbitration. Accordingly, I direct that any application that may be filed under Section 45 of the Act must be decided within three months of its filing. In rare and exceptional cases, the judicial authority may extend the time by another three months but by sending a report to the superior/appellate authority setting out the reasons for such extension. It would be for the superior/appellate authority to issue appropriate directions to the judicial authority and/or take such other action as may be called for.\n28. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.\nORDER\nThe direction of the High Court in the impugned judgment remanding the application under Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for fresh decision by the trial court to confirmed. On remand, the trial court would decide the application in the light of the majority opinion within two months of receipt of the judgment of this Court.\n", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -988,26 +988,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S008", - "case_id": "3371", - "experiment": "baseline_firac", + "case_id": "108", + "experiment": "baseline_no_firac", "model": "qwen3-8b", - "source_file": "S008__baseline_firac__qwen3-8b__3371.json", + "source_file": "S008__baseline_no_firac__qwen3-8b__108.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "04/01/1972", - "machine_error_stage": "facts", - "machine_major_error_category": "input_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in case record" + "judgment_date": "12/08/2005", + "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", + "machine_minor_error_category": "Wrong legal test / threshold" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5697 OF 2021, CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5692-5695 OF 2021 | C.S. Gopalakrishnan Etc. v. The State Of Tamil Nadu & Others | 09/05/2023", - "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5697 OF 2021, CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5692-5695 OF 2021 | C.S. Gopalakrishnan Etc. v. The State Of Tamil Nadu & Others", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 115 of 1971 (From the Judgment and Decree dated November 25/26, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision No. 1101 of 1966), decided on February 1, 1985. | Indumati Markandey Trivedi v. Jhala Umedsinhji Merubhabhai | 01/02/1985", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 115 of 1971 (From the Judgment and Decree dated November 25/26, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision No. 1101 of 1966), decided on February 1, 1985. | Indumati Markandey Trivedi v. Jhala Umedsinhji Merubhabhai", "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED", "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED", - "case_record": "The State of Tamil Nadu enacted three State Acts: The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978; The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997; and The Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001. These Acts received Presidential assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, protecting them from repugnancy with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Following the enactment of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition; Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (new LA Act), these State Acts were rendered void. Tamil Nadu attempted to revive them by inserting Section 105-A into the new LA Act via Act No. 1 of 2015, which also received Presidential assent. However, the Madras High Court declared the three State Acts void and Section 105-A ineffective. Subsequently, Tamil Nadu enacted the Validation Act of 2019, which revived the State Acts and received Presidential assent, a move later upheld by the Supreme Court in G. Mohan Rao. The present appeals challenge the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act and the Highways Act on grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14, when compared to the new LA Act. Specifically, appellants C. S. Gopalakrishnan and V. Thirunarayanan purchased lands after acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Industrial Purposes Act. Appellants K. M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan challenged acquisitions under the Highways Act. The core issue is whether these State Acts are unconstitutional due to procedural and compensatory disparities with the new LA Act, and whether subsequent purchasers have the locus standi to raise such challenges.", - "generated_judgment": "### **Judgment**\n\n#### **Facts:**\n1. The State of Tamil Nadu enacted three State Acts: The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978; The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997; and The Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, all of which received Presidential assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.\n2. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition; Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (new LA Act) rendered these State Acts void.\n3. Tamil Nadu attempted to revive them by inserting Section 105-A into the new LA Act via Act No. 1 of 2015, which also received Presidential assent but was later declared ineffective by the Madras High Court.\n4. The State then enacted the Validation Act of 2019, which revived the State Acts and was upheld by the Supreme Court in *G. Mohan Rao*.\n5. The present appeals challenge the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act and the Highways Act on grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14, compared to the new LA Act.\n6. Appellants C. S. Gopalakrishnan and V. Thirunarayanan purchased lands after acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Industrial Purposes Act.\n7. Appellants K. M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan challenged acquisitions under the Highways Act.\n\n#### **Issues:**\n1. Does the Validation Act of 2019, which revived the Tamil Nadu Industrial Purposes Act, 1997, and the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, violate Article 14 of the Constitution by creating arbitrary and unreasonable disparities in land acquisition procedures and compensation compared to the new LA Act?\n2. Do subsequent purchasers of land (appellants) have the locus standi to challenge the validity of the State Acts under which the original acquisitions were initiated?\n\n#### **Rules:**\n1. **Article 14 of the Constitution** – Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of laws, prohibiting arbitrary state action.\n2. **Article 254(2) of the Constitution** – Allows State laws to override Central laws on concurrent subjects if they receive Presidential assent.\n3. **Doctrine of Locus Standi** – Only a person who has a direct and substantial interest in the matter can challenge a law.\n4. **Judicial Review of Legislative Acts** – Courts can strike down laws that violate fundamental rights, even if they have received Presidential assent, if they are manifestly arbitrary or discriminatory.\n\n#### **Analysis:**\n1. **Maintainability of the Appeal (Locus Standi – Issue 2):**\n - The appellants are subsequent purchasers of land acquired under the challenged State Acts.\n - The doctrine of locus standi requires a direct and substantial interest in the matter. Since the appellants are affected by the acquisition proceedings and the validity of the enabling legislation, they have a sufficient stake to challenge the Acts.\n - **Conclusion:** The appeal is maintainable.\n\n2. **Arbitrariness and Violation of Article 14 (Issue 1):**\n - The new LA Act provides higher compensation and stricter procedural safeguards compared to the State Acts.\n - The Validation Act of 2019 revived the State Acts without addressing these disparities, creating a classification between landowners acquired under the new LA Act and those under the State Acts.\n - Such a classification must have a rational nexus with a legitimate state objective. The State’s justification (e.g., industrial development, highway construction) does not sufficiently explain why different standards apply.\n - The Supreme Court in *G. Mohan Rao* upheld the Validation Act, but the present case involves a specific challenge under Article 14.\n - **Conclusion:** The disparities in compensation and procedure are arbitrary and violate Article 14.\n\n3. **Presidential Assent and Judicial Review (Secondary Issue 4):**\n - While Article 254(2) protects State laws from repugnancy with Central laws, it does not shield them from constitutional scrutiny under fundamental rights.\n - Courts can still examine whether such laws are manifestly arbitrary or discriminatory.\n - **Conclusion:** The Validation Act is not immune from judicial review.\n\n#### **Conclusion:**\nThe Validation Act of 2019, by reviving the Tamil Nadu Industrial Purposes Act, 1997, and the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, creates arbitrary and unreasonable disparities in land acquisition procedures and compensation compared to the new LA Act, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The appellants have the locus standi to challenge these Acts. Therefore, the appeals are **ALLOWED**, and the challenged State Acts are declared unconstitutional.", - "reference_judgment": "1. Past events, contextual to these appeals, being of relevance require recount at some length.\n2. Long ago, the State of Tamil Nadu chose to exercise its right of eminent domain to acquire land for its harijan welfare schemes, its industrial purposes and its highways by deviating from the law and procedure prescribed in the Central legislation, viz., ‘The Land Acquisition Act, 1894’. In exercise of concurrent power under Entry 42 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, it enacted ‘The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978’; ‘The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997’; and ‘The Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001’. These three State Acts stood protected, despite being repugnant to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [hereinafter, ‘the old LA Act’], owing to the Presidential assent that they had received on 21.07.1978, 25.05.1999 and 16.09.2002 respectively, under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. However, upon the Parliament promulgating the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition; Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 [hereinafter, ‘the new LA Act’], replacing the old LA Act, these State Acts were rendered void, being repugnant thereto.\n3. Pertinently, Section 105 of the new LA Act provided that the said legislation would not apply or would apply with modifications to the Central Government’s enactments relating to land acquisition, specified in the Fourth Schedule thereto. In an attempt to save the three State Acts, by taking a cue from Section 105 of the new LA Act, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed Bill No. 5 of 2014 on 22.02.2014, amending the new LA Act. Thereby, Section 105-A was inserted in the new LA Act, making the provisions thereof inapplicable or applicable with modifications to the Acts relating to land acquisition in the State of Tamil Nadu, which were specified in the newly added Fifth Schedule. The three State Acts were shown in this Schedule. However, Bill No. 5 of 2014 was returned by the President of India pointing out some defects and after curing of the same, it was reintroduced as Bill No. 30 of 2014. It was then sent to the President of India for his assent and received the same on 01.01.2015. In consequence, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2014 (Act No.1 of 2015), came into force with retrospective effect from 01.01.2014.\n4. Act No.1 of 2015 was subjected to challenge before the Madras High Court in a batch of writ petitions. Writ Petition No.21323 of 2015 was also filed raising a challenge to the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 (for brevity, ‘the Highways Act’). On the same lines, Writ Petition Nos. 26028 and 26234 of 2013 were filed assailing the validity of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (for brevity, ‘the Industrial Purposes Act’), on the ground that it was ultra vires the Constitution of India and seeking a consequential direction to the authorities to drop the acquisition of the petitioners’ lands thereunder.\n5. In W.P.No.26028 of 2013, the consequential prayer of the two petitioners, viz. P.K. Muralidharan and V. Thirunarayanan, was to direct the authorities not to acquire their lands in old Survey No. 93/4B(3), presently Survey Nos. 93/58 and 93/59, of Pillaipakkam Village, Sriperumbudur Taluk No. 103, Kancheepuram. In W.P.No.26234 of 2013, the prayer of C.S. Gopalakrishnan, the petitioner therein, was to direct the authorities to return his land in Survey No. 92/60, Patta No.1317, Plot No. 236, Thripura Sundari Nagar, Pillaipakkam Village, Sriperumbudur Taluk. Further, V. Thirunarayanan, the second petitioner in W.P.No.26028 of 2013, also filed W.P.No.10282 of 2015 seeking a declaration that Act No.1 of 2015 was ultra vires the Constitution and a consequential direction to the authorities not to acquire his lands in Kancheepuram District. Similarly, C.S. Gopalakrishnan, the sole petitioner in W.P.No.26234 of 2013, filed W.P.No.10283 of 2015 seeking identical reliefs. These four writ petitions, along with several others, were partly allowed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, vide common order dated 03.07.2019.\n6. The common order dated 03.07.2019 reflects that the High Court framed the following issues for consideration: -\n1) Are the State enactments void because of inherent arbitrariness?\n2) Did the President of India fail to apply his mind while granting assent to Section 105-A?\n3) Did the impugned State enactments become repugnant once the Parliament ‘made’ the new Land Acquisition Act. If so, did the presidential assent to Section105-A inserted by Tamil Nadu Act No. 1 of 2015 revive the three Acts?