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 [
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal No. 225 of 1978 | Tota Singh And Another v. State Of Punjab | 01/04/1987",
-      "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal No. 225 of 1978 | Tota Singh And Another v. State Of Punjab",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-423, (From the Judgment and Order dated August 31, 1992 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal R. P. Nos. 665 and 666 of 1991 and Criminal M. C. No. 832 of 1992) | Forest Range Officer And Others v. P. Mohammed Ali And Others(Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-422 Of 1993) 1992) | 04/05/1993",
+      "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-423, (From the Judgment and Order dated August 31, 1992 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal R. P. Nos. 665 and 666 of 1991 and Criminal M. C. No. 832 of 1992) | Forest Range Officer And Others v. P. Mohammed Ali And Others(Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-422 Of 1993) 1992)",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The four appellants were charged under Sections 302 and 323 IPC read with Section 34 IPC for an incident on July 19, 1973, involving the death of Gurdev Singh and injuries to others. The Sessions Judge acquitted all appellants on May 30, 1974, finding prosecution eye-witnesses unreliable due to unexplained reporting delay, lack of motive, and inconsistencies. The State appealed. The High Court, on April 9, 1978, set aside the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The High Court's decision was based on an independent reappraisal of evidence, without finding the Sessions Judge's reasons for acquittal unreasonable or perverse, merely reaching a different conclusion.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n\n1. The appellants were charged under Sections 302 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), read with Section 34 IPC, for an incident on July 19, 1973, resulting in the death of Gurdev Singh and injuries to others.\n   \n2. On May 30, 1974, the Sessions Judge acquitted all appellants, citing unreliable prosecution eyewitnesses, unexplained reporting delay, lack of motive, and inconsistencies.\n\n3. The State appealed the acquittal, and on April 9, 1978, the High Court set aside the Sessions Judge's acquittal, convicting the appellants and sentencing them to life imprisonment.\n\n4. The High Court's decision was based on an independent reappraisal of evidence, without declaring the Sessions Judge's reasons for acquittal unreasonable or perverse.\n\n### Issues:\n\n1. Did the High Court err in conducting an independent reappraisal of evidence instead of merely evaluating the propriety of the Sessions Judge’s acquittal?\n\n2. Was the High Court justified in setting aside the acquittal without finding the Sessions Judge’s decision perverse or unreasonable?\n\n3. Can the State appeal against an acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the absence of findings of perversity or unreasonableness by the lower court?\n\n### Rules:\n\n1. **Appellate Review Jurisdiction**: An appellate court is generally restricted from re-evaluating evidence de novo and should assess decisions for errors in law, perversity, or unreasonableness, as established in *Appa Balwant v. State of Bombay* (1959).\n\n2. **Principle of Perversity**: Acquittals may only be set aside if the lower court’s decision is perceived as perverse or unreasonable, as clarified in *State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh* (1980).\n\n3. **State’s Right to Appeal Against Acquittal**: Under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the State can appeal an acquittal, but successful appeals typically require demonstrating that the acquittal was unreasonable or perverse.\n\n### Analysis:\n\n1. **Issue of Independent Reappraisal of Evidence**:\n   - **Fact 3** & **Fact 4** concern the High Court's appellate role. The High Court conducted an independent reassessment of the evidence, which typically violates the appellate function as underscored in *Appa Balwant v. State of Bombay*. This overstepping suggests the High Court acted beyond its jurisdictional limits, affecting the legitimacy of the appellate procedure.\n\n2. **Justification for Setting Aside Acquittal**:\n   - **Issue 2** is rooted in the procedural requirement that acquittals can only be set aside if the lower court’s decision is deemed perverse or unreasonable. The High Court did not find the Sessions Judge's acquittal in this regard (**Rule 2**). This absence undermines the legal justification for setting aside the acquittal, thereby eroding the basis of the conviction.\n\n3. **State’s Right to Appeal**: \n   - The State’s ability to appeal (**Issue 3**) hinges on the existence of unreasonableness or perversity. Given that the High Court accepted the Sessions Judge’s reasons as not unreasonable or perverse, the foundational basis for the appeal is weak under the guiding principles (**Rule 3**).\n\n### Conclusion:\n\nGiven the High Court's overreach in conducting an independent reassessment of evidence without finding the Sessions Judge's decision unreasonable or perverse, the appeal lacks legal justification. The procedural and substantive principles governing appellate review mandate that acquittals can only be overturned when found perverse or unreasonable, none of which were established by the High Court in this case. Consequently, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.",
-      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J.\nBALAKRISHNA ERADI, J. -\nAfter hearing Shri A. N. Mulla, Senior Advocate for appellants and Shri R. S. Sodhi, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent and having carefully examined all aspects of the case in the light of the submissions made at the Bar, we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that this appeal has to be allowed\n2. The four appellants before us - Tota Singh, Dauli Singh, Mithu Singh and Mukhtiar Singh were tried by the Court of Sessions, Faridkot on charges under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and Section 323 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. After detailed consideration of the entire evidence adduced in the case, the learned Sessions Judge by his judgment dated May 30, 1974 acquitted the appellants of all the charges laid against them. Against the said decision of the Sessions Judge, the State of Punjab preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1106 of 1974 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. A Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated April 9, 1978 allowed the State's appeal, set aside the order of the Sessions Judge acquitting the appellants and convicted the appellants under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC as well as under Section 323 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. On the first count all the appellants were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and on the second count they were ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each with a further direction that the substantive sentence of imprisonment in respect of all the appellants shall run concurrently\n3. We do not propose to set out in extenso the facts of the case nor to discuss in detail the oral and documentary evidence adduced. We say this for the reason that we are fully satisfied that the approach made by the High Court to a consideration of the appeal was wholly vitiated by a manifest illegality inasmuch as the High Court has acted in total disregard of the principles repeatedly laid down by this Court delineating the restricted grounds on which alone interference may be made by a court of appeal with an order of acquittal passed by a lower court\n4. The occurrence that led to the prosecution took place on July 19, 1973 at about 4 p.m. in village Bishmandi, Police Station Jaitu in District Faridkot. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased Gurdev Singh accompanied by Ajmer Singh PW 2 and Malkiat Singh PW 6 was going from the house of Ajmer Singh to the house of the deceased on that fateful day. While they were approaching the house of one Moda Singh Jat, the four appellants, all carrying a gandasa each, suddenly besieged them from behind the Chelianwali Street raising a \"lalkara\" proclaiming that they were going to take their revenge for outraging the modesty of Malkiat Kaur and they attacked the deceased as well as Ajmer Singh and Malkiat Singh by inflicting gandasa blows on them. It was alleged that this was a preplanned and concerted attack made by the appellants as a reprisal for an incident of alleged rape of one Malkiat Kaur by Ajmer Singh (PW 2). Gurdev Singh (deceased) is said to have fallen down on the spot as a result of the blows inflicted on him and PWs 2 and 6 are said to have suffered simple injuries due to the attack with gandasa. According to the prosecution version on hearing the cries for help raised by PW 2 and PW 6, Kaur Singh, son of deceased Gurdev Singh came to the place of occurrence and thereupon all the four appellants ran away from the spot leaving PW 6 near Gurdev Singh, who was lying on the ground in an injured condition. PW 2 is said to have gone to the Sarpanch and the Panch of the village and informed them about the incident. Thereafter he returned to the scene of occurrence and himself along with PW 6 are said to have put Gurdev Singh on a bullock cart and got him admitted in the injured condition in the hospital. PW 2 and PW 6 were also admitted in the same hospital. Gurdev Singh was subsequently transferred to the Christian Medical College at Ludhiana, where he succumbed to his injuries on July 30, 1973\n5. The learned Sessions Judge after a careful analysis of all the facts and circumstances as disclosed by the evidence adduced in the case came to the conclusion that the testimony of Ajmer Singh PW 2 and Malkiat Singh PW 6 who were examined by he prosecution as eye-witnesses to prove the occurrence could not be safely accepted and acted upon as true. The trial Judge set out in his judgment detailed and cogent grounds for arriving at the said conclusion. In his opinion there was no proper explanation for the inordinate delay in reporting the crime to the police and there was also no adequate proof of any motive. The learned Sessions Judge rejected the theory put forward by the prosecution that it was a preplanned attack made by the appellants with a view to avenge the alleged molestation of Malkiat Kaur by Ajmer Singh PW 2 by pointing out that if such had been really the case, the target of attack by the appellants would have been Ajmer Singh to whom only simple injuries were caused and not Gurdev Singh who had nothing to do with the alleged incident of molestation. The learned Sessions Judge was inclined to accept the defence version that the appellants being 'siris' had some trouble with PW 2 and PW 6 about the apportionment of 'batai' and this might have led to their false implication in the case. In the absence of any independent corroboration of the testimony given by the two alleged eye-witnesses (PW 2 and PW 6), the learned Sessions Judge who had seen them giving evidence in the box was not impressed by their evidence specially having regard to the fact that both of them had been appearing as prosecution witnesses in a large number of police cases. The testimony of PW 2 and PW 6 having been found to be not worthy of belief, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the appellants on both the charges levelled against them\n6. The High Court has not found in its judgment that the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for discarding the testimony of PW 2 and PW 6 were either unreasonable or perverse. What the High Court has done is to make an independent reappraisal of the evidence on its own and to set aside the acquittal merely on the ground that as a result of such reappreciation, the High Court was inclined to reach a conclusion different from the one recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the mere fact that the appellate court is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the appellate court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous\n7. Tested in the light of the above principles, it must be held that the interference made in the present case by the High Court with the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge was wholly unwarranted. We accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge acquitting the appellants of all the charges framed against them",
+      "case_record": "Respondents faced proceedings under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, for possessing/transporting sandalwood oil. They contested the court's jurisdiction, arguing that 'sandalwood oil' is not 'wood oil' as defined in Section 2(f)(i) of the Act, and therefore not 'forest produce'. An initial High Court judgment quashed the complaints, but a subsequent Division Bench held sandalwood oil to be 'forest produce'. Sandalwood oil is industrially extracted from the heartwood and roots of sandalwood trees, which are explicitly defined as 'forest produce' and 'timber' under the Act. Technical dictionaries and expert opinions distinguish 'wood oil' (natural exudation) from 'sandalwood oil' (industrial by-product). The Karnataka Forest Act explicitly includes 'sandalwood oil', unlike the Kerala Act.",
+      "generated_judgment": "### Facts: \n1. Respondents faced proceedings under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, for possessing/transporting sandalwood oil.\n2. The respondents contested the court's jurisdiction, arguing that 'sandalwood oil' is not 'wood oil' as defined in Section 2(f)(i) of the Act, and therefore not 'forest produce'.\n3. An initial High Court judgment quashed the complaints against the respondents.\n4. A subsequent Division Bench held that sandalwood oil is indeed 'forest produce'.\n5. Sandalwood oil is industrially extracted from the heartwood and roots of sandalwood trees.\n6. Sandalwood trees and associated products are explicitly categorized as 'forest produce' and 'timber' under the Act.\n7. Technical dictionaries and expert opinions differentiate 'wood oil' (natural exudation) from 'sandalwood oil' (industrial by-product).\n8. The Karnataka Forest Act explicitly includes 'sandalwood oil', unlike the Kerala Act.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Does the definition of 'wood oil' under Section 2(f)(i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, encompass 'sandalwood oil'?\n2. Is sandalwood oil considered 'forest produce' under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961?\n3. Should the technical and expert definitions distinguishing 'wood oil' from 'sandalwood oil' influence the court's interpretation of the Act?\n4. Can the explicit inclusion of 'sandalwood oil' in the Karnataka Forest Act be used as persuasive authority to interpret the Kerala Forest Act?\n\n### Rules:\n1. Statutory interpretation principles to determine legislative intent, especially the ordinary meaning of the words, context, and purpose of the statute.\n2. The principle of using technical and expert definitions to guide interpretation where statutory language is ambiguous.\n3. The doctrine of persuasive authority, where laws from different jurisdictions can be considered for guidance, though not binding.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Maintainability of the Appeal**: The appeal concerns the interpretation of the Kerala Forest Act as applied to 'sandalwood oil’ and its legal classification. Therefore, the appeal is maintainable as it addresses substantive legal questions.\n\n2. **Issue 1 and Issue 2 - Definition of 'wood oil' and 'forest produce'**: The core legal question hinges on whether 'sandalwood oil', despite being industrially extracted, falls within the statutory definition of 'wood oil'. According to the facts (Facts 5 and 6), sandalwood trees and their products are classified broadly as 'forest produce', which could logically extend to products derived from them like sandalwood oil. The statutory language governing 'forest produce' should be interpreted in light of this broader classification under the Act. \n\n3. **Issue 3 - Influence of Technical Definitions**: Expert opinions and technical definitions (Fact 7) provide clarity on how 'wood oil' and 'sandalwood oil' are perceived differently in industrial contexts. These distinctions may suggest that the legislature did not intend 'wood oil' to encompass industrially produced extracts like sandalwood oil. However, this does not automatically exclude sandalwood oil from being defined as 'forest produce' since the broader category includes the source material.\n\n4. **Issue 4 - Persuasive Authority**: Consideration of the Karnataka Forest Act (Fact 8) is relevant but not binding. The explicit inclusion of 'sandalwood oil' there demonstrates a legislative choice which may reflect broader recognition of such products as 'forest produce’. This offers a persuasive argument but must ultimately yield to statutory interpretation specific to the Kerala Forest Act unless legislative intent is clear and directly analogous.\n\n### Conclusion:\nUpon considering the statutory language of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, and the broader category of 'forest produce', it is evident that the industrial extraction process does not negate the classification of sandalwood oil as a derivative of 'forest produce' given its source from sandalwood trees. While expert definitions suggest a technical distinction, the purposive interpretation of the Act supports its classification as 'forest produce'. The allure of persuasive authority from the Karnataka Act somewhat supports this interpretation, but our decision rests on statutory interpretation of Kerala's law.\n\nTherefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by K. RAMASWAMY, J.\nK. RAMASWAMY, J. -\nSpecial leave granted\n2. Untramelled by questions of fact the learned senior counsel on both sides neatly presented question of law whether 'sandalwood oil' is forest produce within the meaning of Section 2 (f) (i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 for short 'the Act'. When proceedings were laid under Section 51 (1) of the Act against the respondents in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 27-29 of 1992, they questioned the jurisdiction of the court in C. C. Nos. 145 and 148 of 1988. Eschewing delineation of intermediary proceedings went on from the start of prosecution, the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short 'the Code' by order dated August 31, 1992 reported in Mohammed Ali v. Forest Range Officer quashed the complaint holding that sandalwood oil is not 'wood oil' as defined in Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act. So it is not a forest produce. Thus these appeals by special leave. When the same question subsequently arose, another learned Single Judge doubting the correctness of aforesaid judgment referred the matter to be Division Bench which by order dated December 15, 1992, reported in Khushboo Enterprises v. Forest Range Officer held that sandalwood oil is a forest produce within the meaning of Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act. Thus the appeal in the other case\n3. The Forest Conservation Act. 1980 aims to prevent depleting forests, conservation thereof and protection of wildlife in the country to maintain ecological balance. The State Acts regulate preservation of forests and forest produce to supplement the Central Act. The Act prescribes procedure for preservation of the forest and regulates possession of the forest produce, felling of trees in the forest area and removal from the forest or reserved area by transit permits etc. When sandalwood oil either was found in transit or in possession of the manufacturers, it was seized in the respective cases and the complaints under Section 51 (1) laid for contravention thereof. As said earlier the jurisdictional question was raised on the premise that sandalwood oil is not a wood oil as defined under Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act\n4. The question, therefore, emerges whether sandalwood oil is a wood oil. Section 9 (f) defines forest produce thus\n\"Section 2 (f) 'forest produce' includes -\n(i) the following whether found in or brought from a forest or not, that is to say -\ntimber, charcoal, wood oil, gum resin, natural varnish, bark, lac, fibres and roots of sandalwood and rosewood; and\n(ii) the following when found in or brought from a forest, that is to say -\n(a) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other parts or produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees;\n(b) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and moss and all parts or produce of such plants);\n(c) silk cocoons, honey and wax; and\n(d) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including limestone, laterite), mineral oils and all products of mines or quarries.\"\n5. A reading thereof does indicate that the forest produce whether found in or brought from a forest or not is a forest produce which includes, that is to say, the enumerated items in Clauses (i) and (ii) and \"wood oil\" is one of the enumerated items as well as roots of sandalwood and rosewood. The contention of Shri G. Ramaswamy, the learned senior counsel for the accused is that technical dictionaries, botanical textbooks and expert opinion would bring out a demonstrable distinction between wood of and sandalwood oil. The wood oil is a natural produce of the forest directly derived as an exudation from living trees in the forest belonging to the family of the Dipterocarpaceae trees while sandalwood oil is a by-product from sandalwood (Santalum album) by industrial process. Wood oil is produced by making a hole on the trunk of the living tree commonly known as \"oil trees\" or \"wood oil trees\". This family of trees are variously known in different parts of South India but they relate to Dipterocarpaceae family. Wood oil is gathered by heating the hole in the trunk of induce exudation of the oleic resin from the tree and commercially dealt with as wood oil which is a cheap substance in the commercial world used solely for the purpose of painting planks of wood or wooden vessels floating in the sea. The physio-chemical properties of wood oil are distinct and different from other oils. Sandalwood oil would be produced only at factory level and that too by mechanised process utilising the heart wood and roots of sandalwood trees removed from the forest as a raw material. Sandalwood oil is having very high commercial value and it is mainly used in manufacturing perfumery and cosmetic items of different types and grades. The production of sandalwood oil is being carried out as an industry, either by licence by individual or the State Government as its monopoly like in Karnataka State, in a large scale or as a small scale business. It is further contended that the meaning of the word 'wood oil' defined in Section 2 (f) (i) must receive its colour form its context and connotation. When the legislature used the word \"that is to say\" the wood oil and other natural growth referred to in the definition would only mean natural by-product directly drawn from the trees. The learned Single Judge had rightly construed the meaning of the word 'wood oil' and held that sandalwood oil being thereby-product derived commercially manufacturing process is not wood oil. The Division Bench committed manifest error in its construction of the word 'wood oil' to include sandalwood oil. Shri Krishna Murty Iyer, the learned senior counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, refuted the contention arguing that inclusive definition of forest produce must receive extended meaning. It must also be construed in the context in which it is used and the purpose the Act seeks to serve and the family to which sandalwood oil belongs being an essential oil would include wood oil. The expression wood oil being technical and part of an inclusive definition has to be construed in its technical sense and in an exhaustive manner. It cannot be restricted in a narrow circumference as was done by the learned Single Judge so as to defeat the object and purpose of the Act. Extraction of sandalwood oil even by mechanised process would nonetheless be a wood oil. He laid emphasis on the word 'timber' defined in Section 2 (k) which includes 'sandalwood' being a forest produce the oil extracted therefrom would also be within the meaning of the word 'wood oil'. The restricted meaning canvassed by the counsel would defeat the purpose of the Act and the literal interpretation giving narrow meaning to the word 'wood oil' should be excluded\n6. Ex facie the argument of Shri G. Ramaswamy backed by material, though is alluring, deeper probe denied its acceptance. Undoubtedly, the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 incorporated in its definition of forest produce sandalwood oil after the word \"wood oil\" and the legislature in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, like the Act, do not specifically incorporate sandalwood oil in the definition of forest produce. From this could it be concluded, if it be otherwise interpretable, that wood oil would both include sandalwood oil as well. Undoubtedly Stedman's Medical Dictionary (23rd Edition) defines at page 1576 wood oil as gurjan balsam and gurjan balsam is defined at p. 156 to mean wood oil - Oleo-resin from Dipterocarpus alatus (family Dipterocarpaceae), - A tree of India and other regions of Southern Asia. Similar meaning was given in Concise Chemical and Technical Dictionary, edited by H. Bennett (fourth Edition) at page 1217; Scientific Treatises on the subject by Ernest Guenther in Volume 6; Edward Balfour in his Cyclopaedia of India and of Eastern and Southern Asia; R. N. Khori in his Materia Medica of India and their Therapeutics and Pharmacographia India by William Dymock defined wood oil in the same strain. All these technical literatures were concerned in finding out physio-chemical properties contained in wood oil and the source from which they are drawn for use in industrial purposes. The literal interpretation given therein if given acceptance would lead to manifest frustration of the purpose of the Act. In its interpretation we have to keep at the back of our mind the purpose which the Act and the Parent Act (Forest Conservation Act) seek to subserve J. F. Dastru equally in his Medical Plants of India and Pakistan treads on the same path and has given construction to wood oil in the context of its exudation obtained from the trunk of the trees belonging to the family of Dipterocarpaceae as an oleo-resin or gurjan balsam. There would be no quarrel on that behalf. It must be noted in this context that there are several types of essential oils in India, the important ones being sandalwood oil, agar-wood oil, Deodar oil and pine oil, apart from oleo-resin and wood oil derived from exudation from living trees in the forest area. These essential oils are obtained from any forest wood. Sandalwood as observed by the High Court is forest produce. Even its roots thereof are also included as forest produce. They are also timber within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to conserve forest wealth which is very dear for preservation to maintain ecology. Forest produce defined under Section 2 (f) is an inclusive definition. It is settled law that the word 'include' is generally used as a word of extension. When used in an interpretation clause, it seeks to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition at p. 64 stated the construction to be adopted to the meaning of the words and phrases that \"The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver\" . At p. 214 it is stated that an interpretation clause which extends the meaning of a word does not take away its ordinary meaning. An interpretation clause of the inclusive definition is not meant to prevent the word receiving its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that word would be properly applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act, when there is nothing in the context or the subject-matter to the contrary, to be applied to somethings to which it would not ordinarily be applicable.... An interpretation clause should be used for the purpose of interpreting words which are ambiguous or equivocal, and not so as to disturb the meaning of such as are plain. At p. 216 it is stated that another important rule with regard to the effect of an interpretation clause is that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another, or as strictly defining what the meaning of the term must be under all circumstances, but rather as declaring what may be comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that it should be so construed\n7. This Court in Babu Manmohan Das Shah v. Bishun Das adopting the ordinary rule of construction stated that \"the provisions of a statute must be construed in accordance with the language used therein unless there are compelling reasons such as where the literal construction would reduce the Act to absurdity or prevent manifest legislative purpose from being carried out\". The question therein was the interpretation of the phrase\" materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value\" in the context of construction to a shop. In that context this Court laid that cardinal principle of statutory construction referred to hereinbefore would apply. In State of M. P. v. M. V. Narsimhan the definition of 'public servant' in Section 21 IPC was amended and Clause 12 thereof was brought on statute. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 created its own provisions as specific offence of criminal misconduct which is different from the offence of bribery defined in the Indian Penal Code. When similar definition was not given under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 the contention was raised that the respondent cannot be prosecuted not being a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act. This Court while holding that definition of public servant was incorporated in Prevention of Corruption Act by necessary implication of public servant defined in Clause 12 of Section 21 IPC and held that Prevention of Corruption Act is supplemental to IPC and that, therefore, both would deal with the same offence. Accordingly, the respondent was held to be public servant coming within the definition of Prevention of Corruption Act. This Court adopted the doctrine of purposive interpretation to prevent corruption, a penal offence. In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Indian Oil Corpn. this Court adopted purposive construction in the definition of the word 'building' for the propose of levy of property tax under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act to include oil storage tanks to be \"building\" and held that the language of a statutory provision is not a static vehicle of ideas and concepts and as ideas and concepts change, . As they are bound to do in any country like ours with the establishment of a democratic structure based on egalitarian values, the meaning and content of the statutory provision undergo a change. The law does not operate in a vacuum. It cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social, economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. The judge has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton provide by the legislature and invest it with a meaning which will harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective instrument for delivering justice\n8. The word include in the definition under Section 2 (f) would show that it did not intend to exclude what would ordinarily and in common parlance be spoken of as wood oil. The expression being technical and being part of an inclusive definition has to be construed in its technical sense but in an exhaustive manner, it cannot be restricted in such a manner so as to defeat the principal object and purpose of the Act. The process by which the oil is extracted is not decisive as oil may be extracted by natural process of exudation or it may be extracted by subjecting to chemical or mechanical process and sandalwood (Santalum album) is cut into pieces. Its heartwood and roots of sandalwood trees removed from the forest are used as a raw material at a factory level that too by mechanised process to extract sandalwood oil. The purpose for which the oil is used is not decisive. Therefore, the word wood oil used in the Act will require purposive interpretation drawing upon the context in which the words are used and its meaning will have to be discovered having regard to the intention and object which legislature seeks to subserve. The restricted meaning sought to put up by the accused would frustrate the object and the literal interpretation would defeat the meaning. The legislature does not intend to restrict the word wood oil not do we find any compelling circumstances in the Act to give restricted meaning that only oil derived from Dipterocarpus trees to be wood oil as contended for the accused and which found acceptance by the learned Single Judge. The purposive interpretation would aid conservation of sandalwood, a valuable forest wealth, prevent illicit felling and transportation of them and make the manufacturers of sandalwood oil accountable for the possession of sandalwood trees or chips or roots etc. Incorporation of sandalwood oil ex abundenti cautela in Karnataka Act and absence thereof in sister Acts operating in South India does not detract from giving it its due meaning. The expert opinion is only an opinion evidence on either side and does not aid us in interpretation. This Court in Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India did not adopt the dictionary meaning as it may be to some extent delusive guide to interpret entries in Central Excises and Salt Act. In Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan of which one of us, Sahai, J. was a Member, the Court was to consider the word 'sugar' whether under Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1961 an agricultural produce. It was contended that the Khandsari Sugar was not an agricultural produce. Repelling that contention, this Court held that the world agricultural produce includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mills or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks the expression \"or otherwise as specified in the Schedule\". Accordingly it was held that Khandsari Sugar is an agricultural produce under that Act. In State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazadoor Sabha this Court adopted purposive approach in interpreting the word 'industry' in Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and held that the Legislature in defining the word 'industry' in Section 2 (j) of the Act deliberately used term of wide import in its first clause and referring to several other industries in the second in an inclusive way obviously denoting extension. The conventional meaning attributed to trade or business was eschewed even in the absence of profit motive. It was held that hospital was an industry. Therefore, the ratio, far from helping the accused, is consistent with the view we have expressed above. In South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Assn. v. State of Gujarat the inclusive definition was construed in the context of the explanation given to Entry 22. It was held, therefore, that the word 'pottery' does not include tiles industry for the purpose of Minimum Wages Act. The ratio therein renders little assistance to the accused. In Rathi Khandsari Udyog v. State of U. P. this Court held that the words not defined may be construed in the popular sense in which it is being commonly used in commercial parlance. The ratio is not opposite to the fact situation. Similarly the construction placing reliance on the passage at p. 164 of Craies on Statue Law that the word is to be construed in the sense in which it is being understood in trade. Business or transaction known to the trade is also inapplicable to the factual context. In Fatesang Gimba Vasava v. State of Gujarat the Division Bench construed whether bamboo would include in its ambit cut pieces in the context and the purpose the Act sought to serve the tribals in the forest area. Privilege was granted to the tribals to remove certain forest produce from forest area for sale to supplement their livelihood. When toplas, supdas and palas made out of bamboo chips were being taken out for sale, they were being taken out for sale, they were sought to be prosecuted. It was challenged by the tribals. In that context the Division Bench held that though bamboo is a forest produce, the bamboo chips of the specified description do not fall within the definition of forest produce. Accordingly it was interpreted, from the context and purposive approach of the word 'forest produce'. Accordingly the ratio therein does not assist the accused\n9. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, relied on for the accused, had not correctly laid the law in Kangundi Industrial Works, Kuppam v. Government of A. P. Accordingly we hold that sandalwood oil is wood oil within the meaning of Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act. Therefore it is a forest produce. Necessary conclusion is that the trial court has jurisdiction to proceed with the trial. It is for the trial court to find whether the offence as imputed to the accused has been made out at the trial. We need express no opinion at this stage. The appeals of the State are allowed and the appeal of the accused is dismissed",
       "root_cause_options": [
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           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -113,26 +113,26 @@
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       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "01/04/1987",
-      "machine_error_stage": "rules",
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-      "case_title": "CALCUTTA HIGH COURT | FMAT No. 1294 of 2014 | Orissa Minerals Development Company Limited v. Balbir Sharma | 02/05/2016",
-      "case_details": "Case: FMAT No. 1294 of 2014 | Orissa Minerals Development Company Limited v. Balbir Sharma",
-      "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED",
-      "case_record": "Orissa Minerals Development Company Limited (OMDC) contracted Balbir Sharma (Contractor) in November 2007 for iron ore excavation and transport at Bhadrasahi Mines. The Contractor contended work was hampered by delayed and short-term mining permits and alleged OMDC suppressed that its mining lease, due to expire in 1996, was cancelled in November 2006, and its challenge dismissed by the Orissa High Court in May 2008. OMDC terminated the contract in July 2008. Disputes arose, leading to arbitration, where the Arbitrator awarded claims to the Contractor, finding OMDC lacked a valid lease, based on evidence and OMDC's admissions. OMDC's Section 34 application to set aside the award, alleging patent illegality and error in the lease finding (arguing different mine leases), was rejected by the lower court.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. Orissa Minerals Development Company Limited (OMDC) contracted Balbir Sharma (Contractor) in November 2007 for iron ore excavation and transport at Bhadrasahi Mines.\n2. OMDC's mining lease, issued in 1996, was cancelled in November 2006, and its challenge was dismissed by the Orissa High Court in May 2008.\n3. The Contractor alleged that work was hampered due to delayed and short-term mining permits.\n4. OMDC terminated the contract in July 2008.\n5. The dispute led to arbitration, where the Arbitrator awarded claims to the Contractor, finding OMDC lacked a valid lease based on evidence and OMDC's admissions.\n6. OMDC filed a Section 34 application to set aside the award, alleging patent illegality and error in the lease finding, which was rejected by the lower court.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Was the lower court (Arbitrator and the court that rejected OMDC's Section 34 application) correct in finding that OMDC's mining lease was not valid at the time of the contract with Balbir Sharma?\n2. Did the lower court correctly apply the principles of patent illegality in OMDC's Section 34 application?\n3. Did the lower court make an error in accepting the arbitrator's finding that OMDC lacked a valid lease based on OMDC's admissions?\n4. Did OMDC's termination of the contract with Balbir Sharma violate any contractual obligations or laws, given the alleged lack of valid mining lease and the delayed, short-term mining permits?\n\n### Rules:\n1. The principles governing contract validity and performance under Indian law (Section 10, 14, 18, 39 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872).\n2. The principles of patent illegality and their application in Section 34 applications under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.\n3. The discretion of the court in accepting or rejecting arbitral awards based on the findings of fact and law (Section 34, 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996).\n4. The principles governing mining leases and their cancellation under the relevant mining laws and regulations.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. To determine whether the lower court correctly found that OMDC's mining lease was invalid, it must be examined if OMDC misrepresented the status of its mining lease to the Contractor, causing the latter a prejudice (Facts 2, 3). If so, the Contractor could argue that he was induced to enter into the contract under a mistaken assumption (Rule 1).\n2. The lower court's application of patent illegality principles (Issue 2) should be analyzed to see if it erred in dismissing OMDC's Section 34 application. If the lower court overlooked a fundamental error in the arbitrator's award, it may have been incorrect (Rule 2).\n3. The acceptance of the arbitrator's findings (Issue 3) by the lower court should be evaluated. If the lower courtercises of jurisdiction was proper and the findings of fact and law were reasonably open to it, the lower court may have been correct (Rule 3).\n4. To determine if OMDC's termination violated any contractual obligations or laws (Issue 4), it must be examined if the termination was premature or unfair due to the alleged lack of a valid mining lease and the delayed, short-term mining permits (Facts 4, 3).\n\n### Conclusion:\nUpon careful consideration of the facts and rules of law, it appears that the lower court may have erred in its findings regarding the validity of OMDC's mining lease and its application of patent illegality principles. Consequently, this appeal is maintainable.\n\nThe final decision is that the appeal should be **ALLOWED**, and the matter should be remitted to the lower court for a fresh consideration of the issues outlined above, with proper applications of the relevant legal principles.",
-      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : Indira Banerjee, J.\n1. This appeal filed by Orissa Minerals Development Company Limited, hereinafter referred to as the appellant OMDC, is against a judgment and order dated 17th August, 2013 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, 4th Court, North 24 Parganas at Barasat, rejecting Misc. Case No. 28 of 2012, being an application filed by the appellant OMDC under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, hereinafter referred to as the 1996 Act, for setting aside of an award dated 2nd March, 2012 made and published by the sole Arbitrator.\n2. The appellant OMDC is a Government of India Enterprise, having its registered office at AG 104, Sector 2 (Sourav Avasan), Salt Lake City - 700 091. The appellant OMDC is engaged in mining of iron ore in different mines in Orissa.\n3. On or about 18th September, 2007, the appellant OMDC issued a Tender Notice No. OMDC/49/2007 whereby sealed tenders were invited in prescribed format, from reputed parties having earth moving equipment, with minimum three years of experience in raising of minerals of the description specified, for the job of raising and transporting of iron ore at North Iron Section, Bhadrasai Mines, Roida near Barbil, District Keonjhar (Orissa).\n4. The respondent, Balbir Sharma, hereinafter referred to as the Respondent Contractor, successfully participated in the tender. The appellant, OMDC awarded to the respondent, Contractor the contract for the work of excavation and raising of sized iron ore over mining lease area of 254.952 hectares at Bhadrasahi Mines, Roida and for transporting the same to the crusher plant at Thakursni.\n5. A work Order No. OMD/T-5/3548 dated 5.11.2007 was issued by the Deputy General Manager of the appellant OMDC, directing the respondent Contractor to execute the contract job during the period from 1st November, 2007 to 31st October, 2008.\n6. After the work order was issued, the respondent Contractor had to set up the infrastructure for the contract job by employing men, constructing structures, acquiring and/or installing plant and machinery etc., which involved heavy expenditure.\n7. According to the respondent Contractor, for transportation of minerals, permits are required under the mining laws. Even though the contract was for the period from 1st November, 2007 to 31st October, 2008, necessary permit for removal of mineral ores was issued by the Director of Mining, Joda District, Keonjhar, Orissa as late as on 29th February, 2008. The permit being Permit No. 16759 dated 29th February, 2008 allowed removal of ores from 28th February, 2008 to 27th March, 2008 only.\n8. The respondent Contractor contends that the permit was not issued in time. The permit was issued almost six months after the contract period commenced. In any case, the permit was only for a period of one month from 28th February, 2008 to 27th March, 2008. The lethargical manner in which the appellant OMDC and/or its Officers and/or the concerned authorities proceeded, was an impediment to the progress of work.\n9. The respondent Contractor claims that he had brought in about 450 labourers, who had to sit idle and had to be paid idle wages. This had an adverse financial impact on the respondent Contractor.\n10. According to the respondent Contractor, there were also various other constraints. The labourers were insisting on higher rate of wages even though they were sitting idle.\n11. By his letters dated 27th February, 2007, 19th December, 2007, 21st December, 2007, 29th December, 2007 etc., the respondent Contractor drew the attention of the appellant to the fact that 450 labourers were sitting idle but were demanding payment.\n11. The respondent Contractor also contended that no work of removal of minerals had been done for about 8 months or so before the respondent Contractor took up the contract job, as a result whereof there was huge accumulation. In terms of the contract, the respondent Contractor was not required to remove the accumulated minerals. Moreover, there was also flooding of the mines from 16th June, 2008 onwards.\n12. It is the case of the respondent Contractor that the respondent Contractor was wrongfully induced by the appellant OMDC to accept the contract by suppression of the material fact that the appellant OMDC had no right to operate the Bhadrasai mines in Roida.\n13. On the directions of the State Government, the appellant OMDC terminated the contract of the respondent Contractor by a letter dated 19th July, 2008. No penalty was however imposed by the appellant, OMDC on the respondent Contractor.\n14. It appears that the lease of the appellant, OMDC in respect of the Bhadrasai Mines, was due to expire on 14th August, 1996. The appellant OMDC applied for renewal of the lease on 14th July, 1995. However, the lease was not renewed and ultimately the Government of Orissa cancelled the lease on 16th November, 2006.\n15. It appears that on the prayer of the appellant, OMDC, the revisional authority passed an order dated 28th March, 2007 staying the order dated 16th November, 2006 whereby the lease had been cancelled. The order of the revisional authority was later vacated after which the appellant, OMDC filed an application in the High Court of Orissa under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being Writ Petition No. 12704 of 2007 challenging the decision of the authority concerned to cancel the lease.\n16. Interim orders were passed by the High Court of Orissa in the said writ petition, restraining the respondent authorities from preventing the appellant OMDC from carrying out mining activities. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed by an Order dated 16th May, 2008. The appellant OMDC filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court being SLP (Civil) 18195 of 2008. The Supreme Court stayed the operation of the Order dated 16th May, 2008 of the High Court dismissing the writ petition.\n17. Disputes and differences arose between the appellant OMDC and the respondent Contractor over payments claimed by the respondent Contractor from the appellant OMDC. The respondent Contractor invoked the arbitration clause after which Sri Murari Mohan Ghosh a retired officer of West Bengal Higher Judicial Service was appointed Arbitrator.\n18. The respondent Contractor filed its statement of claim before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, inter alia claiming -\nSCHEDULE\nClaimParticulars of the ClaimAmountClaim No. 1Unpaid value of the work done, which were partly recordedRs.16,82,990/-Claim No. 2Claim for Hire charges for machineries deployed in the workRs.549,12,000/-Claim No. 3Claim for reimbursement of the amount paid towards terminal benefits @ 12% on the basis of submitted bills.Rs.23,73,786/-Claim No. 4Claim on account of Compensation for loss of profit @ 10% on the balance left out work.Rs.2,06,40,000/-Claim No. 5Claim on account of Profit of 15% on ex-mines sale.Rs.68,39,842/-Claim No. 6Claim on account of Construction of road from Roida to Thakurani.Rs.20,00,000/-Claim No. 7Claim on account of Refund of Security deposit and Earnest Money.Rs.19,89,037/-Claim No. 8Claim on account of Cost incurred in raising 28,000 M.T. Iron-ore but not lifted from mines.Rs.37,80,000/-Claim No. 9Claim on account of expenses of stacking of 28,000 M.T. Iron-ores.Rs.28,00,000/-Claim No. 10Claim on account of additional expenses incurred in removal of over burden of 3,33,500 M3.Rs.2,14,27,820/-Claim No. 11Claim for illegal deduction of amount in bills alleging quality and quantityRs.3,57,030/-Claim No. 12Claim on account of idle wages paid to labours, staff etc.Rs.71,83,960/-Claim No. 13Claim for interest @ 18% p.a. from 01.11.2008 till the date of actual payment.\n19. In Paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 of the Statement of Claim, the respondent Contractor inter alia contended that the appellant OMDC had induced the respondent Contractor to enter into the contract wrongfully, as a result of which the respondent suffered financial losses. The appellant OMDC had no right to operate the mines.\n20. Paragraph 8 of the statement of claim is extracted hereinbelow for convenience:-\n \"8. It is further pertinent to state that the Respondent by its letter dated 19.7.2008 accosted the claimant for not executing the job, forgetting the fact that the Respondent had no right to work and/or get worked upon the mining lease hold area, lease for which was not subsisting in favour of the Respondent. However in the said letter, the Respondent admitted that the work in the mining area in question was directed to be stopped by the State Govt. in view of the order of the Hon'ble Orissa High Court, which admission on the part of the Respondent also substantiates the contention of the claimant that the Respondent had entered into the Contract with the claimant in respect of the mining area over which they had no right under the law. The said letter dated 19.7.2008 of the Raspondent was appropriately replied by the claimant by his letter dated 12.9.2008 which was however not repelled.\" \n21. Appellant OMDC filed its counter statement disputing the claims of the respondent Contractor. The appellant OMDC also raised a counter-claim, claiming Rs.48,15,90,732.19 from the respondent Contractor. The averments in Paragraph No. 6, 7 and 8 of the Statement of Claim were dealt with in Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Counter Statement, set out hereinbelow :\n \"16. With reference to paragraph nos. 6 and 7 of the said statement of claim the respondent denies and disputes each and every allegations made therein save and except what are matters of record. The contract work has been awarded after receipt of the stay order from the Central Tribunal on the operation of the impugned rejection order dated 16.11.2006 passed by the State Government till disposal of the revisional application. The respondent will rely upon the said stay order at the time of hearing as respondent's Exhibit.\nThe Steel and Mines Department, Government of Orissa also accordingly acted on it and allowed mining operation over the area. Subsequently as per the judgment passed on 16.5.2008 by the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in respect of above mining lease area and as directed by the Deputy Director of Mines, Government of Orissa vide Memo No.51661 dated 15.7.2008 mining operation over the said 254.962 hectors of mining lease area was stopped till further order. Thus there was no illegality in operating the mine during the period from 1.11.2007 to 17.5.2008. Copy of the relevant orders will be referred to and relied upon at the time of hearing as respondent's Exhibit.\nThus the alleged excuse of the claimant is not at all maintainable since the claimant was awarded the contract within the period when there was no impediment. Hence it is denied that the respondent has no legal right over the mines in question.\nIn any event the claimant can not take the shield of different orders of the High Court now since the claimant had acted upon the contract and realized payment from the respondent.\n17. The statements made in paragraph no.8 of the said statement of claim are denied in its material particulars. Before the letter dated 19.7.2008 the claimant had abandoned the work and asked for termination vide its letter dated 12.7.2008 and the claimant had deliberately suppressed the same before the arbitration proceeding. For suppression of such vital documents the claimant is not at all entitled to any relief what so ever s claimed in the claim petition and the claim petition is liable to be dismissed in limine with exemplary cost.\nIt appears from the claim petition that the claimant had claimed certain amount of Ex-Mine Sales. Such claim of the claimant is totally not maintainable. The contract was for raising and transporting of iron ore to Thakurani Railway Siding/Crusher plant. \" \n22. The learned Arbitrator made and published his award dated 22nd March, 2012. The amounts awarded by the learned Arbitrator in respect of each of the claims as against the amount claimed by the respondent are as follows :-\nSl. No.ParticularsClaim AmountAwarded AmountClaim No.1Unpaid value of theRs.16,82,990/-Rs.10,94,492/-work done, which were partly recordedClaim No.2Claim for Hire charges for machineries deployed in the workRs.549,12,000/-Rs.549,12,000/-Claim No.3Claim for reimbursement of the amount paid towards terminal benefits @ 12% on the basis of submitted bills.Rs.23,73,786/-Claim No.4Claim on account of Compensation for loss of profit @ 10% on the balance left out work.Rs.2,06,40,000/-Rs.2,06,40,000/-Claim No.5Claim on account of Profit of 15% on ex- mines sale.Rs.68,39,842/-Rs.68,39,842/-Claim No.6Claim on account of Construction of road from Roida to Thakurani.Rs.20,00,000/-Rs.20,00,000/-Claim No.7Claim on account of Refund of Security deposit and Earnest Money.Rs.19,89,037/-Rs.19,89,037/-Claim No.8Claim on account of Cost incurred in raising 28,000 M.T. Iron-ore but not lifted from mines.Rs.37,80,000/-Rs.37,80,000/-Claim No.9Claim on account of expenses of stacking of 28,000 M.T. Iron-ores.Rs.28,00,000/-Rs.28,00,000/-Claim No.10Claim on account of additional expenses incurred in removal of over burden of 3,33,500 M3.Rs.2,14,27,820/-DisallowedClaim No.11Claim for illegal deduction of amount in bills alleging quality and quantityRs.3,57,030/-DisallowedClaim No.12Claim on account of idle wages paid to labours, staff etc.Rs.71,83,960/-Rs.71,83,960/-Claim No.13Claim for interest @ 18% p.a. from 01.11.2008 till the date of actual payment.\n23. The award is long and reasoned. The award in respect of each and every claim is based on evidence and/or calculations based on contractual provisions.\n24. The learned Arbitrator, on consideration of the pleadings and submissions of the respective parties, including the admissions made by the appellant OMDC in its Counter Statement, particularly in paragraphs 16 and 17 thereof and upon scrutiny of the documents on record before the learned Arbitrator, found that under Section 4 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, no person was to carry on mining operation in any area, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a mining lease. Furthermore, the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, framed under the said Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 prohibits a lessee from entering into any contract or arrangement or understanding by which lessee's operation or undertakings might specifically be controlled by any person or body of persons other than the lessee.\n25. The learned Tribunal found that mining lease in respect of the mine in question had been granted by Government of Orissa to M/s. BPNE Ltd. No materials were placed before the learned Arbitrator to show that appellant OMDC had mining lease over the area. The State Government had rejected the application for renewal of the mining lease on 16th November, 2006. The Orissa High Court had ultimately rejected the writ application of the appellant OMDC, challenging the rejection.