\n4) Are the provisions of Section 105-A(2) and (3) mandatory, and if so, whether non-compliance with these provisions (is, sic) fatal to the validity of these enactments.\n7. As regards the first issue, the High Court noted that the validity of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978, was upheld by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu and others Vs. Ananthi Ammal and others [(1995) 1 SCC 519] and that the Industrial Purposes Act was upheld by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in K. Ramakrishnan Vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu [2007 WLR 372], wherein it was specifically held that the said enactment did not suffer from any illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. Similarly, the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 (for brevity, ‘the Highways Act’), was upheld by the Madras High Court in S.N. Sumathy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others [2015 SCC OnLine Madras 14055]. The High Court, therefore, opined that the three State Acts could not be said to be irrational, capricious or without adequate determining principles and rejected the contention that they were liable to be invalidated on the ground of inherent arbitrariness.\n8. On the second issue, the High Court held that all the material was placed before the President of India and, therefore, it could not be said that there was any non-application of mind by the President of India while granting assent. The High Court also noted that the first Bill was returned by the President pointing out some defects and it was only after the same were cured that the Presidential assent was given. The second issue was, therefore, decided accordingly.\n9. Apropos the third issue, the High Court accepted the contention of the writ petitioners that, as the new LA Act received Presidential assent on 27.09.2013, all the three State Acts became void on that date itself and Act No.1 of 2015 did not have the effect of reviving these void State Acts. It was noted that Article 254(2) of the Constitution would not apply to a law already made by a State which becomes repugnant as a result of a new enactment made by the Parliament and it would not offer protection to laws made by the State before the Central legislation. The High Court opined that Article 254(2) of the Constitution required the repugnant law to be reserved for consideration afresh by the President for giving his assent thereto and, therefore, these State Acts had to receive Presidential assent in the present sense. The High Court concluded that, in order to bring an Act within the purview of Article 254(2) of the Constitution, it must be re-enacted by the State and reconsidered by the President and mere insertion of Section 105-A in the new LA Act was inadequate. The High Court, accordingly, declared the three State Acts void and held that Section 105-A did not resurrect them and was a mere dead letter.\n10. On the last issue, the High Court held Section 105-A(2) and (3) to be mandatory. Holding so, the Madras High Court allowed the writ petitions to the extent indicated. However, the High Court deemed it appropriate not to reopen the acquisitions made under the State Acts, on or after 27.09.2013, where the acquired lands had already been put to use and the purpose for which the lands were acquired had been accomplished. The High Court held that as Section 105-A, inserted in the new LA Act by Act No.1 of 2015, was rendered virtually otiose as Act No.1 of 2015 did not meet the requirements of Article 254(2) of the Constitution and did not have the effect of reviving the State Acts, the validity of Section 105-A need not be independently examined.\n11. SLP (C) Nos. 2063-2066 of 2020, which were thereafter numbered as Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5695 of 2021, arose out of the common order dated 03.07.2019 in so far as it pertained to W.P.Nos.26234 & 26028 of 2013 and W.P.Nos.10282 & 10283 of 2015 respectively. V. Thirunarayanan, the second petitioner in W.P.No.26028 of 2013, and C.S. Gopalakrishnan, the sole petitioner in W.P.No.26234 of 2013, filed the first two SLPs aggrieved by the common order to the extent that it did not hold the Industrial Purposes Act to be void on the grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The other two SLPs filed by them pertained to W.P.Nos.10282 and 10283 of 2015 respectively, relating to the validity of Act No.1 of 2015 and Section 105-A.\n12. During the pendency of these SLPs before this Court, the State of Tamil Nadu again attempted to revive the three State Acts by enacting The Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Laws (Revival of Operation, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2019 (for brevity, ‘the Validation Act of 2019’). This Act received the assent of the President, under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, on 02.12.2019. It came into effect retrospectively from 26.09.2013. The Validation Act of 2019 was challenged before this Court in a batch of writ petitions. By judgment dated 29.06.2021, reported in G. Mohan Rao and others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others [AIR 2021 SC 3126], this Court held that the said enactment was a legitimate legislative exercise which was consistent with and fell within the four corners of Article 254 of the Constitution. The writ petitions were, accordingly, dismissed.\n13. It may be noted that one K.M. Vittal Babu and one T. Chinnappan had filed W.P.No.5893 of 2018 before the Madras High Court, wherein they had sought a declaration that Section 105-A inserted in the new LA Act by Act No.1 of 2015 was unconstitutional. This writ petition was also clubbed with the batch of writ petitions, which came to be disposed of by the common order dated 03.07.2019. While so, on 07.07.2021, K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan filed I.A. No. 77573 of 2021 in SLP (C) Nos. 2063-2066 of 2020, which were numbered as Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5695 of 2021, seeking to be impleaded therein. They stated that the provisions of the Industrial Purposes Act are in pari materia with the provisions of the Highways Act, whereunder their lands were acquired, and as there was no separate petition dealing with the validity thereof, it was just and necessary that they get impleaded in SLP (C) Nos. 2063-2066 of 2020 so as to question the pari materia provisions of the Highways Act. Their impleadment application was allowed on 09.09.2021. Surprisingly, two days later, on 11.07.2021, K.M. Vittal Babu chose to file SLP (C) Diary No. 15466 of 2021 in the context of W.P.No.21323 of 2015, referred to hereinbefore, wherein he was not a party. In his application for permission to file the SLP, he stated that W.P.No.21323 of 2015 raised a challenge to the Highways Act, which was missing in his own writ petition and he, therefore, wanted to raise that issue before this Court. He was granted leave to do so on 09.09.2021 and his SLP was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 5697 of 2021. His prayer therein is to declare the Highways Act unconstitutional and void. Thus, K.M. Vittal Babu figures as the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 5697 of 2021 and is also impleaded as a respondent in the other appeals, along with T. Chinnappan.\n14. In the light of G. Mohan Rao (supra), the challenges before this Court to Act No.1 of 2015 and Section 105-A are rendered redundant. SLP (C) No. 4106 of 2020, involving such a challenge, was disposed of on 09.09.2021. Therefore, Issue Nos. 2, 3 and 4 dealt with by the High Court in the common order dated 03.07.2019 no longer require consideration on merits. In consequence, though numbered thereafter, Civil Appeal Nos. 5694 and 5695 of 2021 are infructuous and need no adjudication. The only issue left for consideration is whether the Industrial Purposes Act and the Highways Act are void owing to inherent arbitrariness and infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution. In this context, it may be noted that, in paragraph 74 in G. Mohan Rao (supra), this Court observed that the contention, based on comparative analysis of the State Acts and the new LA Act, to establish violation of the equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution, is left open. Parties were given liberty to raise all other issues not dealt with in that judgment, in relation to the validity of the State laws, in the pending cases arising from the order dated 03.07.2019, including by getting themselves impleaded.\n15. Heard Mr. Suhrith Parthasarathy, learned counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos.5692-5693 of 2021; Mr. N. Subramaniyan, learned counsel, appearing for K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan; and Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel, appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu and its authorities.\n16. Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5693 of 2021 : The Industrial Purposes Act is founded on the premise that the State of Tamil Nadu found it expedient to make special provision for speedy acquisition of lands for industrial purposes in the State of Tamil Nadu and for matters connected therewith. The scheme therein envisages that the Government would cause a Public Notice to be given under Section 3(2) of the Industrial Purposes Act, in such manner as may be prescribed, calling upon the owner of the land and any other person, who in the opinion of the Government may be interested in such land, to show-cause, within such time as may be specified in the Public Notice, why the land should not be acquired. Section 3(3) provides that after hearing and considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner or person interested, the Government may pass an order under Section 3(1). In turn, Section 3(1) states that the Government may acquire any land required for any industrial purpose, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act, by publishing a Notice in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, specifying the particular purpose for which the land is required. Once the Notice under Section 3(1) is published in the Gazette, Section 4 states that the land would vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances, on and from the date of such publication.\n17. The gravamen of the attack in the present appeals is that the Madras High Court erred in holding that the Industrial Purposes Act was not liable to be invalidated on the grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Various issues were raised in the course of arguments in this regard, citing an abundance of caselaw. However, it is an admitted fact that C.S. Gopalakrishnan purchased the land in Survey No. 92/60, Patta No. 1317, Plot No. 236, Pillaipakkam Village, Kancheepuram District, under registered sale deed dated 14.12.2012, long after initiation of the acquisition proceedings, by issuance of the Public Notice on 23.10.2007, for setting up SIPCOT Industrial Park. Similarly, V. Thirunarayanan, the other appellant, also purchased the land in old Survey No. 93/4B(3), presently Survey Nos. 93/58 and 93/59, Pillaipakkam Village, Kancheepuram District, under registered sale deed dated 21.02.2013, well after the initiation of the aforestated acquisition proceedings. However, the Notice under Section 3(1) of the Industrial Purposes Act was published in the Gazette only in March, 2013, after their purchase of the lands in question.\n18. In the above milieu, the question that would arise is as to the locus standi of the appellants, who admittedly purchased their lands after the initiation of land acquisition proceedings, to maintain a challenge to the provisions of the Industrial Purposes Act and the proceedings initiated thereunder.\n19. It is the argument of the State that such subsequent purchasers would have no right to challenge the acquisition proceedings and, in that context, maintain an attack against the legislation under which such acquisition is being made. It is further contended that, as the Section 3(1) Notice was published in the year 2013, i.e., before the coming into force of the new LA Act, determination of the compensation in relation thereto would be only on the basis of the old LA Act and not under the new LA Act.\n20. Per contra, the appellants assert that they would have locus to challenge the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act, as their sale transactions were nearly 6 years after issuance of the Public Notice under Section 3(2) of the Industrial Purposes Act and any reasonable person would have a bonafide belief that such proceedings would have lapsed owing to passage of time. They also contend that as per Section 4 of the Industrial Purposes Act, the acquired land would vest in the Government only on publication of the Notice under Section 3(1) and, therefore, a sale transaction prior thereto would not be rendered void. They would argue that the State cannot freeze property rights for a period of six years by issuing a Public Notice under Section 3(2) of the Industrial Purposes Act and forgetting about it thereafter for years together. Reference is made to the judgment of the Madras High Court in Sri Venkateswara Educational and Charitable Trust Vs. The Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and others [Writ Appeal No. 1063 of 2012, decided on 17.10.2022], which held that in cases where compensation still needed to be determined for acquisitions made under the Industrial Purposes Act, the new LA Act would apply perforce and the base date for determining compensation would not be the date on which the Section 3(2) Notice was issued but 01.01.2014, the date on which the new LA Act came into force.\n21. It may be noted that, after publication of the Notice under Section 3(1), the appellants are stated to have filed writ petitions before the Madras High Court in which orders of status quo were passed. Those cases are stated to be pending as on date. We are not concerned at this stage with the validity of individual acquisition proceedings initiated under the Industrial Purposes Act. If the validity of such acquisition proceedings is under challenge before the High Court, it is for the parties to pursue the same and invite an adjudication on merits. Issues pertaining to such individual acquisition proceedings, including quantification of compensation and other aspects based on facts, can be decided in those writ petitions and need not concern us at this stage. Presently, we are only dealing with the challenge to the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act and the Highways Act on the grounds of arbitrariness and breach of Article 14 of the Constitution and no more.\n22. As regards the issue of the appellants’ locus standi, that very aspect was considered by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Kumar and another Vs. Union of India and others [(2019) 10 SCC 229]. The question therein was whether subsequent purchasers of acquired land would be entitled to seek invalidation of the acquisition on the ground of delay under Section 24(2) of the new LA Act. The Bench held that a sale transaction, effected after the Notification under Section 4 of the old LA Act, is void and would be ineffective to transfer the land and such a sale would not clothe the subsequent purchasers with title, whereby they could claim to be in possession. It was observed that it would be profoundly unfair and unjust and against the policy of law to permit such a purchaser to claim resettlement or claim the land back, as envisaged under the new LA Act. Support in this regard was drawn from the earlier judgments in UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow, and another Vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. [(1996) 3 SCC 124]; Sneh Prabha and others Vs. State of UP and another [(1996) 7 SCC 426]; Union of India Vs. Shivkumar Bhargava and others [(1995) 2 SCC 427]; Meera Sahni Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and others [(2008) 9 SCC 177]; V. Chandrasekaran and another Vs. Administrative Officer and others [(2012) 12 SCC 133]; Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Vs. Subhash Sindhi Co-op. Housing Society, Jaipur [(2013) 5 SCC 427]; and M. Venkatesh and others Vs. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority [(2015) 17 SCC 1]. Be it noted that, in UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow (supra), Meera Sahni (supra) and V. Chandrasekaran (supra), this Court held that such a purchaser could not challenge the acquisition and would, at best, be entitled to receive compensation.\n23. As both C.S. Gopalakrishnan and V. Thirunarayanan seek to assail the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act only in the context of the acquisition proceedings initiated thereunder in relation to the lands purchased by them after issuance of the Public Notice under Section 3(2) thereof, viz., the equivalent of a Notification under Section 4 of the old LA Act, their challenge is tainted and unacceptable in its very inception. They were both subsequent purchasers and are deemed to be aware of the acquisition proceedings. In that regard, we may note that the original owners of the subject lands raised their objections in response to the Public Notice issued under Section 3(2) in the year 2007, but chose to sell their lands in 2012 and 2013. In any event, neither of these subsequent purchasers can be permitted to claim ignorance of the acquisition proceedings. In effect, the very sale transactions under which they claim title and interest in the subject lands are rendered void in the eye of law. Mere passage of time and publication of the Section 3(1) Notice after their purchase of the lands would not save their sale transactions or vest them with a right to attack the acquisition. In consequence, we find no reason to entertain their challenge to the Industrial Purposes Act on the grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution or their consequential challenge to the acquisition proceedings. Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5693 of 2021 are, therefore, liable to be dismissed on this short ground.\n24. Civil Appeal No. 5697 of 2021 et al: K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan assail the common order dated 03.07.2019 passed by the Madras High Court, whereby challenge to the validity of the Highways Act, on the grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, was rejected. The grievance of these two persons is with regard to the acquisition of their lands by the State of Tamil Nadu under the Highways Act. The Government of Tamil Nadu had issued GO.Ms.No.200, Highways and Minor Ports Department, dated 07.12.2011, proposing to acquire land for construction of a Flyover/Road over Bridge to replace Railway Level Crossing No. 184 in Salem. Thereafter, Public Notice dated 02.07.2016, under Section 15(2) of the Highways Act, which is the equivalent of Section 3(2) of the Industrial Purposes Act, was issued calling for objections as to why their lands should not be acquired for the said purpose. After consideration of the objections received, Notice dated 01.02.2017 was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, under Section 15(1) of the Highways Act, which is the same as Section 3(1) of the Industrial Purposes Act. Thereupon, these two persons filed W.P.No.3276 of 2017 before the Madras High Court challenging the acquisition proceedings and status quo was ordered therein. This case is pending as on date.\n25. The Validation Act of 2019 states that the provisions in the First Schedule, the Second Schedule and the Third Schedule to the new L.A. Act shall apply to land acquisition proceedings under the Highways Act. Part III of the Validation Act of 2019 pertains to the Highways Act. Section 10(1) therein states that all the provisions of the Highways Act, except the provisions relating to determination of compensation, shall stand revived with effect on and from 26.09.2013. Section 10(2) states that all rules, notifications, notices, orders, directions issued or any other proceedings initiated under the Highways Act, except those relating to determination of compensation, which were in force immediately before 26.09.2013 shall, for all purposes, be deemed to have been revived on and from 26.09.2013. Section 10(3) states that the provisions relating to determination of compensation as specified in the First Schedule; rehabilitation and resettlement as specified in the Second Schedule; and infrastructure amenities as specified in the Third Schedule to the new L.A. Act, shall apply to the acquisition proceedings under the Highways Act. Section 11 states that except as provided in the Validation Act of 2019, the provisions of the new L.A. Act shall cease to apply to any land which is required for the purposes specified in Section 15(1) of the Highways Act and any such land shall be acquired by the Government only in accordance with the provisions of the Highways Act.\n26. Though Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5693 of 2021 are liable to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability, the arguments of Mr. Suhrith Parthasarathy, learned counsel appearing therein, were adopted in toto by Mr. N.Subramaniyan, learned counsel for K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan. This adoption of arguments is based on the premise that the provisions of the Industrial Purposes Act are in pari materia with the provisions of the Highways Act, with which they are concerned. In that view of the matter, we shall advert to the arguments advanced by both the learned counsel in the context of the Highways Act alone.\n27. The Highways Act is stated to be discriminatory, both with regard to determination of compensation as well as the acquisition procedure, when compared to the new LA Act. Reference is made to the provisions of the new LA Act which require the appropriate Government to consult the local authorities in the affected area and to carry out a Social Impact Assessment Study in consultation with them. It is pointed out that a Social Impact Assessment Study Report would lapse, under Section 14 of the new LA Act, if the Preliminary Notification under Section 11 is not issued within 12 months from the date that such report is submitted, and in such an event, a fresh Social Impact Assessment Study has to be undertaken before acquisition proceedings are initiated. It is pointed out that the First Schedule to the new LA Act states that the market value of the land is to be determined as per Section 26 thereof. The proviso to Section 26(1) of the new LA Act, in turn, links the market value to the date on which the Preliminary Notification is issued under Section 11. The Notification under Section 11 of the new LA Act is equivalent to the Public Notice issued under Section 15(2) of the Highways Act. The Declaration under Section 19 of the new LA Act is on par with the Notice published under Section 15(1) of the Highways Act.\n28. In the context thereof, it is pointed out that Section 19(7) of the new LA Act prescribes the time limit of one year between the Notification under Section 11 and the publication of the Declaration under Section 19 and in the event of failure to abide by this time stipulation, the Preliminary Notification is deemed to lapse, subject to exceptions in terms of the second proviso to Section 19(7) of the new LA Act. Similarly, Section 25 of the new LA Act provides that the Award must be passed within 12 months of the Declaration under Section 19 and if not, the entire proceedings would lapse, subject to the proviso to Section 25, which entitles the Government to extend the time. However, as all these provisions do not find reflection in the First Schedule to the new LA Act, which has been extended to the Highways Act, the timelines put in place to safeguard the interests of the land owners would not be applicable to an acquisition thereunder. In consequence, there would be no restriction upon the State of Tamil Nadu to complete the exercise in a time-bound manner and compensation would be determined by taking into consideration a market value from the distant past, which would not be the case had the acquisition been under the new LA Act. In the light of the flexibility afforded to the State Government, it is argued that the market value of the acquired land would change to the detriment of the land owner.\n29. It is further pointed out that the procedure prescribed in Section 28 of the new LA Act for determining the amount of compensation is not followed by the State of Tamil Nadu under the Highways Act and more particularly, the power given to the Collector under Section 28(7) of the new LA Act to take into consideration any other ground which may be in the interest of equity, justice and beneficial to the affected families. It is also their grievance that safeguards provided in the new LA Act, which are beneficial to land owners, are not available in the Highways Act, both in relation to the quantum of compensation as well as the procedure. Reference is made to Section 39 of the new LA Act, which provides for additional compensation in case of multiple displacements and it is pointed out that no such relief is provided in the Highways Act, despite multiple acquisitions for widening of highways.\n30. It is contended that though the Validation Act of 2019 applies the provisions of the new LA Act to the Highways Act insofar as compensation is concerned, the selective application of the provisions of the new LA Act would result in discrimination even in the matter of compensation. It is pointed out that timelines prescribed under the new LA Act, which are not relatable to the First Schedule to the new LA Act, are not made applicable under the Validation Act of 2019 and the absence of such timelines would permit the State to peg the market value for determining compensation on a date in the remote past, thereby depriving the land owners of just and fair compensation. According to the learned counsel, though there is de jure parity between the new LA Act and the State Acts, there would actually be de facto discrimination in the payment of compensation. Reference is made to P. Vajravelu Mudaliar Vs. Special Deputy Collector, Madras and others [AIR 1965 SC 1017], Nagpur Improvement Trust and others Vs. Vithal Rao and others [AIR 1973 SC 689], Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh and others [(2019) 9 SCC 304], Savitri Cairae and others Vs. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and others [(2003) 6 SCC 39] and The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. G.C. Mandawar [AIR 1954 SC 493].\n31. It is asserted that there is no intelligible differentia between land owners whose lands are acquired under the Highways Act and those whose lands are acquired under the new LA Act and it would amount to an unreasonable classification if they are denied compensation on the same terms, when their lands are acquired for public purposes. An example is cited, where a person’s land may be acquired under the Highways Act while his neighbour’s land, which is identically situated in all respects, is acquired under the new LA Act, but they would be given compensation on different criteria owing to the absence of timelines in the Highways Act, which would permit the State to peg the market value on a past date to determine the compensation unlike the situation obtaining under the new LA Act. Reference is made to Joseph Shine Vs. Union of India [(2019) 3 SCC 39] to contend that when a statute is arbitrary, it would offend Article 14 of the Constitution and would require to be struck down. It is also argued that certain critical clauses pertaining to compensation, contained in Sections 27 to 30 of the new LA Act, are not brought into play in the Highways Act, as only the First Schedule to the new LA Act has been incorporated therein, causing discrimination, as land owners whose lands have been acquired under the Highways Act would not be entitled to the benefits under these provisions of the new LA Act.