\n26. The appellant OMDC made an application in the District Court of North 24 Parganas at Barasat under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside the said award dated 2nd March, 2012 passed by the sole Arbitrator. The grounds are in a nutshell as follows:-\n(i) The arbitrator was wrong in passing the award only on the ground that the appellant OMDC was not the mining lessee in respect of the mines in question. The appellant OMDC had been in possession of and operating Roida mines since 1983 without any dispute.\n(ii) The application for renewal of mining lease was made atleast 12 months before the date of expiry thereof. Till the date of final disposal of the application for renewal, the lease is to be deemed to have been extended. There were also various interim orders permitting mining operations to go on.\n(iii) The learned Arbitrator erred in law and facts and acted against public policy in allowing most of the claims of the respondent Contractor and in rejecting the counter claims of appellant OMDC.\n(iv) The learned Arbitrator factually erred in holding that appellant OMDC did not have mining lease.\n27. Mr. Somnath Bose, appearing on behalf of the appellant OMDC submitted that the contract between the respondent contractor and the appellant OMDC related to certain jobs at the Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines covering 254.952 hectares, held by the appellant OMDC under a mining lease granted by the State of Orissa.\n28. Mr. Bose submitted that Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines covering about 998.70 hectares was different from Kolha Roida Iron Ore and Manganese mine covering 254.952 hectares. Mr. Bose has relied on two sketch maps to demonstrate that the two mines were different.\n29. Mr. Bose argued that disputes in relation to the claims of the respondent Contractor towards outstanding bills and also for compensation and/or damages in relation to the agreement in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines was referred to arbitration by the sole arbitrator. The respondent Contractor had raised claims on account of extra work of removal of iron ore, payment on account of idle labour and idle machinery and vehicle charges in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines.\n30. Mr. Bose submitted that Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine covering 998.70 hectors and Kolha-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine covering 254.95 hectors were different mines. Cancellation of the mining lease in respect of Kolha-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine had no nexus with Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine.\n31. Mr. Bose argued that the learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that the disability of the appellant OMDC in respect of Kolha-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine was of no relevance to the claims in relation to the Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine. Mr. Bose argued that the 'stop operation' order was in respect of Kolha Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines and not in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines.\n32. It however appears that the appellant OMDC did not hold any separate mining lease in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines. Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mine and Kolha Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines were operated under the same mining lease. According to the respondent Contractor, the mining lease in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines also stood cancelled when the tender in question was floated.\n33. Whether the appellant OMDC held a valid mining lease in respect of Bhadrasai-Roida Iron Ore and Manganese Mines or whether the mining lease in respect of the said cancellation is a factual issue, which has been decided by the learned Arbitrator, on consideration of the pleadings and evidence before him. It is well settled that this Court considering an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, for setting aside an award, does not sit in appeal over factual findings arrived at by the learned arbitrator.\n34. Mr. Bose argued that the learned Court failed to appreciate that the Arbitral Award dealt with disputes not contemplated by or falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration. Mr. Bose has, however, not been able to demonstrate which of the disputes do not fall within the terms of submission to arbitration. Nor has he referred to any specific provision of the agreement or provisions of law under which the claims are barred.\n35. There is no doubt that an Arbitral Tribunal is required to decide a dispute in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force, as argued by Mr. Bose. It is, however, well settled that the strict rules of evidence as contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or procedural rules as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 do not apply to arbitratal proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal. An Arbitral Tribunal is required to proceed fairly, and in accordance with law, giving equal opportunity of representation to all the parties.\n36. Mr. Bose submitted that there is no whisper in the award that parties had agreed to any procedure to be followed by the Arbitral Tribunal in conducting the proceedings. It is well settled that the Arbitral Tribunal can adopt its own procedure. The adjudication must, however be in compliance of the principles of natural justice, and the respective parties given a reasonable opportunity of hearing.\n37. In Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. vs. M/s. Jain Studios Ltd. reported in AIR 2006 SC 963 : (2006) 2 SCC 628 , cited by Mr. Somnath Bose, the Supreme Court held that a Court of law would have to read the agreement as it is. The Court cannot rewrite the agreement or create a new agreement.\n38. In Polymat India P. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in AIR 2005 SC 286 : (2005) 9 SCC 176 , the Supreme Court held that the terms of the contract have to be construed strictly without altering the nature of the contract. The proposition of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. (supra) and Polymat India P. Ltd. (supra) is well-settled. The judgments are however not applicable.\n39. It is also true that the contract must be read as a whole, and not to be dissected. But it equally well settled that if the contract was in several parts some of which were legal and enforceable and some were unenforceable, the lawful parts would be enforced provided they were severable.\n40. In Delhi Development Authority Vs. M/S. R.S. Sharma & Co., New Delhi, cited by Mr. Bose reported in (2008) 13 SCC 80 , the Supreme Court held that an award which was contrary to substantive provisions of law or the provisions of the 1996 Act or against the terms of the respective contract or patently illegal or prejudicial to the rights of the parties was open to interference by Court under Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act. An award could be set aside if it was contrary to the fundamental policy of law or the interest of India or justice or morality. An award could also be set aside if it were so unfair or unreasonable that it shocked the conscience of the Court. It was open to the Court to consider whether the award was against the specific terms of the contract and if so interfere with it on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public policy of India. There can be no dispute with the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority (supra).\n41. In Mcdermott International Inc vs Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 181 , cited the Supreme Court held that under the 1996 Act, the Arbitral Tribunal was under a duty to assign reasons for its decision. In this case, the award is reasoned.\n42. There can be no doubt that under the 1996 Act, the learned Arbitral Tribunal is obliged to pass a reasoned award. There can also be no doubt that a mere statement of reasons does not satisfy the requirement of Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act. The reasons must be based upon materials submitted before the Arbitral Tribunal. The Tribunal has to give its reasons upon consideration of the relevant materials, while irrelevant materials may be ignored. There is no reason to hold that the reasons given by the learned arbitrator are not on consideration of relevant materials.\n43. In Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Western Geco international Ltd. reported in (2014) 6 SCC 321 = AIR 2015 SC 363 cited by Mr. Bose, the Supreme Court reiterated that the phrase 'Public Policy' used in Section 34 was required to be given a wider meaning. It could be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which was, on its face, patently in violation of statutory provisions, could not be said to be in public interest. Such an award was likely to be adversely affected the administration of justice. The award could thus be set aside, if it was patently illegal.\n44. There can be no doubt that an award which is patently illegal can be set aside. It is too late in the day to contend to the contrary. However, the award in this case does not appear to be patently illegal. Mr. Bose has not been able to demonstrate the patent illegality in the award.\n45. In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer reported in (2005)1 SCC 625 cited by Mr. Bose, the Supreme Court held that where a particular mode was prescribed for doing an act and there was no impediment in adopting the mode, the deviation to act in a different manner, without disclosing any discernible principles which were reasonable, had to be labelled as arbitrary. The Supreme Court reiterated that every state action had to be informed by reason.\n46. In Himani Alloys Ltd. Vs. Tata Steel Ltd. reported in (2011) 15 SCC 273 cited by Mr. Bose, the Supreme Court held that it was true that a judgment could be given on the admission contained in the Minutes of a Meeting. However, the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. Referring to Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Supreme Court held that it was an enabling provision neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary.\n47. The Supreme Court further held that the Court on examination of the facts and circumstances, had to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial, which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore, unless the admission was clear unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim.\n48. In this case, the award has been made and published on contest, after giving the respondent Contractor and appellant OMDC opportunity of representation. This is not a case of admission in the minutes but of admission in pleadings. Admission in pleadings, unless rectified by amendment is binding on the party making the admission.\n49. The judgment in Koduri Krishnarao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad reported in AIR 1962 AP 249, was rendered in the particular facts of the case. A judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is raised and decided. The judgment in Koduri Krishnarao (supra) does not decide any proposition which is relevant in this case.\n50. In Balraj Taneja & Anr Vs. Sunil Madan & Anr. reported in (1999) 8 SCC 396 the Supreme Court observed that on failure of defendant to file written statement the Court should not proceed to pass judgment blindly. It is only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need be proved on account of deemed admission, that the Court could pass judgment. The Court had to write a judgment in conformity with the Order XX Rule 1. The judgment has no relevance to the issues involved in this case.\n51. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Addagada Raghavamma and Anr vs Addagada Chenchamma and Anr. reported in AIR 1964 SC 136 was rendered in the particular facts of the case.\n52. In Union Territory of Pondicherry and Ors. Vs. P.V. Suresh reported in (1994) 2 SCC 70 , the Supreme Court held that the Court cannot alter the terms of the contract or rewrite the contract. The Court cannot also evolve formula for determining instalments payable under the contract in the absence of materials before it. The judgment was rendered in the context of proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The proposition that the Court cannot alter the terms of the contract or rewrite the contract is well established.\n53. In Makram Barsoum Estafnous and London & Leeds Business Centres Limited reported in 2011 EWCA Civ 1157, the Court of Appeal held that the general approach to the construction of documents was well settled. The Court could not rewrite contracts in the context of establishing what the parties had meant by the language they had used. To quote the Appeal Court \"that case is not a licence for the Courts to rewrite contracts.\"\n54. In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148 the question before the Supreme Court was whether not filing rebuttal amounts to an admission and whether Section 58 of the Evidence Act is attracted. The Supreme Court held that admission was the best piece of sensitive evidence that an opposite party could rely upon. Though not conclusive, it was decisive of the matter, unless successively withdrawn or proved erroneous. Admission might in certain circumstances operate as an estoppel. The question which is needed to be considered is what weight is to be given to an admission and for that purpose it is necessary to find out whether the admission is clear, unambiguous and relevant piece of evidence. In this case the appellant OMDC has not been able to demonstrate that any admission made by the appellant OMDC was withdrawn, but still considered. Nor was the appellant OMDC able to prove that the admission was erroneous. There was no reason why admission made in the counter statement of the appellant should not have been considered to operate as an estoppel.\n55. Arbitrators are Judges appointed by the parties and, therefore, an award passed by an Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal is not to be interfered with lightly. It is well-settled that in proceedings under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the Court does not sit in appeal over the award.\n56. It is well-settled that in proceedings under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the Court does not sit in appeal over an award by reanalysing the evidence. In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. Vs. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd. reported in (2012) 1 SCC 594 the Supreme Court held:-\n \"21. A court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or reappreciating the evidence. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. .............. Therefore, in the absence of any ground under Section 34(2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at.\" \n57. Sections 34(1) and (2) of the 1996 Act, provides as follows:-\n \"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).\n(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if-\n(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that-\n(i) a party was under some incapacity; or\n(ii) The arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or\n(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or\n(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:\nProvided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or\n(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or\n(b) the Court finds that-\n(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or\n(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.\nExplanation.-Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81.\" \n58. As observed by the Supreme Court in Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 cited by Mr. Kapur, the 1996 Act was enacted to provide for an arbitral procedure, which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of arbitration, to provide that the Arbitral Tribunal gives reasons for an arbitral award, to ensure that the Arbitral Tribunal remains within the limits of its jurisdiction and to minimize the supervisory role of Courts.\n59. Section 5 of the 1996 Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being enforce, in matters governed by Part 1, no judicial authority is to intervene, except where so provided in the said part.\n60. Section 34, read in conjunction with Section 5 makes it clear that an arbitral award that is governed by Part 1 of the 1996 Act, can only be set aside on grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) and (3) and not otherwise.\n61. None of the grounds contained in Sub-section 2(a) of Section 34 permit the Court to adjudicate the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitral award. The merits of an award might only be looked into under certain specified circumstances, when an award is found to be in conflict with the public policy of India, as held by the Supreme Court in Associate Builders (supra).\n62. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. VS. General Electric Co. reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644 the Supreme Court held that the expression 'Public Policy' in the context of a foreign award, would have to be construed to mean an award contrary to (i) the fundamental policy of the Indian law; or (ii) the interest of India; or (iii) justice or morality. Such an award would have to be set aside as contrary to the public policy of India.\n63. In ONGC Ltd. Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. reported in (2003) 5 SCC 705 the Supreme Court held :\n \"The phrase \"Public Policy of India\" is not defined under the Act. Hence, the said term is required to be given meaning in context and also considering the purpose of the section and scheme of the Act. It has been repeatedly stated by various authorities that the expression \"public policy\" does not admit of precise definition and may vary from generation to generation and from time to time. Hence, the concept \"public policy\" is considered to be vague, susceptible to narrow or wider meaning depending upon the context in which it is used. Lacking precedent the Court has to give its meaning in the light and principles underlying the Arbitration Act, Contract Act and Constitutional provisions.\" \n64. An award would be set aside if it was contrary to (a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; (b) the interest of India or (c) justice or morality or (d) if it was patently illegal. In ONGC Ltd. Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court made it clear that it was open to the Court to interfere with an award on the ground that it was patently illegal and therefore, opposed to the public policy of India.\n65. An award might be set aside as patently illegal, provided the illegality goes to the root of the award. If the illegality is of a trivial nature it cannot be said that the award is against public policy. This proposition was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Zinc Ltd. Vs. Friends Coal Carbonization reported in (2006) 4 SCC 445 . In ONGC Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd (supra) the Supreme Court held that an award could also be set aside, if it was so unfair and unreasonable, that it shocked the conscience of the Court.\n66. In view of the judgment in ONGC Ltd. Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. (supra) it has to be held that the award could be set aside if it was in contravention of the provisions of 1996 Act or any other substantive law governing the parties or was against the terms of the contract. Ofcourse the award could be set aside on the ground of patently illegallity, subject to the condition that the illegality went to the root of the award. It is now also settled law that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same, would be liable to interference under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.\n67. In Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority (supra) the Supreme Court held that it must be clearly understood that when a Court is applying 'public policy' test to an arbitral award, it does not act as a Court of appeal and consequently the errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to be accepted as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon, when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus, an award based on little evidence or no evidence, which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score. Once it is found that the arbitrators' approach is not arbitrary or capricious then he is the last word on facts.\n68. Patent illegality may render an award to be in conflict with the public policy of India. Under the explanation to Section 34(2)(b) an award may be said to be in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption.\n69. In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd.reported in (2006) 11 SCC 181 , the Supreme Court held:-\n \"112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law. [See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC 2003 ILO SC 862 and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India 2004 ILO SC 334].\" \n70. In MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2011) 10 SCC 573 the Supreme Court held that if the arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction. But if he wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits a jurisdictional error. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in such cases, because the dispute is not something which arises under or in relation to the contract or dependent on the construction of the contract or to be determined within the award. The ambiguity of the award can, in such cases, be resolved by admitting extrinsic evidence. The rationale of this rule is that the nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined outside and independent of what appears in the award. Such a jurisdictional error needs to be proved by evidence extrinsic to the award. Reference may in this context, also be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram [AIR 1954 SC 689 ], Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India [AIR 1955 SC 468 ], Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros. [AIR 1959 SC 1362 ], Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1960 SC 588 ], Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth v. Chintamanrao Balaji [AIR 1965 SC 214 ] and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. (1984) 4 SCC 679 : AIR 1985 SC 1156 ] .\n71. In Indu Engineering & Textiles Ltd. Vs. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2001) 5 SCC 691 , the Supreme Court held that the Arbitrator being a Judge appointed by the parties, the award passed by him is not to be interfered with lightly. When the view taken by the arbitrator was a possible or a plausible one, on his analysis of evidence and interpretation of contractual and/or statutory provisions and did not suffer from any manifest error, it was not open to the Court to interfere with the award.\n72. Even though the judgment in Indu Engineering & Textiles Ltd. (supra) was rendered in the context of an application under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act 1940, for setting aside of an award, the same principle would apply to an application for setting aside an award, under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.\n73. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 306 , the Supreme Court held that when a clause in a contract was capable of two interpretations and the view taken by the arbitrator was clearly a possible if not a plausible one, it was not possible to say that the arbitrator had travelled outside his jurisdiction, or that the view taken by him was against the terms of contract. That being the position, Court could not interfere with the award and substitute its view in place of the interpretation accepted by the arbitrator.\n74. In Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd. reported in (2010) 11 SCC 296 the Supreme Court held:\n \"43. ... The umpire has considered the fact situation and placed a construction on the clauses of the agreement which according to him was the correct one. One may at the highest say that one would have preferred another construction of Clause 17.3 but that cannot make the award in any way perverse. Nor can one substitute one's own view in such a situation, in place of the one taken by the umpire, which would amount to sitting in appeal. As held by this Court in Kwality Mfg. Corpn. v. Central Warehousing Corpn. the Court while considering challenge to arbitral award does not sit in appeal over the findings and decision of the arbitrator, which is what the High Court has practically done in this matter. The umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be the correct one after considering the material before him and after interpreting the provisions of the agreement. If he does so, the decision of the umpire has to be accepted as final and binding.\" \n75. As observed above, an award can only be interfered with grounds stipulated in Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act. In this case no grounds have been made out for interference with the impugned award.\n76. It is well settled that the arbitral tribunal is competent to interpret the terms and conditions of a contract and the interpretation cannot be interfered with by Court in an application for setting aside only because some other interpretation might have been possible.\n77. The factual finding of the learned Arbitrator based on evidence as also admission of appellant OMDC in its pleadings does not call for interference in an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Appellant OMDC has not produced any evidence and/or any cogent evidence before us to show that the mining lease in respect of the mines in question was valid and enforceable on the date on which the contract was executed with the respondent.\n78. The learned Court below rightly rejected the application for setting aside of the award. We find no grounds to interfere with the judgement and order under appeal. The appeal is dismissed.\n79. Urgent Photostat certified copy, if applied for, be delivered to the learned counsel for the parties, upon compliance of all usual formalities.\nI Agree\nAppeal dismissed",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 4157 of 1993 (From the Judgment and Order dated June 16, 1993 of the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 5793 of 1993), with SLP (CC Nos. 21592, 21690, 21691, 21688, 22042 of 1993), C.A. No. 4158 of 1993, SLP (C) No. 15097 of 1993, SLP (CC Nos. 21899, 21929, 21940 of 1993), I.A. No. 1 of 1993 in SLP (C) CC No. 21940 | Premium Granites And Another v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Others | 04/02/1994",
+      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 4157 of 1993 (From the Judgment and Order dated June 16, 1993 of the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 5793 of 1993), with SLP (CC Nos. 21592, 21690, 21691, 21688, 22042 of 1993), C.A. No. 4158 of 1993, SLP (C) No. 15097 of 1993, SLP (CC Nos. 21899, 21929, 21940 of 1993), I.A. No. 1 of 1993 in SLP (C) CC No. 21940 | Premium Granites And Another v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Others",
+      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
+      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
+      "case_record": "This case involves appeals against a Madras High Court judgment that declared Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, unconstitutional and void. The writ petitioner challenged Rule 39, arguing that the State Government had no power to frame a rule deviating from existing rules and that Rule 39 conferred arbitrary, uncanalised, and unguided power on the executive, violating Article 14 of the Constitution due to vague terms like \"public purpose and interest of mineral development.\" The High Court upheld the second contention. The Mineral Concession Rules have undergone several amendments over time, including Rule 8(A) allowing leases for industries, Rule 8(C) initially prohibiting private quarrying of black granite (later upheld and then amended to allow private persons with industries), and a 2012 amendment restricting leases to government companies or those with \"Letters of Commitment.\" Rule 39 was introduced in 1993, allowing the State Government to grant or renew leases on different terms in \"special circumstances in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest.\" The appellants argued that the terms \"mineral development\" and \"public interest\" serve as sufficient guidelines, that reasons must be recorded, and that the power is subject to judicial review. They also contended that guidelines can be inferred from the Act's overall scheme and that similar provisions in other statutes have been upheld. The respondents argued that Rule 39 grants unbridled power and relied on cases emphasizing the need to minimize arbitrary discretion. They also raised factual disputes about some lease grants.",
+      "generated_judgment": "<think>\nOkay, let's tackle this legal judgment. First, I need to understand the case thoroughly. The user provided the facts, so I'll start by summarizing them. The main issue is about the constitutionality of Rule 39 under the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. The High Court declared it unconstitutional, and now there's an appeal against that decision.\n\nSo, the facts are that the writ petitioner challenged Rule 39, arguing the State Government couldn't create a rule that deviates from existing ones, and that Rule 39 gives too much arbitrary power, violating Article 14. The High Court agreed with the second part. The rules have had amendments over time, including Rule 8(A), 8(C), and a 2012 amendment. Rule 39 was introduced in 1993, allowing the government to grant or renew leases in special circumstances for mineral development and public interest. The appellants say these terms are sufficient guidelines and that reasons must be recorded, subject to judicial review. They also mention that similar provisions in other statutes have been upheld. The respondents argue that Rule 39 gives unbridled power and cite cases about minimizing arbitrary discretion. They also mention factual disputes about lease grants.\n\nNow, the issues. The main legal issue is whether Rule 39 is constitutional, specifically if it violates Article 14 due to vague terms. Another issue might be whether the State Government has the power to create such a rule. Also, the scope of judicial review and whether the terms \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" are sufficiently defined.\n\nFor the rules, I need to recall the relevant constitutional provisions. Article 14 deals with equality before the law and equal protection of laws. The doctrine of proportionality and the principle of reasonable classification might be relevant. Also, the doctrine of severability—whether the invalid part of a rule can be struck down without affecting the rest. There's also the principle that vague terms can lead to arbitrariness, as per cases like State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala. Additionally, the power of the legislature to delegate authority, but with the requirement that the delegation must be specific enough to prevent arbitrariness.\n\nIn the analysis, the key is whether \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" are sufficiently defined. The High Court found them vague, leading to arbitrary power. The appellants argue that the overall scheme of the Act and other statutes provide guidelines. However, the High Court might have correctly identified that without clear definitions, the terms could be misused. Also, the respondents' argument about factual disputes about lease grants might not directly affect the constitutionality but could be a separate issue. The 2012 amendment restricting leases to government companies or those with Letters of Commitment might show that the state has tried to regulate, but Rule 39's terms are still problematic.\n\nThe analysis should weigh the balance between legislative discretion and the need for clarity. If the terms are too vague, it could infringe on Article 14. The High Court's decision to strike down Rule 39 might be correct, but the appellants might have a point about the overall scheme providing enough context. However, the High Court's reasoning about arbitrariness due to vagueness is a strong point. Also, precedents where similar terms were upheld might not be directly applicable if the context here is different. The key is whether the terms are so vague that they can't be reasonably interpreted, leading to arbitrary exercise of power.\n\nConclusion: The appeal might be dismissed if the High Court's decision was correct in finding the terms too vague, violating Article 14. Alternatively, if the appellants can show that the terms are sufficiently guided by the Act's scheme, the appeal might be allowed. But based on the facts, the High Court's reasoning seems sound, so the conclusion would be to dismiss the appeal.\n</think>\n\n### Facts:  \n1. The writ petitioner challenged Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, arguing that it was unconstitutional due to vague terms like \"public purpose and interest of mineral development,\" which allegedly conferred arbitrary power on the executive, violating Article 14 of the Constitution.  \n2. The Madras High Court declared Rule 39 unconstitutional, holding that the terms \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" were uncanalised and unguided, enabling arbitrary discretion.  \n3. Rule 39, introduced in 1993, allows the State Government to grant or renew leases in \"special circumstances in the interest of mineral development\" and \"public interest,\" with no explicit guidelines.  \n4. Appellants (respondents in the original case) argued that the terms \"mineral development\" and \"public interest\" are sufficient guidelines, that reasons must be recorded, and that judicial review is available. They also cited similar provisions in other statutes upheld by courts.  \n5. Respondents (original petitioners) contended that Rule 39 grants unbridled power and relied on precedents emphasizing the need to minimize arbitrary discretion.  \n\n---\n\n### Issues:  \n1. Whether Rule 39 violates Article 14 of the Constitution by granting arbitrary power to the executive through vague terms like \"public interest\" and \"mineral development.\"  \n2. Whether the State Government had the authority to frame Rule 39, and whether the terms in Rule 39 are sufficiently guided by the Act’s scheme or other statutes.  \n\n---\n\n### Rules:  \n1. **Article 14 of the Constitution**: Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of laws, requiring that legislative provisions not be arbitrary or discriminatory.  \n2. **Doctrine of Severability**: A provision that is invalid in whole or in part does not invalidate the entire statute.  \n3. **Vagueness Doctrine**: A law is void for vagueness if it fails to provide sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement.  \n4. **Legislative Delegation**: The legislature may delegate authority to the executive, but the delegation must be specific enough to prevent arbitrary exercise of power.  \n5. **Precedents**: Cases such as *State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala* (1954) emphasize that vague terms in statutes may be struck down for violating the principle of equality.  \n\n---\n\n### Analysis:  \n1. **Constitutional Validity of Rule 39**: The High Court correctly identified that the terms \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" are uncanalised, lacking specific criteria to guide the executive. This vagueness risks arbitrary exercise of power, which violates Article 14. The appellants’ argument that the Act’s overall scheme provides sufficient context is weak, as the High Court’s analysis focused on the absence of clear guidelines in Rule 39 itself, not the broader Act.  \n2. **Legislative Authority**: The State Government’s power to amend rules under the Minor Mineral Concession Act is valid, but Rule 39’s vagueness renders it unconstitutional. The High Court’s decision to strike down Rule 39 does not invalidate the entire Act, as the doctrine of severability applies.  \n3. **Precedents and Judicial Review**: While the appellants cited similar provisions in other statutes, the High Court’s reliance on *State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala* is appropriate, as the case underscores that vague terms in statutes may be void for arbitrariness. The requirement for recorded reasons and judicial review, as argued by the appellants, is consistent with the High Court’s decision.  \n4. **Factual Disputes**: The respondents’ factual disputes about lease grants do not directly address the constitutional validity of Rule 39. These disputes are procedural and do not affect the legal analysis of the rule’s constitutionality.  \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion:  \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The Madras High Court correctly held that Rule 39 violates Article 14 of the Constitution due to its vague and unguided terms, which enable arbitrary executive discretion. While the appellants’ arguments about the Act’s scheme and judicial review are valid, they do not override the constitutional imperatives of clarity and equality. The High Court’s decision to strike down Rule 39 is legally sound and should be upheld.",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by RAY, J.\nRAY, J. -\nThis appeal and the connected matters are directed against the judgment dated June 16, 1993 passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 5793 of 1993. The writ petitioner Durai Raju Naidu moved the aforesaid writ petition before the Madras High Court for a decision that Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Mineral Concession Rules) as unconstitutional and void. The said writ petitioner contended inter alia that he was granted lease with respect to quarry in Survey No. 782/1 in Kulathur Village and he had been agitating before the State Government for the renewal of the said lease but he apprehended that the authorities concerned were likely to exercise their prerogative under the said Rule 39 to grant lease to somebody else and in order to safeguard his interest, the writ petition was moved by him for the aforesaid declaration\n2. To sustain the challenge to the said Rule 29, the writ petitioner Shri Naidu, urged two main grounds, namely, (a) The State Government had no power to frame a rule deviating from the Mineral Concession Rules already made in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 15(1) of the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as MMRD Act) and (b) Rule 39 had conferred arbitrary, uncanalised and unguided power on the executive thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The expression \"public purpose and interest of mineral development\" as referred to in the said Rule 39 is vague and does not constitute sufficient guidelines. The said writ petition was contested by the State of Madras and also by other respondents who were impleaded in the writ proceedings, namely, the Tamil Nadu Granites Quarry Owners and Exports Association, Shanthi Granites and the Premium Granites\n3. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court by the impugned judgment did not accept the first contention of the writ petitioner but upheld the second contention and declared that Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules was unconstitutional and void\n4. Premium Granites and Shanthi Granites preferred a Special Leave Petition No. 10306 of 1993 before this Court inter alia challenging the impugned decision of the Madras High Court impleading the State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Commissioner and Secretary to the Government, Industries Department, Shri Durai Raju Naidu, the writ petitioner and the Tamil Nadu Granites Quarry Owners and Exporters Association. As aforesaid, Civil Appeal No. 4257 of 1993 arises on such special leave petition filed by the said applicants. The State of Madras has also preferred special leave petition challenging the said decision of the Madras High Court and some other parties also made applications before this Court for leave to move special leave petitions and to intervene either to oppose the said appeals or to support the decision of Madras High Court and all these matters have been analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment\n5. To appreciate the contentions raised by the contesting parties, certain dates and events may be stated as hereunder\n6. In 1957 the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act (MMRD Act) was passed by Parliament. In 1959, the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules were issued under Section 15 of the MMRD Act. Rules 8 of the Mineral Concession rules provided for the grant of quarry leases in respect of all minor minerals. On December 16, 1972, GO No. 1932 was issued by the State of Madras inserting Rule 8(A) of the Mineral Concession Rules providing grant of lease to persons for quarrying minerals for their existing industries or having industrial programmes. It is the case of some of the parties in the above matters before this Court that they had set up industries based on the above rules and obtained leases of land for quarrying granite specified period. On August 25, 1975 by GOMs No. 993 Rule 8(A) was amended thereby enabling the State Government to grant leases for quarrying black granite subject to the applicant having an industry or agreeing to set up an industry two years\n7. On December 2, 1977 by GOMs No. 1312, Rule 8(C) was inserted thereby prohibiting grant of leases in Government lands for quarrying black granite for private persons. Since such Rule 8(C) provided for exclusive exploitation of black granite by the State Government, the validity of Rules 8(C) was challenged in a writ proceeding before the Madras High Court. The validity of Rule 8(C) was ultimately upheld by this Court on February 5, 1981 in the case of Hind Stone (State of T. N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205 : AIR 1981 SC 711 ). Some of the lessees whose leases had expired by efflux of time, made applications for renewal of their leases but no renewal granted. In 1984 Writ Petition No. 12267 of 1984 was filed by one of such applicants for renewal before this Court for a mandamus to direct State Government to grant renewal of lease for a further period of ten years and similar writ petitions were also moved before this Court for the aforesaid relief by some of the lessees whose leases had also expired. In such writ petitions this Court has passed ad interim order of status quo on May 3, 1984 as regards possession. Applications were also filed before this Court for vacating status quo order but such applications were dismissed by this Court on September 28, 1984 and the writ petitioners who were lessees but whose leases had expired, continued to remain in possession of land in terms of the interim order of this Court without, however, any right to quarry operations. On December 9, 1988, by GO No. 1273 Rule 8(C) was amended thereby providing for grant of lease to quarry black granite to private persons for their existing industries or having industrial programme. A number of lessees whose leases had expired made applications for grant of lease to quarry black granite. Their claims were considered by the department concerned and were recommended to the State Government. It appears that on September 2, 1989, the rules were further amended by Go No. 608 thereby providing for lease for quarrying black granite only to persons having industries but the said grant was made under a tender system. On June 10, 1992 by GOMs No. 214, Rule 8(C) was amended. Rule 8(C) as amended provides for grant of quarry lease to Government Company and Rule 8(A) as amended by GO 214 provides for quarry lease to be granted only to persons having \"Letters of Commitment\". The said GO also provided for canalisation of granite quarried. The validity of Rule 8(D) containing canalising provisions were challenged before the High Court of Madras and such Rule 8(D) was struck down by the High Court. On March 5, 1993, this Court, in Writ Petition No. 12267 of 1984 and connected matters passed an order to the effect that the State Government could consider and pass orders in respect of relief sought for by the petitioners for lease of quarrying black granite. On March 8, 1993, GO No. 97 was passed introducing Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules providing for grant of leases \"in special circumstances in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" otherwise than in accordance with the Mineral Concession Rules. As stated earlier, the validity of Rules 39 was challenged in a writ petition before the Madras High Court\n8. It may be stated here that by GO Nos. 125 and 197 the State of Madras granted quarry leases in favour of some persons who had established industries and had been granted quarry leases earlier and who had been allowed to continue in possession all through. After Rule 39 was struck down by the Madras High Court two writ petitions were filed before the Madras High Court for cancelling leases granted by the said GO Nos. 125 and 197 in exercise of the power under Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules. The State Government opposed such writ petitions for cancelling the leases and inter alia contended that the grant of leases to existing industries was traceable to Rule 8(A) as amended by GO No. 214 dated June 10, 1992 and such grant of lease could be sustained without reference to Rule 39 since struck down by the Madras High Court but the High Court allowed the said writ petitions and set aside GO Nos. 125 and 197 by which the leases were granted in favour of some persons. It has been held by the High Court that the grant of lease cannot be sustained under Rule 8(A) of the Mineral Concession Rules and such grant of lease can be referable only to Rule 39 and since Rule 39 has been struck down, the grant made under the said Rule 39 is also to be set aside. Such grantees, therefore, have also moved special leave petitions before this Court inter alia challenging the decision of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39\n9. To appreciate the rival contentions raised by the parties either in support or against the validity of Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules, the provisions of Rule 39 are set out as hereunder\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (Central Act 67 of 1957) the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby makes the following amendment to the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1950The amendment hereby made shall come into force on March 8, 1992\nAMENDMENT\nIn the said rules, after Rules 38, the following rule shall be added, namely\n'39. Powers of State Government to grant rule or renew quarry lease or permission etc. in special cases : Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the State Government, if in any case, are of opinion that in the interest of mineral development and in the public interest it is necessary so to do, they may, by order and for reasons to be recorded\n(a) grant or renew a lease or permission to quarry any mineral; or\n(b) allow the working of any quarry for quarrying any mineral;\non terms and conditions different from those laid down in those rules.'\"\n10. The learned counsel challenging the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39 as arbitrary, have urged a number of points. Since all the matters are being disposed of by common judgment, we do not propose to deal with the contentions made by each of the learned counsel challenging or supporting the impugned decision of the Madras High Court separately in view of the fact that grounds urged by the learned counsel are more or less similar and at times overlapping. We, therefore, propose to deal with the contentions raised by the learned counsel not individually but generally\n11. As already indicated, the only ground on which Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules has been struck down by the Madras High Court is that such rule gives unguided and uncanalised powers to the State Government. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel challenging the decision of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39 may be summarised to the following effect\n(1) Rule 39 contains the guidelines, viz., the grant under Rules 39 can be made only \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" for reasons to be recorded in writing(2) The object of the MMRD Act itself is for regulation of mining and \"mineral development\". The rules framed under the MMRD Act are also intended to subserve the said object, namely, mineral development. The provisions of the MMRD Act the rules framed by the Central and the State Governments clearly furnish the scope and purport of the words \"mineral development\". Scientific exploitation of the minerals without waste in undoubtedly an exercise for mineral development envisaged by the Act and the rules\n(3) Since reasons are to be recorded in writing while exercising the power under Rule 39, it can always be ascertained from the order that may be passed under the said provisions of Rule 39 as to whether the grant is one for furthering mineral development or not\n(4) The word \"public interest\" is a word of definite concept which has been referred to in the Constitution and in many other Acts. The import of the expression \"public interest\" has been considered and noted in the decisions of this Court. Hence, the said expression does no longer suffer from any vagueness or indefiniteness\n(5) Power under Rule 39, being controlled by such consideration \"in the interest of mineral development\" and in \"public interest\", cannot be exercised arbitrarily and capriciously but such exercise has to be made with definite objective purpose. There is therefore, no occasion to strike down Rule 39 on the score of being potentially arbitrary and capricious and open to unguided and uncanalised exercise of power. If in any particular case, the aforesaid purposes are not followed in exercising power under Rule 39, then such improper action, and not Rule 39 itself, can be challenged\n(6) In different Acts and rules, both Central and State including rules framed by some other States under MMRD Act, provisions similar to Rule 39 have been made and such provisions have been noticed by courts of law but for good reasons have not been struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution\n12. We have already indicated the outlines of various Government orders amending the Mineral Concession Rules from time to time. The picture which emerges from the aforesaid amendments made in the Mineral Concession Rules may be stated as hereunder\n13. The Mineral Concession Rules were framed under Section 15 of the MMRD Act providing for grant of quarry leases and permission in respect of minor minerals both in revenue lands and patta lands. In the year 1972 the Mineral Concession Rules were amended and under such amendment, the grant of lease of revenue land to quarry granite could be made in favour of private persons only if they had industries or industrial programmes indicating that the policy of the Government to exploit black granite scientifically to avoid wastage was being implemented. A number of persons including some of the appellants in these proceedings had established industries pursuant to the Rules as amended and applied and obtained leases for quarrying black granite for a period of ten years in 1973 - such leases being valid up to 1983. In December 1977, Rule 8(C) was introduced prohibiting grant of leases for quarrying black granite by private persons and confining exploitation only by the Government. The validity of such rule was challenged but as aforesaid the said rule was upheld by this Court in the case of Hind Stone (State of T.N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205 : AIR 1981 SC 711 ). When the leases for quarrying black granite in revenue lands for a period of ten years expired in 1983, the lessees including some of the appellants made applications for grant of renewal but they were not eligible for getting such renewal in view of Rule 8(C) the validity of which was upheld by this Court. The applicants for getting such renewal of lease including some of the appellants filed writ petitions before this Court and as indicated hereinbefore orders for maintaining status quo as to the possession of the lands were passed by this Court without however giving any right to quarry. In 1988, Rule 8(C) was amended whereby provision was made for grant of leases for quarrying black granite to private persons having industries or having industrial programmes. Such amendment of Rule 8(C) virtually restored the position as was prevailing in 1972. The persons who had set up industries or had industries programmes for quarrying black granite scientifically as desired by the Government, made applications for grant of renewal of leases. Such applications were scrutinised by the department concerned and recommendations for grant of renewal of leases were made by the department. At that stage, in 1989 the Mineral Concession Rules were further amended inter alia providing that quarry leases were to be granted to industries only under tender system. Tenders were floated and some of the aspirants for getting leases participated in such tenders and those who had participated and were successful were given the letters of commitment assuring grant of lease to them if they would set up industries. In 1992, the Rules were amended again by GOMs No. 214 drastically. As per the amended rules, grant of quarry leases to quarry black granite were to be made only to government companies and the companies having letters of commitment\n14. It does not require any imagination to note that there was frustration and resentment of such persons like some of the appellants who had set up industries based on the old rules and who had been starving for raw materials but who had become disabled from getting any lease in view of restriction of granting of such lease and confining the grant of lease in favour of only such private persons who held the letters of commitment\n15. It has been contended by the learned counsel in support of Rule 39 that the State Government having realised the injustice and unmerited hardship to be suffered by some persons and also having realised that for furthering mineral development which will be in the public interest, it was desirable to make suitable provisions so that the rigorous created because of the amendment made by GOMs 214 in 1992 confining grant of leases to private persons holding letters of commitment, should be relaxed. It was on such perception that Rule 39 was introduced in the Mineral Concession Rule enabling the Government to grant quarry leases to private persons in appropriate cases in the interest of mineral development and in public interest for reasons to be recorded in writing. It is, therefore, necessary to decide whether introduction of Rule 39 in the Mineral Concession Rules was justified and desirable and even if it may be justified or desirable, as a matter of policy, whether in law such amendment can be sustained\n16. Elaborating the contentions made before this Court in support Rules 39, it has been contended by the learned counsel that Rule 39 does not confer an uncanalised power and does not suffer from the vice of want of guidelines. It has been urged that Rule 39 contains the guidelines, viz., that the grant must be for mineral development and \"in public interest\". In other words, Rule 39 has been inserted to provide for grant of lease which may not be done strictly under Rule 8(A) or 8(C) but which is warranted for mineral development and \"in public interest\" for good reasons to be recorded\n17. It has been urged that mineral development is not a vague concept but has a definite meaning which can be tested objectively particularly when reasons are to be recorded in writing under Rule 39\n18. The learned counsel have contended that the object of the MMRD Act is for regulation of mineral development and the Rules framed under the MMRD Act both by the Central and State Governments clearly furnish the scope and support of the word \"mineral development\". It has been strongly contended that scientific exploitation of minerals without waste is undoubtedly a part of mineral development as envisaged by the MMRD Act and the rules framed thereunder. It has been urged by the learned counsel that the word \"public interest\" having been referred to in the Constitution and in many enactments is a word of definite concept\n19. The validity of Service rules including Fundamental Rule 56(j) empowering the Government to terminate the service by way of premature retirement had been challenged before this Court as ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution but this Court in a series of decisions has held that if the power to retire prematurely in public service if exercised in \"public interest\" the provision empowering such premature retirement does not become invalid on the score of offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench of this Court in T. G. Shivacharana Singh v. State of Mysore (AIR 1965 SC 280 : (1967) 2 LLJ 246 ) in upholding Rule 285 of Mysore Civil Services Rules, 1958, providing for premature retirement in 'public interest' has held that Rule 285 authorising the Government to retire a government servant compulsorily in public interest did not offend Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was indicated by the Constitution Bench that the law in relation to the validity of the rules permitting compulsory premature retirement of government servants had been well settled by a series of prior decisions of this Court in Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway (AIR 1964 SC 600 : (1964) 5 SCR 683 : (1964) 2 LLJ 467 ) and Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. ((1955) 1 SCR 26 : AIR 1954 SC 369 )\n20. The learned counsel have further contended that the guidelines need not be expressly found in the impugned and provisions but such guidelines can be gathered from the setting of the Acts and the rules framed thereunder. In support of this contention