\n32. On the other hand, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel, would point out that the timelines fixed in the new LA Act are not sacrosanct as the provisions thereof permit extension of time in certain circumstances. It is pointed out that, once such an extension is granted, no outer limit is prescribed and, therefore, the argument that the new LA Act places binding temporal constraints on the State is not correct. It is pointed out that the second proviso to Section 19(7) of the new LA Act empowers the Government to extend the period of 12 months if, in its opinion, circumstances exist to justify the same and, in effect, there is no distinction between the Highways Act and the new LA Act. Reference is made in this regard to State of Kerala and others Vs. T.M. Peter and others [(1980) 3 SCC 554]. Reliance is placed upon the State of Karnataka Vs. Ranganatha Reddy [(1977) 4 SCC 471] in support of the contention that a State law enacted on a subject in the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution would stand protected after it receives the assent of the President under Article 254(2), even if it is repugnant to the Central legislation on the same subject, and it is argued that any such repugnancy would stand cured and would no longer be a ground to invalidate the Highways Act.\n33. It is contended that the question of comparing the Highways Act with the new LA Act would not arise at all, as any repugnant provision in the Highways Act would continue to operate notwithstanding the contrary provision in the new LA Act, as the Validation Act of 2019, which revived the Highways Act, stood protected by the assent given by the President of India under Article 254(2). It is pointed out that the Public Notice under Section 15(2) of the Highways Act was issued on 02.07.2016 and was followed by publication of the Notice under Section 15(1) thereof on 01.02.2017, i.e., a mere 7 months later. It is argued that, even in a case where delay ensued due to factors beyond control or any other incidental reason, it would not be sufficient in itself to declare the legislation void on that short ground.\n34. Having given serious and thoughtful consideration to the matter, we must first take note of certain crucial aspects that practically clinch the issue. The very foundation and basis of Article 254(2) of the Constitution is that a particular State enactment runs contra to the provisions of a Central legislation on the same subject, but despite the same it would stand protected after it receives the assent of the President of India thereunder. Therefore, it is a foregone conclusion that disparity and discrimination would be writ large between the two enactments and aspects relating to their implementation. In such a situation, the question of comparing the two legislations, for the purpose of making out a case under Article 14 of the Constitution, would not arise. Such an exercise would be akin to comparing chalk with cheese, i.e., two essentially unequal entities.\n35. Notably, in G.C.Mandawar (supra), a Constitution Bench observed that it is conceivable that, when the same legislature enacts two different laws but in substance they form one legislation, it might be open to the Court to disregard the form and treat them as one law and strike it down if, in their conjunction, they result in discrimination, but such a course would not be open where the two laws sought to be read in conjunction are by different Governments and by different Legislatures as Article 14 does not authorize the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that, in contrast with a law of another State on the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory and nor does it contemplate a law of the Centre or of the State, dealing with similar subjects, being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions thereof. The Bench pointed out that the sources of authority for the two statutes being different, Article 14 can have no application. This was the very logic that was applied by this Court in Ananthi Ammal (supra), while upholding the validity of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978.\n36. In P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra), a Constitution Bench was dealing with an amendment to the old LA Act brought by the Madras Legislature, whereby different principles were specified for fixing compensation for lands acquired for housing schemes when compared with acquisition for other purposes. Significantly, this was not a case where Presidential assent was obtained under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. It was in those circumstances that the Bench observed upon a comparative study of the old LA Act and the Amending Act that, if a land is acquired for a housing scheme under the Amending Act, the claimant would get a lesser value than what he would get for the same land if it was acquired for a different public purpose under the old LA Act and such classification between persons whose lands were acquired for housing schemes and those whose lands were acquired for other public purposes would not be a reasonable one under Article 14. It was on that ground that the Bench held the Amending Act to be void, as it clearly infringed Article 14 of the Constitution. Similar was the situation in Deputy Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup Vs. Durga Nath Sarma [AIR 1968 SC 394] and Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), as those cases also did not involve validation of a repugnant State law under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.\n37. In Ranganatha Reddy (supra), a Constitution Bench of 7 Judges observed that the repugnancy, if any, between a State Act and a Central Legislation on a subject in the Concurrent List would stand cured if the State Act receives the assent of the President under Article 254(2) and such repugnancy cannot thereafter be a ground to invalidate the State Act. Again, in Javed and others Vs. State of Haryana and others [(2003) 8 SCC 369], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held that it is not permissible to compare a piece of legislation enacted by a State in exercise of its own legislative power with the provisions of another law, though pari materia it may be, but enacted by the Parliament or by another State Legislature within its own power to legislate, as the sources of power are different and so do differ those who exercise the power. It was observed that two laws enacted by two different Governments and by two different legislatures can be read neither in conjunction nor by comparison for the purpose of finding out if they are discriminatory and Article 14 does not authorize the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that, in contrast with a law of the Centre or of another State on the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory.\n38. In U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Jainul Islam and another [(1998) 2 SCC 467], this Court was dealing with a State Act for acquisition of land for executing housing schemes. However, the compensation payable thereunder was lesser than that payable under the old LA Act. This State law was of the year 1965 and had received the assent of the President. However, the old LA Act was amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, whereby several new provisions were inserted in the interest of the land owners, by enhancing the amount of solatium and interest. The State Act of 1965, however, remained unchanged. The High Court came to the conclusion that the land owners would be entitled to the benefit of the provisions introduced in the old LA Act by the Amendment Act of 1984. The matter thereupon came before this Court. This Court held that Section 55 of the State Act of 1965, which incorporated the provisions of the old LA Act, also intended that the amendments to the old LA Act relating to determination of compensation would be applicable to acquisition of lands under the State Act of 1965. Owing to this construction and interpretation of the statutory provision, this Court held that it would not be necessary to deal with the submission that, if the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1984 were not applicable to acquisitions under the State Act of 1965, the provisions of the old LA Act made applicable under the State Act of 1965 would be void on the ground of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution. This judgment, therefore, does not aid or advance the case of the appellants.\n39. Similar logic was applied by this Court in Savitri Cairae (supra), while dealing with the very same State Act of 1965. Noting that it provided for acquisition of land in terms of the old LA Act and by reason of the legal fiction created thereunder, this Court held that, even if the acquisition was made under the State Act of 1965, if higher amount of compensation is payable under the old LA Act, such higher amount of compensation has to be paid. Pertinently, this Court observed that, ordinarily, the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be invoked in the matter of enforcement of a State legislation vis-à-vis Parliamentary legislation and/or legislation of another State.\n40. We are, therefore, not inclined to entertain the attack launched against the Highways Act on the strength of the so-called disparity and discrimination in the norms and procedures prescribed therein when compared with the new LA Act. In this regard, we may point out that the Highways Act in the State of Tamil Nadu stood protected even at the time the old LA Act was in force and effect, owing to the Presidential assent that it had received under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, and it continued to operate and provide altogether different yardsticks for acquisition of land and payment of compensation till the advent of the new LA Act.\n41. Even otherwise, in so far as the issue of social impact assessment and the timelines for various steps in the new LA Act are concerned, this very argument was advanced in G. Mohan Rao (supra) and this Court observed that the whole exercise of pointing out any repugnancy after a validating Act has obtained the assent of the President is otiose for the whole purpose of Article 254(2) of the Constitution is to resuscitate and operationalize a repugnant Act or repugnant provisions of such Act. The inescapable fact also remains that the second proviso to Section 19(7) of the new LA Act empowers the appropriate Government to extend the stipulated period of 12 months for publishing the Declaration after issuance of a Preliminary Notification if, in its opinion, circumstances exist to justify the same. The third proviso requires that any such decision to extend the period shall be recorded in writing and the same shall be notified and uploaded on the website of the authority concerned. More importantly, once such extension is granted, there is no outer limit prescribed and the proceedings would not lapse owing to a time stipulation. In T.M. Peter (supra), while dealing with the attack against absence of a time limit for Government sanction in the Town Planning Act, 1932, this Court observed that, as the scheme of the said enactment was urgent improvement of a town and it was left to the Government to deal with it with expeditious dispatch, no precise time scale could be fixed in the Act owing to the myriad factors which would have to be considered by the Government before granting sanction to a scheme and concluded by stating that the Court would not be powerless to quash and grant relief where, arbitrary protraction or malafide inaction of the authorities caused injury to an owner.\n42. No doubt, the scheme of the new LA Act advocates timely measures being adopted in implementation of the acquisition and such general temporal restrictions would benefit the land owners, but the absence of such restrictions in the Highways Act may not be reason enough to invalidate it, as the very premise on which the Highways Acts was enacted by the State of Tamil Nadu was to cut down on time-consuming processes. In G. Mohan Rao (supra), this Court had noted that the letter dated 25.07.2019 written by the State of Tamil Nadu, for obtaining the assent of the President of India for the Validation Act of 2019, specifically emphasized that the three State Acts were made for the purpose of speedy acquisitions but the new LA Act rendered them repugnant. Therefore, it is not the intendment or purpose of the Highways Act that the processes for acquisition of land thereunder should be protracted or be ridden by avoidable delays.\n43. A particular instance or a stray case, involving some delay in the acquisition of land under the Highways Act, may have to be dealt with on its own individual merits but that would not be sufficient in itself to invalidate the legislation itself. As noted above, K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan have already approached the Madras High Court challenging the individual acquisition proceedings initiated against them and those cases have to be considered on their own merits and in accordance with law, without reference to this adjudication which is limited only to the attack on the validity of the Highways Act.\n44. Further, there is no possibility of the State of Tamil Nadu exercising arbitrary discretion in adopting one legislation or the other for the purpose of acquiring lands, as contended by the learned counsel. Sections 3, 7 and 11 of the Validation Act of 2019 expressly exclude the operation of the new LA Act for the purposes contained in the State Acts which stood revived owing to the assent of the President of India. Therefore, the State of Tamil Nadu would be bound to apply only the Highways Act for acquiring lands for the purposes reserved thereunder.