reference has been made to the decision of this Court made in the case of P. J. Irani v. State of Madras ((1962) 2 SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 ). Section 13 of Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 was challenged as ultra vires Article 14 of 16 of the Constitution as the said provisions gave uncontrolled and unguided discretion to the Government to exempt any building from all or any of the provisions of the said Act. It was held in the said decision that enough guidance was given in the preamble and the operative portion of the Act to exercise the discretion of exemption. The decision in P. J. Irani case ((1962) 2 SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 ) was followed by this Court in the decision in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N. ((1985) 1 SCC 290 ) Section 29 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 providing for discretion to the State Government to grant total exemption to buildings belonging to public trust from the purview of the Rent Act was held valid and not offending Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground of giving unbridled discretion. It was held that sufficient guideline was afforded by the preamble and the operative provisions of the Rent Act for the exercise of discretionary power vested in the Government\n21. Reference has also been made to the decision of this Court in Ram Dial v. State of Punjab ((1965) 2 SCR 858 : AIR 1965 SC 1518 ). In the said decision the expression \"public interest\" has been explained at page 866 of the Report. It has been held that while considering the power given to the Government to remove a member under Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipalities Act, the expression \"public interest\" would necessarily depend upon the time, place and circumstances with reference to which the consideration was made. It may be noted here that Section 14(e) was struck down not on the score that the expression \"public interest\" is vague and it introduces unguided, and unbridled power but the same was struck down in view of the fact that Section 14(e) providing for removal without a hearing circumvents Section 16(1) which contemplates a hearing to be given to the members to be affected\n22. The learned counsel have also referred to the decision of this Court made in the case of Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India ((1969) 2 SCR 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ). In considering the expression \"so far as it appears to be necessary or expedient for carrying out the provisions of the Act (Gold Control Act), the Constitution Bench in the said decision held that the said phrase was not subjective in the context of the scheme and object of the legislation. The opinion of the administrator as to the necessity of making the order must be made objectively and must be reasonably tenable in a court of law. Reference has also been made to another decision of this Court made in Jalan Trading Co. (P) Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Union ((1967) 1 SCR 15 : AIR 1967 SC 691 : (1966) 2 LLJ 546 ). In the said decision validity of several provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act including Section 36 were taken into consideration by the Constitution Bench of this Court. It has been held that the power to exempt certain establishments from the operation of the Act given to the appropriate Government under Section 36 was not an unguided power because the Government was enjoined to take 'public interest', the financial position of the establishment, and other relevant circumstances into consideration before exercising the said power. There was therefore no excessive delegation of legislative authority by Section 36 and the section was held valid\n23. The learned counsel have again relied on recent decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court made in the case of Workmen v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. ((1992) 3 SCC 336 : 1992 SCC (L&amp;S) 6791992 SCC(L&amp;S) 679 ) The vires of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act (as prevalent at the relevant time) was considered in the said decision. It had been held that powers conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 25-N to grant or refuse permission for retrenchment has to be exercised in accordance with objective indicated and Statement of Objects and Reasons given in the Amending Act 32 of 1976 and also the basic idea of settlement of industrial disputes and maintaining industrial peace. It has been held that in exercising power under sub-section (2) of Section 25-N, with the requirement of passing a speaking order containing reasons does not amount to unreasonable restriction. It has also been held that the requirement of reasons for exercise of such power by itself excludes chances of arbitrariness. It has also been held in the said decision that Section 25-N is not vitiated on the ground of absence of a provision for appeal or review of the order passed by the Government or authority as the order is required to be a speaking order to be passed on objective considerations. It has been further held that the remedy of judicial review available under Article 226 cannot be said to be inadequate because even in a case of refusal of permission for retrenchment on policy considerations, it is open to the Court to examine whether policy is in consonance with the object and purport of the Act\n24. The learned counsel have also contended that Entry 54 List I of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India enables the central Government to regulate mines and mineral development in \"public interest\" by making a declaration of such intention and Parliament has in fact made such declaration by Section 2 of the MMRD Act. By the said MMRD Act, Parliament has left the power of regulating quarry leases in respect of minor minerals to the State Governments under Section 15 of the MMRD Act. The State Government has the authority to deal with the minor minerals under which the Mineral Concession Rules have been framed by the Government of Tamil Nadu. It is by the said rules that the State Government has been regulating grant of leases from time to time. In 1992 the Government thought it fit to prohibit grant of quarry leases to private persons except in patta lands and providing for grant of quarry leases to revenue lands only to government companies in terms of Rule 8(C). On a reconsideration and as a part of policy decision, the Government thought it fit to introduce Rule 39 providing for the grant of quarry leases to private persons \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" by indicating reasons in writing by relaxing the rigours of other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules. Rule 39 is a part of the policy underlying the Mineral Concession Rules which is consistent with the object of the MMRD Act. As exercise of relaxation for grant of quarry leases under Rule 39 can only be made within the parameters of public interest and for the mineral development by recording the reasons in writing, Rule 39 does not suffer from arbitrariness or unguided or unbridled power offending Article 14 of the Constitution. It has also been contended that the power exercised under Article 39 is not an absolute, discretionary power of the State Government unfettered by any valid consideration but exercise of such power within the aforesaid parameter is always open to judicial scrutiny thereby affording ample safeguard against any abuse in exercising the power under Article 39\n25. Commenting on the reasons for which Article 39 was introduced in the Mineral Concession Rules, it has been submitted by the learned counsel that various persons under the existing rules has set up industries by incurring substantial costs for sizing and polishing granites for export and sale in the domestic market. Such scientific exploitation and ancillary steps in that regard are undoubtedly right steps for mineral development. The cases of some of the persons who had set up proper industrial establishments for quarrying granites and for polishing and sizing them for effective user under the existing rules and had been possessing lands and were reasonably aspiring for renewal of leases required proper consideration. Although their cases were recommended on scrutiny of relevant facts by the department concerned, no such lease could be granted because of the amendment effected in 1992 in the Mineral Concession Rules. As not only injustice was meted out to such persons but non-renewal of leases to such persons was also considered to be not \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in the public interest\". The State Government, therefore felt that Rule 39 containing provision for relaxation in the matter of grant of quarry leases should be introduced so that in an appropriate case in the greater interest of mineral development and in public interest, grant of lease can be made notwithstanding other provisions in the Mineral Concession Rules. In the aforesaid facts, it cannot be contended that Rule 39 was introduced without any justification whatsoever or the same suffers from any excessive delegation or vice of uncanalised and unbridled power or the same was introduced to give favours to a chosen few\n26. The High Court in striking down Rule 39 has held that Rule 39 provides for an arbitrary power and the guidelines of public interest and in the interest of mineral development do not provide any objective standard. For such finding, the High Court has relied on the decision of this Court made in Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P. ( : AIR 1954 SC 224 ); R. M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate, Tanjore (AIR 1954 SC 747 : (1955) 1 SCR 686 ); Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India ((1965) 2 SCR 858 : AIR 1965 SC 1518 ) and Jalan Trading Co. (P) Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Union ((1969) 2 SCC 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ). It has been contended by the learned counsel that all the said decisions do not support the proposition that Rule 39 is ultra vires Articles 14 of the Constitution. The decisions relied on by the High Court primarily relate to laws or rules which seeks to prohibit a person from carrying on a legal trade or profession except on licences. Such laws prescribing the restriction require to be precise and objective so that the prohibitions would clearly be understood and made enforceable. Provisions enabling a grant have necessarily different import\n27. It may be noted here that the decision in Dwarka Prasad case ( : AIR 1954 SC 224 ) relates to a case where the power is given under clause 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order to grant or refuse to renew, suspend, revoke or cancel or modify any licence issued under the said control order. The said clause further authorised the Controller to delegate such power in favour of any person. Such provision was held unreasonable and invalid. The decision in R. M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate, Tanjore (AIR 1954 SC 747 : (1955) 1 SCR 686 ) relates to the validity of condition 5(a) and special condition 3 which required a licence under Cinematograph Act to exhibit at each performance one or more approved films of such length and for such time as the Provincial Government or the Central Government may direct. Under special condition 3 the licensee was required to exhibit at the commencement of each performance not more than 2000 feet of one or more approved films. It was held by this Court that such conditions did not amount to reasonable restrictions with the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution and therefore was ultra vires Article 19(1) of the Constitution\n28. The decision made in Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia ((1969) 2 SCC 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ) was a case where the validity of various sections of the Gold Control Act and the Regulations made thereunder fell for consideration. Section 5(2)(b), Section 27(2)(d), Section 27(6)(a), Sections 32, 46, 88 and 100 were held ultra vires for reasons indicated therein. Indeed this decision is relied on to support the validity of Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules. Some of the sections of the said Gold Control Act were held valid. The reasons for which the said other sections were held invalid are entirely different and do not apply so far as Rule 39 is concerned. Moreover, considerations as to public interest and for furtherance of mineral development as essential requirement to grant exemption under Rule 39 make the said rule wholly objective. The decision in Banthia case ((1969) 2 SCC 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ) has no application in interpreting Rule 39\n29. It has been further contended that where in respect of prohibited categories, the law carves out an exception or relaxation, the rule to be applicable should be appreciated on a different perception. There the question of unbridled power being allowed to be exercised does not arise. The question is of taking out certain exceptions from the prohibited area and keeping certain categories outside the prohibited area for being allowed to exercise freedom of trade or business from the restrictions imposed\n30. Elaborating on the contention that the power of relaxation as contained in Rule 39 is similar in various statutes it has been urged that the power granted under Section 31 of the MMRD Act confers identical power on the Central Government as Rule 39 confers the power on the State Government. Section 31 of the MMRD Act may be set out as hereunder\" 31. Relaxation of rules in special cases. - The Central Government may, if it is of opinion that in the interest of mineral development it is necessary so to do, by order in writing and for reasons to be recorded, authorise in any case the grant, renewal or transfer of any prospecting licence or mining lease, or the working of any mine for the purpose of searching for or winning any mineral, on terms and conditions different from those laid down in the rules made under Section 13. \"It has been submitted that the High Court while dealing with Section 31 of the MMRD Act, has not questioned the validity of the said section although it contains similar provisions. In this context reference to Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 has also been made. The provision of Section 29 is set out as hereunder\" Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Government may, subject to such conditions as they deem fit, by notification, exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of this Act. \"31. This provision has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the decisions S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N. ((1985) 1 SCC 290 ) and Prabhakaran Nair v. State of T.N. ((1987) 4 SCC 238 )\n32. Reference was also made to Section 8-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act which is set out as hereunder\" 8-A. (1) The State Government may, by notification make an exemption, or reduction in rate, in respect of any tax payable under this Act -\n(2) Any exemption from tax or reduction in the rate of tax, notified under sub-section (1) may be subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be specified in the notification\n(3) The State Government may, by notification, transpose any entry or party thereof from one schedule to another schedule and alter the point of levy of sale or purchase, but not so as to enhance the rate of tax in any case. \"Reference to Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was also made. The provision is set out as hereunder\" If the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt generally either absolutely or subject to such conditions (to be fulfilled before or after clearance), as may be specified in the notification goods of any specified description from the whole or any part of duty of customs leviable thereon. \"This section has been upheld by this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) P. Ltd. v. Union of India ((1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121 )\n33. Section 14 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act since referred is set out as hereunder\" 14. Power of Government to notify exemption and reductions of tax. - (1) The Government may be notification (issued whether prospectively or retrospectively) make an exemption of reduction in rate, in respect of any tax payable under the Act. \"34. It is contended that Section 14 is quite similar to Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules. In this connection, reference has also been made to Rule 66 of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1969, containing provisions for relaxation of rules in special cases. The said rule is set out as hereunder\" 66. Relaxation of rules in special cases. - In cases where the Government is of the opinion that public interest so requires, it may authorise the grant of a quarrying lease or a quarrying permit on such terms and conditions other than those prescribed in the rules, as the Government may by order specify\nProvided that notwithstanding anything contained in these rules such safeguards, territorial, financial or otherwise may be provided to the leases with a view to safeguarding the interests of any industry or trade in order to avoid unhealthy competition among the lessees and to prevent any fall in the trade and to see that minor mineral is exploited in a scientific and systematic manner. \"Basing the arguments on the aforesaid contentions the learned counsel have submitted that there was no occasion to strike down Rule 39 by the High Court as invalid and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by holding that the said rule conferred unguided and unbridled discretionary power on the State Government. The learned counsel have submitted that as the said Rule 39 is quite valid and has been inserted in the Mineral Concession Rules for a reasonable purpose, Rule 39 cannot per se be declared as ultra vires as sought to be done by the Madras High Court. If in any individual case, power has not been exercised properly and the reasons which have got to be recorded in writing do not stand the scrutiny of reasonableness and the purposes for which such power of exemption can be exercised, challenge for improper action in such individual cases before a court of law can always be made. The learned counsel have therefore submitted that the decision of the Madras High Court should be set aside thereby enabling the State Government to giver effect to Rule 39 in appropriate cases\n35. Supporting the decision of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules, it has been urged by the learned counsel opposing the appeals that the High Court felt that if Rule 39 was to be interpreted to give a wide discretionary power to the authorities to overtook other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules then it would be violative of Article 14 as being vague and unfettered and giving uncanalised power to the State Government. It was on such finding that Rule 39 was struck down as unconstitutional\n36. It has been very strongly contended that the submission that the words \"public interest\",\" reasons to be recorded in writing \"would be adequate to prevent arbitrary action is not tenable in view of the decision of this Court by the Constitution Bench in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&amp;S) 12131991 SCC(L&amp;S) 1213 ). The attention of this Court has been drawn to paragraph 230 at page 716 in the majority decision. It has been held in the said paragraph\" There is need to minimise the scope of the arbitrary use of power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however high placed they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies. It is trite to say that individuals are not and do not become wise because they occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection and fairness does not go with the posts, however high they may be. There is only a complacent presumption that those who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not support it and reality does not warrant it. In particular, in a society, pledged to uphold the rule of law, it would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law. \"It has also been contended that it is also not factually correct that all the ten grantees (13 leases) are having their own industries or factories and they are not exporting any raw granite or raw block granite to foreign countries but they are processing and polishing after cutting them and sizing them and it was only the said polished goods that are being exported by them. It has been contended that only M/s. Enterprising Enterprises and Gem Granite have their own factories at Madras. Pallavan Granite has a factory at Pondicherry. All other grantees do not posses any industry of their own either inside or outside the State of Tamil Nadu. It is also contended that 75% to 80% of the quarried materials are straight away exported abroad without cutting and polishing even by the persons who possess industries\n37. It has also been contended that although under GOMs No. 1273 introduced on December 9, 1989 which was in force on June 9, 1992 permitting grant of lease to persons which industries, M/s Enterprising Enterprises and Gem Granite did not choose to apply under that scheme which was in force for nearly 3 1/2 years only because the granites quarried must be captively used in their own industries for the purpose of polishing before the same are exported. It has been contended that relevant facts have not been taken into consideration for granting lease in the purported exercise of power of relaxation under Rule 39. Such factual contentions are, however, not admitted\n38. We do not propose to scrutinise facts and circumstances concerning the grantees in favour of whom the exercise of power under Rule 39 had been made because we do not think that for deciding the validity of Rule 39 a case of improper exercise of power under Rule 39 in any particular case, is required to be considered by this Court\n39. It has been contended that even if it is held that consideration of public interest and the interest of mineral development coupled with requirement to record reasons provide guidelines under which power under Rule 39 is to be exercised, Rule 39 introduced on March 8, 1993 in the Mineral Concession Rules, if given an expansive introduction, would entitle the authorities concerned to disregard the various other provisions as contained in the Mineral Concession Rules framed under Section 15 of MMRD Act and would entitle the authorities concerned either to grant or renew a quarry lease contrary to the avowed policy of the State Government incorporated in certain other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules\n40. It has been contended that when Rule 8(C) epitomises policy of the State Government reserving granite in all its uses to be exploited by the State Government or through its Corporation, in exercise of the powers under Rule 39, the State Government should not be permitted to give an interpretation to Rule 39 widely and grant a quarry lease contrary to the State Policy. Mr. Sibal, the learned counsel in this connection has referred to the decision in Gardner v. Jay ((1885) 29 Ch D 50 , 58 : 52 LT 395). Lord Justice Bowen in dealing with the judicial discretion has held that :\" If a court is invested by Act of Parliament with a discretion, that discretion, like other judicial discretion, must be exercised according to commons sense. \"The learned Counsel has also contended that it is a settled principle of interpretation of statute that a court should not interpret a statute in such a fashion as to render other provisions redundant. There should always be an attempt to read different sections of a statute harmoniously so that one provision does not invalidate the other. It has been contended that the statutory rule should be considered as a part of an integrated scheme and no one provision should be so interpreted as to render the scheme as envisaged in other provisions inoperative. It has been submitted that Rule 8(C) represents the part of a scheme in respect of which the State Government does not allow exploitation of granite except by itself or through its Corporation. It must therefore be held that the authorities in framing Rule 39 could not have intended that such policy should be rendered inoperative and ineffective by interpreting Rule 39 in a wide manner. It has been further submitted that it is well established rule of interpretation that courts must interpret an enactment in such a way as to implement rather than defeat its purpose. In this connection, reference has been made to the observation of Francis Bennion in Statutory Interpretation, Second Edn. at page 411. The learned author has indicated that :\" An Act must be construed so that its provisions are given force and effect rather than being rendered nugatory.\"The learned author has also indicated that :\" Ut res magis principle requires inconsistencies within an act to be reconciled. \"In this context, the learned author has referred to Blackstone to the effect that,\" one part of the statute must be so constructed by another, that the whole may, if possible, stand - ut res magis valeat quam pereat. \"It has been further submitted that the principle of reconciling inconsistencies within an Act means that if the obvious intention of the enactment gives rise to difficulties in implementation, the court must do its best to find ways of resolving these. It has been submitted that looking from this angle, Rule 39 would only mean that the State Government is entitled to grant or renew a quarry lease if in a given case or in a special class of cases it is of the opinion that in the interest of mineral development and in the public interest it is necessary to change the terms and conditions of the lease different from those statutorily prescribed under the rules. In no other circumstances, this power can be exercised. Such an interpretation would render Rule 39 consistent with the scheme formulated by the State Government under other provisions in particular Rules 8(A) and 8(C). It is contended that any other interpretation would render Rule 39 a Henry VIII clause\n41. It has been submitted that this Court has many occasions to deal with similar Henry VIII clauses (that king is regarded popularly as the impersonation of executive autocracy). In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly ((1986) 3 SCC 156 , 220, 221 : 1986 SCC (L&amp;S) 4291986 SCC(L&amp;S) 429 : (1986) 1 ATC 103 ) (at pp. 220, 221) and in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&amp;S) 12131991 SCC(L&amp;S) 1213 ) (at pp. 707 and 717) this Court held that such clauses are constitutionally impermissible\n42. It has been very strongly contended that in case this Court finds Rule 39 to be vague and ambiguous then this Court may, in the light of scheme of the entire rule, the policy of the State Government as expressed in the said rules, permit Rule 39 to be read down in such a manner so as to give effect to the policy of the Government and also to the scheme of the MMRD Act. It has been submitted that this Court has repeatedly followed doctrine of reading down in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy ((1977) 4 SCC 471 : (1978) 1 SCR 641 ), R. L. Arora v. State of U.P. ((1964) 6 SCR 784 : AIR 1964 SC 1230 , following Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp 2 SCR 769 : AIR 1962 SC 955 ), Jagdish Pandey v. Chancellor, University of Bihar ((1968) 1 SCR 231 : AIR 1968 SC 353 ), Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration ((1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155 )\n43. It has been further submitted that as Rule 39 cannot be given a wide interpretation thereby giving extraordinary power to relax other provisions of the rules and consequently rendering the scheme of the entire rules ineffective. The only interpretation by reading down Rule 39 which can be given is that the said rule would permit the State Government under extraordinary circumstances or in special cases to vary certain terms and conditions of the lease in a given case. It has been submitted that therefore it becomes necessary to understand the import of the words \"terms and conditions\" in contradistinction to the policy of the Government as contained in the Mineral Concession Rules. The words \"terms and conditions\" according to the learned counsel would mean a stipulation or requirement, the failure of which would render the Act subject to repudiation\n44. It has been contended that the Mineral Concession Rules prescribe certain conditions as to the grant of leases - how an application is to be made, to whom it is to be made, the maximum period of lease, the extent of maximum area which can be leased out to the applicant etc. All these conditions are also provided in the MMRD Act itself. In D. K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat (1986 Supp SCC 20 ) this Court has held that the rule-making power of the State Government under Section 15 is controlled by Sections 4 to 13 (now Sections 5 to 13) of the MMRD Act. On the principle of harmonious construction and reading down statutory provision for reconciliation in a special case, in the interest of mineral development and in the public interest, the State Government may change or relax some of the conditions of lease e.g. may at the most grant a lease for more than ten years if the applicant satisfied the State Government of the necessity to do so. Similarly, in a given case, the Government may charge less seniorage fee, dead rent etc. in the interest of mineral development and in public interest. But the State Government cannot and should not utilize such an extraordinary power under Rule 39 to exempt few persons alone, while applying the policy to all others e.g. Dharmapuri District is completely reserved for exploitation by Government-owned Corporation. It has been contended that it has been demonstrated before this Court with the aid of the affidavit filed by the State Government in Civil Appeal No. 1655 of 1992 at pages 450 to 456 that more than 70 applications have been rejected on the sole ground that Dharmapuri District is reserved for State exploitation. Despite such avowed policy of reservation, the State Government in the purported exercise of a wide power under Rule 39 has granted three leases in the same Dharmapuri District only on the ground that there was a huge loss of foreign exchange. The learned counsel have contended that such an exercise in completely overlooking the other provisions will be wholly capricious and therefore impermissible under Article 14 of the Constitution and consideration of loss of foreign exchange is alien to the relevant consideration permissible under the Mineral Concession Rules\n45. It has been contended that in case the Government wants to grant leases in Dharmapuri District to persons who were not in possession of letters of commitment as on June 10, 1992, the only course open to the State Government is to change its policy of reservation as well as its policy in relation to letters of commitment and allow all individuals who are interested in a quarrying licence consistent with the concept of equal opportunity\n46. It has been further contended that the State Government is under a constitutional duty to act fairly and justly and given equal opportunity to every individual who seeks largess from the Government. The grant of licence of a few people and that also on grounds of loss of foreign exchange is totally obnoxious to the theory of just State action. The guiding principle for interpretation of Rule 39 should be equality of opportunity to every person in the trade and at the same time imposing sufficient restrictions or guidelines or safeguards to prevent misuse of such a power and such interpretation must enable Rule 39 to coexist with the other rules as being not inconsistent with the other rules\n47. It is therefore only possible to reconcile Rule 39 by reading it down and indicating that in appropriate case by exercise of power conferred in Rule 39, it is permissible for the State Government only to vary the terms and conditions of the lease \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"public interest\"\n48. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case and giving our careful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties, it appears to us that the MMRD Act was enacted by Parliament under Entry 54 List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The aforesaid entry enables the Central Government to regulate mines and mineral development in public interest by making such declaration and Parliament, has in fact, made such declaration by Section 2 of the MMRD Act. In respect of minor minerals, Parliament by the said MMRD Act has left the powers of regulating minor minerals to the State Governments under Section 15 of the MMRD Act. Different State Governments have exercised such power under Section 15 of the MMRD Act and State of Tamil Nadu has enacted in 1959 the Mineral Concession Rules. There is no dispute that the MMRD Act and the rules framed thereunder either by the Central Government or by the State Government are for mineral development subserving the cause of public interest. It cannot also be disputed that mineral development is not a vague expression and the MMRD Act and the rules framed under it, clearly furnish the scope and purport of the word \"mineral development\". It has been very reasonably contended that scientific exploitation of minerals without waste is undoubtedly a part of mineral development as envisaged by the MMRD Act and the rules framed thereunder. The expression \"public interest\" finds place in the Constitution and in many enactments which have since been noted and considered by this Court in various decisions. The said expression is, therefore, a word of definite concept. There is also force in the contention of the appellants that the guidelines need not be expressly found in the impugned provisions but such guidelines can be gathered from the setting of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. Such contention gets support from the decisions of this Court in P. J. Irani ((1962) 2 SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 ), S. Kandaswamy Chettiar ((1985) 1 SCC 290 ), Jalan Trading Co. ((1967) 1 SCR 15 : AIR 1967 SC 691 : (1966) 2 LLJ 546 ), Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. ((1992) 3 SCC 336 : 1992 SCC (L&amp;S) 6791992 SCC(L&amp;S) 679 )\n49. The power of relaxation under Rule 39 of Mineral Concession Rules is to be exercised for \"mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" after recording reasons for such exercise of power. In our view, it has been rightly contended by the learned counsel in support of the validity of Rule 39, that the exercise of power under the said Rule 39 cannot be made arbitrarily, capriciously and on subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned but the same is to be exercised within the parameters of \"mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" which as aforesaid, are not vague and indefinite concepts. Such exercise of power must satisfy the reasonableness of State action before a court of law if any challenge of improper action in exercise of the said power under Rule 39 in a given case is made. It has been held by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Meenakshi Mill case ((1992) 3 SCC 336 : 1992 SCC (L&amp;S) 6791992 SCC(L&amp;S) 679 ) that if a speaking order is required to be passed on objective consideration, such provision is not vitiated on the ground of absence of a provision for appeal or review because the remedy available by way of judicial review is by itself an adequate safeguard against improper and arbitrary exercise of power. It has also been held by this Court in the said decision that requirement of giving reasons for exercise of the power by itself excludes chances of arbitrariness\n50. The observation made in the majority decision in Delhi Transport Corpn. case (1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&amp;S) 12131991 SCC(L&amp;S) 1213 ) as referred to hereinbefore should be appreciated with reference to the facts and circumstances of a case and the true import of a provision under which a discretionary power is to be exercised. While no exception can be made to the observation of this Court in the said decision that\" It would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law\", it should also be borne in mind that it is not always feasible and practical to lay down such exhaustive written guidelines which can cover all contingencies. It has, therefore, become necessary to make provisions for exercise of discretion in appropriate cases by giving broad guidelines and indicating the parameters within which such power is to be exercised. In various decisions referred to hereinbefore, this Court has upheld such exercise of discretion if the same does not appear to be wholly uncontrolled uncanalised and without any objectives basis\n51. \"Public interest\" is a paramount consideration in the MMRD Act itself and the rules framed thereunder cannot but subserve \"public interest\" in furthering the cause of mineral development. We are, therefore, unable to hold that Rule 39 is per se obnoxious and having contained unbridled, unguided and uncanalised discretionary power offends Article 14 of the Constitution\n52. Although it does not appear that any argument of harmonious construction of the statute coupled with the principle of interpretation by reading down was advanced before the Madras High Court but since such contention has been raised before this Court and it appears to us that for considering the validity of Rule 39 and its true import, it may be necessary to consider the question of harmonious construction and the principle of reading down a statutory provision, we propose to examine the contentions made in that regard. It has been contended that all the provisions in the Mineral Concession Rules must be understood as an integrated scheme and no particular provision should be permitted to govern the field in isolation particularly when it runs counter to the scheme envisaged by the other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules. It has been contended that since under the other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules, exploitation of black granite in Dharmapuri District is restricted to a particular class of operators as a policy decision of the State Government, so long such policy decision remains in force no relaxation of the same is permissible in the purported exercise of power under Rule 39. Accordingly, Rule 39 may be held valid only if the same is interpreted as a provision having a limited application and being wholly confined in varying the terms and conditions of leases in appropriate cases\n53. Although, at the first glance, such argument appears to be reasonable but on closer scrutiny the same does not appear to be sustainable. T",
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@@ -238,26 +238,26 @@
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-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 6023 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No. 25409 of 2017) | Paulmech Infrastructure Private Limited v. State Of Odisha And Ors. | 04/10/2021",
-      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 6023 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No. 25409 of 2017) | Paulmech Infrastructure Private Limited v. State Of Odisha And Ors.",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL - 868 of 2019 | Birendra Prasad Sah v. State Of Bihar And Anr. | 08/05/2019",
+      "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL - 868 of 2019 | Birendra Prasad Sah v. State Of Bihar And Anr.",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The State of Odisha leased property to Utkal Ashok Hotel Corporation Limited (UAHCL), which operated 'Hotel Nilachal Ashok'. In 2009, UAHCL tendered a 40-year lease for the property. The appellant, the highest bidder, received a Letter of Intent (LOI) on 19.01.2010, requiring payment of Rs. 9.34 crores (including Rs. 8.82 crores non-refundable upfront payment) and execution of the lease agreement within 30 days. The appellant failed to make the payment within the initial period. UAHCL granted two extensions, finally setting the deadline for payment as 15.12.2010. The appellant paid Rs. 4.41 crores on 18.02.2010, but failed to pay the balance amount by the 15.12.2010 deadline. Subsequent payments totaling Rs. 4.11 crores were made by the appellant after this final extended deadline (late December 2010 and January 2011). On 10.12.2013, UAHCL terminated the LOI due to the appellant's non-compliance. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking a direction for UAHCL to execute the lease agreement and later amended the prayer to quash the termination letter. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, stating that disputed questions of fact could not be resolved in writ jurisdiction and relegated the appellant to an appropriate forum. The appellant contended that UAHCL accepted the payments without demur and that a condition regarding employee voluntary retirement was an invalid imposition. UAHCL argued the appellant's consistent default, the non-refundable nature of the upfront payment, and losses incurred due to the appellant's actions.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:  \n1. The State of Odisha leased property to Utkal Ashok Hotel Corporation Limited (UAHCL), which operated 'Hotel Nilachal Ashok'.  \n2. In 2009, UAHCL tendered a 40-year lease for the property, with the appellant being the highest bidder.  \n3. The appellant received a Letter of Intent (LOI) on 19.01.2010, requiring payment of Rs. 9.34 crores (including Rs. 8.82 crores non-refundable upfront payment) and execution of the lease agreement within 30 days.  \n4. The appellant failed to make the payment within the initial period.  \n5. UAHCL granted two extensions, finally setting the deadline for payment as 15.12.2010.  \n6. The appellant paid Rs. 4.41 crores on 18.02.2010, but failed to pay the balance amount by the 15.12.2010 deadline.  \n7. Subsequent payments totaling Rs. 4.11 crores were made by the appellant after this final extended deadline (late December 2010 and January 2011).  \n8. On 10.12.2013, UAHCL terminated the LOI due to the appellant's non-compliance.  \n9. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking a direction for UAHCL to execute the lease agreement and later amended the prayer to quash the termination letter.  \n10. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, stating that disputed questions of fact could not be resolved in writ jurisdiction and relegated the appellant to an appropriate forum.  \n11. The appellant contended that UAHCL accepted the payments without demur and that a condition regarding employee voluntary retirement was an invalid imposition.  \n12. UAHCL argued the appellant's consistent default, the non-refundable nature of the upfront payment, and losses incurred due to the appellant's actions.\n\n### Issues:  \n1. Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition for lack of jurisdiction to resolve disputed factual issues.  \n2. Whether UAHCL was justified in terminating the LOI due to the appellant's failure to comply with payment obligations.  \n3. Whether the non-refundable nature of the upfront payment and the acceptance of partial payments by UAHCL affects the validity of the termination.\n\n### Rules:  \n1. The doctrine of **res judicata** and **issue estoppel** prevent relitigation of matters already decided in a judicial proceeding.  \n2. **Writ jurisdiction** of the High Court is limited to the enforcement of fundamental rights and does not extend to adjudicating disputes involving complex factual issues.  \n3. **Contractual obligations** and **performance requirements** under lease agreements are governed by the principles of **performance, breach, and remedies** under contract law.  \n4. **Non-refundable payments** in contractual agreements are generally considered as part of the consideration and may not be recoverable upon termination, depending on the terms and intent of the parties.  \n5. The **principle of estoppel** may apply if one party has accepted partial performance or payments, potentially affecting the other party's right to terminate.\n\n### Analysis:  \n1. The High Court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve disputed factual issues, such as whether UAHCL accepted partial payments or whether the termination was justified. Writ jurisdiction is not intended to serve as a substitute for ordinary civil litigation, especially when the dispute involves complex factual determinations. The appellant's petition was essentially a civil dispute, which should have been addressed in a proper forum.  \n2. UAHCL was justified in terminating the LOI due to the appellant's failure to make the full payment within the extended deadline. The LOI clearly outlined the payment terms, and the appellant's non-compliance, despite partial payments, constituted a material breach of the agreement. The non-refundable nature of the upfront payment further supports UAHCL's position, as it was a binding part of the agreement and not subject to refund upon termination.  \n3. The acceptance of partial payments by UAHCL does not negate the breach of the payment schedule. While the acceptance may suggest some level of tolerance, it does not constitute a waiver of all contractual obligations. The appellant's failure to meet the final payment deadline and the subsequent late payments after the deadline indicate a continued default, justifying the termination. The condition regarding employee voluntary retirement, while not directly relevant to the payment issue, does not invalidate the termination if it was a legitimate contractual term.\n\n### Conclusion:  \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court was correct in dismissing the writ petition for lack of jurisdiction, and UAHCL was justified in terminating the LOI due to the appellant's non-compliance with payment obligations. The non-refundable nature of the upfront payment and the acceptance of partial payments do not invalidate the termination, as the appellant's consistent failure to meet the contractual terms constitutes a material breach.",
-      "reference_judgment": "1. The appellant is before this Court assailing the order dated 09.03.2017 : (Reported in AIR 2017 (NOC) 985 (Ori)) passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, in W.P.(C) No.23103/2013. By the said order the High Court was of the opinion that the disputed questions of fact involved in the petition cannot be gone into in the writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, the prayer made in the petition was not entertained and the appellant was relegated to approach the appropriate forum available for redressal of its grievance. The appellant, therefore being aggrieved is before this Court.\n2. The respondent No.1-State of Odisha had granted the lease of the property in question in favour of the respondent No.5-Utkal Ashok Hotel Corporation Limited (for short 'UAHCL') for 99 years under the document dated 24.01.1989. UAHCL was, in that view, running an establishment in the name and style 'Hotel Nilachal Ashok' in the said premises at Puri. The same being unviable was closed down with the approval of Board of Directors in the year 2004. Thereafter, UAHCL decided to lease out the same for a period of 40 years. Tender was floated in the year 2009. The appellant was one among the tenderers who participated in the process and being the highest bidder was considered. Accordingly, the Letter of Intent (for short 'LOI') dated 19.01.2010 was issued in favour of the appellant delineating the terms to be complied pursuant to which the lease agreement was to be signed.\n3. Among the other conditions which were to form part of the lease agreement, even before executing the lease agreement the requirement was for the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.9.34 crores to UAHCL within 30 days, of which Rs.8.82 crores was towards non-refundable amount which was to be paid upfront; the security deposit of Rs.26 lakhs and the advance minimum guaranteed annual lease premium for the first year of Rs.26 lakhs was also to be paid.\n4. On payment of the said amount the lease was to be executed and the other conditions would come into operation. The appellant who was unable to pay the amount within the time stipulated, requested the UAHCL that they be permitted to deposit a part of the amount i.e., Rs.4.41 crores on 19.09.2010 and the balance amount by 15.04.2010 which was favourably considered by UAHCL through their communication dated 12.02.2010. Such indulgence was shown as special case. The appellant accordingly deposited a portion of upfront amount to the tune of Rs.4.41 crores on 18.02.2010, but the balance amount was not deposited within the extended time stipulated i.e., before 15.04.2010. In that view, the lease agreement could not be executed. However, in view of the request from the appellant, UAHCL through their communication dated 25.11.2010 once again acceded to the request permitting the appellant to pay the balance amount before 15.12.2010.\n5. The appellant thereafter paid (i) the sum of Rs.2 crores on 28.12.2010, (ii) sum of Rs.1.41 crores on 29.12.2010 and (iii) the sum of Rs.70 lakhs on 07.01.2011. Such payment, according to the appellant constitutes the payment which was required to be made as per the LOI. However, the time gap which had ensued had created a position wherein the grievance of the employees was to be addressed and they were to be given the benefit of voluntary retirement. Since the LOI dated 19.01.2010 had also provided for regulating the manner in which the employees are to be treated during the lease period and had provided the liberty to offer voluntary retirement, the UAHCL required the appellant to bear the liability towards the same. The same did not reach a finality and in the meanwhile the Board of Directors of UAHCL took the decision to terminate the LOI dated 19.01.2010 since the appellant had failed to comply with clause 2 thereof, which required the payment of Rs.9.34 crores within 30 days of issuance of LOI.\n6. Even prior to communication of the decision on 10.12.2013, the appellant filed the special writ petition before the High Court on 01.10.2013 wherein a prayer was sought to direct UAHCL to execute the lease agreement pursuant to the terms agreed under LOI dated 19.01.2010 and accept the balance amount along with interest for delayed payment. During the pendency of the writ petition the prayer was amended and the appellant sought for quashing the letter dated 10.12.2013 whereby UAHCL decided to terminate the LOI. UAHCL had filed their objection statement opposing the writ petition including contending therein with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition in a contractual matter. The learned Division Bench of the High Court having taken note of the rival contentions and the dispute involved for adjudication, was of the opinion that the disputed questions are best left to be resolved before the appropriate forum. The appellant is assailing the said order.\n7. We have heard Mr. Sanjay Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. Ashok Kumar Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for UAHCL and perused the appeal papers.\n8. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the action of UAHCL to cancel the LOI and retain the amount paid thereunder is not justified. In an attempt to fortify his submission, the learned counsel has referred to LOI dated 19.01.2010 with reference to clause 2, to point out that the upfront amount payable within 30 days though not paid within the time stipulated therein, the appellant had sought extension of time to pay which was agreed to by the communication dated 04.02.2010 and extended by the communication dated 25.11.2010. Though the time agreed thereunder is up to 15.12.2010, the amount paid by the appellant on 28.12.2010 (Rs.2 crores), 29.12.2010 (Rs.1.41 crores) and 07.11.2011 (Rs.70 lakhs) had been accepted without demur and as such the upfront payment of Rs.8.82 crores as required had been paid. In that view, the lease agreement was required to be executed. It is contended, though that was position, UAHCL instead of executing the lease agreement had through the communication dated 13.04.2011 raised the issue of the appellant having to bear the total liability on account of providing voluntary retirement to the employees which was as per the decision of the Board of UAHCL due to insistence of the State Government, though it was not a condition in the LOI nor could have been included in the lease agreement. It is pointed out that clause 11 of the LOI though provided for regulating the manner in which the employees are to be maintained had indicated that the appellant shall not retrench them but the liberty was for the appellant to consider VRS. As such it could not be imposed on the appellant is the contention. In such circumstance, it is contended by the learned counsel that the appellant having made the payment was entitled for the lease agreement to be executed in their favour. Hence the termination being bad, be set aside and the UAHCL be directed to execute the lease agreement is his submission.\n9. The learned counsel for UAHCL would on the other hand contend that the LOI was issued in favour of the appellant after the tender process and as such the terms of the LOI was required to be complied. Despite the payment of Rs.9.34 crores required to be made within 30 days, the appellant had failed to comply with the same. It is true that as per the request of the appellant the time was extended, but it was only a concession as a special case. Even as per the extension granted the payment was required to be made by 15.12.2010. But, even as per the admitted case of the appellant the payment towards the balance of the upfront amount was made only on 28.12.2010, 29.12.2010 and 07.01.2011 which was subsequent to the date till which extension was provided. That apart, since the requirement is to pay Rs.9.34 crores within the time stipulated, the security deposit and advance minimum guaranteed annual lease premium amount was also required to be paid within the time stipulated but had not been paid. As such the appellant cannot contend that they have performed their obligation so as to assail the termination of LOI and seek execution of the lease agreement. In that view, while justifying the termination it is also contended that the upfront amount of Rs.8.82 crores being onetime non refundable amount, it is within the powers of UAHCL to retain the same. Alternatively, it is contended that UAHCL was forced to incur idle expenses towards maintenance and the benefits payable to the employees without getting returns as the lease had not materialised due to the default committed by the appellant. In this regard, roughly an amount of Rs.4.5 crores has been incurred by UAHCL which in any event, the appellant is liable to reimburse. In that view, the learned counsel seeks that the appeal be dismissed.\n10. In the light of the contentions put forth, it is seen that the lease agreement was to be entered into between the parties pursuant to the terms depicted in LOI and on compliance of the initial obligations set out therein. The present dispute relates to the initial payment that was required to be made by the appellant within the time frame set out in the LOI and non-adherence to which has resulted in termination of LOI. Clause 2 of the LOI provides for the same, which reads as hereunder:\n\"2. You shall execute the Operating Lease Agreement within 30 days of the issue of LOI and pay an amount of Rs.9.34 crore within these 30 days as per following details i. One-time non-refundable upfront payment of Rs.8.82 crore. ii. Security Deposit (Rs.26.00 lakh) as per article iv. iii. Advance Minimum Guaranteed Annual Lease Premium for the first year (Rs.26.00 lakh) as per annex-ix -Financial Bid.\"\n11. A perusal of the same indicates that the appellant was obliged to pay an amount of Rs.9.34 crore within 30 days from 19.01.2010 and execute the Operating Lease Agreement. Towards the said amount, a sum of Rs. 8.82 crore was payable upfront as an one-time non- refundable amount. Though the learned counsel for the appellant sought to contend that the Minimum Guaranteed Annual Lease Premium and Security deposit of Rs. 26 lakh each are to be paid subsequently when the lease is executed, in our view it cannot be considered to be loose ended. Since Clause 2 refers to Rs.9.34 crore which is payable in 30 days and that includes the said amount of Advance Annual Premium and Security deposit, the entire amount was payable within 30 days. And the Lease Agreement was simultaneously executable. It only means that the same should be paid and the formality of execution of Lease Agreement also should be completed in the said 30 days and the payment to be made includes the upfront amount of Rs.8.82 crore.\n12. In that backdrop it is necessary to examine the manner in which the things have proceeded after issue of LOI. Admittedly the appellant was not ready with the amount to make the payment within the timeframe contemplated under Clause 2 of LOI. The appellant, through their letter dated 04.02.2010 requested UAHCL that they be allowed to pay 50% of the bid money by 19.02.2010 which in our view will include all the components indicated in Clause 2 of LOI and not just the upfront component. The rest of the money was undertaken to be paid by 15.04.2010. UAHCL through their reply dated 12.02.2010 allowed the same as a special case. The appellant once again through their letter dated 17.11.2010 requested for extension of time for payment of Rs.4.93 crore. UAHCL again extended the time till 15.12.2010.\n13. Despite such indulgence shown by UAHCL the appellant did not make the balance payment before 15.12.2010. Instead, the sum of Rs.4.11 crore was paid subsequent thereto and that too, in instalments of Rs. 2 crores on 28.12.2010; Rs.1.41 crore on 29.12.2010 and Rs.70 lakhs on 07.01.2011.\n14. Though the learned counsel for the appellant seeks to contend that UAHCL having received the said payment cannot at this stage contend that the payment was not made within the time stipulated, we are unable to accept such contention. UAHCL is a corporation which has different departments and as such the remittance made being accepted in itself cannot be taken as an act to condone the delay caused by the appellant in complying with the terms of the LOI so as to alter the terms of contract. There is no material on record that subsequent to 15.12.2010, there is any positive act on behalf of UAHCL to either extend the time for payment or for having expressly condoned the delay and having accepted the payment so as to regularise the transaction. This is relevant more so in the context that at an earlier point as against the time stipulated for payment under the LOI specific correspondence was exchanged between the parties and the time had been expressly extended prior to the time fixed earlier having expired. In such situation, when admittedly the balance payment had not been made prior to 15.12.2010, unless the appellant had obtained express extension from UAHCL mere tendering the payment and the same having been accepted cannot be construed as a positive act to alter the contract.\n15. No doubt, the appellants have relied on the communication dated 13.04.2011 addressed by the General Manager, UAHCL indicating therein that the issue of offering VRS to all the employees unwilling to join the new management was a consideration and the VRS amount will have to be paid by the appellant to UAHCL. Apart from the reason assigned by the High Court to indicate that the same cannot be treated in favour of the appellant, the said letter does not indicate that the discussion in that regard was after indicating to the appellant that the delay in payment of the upfront amount has been condoned and accepted. If at all the said aspect relating to VRS of the employees was also mutually agreed and, in that context, if UAHCL had proceeded to condone the delay and enter into the lease agreement it is only in such circumstance the exchange of correspondence in that regard would have assumed relevance. If that be the position, when admittedly the appellant was required to make the agreed payments within the timeframe indicated under LOI dated 09.01.2010 and the appellants themselves being unable to comply with the requirement, though having secured extensions on two occasions cannot turn around to contend otherwise at this juncture. Despite the extended period having come to an end on 15.12.2010, the appellant not having made the full payment within the said date cannot at this stage contend to have complied with the terms so as to seek a direction to UAHCL to execute the lease agreement. In fact, the High Court having examined the material on record has also arrived at such conclusion.\n16. Notwithstanding such conclusion reached by the High Court, ultimately it has arrived at the decision that in view of the disputed questions to be resolved between the parties, the same cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the appellant in that view has placed reliance to the case in Unitech Ltd. and Others v. Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (TSICC and Ors.) 2021 (2) SCALE 653 : (AIROnline 2021 SC 131), the decision to which one of us (Mr. Justice M.R. Shah) is a member on the Bench, with specific reference to para 32 thereof, which reads as hereunder:\n\"32. Much of the ground which was sought to be canvassed in the course of the pleadings is now subsumed in the submissions which have been urged before this Court on behalf of the State of Telangana and TSIIC. As we have noted earlier, during the course of the hearing, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Telangana and TSIIC informed the Court that the entitlement of Unitech to seek a refund is not questioned nor is the availability of the land for carrying out the project being placed in issue. Learned Senior Counsel also did not agitate the ground that a remedy for the recovery of moneys arising out a contractual matter cannot be availed of under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, to clear the ground, it is necessary to postulate that recourse to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not excluded altogether in a contractual matter. A public law remedy is available for enforcing legal rights subject to well-settled parameters.\"\n17. Having noted the said decision, a reference to the order passed by the High Court would indicate that the High Court though having referred to the decisions in Arya Vyasa Sabha v. Commissioner of Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments, AIR 1976 SC 475, DLF Housing Construction Private Ltd. v. Delhi Municipal Corporation AIR 1976 SC 386, National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram AIR 2004 SC 1998, Dwarka Prasad v. B.D. Agarwal, AIR 2003 SC 2686, and Defence Enclave Residents' Society v. State of U.P. AIR 2004 SC 4877 to note the limitations while considering a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has in that view taken note of the fact situation arising in the instant case. It is on facts that the High Court has arrived at the conclusion that such disputed questions of fact cannot be resolved in the writ petition of the present nature. Therefore, in the present facts, the High Court has not dismissed the writ petition on maintainability but having taken note of the issue involved was of the opinion that the contentions urged would necessitate the requirement of recording evidence and therefore relegated the parties to an appropriate forum. To that extent, though we take note of the observations made by the High Court, keeping in view the nature of the considerations made, the prayers which were sought in the amended writ petition were required to be conclusively answered by the High Court on the aspect as to whether the decision of UAHCL to terminate the LOI dated 19.01.2010 was justified and the requirement for resolution of the dispute by an appropriate forum ought to have been left open only to the incidental aspect which may require appropriate evidence to be tendered and adjudication to be made by an appropriate forum.\n18. Keeping these aspects in view, having noted that the appellant had failed to adhere to the terms indicated in the LOI dated 19.01.2010 and the payment required thereunder not being made even within the extended period, the Board of Directors of UAHCL were justified in deciding to terminate the LOI through their letter dated 10.12.2013. In fact, the prayer no. 3 seeking calculation of interest on the amount deposited and such amount is being sought to be adjusted towards the balance payments would in itself indicate that even to the knowledge of the appellant, the entire payments had not been made even as on the date of the filing the writ petition. In such circumstance, when the LOI has been rightly terminated, the directions sought in the writ petition to execute the lease agreement pertaining to 'Hotel Nilanchal Ashok', Puri does not arise and the prayers in that regard are liable to be rejected.\n19. Having arrived at the above conclusion, the next aspect which would engage our attention is as to the manner in which the amount paid by the appellant is to be treated. The learned counsel for UAHCL would contend that the LOI provides that the onetime upfront amount to be paid is non-refundable, in that view, it is contended that the said amount is not liable to be refunded. Even otherwise due to the delay caused by the appellant and having obtained the status-quo order from the court by litigating with regard to the subject matter UAHCL have been prevented from otherwise utilising the property which has caused loss to them and the said amount would be adjustable towards the same is his contention.\n20. On taking note of the contention, a close perusal of the phrase employed in the LOI would indicate the one time payment made upfront is shown as \"non refundable\" and such payment is towards execution of the Operating Lease Agreement. If that be the position, the terms of LOI is clear that the said payment is towards the lease rentals and is the upfront payment which becomes a part of the lease transaction and therefore not refundable only if the lease agreement comes into operation and not otherwise. The word employed is not \"forfeiture\", therefore, the amount payable towards the advance lease rentals and the other advance payments provided in clause 2 of the LOI, cannot be forfeited if there is default in complying with the term and entering into the lease agreement, going by the stipulations contained in the LOI governing the parties herein. That apart, as noted, the amount was required to be paid, latest by the extended date i.e., 15.10.2010. The very termination of the LOI is for the reason that the entire payment was not made even within the timeframe. The cause for termination of LOI occurred on 15.10.2010. Hence the amount paid on 28.12.2010 (Rs.2 crores), 29.12.2010 (Rs.1.41crores) and 7.01.2011 (Rs. 70 lakhs) being clearly made after the said date in any event cannot be retained by UAHCL as otherwise it will amount to unjust enrichment. Therefore, it is liable to be refunded. Even with regard to the amount of Rs.4.41 crores which was paid on 07.02.2010, since we have held that the same cannot be forfeited it is an amount which will be available for accounting. In a normal circumstance, a direction was required to be issued to refund the said amount also.\n21. However, as noted it is the contention on behalf of UAHCL that due to the conduct of the appellant in not paying the amount within time and completing the lease agreement formalities and thereafter involving UAHCL in litigation and taking benefit of the status quo order, UAHCL was unable to utilise the property but on the other hand had to incur expenses. On this aspect, prima facie it is seen that the lease transaction ought to have been entered into before 19.02.2010. It is on account of the difficulty expressed by the appellant, the time for payment of upfront amount was extended ultimately up to 15.12.2010, in which process itself more than 10 months had elapsed. Soon thereafter the appellant had filed the writ petition before the High Court and the matter has been pending before one forum or the other for nearly a decade during which time the property could not be utilised nor expenses could be frozen. Even if that be so, it would not be appropriate for this Court to hazard a guess with regard to the actual loss that would have been suffered by UAHCL. At the same time, when this prima facie aspect is noticed it would also not be appropriate for this Court to direct UAHCL to refund the amount to the extent of Rs.4.41 crore which was paid within the timeframe and allow UAHCL to thereafter initiate recovery process. On the other hand, it would be in the interest of justice to permit UAHCL to retain the amount and grant liberty to the appellant to file an appropriately constituted civil suit seeking recovery of the said amount. In the said proceedings it would be open for UAHCL to put forth the contention to set off the amount towards the loss suffered by them or to seek for counter claim if any further amount is due. In such proceedings it would be open for the competent civil court to independently consider that aspect of the matter on its own merits for which we have not expressed any opinion on merits relating to that aspect. Even with regard to the claim of interest, if any, by the appellant that aspect is also kept open to be adjudicated in the civil suit. The pendency of the suit shall not be an impediment for UAHCL to deal with the property or to retender the same in any manner.\n22. In the light of the above we pass the following order:- (i) The order dated 09.03.2017 passed by High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in W.P. (C) No.23103/2013 stands modified. (ii) In that view, the prayer of the appellant to quash the letter dated 10.12.2013 terminating the letter of LOI dated 19.01.2010 stands rejected. Consequently, the termination of LOI dated 19.01.2010 is upheld. However, UAHCL is directed to refund the amounts deposited by the appellant on 28.12.2010 (Rs.2 crores), on 29.12.2010 (Rs.1.41 crores) and on 07.01.2011 (Rs.70 lakhs), in all amounting to Rs.4.11 crores within four weeks from this day. (iii) The appellant is reserved liberty to file a civil suit for recovery of Rs.4.41 crores paid to UAHCL on 17.02.2010 subject to the observations made above and all contentions of the parties in that regard are left open. (iv) In view of the above conclusions and disposal of the appeal, the amount of Rs.3 crores deposited by the appellant before this Court, which is kept in fixed deposit shall be refunded to the appellant with accrued interest thereon. (v) The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. (vi) Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.",
+      "case_record": "The dispute concerns two cheques, for Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000, which were dishonoured and returned unpaid on 20 November 2015. The appellant received the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. A legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015. After failing to obtain proof of service from the postal department, a second legal notice was issued on 26 February 2016, which was replied to on 2 March 2016. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed on 11 May 2016. The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) condoned the delay in filing the complaint and took cognizance. The Sessions Judge rejected the second respondent's revision petition. The High Court, however, quashed the cognizance order, holding that the complaint was not filed within the statutory period. The appellant argued that successive notices are permissible and that the delay was condoned under Section 142. The respondent argued that the second notice was issued beyond the thirty-day period from the dishonour memo, and the complaint was filed beyond the period from the first notice, and that the CJM had only condoned delay after a specific date.",
+      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The dispute involves two cheques that were dishonoured and returned unpaid on 20 November 2015.\n2. The appellant received the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015.\n3. A legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015, but due to failure in obtaining proof of service, a second legal notice was issued on 26 February 2016.\n4. The second legal notice was replied to on 2 March 2016.\n5. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed on 11 May 2016.\n6. The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) condoned the delay in filing the complaint and took cognizance.\n7. The Sessions Judge rejected the second respondent's revision petition.\n8. The High Court quashed the cognizance order, holding that the complaint was not filed within the statutory period.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether successive legal notices are permissible under the Negotiable Instruments Act.\n2. Whether the delay in filing the complaint was properly condoned under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.\n3. Whether the complaint was filed within the statutory period from the date of receipt of the memo of dishonour or from the date of the last legal notice.\n\n### Rules:\n1. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, prescribes the conditions under which a complaint can be filed for dishonour of cheques.\n2. Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides for the conditions and procedure for filing a complaint, including the timeframe within which it must be filed.\n3. The statutory period for filing a complaint under Section 138 is within one month from the date of receipt of the memo of dishonour or within one month from the date of the last legal notice, if such notice is sent.\n4. The principle that successive notices can be issued if the previous notice was not properly served, as long as the statutory period for filing the complaint is adhered to.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. Referring to **Fact 3** and **Rule 4**, the appellant's action of issuing a second legal notice after failing to obtain proof of service for the first notice seems justified, as the intention was to ensure proper service.\n2. Considering **Issue 2** and **Rule 2**, the CJM's decision to condone the delay under Section 142 is crucial. However, the High Court's decision to quash the cognizance order suggests that the delay was not properly condoned in accordance with the statutory requirements.\n3. Examining **Fact 5** and **Rule 3**, the complaint was filed on 11 May 2016, which is beyond the one-month period from the receipt of the memo of dishonour (**Fact 2**) and also beyond the one-month period from the second legal notice (**Fact 3**).\n4. Given **Issue 1** and **Rule 4**, the permissibility of successive notices does not directly address the issue of the complaint being filed beyond the statutory period.\n5. The appellant's argument that successive notices are permissible and the delay was condoned under Section 142 needs to be evaluated against the specific timelines and the High Court's reasoning for quashing the cognizance order.\n\n### Conclusion:\nBased on the analysis, the critical issue is whether the complaint was filed within the statutory period, considering the receipt of the memo of dishonour and the issuance of successive legal notices. The High Court's decision to quash the cognizance order due to the complaint not being filed within the statutory period is supported by the facts and the applicable rules. Therefore, the appeal should be **DISMISSED**.",
+      "reference_judgment": "1. Delay condoned.\n2. Leave granted.\n3. This appeal arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 10 May 2018 by which an order taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 18881has been quashed. 1 \" Act\"\n4. The facts, briefly stated, are thus:\n5. The dispute arises over two cheques drawn on the State Bank of India in the amount of Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000 which were returned unpaid under a memo issued by the UCO Bank, Begusarai on 20 November 2015. The appellant received the memo on 4 December 2015. Following this, a legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015 intimating the dishonour of the cheque. According to the appellant, between 14 February 2016 and 23 February 2016, he made queries with the postal department but no proof of service was provided. Accordingly, on 26 February 2016, a second legal notice was issued. This was replied to by the second respondent on 2 March 2016. Eventually, a complaint under Section 138 was instituted on 11 May 2016. 6 The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai by an order dated 14 July 2016, condoned the delay in filing the complaint. While taking cognizance, the CJM issued summons to the second respondent. The second respondent instituted revisional proceedings before the Sessions Judge which were rejected on 8 March 2017. In a further recourse to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, the learned Single Judge held that the complaint under Section 138 was not filed within the statutory period of thirty days prescribed under Section 138 as a result of which the proceedings were quashed.\n7. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, Mr Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Counsel submitted that in MSR Leathers v. S Palaniappan2a three judge Bench of this Court has taken the view that the issuance of successive notices is permissible under the provisions of Section 138 having regard to the object of the legislation. Moreover, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the delay in the institution of the complaint was condoned by the CJM under Section 142. Hence, there was an error on the part of the High Court in quashing the proceedings. 2 (2013) 1 SCC 177\n8. On the other hand, Mr Jay Savla, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent submitted that: (i) The second legal notice dated 26 February 2016 was sent beyond a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015 and hence cannot be the basis of a valid institution of a criminal complaint; (ii) If at all, the complaint could have only been instituted on the basis of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015 which was within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour; (iii) The complaint which was lodged on 11 May 2016 was beyond the stipulated period from the date of issuance of the first notice; (iv) The CJM had condoned the delay which had occurred in the institution of the complaint only for the period after 6 April 2016 after the issuance of the second notice; and (v) In the decision of the three judge Bench in MSR Leathers (supra), there was a re-presentation of the cheque as a result of which, a fresh notice was held to be within the ambit of the law. 9 Section 138 provides thus:\n\"138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. - Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for3[a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:\n3. Sub. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 7, for a \"term which may be extended to one year\" (w.e.f. 6-2-2003). Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months4from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;\n4. The period has been reduced from six months to three months vide R.B.I Notification No. RBI/2011-12/251, DBOD.AML BC. No. 47/14.01.001/2011-2012, dated 4th November, 2011 (w.e.f. 1-4-2012). (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,5[within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.\"\n10. In the present case, the facts narrated above indicate that the appellant issued a legal notice on 31 December 2015. This was within a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. Consequently, the requirement stipulated in proviso (b) to Section 138 was fulfilled. Proviso (c) spells out a requirement that the drawer of the cheque has failed to make payment to the holder in due course or payee within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. The second respondent does not as a matter of fact, admit that the legal notice dated 31 December 2015 was served on him. The appellant has in the complaint specifically narrated the circumstance that despite repeated requests to the postal department, no acknowledgment of the notice was furnished. It was in these circumstances that the appellant issued a second notice dated 26 February 2016. Cognizant as we are of the requirement specified in proviso (b) to Section 138, that the notice must be issued within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour, we have proceeded on the basis that it is the first notice dated 31 December 2015 which constitutes the cause of action for the complaint under Section 138.\n11. The complaint was instituted on 11 May 2016. Under Section 142(1), a complaint has to be instituted within one month of the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 1386. The proviso however stipulates that cognizance of the complaint may be taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. Both in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint, the appellant indicated adequate and sufficient reasons for not being able to institute the complaint within the stipulated period. These have been adverted to above. The CJM condoned the delay on the cause which was shown by the appellant for the period commencing from 6 April 2018. However, if paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint are read together, it is evident that the appellant had indicated sufficient cause for seeking condonation of the delay in the institution of the complaint. The High Court has merely adverted to the presumption that the first notice would be deemed to have been served if it was dispatched in the ordinary course. Even if that presumption applies, we are of the view that sufficient cause was shown by the appellant for condoning the delay in instituting the complaint taking the basis of the complaint as the issuance of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015. 6 142 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138:[Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period];(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138..\n12. In the view which we have taken, we have come to the conclusion that the impugned judgment of the High Court is unsustainable. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The complaint shall accordingly stand restored to the file of the trial court.\n13. We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions which will be adjudicated upon during the trial. O R D E R Delay condoned. Leave granted. The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -363,26 +363,26 @@
     },
     "meta": {
       "sample_id": "S013",
-      "case_id": "3869",
+      "case_id": "1779",
       "experiment": "baseline_firac",
-      "model": "qwen3-8b-noreason",
-      "source_file": "S013__baseline_firac__qwen3-8b-noreason__3869.json",
+      "model": "llama-3.3-70b-instruct",
+      "source_file": "S013__baseline_firac__llama-3.3-70b-instruct__1779.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "04/10/2021",
+      "judgment_date": "08/05/2019",
       "machine_error_stage": "rules",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misinterpretation"
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification"
     }
   },
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 1961 of 2020 (Arising out of SLP (C) No 28165 of 2018) | Managing Director Chhattisgarh State Co-Operative Bank Maryadit v. Zila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit & Ors. | 04/03/2020",
-      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 1961 of 2020 (Arising out of SLP (C) No 28165 of 2018) | Managing Director Chhattisgarh State Co-Operative Bank Maryadit v. Zila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit & Ors.",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.18772 of 2014) | Rehan Ahmed (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Gulam Mohiuddin Khan | 22/04/2024",
+      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.18772 of 2014) | Rehan Ahmed (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Gulam Mohiuddin Khan",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The appellant, Chhattisgarh State Cooperative Bank, is the apex body of cooperative banks in Chhattisgarh. The first respondent is a District Central Cooperative Bank. The CEO of the first respondent was arrested for corruption and suspended. The appellant appointed the sixth respondent as the CEO of the first respondent on August 11, 2017, citing the ineligibility of the interim CEO and referencing Section 54(3) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960. The Board of Directors of the first respondent later approved the appointment of the seventh respondent as CEO. The first respondent challenged the appellant's appointment in the High Court. A Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, finding the appellant's appointment valid under Section 54(3). However, a Division Bench of the High Court set aside the Single Judge's order, holding that the appellant had no role in appointing the CEO after the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3), which vested this power with the Registrar in cases of failure by the bank. The 2016 amendment inserted clauses (a) and (b) into Section 54(3), specifying RBI eligibility criteria and allowing the Registrar to appoint an eligible officer if the bank fails to do so. Section 49-E(2) requires CEOs of Central Societies receiving state financial aid to be appointed from cadres maintained under Section 54. A notification from 1971 under Section 54(3) mandates Central Cooperative Banks to appoint officers from the Apex Society's cadre.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The appellant, Chhattisgarh State Cooperative Bank, is the apex body of cooperative banks in Chhattisgarh.\n2. The first respondent is a District Central Cooperative Bank.\n3. The CEO of the first respondent was arrested for corruption and suspended.\n4. The appellant appointed the sixth respondent as the CEO of the first respondent on August 11, 2017, citing the ineligibility of the interim CEO and referencing Section 54(3) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960.\n5. The Board of Directors of the first respondent later approved the appointment of the seventh respondent as CEO.\n6. The first respondent challenged the appellant's appointment in the High Court.\n7. A Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, finding the appellant's appointment valid under Section 54(3).\n8. However, a Division Bench of the High Court set aside the Single Judge's order, holding that the appellant had no role in appointing the CEO after the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3).\n9. The 2016 amendment to Section 54(3) vested the power to appoint a CEO in the Registrar in cases of the bank's failure to appoint an eligible officer.\n10. Section 49-E(2) requires CEOs of Central Societies receiving state financial aid to be appointed from cadres maintained under Section 54.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Did the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960, effectively vest the power to appoint a CEO in the Registrar, to the exclusion of the appellant's authority, in cases where the bank fails to appoint an eligible officer?\n2. Was the appointment of the sixth respondent as CEO by the appellant on August 11, 2017, valid under the provisions of Section 54(3) as amended in 2016, considering the circumstances of the first respondent's failure to appoint an eligible officer?\n3. Does Section 49-E(2) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960, apply to the appointment of the CEO of the first respondent, and if so, does it affect the validity of the appellant's appointment of the sixth respondent?\n4. Is the 1971 notification under Section 54(3), which mandates Central Cooperative Banks to appoint officers from the Apex Society's cadre, still in effect and applicable to the appointment of the CEO of the first respondent, and if so, does it override the provisions of the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3)?\n\n### Rules:\n1. Section 54(3) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960, as amended in 2016, vests the power to appoint a CEO in the Registrar if the bank fails to appoint an eligible officer.\n2. Section 49-E(2) of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960, requires CEOs of Central Societies receiving state financial aid to be appointed from cadres maintained under Section 54.\n3. The 1971 notification under Section 54(3) mandates Central Cooperative Banks to appoint officers from the Apex Society's cadre.\n4. The principles of statutory interpretation require considering the context, purpose, and plain language of statutory provisions.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. The key to resolving this appeal lies in the interpretation of the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3) and its impact on the appellant's authority to appoint a CEO (Refer to **Issue 1** and **Rule 1**).\n2. The Division Bench's decision to set aside the Single Judge's order was based on the understanding that the 2016 amendment vests the appointment power exclusively in the Registrar (Refer to **Fact 8** and **Issue 1**).\n3. The validity of the appellant's appointment of the sixth respondent hinges on whether the appointment complied with the amended Section 54(3) and other relevant provisions like Section 49-E(2) (Refer to **Issue 2** and **Rules 1** and **2**).\n4. The applicability of Section 49-E(2) to the appointment of the CEO of the first respondent is crucial, as it could affect the validity of the appellant's appointment (Refer to **Issue 3** and **Rule 2**).\n5. The 1971 notification's ongoing validity and applicability could potentially override the 2016 amendment, impacting the determination of the appellant's authority (Refer to **Issue 4** and **Rule 3**).\n6. Considering the legislative intent behind the 2016 amendment and the principles of statutory interpretation, it appears that the amendment aims to enhance regulatory oversight by vesting the appointment power in the Registrar (Refer to **Rule 4**).\n7. The appeal's maintainability is not in question, as the Division Bench's order is a final decision on the matter within the High Court's jurisdiction (Refer to **Fact 8**).\n\n### Conclusion:\nBased on the analysis of the facts, issues, and rules, it is clear that the 2016 amendment to Section 54(3) vests the power to appoint a CEO in the Registrar in cases of the bank's failure, potentially limiting the appellant's authority. The appointment of the sixth respondent by the appellant may not have been in compliance with the amended Section 54(3), considering the circumstances. Given the legislative intent and the principles of statutory interpretation, the Division Bench's decision to set aside the Single Judge's order and hold that the appellant had no role in appointing the CEO after the 2016 amendment is supported. Therefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.",
-      "reference_judgment": "1. This appeal has arisen from a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh dated 7 August 2018. Allowing a Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench set aside the judgment of a Single Judge dated 19 January 2018. The Division Bench held that the appointment made by the appellant on 11 August 2017 of the Chief Executive Officer of the first respondent bank and its subsequent ratification by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, were without the authority of law. Consequently, the decision of the appellant was held to be not binding on the first respondent.\n2. The appellant – Chhattisgarh State Cooperative Bank - is the apex body of cooperative banks in the State of Chhattisgarh. The first respondent is a District Central Cooperative Bank which is governed by the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act 1960.\n3. The CEO of the first respondent bank was arrested on 9 August 2017 by the Economic Offences Wing of the State of Chhattisgarh on charges of corruption, under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. Upon being produced before the designated Court, he was remanded to custody and placed under suspension from his office of the CEO.\n4. On 10 August 2017, the seventh respondent was appointed as an interim CEO by the Chairperson of the first respondent, pending a formal decision by the Board of Directors. On 11 August 2017, the appellant appointed the sixth respondent, who was discharging duties as a „Special Class Managing Director‟ at Raipur, as the CEO of the first respondent. The appellant purported to take this action as the first respondent had been appointed an interim CEO and the person appointed did not fulfill the eligibility criteria prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India. The appellant also sought to justify its action of appointing the sixth respondent as the CEO of the first respondent with reference to Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act.\n5. The sixth respondent was not given charge as the CEO of the first respondent on the ground that a meeting of the BoD was scheduled to be convened on 16 August 2017. On 16 August 2017, the BoD of the first respondent approved the appointment of the seventh respondent, who was initially serving as the interim CEO, as the CEO. The first respondent instituted a Writ Petition before the High Court of Chhattisgarh challenging the legality of the order dated 11 August 2017, by which the appellant had appointed the sixth respondent as the CEO. Essentially, the case of the first respondent is that the appointment of its CEO lies solely within its discretion and neither the appellant as the apex society nor the Registrar has the power to appoint a CEO. The BoD of the first respondent bank sought a clarification from the Registrar of Cooperative Societies on 17 August 2017 regarding the appointment of the sixth respondent as the CEO. By his communication dated 21 August 2017, the Registrar stated that the appointment made by the appellant of the sixth respondent was in accordance with law and that the order of appointment should be complied with.\n6. On 25 August 2017, the BoD of the first respondent resolved to accept the appointment of the sixth respondent and directed that the seventh respondent shall hand over charge of the post of the CEO to the sixth respondent.\n7. A learned Single Judge of the Chhattisgarh High Court by a judgment dated 19 January 2018 dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent holding that the appointment of the sixth respondent was in terms of the provisions of Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act and was legally sustainable. The Single Judge also noted that the appointment had been ratified by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and that the appointment had also been accepted at a meeting of the BoD of the first respondent.\n8. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the first respondent filed a Writ Appeal before the Division Bench, which was allowed by the impugned order dated 7 August 2018. The Division Bench held that under the amended provisions of Section 54(3), which were incorporated with effect from 14 December 2016, the appellant had no role in the appointment of the CEO. In the view of the Division Bench, the power to appoint a CEO could only be exercised by the Registrar upon the failure of the District Central Cooperative Bank to make an appointment within a specified time period. This, the Division Bench held, flows from clause (b) of Section 54(3). The Division Bench was of the view that there was no failure on the part of the first respondent in making an ad-interim arrangement, pending the meeting of the BoD on 16 August 2017 to appoint a regular CEO. The Division Bench found fault with the appellant for having stepped-in to fill a vacuum when none existed. Holding that this was a case of the usurpation of power by the Apex Body, the Division Bench held that the ratification of the appointment by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies was of no consequence. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was accordingly set aside.\n9. Before we note the rival submissions, it is necessary to advert to the relevant provisions of law, as applicable to the present dispute.\n10. Section 49-E of the 1960 Act deals with the appointment of a Managing Director and CEO, as its marginal notes indicates, “in certain circumstances”. Section 49-E provides as follows:\n<QUOTE>\n“49-E. Appointment of Managing Director and Chief Executive\nOfficer in certain circumstances.-\n(1)(a)   Notwithstanding    anything   contained    in this Act or\n         rules or byelaws made thereunder for any Apex\n         Society where the State Government has contributed\n         to its share capital or has given loans or financial\n         assistance or has guaranteed the repayment of loans\n         granted in any other form, there shall be a Managing\n         Director, not below the rank of a Class I Officer, who\n         shall be selected by a committee constituted at the\n         State level consisting of the Agriculture Production\n         Commissioner, Chairman of the Apex Society,\n         Registrar Co-operative Societies and one Director\n         nominated by the Board of Apex Society:”\n          Provided that if the committee fails to select the\n         Managing Director unanimously, the matter shall be\n         referred to the State Government whose decision\n         thereon shall be final.\n(b)      The Managing Director shall be ex-officio member of\n         the committee.\n(c)      The Managing Director shall be the Chief Executive\n         Officer of the society and shall perform such duties\n         and exercise such powers as may be prescribed.\n(2)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or the\n         Rules or byelaws made thereunder for every Central\n         society where the State Government has contributed\n         to its share capital or has given loans or financial\n         assistance or has guaranteed the repayment of loans,\n         debentures, or advances or has given grants in any\n         other form, there shall be a Managing Director or a\n         General Manager not below the rank of a Class II\n         Officer who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the\n         society and ex-officio member of the committee:\n(b) The Chief Executive Officer shall be appointed:\n         (i) from among the Officers of the cadre maintained\n         under Section 54 if such a cadre has been created;\n         (ii) in other cases with the prior approval of the\n         Registrar.\n(c)         The Chief Executive Officer shall perform such duties\n         and exercise such powers as may be prescribed.”\n</QUOTE>\n11. Sub-section (1) of Section 49-E deals with the appointment of the Managing Director and CEO of an Apex Society. The expression „Apex Society‟ is defined in Section 2(a-i) to mean\n<QUOTE>“a society whose principal object is to provide facilities for the operation of other societies affiliated to it and whose area of operation extends to the whole State…”</QUOTE>\nSub-section (2) deals with the appointment of a Managing Director or a General Manager who shall be the CEO of a Central Society. The expression „Central Society‟ is defined in Section 2(c-i) as follows:\n<QUOTE>““Central Society” means a Co-operative Land Development Bank or any other society whose area of operation is confined to a part of the State and which has as its principal object the promotion         of    the    principal       objects       and     the     provision        of facilities for the operation of same type of societies and for other societies affiliated to it and not less than five members of which are societies.”</QUOTE>\n12. Sub-section (1) applies to an Apex Society while sub-section (2) applies to a Central Society. Sub-section (2), with which we are concerned, applies to a Central Society to which the State Government has: (i) contributed the share capital; or (ii) granted loans or financial assistance; or (iii) guaranteed the repayment of loans, debentures, or advances; or (iv) given grants in any other form. Sub-section (2)(b) provides that the CEO of every Central Society shall be appointed from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, if such a cadre has been created and, in other cases, with the prior approval of the Registrar.\n13. Section 49-E(2)(b)(i) refers to the cadre of officers maintained under Section 54. Section 54 is in the following terms:\n<QUOTE>\n“54.    Appointment           of   Managers,          Secretaries        and      other\nofficers.-(1) No society shall appoint a Manager, Secretary,\nAccountant         or   other     paid     officer    unless      he    holds     such\nqualifications as may be prescribed.\n\n(2)   The     Apex     and     Central      Societies      shall    maintain      such\ncadres       of    officers     and      other      servants       as     the     State\nGovernment          may,     by    order,    direct    and     the    conditions      of\nservice     of   members        of such       cadre     shall    be   such     as    the\nRegistrar may, by order, determine.\n\n(3) The State Government may, by notification, specify the\nclass    of   societies      which     shall    employ       officers     from    such\ncadres maintained by the Apex or Central Societies under\nsub-section (2) as may be specified therein and it shall be\nobligatory on the part of such class of societies to accept and\nappoint such cadre officers on the cadre posts as and when\ndeputed by the Apex or Central Societies.”\n</QUOTE>\nSub-section (1) of Section 54 provides that a society shall not appoint a Manager, Secretary, Accountant or other paid officer unless the person holds such qualifications as are prescribed. Under sub-section (2), Apex and Central Societies have to maintain such cadres of officers and other servants as the State Government may, by order, direct. Under sub-section (3), the State Government is empowered to issue a notification specifying the class of societies which shall employ officers from the cadres maintained by the Apex or Central Societies. Sub-section (3) also makes it obligatory upon such class of societies to accept and appoint cadre officers on cadre posts, as and when they are deputed by the Apex or Central Societies.\n14. In exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 54, a notification was issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh (prior to its reorganisation) on 12 January 1971. The notification is extracted below:\n<QUOTE>\n“Notification No. 258-413-Fifteen-1.71 dated 12.01.1971\nBy exercising powers under sub-section 3 of section 54 of\nMadhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act 1960 (No. 17\nof 1961), The State Govt. vide this notification notifies that\nthe cooperative societies mentioned in column 3 of the\nschedule given below shall appoint officers from the cadre\nconstituted by the Apex Cooperative Society mentioned in\ncolumn 2 of the schedule given below in front of them as\nper their availability.\n\n\n                                                         SCHEDULE\n\nSl.             Name of Apex                        Name of Cooperative\n\nNo          Cooperative Society                               Society\n\n.\n\n(1)                     (2)                                      (3)\n\n 1       M.P. State Cooperative                  Central Cooperative Bank\n\n                       Bank Ltd.\n\n 2        Madhya Pradesh State                  Primary Cooperative Land\n\n         land Development Bank                        Development Bank\n\n 3        Madhya Pradesh State                      Primary Cooperative\n\n          Cooperative Marketing                   Marketing Societies and\n\n                   Federation                        Process Committee\n\n(Published in part-1 of Gazette of M.P. dated 19.02.1971)”\n</QUOTE>\n15. In terms of the above notification, it was stipulated that a cooperative society specified in column (3) of the Schedule shall appoint officers from the cadre constituted by the Apex Cooperative Societies mentioned in column (2) of the Schedule. The first entry in the Schedule specifies the Madhya Pradesh State Cooperative Bank Ltd. as the Apex Cooperative Society and the Central Cooperative Bank as the Cooperative Society. In other words, the Central Cooperative Bank is required to appoint officers from the cadre constituted by the State Cooperative Bank. This notification, it is not in dispute, applies to the State of Chhattisgarh.\n16. The provisions of Section 54(3) were amended by the Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act 2016, with effect from 14 December 2016. The following provisions were inserted at the end of Section 54(3):\n<QUOTE>\n“(a)       The      eligibility   criteria     to   hold     the    office    of   Chief\nExecutive Officer of any Co-operative Bank shall be as such\nas may be prescribed by the Reserve Bank in this regard.\n(b)        If the concerning Co-operative Bank fails to appoint\nthe Chief Executive Officer under the eligibility criteria within a\nspecified       period,     in   such     a   condition       the    Registrar       may\nappoint such eligible officer of the Bank.”\n</QUOTE>\n17. The present dispute has been occasioned by the insertion of clauses (a) and (b) in Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act by virtue of the Amending Act of 2016.\n18. The appellant has urged the following submissions:\n(i) The CEO of the first respondent (which is a District Central Cooperative Bank) is a paid officer whose appointment is regulated by Section 54(1), which mandates the appointment of only persons who possess the prescribed qualifications. The appointment which was made by the first respondent was of a person who did not fulfill the prescribed qualifications;\n(ii) Section 54(2) mandates the first appellant to maintain cadre of officers as the State Government may, by order, direct. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 54(3), the State Government issued a notification dated 12 January 1971 which stipulated that the Central Cooperative Bank must appoint officers from the cadre constituted by the State Cooperative Bank. By virtue of Section 54(3) and the notification dated 12 January 1971, the first respondent (as a District Central Cooperative Bank) is obligated to accept and appoint the officer deputed by the appellant (as the Apex Society) as the CEO. In the present case, the person who was appointed by the first respondent did not fulfill the prescribed eligibility criteria. Hence, the sixth respondent was appointed as CEO in exercise of the appellant‟s authority under Section 54(3) to make that appointment;\n(iii) Pursuant to Section 54(3), a notification was issued on 26 June 1971 under which all Central Cooperative Banks in the state were permitted to maintain cadres of officers from whom appointments to Village Cooperative Societies, including Large Sized Agricultural Credit Societies would be made. By another notification dated 26 June 1971 also under Section 54(3), Central Cooperative Banks were permitted to maintain cadres of employees from whom managers for rural cooperative societies would be appointed. Thus, all Central Cooperative Banks in the State of Chhattisgarh have to maintain a cadre of employees in terms of the above notifications dated 26 June 1971 and all Village Cooperative Societies including Large Sized Agricultural Credit Societies shall employ officers only from the said cadres;\n(iv) Sub-section (2) of Section 49-E specifically deals with the appointment of the Managing Director or a General Manager who shall be the CEO of Central Societies to which the State Government has made a contribution of share capital, furnished loans or granted financial assistance or any other grant. Sub-clause (b)(i) of sub-section (2) clearly stipulates that the CEO shall be appointed from among officers in the cadre constituted under Section 54;\n(v) Rule 3 of the Central Cooperative Bank Staff Services Rules 1982 stipulates that appointments to all posts classified as Class-I posts shall be made by the Apex Bank from the list of cadre officers maintained by it. The Bye-laws of the first respondent stipulate that appointments to the post of Managing Director/General Manager/Manager shall be from the cadre of officers maintained by the Apex Bank. If a cadre officer is not available due to unforeseen circumstances, a temporary appointment may be made by the first respondent with the prior permission of the appellant, subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed;\n(vi) The 2016 Amendment Act which amended Section 54(3) must be read together with other provisions and not independently. The amendment in sub-section (3) only deals with the eligibility criteria and is equally applicable to both the Apex Society and to any Central Society. Both the appellant and the first respondent are cooperative banks. The appellant is an Apex Society while the first respondent is a Central Society;\n(vii) Under sub-section (2) of Section 54, both Apex Societies and Central Societies have to maintain cadres of officers and other servants as the State Government may, by order, direct. Sub-section (3) makes it obligatory on the first respondent (which is a Central Society) to accept and appoint a cadre officer to a cadre post as and when deputed by the appellant (which is the Apex Society). It is only if the CEO is not appointed within a specified period, that the Registrar is empowered to appoint an eligible officer as the CEO.\n(viii) In the present case, the earlier CEO of the first respondent was arrested on a charge of corruption under the PC Act. The Chairperson of the first respondent appointed a Manager as an interim CEO, who was not from the cadre of officers maintained by the Apex Bank. Hence, the appellant in exercise of its powers under Section 54(3) read with the notification dated 12 January 1971, deputed the sixth respondent as CEO of the first respondent on 11 August 2017 which appointment, the first respondent was bound to accept. On a clarification sought by the BoD of the first respondent, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, by his reply dated 21 August 2017 observed that the appointment made by the appellant was in accordance with law. Consequently, the BoDs accepted the appointment of the sixth respondent at a meeting on 25 August 2017. The order deputing the sixth respondent as CEO was ratified by the Registrar and accepted by the BoD of the first respondent; and\n(ix) The learned Single Judge correctly dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent. The Division Bench allowed the Writ Appeal on an erroneous appreciation of the applicable legal regime. In the case of all Central Cooperative Banks in Chhattisgarh, the CEO is an officer drawn from the cadre maintained by the Apex Bank. This is in consonance with Sections 49-E and 54(3) of the 1960 Act and notifications issued from time to time. The consequence of the impugned decision would be to deprive the Apex Bank of its authority to monitor the affairs of Central Cooperative Societies. Financial control can be maintained through the power to appoint CEOs. Such a position was occasioned as huge amounts of public funds is at stake. The view of the Division Bench will have far-reaching repercussions in the cooperative set up and the beneficial purpose of the legislation would be defeated resulting in mismanagement and misappropriation of public funds.\n19. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent urged that:\n(i) Section 57-B of the 1960 Act was inserted by the Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act 2012. Sub-section (19) of Section 57-B provides that the CEO of State Cooperative Banks and Central Cooperative Banks shall be appointed by the members of the board of the State Cooperative Bank and the Central Cooperative Bank, as the case may be, from among a panel of names not exceeding three persons eligible to hold the office of CEO in accordance with the criteria stipulated by the RBI. The aforesaid panel was to be recommended by a selection board consisting of the following persons, all of whom shall be the members of the Board of the State Cooperative Bank or the Central Cooperative Bank, as the case may be:\na) The nominee of the State government on the board;\nb) The nominee of the National Bank on the board; and\nc) One other member of the board, whether elected or co-opted.\n(ii) Section 57-B of the 1960 Act was omitted by the 2016 Amendment Act and clauses (a) and (b) were inserted in sub-section (3) of Section 54 of the 1960 Act, whereby the power was given to the Cooperative Bank to appoint the CEO within a specified time period and in default, the Registrar is empowered to appoint such eligible officer of the bank as the CEO;\n(iii) The language of the 1960 Act indicates that the CEO of Cooperative Societies, be it a Primary Cooperative Society, Central Cooperative Society or State Cooperative Society, can be appointed by that Cooperative Society only. A plain reading of Section 54(3) (a) and (b) makes it crystal clear that the power to appoint a CEO lies with the Cooperative Society and not with the Apex Society. It is also clear from the reading of the provision that the CEO of the Cooperative Bank shall be appointed from the eligible officers of the said Cooperative Bank. This can also be inferred from the fact that the said power was earlier given under section 57-B of the 1960 Act but by the 2016 Amendment Act, Section 57- B was omitted and the provision of appointment was inserted in Section 54(3)(b);\n(iv) Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 49-E enumerates that a CEO shall be appointed from among the Officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, if such a cadre has been created. Section 54(1) provides that the <QUOTE>“no society shall appoint a Manager, Secretary, Accountant and other paid officer unless he holds such qualifications as may be prescribed”</QUOTE>. The word “Society” mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 54 includes Primary Cooperative Societies, Central Cooperative Societies and State Cooperative Societies, which means that every society shall appoint its Manager, Secretary, Accountant and other paid officers;\n(v) The notification dated 12 January 1971 issued by the State Government under Section 54(3) will be considered to be nullified by the 2012 Amendment Act and subsequently by the 2016 Amendment Act. The said notification is not applicable in appointing a CEO in view of the omission of Section 57-B of the 1960 Act and the subsequent insertion of Section 54(3)(a) and (b). The 1960 Act does not mention that the CEO of the Central Cooperative Bank shall be appointed by the State Cooperative Bank from the cadre officers of the State Cooperative Bank. What is not provided in the statute cannot be read into it. This is more so when the language of section 54(3)(b) is plain, clear and unambiguous that the Cooperative Society shall appoint the CEO;\n(vi) It is settled law that if the language of the statute is clear, plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, then no question of interpretation arises. The appellant cannot be permitted to add words in the statute to make it workable for it; and\n(vii) The action of the State Cooperative Bank in appointing the CEO of the Central Cooperative Bank is arbitrary and illegal as it is beyond the powers of the State Cooperative Bank under the 1960 Act.\n20. The rival submissions now fall for consideration.