\n45. On the above analysis, these appeals are bereft of merit. The Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, is not liable to be invalidated on the ground that its provisions manifest discrimination or arbitrariness when compared with the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition; Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.\nThe appeals are dismissed.\nParties shall bear their own costs.", + "case_record": "The appellant, owner of a residential house, sued the respondent tenant for eviction and recovery of rent arrears, alleging the tenant was in arrears for over six months. The tenant resisted, claiming he had spent a significant amount on repairs and that adjusting these expenses would reduce the arrears to less than six months. The trial court and appellate court found that a substantial portion of the repair expenses was not adjustable because the claim for recovery was barred by the three-year limitation period (Article 23 of the Limitation Act, 1963) or because repairs were done without notice to the landlord. Consequently, the tenant was found to be in arrears for more than six months, and a decree for eviction was granted. The High Court, however, set aside these judgments, holding that the tenant was entitled to deduct repair expenses incurred after notifying the landlord, and that the limitation period for such recovery/adjustment was six years. The High Court concluded that after such adjustments, the tenant was not in arrears for more than six months and dismissed the suit.", + "generated_judgment": "**Analysis:**\n\n1. **Limitation Period for Rent and Repairs**: According to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for the recovery of rent is six years, while recovery for damages due to the tenant's use or occupation of the property is three years (Article 23). In this case, the tenant's repair expenses fell into the latter category.\n\n2. **Notice of Repairs**: The landlord has the right to be notified if the tenant intends to carry out repairs. Repairs done without notice may not be considered for adjustment.\n\n3. **Trial Court and Appellate Court Findings**: Both these courts found that a significant portion of the tenant's repair expenses were not adjustable due to being time-barred (three-year limitation) or done without landlord's notice. Thus, the tenant was found to be in arrears for more than six months, leading to the eviction decree.\n\n4. **High Court Decision**: The High Court disregarded the limitation period for repairs and considered the six-year period for rent recovery when calculating the tenant's adjusted arrears. This interpretation is inconsistent with the Limitation Act, which explicitly prescribes different periods for rent and repair damages.\n\n**Reasoning:**\n\n- The High Court's interpretation of the limitation period for adjustments is not-supported by the Limitation Act, 1963, leading to an incorrect calculation of the tenant's arrears.\n- The trial court and appellate court correctly applied the relevant limitation periods to the repair expenses and considered repairs done without notice.\n- The High Court's decision to set aside these judgments based on an inaccurate interpretation of the law is erroneous.\n\n**Conclusion:**\n\nThe appeal should be **DISALLOWED**. The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by misinterpreting the law and thus, its judgment should not stand. The lower courts' findings, based on a correct application of the relevant law, should prevail.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by R. B. MISRA, J. :\nR. B. MISRA, J. for the The present appeal by special leave raises two questions : (1) whether the expenses incurred by the tenant on repairs of the tenanted premises can be deducted from or adjusted towards the rent due to the landlord despite the claim for recovery having become barred by time; and (2) whether the period of limitation in the present case for the adjustment of the amount spent on repairs towards the rent due will be three or six years ?\n2. The appellant is admittedly the owner of the residential house in dispute and the respondent is her tenant of the said premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 20. As the tenant-respondent had fallen in arrears of rent for more than six months the appellant served a notice of demand but on failure of the tenant to clear the arrears the appellant terminated his tenancy and filed a suit for his eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent. The suit was resisted by the tenant-respondent on grounds inter alia that he had spent a substantial amount on repairs of the tenanted premises and if the same was adjusted subjected towards the rent due, the arrears of rent were not for more than six months and, therefore, the suit for eviction on the ground of default was not maintainable.\n3. The trial court came to the conclusion that the entire amount spent by the tenant-respondent on repairs could not be adjusted towards the rent due as a substantial part of it was spent on repairs without any notice to the landlord. In respect of the part of the expenses incurred towards repairs the court held that as the claim for recovery of the said amount was barred by three years' rule of limitation, that amount also could not be adjusted towards the rent due to the landlord. In this view of the matter the tenant was in arrears of rent for more than a period of six months. Consequently he was liable to be evicted for default and the court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. On appeal the appellate court substantially confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court.\n4. On revision the High Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit holding that the defendant-respondent was entitled to deduct the amount spent by him on repairs of the suit premises after notice to the landlord, the claim for which had not become barred by time and after deducting that amount from the arrears of rent the defendant-respondent was not in arrears for more than six months. The Court further held that the limitation for recovery of the amount spent on repairs of the house was six years and not three years and on that basis it found that a substantial portion of the expenses incurred on repairs by the defendant-respondent could be adjusted towards the rent due as the same was well within time. The plaintiff-appellant has now come to challenge the judgment and order of the High Court.\n5. The first question for consideration, as stated earlier, is whether the expenses incurred by the tenant on repairs of the tenanted premises can be deducted from or adjusted towards the rent due to the landlord despite the claim for recovery having become barred by time. This point is no more res integra as it is concluded by a decision of this Court in Maganlal Chhotalal Desai v. Chandrakant Motilal ((1969) 1 SCC 58 : AIR 1969 SC 37 : (1969) 1 SCJ 100 ). Dealing with Section 20 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Act, 1947 the Court held :\nThe section gives the tenant a general right of recovery of the overpaid rent within six months from the date of payment. Without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, he may deduct the overpayment from any rent payable by him to the landlord. Deduction is one mode of recovery. If the amount is incapable of recovery because of the bar of limitation, it cannot be recovered by deduction. In other words, the right of recovery by deduction is barred at the same time as the right of recovery by suit. If the tenant seeks recovery of the over paid amount he must bring the suit or make the deduction within six months.Therefore, if the claim for recovery of the amount spent on repairs has become barred by time the same cannot be adjusted towards the rent due for the same reason. It would be anomalous to hold that if one remedy by way of recovery is barred by time the other mode of recovery, that is by adjustment, will not be barred.\n6. A feeble attempt was made to contend that there is no period of limitation prescribed for the adjustment of the amount spent by the tenant on repairs towards the rent due and, therefore, the amount so spent can be adjusted at any time before the suit. We feel difficulty in accepting this argument in face of the aforesaid decision of this Court.\n7. Now the next question is whether the period of limitation applicable to the facts of the present case for recovery of the amount spent on repairs or for adjustment of the same towards the arrears of rent due will be governed by three years' limitation or six years' limitation. The trial court and the first appellate court applied Article 23 of the Limitation Act, 1963\n8. For the reasons given above the appeal must fail and it is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -1113,26 +1113,26 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S009", - "case_id": "5248", - "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct", - "source_file": "S009__ablation_issue__mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct__5248.json", + "case_id": "256", + "experiment": "baseline_cot", + "model": "mistral-nemo", + "source_file": "S009__baseline_cot__mistral-nemo__256.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "09/05/2023", - "machine_error_stage": "issues", + "judgment_date": "01/02/1985", + "machine_error_stage": "conclusion", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue misframing" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis" } }, { "data": { - "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1741 of 1967. Appeal by special leave from judgment and order dated the 30th November, 1962 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 777 of 1961. | State Of Mysore v. Anant Vinayak Patwardhan | 26/02/1974", - "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1741 of 1967. Appeal by special leave from judgment and order dated the 30th November, 1962 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 777 of 1961. | State Of Mysore v. Anant Vinayak Patwardhan", + "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal Nos. 5193-5195 of 2008 (Arising Out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 24733-24735 of 2005) | Ramisetty Naraiah v. Poluri Venkata Subbamma And Others | 22/08/2008", + "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal Nos. 5193-5195 of 2008 (Arising Out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 24733-24735 of 2005) | Ramisetty Naraiah v. Poluri Venkata Subbamma And Others", "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED", "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED", - "case_record": "The respondent's ancestors received a permanent cash allowance called Tainat from the Peshwas. Following the 1819 Treaty of Gulgallee, the East India Company agreed to continue all such allowances. The allowance was Rs. 2010/- minus a Rs. 240/- commutation amount. In 1944, the ruler of Jamkhandi converted this allowance to one for life. After Jamkhandi State merged with Bombay State, the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955, was enacted. The respondent applied under Section 17 of this Act, claiming the allowance was permanent and hereditary, and that his application to the ruler for correction of the record (which stated it was for life) was pending. He sought compensation based on it being permanent or for life. The Assistant Commissioner granted the amount the respondent was receiving. The respondent appealed to the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, arguing the ruler lacked power to change the allowance to for life. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the ruler's sovereign powers. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the High Court of Mysore, reiterating his claims. The High Court directed payment of Rs. 14,070 (seven times the annual allowance) on the basis that the grant was hereditary. This appeal challenges the High Court's decision.", - "generated_judgment": "### Facts \n\n1. The respondent’s ancestors were granted a permanent cash allowance known as **Tainat** by the Peshwas. \n2. The **Treaty of Gulgallee (1819)** between the Peshwas and the East India Company provided that all such allowances would continue to be paid. \n3. The allowance amounted to **Rs. 2010** less a **commutation amount of Rs. 240**, i.e., a net annual sum of **Rs. 1,770**. \n4. In **1944** the ruler of the princely State of **Jamkhandi** altered the character of the grant from a permanent hereditary allowance to a **grant for life only**. \n5. After Jamkhandi’s merger with **Bombay State**, the **Bombay Merged‑Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955** (the “1955 Act”) came into force. \n6. Under **Section 17 of the 1955 Act**, a person whose *permanent* right is extinguished is entitled to compensation. \n7. The respondent filed an application under Section 17, asserting that the Tainat was a permanent hereditary right and that his request to the ruler for correction of the record (which still described the grant as “for life”) was pending. \n8. The **Assistant Commissioner** granted only the amount the respondent was actually receiving under the life‑grant (i.e., the reduced sum). \n9. The respondent appealed to the **Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal**, arguing that the ruler had no legal authority to convert the permanent hereditary allowance into a life‑grant. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that the ruler’s sovereign powers allowed the alteration. \n10. The respondent then filed a **writ petition** in the **High Court of Mysore** reiterating his claim that the allowance remained a permanent hereditary right. The High Court, accepting this view, ordered payment of **Rs. 14,070** (seven times the annual allowance) as compensation. \n11. The present appeal challenges the High Court’s decision.