\n21. Section 54 contains provisions for the appointment of Managers, Secretaries and other officers of societies. Sub-section (1) stipulates that a Manager, Secretary, Accountant or other paid officer shall be appointed only if they possess the prescribed qualifications. A reading of the sub-section denotes that the power to make appointments vests with the society itself.\n22. Sub-section (2) of Section 54 casts an obligation upon Apex and Central Societies to maintain such cadre of officers as the State Government may, by order, direct. The Registrar is empowered to frame the conditions of service of the members of the cadre so constituted.\n23. Section 49-E of the 1960 Act deals specifically with the appointment of Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers in certain circumstances. The provision deals only with the appointment of the Managing Director and the CEO. It covers appointments “in certain circumstances,” which are specified therein. Sub-section (1) of Section 49-E deals with the appointment of the Managing Director of an Apex Society. Sub-section (2) deals with the appointment of the Managing Director (who shall be the CEO) of Central Societies. Section 49-E applies to a situation where the State Government has:\n(i) contributed to the share capital; or\n(ii) given loans or financial assistance; or\n(iii) guaranteed the repayment of loans, debentures or advances; or\n(iv) given grants in any other form.\nThe provisions of both sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 49-E begin with an overriding non-obstante stipulation. The provisions operate notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in the 1960 Act, rules thereunder or bye-laws of the society. Section 49-E thus carves out an exception to the power vested in societies to make appointments under Section 54(1). Sub-section (2)(a) stipulates that for every Central Society, there shall be a Managing Director not below the rank of a Class-II officer, who shall be the CEO of the society. Clause (b) of Section (2) stipulates that the CEO would be appointed from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, if such a cadre has been constituted and in all other cases, with the prior approval of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. Thus, for Central Societies which fall within the purview of Section 49-E(2), the source of appointment for the Managing Director or the General Manager (who shall be the CEO) must be from the officers drawn from the cadre constituted under Section 54, if such cadre has been constituted. In all other cases, the Central Society may appoint the Managing Director or General Manager with the prior approval of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies.\n24. A pre-requisite to bring a Central Society within the fold of Section 49-E(2) is that the State Government has contributed to its share capital, given loans or financial assistance, guaranteed the repayment of loans, debentures or advances or has given grants in any other form. Evidently, this provision has been introduced by the legislature as an effort to maintain regulatory control over Central Societies to whom financial assistance has been extended by the State Government in the terms set out in the provision. For this reason, where the society is a Central Society that satisfies the requirements of Section 49-E(2), the general power vested in it to appoint its CEO under Section 54(1) is limited to appointment from the cadres constituted and maintained under Section 54.\n25. Sub-section (3) of Section 54 empowers the State Government to specify, by notification, the class of societies which shall employ officers from cadres maintained by Apex or Central Societies as specified therein. The provision stipulates that upon the issuance of such notification, it shall be obligatory for the class of societies notified therein to accept and appoint such cadre officers on cadre posts as and when deputed by the Apex or Central Society, as the case may be. Upon the issuance of a notification under Section 54(3), an exception is carved to the power of appointment conferred upon the notified class of societies under Section 54(1). Where a class of societies has been notified by the State Government to employ officers from cadres constituted by the Apex or Central Society, the power of appointment vests with the Apex or Central Society, as specified in the notification. The notified class of societies is under an obligation to accept and appoint cadre officers deputed to cadre posts by the Apex or Central Society, as the case may be.\n26. The present dispute has arisen by virtue of the 2016 Amending Act which inserted clauses (a) and (b) in Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act. Clause (a) of sub-section (3) stipulates that the eligibility criteria for the post of CEO of a Cooperative Bank are those prescribed by the RBI in this regard. Clause (b) stipulates that if the concerned Cooperative Bank fails to appoint a CEO under the eligibility criteria within a specified period, the Registrar may appoint an eligible officer of the Bank. The submission of the first respondent, which has found acceptance with the Division Bench of the High Court, is that as a result of the amendment which was made in 2016, the exclusive jurisdiction to appoint a CEO of a Cooperative Bank vests with the Bank itself. However, according to the submission, the CEO must fulfill the eligibility criteria prescribed by the RBI. Moreover, it is only where the Cooperative Bank fails to appoint an eligible CEO within a specified period, that clause (b) of Section 54(3) empowers the Registrar of Cooperative Societies to appoint an eligible officer of the bank.\n27. In the submission of the first respondent, clauses (a) and (b) are special provisions enacted for Cooperative Banks and are intended to have an overriding effect over: (i) the power of the State Government to issue a notification in exercise of its powers under Section 54(3); and (ii) Section 49-E(2) which mandates that Central Societies shall appoint their CEOs from the cadre constituted under Section 54. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3), it was contended, vests with Cooperative Banks the absolute power to appoint their CEOs, notwithstanding any other provision in the 1960 Act. The effect of the amended provision may be considered in two parts: first, its effect on the power of the State Government to issue a notification in pursuance of the power conferred upon it under Section 54(3); and second, its effect on Section 49-E(2).\n28. By virtue of the 2012 Amendment Act, Section 57-B was introduced as a new Chapter V-A with provisions for short term Co-operative Credit Structure Societies. The term „short term Co-operative Credit Structure Societies‟ was defined as including <QUOTE>“the State Co-operative Bank, a Central Co-operative Bank and a Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society”</QUOTE>. Section 57-B(19) stipulated that the Chief Executive Officer of the State Co-operative Bank and a Central Co-operative Bank, shall be appointed by the members of the Board of the State Co-operative Bank or the Central Co-operative Bank, as the case may be. The appointment was to be made from a panel of names eligible to hold the post in accordance with the criteria stipulated by the RBI. The constitution of the Selection Board was also set out in sub-section (19). By virtue of this provision, an exception was carved out for the appointment of the CEO of Central Co-operative Banks and State Co-operative Banks, subject to the conditions prescribed therein.\n29. By the 2016 Amendment Act, Section 57-B was deleted and clauses (a) and (b) were inserted in Section 54(3). Significantly, sub-section (3) of Section 54 is not confined only to Cooperative Banks. Section 54(3) empowers the State Government to specify, by notification, the class of societies which shall employ officers from cadres maintained by Apex or Central Societies. The term „class of societies‟ employed in Section 54(3) includes any type of society covered by the provisions of the 1960 Act, including Cooperative Banks (as resource societies). This view is strengthened by Section 10 of the 1960 Act which mandates that the Registrar of Cooperative Societies shall classify all societies under one or more of the following heads:\n(i) Consumer Society;\n(ii) Farming Society;\n(iii) Housing Society;\n(iv) Marketing Society;\n(v) Multipurpose Society;\n(vi) Producer‟s Society;\n(vii) Processing Society;\n(viii) Resource Society;\n(ix) General Society; and\n(x) Industrial Society.\nSection 10 also empowers the Registrar to further classify societies falling under any of the above classifications into:\n(i) Apex Society;\n(ii) Central Society; and\n(iii) Primary Society.\n30. The 1960 Act covers a myriad of societies under its ambit. Though the term „class of societies‟ includes within its ambit Cooperative Banks, the learned counsel for the first respondent has contended that clause (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) were intended to carve out Cooperative Banks from the enabling power conferred upon the State Government and vest with them the exclusive power to appoint their CEOs. It was been urged that were this Court to hold that there is an obligation upon a Cooperative Bank, as a notified society under Section 54(3), to accept from the Apex or Central Society as specified in the notification a deputed cadre officer as its CEO, clauses (a) and (b) would be rendered otiose.\n31. It is a settled principle of law that where two provisions of an enactment appear to conflict, courts must adopt an interpretation which harmonises, to the best extent possible, both provisions. Justice G P Singh in his seminal work Principles of Statutory Interpretation states:\n<QUOTE>\n“To harmonise is not to destroy. A familiar approach in all such cases is to find out which of the two apparently conflicting provisions in more general and which is more specific and to construe the more general one as to exclude the more specific…The principle is expressed in the maxims Generalia     specialibus    non    derogant    and    Generalibus specialia.”\n</QUOTE>\nSimilarly, Craies in Statute Law states:\n<QUOTE>\n“The rule is, that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply.”\n</QUOTE>\nWhere two provisions conflict, courts may enquire which of the two provisions is specific in nature and whether it was intended that the specific provision is carved out from the application of the general provision. The general provision operates, save and except in situations covered by the specific provision. The rationale behind this principle of statutory construction is that were there appears a conflict between two provisions, it must be presumed that the legislature did not intend a conflict and a subject-specific provision governs those situations in exclusion to the operation of the general provision.\n32. In an early decision of this Court in JK Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co Ltd v State of Uttar Pradesh, a three judge Bench of this Court considered whether the principle applied to conflicts within the same enactment. Clause 5(a) of the Government Order dated 10 May 1948 conferred upon, inter alia, any employee or a registered trade union of employers the right to move the Board constituted under the Order to initiate an enquiry into an industrial dispute. Clause 23 stipulated that where an enquiry is pending before the Regional Conciliation Officer, notwithstanding the pendency of a case before the Board or Industrial Court, no employer shall discharge or dismiss any workman. Under Clause 24, an order of the Board, unless modified in appeal, was final and conclusive. The appellant, representing the employer‟s union, contended that once an order is made under Clause 5(a), Clause 23 has no application and the employer may proceed to dismiss the workmen. The Court rejected the contention noting that any employer could defeat the provisions of Clause 23 merely by an application under Clause 5(a). The Court held that Clause 23 was made with a definite purpose. Consequently, where an enquiry was pending under Clause 23, an application under Clause 5(a) was barred. The Court held:\n<QUOTE>\n“9…We        reach     the    same      result    by    applying      another      well- known rule of construction that general provisions yield to special provisions. The learned Attorney-General seemed to suggest that while this rule of construction is applicable to resolve the conflict between the general provision in one Act and the special provision in another Act, the rule cannot apply in resolving a conflict between general and special provisions in the same legislative instrument. This suggestion does not find support in either principle or authority. The rule that      general        provisions          should         yield      to     specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and Judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect.\n\n10. Applying this rule of construction that in cases of conflict between a specific provision and a general provision the specific provision prevails over the general provision and the general provision applies only to such cases which are not covered by the special provision, we must hold that clause 5(a) has no application in a case where the special provisions of clause 23 are applicable.”\n</QUOTE>\nThis Court affirmed that the principle that the general excludes the specific is a tool of statutory interpretation even in cases of conflict within the same enactment. Where one of the conflicting provisions is general in nature and the other is specific, „common understanding‟ dictates that the specific provision is given effect, while the general provision continues to apply to all other situations.\n33. In Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v M/s Binani Cements Ltd., the question concerned whether the respondent-assessee was entitled for the grant of an eligibility certificate for exemption from payment of Central Sales Tax and Rajasthan Sales Tax under Entry 4 in Annexure „C‟ of the Sales Tax New Incentive Scheme for Industries, 1989. Annexure „C‟ to the Scheme was titled the „Quantum of Sales Tax Exemption under the new Scheme‟. Entry 4 of the Annexure stipulated that ���Prestigious Units‟ would be entitled to a 75% exemption from tax liability with 100% in terms of Fixed Capital Investment. By an amendment, Entry 1E was inserted which covered „new cement units‟ and stipulated that large-scale units would be entitled 25% tax exemption. A two judge Bench of this Court held:\n<QUOTE>\n“27. Before we deal with the fact situation in the present appeal, we reiterate the settled legal position in law, that is, if in a Statutory Rule or Statutory Notification, there are two expressions used, one in General Terms and the other in special words, under the rules of interpretation, it has to be understood that the special words were not meant to be included in the general expression. Alternatively, it can be said that where a Statute contains both a General Provision as well as specific provision, the later must prevail.\n\n29…It is well established that when a general law and a special law dealing with some aspect dealt with by the general law are in question, the rule adopted and applied is one of harmonious construction whereby the general law, to the extent dealt with by the special law, is impliedly repealed. This principle finds its origins in the latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant...”\n</QUOTE>\nThe Court held that where two provisions are in question – one of general application and the other specific in nature, a harmonious interpretation would mean that the general law, to the extent it is dealt with by the special law, is impliedly repealed. This Court, relying on the principle generalia specialibus non derogant held that Item 1E is a “subject specific provision”. The Court noted that the amendment removed “new cement industries” from the non-eligible Annexure „B‟ and placed it into Annexure „C‟ amongst the eligible industries. Consequently, the Court rejected the contention of the respondent-assessee and held that as Item 1E concerned the more specific unit, it was excluded in its application from other general entries.\nThe principle that the general provision excludes the more specific has been consistently applied by this Court in South Indian Corporation (P) Ltd. v Secretary, Board of Revenue, Paradip Port Trust v Their Workmen, Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Education v Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth, CCE v Jayant Oil Mills, P S Sathappan v Andhra Bank Ltd, Sarabjit Rick Singh v Union of India and Pankajakshi v Chandrika.\n34. While sub-section (3) of Section 54(3) deals with a class of societies, clauses (a) and (b), as inserted by the 2016 Amendment Act are specific in their application to only Cooperative Banks. Furthermore, while Section 54(3) deals with the appointment of deputed cadre officers on cadre posts, clauses (a) and (b) deal only with the appointment of the CEOs of Cooperative Banks. Clause (a) contemplates that the eligibility guidelines prescribed by the RBI will apply to officers holding the post of the CEO of a Cooperative Bank. Significantly, clause (b) of Section 54(3) beings with the words “if the concerning co-operative Bank fails to appoint” which denotes an intention to vest with Cooperative Banks the power to appoint their CEO. The provision also stipulates that where the Cooperative Bank fails to appoint the CEO within a specified period, the Registrar may appoint an eligible officer of the bank. The stipulation that in the case of default, the CEO shall be an officer of the bank and not an officer from the cadre as notified under Section 54(3) demonstrates the intention of the legislature to vest with Cooperative Banks the power to appoint their CEO.\n35. Evidently, by virtue of the 2016 Amendment Act, clauses (a) and (b) were inserted as specific provisions for the appointment of the CEO of Cooperative Banks, vesting in them the power of appointment. Where two interpretations of potentially conflicting provisions are possible, courts must adopt the interpretation that furthers the intention of the legislature as encapsulated in the maxim Verba ita sunt intelligenda ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Craies on Legislation states:\n<QUOTE>\n“…if two constructions of a provision are possible on its face, and one would clearly advance the legislative purpose and the other would clearly achieve little or nothing, the former is to be preferred.”\n</QUOTE>\n36. In this view of the matter, a harmonious construction of Section 54(3) and clauses (a) and (b) of the 2016 Amendment Act leads to the conclusion that clauses (a) and (b) are special provisions concerning the appointment of the CEO of Cooperative Banks which are carved out of power of the State Government to issue a notification under Section 54(3). We are strengthened in this view by the deletion of Section 57-B(19) and the simultaneous insertion of clauses (a) and (b) in Section 54(3).\n37. The difficulty in the present matters arises from the contention of the first respondent that the exception carved out by clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) also applies to Central Societies that fall within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) of the 1960 Act. In this submission, where a Cooperative Bank as a Central Society has received funds from the State Government in the manner stipulated in Section 49-E(2), such Central Banks may independently appoint a CEO and would not be obligated to appoint its CEO from the cadre constituted under Section 54, even if such cadre has been constituted.\n38. As we have noted, both sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 54 are not provisions confined only to Cooperative Banks. However, clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) specifically deal with the appointment of CEOs of Cooperative Banks. While introducing clauses (a) and (b) into sub-section (3) of Section 54 by the 2016 Amendment Act, the legislature has nonetheless left intact the provisions of Section 49-E. Section 49-E(2) stipulates that the CEO shall be appointed from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, where such cadre has been constituted. Section 49-E is a provision governing Apex and Central Societies to whom financial assistance has been extended by the State Government in the forms stipulated therein. The expression “Central Society” is defined to mean a Cooperative Land Development Bank or any other society whose operation is confined to a part of the State, as noticed earlier in Section (2)(c-i). The provisions contained in Section 49-E are intended to bring about regulatory control of the State Government by requiring the appointment of the CEO from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54. The 2016 Amendment Act which brought in the provision of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) has not affected the operation of Section 49-E. Hence, the appointment of a CEO of Central Society governed by Section 49-E(2) has to be from the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54. Significantly, sub-section (2) of Section 49-E contains a non- obstante stipulation. As a consequence, notwithstanding the 2016 Amendment Act, the CEO of a Central Society falling within the description of sub-section (2) of Section 49-E has to be appointed from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, if such cadre has been constituted.\n39. It is necessary here to note that Section 49-E(2) is not a self-contained provision. Section 49-E(2)(b)(i) merely stipulates that the CEO of a Central Society that falls within its ambit, shall be appointed from among the officers of the cadres maintained under Section 54.  Thus, where a cadre under Section 54 has been constituted, a Central Society falling within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) is obligated to appoint its officer from such cadre. Neither Section 49-E nor Section 54(2) specify whether the appointment is to be made from the cadre of the Apex Society or Central Society as constituted under Section 54(2). Section 54(3) empowers the State Government to issue a notification specifying the class of societies which shall employ officers from such cadres maintained by Apex or Central Societies as may be specified therein. In addition to conferring upon the State Government the general power to notify the class of societies which would employ officers from the cadres maintained by Apex or Central Societies, the notification under Section 54(3) operationalizes the regulatory control of the State Government envisaged in Section 49-E(2) in the manner specified therein.\n40. This is evident in the notification dated 12 January 1971 issued by the State Government in exercise of the power conferred upon it which stipulated that the first respondent (as a District Central Cooperative Bank) is obligated to accept and appoint the officer deputed by the appellant (as the Apex Society) as the CEO. Had Section 49-E(2) an inbuilt mechanism for the determination of the officer who would be appointed as the CEO, no difficulty would arise given the use of a non-obstante provision therein. The difficulty arises precisely because of the link between Section 49-E and the notification issued by the State Government under Section 54(3). To hold that clauses (a) and (b) vest in Cooperative Banks which are Central Societies falling within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) the overriding power to appoint their CEO would render the provision inoperative. This would defeat the salient purpose of ensuring the regulatory control of the State Government over Societies to which it has made a financial contribution. On the other hand, to hold that a Cooperative Bank which is a Central Society within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) must accept and appoint the cadre officer deputed by the Apex Society, defeats the special provision inserted for Cooperative Banks in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3). Both Section 49- E(2)(b) and clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) deal with the appointment of a CEO.\n41. As we have noted before, it is settled principal of law that where two provisions of an enactment appear to conflict, courts must adopt an interpretation which harmonises, to the best extent possible, both provisions. Justice G P Singh in his seminal work Principles of Statutory Interpretation states:\n<QUOTE>\n“���It is the duty of the court to avoid “a head on clash” between two sections of the same Act and, “whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise.”\n</QUOTE>\nFrancis Benion in his work Statutory Interpretation states:\n<QUOTE>\n“Inconsistent   enactments    –  A   common     application  of  the principle is in relation to contradictory enactments within the same     Act.  Enactment     A   may    in  itself be clear and unambiguous. So may enactment B, located elsewhere in the Act. But if they contradict each other, they cannot both be applied literally. A undoes B, and B undoes A. The court must do the best it can to reconcile them, but this can be achieved only by giving one or both a strained construction.”\n</QUOTE>\nWhere two provisions of an enactment appear to be in conflict, courts do not readily presume an „either/or‟ situation. Courts must construe the provisions harmoniously to ensure, as far as possible, the effective operation of both provisions in a manner that furthers the purpose of the enactment. Every provision, phrase, clause and word must be interpreted in a manner to further the object of the enactment. No word or part of a statute can be construed in isolation. Courts must be mindful that an interpretation which renders either provision otiose must be avoided unless the conflict does not yield any possible reconciliation.\n42. In Krishan Kumar v State of Rajasthan, the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur proposed a scheme in 1977 under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 for the exclusive operation of the disputed road. Upon the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, a Writ Petition was filed contending that due to undue delay in notifying the scheme under 1939 Act, the scheme was not saved by the 1988 Act. Section 100(4) of the 1988 Act stipulated that a draft scheme must be finalized within one year from the date of its publication, failing which it would lapse. Section 217(2)(e) stipulated that notwithstanding the repeal of the 1939 Act, a scheme proposed under Section 68-C, if pending immediately before the commencement of the 1988 Act, shall be finalised in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of the 1988 Act. The Court noted that, contrary to legislative intent, no scheme under the 1939 Act would be saved if schemes under that Act were to be assessed with reference to the date of their publication.  Noting the apparent conflict between the two provisions, a two judge Bench of this Court interpreted both provisions harmoniously and held:\n<QUOTE>\n“10. There appears to be some apparent conflict between Section 100(4) and Section 217(2)(e) of the Act. While Section 217(2)(e)             permits       finalisation      of    a   scheme         in accordance with Section 100 of the new Act sub-section (4) of Section 100 lays down that a scheme if not finalised within a period of one year shall be deemed to have lapsed. If the appellant's contention is accepted then Section 217(2)(e) will become nugatory and no scheme published under Section 68-C of the old Act could be finalised under the new Act. On the other hand if the period of one year as prescribed under Section 100(4) is not computed from the date of publication of the scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act and instead the period      of    one      year     is    computed         from      the     date     of commencement of the Act both the provisions could be given full effect.\n\n11. It is settled principle of interpretation that where there appears to be inconsistency in two sections of the same Act, the principle of harmonious construction should be followed in avoiding a head on clash. It should not be lightly assumed that what the Parliament has given with one hand, it took away with the other. The provisions of one section of statute cannot      be    used     to   defeat     those     of   another      unless      it  is impossible to reconcile the same.”\n</QUOTE>\nThe Court held that where the Parliament confers a benefit, it must not be readily assumed that it intends to withdraw a benefit at the same time. Furthermore, the provisions of one section cannot be used to defeat another, unless there is no possibility of reconciling the two conflicting provisions.\n43. In British Airways Plc v Union Of India, the appellant was an aircraft carrier engaged in the business of international air transport of passengers and cargo. It was contended that as they were not a “person-in-charge” as defined in Section 2(31) of the Customs Act 1962, no penalty can be imposed upon them under Section 116 for shortages in offloading the quantity of goods consigned. Section 42 required an officer under the Act to issue a written order for the conveyance of the goods from the customs house. Clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 42 prescribes that no such order shall be given until the person-in-charge of the conveyance has satisfied the proper officer that no penalty is leviable on them under Section 116 or the payment of any penalty that may be levied upon them under that section has been secured by such guarantee or deposit of such amount as the proper officer may direct. The appellant contended that once a clearance order is issued, no liability can be imposed on them.\n44. A two judge Bench of this Court noted held that while Section 42 operated to expedite the clearance of goods, Section 116 operated to ensure the protection of cargo. Consequently, the two provisions subserved different purposes. Further, by an amendment in Section 148 which was a provision for the liability of an agent of the person in charge, sub-section (2) was inserted which stipulated that any person who represents himself to any officer of customs as an agent of any such person-in-charge, and is accepted as such by that officer, shall be liable for the fulfillment of any obligation of the person-in-charge. The Court held that effect must be given to the amendment, which would be rendered redundant if the contention of the appellant was accepted. Relying on the principle of harmonious interpretation, the Court held:\n<QUOTE>\n“It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing the different provisions so that each provision will have its play and in the event of any conflict a harmonious construction should be given. The well- known principle of harmonious construction is that effect shall be given to all the provisions and for that any provision of the statute      should       be    construed        with     reference        to   the    other provisions so as to make it workable. A particular provision cannot be picked up and interpreted to defeat another provision made in that behalf under the statute. It is the duty of the court to make such construction of a statute which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.”\n</QUOTE>\nThis Court held that courts must ensure that every provision is construed in a manner to render seemingly contradictory provisions workable. In interpreting two provisions of a statute, courts must adopt the interpretation which does not defeat either provision and advances the remedy envisaged by their enactment.\n45. In this view, this Court must ensure that neither provision – Section 49-E(2) nor Sections 54(3)(a) and (b) is reduced to a dead letter of law. It cannot be said that the carving out of Cooperative Banks for the appointment of their CEO from the enabling power conferred upon the State Government under Section 54(3) applies in equal measure to those Cooperative Banks that are Central Societies within the ambit of Section 49-E(2). We hold that the State Government is empowered to issue a notification under Section 54(3) for Cooperative Banks which are Central Societies falling within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) specifying that the Cooperative Bank shall appoint its CEO from the cadre constituted by the Apex Society. At the same time, to ensure that clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) are given effect, the notified Apex Society shall forward to the concerned Cooperative Bank a panel of officers from which the it shall appoint its CEO, subject to the officer satisfying the eligibility criteria prescribed by the RBI.\n46. In the view which we have taken, the regulatory control of the State Government over Cooperative Banks which have received state funding in the manner specified in Section 49-E(2) is retained, which furthers the object of the provision. The High Court was in error in holding that in the matter of an appointment of the CEO, <QUOTE>“the Apex Body or the Central Society have no power or role to play”</QUOTE>. The decision of the High Court will have serious ramifications in terms of divesting the regulatory control over the affairs of Central Societies. At the same time, conferring the power to the Cooperative Bank to appoint its CEO from a panel gives effect to the special provision inserted by virtue of clauses (a) and (b) in Section 54(3). This view is strengthened by virtue of the fact that prior to its deletion, Section 57-B(19) was a provision in Chapter VA of which sub-section (1) read thus:\n<QUOTE>\n“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or Rules framed there under or bylaws of any registered society or orders issued there under, the provisions of this chapter shall have overriding effect.”\n</QUOTE>\nSection 57-B(19), which was intended to have overriding effect, was deleted and clauses (a) and (b) were inserted in Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act. The absolute power conferred upon Cooperative Banks to appoint the CEO was deleted. In this view, Section 49-E(2) and clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) are to be read harmoniously in the manner noted above.\n47. The position of law that emerges from the above discussion is thus:\n(i) Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3), as special provisions for the appointment of the CEO of Cooperative Banks confer upon them the power to appoint their CEO, subject to such officer satisfying the eligibility criteria prescribed by the RBI in this regard. The term „class of societies‟ in Section 54(3) excludes Cooperative Banks for the limited purpose of the appointment of their CEO;\n(ii) However, where a Cooperative Bank is a Central Society within the ambit of Section 49-E(2), the CEO shall be appointed from among the officers of the cadre constituted and maintained under Section 54, where such cadre has been constituted. The State Government is empowered to issue a notification in pursuance of the power conferred upon it under Section 54(3) specifying that such Cooperative Bank shall appoint its CEO from the cadre maintained by the Apex Society as notified therein. The notified Apex Society shall forward to the concerned Cooperative Bank a panel of officers, from which the Cooperative Bank shall appoint its CEO, subject to such officer possessing the eligibility criteria as stipulated by the RBI; and\n(iii) Where no cadre has been constituted under Section 54, the CEO of a Cooperative Bank which is a Central Society under Section 49-E(2) shall be appointed with the prior approval of the Registrar as stipulated in Section 49-E(2)(b)(ii).\n48. In the present case, it was not disputed that the first respondent is a Central Society falling within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) of the 1960 Act. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act, the State Government issued a notification dated 12 January 1971 specifying that Central Cooperative Banks were obligated to employ officers, according to their availability, only from the cadres created by the State Cooperative Bank. A similar notification was issued on 26 June 1971 in terms of which, Central Cooperative Banks were permitted to maintain cadres of officers and, it was stipulated that Village Cooperative Societies including Large Sized Agricultural Credit Societies would have to employ officers drawn only from the cadres maintained by the Central Cooperative Bank. Similarly, by another notification dated 26 June 1971, Central Cooperative Banks were directed to maintain cadres of officers for the appointment of managers in rural cooperative societies including Large Sized Agricultural Credit Societies.\n49. The seventh respondent is not an officer from the cadre maintained by the appellant. Consequently, the action of the first respondent in seeking to appoint the seventh respondent as the CEO is not sustainable in law. The appointment of the sixth respondent as CEO was ratified by the Registrar of Societies by his reply dated 21 August 2017 and accepted by the BoD of the first respondent on 25 August 2017.\n50. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 7 August 2018. In consequence, we uphold the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ Petition, though for the reasons that we have indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.",
+      "case_record": "The appeal challenges a Rajasthan High Court order that allowed a revision petition, setting aside an Executing Court's order. The dispute concerns a property originally owned by Ghulam Mohiuddin (Defendant No.1). His brother, Saeeduddin (Defendant No.2), who held a power of attorney, entered into an Agreement to Sell dated 04.10.1967 with the appellant (plaintiff). The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance. A compromise was reached on 11.05.1978 between the plaintiff and Defendant No.1, acknowledging Defendant No.1's admission of the sale agreement and outlining terms for sale deed execution by 01.07.1978. Defendant No.1 was also to secure possession from Defendant No.2 and transfer rent notes. The Trial Court decreed the suit based on this compromise on 09.05.1979, dismissing it against Defendant No.2 and pro forma Defendant No.3. When Defendant No.1 failed to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff initiated execution. Defendant No.1's objections under Section 47 CPC were dismissed by the Executing Court on 09.12.1998, a decision upheld by the High Court and this Court in prior proceedings involving General Tariq, Defendant No.2's son and Defendant No.1's heir. Subsequently, Akhtar Un Nisa, wife of Defendant No.2, filed fresh objections under Section 47 CPC, arguing the decree was null and void. These objections were dismissed by the Executing Court on 03.05.2007. The High Court, however, allowed Akhtar Un Nisa's revision, declaring the decree inexecutable and a nullity.",
+      "generated_judgment": "**Decision: DISMISSED**\n\n**Reasoning:**\nThe appeal is **dismissed** because the High Court’s order upholding the **legality** of a null and void decree (recognition of a non-existent or invalid obligation) displaces the Excuuting Court’s discretion, warranting intervention only on questions of law—not procedural failures from the plaintiff. The issue of pre-existing title or substantive validity encapsulates sympathy for tidbits—*reparenting Gerunds over Granting Trite Protocol Through Asymmetric Timeaignment*—not any ready vulnerability necessitating rehearing.\n\nCritical missteps in procrastination suggest timeless legal obstinacy (Ghulam Mohiuddin, Saeeduddin array of dawk-in) that the courts, in concurrence, corrected finally. The pathos of preexisting title remained excluded as null legal nephurial unkernaled hereto by invalid compromise, made non-credentialing enforceable as self-covering: **\"unsketch\" solvency undécédé** ** bila kial kanjapundi étype**—suffice to observe acquiesced timeline tension.\n\n**Conclusion:** DISMISSED.\n---\n*(Judicial idiosyncrasy trumps XFR forecaster: why cleave to this mastery…?)*",
+      "reference_judgment": "Leave granted.\n2. This appeal, by the Decree Holder, assails the\ncorrectness of the judgment and order dated\n21.03.2014 passed by the Rajasthan High Court,\nJaipur Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil Revision Petition\nNo.95/2007, Smt. Akhtar Un Nisa vs. Rehan Ahmed,\nwhereby the revision filed under Section 115 of the\nCode of Civil Procedure, 19081 challenging the order of\nthe Executing Court dated 03.05.2007 rejecting the\nobjections under Section 47 CPC, has been allowed. The\norder impugned therein passed by the Executing Court\nwas set aside and it was held that the decree dated\n09.05.1979 passed by the Trial Court in Suit No.13/72\nwas inexecutable and a nullity and accordingly, the\nobjections under Section 47 CPC, were allowed.\n3. The factual matrix giving rise to the present appeal is\nas follows:\n3.1. The dispute relates to property being Municipal Nos.52-\n57, Maniharon Ka Rasta, Jaipur which was originally\nowned by Ghulam Mohiuddin (Defendant No.1). An\nagreement to Sell dated 04.10.1967 was executed for\nsale of the suit property by Saeeduddin – Defendant\nNo.2 (brother of Defendant No.1) and also the power of\n1 CPC\nattorney of Defendant No.1, for himself and for the\nprincipal Defendant No.1.\n3.2. Pursuant to the aforesaid agreement to sell, as the\nvendor was not executing the sale deed, the appellant\n(plaintiff) instituted a Civil Suit for specific performance\nregistered as Suit No.13/72 impleading Ghulam\nMohiuddin as Defendant no.1 and Saeeduddin as\nDefendant No.2. During the pendency of the Suit, the\nparties entered into a compromise dated 11.05.1978\nand presented the same before the Trial Court, a copy\nof which is filed as Annexure P-4. The terms of the\nCompromise Deed are briefly set out below:\n“ANNEXURE P-4\nIN THE COURT OF ADDL. DIST., CLASS-1,\nJAIPUR CITY, JAIPUR\nIN THE MATTER OF:\nRehan Ahmad S/o. Sh. Sultan Ahmad, aged about 22\nyears, Caste Muslim, R/o. Chaukadi Modikhana, Rasta,\nManiharan, H. No. 57, Jaipur-3\n... Plaintiff\n1. Gulam Mohiuddin Khan, aged about 58 years S/o.\nSh. Badiuddin Khan, Caste Muslimn, R/o. Mohalla\nKamnagran, Badayun (U.P)\n2. Saiduddin Khan aged about 52 years S/o. Sh.\nBadiuddin Khan, Caste Muslim, R/o. House of\nAbdulramham Khan, Gali Aatishbazi Rampur (U.P)\n...Defendants\n3. Ahsan Ahmad S/o. Sh. Sultan Ahmad aged about\n32 years, Caste Muslim, R/o. Chaukadi\nModikhana, Rasta Maniharan, H.No. 57, Jaipur-3\n...Pro forma Defendant\nSuit for specific performance of the contract regarding\nhouse and shop situated at Modikhana, Rasta\nManiharan, Jaipur\nMost respectfully showeth:\nIn the above civil suit, a compromise has been arrived at\nbetween the parties on under mentioned conditions,\ntherefore, the suit may be decreed as per the compromise.\n1. That, plaintiff and defendant No.3 executed an\nagreement for sale with the real brother and\ngeneral power of attorney of Def. No.2 named\nSaiduddin Khan on 4.10.1967 in writing in\nrespect to houses and shops No. 52 to 57,\nsituated at Circle No.1, Chaukadi Modikhana,\nJaipur, whose full description is given under, for\na sale consideration of Rs.40,000/-in his own\ncapacity and in the capacity of general power of\nattorney of Def. No.l, which was not accepted\nearlier by the defendant No.1 and 2, but now the\nDef. No.1 admits that agreement for sale was\nexecuted on 4.10.1967 on behalf of Def. No.2 in\nhis own capacity and on behalf and consent of\nDef. No.1.\n2. That, Def. No.l also admits that a sum of Rs.\n10,000/-out of entire agreed sale consideration\nwas received in respect to the disputed property\non 4.10.1967 and a sum of Rs.1,000/-was\nreceived on 1.1.69 and Rs.500/-on 22.1.69 i.e. a\ntotal of Rs.11,500/-was received by def. No. 2 on\nbehalf of Def No. 1 which is liable to be adjusted\nfrom the total consideration of the property, but\nthe plaintiff and defendant No.3 have alleged to\nspent Rs.6,500/-in the repairing of house etc,\nwhich amount shall not be adjusted from the sale\nconsideration because all these repairing and\nconstruction was done after the above agreement\nby the plaintiff and Def. No.3. besides this, the\nDef. No.1 has received Rs. 1500/-on 17.10.88,\nand Rs.1000/-on 24.10.77 and Rs.1000/-on\n11.11.77 from the plaintiff towards the cost of this\nproperty.\n3. That, the Def. No.1 shall get executed and\nregistered sale-deed of the above described\nhouses and shops in favor of plaintiff Rehan\nAhmad till 1.7.1978 and shall receive remaining\nsale consideration amount of Rs.25,000/-. If the\nDef. No. 1 fails to execute sale deed in this period\nthen the plaintiff Rehan Ahmad shall be entitled\nto get the sale-deed executed and registered in his\nfavor through the Court. Entire cost of registry\nwould be borne equally by the plaintiff Rehan\nAhmad and Def. No.1 Gulam Mohiuddin. In this\nrespect when the Def. No.1 will ask for half cost\nfor this from the plaintiff Rehan Ahmed then the\nplaintiff Rehan Ahmad shall pay the same taking\nreceipt from him and because of this the Def. No.1\nshall not be entitled to get the period agreed for\nregistry extended. The def. No.1 has received\ntoday the half cost of registry i.e. Rs.1,000/-from\nthe plaintiff Rehan Ahmad. Complete\nresponsibility to receive N.O.C. shall be of the Def.\nNo.l.\n4. That, Def. No.2 is residing in the third floor of\ndisputed property which would be got vacated by\ndefendant No.1 and the physical possession will\nbe given to the plaintiff Rehan Ahmed prior to\nregistration, and shall get the rent notes executed\nby the tenants who are presently occupying the\ndisputed property in favour of Rehan Ahmed.\n5. That, pro forma defendant No.3 has relinquished\nhis entire right in respect to the disputed property\nin favor of plaintiff Rehan Ahmad on 28.6.1977\nthrough a deed of Relinquishment, which was.\nordered by the court on 28.09.1977. Therefore,\npro forma defendant no.3 shall have no\nconnection now with this sale.\n6. That, the. def. No.2 Saiduddin Khan, himself has\nadmitted that he did not have right to sell or to\nexecute agreement for sale of the disputed\nproperty, but now, the defendant No.1, who is the\nreal owner of this disputed property, admits this\nagreement, therefore, now there is no hindrance\nin passing decree.\n7. That, cost of this suit shall be borne by the parties\nrespectively.\nDESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY\nPucca House comprising of three storeys and One chauk\nincluding entire internal houses of three storevs and five\nshops outside, out of which two shops are situated\ntowards south of Sadar Darwaja and three shops are\nsituated towards north of Sadar Darwaja along with\nstaircase adjoining the shops towards the north on which\nMunicipal No, written on the pole of House is 54/1 and\nMunicipal Number of shops situated towards south are\n52 and 53 and Municipal Number of shops situated\ntowards north are 55, 56 and 57, Circle 1 and no number\nis assigned to the staircase i.e. entire property including\nhouse and shops having municipal number 52 to 57,\nCircle No.1 and boundaries of these houses and shops\nare as under:\nIn East: Rasta Maniharan Government.\nIn west: House of Sindhi in between which littered\nGovernment street is situated.\nIn north: Temple of Digambar Jain\nIn south: House and shops of Tirthdas Shyamiani.\nTherefore, it is prayed that compromise be verified and\ndecree be passed in accordance with the compromise.\nApplicants\nRehan Ahmad, Plaintiff\nRehan (in English)\nGulam Mohiuddin Khan, Def. No.1\nsd.Ghulam mohiuddin khan (in\nEnglish)\nBoth Parties\nJaipur:\nDate: 11.5.78”\n4. In paragraph No.1 of the Compromise Deed, it is\nmentioned that Defendant No.1, although had earlier\nnot accepted the Agreement to Sell, now admits that the\nAgreement to Sell dated 04.10.1967 was executed by\nSaeeduddin–Defendant No.2, not only in his own\ncapacity but also on behalf of Defendant No.1 as Power\nof Attorney holder. Paragraph No.2 mentions the details\nof the amount received by the Defendant under the\nAgreement to Sell as advance until the time the\ncompromise was arrived at. It would be relevant to\nmention that the total sale consideration was\nRs.40,000/-out of which as per paragraph No.2 of the\nCompromise Deed, Rs.15,000/-had already been\nreceived by the Defendants. Paragraph No.3 mentions\nthat the Defendant No.1 will get the Sale Deed executed\nand registered in favour of the Plaintiff till 01.07.1978\nafter receiving Rs.25,000/-of the remaining sale\nconsideration. It, however, mentioned that if the\nDefendant No.1 does not execute the Sale Deed till\n01.07.1978, the Plaintiff would be entitled to get the\nSale Deed executed and registered in his favour through\nthe Court. The cost of registration would be borne\nequally by the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1. It was\nfurther mentioned that Defendant No.1 had also\nreceived half of the cost of registration from the Plaintiff\nand furthermore, the responsibility to receive the NOC\nwould be of Defendant No.1. Paragraph No.4 mentions\nthat Saeeduddin–Defendant No.2 was residing on the\nthird floor of the suit property which Defendant No.1-\nGhulam Mohiuddin would get vacated and ensure that\nphysical possession is delivered to the Plaintiff-Rehan\nAhmed prior to registration. Further, the rent notes\nexecuted by the tenants who are presently occupying\nthe suit property, would be executed by the tenants in\nfavour of Rehan Ahmed. One Ahsan Ahmed has been\nimpleaded as proforma defendant in respect of whom it\nwas stated in paragraph No.5 of the Compromise Deed\nthat he had relinquished his entire right to the property\nin favour of the Plaintiff–Rehan Ahmed through a Deed\nof Relinquishment dated 28.06.1977 which was\naccepted by the Court vide order dated 28.09.1977. In\nparagraph No.6 it was stated that Defendant No.2-\nSaeeduddin admitted that he did not have the right to\nsell or execute the Agreement to Sell but now Defendant\nNo.1, who was the real owner of the suit property,\nadmits this agreement. Therefore, there is no hindrance\nin passing the compromise decree. The property was\nalso described in the Compromise Deed to be a pacca\nhouse comprising of three stories and one chauk\nincluding the entire internal houses of the three storeys\nand five shops outside along with the staircase\nadjoining the shops. The house was numbered as 54/1\nin the municipal records, whereas the five shops were\nnumbered as 52, 53, 55, 56 and 57. Thus the entire\nproperty in question including the house of the five\nshops having municipal numbers 52 to 57 (except 54),\nCircle No.1.\n5. The Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Jaipur\nCity, Jaipur proceeded with the compromise and\nrequired the same to be duly verified for which due time\nwas granted to the parties. On 09.05.1979, initially the\nsuit was dismissed in the absence of the Plaintiff.\nHowever, on the same date, upon an application being\nfiled, the case was again taken up on board. The Trial\nCourt recorded that Rehan Ahmed and that Mohiuddin\n(Defendant No.1) had executed the compromise. The\nPlaintiff (Rehan Ahmed) further stated that he does not\nwant to pursue any proceedings against Saeeduddin\nand also Ahsan Ahmed-Defendant Nos.2 and 3, as such\nthe suit was dismissed against Saeeduddin and Ahsan\nAhmed. It was decreed against Ghulam Mohiuddin as\nper the compromise. Accordingly, a decree was drawn.\nAs per the decree, when the defendant did not execute\nthe Sale Deed, the Plaintiff-Decree holder initiated the\nproceedings for execution. In the execution proceedings\nDefendant No.1 Ghulam Mohiuddin filed objections\nstating that the Plaintiff had not paid the balance sale\nconsideration, and had allowed substantial time to pass\nfor about six to seven years, during which time the\nvalue of the property had doubled and as such the\ndecree could not be executed now on account of the\ndefault of the Plaintiff-Decree holder. These objections\nwere dismissed by the Executing Court by a detailed\norder dated 09.12.1998 on the findings that before the\nregistration of the Sale Deed, Defendant No.1 was\nrequired to fulfil his obligations which included getting\nthe third floor vacated, getting the NOC and also getting\nthe rent deeds transferred in the name of the Plaintiff.\nAs such there was no default on the part of the Plaintiff.\nIn the meantime, the Defendant No.1 Mohiuddin died.\nThe order dated 09.12.1998 was challenged by one\nGeneral Tariq, s/o. Defendant No.2-Saeeduddin and\nlegal heir of Defendant No.1 Gulam Mohiuddin,\nclaiming rights under a sale executed by Defendant\nNo.1 Mohiuddin by way of S.B.Civil Revision Petition\nNo.55 of 1999. The said revision came to be dismissed\nby the High Court vide order dated 02.06.2006. General\nTariq preferred a Special Leave Petition before this\nCourt registered as S.L.P.(C) No.12463 of 2006, which\ncame to be dismissed by this Court vide order dated\n11.08.2006. With the dismissal of the Special Leave\nPetition the innings of the objections under Section 47\nCPC filed by the Judgment-debtor – Defendant No.1\nMohiuddin came to an end. General Tariq, s/o.\nDefendant no.2-Saeeduddin did not carry the matter\nany further by way of review or otherwise before this\ncourt. However, a new round of objections under\nSection 47 CPC came to be initiated by respondent no.1\n– Akhtar Un Nisa, wife of Defendant No.2-Saeeduddin\nand the mother of General Tariq. The objections by\nrespondent No.1 Akhtar Un Nisa are to the following\neffect:\nI. The decree dated 09.05.1979 is without\njurisdiction and a nullity;\nII. The property in the suit was a joint property of\nGhulam Mohiuddin and Saeeduddin–\nDefendants No. 1 and 2 respectively;\nIII. The suit having been filed as against both the\nbrothers, the compromise deed could not have\nbeen arrived at between the Plaintiff and\nDefendant No.1 alone;\nIV. The Trial Court could not have accepted the\nsettlement/compromise between the Plaintiff\nand Defendant No.1 regarding Defendant No.2\nvacating the third story of the house in question\nand the rent notes being transferred in favour\nof the plaintiff.\nV. Since there was no decree against Saeeduddin,\nas such Decree holder could not have any right\nof getting possession of the portion of the\nproperty which was admittedly in possession of\nSaeeduddin and owner. Further, the tenants of\nSaeeduddin in the disputed property were\ntenants of the applicant-objector Akhtar Un\nNisa-respondent no.1.\n6. The Executing Court, vide judgment and order dated\n03.05.2007, dismissed the objections under Section 47\nCPC filed by Smt.Akhtar Un Nisa.\n7. Aggrieved by the same, Smt.Akhtar Un Nisa preferred a\nrevision before the High Court which has since been\nallowed by the impugned order giving rise to the present\nappeal.\n8. After careful consideration of the arguments presented\nby both sides, this Court believes that the High Court\nerred in setting aside the Executing Court's order dated\n09.12.1998 and in declaring the Trial Court's decree\ndated 09.05.1979 void. The High Court's decision\nappears to be based on several incorrect assumptions\nand observations.\n9. The core of the High Court's reasoning rests on the\nerroneous assumption that the property was jointly\nowned by Defendants No. 1 and No. 2, and that the\nabsence of Defendant No. 2's signature on the\ncompromise dated 11.05.1978 invalidated the decree.\nHowever, Defendant No. 2 has consistently\nacknowledged that he had no ownership rights over the\nproperty. In his written statement to the Trial Court in\nSuit No. 13/72, he explicitly stated that the property\nbelonged solely to Defendant No. 1. This was further\nsupported by a family arrangement dated 17.09.1976\nand reinforced in Paragraph 6 of the compromise deed.\nThe compromise, signed by Defendant No. 1 and the\nplaintiff and later verified by Defendant No. 2 through\nan application dated 14.05.1979, substantiates that\nDefendant No. 1 was the sole owner. These facts were\nupheld by the High Court and this Court in previous\nproceedings. During the challenge to the execution\nproceedings filed by General Tarik before the High\nCourt, the High Court vide order dated 11.8.2006 had\nalso recorded the finding that Defendant no.2 did not\nhave ownership rights over the suit property which fact\nwas also upheld by this Court. Defendant no. 2 had\nlimited rights of being in possession of the third floor of\nsuit property. Due to the aforesaid reasons, the Plaintiff\nand Defendant no. 1 were the only necessary parties\nneeded for the compromise dated 11.05.1978 as\nDefendant no.1 was the sole owner of the suit property.\n10. The High Court also incorrectly held that the provisions\nof Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the CPC were not adhered to,\nclaiming that the Trial Court failed to properly verify the\ncompromise. It is essential to clarify that the\ncompromise was indeed reached on 11.05.1978, with\nits verification delayed due to various adjournments\ncaused by the absence or illness of Defendant No.1 and\nother procedural delays. On 09.05.1979, a fresh\ncompromise application containing identical terms was\nsubmitted and duly signed by both parties due to the\noriginal being misplaced. The Trial Court then correctly\nrecorded and verified this compromise, fulfilling the\nrequirements of Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the CPC.\n11. It must be made clear that the compromise between the\nPlaintiff and Defendant no. 1 was arrived on 11.05.1978\nand it was only the procedural requirements of Order\nXXIII Rule 3 of verifying and the compromise before the\nCourt which were eventually completed on 09.05.1979.\nA perusal of the record of proceedings before the Trial\nCourt reveals that verification of the terms of the\ncompromise was attempted on 11.05.1978 but was not\npossible as Defendant No.1 was not present. Moreover,\non subsequent dates being 11.5.1978, 24.07.1978,\n31.01.1979 and 20.03.1979, either due to the illness of\nDefendant no.1 or due to the Presiding Officer not being\npresent, there were various adjournments before the\nTrial Court. Finally, on 09.05.1979, Gulam Mohiuddin\nappeared before the Court and the parties submitted a\nfresh compromise application was filed because the\nearlier compromise application submitted on 11-05-\n1978 was not traceable on the record of the Court\ncontaining the same terms and conditions as in the\ncompromise application earlier filed on 11.05.1978. The\nsaid application was also duly signed by both the\nparties. On the basis of the said compromise presented\non 09.05.1979, the Trial Court took the compromise\napplication on record, verified the fresh compromise\napplication fulfilling all the terms and conditions of\nOrder XXIII Rule 3 CPC. The terms and conditions of\nthe compromise were read over to the parties and were\naccepted by them and the signatures of the parities\nwere taken on the compromise application by the Court\nand thereafter the Court recorded its satisfaction on the\ncompromise application, which is on the record of the\nTrial Court. The decree dated 09.05.1979 was passed\nbased on this compromise.\n12. As far as the terms of the compromise are concerned,\nwhich have also been questioned by the High Court, the\nagreement stipulated that Defendant No. 1 was to\nexecute and register the sale deed in favor of the\nplaintiff by 01.07.1978, after receiving balance\npayment of Rs 25,000/-. The decree's execution was\ncontingent upon Defendant No. 1 fulfilling conditions\nsuch as obtaining the NOC and ensuring Defendant No.\n2 vacating the portion of the property in question in his\npossession. The recording of the compromise and the\nconsequent decree on 09.05.1979, although appearing\nprocedurally delayed, adhered to the process required\nunder CPC.\n13. Furthermore, the High Court overlooked the fact that\nGeneral Tarik, legal heir of Defendant No. 2, had\npreviously objected to the execution proceedings, which\nwas dismissed on 09.12.1988. Subsequent appeals\nbefore the High Court, including a Special Leave\nPetition to this Court, were also dismissed. Therefore,\nsimilar objections by Respondent No. 1, Smt. Akhtar Un\nNisa, in her capacity as one of the legal heirs of\nDefendant No. 2 would not be maintainable and would\namount to abuse of process of law.\n14. In light of the reasons recorded above, this Court finds\nmerit in the appellant-plaintiff’s argument and holds\nthat the Executing Court had rightly rejected the\nobjections under Section 47 CPC filed by Smt.Akhtar\nUn Nisa vide order 03.05.2007.\n15. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned\njudgement of the High Court is set aside, and the\nExecuting Court's order dated 03.05.2007 is restored\nand the objections of Respondent no.1 under Section 47\nof the CPC stand rejected.\n16. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -488,26 +488,26 @@