\n\n### Issues \n\n1. **Did the ruler of Jamkhandi have the legal authority to convert a permanent, hereditary cash allowance (“Tainat”) into a grant *for life* under the 1819 Treaty of Gulgallee and the statutory framework that survived the merger of Jamkhandi with Bombay State?** \n\n2. **Is the “Tainat” allowance a *permanent, hereditary* right that survived the abolition of “miscellaneous alienations” by the Bombay Merged‑Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955?** \n\n3. **Did the Assistant Commissioner correctly apply Section 17 of the 1955 Act by limiting the award to the amount the respondent was actually receiving under the life‑grant?** \n\n4. **Did the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal err in law by accepting the ruler’s sovereign power to alter a hereditary grant?** \n\n5. **Did the High Court of Mysore err in law (or in fact) by concluding that the allowance was hereditary and by fixing the compensation at seven times the annual amount?** \n\n6. **Is the quantum of compensation (seven‑fold multiplier) consistent with the purpose and language of Section 17 of the 1955 Act?** \n\n7. **Does the pending application for correction of the record bar the respondent’s claim for compensation?** \n\n8. **Is the respondent’s claim barred by lapse of time or laches?** \n\n### Rules \n\n1. **Treaty Principle** – A treaty entered into by a sovereign (here, the 1819 Treaty of Gulgallee) creates a *vested* right that survives the existence of the original parties and binds their successors unless expressly surrendered. \n\n2. **Doctrine of *perpetuity of hereditary rights* (Indian law)** – Rights conferred as “permanent” and “hereditary” under a treaty or a grant are deemed *permanent* unless they are lawfully extinguished by a competent authority. \n\n3. **Section 17 of the Bombay Merged‑Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955** – Provides a lump‑sum compensation when a *permanent* right is extinguished; the quantum is generally a multiple of the annual amount, the multiplier being fixed by the Act or by judicially‑established precedent (often seven years). \n\n4. **Power of a princely ruler post‑independence** – After the integration of princely states, a ruler’s sovereign powers were limited to those retained under the Instrument of Accession and the Constitution; they could not unilaterally modify rights that were *vested* under a treaty with the British Crown. \n\n5. **Principle of *cessation of sovereign prerogative*** – A sovereign may not impair a vested, permanent right without lawful authority; any such impairment is void. \n\n6. **Limitation and laches** – A claim for compensation under a statutory scheme must be brought within the period prescribed by the relevant limitation law; however, where a right is *permanent* and the claimant is a beneficiary, the limitation clock typically starts from the date of extinguishment, not from the date of the original grant. \n\n7. **Pending correction of records** – An administrative or remedial petition to correct the record does not preclude a claim for statutory compensation if the underlying right is already vested. \n\n### Analysis \n\n**Maintainability** – The appeal is filed against a judgment of the High Court of Mysore. No material procedural defect (e.g., lack of jurisdiction, expiry of appeal period) is indicated in the record. Consequently, the appeal is **maintainable**. \n\n1. **Authority of the ruler (Issue 1 & Rule 4 & 5)** \n - The Tainat was created by the 1819 Treaty, which the East India Company solemnly undertook to continue. Post‑independence, the treaty’s obligations were transferred to the successor State (Bombay State). \n - The ruler’s act in 1944 occurred after the State’s accession and after the treaty’s rights had become vested in the State. Under Rule 4, a post‑accession ruler possessed no sovereign power to alter a right that was a *permanent hereditary* grant enforceable against the State. \n - Hence, the ruler **lacked authority** to convert the permanent grant into a life‑grant; the conversion is legally **void**. \n\n2. **Nature of the allowance (Issue 2 & Rule 1,2,3)** \n - Because the conversion is void, the allowance remains a **permanent, hereditary** right. \n - The 1955 Act’s Section 17 is triggered where such a permanent right is extinguished. The 1955 Act, however, abolished “miscellaneous alienations” but expressly provided for compensation when a *permanent* right is lost. The respondent, being the legal heir, is therefore a *beneficiary* under Section 17. \n\n3. **Assistant Commissioner’s interpretation (Issue 3)** \n - The Commissioner limited the award to the amount the respondent was actually receiving under the life‑grant, treating the life‑grant as the extant right. Given the ruling in point 1 that the life‑grant is void, the Commissioner erred in restricting compensation to the reduced amount. \n\n4. **Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal’s view (Issue 4)** \n - The Tribunal’s affirmation of the ruler’s sovereign power conflicts with the legal principle that a sovereign cannot impair a vested permanent right (Rule 5). The Tribunal therefore committed a legal error. \n\n5. **High Court’s decision (Issue 5,6,7)** \n - The High Court correctly recognized the hereditary nature of the allowance (Issue 5, Rule 2). \n - The quantum—seven times the annual allowance—is consistent with the established method of valuation under Section 17 (Rule 3) and with precedent in similar compensation cases (e.g., *State of Bombay v. M/s. Deoghar Silks* where a seven‑year multiplier was applied). Accordingly, the High Court’s computation is not ultra vires. \n - The pending application for correction of the record does not bar the claim (Issue 7, Rule 7) because the right is already vested; the High Court’s award therefore stands. \n\n6. **Limitation (Issue 8)** \n - The claim was filed after the 1955 Act came into force; the statute does not prescribe a restrictive limitation period for claims arising from extinguishment of permanent rights, and no evidence of inordinate delay is shown. Hence the claim is not barred by limitation or laches. \n\n**Conclusion** – The ruler of Jamkhandi had no legal authority to alter a permanent hereditary allowance created by the 1819 Treaty. Consequently, the allowance remained a permanent hereditary right, invoking Section 17 of the 1955 Act. The Assistant Commissioner and the Revenue Appellate Tribunal erred in limiting the claimant’s entitlement. The High Court correctly held the allowance hereditary and correctly applied the statutory multiplier, awarding Rs 14,070 as compensation. \n\n### Conclusion \n\nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court’s decree ordering payment of Rs 14,070 in favour of the respondent is upheld.", - "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by\nALAGIRSWAMI, J.-The respondent's ancestors had been granted a cash allowance called Tainat by the Peshwas. After the, defeat of the Peshwas by the British, by the Treaty of Gulgallee with Jainkhandi dated 6-6-1819 by the Hon'ble Mr. Elphinston, Governor of Bombay on behalf of the East India Company one of the terms which were granted to Gopalrao Jamkhandikar was regarding the terms which the held from the Government of His Highness the Peshwa, for the payment of his, contingent (apparently army) of his personal allowance. It stated that he was to continue all allowances and no complaints on. this head were to be suffered to reach the Government (East India Company). The allowance to respondent's ancestors was one- such allowance. This allowance seems to have amounted to a sum Rs. 2010/- minus a sum of Rs. 240/- being the commutation amount as shown in Petha Khata Wahi Extract of 1942-43. That: exact, also at this grant was permanent. But. in 1944 the then ruler of Jamkhandi seems to have converted this allowance to one for life. After the Jamkhandi State was merged in the State of Bombay, the, Bombay Legislature passed the Bombay Merged Territories Mislaneous Alienations. Abolition Act 1955. The respondent's filed an application on 21-7-1956 under s. 17 of that Act before the Assistant Commissioner, Jamkhandi claiming that the cash allowance be payable: was both permanent and hereditary but he learnt that the ruler Jamkhandi had passed an order that the said cash allowance be continued till his (appellant's) The time when the same was to him after the death of his father. He mentioned that he had moved the Rajasaheb by an application which was not finally disposed of. He, therefore. claimed that he would be entitled to Rs. 21.000/- at 7 times of the cash, allowance on the basis that it was Rs. 3, 000/- a year and permanent' or in the alternative to Rs. 9 000/- being three times the cash allowance on the basis that it; was payable for. life. It would be appreciated that by, this time the Ruler of Jamkhandi was no longer a Ruler and was certainly not in a position to , be of any assistance to the. respondent on the basis of h is application. The Assistant Commissioner passed an order granting a sum which the respondent was receiving. The respondent then filed an appeal to the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal as by that time the area had become part of the 'Mysore State . In that appeal he mentioned that through mistake his name has been recorded as holder of the Tainat cash allowance for life only. He also mentioned that his application to the Rejasaheb of Jamkhandi for correction of the mistake was still pending even though the state of Jamkhandi was merged. The 'Tribunal dealt with the argument before it on behalf of the respondent to the effect that the ruler of Jamkhandi had no power to change the. cash allowance to one for life as according to his own earlier order passed in the year 1909-10 it was permanent and in the view that the ruler of Jamkhandi had sovereign powers and was the fountain head of all source of authority, that is. executive, judiciary and legislature, he could change t he Tainat cash allowance at his sweet will and pleasure, dismissed the appeal. The respondent thereupon filed a writ petition No. 777 before the High Court of Mysore. Where also he stated that through mistake his name was recorded as the holder of the cash allowance for life only, and also urged that the ruler of the Jam State had no power to interfere with the Tainat cash allowance. The High Court did not deal with the question whether the Ruler of Jamkhandi had, in 1944, the power to convert a hereditary grant to one for life but directed that a sum of Rs. 14, 070 being seven times annual cash allowance of Rs. 29010 be paid to the respondent on , the basis that the grant was hereditary. This appeal is against that judgment and order of the High Court.We are of opinion that clearly the decision of the Mysore High 'Court is wrong. In Ameer-un-Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum (AIR 1953 SC 352 ) this Court stated the constitutional position of the Nizani of Hyderabad in these words:\n\"...... It cannot be dispute that prior to the integration of 'Hyderabad State with the Indian Union and the coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the Nizam of Hyderabad enjoyed uncontrolled sovereign powers. He was the supreme legislature the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of 'the executive, and there were no constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities. The Firmans were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam anti they Were, binding in the same way any other 'law;- nay, they would override all other laws which were in conflict with them. So long as a particular 'Fireman, held the field that alone would govern or regulate the rights of the p arties concerned, though it could be annulled or modified by a later 'Firman' at any time that the Nizam willed.\nThe, Nizam war, not only the supreme legislature, he was the fountain of justice as well., When he constituted a new Court, be could, according to ordinary notions, be deemed to have exercised his legislative authority. When again he affirmed or reversed a Judicial decision, that may appropriately be described as a judicial act. A rigid line of demarcation, however. between the one and the other would from the very nature of things be not justified or even possible.\"\nThat sets out the constitutional position of the ruler of every of the Indian States before their integration with the rest of India and coming into force of the Constitution of India. It follows therefore that if the ruler of Jamkhandi had changed the permanent cash allowance granted to the respondent's ancestors to one for life it is legally valid and it cannot be questioned. The extract from the Jamkhandi State Gazette dated 7-8-1920 publishing rules regarding cash allowance, itself shows that those rules cancelled the earlier rules and those rules also could be appropriately cancelled 'by the subsequent rules. Any application made by the respondent to the former ruler of Jamkhandi after the State was merged in Bombay State will not help him. The ruler held by that time lost all his powers. The decision of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal is, therefore, right.There is only one small point which has got to be mentioned. The compensation allowed was three times the cash allowance. As already mentioned the Petha Khata Wahi extract shows the allowance at Rs. 2010.00 minus Rs. 240.00 being the commutation amount. These allowances being service allowances, the deduction is for the payment to the person who was doing the service in place of the cash allowance holder. That is why what was being paid to the respondent year after year was the cash allowance minus commutation amount. The Mysore High Court was, therefore, wrong in holding that this sum of Rs. 240 cannot be deducted from the cash allowance while calculating the compensation payable to the respondent.\nWe must mention that when this appeal was take, , , . up for hearing Mr. Datar appearing for the respondent contended that as this Court in M.P. State v. Ranojirao (1968 3 SCR 489 ) has held that the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act violates Art. 19(1)(f) or Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, and so struck it down, the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienation Abolition Act is also liable to be struck down on the same ground. He, therefore, wanted that tic should be given the liberty to move the High Court for striking down the Act under consideration in this case. We do not propose to express any opinion as to whether it would be open him to do so in the background of this case. There is nothing to prevent him from filing an application if he is so advised.,\nIn the result this appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court of Mysore set aside. As the special leave was granted on the condition that the appellant would in any event pay to the respondent his of the' appeal, the appellant shall pay the respondent's costs.\n", + "case_record": "The appellant leased agricultural land in April 1975 and paid rent regularly. In 1979, the appellant learned of respondents' claims to have purchased the land. The appellant filed a suit for injunction and obtained a temporary injunction. Section 15 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956, was incorporated on July 1, 1980. Sale deeds for the land were executed on January 17, 1981, in favor of the respondents. The appellant filed an Andhra Tenancy Case (ATC) asserting his right to purchase the land, claiming the sales were void under Section 15. The respondents filed an ATC seeking eviction for alleged rent default. The trial court dismissed the appellant's ATC and allowed the respondents' eviction ATC, finding the sales valid as agreements predated Section 15 and ruling the appellant defaulted on rent. The District Court reversed this, holding that the sales were intended to circumvent Section 15 and that the appellant had not defaulted. The respondents then filed Civil Revision Petitions (CRPs) in the High Court. The High Court allowed the CRPs, setting aside the District Court's orders. The appellant challenged the High Court's order, arguing that Section 15 should apply as the sale deeds were executed after the amendment, and that the High Court failed to consider the effect of a landlord's withdrawal on the default issue and the execution of sale deeds in favor of nominees.", + "generated_judgment": "### **Judgment in the Appeal**\n\n---\n\n#### **Facts:**\n1. The appellant leased agricultural land in **April 1975**, paying rent regularly.\n2. From **December 1979**, the appellant was apprised of respondents’ ownership claims over the said land.\n3. **Temporary injunction in favour of the appellant** was granted to prevent eviction for alleged default in rent.\n4. **Section 15 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (as amended on **07.07.1980**)** became operative, prohibiting agricultural land sales in favour of tenants without prior dissolution of tenancy.\n5. **Deeds of sale** executed on **17.01.1981** (post-emendment) in favour of respondents, recording renditions through an Intermediate Party named the flier *(ZimandAL)*.\n6. The appellant filed suit under **Agricultural Tenancy Case (ATC)** raising intent to obtain land sale on inflated (discrepant) documents.\n7. Respondents separately filed an eviction suit under **ATC for 6 “verbal receipts” of rent (improperly traced)** predating the invalid transition.\n8. **Trial Court genuflected to eviction**, dismissing appellant’s ATC on:\n - Adjusting outsider squatters to past rents over doubts of receipt.\n9. **District Court reversed**, holding post-1980 sales illegal and resetting default debíaus on pre-accordances where invoices / bookmarks contained payment overhauls due for reason of fraudulent transpasser (ZimandAL).\n10. **High Court (RM)** recalled arrived orders, adopting strict callouts for rent shortfall train-rides closer to forensic accurateness and punishing legal perversions without substantial move/gaps for vaccine-lumpy formulae‐based reassirments cropping up.\n11. Objections arteries from appellant activated current notes:\n - Fifteen-feet void‐vocery violates “Declaratory Judgment” time-skeleton.\n - Nominee missteps obfuscate reality‐check payment.\n\n---\n\n#### **Issues:**\n1. **Statutory Violation**\n - *Do sale deeds on **17.01.1981**, made after Section 15’s **07.07.1980** sunset became (operative) amnesty‐myopic – void orvideable under Section 15(1)?*\n2. **Fraud/Gavest Non‐Seachianity**\n - *Has High Court become guilty of acquiescing Tenant‐acquisition retaliations by blanket-eduidual evaluations, seeing ainsiary tenancies at risk of listing nominals without conformance (re lease‐forwarderrors) to sergeant‐secucilitary snares.*\n3. **D boute‐anger /Desouth**\n - *Retribution must avail Anglo‐Old‐\tos Saxon norms distilled to prae‐guidelines instead of leering at subypte‐defined surreners nondifining legacy‐mongering under Section (15(4))?*\n **- Specific (**Appendant**Lay to High‐Court maderaose‐)\n - Should presumptuous buyer latitude be bent by nuances over renouncing‐frustration workshop‐violations (decapp compatibility) soofexcesses like progressive rental Votes?\n\n---\n\n#### **Rules:**\n1. **Section 15, Andhra AP Act 1956:**\n - Sales of land within the jurisdiction made **after** July 1, 1980, constituted criminal offences unless **prior dissolution of tenancy or precedual north-open deposits R/M**. (APGA Reports †)\n2. **Fraud‐Reactive Genetic Definitions**\n - Miscueješuez about ‘escrivcor“I appeal”مكانs invocation attributes swayedAMP/Bridge’s Brother‐last of emthor evolution (ADCA) over Repurchases/Third-Party-Chaser of land implied for tenancy‐following due‐care spell‐bound.)\n3. **Default‐Modifier Establishing Equikteness:**\n - Elections unhinged by ”just-readirable” lien‐filings augmented by declaration-modifiable award in traditional terminate‐wise pokes coinant‐slope-PDL—leached‐words‐PA covert‐ossen assenting learners invoking mistepper‐criteria under procedural-couten‐backload proődexs.\n4. **Tenancy Validity**\n - Premised on demise‐permit dispossessed rentals post-aplode-maskers with acts routining buy‐backs among Equifax‐havelwee,aide-whishes ; hereniary squadron DOCÜment slided inappropriate straight‐insic promotional advances with remoduted Title‐ Ηνω quân `@’´.\n\n---\n#### **Analysis:**PER **FINALABLE BARREN-CORTOU* (CONCRETE SPIZ RANS);\n\n1. **Maintainable Appeal?**—*NO UPDATE—CERTAIN ALTOGVERDANCE WORKS TRUE:*\n **(i)** Nor hideout disputes regarding content holder, exemplars< or malarial records joined‐with valid files post‐amendments. **Gist**—tenure dirrupili Fantasm just lands deeply split through groundwork.\n **(ii)** **_Fraud case_** owing clausible–зибли -ing-enough quandary swung Clear’s merging of blanks (L+++++ contracts for $1.1-million of source-struck )\n -(iii) \"Papers gripping suppragma welcome sciVR pulse check under Section 5 of ALA’s Prop AssCity \",\" is barred by “(Due Process Supply of rare‐” befo-field‐Present‐Paradiems”\n -(iv) Manned II dealings converted pedigrees without choice of pre-1957 “Othellian tenancy deeds ” or other‐irrevocable mutating deeds.**\n\n WHEREAS: The accused’s armatorial failure dogged in judicial to-do list multiplication quietly adopted withdrew groundplans. Existing rejipiled underbindAlternatives got bondage for evacuee fraud‐odds imposed.\n\n **PROVING TERTIARY COKED**:\n - Voiding–you’d sell document was laid exhaustively, (Facts A neurologic stand nil). Retroverted-bitter press of _errors locus penditus_ lack driving embrace ratifies BP Crawford Nm this attempt to convert defensible tenancies displacing selfione accused’s claims on specaskirty.\n\n **PLEADS CAFF: PORTRÖED IMMINESPOTAS-**\n *(a)Easy ‘(LISTER FOUR-AT-PEEL) WaitilineChecked – ‘Garafia’ Then **RED-surprise-free**,turned:*:Wallowed possible vendue in base-identing deal west Procs in ^industrial-general jig-saw finds$$ tossing net over fleeing trace of risky residue.[Result]:\n\n---\n\n2. **Eviction-rem:\n**Returns Evidence– Generative/Gpublicly/GIT**, replies renderfully-phanetic per circum 매무 wheresack shake-co focused rip-proof.\n - Pools of timbers extending over SP mis-communion of clothing‐to-date rubbishlessly with INSIS ( rent-recieves*-boutsp), gone‐makerism.\n - Defraud‐tiny details standard‐ NirvanVR Australodied on €1‐€2 K **receipts**-cited or papers vanishing without undecerptible pace‐how will Election‐teenancy, thenherence‐ismu nations keep finance‐wieguntilly.\n\n3. Conclusions:\n - **High Court—taped judiciary Exhibit gone operately off-court (+ their argument saying \"subsequence‐_quantum consenti_\"), stayed APGA deeper problem-blatterunder brute‐roll-back-load bullion‐coanny’s inflated submission start-bumps**\n **bay topped up by DR-Konaware autumn‐lyment difference-nailers into gut‐gain.**\n - Assigned‐resembles rhythms mainting A litable however provisions that wiped‐having statutes four-way exaggeration reentrainment under this “collateral invader.” promises Abhors no man’s lookouts.\n - **ONTRY TENT!** Title‐widering Ordারে--> Mess Sad and hoops of Kiser-Consumlikes-of mimicked contradicted beyond the criminal dic Berlino incapacity to go levee-wide the questioned muddy‐stork‐flawsingly becoming variance‐clashed parties.\n\n---\n---\n#### **Conclusion:** **DISMISSED**\n\n---\n**TO-The
bummed Last-Pagecription:**\nThough High Act fluttered another stack, non-blockading-to‐below Letter underlined **clean-words encasing apparent haga Ether backward trades** still screamed **public value faithly** that attorneys left‐gross high‐resolving‐clauses out for show “rehallus”‐laybudies only.\nLapses\\(-\\)still truly 다소 `supersession‐gardened ‐ear-arming‐gentlement churning ofterraform‐failure‐drawn‐remodel realized a **dual‐pronged‐symmetry** of plausible dissent‐bingeing‐all thru‐ファーリン-— over-drag‐nine swarms of cadavers who’d generaders. They’re not worth huge brown‐(nourment‐both‐far) above legal‐drop point. Period, **Recited.** —EndBattle.", + "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT\n1. Leave granted.\n2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowing the Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 5692 and 5695 of 1998 filed by the respondent while dismissing the CMP No. 6683 of 2005 filed by the appellant.\n3. Background facts as projected by the appellant are as follows:\nIn April, 1975 the appellant herein had taken the petition schedule lands which are to an extent of Acres 5-36 cents of agricultural land situated at Pernamatta village, Santhalapadu, Patta No.2182- Survey No.158/2, Ongole District with the following boundaries - East : Government Donka, South: Land of Inabathana Ramaiah, West : Land of Gajula Kotaiah, North: Land of Adapal Jogaiah and Venkatarao. Since the time he had taken on lease the above mentioned lands, he has been regular in payment of Maktha which is a lump sum amount of Rs.1200/- towards rent per year to the schedule lands.\nIn 1979 as the appellant came to know that the husband of 2nd respondent herein i.e Mannam Sundarannaiah and one Adapa Venkatarao were contending that they had purchased the schedule lands from G. Seetharamamma who is the wife of the original Landlord and from whose brother the appellant had taken the schedule lands on lease after his death. As the respondents were contending that they will evict, appellant filed suit O.S No. 791/1979 on the file of District Munsif against 1st to 3rd respondents herein seeking permanent injunction against them and also filed an I.A. No. 3963 of 1979 seeking temporary injunction.\nIn the suit for the first time it came to the knowledge of the appellant herein that the 3rd respondent herein, to discharge the debts had agreed to sell the schedule lands to the husbands of the Ist and 2nd respondents herein by way of agreements of sale dated 10.9.1979. Possession continued to remain with the appellant herein and he was cultivating the petition schedule lands.\nOn 13.11.1979 the temporary injunction which was granted in favour of the appellant was allowed and the temporary injunction was made absolute, against which an Appeal C.M.A. No. 111/1979 was filed by the 1 to 3 respondent herein in the court of District Court Munsif, Ongole.\nOn 01.07.1980 Section 15 was incorporated in the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (in short the 'Act').\nOn 11.12.1980 the appeal C.M.A. No.111/ 1979 which was filed by the respondents herein challenging the injunction order dated 13.11.1979 was also dismissed.\nOn 17.01.1981, the 3rd respondent herein contrary to Section 15 of the Act, sold the Southern half of the schedule lands to the Ist respondent herein and Northern half of the schedule lands to the 2nd respondent herein by executing registered sale deeds. But still the appellant was in possession of the lands and he was cultivating the same.\nOn 17.11.1981 the appellant filed A.T.C. (Andhra Tenancy Case) which was numbered in the year 1982 and the number of the case was A.T.C. No.2 of 1982 on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Ongole (Special Officer Constituted under Andhra Tenancy Act) and in the A.T.C. he contended that the sales are contrary to Section 15 of the Act and as such they are void and sought declaration from the court (a) that he is entitled to first purchase the schedule lands, (b) that the sale deeds executed on 17.01.1981 are void (c) that respondents should execute proper sale deeds in favour of the appellant and convey the schedule lands to him.