     },
     "meta": {
       "sample_id": "S014",
-      "case_id": "3530",
-      "experiment": "role_play_v3",
-      "model": "llama-3.3-70b-instruct",
-      "source_file": "S014__role_play_v3__llama-3.3-70b-instruct__3530.json",
+      "case_id": "5562",
+      "experiment": "baseline_no_firac",
+      "model": "ministral-8b",
+      "source_file": "S014__baseline_no_firac__ministral-8b__5562.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "04/03/2020",
-      "machine_error_stage": "conclusion",
+      "judgment_date": "22/04/2024",
+      "machine_error_stage": "facts",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis"
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in reasoning"
     }
   },
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "BOMBAY HIGH COURT | APPEAL - 8 of 2021 | Anil V. Madgavkar v. Ifin Commodities Limited And Ors. | 07/04/2021",
-      "case_details": "Case: APPEAL - 8 of 2021 | Anil V. Madgavkar v. Ifin Commodities Limited And Ors.",
-      "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED",
-      "case_record": "The appellant invested Rs. 75 lakhs with Respondent No.1 (broker) through Respondent No.2 (Rajesh Sharma) in March 2011, under an agreement specifying a stop loss trigger and requiring prior written consent for trades. Following a commodity market crash in May 2011, resulting in a 70% loss, the appellant's family alleged unauthorized trades and breach of agreement. Respondent No.2 subsequently allegedly admitted liability via email and affidavit, issuing a Rs. 5 crore cheque. On May 13, 2011, appellant Anil Madgavkar emailed Respondent No.1 agreeing to continue *his own* investments. Respondent No.1 later communicated on July 22, 2011, that Respondent No.2 was no longer authorized from July 19, 2011. The appellant invoked arbitration, but the Arbitral Tribunal dismissed claims and dropped Respondent No.2. Section 34 petitions to set aside the award were initially allowed by the Panaji District Judge but later set aside by the Goa High Court due to jurisdictional issues. Fresh Section 34 petitions filed in the Mumbai High Court were dismissed by a Single Judge. This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act challenges that dismissal. The appellant argued that Respondent No.2 was an authorized agent of Respondent No.1, making Respondent No.1 liable for losses under MCX Rules, and that the award was non-speaking. Respondent No.1 countered that Respondent No.2 was not their authorized agent and that Respondent No.2's admissions were private arrangements.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. In March 2011, the appellant invested Rs. 75 lakhs with Respondent No.1 through Respondent No.2, under an agreement specifying a stop loss trigger and prior written consent for trades.\n2. A commodity market crash in May 2011 resulted in a 70% loss of the appellant's investment.\n3. Respondent No.2 allegedly admitted liability via email and affidavit and issued a cheque of Rs. 5 crore.\n4. On May 13, 2011, the appellant agreed to continue his own investments with Respondent No.1.\n5. On July 22, 2011, Respondent No.1 communicated that Respondent No.2 was no longer authorized from July 19, 2011.\n6. The appellant invoked arbitration, but the Tribunal dismissed the claims and dropped Respondent No.2 from the proceedings.\n7. Claims seeking to set aside the arbitral award were initially allowed by the Panaji District Judge but later set aside by the Goa High Court due to jurisdictional issues.\n8. Fresh Section 34 petitions were dismissed by the Mumbai High Court, leading to this appeal under Section 37.\n9. The appellant argued Respondent No.2 was an authorized agent of Respondent No.1, making them liable, and that the award was non-speaking.\n10. Respondent No.1 contended that Respondent No.2 was not their authorized agent and that his subsequent actions were private arrangements.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Was Respondent No.2 an authorized agent of Respondent No.1 at the time of the disputed trades?\n2. Did the Arbitral Tribunal's award fail to address or find as a fact the issue of agency between Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2?\n3. Did the Mumbai High Court properly exercise its jurisdiction to dismiss the fresh Section 34 petitions?\n4. Are the admissions and the Rs. 5 crore cheque issued by Respondent No.2 binding upon Respondent No.1?\n5. Did Respondent No.1 breach the agreement requiring prior written consent for trades?\n\n### Rules:\n1. Under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an appeal or application can be made against the order of the court under Section 34.\n2. An agency relationship may exist if an agent has the authority to act on behalf of the principal.\n3. An award may be set aside under Section 34 if it is found to be non-speaking or if it fails to address material issues of fact.\n4. The jurisdiction of a court in hearing Section 34 petitions is determined by which parties are included and the context of the arbitration agreement.\n5. An agreement requires compliance with specific provisions, and failure to do so, such as not obtaining prior written consent, may constitute a breach.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Issue 1: Authorized Agent** - The key dispute revolves around whether Respondent No.2 was an authorized agent of Respondent No.1 during the period of the disputed trades. If established as an agent, Respondent No.1 could be liable (Fact 1, Fact 5). The relationship between Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2 is crucial, and the evidence presented by the appellant is not definitive in establishing explicit authority (Fact 10).\n\n2. **Issue 2: Tribunal's Award** - The appellant alleges the award is non-speaking. A non-speaking award does not explicitly address all the issues before the tribunal, which in this case includes the agency relationship (Fact 9). The absence of explicit findings in the award is a foundation for questioning its validity under Rule 3.\n\n3. **Issue 3: Mumbai High Court Jurisdiction** - The Mumbai High Court dismissed the Section 34 petitions, an action potentially premised on procedural grounds related to jurisdiction. The appellant challenges this dismissal, asserting jurisdiction was exercised improperly (Fact 8).\n\n4. **Issue 4 and 5: Binding Nature of Admissions and Consent Breach** - Respondent No.2’s admissions and payment of the cheque are argued by the appellant to be liabilities of the Respondent No.1 (Fat 3). If Respondent No.2 was acting without authority, these actions would not necessarily bind Respondent No.1 unless it is proven there was implied authority or a personal arrangement involving Respondent No.1 (Rule 4).\n\n5. **Maintainability of Appeal** - The appeal centers on the dismissal of Section 34 petitions, which concerns the lawfulness of the tribunal's award and whether the judicial decision on such dismissal was legally sound. Since these elements engage directly within Rule 1 and questions jurisdictional propriety, the appeal is maintainable.\n\n### Conclusion:\nUpon consideration of the issues and analysis, the appeal should be **ALLOWED**. The questions surrounding the agency relationship, the non-speaking nature of the award, and the interpretation of jurisdictional propriety are critical and merit further factual and legal examination. Therefore, a reconsideration of the original dismissal of the Section 34 petitions by the Mumbai High Court is warranted.",
-      "reference_judgment": "1. By these Appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the appellants have impugned the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge dismissing the Arbitration Petitions filed by each of these Appellants under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Arbitration Act') . By consent of parties, all these appeals were heard finally at the admission stage. The parties have addressed this Court in the lead matter i.e. Appeal No. 8 of 2021 and have stated that the view that would be taken by this Court in the said lead matter would also apply to the other matters in this batch of appeals. Some of the relevant facts for the purpose of deciding these appeal are as under :- Facts and submissions in Appeal No. 8 of 2021 :-\n2. The appellant was the original claimant in the arbitral proceedings and was the original petitioner before the learned Single Judge. It was the case of the appellant that on 8 March, 2011, the appellant and the respondent no.1 entered into an agreement in respect of investment of Rs.50,00,000/- to be made by the appellant. The appellant issued a cheque for the said amount in the name of the respondent no.1. Under the said agreement, there was a stop loss trigger of 3.5% loss. According to the appellant, all trades were to be done with prior written consent of the appellant by the respondent no.1. On 14 March, 2011, the appellant invested an additional amount of Rs.25,00,000/- by issuing a cheque in the name of the respondent no.1. The transactions were carried out by the appellant through the respondent no.2.\n3. It is the case of the appellant that on 14 April, 2011, the respondent no.2 who was alleged to be an agent of the respondent no.1 asked for a massive increase in its commission. The entire family of the appellant who had invested along with the appellant immediately instructed the respondent no.1 to stop all further investments and called for refund of the amounts invested by the appellant. In the first week of May, 2011, there was a crash in the Commodity Market due to which the appellant lost 70% of its investment value.\n4. It is the case of the appellant that on 8 May, 2011, the entire family of the appellant sent an email to the respondent no.1 specifying that the trades had not been done with their consent and that the stop loss trigger clause had been breached by it. In response to the said email, on 11 May, 2011, the respondent no.2 who was alleged to be an agent of the respondent no.1 according to the appellant, pleaded on behalf of the respondent no.1 and allegedly admitted liability and requested that no legal action be taken against the respondent no.1/respondent no.2. Respondent no.2 issued a cheque for Rs.5 crores in favour of the family of the appellant as repayment allegedly on behalf of the respondent no.1.\n5. It is the case of the appellant that on 13 May, 2011, Mr. Anil Madgavkar, the appellant in Appeal No. 8 of 2021 sent an email only for himself stating that he was agreeable to continue with his investments with respondent no.1 It is the case of the appellant that the said email was sent on the basis of certain representations made by the respondent no.2 on behalf of the respondent no.1 which were then breached. On 13 June, 2011, the respondent no.2 forwarded an affidavit admitting that he was responsible for the losses incurred by the appellant and his family. On 22 July, 2011, the appellant received a communication from the respondent no.1 that w.e.f. 19 July, 2011 the respondent no.2 was not its authorized person.\n6. On 5 August, 2011, the entire family of the appellant sent an email to the respondent no.1 protesting the losses alleged to have been caused to them by the respondent no.1 by carrying out the trades contrary to the terms and conditions of the agreement in the accounts of the appellant and his family members including the stop loss trigger provision and without their prior written consent. It is the case of the appellant that there was no response to the said email dated 5 August, 2011 and also to email dated 8 May, 2011, which were sent by the respondent no.2 on behalf of the respondent no.1. On 10 August, 2011, the appellant and his family members sent an email to the Multi Commodity Exchange of India Limited with a request to take action against the respondent no.1 (hereinafter referred to as 'MCX').\n7. On 10 August, 2011, the respondent no.1 responded to the said email dated 5 August, 2011 referring the letter of 13 May, 2011 written by Mr. Anil Madgavkar and denied the allegations made by the appellant and his family members. In the said letter, the respondent no.1 denied its knowledge of the alleged representations made by the respondent no.2, appellant and his family members on or around 11 May, 2011. On 11 August, 2011, the appellant and his family members respondent no.1 to the letter dated 10 August, 2011 sent by the respondent no.1 and reiterated that the respondent no.1 could not disclaim liability for the action of the respondent no.2 and holding it accountable for trading contrary to the agreement as well as explicit instructions to close the accounts and seeking refund of the amounts invested by the appellant and his family members.\n8. On 19 August, 2011, the appellant and his entire family sent a legal notice to the respondent nos. 1 and 2 calling upon them to be pay the various amounts. On 24 August, 2011, the appellant and his family members sent an email to respondent no.1 alleging that all their accounts with the respondent no.1 were to be closed and the moneys were liable to be returned to the appellant and his family members. It is the case of the appellant that on 24 August, 2011, the respondent no.1 responded listing out certain actions for closure. On 24 August, 2011, the appellant and his family members responded to the said letter dated 24 August, 2011 and expressed surprise that the respondent no.1 was asking them to go through a broker when their broker's agency relationship with respondent no.1 had been allegedly terminated w.e.f. 19 July, 2011. On 16 January, 2012, the appellant and his family members invoked the arbitration clause against the respondent nos. 1 and 2. On 20 March, 2012, the respondent no.1 filed its written statement before the learned Arbitrator. The appellant and his family members filed rejoinder on 9 April,\n2012. 9. It is the case of the appellant that on 30 June, 2012, the Arbitral Tribunal made an award after hearing the parties only for two hours. The respondent no.2 was dropped from the arbitration proceedings without assigning any reasons. The Arbitral Tribunal dismissed the claims made by the appellant and his family members by making separate awards. Being aggrieved by the Arbitral Awards, the appellant and his family members filed separate Arbitration Petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Panaji. On 22 August, 2013, the respondent no.2 filed an intervention application in the said arbitration petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act on the ground that various findings in the arbitral awards rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal adversely affected it and that the said arbitral awards were passed without hearing the respondent no.2.\n10. By an order dated 23 March, 2015, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Panaji permitted the respondent no.2 to intervene in those proceedings filed under Section 34 though opposed by the respondent no.1. On 8 October, 2015, the respondent no.1 filed a writ petition impugning the said order dated 23 March, 2015, permitting the respondent no.2 to intervene in those petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The said writ petition was dismissed by the Goa Bench of this Court on 8 October, 2015. On 26 February, 2018, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Panaji allowed those petitions under Section 34 filed by the appellant and his family members and was pleased to set aside those arbitral awards.\n11. On 27 August, 2018, the appeals filed by the respondent no.1 impugning the said order dated 26 February, 2018 passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Panaji came to be set aside by the Goa Bench of this Court on the ground of jurisdiction. It was held that the arbitration proceedings having been held in Mumbai, only the Court in Mumbai had jurisdiction to entertain those petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration. On 29 September, 2018, the appellant along with his family members filed separate arbitration petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the learned Single Judge of this Court. On 26 September, 2019, the learned Single Judge dismissed all those petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act at the admission stage. Being aggrieved by the said judgment dated 26 September, 2019 passed by the learned Single Judge, each of the appellants have filed separate Appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.\n12. Mr. Ashwin Shanker, learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to various correspondence forming part of the record before the Arbitral Tribunal, various portions of the pleadings filed by both the parties before the Arbitral Tribunal and various findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal in the impugned arbitral award. He also strongly placed reliance on Rule 13 ii, v, vi, vii(c), 5.24 and the directives issued by the said MCX on 30 September, 2009 and more particularly clause (b) thereof stating that the member shall keep evidence of making the payment of having dispatched the contract note to the clients. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the respondent no.2 was an authorized agent of the respondent no.1. The appellant and his family members had issued sale instructions to the respondents and to close out the transactions and to refund the investments made by the appellant and his family members. On 1 May, 2011, the entire market was crashed.\n13. Learned counsel submits that the respondent no.2 had admitted on behalf of the respondent no.1 in the correspondence as well as in the affidavit filed by him that the sale instructions were received from the appellant and his family members and that various amounts were due and payable to the appellant by the respondents. He submits that under aforesaid Rules of the said MCX, the respondent no.1 broker was liable for each and every acts performed by the respondent no.2 as an authorized agent on behalf of the respondent no.1. The respondent no.1 thus could not disown the liability admitted by the respondent no.2 and the losses suffered by the appellant and his family members due to the acts on the part of the respondent no.2 carried out as an authorized agent on behalf of the respondent no.1.\n14. It is submitted that though these Rules were specifically pointed out to the Arbitral Tribunal by the appellant, there is no reference of any of these Rules in the impugned award. There was no findings rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on various issues raised by the appellant during the course of the argument. Though the defense raised by the respondent no.1 in the arbitral proceedings were untenable, the Arbitral Tribunal accepted those defences and rejected the claims made by the appellant and his family members. According to the learned counsel, the arbitral award was a non speaking award in respect of various issues though urged by the appellant but not having been dealt with in the impugned award at all.\n15. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the Arbitral Tribunal has erroneously construed the email dated 13 May, 2011 sent by Anil Madgavkar to the respondent no.1. He submits that though all other emails sent by Anil Madgavkar were sent for himself and his family members, the said mail was sent by Mr. Anil Madgavkar only in respect of his own account with the respondent no.1 and was not on behalf of all the family members. He submits that in any event, the said email was in respect of the problems faced by his account specially with reference to how the market operated during circuits and thus could not have been construed as the email on behalf of the entire family. He submits that email dated 8 May, 2011, disputing the transactions carried out by the respondent no.1 was sent on behalf of the appellant and all his family members having account with the respondent no.1 The family members of the appellant not having withdrawn the earlier email 8 May, 2011 and not having agreed to continue the account with the respondent no.1, the Arbitral Tribunal could not have rejected the claims made by the family members on the basis of such email dated 13 May, 2011 which was sent only by Mr. Anil Madgavkar in his individual capacity to the respondent no.1.\n16. Learned counsel for the appellant strongly placed reliance on the letter dated 11 May, 2011 sent by the respondent no.2 to the appellant and his family members and submits that the said letter was sent by the respondent no.2 on behalf of the respondent no.1 admitting his negligence and the loss caused to the appellant and his family members. The respondent no.2 had also admitted liability on behalf of the respondent no.1 and had issued a cheque for Rs. 5 crores in favour of the appellant. The Arbitral Tribunal did not consider the other correspondence entered into between the parties in the entire arbitral award. The Arbitral Tribunal also did not consider the affidavit dated 13 June, 2011 filed by the respondent no.2 admitting the liability on behalf of himself and respondent no.1.\n17. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the following judgments in support of the submission that the respondent no.1 was liable for all the losses suffered by the appellant and his family members due to acts of the respondent no.2 while carrying out the trading in the accounts of the appellant and his family members under the said MCX Business Rules. a) An unreported judgment passed by a Single Judge of this Court on 21 June, 2018 in Arbitration Petition No. 1543 of 2014 in case of Keynote Capitals Ltd. v/s. Eco Recycling Ltd. b) Judgment of this Court in case of Bonaza Commodities Brokers Pvt. Ltd. v/s. Mrs. Roshanara Bhinder, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 1411. c) Judgment of this Court in case of Mrs. Kaberi Mondal v/s. BMA Commodities Private Limited, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 3353.\n18. Mr. Charles D'Souza, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 on the other hand submits that there were no pleadings on the applicability or otherwise of the said MCX Rules and more particularly on the issue whether the acts committed by the respondent no.2 as an alleged authorized agent were binding on the respondent no.1 or not. No such arguments had been advanced before the Arbitral Tribunal by the appellant. He submits that on the contrary the oral arguments advanced before the Arbitral Tribunal were contrary to the pleadings filed before the Arbitral Tribunal by the appellant. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to various paragraphs of the arbitral award and the statement of case in case of Anil Madgavkar and submits that the similar pleadings and the arguments were advanced by other appellants also before the Arbitral Tribunal.\n19. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to a letter dated 14 April, 2011 from the appellant to Finance Factory and would submit that the said letter was neither addressed to the respondent no.1 nor received by it. In any event the said letter was alleged to have been addressed to Finance Factory requesting the said Finance Factory to instruct P-Word/ TFIL Commodities Limited to stop all other investment / management of his fund and to close all their accounts and to refund their moneys to them. He invited our attention to the alleged writing dated 11 May, 2011 between the appellant and P-Word/TFIL which was witnessed by Rajesh Cheda annexed at page 82 of the compilation. He submits that the said writing was alleged to have been executed between the appellant and the said P-Word/TFIL.\n20. The respondent no.1 was not at all party to any such agreement or communication inter- se and arrived at between the appellant and his family members and the said P-Word/TFIL. It is submitted that the said Finance Factory was the personal advisor of Madgavkar family. The respondent no.1 was not concerned with the said Finance Factory at all. It is the case of the respondent no.1 that the said P-Word/TFIL was the sole proprietrix concern of Ms.Rashmi M. T. The respondent no.1 had appointed only Ms. Rashmi M. T. as an authorized person. Rajesh (Raj) Sharma was not an authorized representative or authorized person or agent or franchise of the respondent no.1. The said Ms.Rashmi M. T. who was proprietrix of P-Word/TFIL had ceased to be the authorized person of the respondent no.1 with effect from 19 July, 2011.\n21. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to the letter dated 13 May, 2011 addressed by Anil Madgavkar to the respondent no.1 and would submit that the said letter has to be read with e-mail dated 8 May, 2011, which was even according to the appellant was not only on his behalf but also on behalf of his family members and all subsequent correspondence between the appellant and the said Rajesh Sharma and not between the appellant and the respondent no.1. The said Rajesh Sharma was not authorized by the respondent no.1. In any event, the affidavit disclosed admission of personal liability on the part of said Rajesh Sharma and not on behalf of the respondent no.1.\n22. It is submitted that the fact that the said Rajesh Sharma had given his own cheque for Rs.5 crores in favour of the appellant and had agreed to mortgage his personal property would also clearly indicate that there was personal transaction between the appellant and his family members with Rajesh Sharma. He submits that even the said affidavit was identified by Rajesh Cheda who was concerned with the said Finance Factory. The respondent was not a party to any such transaction between the appellant, Finance Factory and Mr. Rajesh Sharma.\n23. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to the written statement filed by the respondent no.1 before the Arbitral Tribunal contending that the respondent no.1 had appointed the counsel Ms.Rashmi MT, who was proprietrix of P-Word/TFIL as an authorized person and had ceased to be the authorized representative of the respondent no.1 with effect from 19 July, 2011. The respondent no.1 had no legal or contractual relationship with Rajesh Sharma. Rajesh Sharma was not even an employee or authorized representative or an agent of the respondent no.1. The so called promises, assurances or representations, if any, made by Rajesh Sharma to the appellant and his family members was their private arrangement and was not binding on the respondent no.1.\n24. It is submitted that the said Rajesh Cheda of Finance Factory was not authorized or had no authority to deal with the appellant and his family members on behalf of the respondent no.1. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to the letter dated 29 September, 2011 from the respondent no.1 to the legal department of the said MCX in response to the complaint made by one of the family member of the appellant to the said Exchange denying such allegations made by the said family member of the appellant.\n25. The respondent no.1 also had denied that the appellant had ever submitted any letter or e-mail to the respondent no.1 in the month of April, 2011 requesting the respondent no.1 to stop the transactions / close the account. He submits that on receipt of e-mail from Anil Madgavkar in the last week of 2011, the respondent had remitted the fund available in the account to the bank account of the family members of the said Anil Madgavkar. He submits that the appellant never made any application before the Arbitral Tribunal for seeking liberty to lead oral evidence. The onus was on the appellant to prove that the respondent no.2 was an authorized agent/representative of the respondent no.1 and had admitted the alleged liability of the respondent no.1 to Anil Madgavkar and his family members which onus the appellant had failed to discharge.\n26. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 invited our attention to various findings rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal in the impugned award and would submit that the learned single Judge in the petition filed by the appellants under section 34 of the Arbitration Act has rightly not interfered with those findings of fact. He invited our attention to the arguments advanced by the appellant before the Arbitral Tribunal and recorded in the arbitral award that the transactions between the parties were in the nature of Mutual Fund Deposit. He submits that the said arguments advanced before the Arbitral Tribunal were contrary to the pleadings filed by the appellant in the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal has also rendered various findings of fact on the issue that the respondent no.2 was not an authorized agent/representative of the respondent no.1. He submits that the powers of the Appellate Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act are very limited. This Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal while hearing an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act.\n27. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 relied upon paragraph 60 of the judgment of this Court in case of Keynote Capitals Ltd. (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant and would submit that the said judgment would support the case of the respondent no.1 and not the appellant. It is submitted that in the said judgment, learned single Judge has held that the Arbitral Tribunal could not have allowed the claim of the constituent based on confessional statement obtained by the constituent from the agent of the member without proving the authenticity of such employee to send such email and assign such financial statement thereby allegedly admitting the alleged liability of the member. He submits that the judgment of this Court in case of Kaberi Mondal (supra) and in case of Bonaza Commodities Brokers Pvt. Ltd.(supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 do not apply to the facts of this case even remotely.\n28. Mr. Ashwin Shanker, learned counsel for the appellant in rejoinder submits that the appellants have raised the ground in the petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act though the appellant had relied upon the Rules of the said MCX on the issue that the respondent no.1 member was liable to pay for the loss suffered by appellant due to the acts of the respondent no.2, the Arbitral Tribunal did not consider those Rules. He submits that judgments of this Court in case of Kaberi Mondal (supra) and in case of Bonaza Commodities Brokers Pvt. Ltd.(supra) had clearly held that the Rules of the said MCX were statutory and were binding on the member and also on the constituent. REASONS AND CONCLUSION :\n29. A perusal of the record indicates that there was a private arrangement between the appellant, Rajesh Cheda of Finance Factory and Rajesh Sharma who claimed to be an authorized representative of the respondent no.1. The appellant could not prove that respondent no.2 was an authorized representative or agent of the respondent no.1 to deal with the appellant in respect of any of the alleged transactions. No evidence was led by the appellants before the Arbitral Tribunal to prove their case.\n30. A perusal of the statement of claim filed by the appellants would indicate that it was the case of the appellants that they were approached by Rajesh Cheda of Finance Factory in the month of February, 2011 and made a representation that there would be safe and guaranteed return on the investment of the claimant. The funds / investment made by the appellant would be managed by P-Word/TFIL, an authorized person / (sub-broker) of the respondent no.1. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 rightly invited our attention to the Management Mandate Agreement alleged to have been entered into between the P- Word/TFIL and Rajesh Cheda.\n31. The said agreement does not refer to the respondent no.1 at all in respect of any of the alleged transaction. The correspondence placed on record would also indicate that various representations were alleged to have been made by the Finance Factory to the appellants and his family members for reasonable return on the investment proposed to be made by the appellant and his family members and not by the respondent no.1. It was not the case of the appellant that the said Finance Factory was authorized agent of the respondent no.1. The said letter dated 14 April, 2011 relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant was alleged to have been addressed to the Finance Factory thereby requesting to instruct P-Word/TFIL commodities to stop all further investments / management of his funds and to close all account and to refund their moneys. The said letter was disputed by the respondent no.1.\n32. Even otherwise the said letter was addressed to the Finance Factory and not to the respondent no.1. E-mail dated 8 May, 2011 was between the appellant, his family members and Rajesh Sharma alleging negligence and fraud on the part of Rajesh Sharma. In our view, since the appellant failed to prove that the respondent no.2 was authorized agent of the respondent no.1 and had acted on behalf of the respondent no.1 while allegedly carrying out any transaction on behalf of the appellant as authorized representative of the respondent no.1, the respondent no.1 was rightly held not liable to pay to the appellants towards any loss suffered by the appellant.\n33. In our view, the admission of the alleged liability by the respondent no.2 on behalf of the respondent no.1 to the appellant and his family members was not binding on the respondent no.1 as the same was not authorized by the respondent no.1. The judgment of this Court in case of Keynote Capitals Ltd. (supra) relied upon by the appellant would support the case of the respondent no.1 and not the appellant.\n34. In our view, the Arbitral Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have rightly not considered such alleged confessional statement obtained by the appellant from the respondent no.2 without proving the authority of the respondent no.2 to make such confession and admission of liability on the part of the respondent no.1. There cannot be any implied authority even to the agent on behalf of the principal to acknowledge the alleged liability on behalf of the principal or to make any such confessional statement on behalf of the principal. This Court in the said judgment in case of Keynote Capitals Ltd. (supra) had adverted to the judgment of this Court in case of Kotak Securities Ltd. v/s. Prakash S. Khanokar and Anr. (supra) in Arbitration Petition (L) No. 643 of 2002 delivered on 30 July, 2013 and judgment of Supreme Court in case of Lakshmirattan Cotton Mills Company Limited v/s. Aluminium Corporation of India Limited, AIR 1971 SC 1482. We are not inclined to take a different view from the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Keynote Capitals Ltd. (supra) which view was based on another judgment of this Court and also the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Kotak Securities Ltd. v/ s. Prakash S. Khanokar and Anr. (supra).\n35. There is no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned award is contrary to Rule 13 ii, v, vi, vii(c), 5.24 and the directives issued by the said MCX on 30 September, 2009 and more particularly clause (b). Since, the appellant failed to prove that the respondent no.2 was the authorized agent of the respondent no.1 to carry out transactions between the appellant and his family members with the respondent no.1, there would be no question of the Arbitral Tribunal allowing the claims made by the appellant on the basis of those Rules framed by the Multi Commodity Exchange or the directives issued by the Multi Commodity Exchange on 30 September, 2009. No reliance was placed by the appellant and his family members on those Rules in the statement of claim filed before the Arbitral Tribunal.\n36. The arguments advanced before the Arbitral Tribunal by the appellant and his family members were inconsistent with the pleadings filed before the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal after considering the agreement entered into between the appellant and the respondent no.1 has rendered a finding that the appellant had entered into an agreement with the respondent no.1 to trade in securities and derivatives transactions. The terms of the agreement did not spell out that the same was in the nature of mutual fund deposit as contended by the appellant during the oral hearing. The Arbitral Tribunal had interpreted the said agreement and had recorded a finding that there was no transaction in the nature of mutual fund deposit. The possible interpretation of the agreement entered into between the appellant and the respondent no.1 by the Arbitral Tribunal was rightly not substituted by another interpretation by the learned Single Judge.\n37. A perusal of the award clearly indicates that Arbitral Tribunal has referred to the various correspondence forming part of the record before the Arbitral Tribunal and has recorded a finding that by letter dated 13 May, 2011, whatever problems the appellant had with the respondent no.1 were resolved and the contention of the appellant that the respondents traded on their whims and fancies without obtaining the consent of the appellant and his family members was unwarranted. It was thus not open to the appellant to contend in the statement of claim that what was transacted by them with the respondent no.1 was a mutual fund account or that they had not placed any orders for trading or that the respondent no.1 had carried on the trading activity without the knowledge and consent of the appellant.\n38. The Arbitral Tribunal also dealt with the affidavit filed by Mr.Rajesh Sharma dated 13 June, 2011 allegedly admitting the liability on behalf of the respondent no.1 and has rightly recorded a finding that the said affidavit reflected a private arrangement between the appellant and Mr. Rajesh Sharma and was thus not binding upon the respondent no.1. The learned counsel for the appellant could not dispute before this Court that the 3P World was appointed as the authorized person by the respondent no.1 and not the said Mr. Rajesh Sharma. He also could not demonstrate before this Court as to how the said Finance Factory managed by Mr.Rajesh Chheda came in picture in the transaction between the appellant and the respondent no.1 with authority and consent of the respondent no.1. The learned Single Judge rightly did not interfere with the findings of fact rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal. There is no substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Arbitral Tribunal did not deal with any of the arguments advanced by the appellant and his family members in the impugned awards. The record of the arbitral proceedings speak for itself. There is thus no substance in this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant.\n39. The learned counsel for the appellant could not demonstrate before this Court that the letter dated 14 April, 2011 from the appellant to the Finance Factory was ever served upon the respondent no.1. Be that as it may, there was no such transaction between the said Finance Factory and the respondent no.1. The said Finance Factory was personal advisors of Madgavkar family. The respondent no.1 was not concerned at all with the said Finance Factory. The appellant could not dispute before this Court that the said 3P World was the sole proprietor concerned of Ms.Rashmi M.T. who alone was appointed as authorized agent of the respondent no.1 and not the said Mr. Rajesh Sharma.\n40. In our view, the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 is right in his submission that the letter dated 13 May, 2011 addressed by Mr.Anil Madgavkar to the respondent no.1 has to be read with email dated 8 May, 2011, which was even according to the appellant was not only on his behalf but also on behalf of his family members. All through out the said Mr. Anil Madgavkar was representing the entire family members in those transaction with the respondent no.1 had addressed all the letters on behalf of the entire family and also in the arbitration proceedings. We are thus not inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the said letter dated 13 May, 2011 was only on behalf of the said Mr. Anil Madgavkar.\n41. The appellant did not make any application before the Arbitral Tribunal for leading any oral evidence. The onus was on the appellant to prove that the respondent no.2 was an authorized agent of the respondent no.1 and had admitted the alleged liability of the respondent no.1 to the appellant and his family members, which onus the appellant and his family members had failed to discharge. The appellant failed to prove before the Arbitral Tribunal that he and his family members had made any request to the respondent no.1 for closure of the accounts at any point of time.\n42. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in case of Bonanza Commodities Brokers (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, this Court in the said judgment had held that since the member of the Multi Commodity Exchange had failed to carry out his obligation of squaring up the transactions when there was a shortfall in the margin money which according to the member was not paid by the constituent though demanded, the member cannot be allowed to make any claim against the constituent for such unauthorized transactions. In that context, the learned Single Judge had held that the by-laws of the MCX referred to in the said judgment were mandatory and the transaction carried out in violation of such mandatory by- laws would not make the broker entitled to make any claim against the constituent based on such unauthorized trade effected by the member of the exchange. In our view, the said judgment would not even apply remotedly to the facts of this case.\n43. There is no dispute in the proposition of law that the Rules and by-laws of the Multi Commodity Exchange Limited are mandatory and binding on the member as well as constituent. However, in the facts of this case, since the appellant failed to prove that the respondent no.2 was an authorized agent of the respondent no.1, the appellant cannot take shelter of the Rules providing that the member shall be responsible of all acts, omission and commission of the authorized person or that all the acts, omission and commission of the authorized shall be deemed to be those of the member.\n44. Under Rule 13 of the said Rules, it is clearly provided that the members desirous of dealing through authorized person are required to seek approval of the exchange by submitting an application as per the modes specified by the exchange duly completed in all respect to the membership department of the exchange as per the regulatory frame work of the SEBI and also the circulars issued by the said MCX from time to time. The appellant did not produce any document in support of the case that the respondent no.2 had acted as an authorized person on behalf of the respondent no.1 pursuant to any approval granted by the Multi Commodity Exchange in the prescribed manner under Rule 13 by following the procedure for appointment of such authorized person under Rule 13(iii).\n45. In our view, Rule 13(V) which provides that the member shall be responsible in all acts, omission and commission for the authorized person would apply only if such authorized person is appointed pursuant to the approval of the Multi Commodity Exchange in the manner prescribed under Rule 13(iii) after following the eligibility criteria and not otherwise. In our view, conditions prescribed under Rules 13(v) and 13(vi) were not satisfied in the facts of this case. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in case of Kaberi Mondal (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, a learned Single Judge of this Court in the said judgment after adverting to the judgment of this Court in case of Bonanza Commodities Brokers (supra) has reiterated that the by-laws of the Multi Commodity Exchange of India are mandatory and the broker member cannot make any claim against the constituent based on any unauthorized trade effected by him. The said judgment also would not advance the case of the appellant.\n46. The powers of the Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act are very limited. The learned counsel for the appellant could not make out a case for interference with the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge. This batch of appeals are thus devoid of merits.\n47. We therefore pass the following order :- (a) The Appeal Nos.8 of 2021, 5 of 2021, 6 of 2021, 7 of 2021, 10 of 2021, 11 of 2021, 12 of 2021 and 13 of 2021 are dismissed. (b) In view of dismissal of aforesaid appeals, all pending Interim Applications in the said appeals are also dismissed. (c) There shall be no order as to costs.",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12812 OF 2024 | Sincere Securities Private Limited & Ors. v. Chandrakant Khemka & Ors. | 05/08/2025",
+      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12812 OF 2024 | Sincere Securities Private Limited & Ors. v. Chandrakant Khemka & Ors.",
+      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
+      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
+      "case_record": "Nandini Impex Private Limited, the corporate debtor, secured ₹3 crores each from Sincere Securities Private Limited (appellant 1) and Noble Dealcom Private Limited along with Jodhpur Properties and Finance Private Limited (appellants 2 & 3) via MoUs in February 2019. These loans were secured by depositing title deeds for the front and rear portions of the ground floor of White House, New Delhi. Following loan defaults, conveyance deeds were executed on February 27, 2020, transferring title of these portions to the respective appellants. Simultaneously, Leave and License Agreements allowed Nandini Impex to retain possession on payment of ₹6 lakhs monthly rent for each portion. Appellants terminated these agreements on May 8, 2020, and initiated eviction suits due to rental payment defaults. UCO Bank, the sole Committee of Creditors member, initiated CIRP against Nandini Impex on September 20, 2022. The CoC decided the property was unnecessary due to high rentals and directed the Resolution Professional to return possession to the appellants. Chandrakant Khemka, a suspended director, objected to this decision. The NCLT, on August 7, 2023, directed the Resolution Professional to deliver possession to the appellants. Chandrakant Khemka appealed to the NCLAT, which, on November 12, 2024, set aside the NCLT order, citing Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC, and remanded the matter. The Supreme Court noted that UCO Bank and the current Resolution Professional supported the property's return, while Chandrakant Khemka refused to pay rent.",
+      "generated_judgment": "### Facts  \n1. Nandini Impex Private Limited (the corporate debtor) obtained three separate loans of ₹3 crore each from Sincere Securities Pvt. Ltd. (appellant 1) and Noble Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. together with Jodhpur Properties and Finance Pvt. Ltd. (appellants 2 & 3) pursuant to MoUs executed in February 2019.  \n2. The loans were secured by the title deeds of the front‑ and rear‑portions of the ground‑floor of the White‑House premises, New Delhi, which were later handed over to the secured‑creditors by conveyance deeds dated 27 February 2020.  \n3. Simultaneously the parties executed Leave‑and‑License Agreements permitting Nandini Impex to retain possession of the conveyed portions on payment of ₹6 lakhs per month as rent to each secured‑creditor.  \n4. The secured‑creditors terminated the Leave‑and‑License Agreements on 8 May 2020 and instituted civil eviction suits on the ground of non‑payment of rent.  \n5. UCO Bank, the sole member of the Committee of Creditors (CoC), admitted a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Nandini Impex on 20 September 2022.  \n6. The CoC, after evaluating the estate, concluded that the White‑House premises were “unnecessary” for the resolution‑plan because the rental receipts were high, and directed the Resolution Professional (RP) to return possession of the premises to the secured‑creditor appellants.  \n7. Chandrakant Khemka, a director who had been suspended from the board of Nandini Impex, objected to the CoC’s decision.  \n8. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) on 7 August 2023 ordered the RP to deliver possession of the premises to the secured‑creditor appellants.  \n9. Khemka appealed to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), which on 12 November 2024 set aside the NCLT order, holding that the CoC’s reliance on Section 14(1)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was erroneous and remanded the matter.  \n10. The Supreme Court, noting that the RP and UCO Bank supported the return of possession while Khemka refused to pay rent, recorded observations but did not pronounce a substantive order on the merits.  \n\n### Issues  \n1. Whether the appeal filed by the suspended director, Chandrakant Khemka, is maintainable under Section 14(4) IBC, i.e., whether a suspended director has a statutory right to raise an “objection” that can stall or set aside the CoC’s decision.  \n2. (Assuming maintainability) Whether the CoC correctly applied the “unnecessary property” test under Section 14(1)(d) IBC in classifying the White‑House premises as unnecessary.  \n3. (Assuming maintainability) Whether the NCLAT was correct in setting aside the NCLT order on the basis of the alleged mis‑application of Section 14(1)(d).  \n\n### Rules  \n1. **Section 14(4), IBC** – Allows an “objection” to a resolution‑plan only from a “creditor” (including a financial or operational creditor) or a “debtor” as defined in the Code. The objection must be filed within the prescribed period and be in respect of the resolution‑plan as a whole.  \n2. **Section 14(1)(d), IBC** – Permits the CoC to deem a “property” “unnecessary” for the purpose of the resolution‑plan if the property is not required for the revival of the corporate debtor and its sale would maximise the value of the assets.  \n3. **Section 31, IBC** – Deals with the failure to comply with the terms of the approved resolution‑plan.  \n4. The Supreme Court of India, in *Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Hon’ble Supreme Court* (2022) 4 SCC 344, clarified that only persons recognised as “creditors” or “debtor” under the Code have locus standi to file an objection under Section 14(4).  \n5. The NCLAT is empowered to examine whether the CoC’s decision is in accordance with the provisions of the IBC and may set aside an NCLT order only on a finding of error of law or jurisdiction.  \n\n### Analysis  \n**1. Maintainability of the appeal (Issue 1)**  \n- The appellant, Chandrakant Khemka, is a *suspended* director of Nandini Impex. Under Section 14(4) the statutory “objection” is limited to a *creditor* or the *debtor* (the corporate debtor itself). A director, whether active or suspended, does not fall within either category unless he is also a creditor. No allegation is made that Khemka holds any claim as a financial or operational creditor.  \n- The Supreme Court’s pronouncement in *Swiss Ribbons* confirms that a director, absent creditor status, lacks locus standi to raise a Section 14(4) objection. Consequently, Khemka’s objection is a personal grievance and not a statutory objection.  \n- As the appeal is premised on the existence of a valid objection under Section 14(4), the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The appeal is therefore *not maintainable*.  \n\n**2. (Sub‑issues) – Not proceeded**  \nSince the appeal is not maintainable, the court does not need to address the substantive questions concerning the “unnecessary property” test or the correctness of the NCLAT’s order.  \n\n### Conclusion  \nThe appeal filed by the suspended director, Chandrakant Khemka, is not maintainable because he does not possess the statutory standing required under Section 14(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code to raise an objection to the CoC’s decision. Accordingly, the appeal must be **DISMISSED**.",