\nIn ATC 2/1992 the respondents herein filed their counter wherein they contended that the appellant defaulted in payment of rents and they also stated that the schedule property was sold to the respondents 1 and 2 by way of registered sale deeds dt. 17.01.1981.\nOn 21.09.1984, the respondents herein filed A.T.C. No. 44 of 1984 under Section 13(a) of Act and sought for eviction of the appellant and delivery of possession of the schedule lands contending that the appellant defaulted in payment of rents from 1978 to 1984. In this petition it was also contended that on 5.5.1979 the appellant had written a letter and re-delivered possession of the schedule lands to the 3rd respondent's father and subsequently after the death of the 3rd respondent's late father, the 3rd respondent herein leased out the schedule lands to one A Vankata Rao on 15.06.1979 for a period of one year.\nIn the year 1984 the appellant herein filed statement in A.T.C. No.44/1984 denying the contentions pleaded by the respondents and he also contended that the surrender document alleged to have been executed by the appellant herein is a false and forged one and that it is a concocted document and that as a counter blast to the suit O.S. 791/1979 as well as A.T.C. 2 of 1982, the respondents herein filed the present A.T.C. 44/1984 and he also contended that as per the Court's order he had deposited the rents in the Court. In the counter he also contended that the sale of schedule lands are bad in the eye of law as he was not offered first option to purchase the same.\nOn 07.11.1988, the learned Additional District Munsif, Ongole dismissed O.S.No.791/1979 holding that the Court had no jurisdiction as the dispute in the suit relates to a dispute between a tenant and a landlord and that it can be decided only by the Special Officer under the provisions of Act.\nBoth the A.T.Cs were clubbed together and common evidence was recorded and on behalf of the appellant herein two witnesses were examined and on behalf of the respondents herein two witnesses were examined and exhibits Al to A30 were marked and no exhibit and/or any document was marked by the respondents herein.\nOn 15.05.1992 the Court of the Special Officer for Tenancy Cases, Ongole (Principal District Munsif, Ongole) dismissed A.T.C No.2/1982 filed by the appellant herein and allowed A.T.C. No.441/1984 filed by the respondents herein taking the view that as the alleged agreements of sales are prior to the enactment of Section 15 of Act and as registered sale deeds are executed subsequent to the enactment of Section 15 of the Act the same are not hit by Section 15 of Act. The Trial Court also held that the appellant also committed default in payment of rents. The Court however held that there is no proof that the appellant surrendered the lands by way of a delivery receipt on 05.05.1979 and no such delivery receipt was filed.\nIn the year 1992 the appellant herein aggrieved by the orders passed in A.T.C. No. 2/1982 and A.T.C. No. 44/1984 filed A.T.A. No. 8 of 1992 and cross objections were filed by the respondents 1 and 2 herein against the orders passed in A.T.C. No. 44/1984 and the appellant herein filed A.T.A. No.9/ 1992 and cross objections were filed by the respondents 1 and 2 herein against the orders passed in A.T.C. No.2/1982\nOn 19.04.1997, the Court of District Judge, Ongole on appreciation of facts, evidence and law allowed both the appeals i.e A.T.A. Nos. 8 and 9 of 1992 filed by the appellant herein and dismissed both the cross objections field by the respondents herein. In its order the appellate Court has specifically held that there is only recital in the sale deeds about the agreement of sale. The agreements are not filed. The recital about the sale agreement is made in the sale deeds only to avoid the benefit of Section 15 of the amended Act to the tenant. Admittedly, Exhibits A2 and A3 sale deeds were executed after the amendment Act came into force. Even if there is an agreement of sale by the time of 01.07.1980 in favour of the husbands of vendees, the landlord should have issued notice as contemplated U/S. 15 (1) of the Act as the sale had not been completed. Section 15(6) of the Tenancy Act refers to only sale, but not agreement of sale. Though sale can be made under a registered document, consent was not obtained prior to the amended Act and also no suit for specific performance was filed and that it is not known why the purchases under the agreement of sale on 10.9.1979 kept quite for about one year and four months in obtaining the sale deeds in the name of their nominees. The circumstances under which the agreements of the sale were executed and obtained sale deeds in the name of the wives of the agreement holders and filing of A.T.C. 44/1984 by one of the landlords and vendees give rise to suspicion that only to evict the tenant from the land, the landlord set up to plea that the land was leased out to another person A. Venkata Rao and the land was agreed to be sold to the husbands of vendees and executed agreements of sale. The collusion can also be seen in filing of A.T.C. 44 of 1984. All the vendors did not join in A.T.C. 44 of 1984. Only R.1 and vendees joined in A.T.C. 44 /1984 for evicting the tenant. There is no need for R.1 to join as a party in A.T.C. 44 / 1984 to evict the tenant as by then the title was conveyed to the vendees and R1 had no interest in the land. Only to protect his right to evict the tenant in case the sale deeds are found to be void, he joined in A.T.C. 44/1984. As the amended Act provided an option for the tenant to purchase the land the landlord had to first give notice to the tenant in case he wants to sell the lands. To avoid such notice, sale deed were obtained in the names of the wives in pursuance of the agreements of the sales. Even though there was an agreement of sale prior to amended Act, the agreement of sale is not enforceable as it contravenes the provisions of section 15 of the amended tenancy Act and Section 17 of the Act reads \"The provision of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any pre-existing law; custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of Court.\" The appellate Court has also negatived the contentions of the respondents that the appellant has committed default in payment of rents. So holding, appellate Court allowed both the A.T.A. Nos. 8 and 9 of 1992 and dismissed the cross objections in both the appeals.\nIn 1997 after the A.T.A.s were allowed, the appellant herein filed O.S. No.619 of 1997 in the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge Ongole, against respondents 1 to 12 in A.T.C. 21 1982 and sought a direction to be given to the respondents 1 to 12 therein to execute a registered sale deed in favour of him for the schedule property.\nIn 1998, aggrieved by the orders passed in both A.T.A. 8 and 9 of 1992 only the respondents 1 to 3 filed C.R.P. Nos. 5692 and 5695 of 1998 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 in the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh.\nOn 20.10.2000, the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Ongole by its judgment allowed O.S. No.619 of 1997 directing the defendants therein to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff (appellant herein) for the schedule lands.\nOn 22.09.2005, the respondents 1 and 2 filed C.M.P. No.6683/2005 in C.R.P. No.5695 of 1998 and sought to implead respondents 2 to 12 in A.T.C. No.2/1982 who are legal heirs of original landlords as respondents 5 to 15 in C.R.P. No.5695 /1998.\nOn 3.09.2005 the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh by a common judgment allowed both the C.R.Ps. i.e. 5692 and 5695 of 1998 and dismissed C.M.P. No. 6683 of 2005 filed by the appellant.\nAccording to the appellant the alleged agreement for sale was in favour of the husbands of R1 and R2. There was nothing indicated in the said agreements that there can be execution in favour of any other person or nominee. The stand taken was that the property was leased out to somebody else and not to appellant. It is his case that Section 15 of the Act makes the position absolutely clear that when there is an intention to sell the land leased to a cultivating tenant, such tenant shall be first given notice of the intention to sell such land and requiring him to exercise his option to purchase the land. Only in case the cultivating tenant does not exercise his option, it can be offered to somebody else. The High Court has erroneously come to the conclusion that since the alleged agreement for sale was executed prior to introduction of the provision, the provision has no applicability.\nAccording to learned counsel there was no discussion even of the ingredients of the provision and in any event of sub section (6) of Section 15 and Section 17 of the Act. It is pointed out that R-3 had filed an application to the effect that he does not want to press the petition before the High Court. On that basis, his name was deleted from the array of parties and he was added as respondent No.4. The question of default therefore becomes redundant as the District Court has dismissed the eviction petition which was filed on the ground of default. The effect of the prayer made by the respondent No. 3, who was a petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition, was also not considered by the High Court.\n4. It is the stand of learned counsel for the appellant that the object of Section 15 is to protect the interest of the cultivating tenant. Therefore, in case the landlord intends to sell the land, he has to first give option to the cultivating tenant. Even if there was an agreement earlier to the introduction of the provision, that is really of no consequence as otherwise the provisions of Section 17 would become redundant. It is, therefore, submitted that though the provision according to the High Court came into force with effect from 1.7.1980 and the agreements were purportedly entered into on 10.9.1979, the sale deed was executed on 17.1.1981. The High Court, it is submitted, has not also considered the question whether the sale deeds could have been executed in favour of the respondents 1 & 2 when admittedly the purported agreement for sale was entered into with their respective husbands.\n5. In reply learned counsel for the respondents submitted that High Court's judgment is in order because what is stated in Section 11 of the Act. According to him, even if there is a change in ownership of the land the cultivating tenant continues the tenancy on the same terms as before. It is pointed out that Section 15 shall came into operation only when there is an intention to sell the land. That intention in the present case was already expressed and agreement for sale was executed prior to introduction of the provision in question.\n6. We find that the trial court has not considered the effect of the sub-section (6) of Section 15 and Section 17. The relevant provisions read as follows:\n \"Section 15. Cultivating tenants' right to-first purchase the land leased to him: (1) Any landlord intending to sell the land leased to a cultivating tenant shall first give notice to such cultivating tenant; of his intention to sell such land, and requiring him to exercise his option to purchase the land. The particulars to be specified in the notice and the time within which the option shall be exercised by cultivating tenant shall be such as may be prescribed. (2) to (5) ..............................................\n(6) Any sale of the land by the landlord in cultivation of this Section shall be voidable to the option of the cultivating tenant.\"\n\"17. Act to override contract and other laws:- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any pre-existing law custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of a Court.\" \n7.Section 17 has overriding effect. As a bare reading of the provision makes it clear, it inter-alia provides that notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any pre existing law, custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of the court, the provisions of the Act shall have effect. Similarly, sub-section (6) of Section 15 provides that any sale of the land by the landlord in contravention of Section 15 shall be voidable to the option of the cultivating tenant. The High Court has come to an abrupt conclusion that since the agreement to sell was purportedly executed prior to the introduction of the provision, they have no relevance. There is no discussion as to the effect of the provisions, and the specific reference to agreements. Additionally, the High Court has not dealt with the aspect as to whether it could have gone into the question of default when respondent No. 3 who was shown as the petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition did not want to pursue the petition.\n8. In the aforesaid background we deem it proper to remit the matter to the High Court to hear and dispose of the Civil Revision Petitions afresh and deal with the aspects highlighted above. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits. Since the matter is pending since long, we request the High Court to dispose of the petitions as early as practicable preferably by the end of February, 2009.\n9. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. No costs.", "root_cause_options": [ { "value": "Missing fact", @@ -1238,15 +1238,15 @@ }, "meta": { "sample_id": "S010", - "case_id": "6135", + "case_id": "6043", "experiment": "ablation_issue", - "model": "gpt-oss-120b", - "source_file": "S010__ablation_issue__gpt-oss-120b__6135.json", + "model": "ministral-3b", + "source_file": "S010__ablation_issue__ministral-3b__6043.json", "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", - "judgment_date": "26/02/1974", - "machine_error_stage": "rules", + "judgment_date": "22/08/2008", + "machine_error_stage": "facts", "machine_major_error_category": "model_error", - "machine_minor_error_category": "Wrong legal test / threshold" + "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in reasoning" } } ] \ No newline at end of file