+      "reference_judgment": "1. This appeal, under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 20161, calls in question the order dated 12.11.2024 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi2, allowing Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1064 of 2023 filed by Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, and setting aside the order dated 07.08.2023 of the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench3, in CP(IB) No. 1377/KB/2020. Thereby, the NCLT had directed delivery of possession of the property in question to the appellants herein.\n1 for short, “IBC”\n2 for short, “NCLAT”\n3 for short, “NCLT”\n\n12. Facts, relevant to this adjudication, need recounting at some length. On 13.02.2019, a Memorandum of Understanding was executed by and between Nandini Impex Private Limited, which became a corporate debtor under the IBC thereafter, represented by its Director, Chandrakant Khemka, on the one hand, and Noble Dealcom Private Limited along with Jodhpur Properties and Finance Private Limited, appellant Nos. 2 and 3 herein, on the other hand, whereby Nandini Impex Private Limited availed financial assistance to the tune of ₹3 crores from them and secured the same through deposit of the title deeds relating to the rear portion of the ground floor of White House, 1/18-20, Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi. Another Memorandum of Understanding was executed by Nandini Impex Private Limited on 15.02.2019 with Sincere Securities Private Limited, appellant No.1 herein, for availing a loan of ₹3 crores from it and the same was secured through deposit of the title deeds of the front portion of the ground floor of White House. As Nandini Impex Private Limited failed to repay the loans, separate conveyance deeds were executed by it on 27.02.2020 transferring the title over the front and rear portions of the ground floor of White House to the appellants respectively. However, two separate Leave and License Agreements were executed simultaneously on the same day, whereby possession of the front and rear portions of the ground floor of White House was retained by Nandini Impex Private Limited on payment of rentals of ₹6 lakhs per month for each portion. Owing to the default in payment of the rentals, the appellants terminated the Leave and License Agreements on 08.05.2020. Eviction suits were also instituted by the appellants for regaining possession of the subject ground floor portions along with other reliefs.\n\n3. While so, UCO Bank, respondent No. 3 herein, filed a petition under Section 7 of the IBC against Nandini Impex Private Limited. The same was admitted on 20.09.2022 by the NCLT, initiating corporate insolvency resolution process4 against Nandini Impex Private Limited, the corporate debtor. Significantly, UCO Bank was the sole member of its Committee of Creditors5. The appellants, as operational creditors, filed their respective claims before the Interim Resolution Professional appointed for the corporate debtor and the said claims were accepted in toto. At that stage, UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, deputed the Resolution Professional to visit the subject property on the ground floor of White House and decide whether there was any need to retain the same by paying huge rentals. Thereafter, at its meeting held on 06.04.2023, the CoC decided that there was no requirement to hold on to the subject property and requested the Resolution Professional to hand over the possession thereof to the appellants. Chandrakant Khemka, being a suspended director of the corporate debtor, raised objections to this move. Interlocutory Applications came to be filed by the appellants in 2023 seeking a direction from the NCLT to return the subject property to them. By order dated 07.08.2023, the NCLT noted the decision of the CoC that the subject property was not required and directed the Resolution Professional to deliver possession of the same to the appellants. Aggrieved thereby, Chandrakant Khemka filed an appeal before the NCLAT. By way of the impugned order dated 12.11.2024, the NCLAT allowed his appeal and set aside the order dated 07.08.2023 passed by the NCLT, observing that Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC barred recovery by an owner of property during the CIRP, when such property was occupied by the corporate debtor. The NCLAT remanded the matter to the NCLT to consider the issue afresh.\n4 for short, “CIRP”\n5 for short, “CoC”\n\n4. By order dated 25.11.2024, this Court permitted the proceedings before the NCLT to continue, subject to the final outcome of this appeal. This Court also noted that UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, supported the appellants in so far as return of possession of the subject property was concerned. Further, this Court noted that the learned counsel appearing on advance notice for Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, conceded that he was not willing to pay the current rent or the arrears of rent, post initiation of the CIRP. This Court also recorded that the Resolution Professional did not wish to retain possession of the property in question.\n\n5. Thereafter, on 14.07.2025, upon being informed that a new Resolution Professional was appointed for the corporate debtor, this Court required him to make known his stand by way of a written affidavit. Pursuant thereto, Pratim Bayal, the new Resolution Professional, filed affidavit dated 17.07.2025. Therein, he categorically stated that, given the extremely limited operations of the corporate debtor at present and the extremely high rent of the White House property, it was not feasible and was totally unnecessary for the corporate debtor to continue to hold on to the said property. He, therefore, reiterated the statement made by his predecessor before the NCLT to the effect that the property could be returned to the appellants.\n\n6. Given the aforestated facts, it is clear that except for Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, who is a suspended director of the corporate debtor, all other parties are at consensus that the property in question need not be retained by the corporate debtor, as it is not required by it and imposes a huge financial burden on it, in terms of the lease/license rentals payable therefor. It is, however, the case of Chandrakant Khemka that the erstwhile Resolution Professional of the corporate debtor made a factually incorrect statement before the NCLT, leading to the passing of the unreasoned order dated 07.08.2023 and, therefore, the NCLAT was justified in remanding the matter for a comprehensive adjudication afresh. It is his further case that the property in question is essential for the functioning of the corporate debtor and Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC barred its return to the appellants.\n\n7. Despite all others involved in the CIRP being in favour of doing so, Chandrakant Khemka alone opposes the return of the subject property to the appellants. His lofty claim that the rent due to the appellants would stand secured by the provisions of the IBC does not stand to reason, Further, Chandrakant Khemka is himself not willing to bear the expenditure for retaining the possession of the subject property.\n\n8. UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, echoed the stand of the Resolution Professional, by filing separate written submissions. Reference was made therein to the decision of this Court in K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank and others6. Paragraph 52 of the decision reads as follows:\n<QUOTE> 52. As aforesaid, upon receipt of a “rejected” resolution plan the adjudicating authority (NCLT) is not expected to do anything more; but is obligated to initiate liquidation process under Section 33(1) of the I&B Code. The legislature has not endowed the adjudicating authority (NCLT) with the jurisdiction or authority to analyse or evaluate the commercial decision of CoC much less to enquire into the justness of the rejection of the resolution plan by the dissenting financial creditors. From the legislative history and the background in which the I&B Code has been enacted, it is noticed that a completely new approach has been adopted for speeding up the recovery of the debt due from the defaulting companies. In the new approach, there is a calm period followed by a swift resolution process to be completed within 270 days (outer limit) failing which, initiation of liquidation process has been made inevitable and mandatory. In the earlier regime, the corporate debtor could indefinitely continue to enjoy the protection given under Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 or under other such enactments which has now been forsaken. Besides, the commercial wisdom of CoC has been given paramount status without any judicial intervention, for ensuring completion of the stated processes within the timelines prescribed by the I&B Code. There is an intrinsic assumption that financial creditors are fully informed about the viability of the corporate debtor and feasibility of the proposed resolution plan. They act on the basis of thorough examination of the proposed resolution plan and assessment made by their team of experts. The opinion on the subject-matter expressed by them after due deliberations in CoC meetings through voting, as per voting shares, is a collective business decision. The legislature, consciously, has not provided any ground to challenge the “commercial wisdom” of the individual financial creditors or their collective decision before the adjudicating authority. That is made non-justiciable. </QUOTE>\n\nThe commercial wisdom of the CoC must, accordingly, be given primacy during the CIRP. When UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, decided that retention of the possession of the subject property was not in the interest of the CIRP, that decision must be given the respect that is lawfully due to it.\n6 (2019) 12 SCC 150\n\n9. Lastly, we may note that Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC states that once the adjudicating authority, by order, declares a moratorium, it would prohibit, amongst other acts, the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or is in the possession of the corporate debtor. In the case on hand, the chronology of events manifests that, at its very first meeting held on 20.02.2023, the CoC discussed the issue of retention of the ground floor of White House. It asked the Resolution Professional to visit the said premises and decide as to whether holding on to the same was required, spending a huge amount towards rentals. Thereafter, at its third meeting held on 06.04.2023, the CoC took note of the Resolution Professional’s report that it was not feasible to hold on to the subject property, as only 8 to 9 staff members were there and the revenue generated would not be sufficient to pay the lease/license rentals. The CoC recorded that the matter was duly discussed and the Resolution Professional was asked to hand over possession as early as possible, as there was no requirement to hold on to the said premises spending such a huge amount towards rentals.\n\n10. It was only thereafter that the appellants filed Interlocutory Applications before the NCLT praying for a direction to deliver possession of the subject property to them along with other reliefs. It is, therefore, manifest that this was not a simple case of the owner of the property seeking recovery of possession thereof from the corporate debtor, which would be barred by the express language of Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC. On the other hand, as already noted hereinbefore, it was the CoC and the Resolution Professional who were and still are desirous of returning the possession of the property in question to the appellants, keeping in mind the adverse financial implications of retaining the same. It appears that Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, who is not willing to personally bear the expenditure for such retention, is bent upon stalling that process for some undisclosed and extraneous reasons.\n\n11. This was, therefore, not a situation which warranted an order of remand in the context of Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC. The order dated 12.11.2024 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1064 of 2023, is accordingly set aside and the order dated 07.08.2023 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, in CP(IB) No. 1377/KB/2020, is restored. The Resolution Professional shall act upon and implement the said order expeditiously.\n\nThe appeal is allowed, in the aforesaid terms.\n\nPending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -613,26 +613,26 @@
     },
     "meta": {
       "sample_id": "S015",
-      "case_id": "141",
+      "case_id": "4274",
       "experiment": "ablation_issue",
-      "model": "phi-4",
-      "source_file": "S015__ablation_issue__phi-4__141.json",
-      "court": "BOMBAY HIGH COURT",
-      "judgment_date": "07/04/2021",
-      "machine_error_stage": "rules",
+      "model": "gpt-oss-120b-noreason",
+      "source_file": "S015__ablation_issue__gpt-oss-120b-noreason__4274.json",
+      "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
+      "judgment_date": "05/08/2025",
+      "machine_error_stage": "issues",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication"
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue misframing"
     }
   },
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "DELHI HIGH COURT | FAO(OS) - 47 of 2020 | Ram Sarup Lugani And Anr. v. Nirmal Lugani And Ors. | 19/10/2020",
-      "case_details": "Case: FAO(OS) - 47 of 2020 | Ram Sarup Lugani And Anr. v. Nirmal Lugani And Ors.",
-      "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED",
-      "case_record": "Appellants/plaintiffs filed a civil suit in April 2019. Summons were issued, and respondents/defendants filed their written statement. On July 23, 2019, the court granted appellants four weeks for replication. On September 30, 2019, the Joint Registrar closed their right to file replication, noting over two months had passed without filing or extension application. Appellants challenged this order by filing a Chamber Appeal. They argued the delay, attributable to voluminous pleadings (125+ pages, 500+ documents) and appellant no.1's advanced age and medical condition, was not deliberate and should be condoned. They contended that Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 (DHC Rules), which prescribes 30 days + 15 days for replication, is directory, not mandatory, drawing analogy with Order VIII Rule 1 CPC (citing Desh Raj). They also argued that Rule 5's provision for the Registrar to place the matter \"for appropriate orders before the Court\" implies judicial discretion for further extension. Furthermore, they invoked DHC Rules 14 & 16 (Court's power to dispense with compliance and inherent powers) and the High Court's inherent constitutional powers, asserting these allowed condonation of delay beyond 45 days. On August 6, 2020, the learned Single Judge dismissed the Chamber Appeal, holding replication could not be filed beyond 45 days as prescribed under Rule 5 of the DHC Rules, and there was no power to condone delay beyond that period. The present appeal was filed against the Single Judge's order.",
-      "generated_judgment": "<think>\nOkay, let's tackle this legal judgment. First, I need to understand the case thoroughly. The appellants filed a civil suit in April 2019. The defendants responded, and the court gave them four weeks to replicate. But the Joint Registrar closed their right to file replication on September 30, 2019, saying two months had passed without an extension. The appellants appealed, arguing the delay was due to voluminous documents and the plaintiff's age and health. They claim Rule 5 of the DHC Rules is directory, not mandatory, and that the court can extend beyond 45 days using inherent powers.\n\nThe Single Judge dismissed the appeal, saying replication couldn't go beyond 45 days. Now, the appellants are appealing that decision. \n\nSo, the main issues here are whether the delay was excusable and if the rules are mandatory or directory. The rules mentioned are Rule 5 of DHC Rules, Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, and the inherent powers of the court. \n\nI need to check if Rule 5 is mandatory or directory. The appellants are citing Desh Raj, which might be a case where a rule was considered directory. Also, the DHC Rules 14 and 16 mention the court's power to dispense with compliance. The High Court's inherent powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could also be relevant. \n\nThe analysis should consider whether the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and if the court has discretion to condone beyond the 45 days. The Single Judge said no, but the appellants argue that the rules allow for judicial discretion. \n\nI need to structure this into the FIRAC framework. The facts are the timeline, the reasons for delay, the rules cited. The issues are whether the delay is excusable and if the rules are mandatory. The rules are the DHC Rules, CPC, and inherent powers. The analysis would weigh the arguments of both sides, considering the circumstances and the flexibility of the rules. The conclusion would depend on whether the court can extend beyond the 45 days based on the rules and the circumstances.\n</think>\n\n### Facts:  \n1. Appellants/plaintiffs filed a civil suit in April 2019, and respondents/defendants filed their written statement.  \n2. On July 23, 2019, the court granted appellants four weeks (i.e., 28 days) to file replication.  \n3. The Joint Registrar closed the right to file replication on September 30, 2019, citing that over two months had passed without filing or an extension application.  \n4. Appellants challenged this order by filing a Chamber Appeal, arguing the delay was attributable to voluminous pleadings (125+ pages, 500+ documents) and appellant no.1’s advanced age and medical condition.  \n5. Appellants contended Rule 5 of the DHC Rules (30 days + 15 days for replication) is directory, not mandatory, and that the Registrar’s power to refer the matter to the court for “appropriate orders” implies judicial discretion.  \n6. They invoked DHC Rules 14 & 16 (court’s power to dispense with compliance and inherent powers) and the High Court’s constitutional inherent powers to condone delays beyond 45 days.  \n7. The Single Judge dismissed the Chamber Appeal, holding replication could not be filed beyond 45 days under Rule 5 and no power existed to condone delays beyond that.  \n8. The present appeal challenges the Single Judge’s order.  \n\n---\n\n### Issues:  \n1. Whether the delay in filing replication was attributable to unavoidable circumstances and thus excusable under the DHC Rules and inherent powers of the court.  \n2. Whether Rule 5 of the DHC Rules is mandatory or directory, and whether the court has discretion to extend the replication period beyond 45 days.  \n\n---\n\n### Rules:  \n1. **Rule 5 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 (DHC Rules)**: Prescribes a 30-day period for replication, with an additional 15 days for the Registrar to place the matter “for appropriate orders before the Court.”  \n2. **Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)**: Provides for condonation of delay in filing pleadings if the delay is not deliberate.  \n3. **DHC Rules 14 & 16**: Grant the court inherent powers to dispense with compliance with procedural rules and exercise inherent authority.  \n4. **Inherent Constitutional Powers**: Under Article 226 of the Constitution, High Courts have inherent powers to ensure justice, including condoning procedural defaults.  \n5. **Desh Raj v. State of Punjab (1975)**: A precedent where a rule was deemed directory, not mandatory, allowing flexibility in its application.  \n\n---\n\n### Analysis:  \n1. **Nature of Rule 5**: The appellants argue Rule 5 is directory, not mandatory, based on the phrase “for appropriate orders before the Court,” which implies judicial discretion. This aligns with the precedent in *Desh Raj*, where procedural rules were treated as directory when they allowed for judicial flexibility. The Single Judge’s rigid interpretation of Rule 5 as mandatory overlooks this textual ambiguity.  \n   \n2. **Excusable Delay**: The appellants’ delay was caused by voluminous pleadings (125+ pages, 500+ documents) and appellant no.1’s medical condition. These are recognized as unavoidable circumstances under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC and the court’s inherent powers. The Single Judge’s dismissal of these factors ignores the factual context and the burden on the appellants to comply with a procedural deadline under exceptional circumstances.  \n\n3. **Inherent Powers of the Court**: DHC Rules 14 & 16, along with the High Court’s constitutional inherent powers under Article 226, empower the court to condone delays when justice demands it. The Single Judge’s refusal to exercise this discretion contravenes the spirit of procedural flexibility and the principle of justice being done.  \n\n4. **Procedural Rigidity vs. Judicial Discretion**: While Rule 5 sets a 45-day deadline, the Registrar’s role in referring the matter to the court for “appropriate orders” explicitly leaves room for judicial extension. The Single Judge’s rigid adherence to the 45-day limit without considering the appellants’ specific circumstances constitutes an error in applying the rules.  \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion:  \nThe appeal is **ALLOWED**. The Single Judge erred in treating Rule 5 as a mandatory deadline without considering the appellants’ excusable delay and the court’s inherent powers to condone procedural defaults. The facts demonstrate that the delay was unavoidable, and the rules permit judicial discretion to extend the replication period. The High Court’s inherent authority and the principles of justice require a departure from the rigid application of the 45-day limit in this case.",
-      "reference_judgment": "1. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 06.08.2020 passed by a learned Single Judge whereby, Chamber Appeal registered as OA 122/2019, filed by the appellants/plaintiffs in CS(OS) 182/2019, challenging the order dated 30.09.2020, passed by the learned Joint Registrar closing their right to file the replication in response to the written statement of the respondents/defendants, has been dismissed.\n2. The appellants/plaintiffs herein had instituted a suit on the Original Side of the court in April, 2019 with the following prayers:- \"a. A Decree of Declaration thereby declaring that defendants 1 to 6 are not eligible to continue as Trustee of defendant no. 7 Trust and hence cease to be Trustees of the said Trust and consequently appoint an Administrator to frame a scheme for appointing new Trustees in place of defendants 1 to 6, while retaining plaintiffs as trustees. b. A Decree of Permanent Injunction restraining defendant no.1 from representing herself as a Trustee of Defendant Trust. c. A Decree of Mandatory Injunction directing the defendants to deposit all original title deeds/ lease deeds and other ownership documents pertaining to Sector 55 and Sector 62 Schools, with plaintiff no.1 and also return all assets/properties of defendant Trust or of the schools running under the aegis of defendant Trust, i.e. 'Gurugram Public School' to the respective Schools. d. A Decree of Recovery of amount from defendants 1 to 6, assessed by a valuer appointed by this Hon'ble Court, for the loss suffered by the Sector 55 School of Defendant Trust, due to loss of vehicles bearing nos. HR26BE4849 and HR26BP2892. e. A Decree of rendition of accounts directing the defendants to render accounts for the period 2011 till date of decree, and further direct the defendants to make good all losses caused by their acts of omission and commission and consequently to replenish all such amounts in to the trust with interest. f. Award cost of suit in favour of plaintiffs. Such other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may kindly be granted in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.\"\n3. Summons were issued in the suit and the case was adjourned to 23.07.2019. In the meantime, written statement was filed by the respondents/defendants. When the matter was listed in court on 23.07.2019, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs had stated that he had received a copy of the written statement and the court had granted him four weeks' to file the replication and the affidavit of admission/denial of documents. The suit was directed to be posted before the learned Joint Registrar on 30.09.2019, for further proceedings. On 30.09.2019, when learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs had sought for more time from the learned Joint Registrar to file the replication, noting that over two months had lapsed reckoned from 23.7.2019, he had closed their right to do so and directed that admission/denial of the documents of the respondents/defendants be carried out. The order passed by the learned Joint Registrar on 30.09.2019, reads as under: \"Written statement and affidavit of admission/denial of documents filed on behalf of defendants no.1 to 6. Copy supplied. No replication to the written statement filed. Learned counsel for plaintiff has submitted that he is going to file replication within two weeks along with appropriate application, but same is strongly opposed by learned counsel for defendants on the ground that as per Chapter 7 Rule 5 Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, only 45 days has been granted to the plaintiff to file replication including 15 days time of extension on application, but neither such application moved nor replication filed within 30 days. On 23.07.2019, plaintiff sought time to file replication, but no replication has been filed despite lapse of more than two months and no ground is made out for further extension of time. Accordingly, opportunity of plaintiff to file replication is hereby closed. Admission/denial of documents on behalf of defendant qua the documents of plaintiff carried out. Learned counsel for defendant has admitted six documents of plaintiff which are Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-6. Rest of the documents are denied. On the other hand, plaintiff has not filed any affidavit of admission/denial of documents qua the documents of defendants due to no admission/denial is carried out on behalf of plaintiff and consequences of non-filing of affidavit of admission/denial shall follow. List the matter before the Hon'ble Court for issues/further direction on the date already fixed i.e. 01.11.2019.\"\n4. The above order of the Joint Registrar was challenged by the appellants/plaintiffs by filing a Chamber Appeal. Vide judgment/order dated 06.08.2020 impugned herein, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the said Chamber Appeal holding that the replication could not be filed beyond the period of 45 days, as prescribed under Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court(Original Side) Rules, 2018 (for short 'DHC Rules') and there is no power to condone the delay beyond the time prescribed under the DHC Rules. Aggrieved by the said order, the present appeal has been filed.\n5. The short question which arises for our consideration is as to whether in a non-commercial ordinary civil suit, the period prescribed for filing the replication under Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the DHC Rules is directory or mandatory in nature and whether the time prescribed therein, even if not extendable by the Joint Registrar, can still be extended by the court.\n6. Arguing for the appellants/plaintiffs, Mr. Tanmaya Mehta, learned counsel submitted that the respondents 1 to 6 had filed a written statement running into over 125 pages and they had filed over 500 pages of documents. Due to the voluminous pleadings in the written statement and the documents filed and the medical condition of the appellant No.1, who is the Managing Trustee of the respondent No.7/Trust and is 93 years of age with constraints in his movement, the appellants and the counsel took some time to prepare the replication. The said delay was not deliberate and ought to have been condoned. Learned counsel places reliance on Desh Raj v. Balkishan, reported as (2020) 2 SCC 708 wherein, in an appeal arising from a decision of the Delhi High Court, while interpreting the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC, in circumstances where the defendant therein had filed his written statement after a delay of 95 days beyond the maximum extendable period provided under Proviso 2 of Rule 1, Order VIII of the CPC, the Supreme Court has held that the said provision is only directory and not mandatory. Drawing an analogy with the fact situation in the said decision, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs contended that the time period prescribed in Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the DHC Rules is also directory in nature and therefore, it cannot be said that the court is powerless to condone the delay and accept the replication beyond the time prescribed therein.\n7. Seeking to distinguish the way Rule 4 and Rule 5 of the DHC Rules are worded, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs submitted that unlike Rule 4, that mandates the Registrar to close the right to file the written statement upon expiry of 120 days, no such rigorous language has been used in Rule 5. Rather, Rule 5 stipulates that upon expiry of 45 days, the Registrar has to place the matter before court for further orders. Therefore, even if the Registrar has no power to condone the delay beyond the period of 45 days, the court can condone the delay even beyond the said period and take the replication on record.\n8. Adverting to Rule 16 in Chapter I of the DHC Rules, learned counsel for the appellant sought to urge that the said Rule stipulates that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of court and the said provision could have been well invoked by the learned Single Judge in the present case. Placing reliance on Rule 14 of Chapter I that empowers the court to dispense with making compliance of the DHC Rules for sufficient cause shown it was argued that Rules 14 and 16 vest sufficient powers in the court to relax the period prescribed in Rule 5 and permit filing of the replication beyond the period of 45 days. It was sought to be canvassed that if it is held that there is no power vested in the court to condone the delay in filing the replication beyond the period of 45 days, then Rules 14 and Rule 16 will become superfluous.\n9. Another argument sought to be advanced on behalf of the appellants/plaintiffs was that when Rule 5 provides that after the period of 45 days, the Registrar has to place the matter before the court for passing appropriate orders, it postulates that discretion still vests in the court to accept the replication even beyond the period of 45 days, on sufficient reasons being offered as to why the same was not filed within the prescribed time. Learned counsel submitted that if the Rule is not construed in this manner, the words 'for appropriate orders' used in Rule 5, will be rendered nugatory.\n10. Referring to the scheme of Chapter VII of the Rules which shows that after the replication, parties are to proceed with admission/denial of documents which the Registrar can get done himself, learned counsel contended that the very fact that the matter has to be placed in court, shows that there is ample power in the court to accept the replication filed beyond the period of 45 days and that is the reason why the matter is required to be placed before the court to consider as to whether sufficient cause has been shown by a party to condone the delay even beyond the period of 45 days. Lastly, it was submitted that the High Court being a Constitutional court, has the inherent power to accept replications even beyond the time prescribed in the DHC Rules and the said power cannot be circumscribed or curtailed in any manner.\n11. A quick glance at the rule position first. Rule 4 falling under Chapter I of the DHC Rules is the definition clause which defines various terms used in the Rules. Rule 4(e) defines \"The Court\" or \"this Court\", while Rule 4(k) defines 'Registrar' and read as under:\n\"4. Definitions. -In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires: ... ... (e) \"The Court\" or \"this Court\" means the Delhi High Court; .... ... (k) \"Registrar\" means and includes the Registrar and Joint Registrar, respectively of the Court, and includes any other officer of the Court to whom the powers and functions of the Registrar under these Rules, may be delegated or assigned;\"\n12. Chapter VII of the DHC Rules lays down the procedure for appearance by the defendant, of filing of the written statement, set off, counter-claim and replication. Rule 4 and Rule 5 of Chapter VII are relevant for this case and read as under:\n\"4. Extension of time for filing written statement.-If the Court is satisfied that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause for exceptional and unavoidable reasons in filing the written statement within 30 days, it may extend the time for filing the same by a further period not exceeding 90 days, but not thereafter. For such extension of time, the party in delay shall be burdened with costs as deemed appropriate. The written statement shall not be taken on record unless such costs have been paid/ deposited. In case the defendant fails to file the affidavit of admission/ denial of documents filed by the plaintiff, the documents filed by the plaintiff shall be deemed to be admitted. In case, no written statement is filed within the extended time also, the Registrar may pass orders for closing the right to file the written statement.\n5. Replication.-The replication, if any, shall be filed within 30 days of receipt of the written statement. If the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause for exceptional and unavoidable reasons in filing the replication within 30 days, it may extend the time for filing the same by a further period not exceeding 15 days but not thereafter. For such extension, the plaintiff shall be burdened with costs, as deemed appropriate. The replication shall not be taken on record, unless such costs have been paid/ deposited. In case no replication is filed within the extended time also, the Registrar shall forthwith place the matter for appropriate orders before the Court. An advance copy of the replication together with legible copies of all documents in possession and power of plaintiff, that it seeks to file along with the replication, shall be served on the defendant and the replication together with the said documents shall not be accepted unless it contains an endorsement of service signed by the defendant/ his Advocate.\" (emphasis supplied)\n13. Rules 14 and 16 of Chapter I of the DHC Rules that lays down the general provisions, read as under:\n\"14. Court's power to dispense with compliance with the Rules.- The Court may, for sufficient cause shown, excuse parties from compliance with any requirement of these Rules, and may give such directions in matters of practice and procedure, as it may consider just and expedient. [Provided where the Court/Judge is of the opinion that Practice Directions are required to be issued, he may make it suitable reference to the Hon'ble Chief Justice.]\" ... ...\n\"16. Inherent power of the Court not affected.- Nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court.\"\n14. The term \"The Court\" and \"Registrar\" have been defined in Rule 4 that is a part of Chapter I of the Rules. On a reading of Rule 5 it is clear that the replication, if any, should be filed within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the written statement. The word \"shall\" used in the said Rule postulates that the replication must be filed within 30 days of the receipt of the written statement. The Registrar does not have the power to condone any delay beyond 30 days. The permission to condone the delay beyond the period of 30 days, lies with the court. If the court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause or for exceptional and unavoidable reasons from filing the replication within 30 days, it may extend the time for filing the same by a further period not exceeding 15 days with a suffix appended to the Rule stating, \"but not thereafter\". The phrase \"but not thereafter\" mentioned in the Rule indicates that the intention of the rule making authority was not to permit any replication to be entertained beyond a total period of 45 days. If any other interpretation is given to the said Rule, then the words \"but not thereafter\", will become otiose.\n15. This is not the first time that the phrase, \"but not thereafter\" have been used in the statute. The said preemptory words have been used in other provisions that have come up for interpretation before the Supreme Court. In Union of India v. Popular Construction Co, reported as (2001) 8 SCC 470, the words \"but not thereafter\" were used in relation to the power of the court to condone the delay in challenging the award beyond the period prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Supreme Court observed as below:-\n\"12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are \"but not thereafter\" used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase \"but not thereafter\" wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.\n16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award \"in accordance with\" sub- section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application \"in accordance with\" that sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that \"where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired ... the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court\". This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to \"proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow\" (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.\" (emphasis supplied)\n16. In Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors, reported as (2008) 3 SCC 70, on interpreting Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, which contains similar provisions, the Supreme Court has observed as under:\n\"8. The Commissioner of Central Excise(appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short \"the Limitation Act\") can be available for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision of order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section(1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period.\" (emphasis supplied)\n17. After referring to the above decision, in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited and Anr, reported as (2009) 5 SCC 791, the Supreme Court went on to observe as under:\n\"30. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which provides for appeals and revisions to various authorities. Though Parliament has specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by the Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and reference application to the High Court under Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act. X X X X\n32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. X X X X\n35. It was contended before us that the words \"expressly excluded\" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court.\" (emphasis supplied)\n18. We may also profitably refer to Bengal Chemists and Druggists Association v. Kalyan Chowdhury, reported as (2018) 3 SCC 41, where while examining the provisions of the Companies Act, the Supreme Court made the following observations:\n\"3. Before coming to the judgments of this Court, it is important to first set out Section 421(3) and Section 433 of the Act. These provisions read as follows:\n\"421. Appeal from orders of Tribunal.-(1)- (2) * * * (3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved and shall be in such form, and accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days from the date aforesaid, but within a further period not exceeding forty-five days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period. ... * * *\n433. Limitation.-The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall, as far as may be, apply to proceedings or appeals before the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be.\"\n4. A cursory reading of Section 421(3) makes it clear that the proviso provides a period of limitation different from that provided in the Limitation Act, and also provides a further period not exceeding 45 days only if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period. Section 433 obviously cannot come to the aid of the appellant because the provisions of the Limitation Act only apply \"as far as may be\". In a case like the present, where there is a special provision contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply.\n5. Another very important aspect of the case is that 45 days is the period of limitation, and a further period not exceeding 45 days is provided only if sufficient cause is made out for filing the appeal within the extended period. According to us, this is a peremptory provision, which will otherwise be rendered completely ineffective, if we were to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. If we were to accept such argument, it would mean that notwithstanding that the further period of 45 days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if the facts so warrant, condone the delay. This would be to render otiose the second time-limit of 45 days, which, as has been pointed out by us above, is peremptory in nature.\" (emphasis supplied)\n19. In P. Radhabai v. P. Ashok Kumar, reported as (2019) 13 SCC 445, while construing the phrase, \"but not thereafter\" used in the proviso to sub section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the Supreme Court held thus: \"32.4. The limitation provision in Section 34(3) also provides for condonation of delay. Unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay can only be condoned for 30 days on showing sufficient cause. The crucial phrase \"but not thereafter\" reveals the legislative intent to fix an outer boundary period for challenging an award. X X X X 33.2. The proviso to Section 34(3) enables a court to entertain an application to challenge an award after the three months' period is expired, but only within an additional period of thirty dates, \"but not thereafter\". The use of the phrase \"but not thereafter\" shows that the 120 days' period is the outer boundary for challenging an award. If Section 17 were to be applied, the outer boundary for challenging an award could go beyond 120 days. The phrase \"but not thereafter\" would be rendered redundant and otiose. This Court has consistently taken this view that the words \"but not thereafter\" in the proviso of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act are of a mandatory nature, and couched in negative terms, which leaves no room for doubt. (State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers [State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 605] , Assam Urban Water Supply and SewerageBoard v. Subash Projects and Mktg. Ltd. [Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Mktg. Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831] and Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel [Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel, (2018) 15 SCC 178 : (2019) 1 SCC (Civ) 141] .)\n34. In our view, the aforesaid inconsistencies with the language of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act tantamount to an \"express exclusion\" of Section 17 of the Limitation Act.\" (emphasis supplied)\n20. In New India Assurance Company Limited v. Hili Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited, reported as (2020) 5 SCC 757, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 that provides for the respondent/opposite party to file its response to the complaint within 30 days or such extended period, not extending 15 days, should be read as mandatory or directory i.e. whether the District Forum would have the power to extend the time for filing the response beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days. The Supreme Court has answered the said question in the following words:\n\"20. The legislature in its wisdom has provided for filing of complaint or appeals beyond the period specified under the relevant provisions of the Act and Regulations, if there is sufficient cause given by the party, which has to be to the satisfaction of the authority concerned. No such discretion has been provided for under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act for filing a response to the complaint beyond the extended period of 45 days (30 days plus 15 days). Had the legislature not wanted to make such provision mandatory but only directory, the provision for further extension of the period for filing the response beyond 45 days would have been provided, as has been provided for in the cases of filing of complaint and appeals. To carve out an exception in a specific provision of the statute is not within the jurisdiction of the courts, and if it is so done, it would amount to legislating or inserting a provision into the statute, which is not permissible. X X X X\n25. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that by not leaving a discretion with the District Forum for extending the period of limitation for filing the response before it by the opposite party, grave injustice would be caused as there could be circumstances beyond the control of the opposite party because of which the opposite party may not be able to file the response within the period of 30 days or the extended period of 15 days. In our view, if the law so provides, the same has to be strictly complied, so as to achieve the object of the statute. It is well settled that law prevails over equity, as equity can only supplement the law, and not supplant it. X X X X\n27. It is thus settled law that where the provision of the Act is clear and unambiguous, it has no scope for any interpretation on equitable ground.\" (emphasis supplied)\n21. A conspectus of the decisions referred to above leaves no manner of doubt that where ever the phrase \"but not thereafter\" has been used in a provision for setting a deadline, the intention of the legislature is to treat the same as a preemptory provision. Thus, if Rule 15 of the DHC Rules mandates filing of a replication within a period of 30 days reckoned from the date of receipt of the written statement, with an additional period of 15 days provided and that too only if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has been able to demonstrate that it was prevented to do so by sufficient cause or for exceptional and unavoidable reasons, can the time for filing the replication be extended for a further period not exceeding 15 days in any event, with costs imposed on the plaintiff. The critical phrase \"but not thereafter\" used in Rule 15 must be understood to mean that even the court cannot extend the period for filing the replication beyond the outer limit of 45 days provided in the DHC Rules. Upon expiry of the said period, the plaintiff's right to file the replication would stand extinguished. Any other meaning sought to be bestowed on the above provision, would make the words \"but not thereafter\", inconsequential.\n22. The next contention of Mr. Mehta that the words \"the Registrar shall forthwith place the matter for appropriate orders before the court\" used in Rule 5 of the DHC Rules indicates that the court would still have the power to accept a replication filed beyond a period of 45 days, is also untenable. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the answer to the problem as to whether a statutory provision is mandatory or is directory in nature, lies in the intention of the law maker, as expressed in the law itself. The words \"replication, if any, shall be filed within 30 days of the receipt of the written statement\" and further, the words \"further period not exceeding 15 days, but not thereafter\" used in Rule 5 will lose its entire meaning if we accept the submission made on behalf of the appellants that even if the timeline for filing the replication cannot be extended by the Registrar, there is no such embargo placed on the court.\n23. The court must start with the assumption that every word used in a statute, has been well thought out and inserted with a specific purpose and ordinarily, the court must not deviate from what is expressly stated therein. The period granted for filing the replication under Rule 15 of the DHC Rules is only 30 days and on expiry of 30 days, the court can only condone a delay which does not exceed 15 days over and above 30 days and that too on the condition that the plaintiff is able to offer adequate and sufficient reasons explaining as to why the replication could not be filed within 30 days. As observed earlier, since the terms 'Court' and 'Registrar' have been defined in the DHC Rules, Rule 5 requires that the court alone can extend the time to file the replication beyond the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the written statement. Even the discretion vested in the court for granting extension of time is hedged with conditions and the outer limit prescribed is 15 days. If the replication is not filed within the extended time granted, the Registrar is required to place the matter back before the court for closing the right of the plaintiff to file the replication.\n24. A reading of the relevant provisions of the DHC Rules shows that it is a special provision within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act (for short 'the Act'), that contemplates that where any special or local law prescribes a time limit that is different from the one provided for under the Limitation Act, 1963, then Section 4 to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be expressly excluded. It is well settled that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Section 4 to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by an express provision or reference, then too, if it is clear from the mandate or the language of the statute, the scheme of the special law will exclude the application of Section 4 to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (Ref: Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, reported as (1974) 2 SCC 133).\n25. It is equally well settled that when the provision of a law/statute prescribes specific provisions, then those provisions cannot be sidestepped or circumvented by seeking to invoke the inherent powers of the court under the statute. The principles required to be followed for regulating the inherent powers of the court in the context of applying the provisions of Section 151 CPC, have been highlighted in State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Roshan Singh and Ors., reported as (2008) 2 SCC 488, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under:\n\"7. The principles which regulate the exercise of inherent powers by a court have been highlighted in many cases. In matters with which the Code of Civil Procedure does not deal with, the court will exercise its inherent power to do justice between the parties which is warranted under the circumstances and which the necessities of the case require. If there are specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with the particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter, the inherent powers of the court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. The inherent powers of the court are not to be used for the benefit of a litigant who has a remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure. Similar is the position vis-a-vis other statutes.\n8. The object of Section 151 CPC is to supplement and not to replace the remedies provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 151 CPC will not be available when there is alternative remedy and the same is accepted to be a well- settled ratio of law. The operative field of power being thus restricted, the same cannot be risen to inherent power. The inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on it. If there are express provisions covering a particular topic, such power cannot be exercised in that regard. The section confers on the court power of making such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice of the court. Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked when there is express provision even under which the relief can be claimed by the aggrieved party. The power can only be invoked to supplement the provisions of the Code and not to override or evade other express provisions. The position is not different so far as the other statutes are concerned. Undisputedly, an aggrieved person is not remediless under the Act.\" (emphasis supplied)\n26. Yet again, expounding on the inherent powers of the court and the fetters placed on it, in K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, reported as (2011) 11 SCC 275, the Supreme Court has made the following pertinent observations:\n\"12. The respondent contended that Section 151 cannot be used for reopening evidence or for recalling witnesses. We are not able to accept the said submission as an absolute proposition. We however agree that Section 151 of the Code cannot be routinely invoked for reopening evidence or recalling witnesses. The scope of Section 151 has been explained by this Court in several decisions [see Padam Sen v. State of U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 218 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 322] , Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal [AIR 1962 SC 527] , Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] , Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava [AIR 1966 SC 1899], Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee [(1970) 1 SCC 732] , Newabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [(1976) 1 SCC 120 : AIR 1976 SC 1152] , Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. CIT [(1977) 1 SCC 508 : 1977 SCC (Tax) 208 : AIR 1977 SC 1348] , National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara [(2005) 2 SCC 256] and Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj [(2010) 8 SCC 1 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 212] ]. We may summarise them as follows: (a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognises the discretionary power inherent in every court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is \"right\" and undo what is \"wrong\", that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. (b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, Section 151 recognises and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. (c) A court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or in a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. (d) The inherent powers of the court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the legislature. (e) While exercising the inherent power, the court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends upon the discretion and wisdom of the court, and in the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of an express provision in the Code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief. (f) The power under Section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court.\" (emphasis supplied)\n27. Since the language of Rule 5 shows that the intention of the Rule making Authority was to exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, giving no power to the court to condone any delay beyond the period of 45 days for accepting the replication, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs cannot be heard to state that Rule 16 could have been very well invoked by the learned Single Judge to take on record the belatedly filed replication. The sanctity of the period of 30 days, extendable by another period of 15 days cannot be diluted by giving such an interpretation. In view of the specific provision and the timeline stated in Rule 5 of Chapter VII, that precludes the court from extending the timeline beyond 45 days for accepting the replication, the argument advanced by Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs that notwithstanding Rule 5, provisions of Rule 16 and Rule 14 of Chapter I of the DHC Rules empower the court to take on record, the replication even beyond the period of 45 days and ought to have been resorted to by the learned Single Judge, cannot be accepted\n28. In our opinion, reliance placed by Mr. Mehta on Desh Raj (supra), is also misplaced. No doubt, the Supreme Court has held that a reading of proviso 2 appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII would show that the said Rule is only directory and not mandatory, ultimately the Supreme Court has refused to condone the delay in that case. In fact, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of this case for the reason that in the said judgment, there was no occasion to deal with the scope and effect of Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the DHC Rules. In any event, the DHC Rules will have an overriding effect on the CPC. Notably the Code does not provide for filing of any replication. Order VI, Rule 1 describes \"pleadings\" to mean plaint or written statement. It is the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 that provides a time limit for filing the replication and since the said Rules regulate the procedure, the same will have to prevail over the Code. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of this court in DDA and Another Vs. K.R. Builders (P) Ltd., reported as 2005 (81) DRJ 708 and relied on in HTIL Corporation, B.V. and Ors. v. Ajay Kohli and Ors., reported as (2006) 90 DRJ 410, where it was observed as under:\n\"6. The question as to whether the CPC or the Original Side Rules will apply was considered by a Division Bench of this court in the recent case of DDA and Anr. v. K.R. Builders P. Ltd., 2005 (81) DRJ 708 (DB). The finding of the Division Bench supported the view of the learned defence counsel that suits filed on the original side of this court would be governed by the rules framed by the High Court to the exclusion of the provisions of the CPC wherever the field is occupied by these Rules and that this court has the power to extend the time for filing the written statement even beyond 90 days. However, the Division Bench also clarified that Rule 3, as it then stood, of Chapter IV of the Delhi High Court (Original Side Rules) does not contemplate unending extensions to be granted on the asking. Rule 3 provided as under:\n\"3. Extension of time for filing written statement.- Ordinarily, not more than one extension of time shall be granted to the defendant for filing a written statement provided that a second or any further extension may be granted only on an application made in writing setting forth sufficient grounds for such extension and supported, if so required, by an affidavit.\"\n7. The Division Bench pointed out that as per the rule quoted above, only one extension of time was to be granted for filing written statement and that the second or further extension may be granted only on an application made in writing setting forth sufficient grounds. It was also pointed out that the expression 'any further extension' in this proviso does not contemplate unending extensions on the asking and that 'any further extension' should receive a restricted interpretation. The situation has now changed since the Delhi High Court (Original Side Rules) have also been amended. The amendment which has taken effect on 9.1.2006 is now as under:\n\"3. Extension of time for filing written statement.- Where the defendant fails to file written statement within the period of 30 days as stated in Rule 2(ii) he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day as may be specified by the Court on an application made in writing setting forth sufficient ground for such extension and supported, if so required, by an affidavit but such day shall not be later than 90 days from the service of summons.\"\n8. In view of this amendment, the Delhi High Court (Original Side Rules) give the same time schedule for filing a written statement. Written statement, therefore, can be filed within 30 days and thereafter on sufficient ground for such extension being shown on an affidavit but such extension shall not be later than 90 days from the date of service.\" (emphasis supplied)\n29. In M/s Print Pak Machinery Ltd. v. Jay Kay Papers Converters, reported as AIR 1979 Del 217, answering a reference placed before it for reconciling the consistency between the scheme of Order 37 of the CPC, as amended in 1976 and the provisions Chapter XV of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967 that deals with \"summary suits\", a Full Bench of this court held that the Rules will take a precedence over the Code and observed as under:-\n\"8. I think, the question is really concluded by Section 129 of the Code. It reads: \"Notwithstanding anything in this Code, any High Court not being the Court of a Judicial Commissioner may make such rules not inconsistent with the Letters Patent or order or other law establishing it to regulate its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction as it shall think fit, and nothing herein contained shall affect the validity of any such rules in force at the commencement of this Code.\" No doubt the closing words will not save the Original Side Rules of this Court, as they were not 'in force at the commencement' of the Code. But, the opening words 'Notwithstanding anything in this Code' are self-effacing, and subordinate the Code to rules made by a High Court for its original side at any time. The cumulative effect of those two parts of the section is to leave untouched the original rules of a High Court whether framed before or after 1908. Since section 2(1) says that the '\"Code\" includes rules', the original side rules will prevail both over the body of the Code and the First Schedule. Therefore, the statement in Order 37 rule 1(a) that 'This order shall apply to........High Courts' must be read subject to section 129.\n9. These propositions are old and well-established. In Newab Behram Jung v. Haji Sultan Ali Shustry, ILR 27 Bombay 572 (1) it was held that, in view of section 129, a rule in the Code did not apply as it was inconsistent with a rule in the Bombay High Court Rules. Similarly, in Virupaksha Rao Naidu v. M. Ranganayaki Ammal, AIR 1925 Madras 1132 (2), it was said: 'Section 129 of the Code gives the High Court the power to make rules, regulating the procedure of the Original Side and nothing in the Code will affect such rules. The effect is that if the rules of the High Court, Original Side, and the Code are inconsistent, the rules prevail.' Many cases from Calcutta hold the same: Umeshchandra Banerji v. Kunjilal Biswas, AIR 1930 Calcutta 685 (3), Gowal Das Sidany v. Luchmi Chand Jhawar, AIR 1930 Calcutta 324 (4); In re: Ram Dayal De, AIR 1932 Calcutta 1 (5); Shaw and Co. v. B. Shamaldas and Co., AIR 1954 Calcutta 369 (6) and Manickchand Durgaprasad v. Pratabmull Rameswar, AIR 1961 Calcutta 483 (7). And, so does the High Court of Allahabad: Mool Chand v. Kamta Prasad, AIR 1961 Allahabad 595 (8).\n11. The conclusion thus drawn from section 129 can also be reached from section 4(1) of the Code, though not in the manner that was suggested in argument. Section 4(1) of the Code provides that: 'In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force.' It has been held that rules made by a High Court or the Supreme Court to regulate their procedure and practice are a 'special law' as they deal with a particular subject: The Union of India v. Ram Kanwar, AIR 1962 SC 247 (11); Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lahore v. Official Liquidators, Punjab Cotton Press Co. Ltd. (in liquidation), AIR 1941 Lahore 257 (12) and The Deities of Sri Audinarayana Swamy and Anjenayaswami Temples of Donepudi v. R. Hanumacharyulu, AIR 1962 AP 245 (13). Nevertheless, the Original Side Rules of Delhi High Court would not be protected by section 4(1) of the Code. Only those 'special laws' are saved which are 'now in force', which means 1908. But, they are a 'special form of procedure prescribed' by or under a law 'for the time being in force', and would be covered on that account. There is no 'specific provision to the contrary' and the result is that nothing in the Code 'shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect' anything in the Original Side Rules.\" (emphasis supplied)\n30. To answer the last plea taken by Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs that a Constitutional Court cannot be denuded of the power to condone the delay in filing the replication even if the power of the High Court to condone delay in relation to periods prescribed in the DHC Rules has been circumscribed, we need not travel beyond Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, reported as (2001) 7 SCC 549, where the Supreme Court has observed as under:\n\"31. This Court has always frowned upon the grant or existence of absolute or unbridled power. Just as power or jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in accordance with law, if any, enacted by the legislature, it would stand to reason that the power under Article 129 and/ or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted law. In case of apparent or likelihood of conflict the provisions should be construed harmoniously.\"\n31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 will prevail over the Civil Procedure Code. The inherent powers contemplated in Rule 16 are not to be exercised to overcome the period of limitation expressly prescribed in Rule 5 for filing the replication. Nor can Rule 5 be circumvented by invoking any other provision or even the inherent powers of the court, contrary to the scheme of the Rules. The phrase, \"but not thereafter\" used in Rule 5 makes it crystal clear that the Rule is mandatory in nature and the court cannot permit the replication to be taken on the record after the plaintiff has exhausted the maximum prescribed period of 45 days. Any other interpretation will result in causing violence to the DHC Rules.\n32. In view of the above, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order whereby the Chamber Appeal filed by the appellants/plaintiffs was dismissed. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed as meritless, along with the pending applications.",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Appeal (Civil) 6782 of 2001 | Secretary, School Of Committee, Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School v. The Govt. Of Tamil Nadu And Others | 02/04/2003",
+      "case_details": "Case: Appeal (Civil) 6782 of 2001 | Secretary, School Of Committee, Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School v. The Govt. Of Tamil Nadu And Others",
+      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
+      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
+      "case_record": "The Managing Committee of Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School appeals against a High Court decision concerning the termination of an employee (P.G. Assistant for English, appointed in 1978). The management deemed the employee's performance and attendance unsatisfactory, citing irregular teaching, absence without prior permission from December 1, 1984, and failure to pass a mandatory Tamil language examination. Memos were issued regarding these deficiencies, and charges were framed. Despite show cause notices, the employee did not respond. The management terminated the employee's services effective December 1, 1984, and sought approval from the Chief Educational Officer (CEO) as per Rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974. The CEO refused approval, deeming the allegations not grave enough for dismissal. An appeal to the Joint Director was rejected, and the CEO later directed reinstatement with back wages. The management challenged this in the High Court, arguing that student welfare necessitated disciplinary action and that the authorities overstepped their jurisdiction by examining punishment proportionality. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The employee, who has since been superannuated, appeared in person, claiming to be a victim of mala fides. The State Government has been paying the employee's salary based on interim court orders.",
+      "generated_judgment": "**CONCLUSION: DISMISSED.**\n\n### **Rationale:**\nThe appeal fails on all material grounds due to a **lack of substantial errors of law or fact** in the process followed:\n\n1. **Sufficient Evidence for Dismissal** – The record confirms the grounds stated (irregular teaching, unauthorized absence, and failure to pass a qualifying examination) as demonstrably viable under administrative discipline. The Demonstrations in earnest followed, with the employee not responding—material that Mastersավորced their containment.\n\n2. **Procedural Strict Communications**: The management complied with legal wellreacied by this Rule 17, seeking CEO’s veil on time. The CEO’s stay call **not oppress/search but case-specific** (*Role 31(1)(c)* broadly covered ‘unsatisfactory services.’ Multiple charges and per collation was at lawful interpretation.\n\n3. **High Court Ruling Grounds Valid**: The school argued studentability motives (e.g., correcting intra-school misconduct habits), not exceeding jurisdiction. The High Court *fully assessed* the proportionality of dismissal admissible disciplinary action beyond 1st years lin-this teacher’s 36 years’ duration (e.g., not analogous to punitive salary dedctions).\n\n4. **No Mala fides Misconduct—Writ in *Recap***: Superannuation matter *is locked*, establishing arbitrary cruelty accusation a rejection of the facts.\n\nThus, failure recurrence— Wald independently, Pursuant to stopping order criteria as meeting procedural/statutory ‘constituted force rules’—isopposably dismissed for *no viable merits.*",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : Arijit Pasayat, J.\n1. Undaunted by reverses before the departmental authorities and the High Court, the Managing Committee of Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School (hereinafter referred to as the 'management') has filed this appeal. The controversy lies within u narrow compass and factual position being undisputed, a brief reference thereto would suffice.\n2. The 5th respondent (hereinafter referred to as the 'employee') was appointed as P.G. Assistant for teaching English in 1978. According to management, his behaviour and performance was not satisfactory and that he was highly irregular both in attendance as well as in teaching. A memorandum was sent to him and to another teacher on 14.1.1983 stating therein that they would be required to pass examination conducted by the State of Tamil Nadu in Tamil language before the end of the academic year in order to qualify for the posts they were holding, failing which appropriate action was to be taken. From 1.12.1984, the employee did not attend school.\n3. The management was of the view that since he had not taken prior permission from the school and had not chosen to intimate the school authorities; it resulted in dislocation of the teaching. Prior to his long absence, he had not been taking classes regularly. The students were put to grave and irreparable loss and hardship. Students as well as their parents complained about the deficiencies of the employee in not taking classes regularly and leaving the classes in the middle. He had also not completed portions of the lessons for the 11th standard. Several requests were made to the employee to attend classes, but he turned down their requests. On 29.8.1984, the management issued another memo to him seeking a clarification as to whether he had passed the Tamil examination. On 31.8.1984, the management issued another memo to the employee stating therein that since he had not attended the school for very long period without obtaining prior permission and as he had cancelled the classes and left for home early, same amounted to deficiency in service, misconduct and warranted action. Charges were framed and the employee was called upon to submit his reply to the charges. Another memo was issued on 30.10.1984 containing similar charges.\n4. Additionally, it was indicated that as he had not completed portions of the lessons for 11th standard and the students and parents had complained. He was required to show cause in respect of the allegations. On 24.1.1985 memo of charges was also issued to him, inter alia, indicating that since he had not passed the Tamil examination as required, and since he had failed to discharge his duties diligently having absented from school frequently without prior permission and having not taken classes regularly, there was serious dislocation of work and inconvenience to the students. On 13.3.1985, the show cause notice was issued indicating that in spite of opportunity given; he had failed to respond and was called upon to submit his explanation as to why his services should not be terminated for violation of code of conduct prescribed for teachers employed in private schools.\n5. Another copy of the show cause notice was served through another mode on 9.4.1985. The employee did not respond to the show cause notice. Therefore, a decision was taken by school committee unanimously to terminate his services w.e.f. 1.12.1984, the date from which he had stopped attending the school. On 9.5.1985, letter was written to the Chief Educational Officer, respondent No.3 (in short the 'CEO') seeking his approval for term (nation of employee's services in terms of Rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'). On 29.8.1985 letter was written to the District Educational Officer, respondent No.4 (in short the 'DEO') requesting for early action in the matter.\n6. The DEO issued a notice to the employee but there was no response thereto. On 3.12.1985, DEO sent a report to the CEO. inter alia, indicating that the employee had not denied any of the charges and since the management had produced materials in support of the charges, sanction for dismissal should be granted. On 21.4.1987, an enquiry was conducted by the authorities and the employee was called to the school. But he did not make any effective participation. Again, an enquiry was conducted by the CEO on 23.4.1987. After seeing the employee, the CEO was prima facie of the view that he was psychic.\n7. Finally, on 24.4.1987 the CEO passed an order refusing permission for termination on the ground that the allegations which constituted foundation for the proposed order of termination, were not so grave as to warrant punishment like dismissal. Therefore, permission was refused. Aggrieved by the said order, the Management preferred an appeal under Section 41 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (in short the 'Act') to the Joint Director of School Education (Secondary), Directorate of School Education (in short the 'Joint Director'). The appeal was rejected. inter alia, observing that though the employee did not give any reply to the charges as against him though he appeared before the CEO twice, yet the charges were not so grave as to warrant dismissal. The Joint Director wrote to the management that if it does not pay the wages directly to the employee, action should be taken for making direct payment to him.\n8. On 9.3.1988. CEO asked the management for re instatement of the employee with back wages. Aggrieved by such direction, management preferred a revision before the State Government. It was indicated that the very purpose for which a teacher is appointed is to impart teaching to the students. If the teacher was deficient in teaching and was irregular in taking classes, that is a very serious matter warranting termination of service. It also took a stand that since it had neither suspended the employee nor terminated his services and awaiting approval of the concerned authority, the question of reinstatement and paying back wages did not arise. In fact, the employee had not worked and abandoned work. But the DEO again directed the management to reinstate the employee and pay him back wages failing which the steps regarding direct payment were to be taken. Aggrieved by these orders, the Management filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court. Learned Single Judge was of the view that in terms of what is required under Section 22(1) of the Act, prior approval for effecting termination was necessary. This was intended to be a safeguard to protect the interest of the teacher so that there is no victimisation. An appeal was preferred before the Division Bench, inter alia, taking a stand that disciplinary action was taken was necessary in the interest of the Institution and the students whose interest was of paramount consideration.\n9. The authority and the learned Single Judge lost sight of this vital aspect. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal holding that the authorities had considered the materials on record and, therefore, no interference was called for.\n10. In support of the appeal, Mr. L. Nageshwara Rao, learned senior counsel submitted that the authorities and the High Court were not justified in their views and approach. It was submitted that Section 22 has not been interpreted in the proper perspective. Action of the authorities was beyond jurisdiction. They could not have gone into the question of the proportionality of punishment, as it was beyond the scope of their authority. Secondly, even if it is conceded for the sake of argument that there was jurisdiction to deal with the quantum of punishment, yet there was no application of mind in considering the relevant materials.\n11. Finally, it was submitted that if any amount has to be paid, the same has to be borne by the State Government as the post was a sanctioned and aided post. Another teacher has been appointed and the management is paying his salary. In elaborating the first ground of challenge, it was submitted that if the authorities can decide the quantum of punishment aspect, it would mean as if they are acting as an appellate authority. In case of approved action, appeal is provided under Section 23 of the Act and the effected employee is given an opportunity to prefer an appeal. There is also a scope for second appeal in terms of Section 24 of the Act. Proportionality is not within the domain of approved authority.\n12. The satisfaction of the approving authority is limited to consider whether adequate and reasonable grounds exist for taking action in the manner proposed by the management. The authorities and the High Court have lost sight of the fact that what was of paramount consideration is the welfare of the institution and the students in particular. A teacher, who is deficient in teaching as well as irregular, does not meet the requirements of a teacher, as one would expect him to be. This aspect which was of vital importance has been lost sight of, and not taken note of by the authorities and the High Court. The employee reflected very casual approach and even has absented from duty on several occasions for very long periods and after 1.12.1984 has not bothered to join duty. The employee who appeared in person supported the action and took the stand that he is victim of circumstances, and mala fides, and the management has been unfair to him. He claimed to be an ideal teacher for whom truth and honesty are the key-words.\n13. Learned counsel for the State Government submitted that pursuant to the interim directions given by this Court, the State has been paying the employee the amounts of salary directed to be paid. In fact, it has filed an interlocutory application No. 2 for modification of this Court's order. With reference to the counter affidavit filed in appeal, it is pointed out that the management has not drawn the amount sanctioned to it on the ground that it cannot make payment of said amount to a person (the teacher appointed in place of the employee) whose appointment has not been approved and, therefore, it was paying from its own funds. It was further submitted that the management has, in spite of the fact that no order of stay has been passed, not taken back the employee to service. Since no approval was given to the proposed order of termination, for all prActical purposes, there was no termination of the services of the employee and if any amount has to be paid, the same has to be borne by the management\n14. For considering the rival submissions, a few provisions need to be quoted. The pivotal provisions are Sections 22(1) and (2) and Rule 17(1) which so far as relevant read as follows:\n \"Section 22- Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers or other persons employed in private school- (1) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no teacher or other person employed in any private school shall be dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority.\n(2) Where the proposal to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher or other person employed in any private school is communicated to the competent authority, that authority shall, if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal, approve such dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of appointment.\nRule 17, Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers or other person employed in private schools:- \n(1) The competent authorities to accord prior approval for the dismissal. removal or reduction in rank of a teacher or other person employed in any private school, shall be the District Educational Officer in respect of teacher or other person employed in Pre-Primary, Primary and Middle Schools and the Chief Educational Officer in respect of teacher or other person employed in High Schools, Higher Secondary Schools and Teachers' Training Institutes.\" \n15. Though attempt was made to contend that at the stage of consideration under Section 22(1) and 22(2) and Rule 17(1), there is no scope for looking into the proportionality of punishment aspect, the same is clearly without any substance. What an authority is required to do at that stage is to see whether the proposed punishment is to be approved. Obviously, it has to consider whether the punishment as proposed is proper one; otherwise there is no need for seeking its approval. The crucial words used in sub-section (2) of Section 22 are \"adequate and reasonable ground\" for the proposal.\n16. The proposal relates to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or otherwise termination of appointment of any teacher or any other person employed in a private school. While considering whether adequate and reasonable ground exist for giving approval, the authority is certainly required to look into the gravity of the proved charges and whether the punishment as proposed commensurates with it. Any other interpretation would make the question of approval an exercise in futility.\n17. Stand of the learned counsel for the Management is that if adequate and reasonable grounds exist for the action, then no other question needs to be looked into. This argument overlooks a vital aspect that the adequacy and reasonableness of grounds are relateable to the proposals for the enumerated actions. The proposed Actions being punishments, there is an inbuilt requirement to see whether the quantum of punishment commensurates with the gravity of the proved charges. Therefore, clearly the authority has jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the punishment proposed commensurates with the proved charges. One of the related pleas was that if quantum of punishment is permitted to be considered, it would partake charActer of an appeal. This plea is equally untenable. Sections 22 and 23 operate in different fields. At the stage of consideration under Section 22, the teacher does not get any opportunity for presenting his side of the case. This opportunity is provided under Sections 23 or 24 as the case may be.\n18. The authority under Section 22 takes decision on the material placed before it by the management. So the question of action under Section 22 partaking appellate charActeristics does not arise. The second plea of learned counsel for the management was even if the authority had jurisdiction, there was no application of mind, as relevant factors have not been looked into. The basic duties of a teacher and what is expected from him were highlighted. It was strenuously contended that the welfare of the students' aspect was not even taken note of.\n19. The role a teacher plays in shaping the career and future of a student needs no great emphasis. In olden times, a teacher was considered equal to God. He is required to ensure good conduct of his pupils in addition to teaching lessons to them. The situation has not changed now so far as this basic concept is concerned. But nevertheless, the number of such teachers is sadly on the decline, and instead of tribe of such teachers increasing, it is alarming decreasing. A teacher is required to remove darkness and ignorance from the minds of students. But present day experiences show that the teachers are themselves ill-equipped and take their jobs very casually. No doubt, there are exceptions and those teachers who belong to the exception category are trying their best to make up the deficiency of their brothers in service.\n20. In the hands of these ill-equipped teachers, the destiny of the students does not get moulded in the way it ought to be. The centres of learning are becoming trade and money-making business centres. Learned counsel for the appellant is correct in his submission that welfare of the students has to receive utmost priority. But his submission that there was no application of mind by the authorities to the materials has not borne out from the records. The appellate authority has addressed itself to the relevant factors in greater details and has come to the conclusion that CEO was justified in not according approval for the proposed action of dismissal.\n21. Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have put their seal of approval on the findings recorded. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that once the disciplinary authority comes to a view that there was adequate material for imposing a particular punishment; the approving authority should not lightly interfere with the findings. This submission holds good only when the authority does not apply its mind to the materials forming the foundation of the proposed action. When after consideration of the material, it comes to a conclusion that the proposed punishment is harsh or disproportionate to the proved charges; the scope of interference with the finding is rather limited. This is because the approving authority has to consider whether the proved charges on the facts and the materials justify a particular action. Since reasons have been given on consideration of the materials, there is no scope for interference.\n22. The order of the authorities declining to accord approval does not suffer from any infirmity. The High Court was justified in declining to interfere.\n23. Another point urged by learned counsel for the appellant was that the direction for the back wages in its entirety is not justified because the employee absented from duty without sanctioned leave for long periods and even on some dates he went away during the school period and even abandoned the classes on several days. This certainly is a factor which needed consideration by the authorities. Except for the enumerated categories for other actions no approval is necessary. Authority acting under Section 22 could not have indicated any other aspect. Looking into the circumstances of the case, we feel that payment of 60% salary for the concerned period up to the date of superannuation (since we are told that the employee has been superannuated in the meantime) shall be proper. The undisputed position is that the charges have been proved. The question as to who will make the payment to the employee is a matter between the management and the Government. (The payment has, in any event, to be made, at the first instance, by the Management). So far as the question of re-imbursement is concerned, we do not think it necessary to give any direction in that regard, so far as the present dispute is concerned. No further orders are to be passed in the application for modification of earlier interim orders passed.\nThe appeal is disposed of accordingly.\nAppeal disposed of\n",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -738,26 +738,26 @@
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       "sample_id": "S016",
-      "case_id": "6768",
-      "experiment": "baseline_firac",
-      "model": "qwen3-8b",
-      "source_file": "S016__baseline_firac__qwen3-8b__6768.json",
-      "court": "DELHI HIGH COURT",
-      "judgment_date": "19/10/2020",
-      "machine_error_stage": "facts",
-      "machine_major_error_category": "input_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Missing fact"
+      "case_id": "2104",
+      "experiment": "baseline_no_firac",
+      "model": "ministral-3b",
+      "source_file": "S016__baseline_no_firac__ministral-3b__2104.json",
+      "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
+      "judgment_date": "02/04/2003",
+      "machine_error_stage": "issues",
+      "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue omission"
     }
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   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Ia No. 336 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 With Cp (C) No. 398 of 1998 In Ias Nos. 245-46 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 With Ia No. 284 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987, Ias Nos. 340-48 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987, Ias Nos. 349-50 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 and Ia No. 351 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 | (1) Rajendra Kumar And Others, (2) Pushpa Market Subji Evam Phal Tatha Laghu Variety Patri Association v. (1) M. C. D. And Another, (2) V. K. Duggal And Others | 01/12/2000",
-      "case_details": "Case: Ia No. 336 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 With Cp (C) No. 398 of 1998 In Ias Nos. 245-46 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 With Ia No. 284 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987, Ias Nos. 340-48 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987, Ias Nos. 349-50 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 and Ia No. 351 In Wp (C) No. 1699 of 1987 | (1) Rajendra Kumar And Others, (2) Pushpa Market Subji Evam Phal Tatha Laghu Variety Patri Association v. (1) M. C. D. And Another, (2) V. K. Duggal And Others",
-      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
-      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "This case involves multiple interlocutory applications (IAs) and a contempt petition related to hawkers and tehbazari sites in Delhi, particularly near a bomb blast site. Previously, the Court directed the Government of NCT of Delhi to examine the necessity of prohibiting tehbazari in Blocks 'D' and 'T' near the bomb blast site. Following this, an affidavit was filed by the Additional Secretary, Department of Urban Development, Government of NCT of Delhi, referencing a Lt. Governor's decision from November 13, 1996. The affidavit stated that permitting tehbazari in sites closer to the bomb blast site while excluding Blocks 'D' and 'T' was unsustainable. The Lt. Governor's view was that tehbazari should only be permitted in properly selected squatting zones according to Supreme Court directions in Gainda Ram v. M.C.D. The Government's policy is to maintain prohibitory orders against encroachments in roads, lanes, and bylanes in that area, and it was decided that tehbazari should not have been permitted in some pockets closer to the bomb blast site. Consequently, the Court ordered that Blocks 'D' and 'J' (likely a typo for 'T') and other areas closer to the bomb blast site where tehbazari was permitted, would be treated as non-squatting areas. Occupants of these areas were to be removed and provided alternative sites based on seniority. M.C.D. was directed to give occupants three months to vacate, with eviction starting from the juniormost. For applicants in IAs Nos. 349-50, their files were to be examined by M.C.D. for seniority determination by a Committee in the Central Zone, allowing them to continue squatting temporarily if the areas were not non-squatting zones.",
-      "generated_judgment": "Based on the provided facts, here's a step-by-step analysis to determine whether the appeal should be allowed or dismissed:\n\n1. **Initial Court Directive**: The Court initially directed the Government of NCT of Delhi to examine the necessity of prohibiting tehbazari in Blocks 'D' and 'T' near the bomb blast site. This was likely due to safety and security concerns.\n\n2. **Government's Response**: The Government, through an affidavit, agreed with the Lt. Governor's decision from 1996, which advocated for tehbazari to be permitted only in properly selected squatting zones as per the Supreme Court's directives in Gainda Ram v. M.C.D. Notably, the affidavit stated that the current permit system (where tehbazari was allowed in some pockets closer to the bomb blast site while excluding Blocks 'D' and 'T') was unsustainable.\n\n3. **Court's Order**: Based on the above, the Court ordered that Blocks 'D' and 'J' (likely a typo for 'T') and other areas closer to the bomb blast site where tehbazari was permitted, would be treated as non-squatting zones. The occupants of these areas were to be removed and provided alternative sites based on seniority. M.C.D. was given three months to carry out this eviction process, starting from the juniormost. This order aligns with the Government's policy to maintain prohibitory orders against encroachments in roads, lanes, and bylanes in that area.\n\n4. **Interlocutory Applications (IAs) Nos. 349-50**: The applicants in these IAs sought seniority determination by a Committee in the Central Zone. The Court directed M.C.D. to examine their files for this purpose and allowed them to continue squatting temporarily if their areas were not non-squatting zones.\n\nGiven these facts, the appeal should be **DISMISSED** for the following reasons:\n\n- The Court's order is in line with the Government's policy and a 1996 Lt. Governor's decision, which emphasizes the need to strictly regulate tehbazari sites, especially near sensitive areas like a bomb blast site.\n- The order provides a systematic process for eviction and relocation, considering the seniority of the occupants.\n- The Court also made provisions for those who applied for seniority determination, allowing them to continue squatting temporarily if their areas are not non-squatting zones.\n- There's no indication that the Court's order or the Government's decision was arbitrary or unfair, which are common grounds for allowing an appeal.",
-      "reference_judgment": "The Order of the Court was as follows :\nWP (C) No. 1699 of 1987\nThis Court will not entertain any SLPs, writ petitions, IAs or contempt petitions pertaining to the hawkers' cases unless the same are first served upon Mr. Shiv Kumar, learned counsel for M.C.D. Mr. Shiv Kumar will present the same in open court and it is only after hearing, the same shall be registered by the Registry.\nIAs Nos. 336, 284, 340-48 in WP (C) No. 1699 of 1987 and Contempt Petition (C) No. 398 of 1998 in IAs Nos. 245-46 in WP (C) No. 1699 of 1987\nOn 4-8-2000 this Court directed the Government of NCT of Delhi to look into the question whether it is still necessary to prohibit tehbazari in Blocks 'D' and T near the bomb blast site, shown in the plan filed along with IAs Nos. 340-48 etc. Unfortunately, no decision was taken after 4-8-2000, therefore we passed a further order on 28-11-2000 that the Government of NCT of Delhi should look into the matter and inform the Court whether Blocks 'D' and T could be declared as squatting areas in view of the fact that certain other areas close to the place where bomb blast had taken place are being used for squatting purposes.\nAn affidavit has now been filed by Dr. B. S. Banerjee, working as Additional Secretary in the Department of Urban Development, Government of NCT of Delhi wherein after referring to the earlier decision of the Lt. Governor of Delhi dated 13-11-1996 it is stated in para 5 as follows:\n\"5. That the action of M.C.D. in permitting tehbazari in sites closer to the bomb blast site even while excluding Blocks 'D' and T is not sustainable and the Lieutenant Governor is of the view that it would be appropriate to permit tehbazari only on sites or squatting zones properly selected in accordance with the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its order dated 1-5-1997 in the matter of Gainda Ram v. M.C.D. ((1998) 1 SCC 98) and not permitting this in any non-squatting zones.\"\nIf it is the policy decision of the Government of NCT of Delhi to maintain the earlier prohibitory orders dated 13-11-1996 of the Lt. Governor to clear all roads, lanes and bylanes of all encroachments in that area and now a further decision has also been taken that ought not to have permitted tehbazari in some pockets closer to the bomb blast site, then there is no question of excluding Blocks 'D' and 'J' from the purview of prohibition contained in the earlier orders of the Lt. Governor. Not only will Blocks 'D' and 'J' be treated as non-squatting areas but the areas which are shown in the same plan closer to the bomb blast site, where M.C.D. has permitted tehbazari will now be treated as non-squatting areas and all those who are occupying those areas will be removed from that area and provided tehbazari sites for squatting in accordance with their seniority, elsewhere. Before the aforesaid persons who are in occupation of the other areas near the bomb blast site are asked to vacate, M.C.D. is directed to give them reasonable time to vacate. The reasonable time shall be a period of 3 months from today. No. objection will be entertained from those persons for squatting in view of the earlier order passed by the Lt. Governor and the policy of the Government of NCT of Delhi which has been reiterated and now accepted by this Court. It is expected that M.C.D. will be able to allocate other particular places for these persons in squatting areas as per their seniority i.e. non-prohibited areas, within the aforesaid period of 3 months.\nThe applicants also will be allowed to continue for three months till an alternative temporary or final arrangement is made. While asking these eligible squatters from vacating the prohibited areas near the bomb blast site, the eviction will start with the juniormost.\nAll these IAs stand disposed of.\nContempt Petition (C) No. 398 of 1998 in IAs Nos. 245-46 is also disposed of.\nIAs Nos. 349-50\nPursuant to the orders passed on 28-11-2000 the officer concerned of M.C.D. has examined the reconstructed files of these applicants on the basis of the documents produced by them and the file has now been submitted to the Committee which is competent to fix up the seniority on examination of these documents. The Committee in the Central Zone is hereby directed to give hearing to the petitioner-applicants and decide the question relating to their seniority. Till the final allotment is made, these applicants may continue to squat at the places where they are presently squatting, provided that the same are not non-squatting areas. The IAs stand disposed of.\nIA No. 351\nThis application is adjourned to await the report of M.C.D. as directed in the order of this Court dated 28-11-2000. However, we are making it clear that if M.C.D. has fixed up the seniority, no further arguments will be allowed.\n\n",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal - 1627 of 2019 | Union Of India And Ors. v. Sepoy Pravat Kumar Behuria | 06/11/2019",
+      "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal - 1627 of 2019 | Union Of India And Ors. v. Sepoy Pravat Kumar Behuria",
+      "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED",
+      "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED",
+      "case_record": "The Respondent, enrolled in the Indian Army in 2002, was dismissed from service on 23.07.2012 following a Summary Court Martial. On 02.06.2011, he assaulted Subedar Satyendra Singh Yadav with a Talwar, causing a skull fracture and internal bleeding. A Court of Inquiry was convened, and summary of evidence was recorded. The Respondent declined to cross-examine witnesses during these proceedings and made no statement in his defence, though he voluntarily stated he attacked without provocation. The Summary Court Martial found him guilty under Section 326 of the IPC. The Respondent appealed to the Armed Forces Tribunal, alleging procedural irregularities, including being kept in close arrest without proper authorization, denial of participation in the Court of Inquiry and summary of evidence, hasty conduct of the Court Martial (45 minutes), and inconsistency between medical and oral evidence regarding the injury. The Tribunal accepted these contentions, finding inconsistencies between the medical report (compressed injury) and the weapon used (sharp-edged Talwar), noting the absence of blood and fingerprints on the weapon, and concluding that the proceedings were conducted hastily and without following prescribed rules, specifically Rules 179, 180, 115, and 116. The Tribunal also noted that the Respondent's signatures appeared to be taken in advance on blank papers.",
+      "generated_judgment": "### **Facts:**\n1. The Respondent was enrolled in the Indian Army in 2002 and was dismissed from service on **23.07.2012** following a **Summary Court Martial**.\n2. On **02.06.2011**, the Respondent assaulted **Subedar Satyendra Singh Yadav** with a **Talwar**, causing a **skull fracture and internal bleeding**.\n3. A **Court of Inquiry** was convened, and a **summary of evidence** was recorded.\n4. The Respondent **declined to cross-examine witnesses** and made **no statement in his defence**, though he **voluntarily admitted** attacking without provocation.\n5. The **Summary Court Martial found him guilty under Section 326 of the IPC** (voluntarily causing grievous hurt).\n6. The Respondent appealed to the **Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT)**, alleging:\n   - **Procedural irregularities**, including:\n     - Being kept in **close arrest without proper authorization**.\n     - **Denial of participation** in the Court of Inquiry and summary of evidence.\n     - **Hasty conduct of the Court Martial** (completed in **45 minutes**).\n     - **Inconsistency between medical and oral evidence** regarding the injury.\n7. The **AFT accepted these contentions**, noting:\n   - **Inconsistencies** between the **medical report** (compressed injury) and the **weapon used** (sharp-edged Talwar).\n   - **Absence of blood and fingerprints** on the weapon.\n   - **Proceedings were conducted hastily** and **without following prescribed rules** (Rules **179, 180, 115, and 116**).\n   - The Respondent’s **signatures appeared to be taken in advance on blank papers**.\n\n### **Issues:**\n1. **Whether the Summary Court Martial proceedings were conducted in violation of procedural rules, rendering the conviction unlawful?**\n2. **Whether the inconsistencies in evidence and alleged coercion justify setting aside the dismissal?**\n\n### **Rules:**\n1. **Article 142 of the Constitution of India** – The Supreme Court and High Courts have the power to pass any order necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before them.\n2. **Army Act, 1950 (Sections 115, 116, 179, 180)** – These sections prescribe procedural safeguards in Court Martial proceedings, including:\n   - **Right to a fair hearing** (Rule 115).\n   - **Proper recording of evidence** (Rule 116).\n   - **Adequate time for defence** (Rule 179).\n   - **Proper authorization for arrest** (Rule 180).\n3. **Principles of Natural Justice** – Require fairness, impartiality, and an opportunity to defend oneself.\n4. **Precedents on Procedural Irregularities in Court Martial** – Courts have set aside convictions where fundamental procedural violations occurred (e.g., **Union of India v. Col. K.S. Kahlon**).\n\n### **Analysis:**\n1. **Procedural Violations (Facts 6, 7; Rules 2, 3, 4):**\n   - The **AFT found violations of Rules 179, 180, 115, and 116**, which are **mandatory procedural safeguards** in Court Martial proceedings.\n   - The **hasty conduct (45 minutes)** and **lack of proper authorization for arrest** (Rule 180) **deprived the Respondent of a fair trial**.\n   - The **pre-signed blank papers** suggest **coercion or lack of free consent**, violating **natural justice principles**.\n\n2. **Inconsistencies in Evidence (Facts 6, 7; Rule 3):**\n   - The **medical report (compressed injury) vs. weapon (Talwar)** discrepancy raises **reasonable doubt** about the prosecution’s case.\n   - The **absence of blood and fingerprints** further weakens the prosecution’s evidence.\n\n3. **Respondent’s Conduct (Facts 3, 4):**\n   - While the Respondent **admitted the attack**, his **refusal to cross-examine witnesses** does not negate the **procedural violations** or **evidentiary inconsistencies**.\n   - The **lack of proper defence opportunity** (Rule 115) makes the conviction **vulnerable to challenge**.\n\n### **Conclusion:**\nGiven the **gross procedural violations**, **inconsistent evidence**, and **lack of a fair trial**, the **appeal is ALLOWED**. The dismissal from service is set aside, and the Respondent is entitled to a **fresh inquiry** in accordance with the law.",
+      "reference_judgment": "1. This Appeal is filed against the judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow (hereinafter, 'the Tribunal') by which the order of dismissal of the Respondent dated 23.07.2012 was set aside.\n2. The Respondent was enrolled in the Indian Army as Sepoy in the Unit 981 AD Regiment Workshop on 02.02.2002. He was posted at Jamnagar on 01.06.2011 and was scheduled to be on the third night duty from 04:00 hrs to 06:00 hrs. Thus, he was excused from physical training parade. On 02.06.2011, at about 07:45 1 hrs, he assaulted Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav, with a Talwar (grass cutting tool) without any provocation. Initially, the Respondent hit Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav on his head from behind and when Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav turned around, the Respondent hit on his forehead with the Talwar. When the Respondent attempted to give a third blow, Naib Subedar A. P. Singh intervened. Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav was immediately shifted to Gokul Hospital, Jamnagar and a surgery was conducted by a Neurosurgeon as his skull bone was fractured leading to internal bleeding and blood clotting in the brain.\n3. The Court of Inquiry was convened against the Respondent by Colonel Sanjay Khanna, Commanding Officer, 48 AD Regiment on 03.06.2011 to investigate into the circumstances which led the Respondent using criminal force against Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav. Nine witnesses were examined and the Respondent declined to cross- examine the witnesses though he was given an opportunity. The Respondent also did not make any statement in his defence. After appreciating the material on record, the Court of Inquiry recommended action to be initiated against the Respondent.\n4. The proceedings for recording the summary of evidence were initiated by Lt. Col. Amarvir Singh. Twelve witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution between 10.06.2011 and 15.06.2011. According to the Appellants, the Respondent declined to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. The Respondent had voluntarily given a statement that he hit the victim with a grass cutting tool without any provocation. Thereafter, on 20.10.2011, additional summary of evidence was recorded. Two additional witnesses were examined and witness No. 2 and 12 were re-examined in the presence of the Respondent. The prosecution alleges that the Respondent refused to cross-examine the witnesses though he was given an opportunity to do so.\n5. By an order dated 23.07.2012, the Summary Court Martial found the respondent guilty and imposed the sentence of dismissal from service.\n6. The order dated 23.07.2012 was questioned by the Respondent before the Tribunal. The Respondent contended that he was kept in close arrest from 02.06.2011 to 05.10.2011 without the permission from the Chief of the Army Staff. It was further contended that he was not given an opportunity to participate in the Court of Inquiry and during the recording of summary of evidence. He complained that the Summary Court Martial was conducted in a hasty manner. The entire proceedings before the Court Martial was completed within a period of 45 minutes. It was further argued on his behalf that the oral evidence was inconsistent with the medical evidence. The Respondent's case was that there was no incised wound on the head of the victim though the Respondent is alleged to have used a Talwar which is a sharp-edged weapon. He submitted before the Tribunal that non- compliance of the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 and the Army Rules, 1954 (hereinafter, 'the Rules') vitiated the Summary Court Martial proceedings.\n7. The Tribunal accepted the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent and held that there was an irreconcilable inconsistency between the medical evidence and the oral testimonies of the witnesses. According to the medical certificate, the injury caused to Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav was a compressed injury whereas the Respondent is alleged to have wielded a grass cutting tool which is sharp-edged. The Tribunal also found that there was no blood on the weapon and the prosecution was unable to prove that there were any finger prints of the Respondent on the weapon. The Tribunal agreed with the Respondent that the Summary Court Martial was conducted in a hasty manner. The entire enquiry was completed within a period of 45 minutes. After perusing the record of the summary of evidence, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the signatures of the Respondent appear to have been taken before the proceedings were held. The Tribunal found that the signatures of the Respondent were at the right-side corner at the bottom of every page. On some pages where the depositions of the witnesses concluded at the middle of the page, the signature of the Respondent was found at the right side at the bottom of the page. After examining the material on record, the Tribunal held that the Respondent was not afforded an opportunity as provided in Rules 179 and 180 of the Rules. The Tribunal was of the further opinion that the procedure prescribed in Rules 115 and 116 of the Rules which deals with recording the plea of guilt of a delinquent was not followed. After a detailed discussion, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the Respondent by holding that the imposition of the penalty of dismissal was with a pre-determined mind and was arrived at without following the procedure prescribed by law.\n8. We have heard Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants and Mr. Sudhanshu S. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent. The Court of Inquiry was ordered against the Respondent to investigate the circumstances under which he used criminal force against Subedar/Master Technical, Satyendra Singh Yadav. The Court of Inquiry assembled on 03.06.2011. During the Court of Inquiry, the statement of the Respondent was recorded in which he stated that he was not provided liquor at 20:00 hrs on 01.06.2011 by Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav. He was angry about the refusal of liquor due to which he attacked the victim by using Talwar on the morning of 02.06.2011. Other witnesses, including the victim Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav were examined in the Court of Inquiry.\n9. We have perused the original record relating to the summary of evidence which was recorded between 10.06.2011 to 15.06.2011. The signatures of the Respondent are found on the right- hand side at the bottom of each page, at the same place on each page. The manner in which the signatures of the officer who recorded the summary of evidence and the other officers were put on certain pages would clearly show that the signature of the Respondent was taken in advance on blank papers. The statement of the Respondent was recorded under Rule 23 (2) of the Rules. Lt. Col. Amarvir Singh who recorded the summary of evidence certified that the summary of evidence containing 40 pages were recorded by him in the presence of the Respondent and that Clauses (1), (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 23 have been complied with while recording the summary of evidence. Even on this certificate, whereas the signature of Lt. Col. Amarvir Singh is at the center of the page, the signature of the Respondent is found at the right-hand side at the bottom of the page. The second half of the page is left blank. A bare perusal of the recording would indicate that the signatures of the Respondent were obtained and filled up with the depositions of the witnesses later. The contention of the Appellant that the summary of evidence was recorded in the presence of the Respondent is not acceptable. We have also perused the additional summary of evidence which was recorded on 20.10.2011. The original record discloses that the signatures of the Respondent were taken earlier as there is a huge gap on certain pages between the place where the depositions have ended and the place where the signature of the Respondent is found. The certificate given by the officer recording additional summary of evidence on 20.10.2011 actually ends with his signature at the center of the page and the signature of the Respondent was found at the bottom of the page without anything being written in between.\n10. After the judgment was reserved, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Union of India, handed over the original record pertaining to the Court of Inquiry. The proceedings of the Court of Inquiry were conducted between 04.06.2011 and 08.06.2011 during which the statements of the Respondent and the other witnesses were recorded. The signature of the Respondent is found on the left-hand side at the bottom of each page. The statement of witness No.3, Naib Subedar A. P. Singh ends at the middle of page No.9 of the original record. The signature of the Respondent is found at the left-hand side at the bottom of the said page. Major Hemant Juneja, who was the Presiding Officer of the Court of Inquiry appears to have signed at the bottom of each page on the right-hand side. On some pages where the deposition ended at the center of the page, signature of Major Hemant Juneja is found. Resultantly, on some pages, the signature of the Presiding Officer i.e. Major Hemant Juneja is found at the appropriate place i.e. immediately after the deposition has ended, as well as at the right-hand side of the bottom of the page.\n11. The Summary Court Martial was held on 23.07.2012. The Respondent was charged for committing an offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by causing grievous hurt to Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav. We agree with the Tribunal that the entire Summary Court Martial was held in a hasty manner. The enquiry commenced at 12.45 p.m. and concluded at 1.30 p.m. and the sentence was imposed at 2.30 p.m.\n12. It is clear from the record that Respondent was not given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses whose statements were recorded in the summary of evidence. The proceedings of Court of Inquiry, recording of summary of evidence and the Summary Court Martial have been conducted without following the procedure prescribed by the Act and the Rules.\n13. The Tribunal examined the evidence on record to hold that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the Respondent. The irreconcilable inconsistency between the medical evidence and ocular testimony, lack of scientific evidence like finger prints on the weapon and the absence of blood on the weapon have been taken into account by the Tribunal to hold that the charge against the Respondent was not proved.\n14. It is trite law that judgments of acquittal should not be disturbed unless there are substantial or compelling reasons. The substantial or compelling reasons to discard judgment of acquittal were examined by this Court in Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh1which are as follows: 1 (2008) 10 SCC 450 \" 1....... i) The trial Court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii) The trial Court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii) The trial Court's judgment is likely to result in \"grave miscarriage of justice\"; iv) The entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v) The trial Court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi) The trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/ report of the Ballistic expert, etc. vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.\n2. The Appellate Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial Court.\n3. If two reasonable views can be reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts /appellate Courts must rule in favour of the accused.\"\n15. Applying the law laid down by this Court as stated above, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Tribunal should not be interfered with.\n16. We have carefully examined the evidence. A view that the respondent is guilty is possible on a scrutiny of the oral evidence. However, the relevant factors taken into account by the Tribunal present another probable view. It is settled law that if two views can be reached, the one that leads to acquittal has to be preferred to the other, which would end in conviction. That apart, there is a clear violation of Rules 179 and 180 of the Rules and the respondent was deprived of an opportunity to defend himself.\n17. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the Tribunal is upheld and the Appeal is dismissed.",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -863,26 +863,26 @@
     },
     "meta": {
       "sample_id": "S017",
-      "case_id": "1808",
-      "experiment": "baseline_cot",
-      "model": "mistral-nemo",
-      "source_file": "S017__baseline_cot__mistral-nemo__1808.json",
+      "case_id": "4759",
+      "experiment": "baseline_firac",
+      "model": "mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct",
+      "source_file": "S017__baseline_firac__mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct__4759.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "01/12/2000",
-      "machine_error_stage": "issues",
+      "judgment_date": "06/11/2019",
+      "machine_error_stage": "rules",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue omission"
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Wrong legal test / threshold"
     }
   },
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal' Appeal No. 93 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the April 14, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1955 and Criminal Revision Application No. 435 of 1955 arising out of Judgment dated the January 3, 1955, of the Court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, in Case No. 9/p of 1954. | Hansraj Moolji v. State Of Bombay | 12/02/1957",
-      "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal' Appeal No. 93 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the April 14, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1955 and Criminal Revision Application No. 435 of 1955 arising out of Judgment dated the January 3, 1955, of the Court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, in Case No. 9/p of 1954. | Hansraj Moolji v. State Of Bombay",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 12645 of 1996 | Madan Mohan Rajgarhia v. Messrs Mahendra R. Shah And Brothers And Another | 31/07/2003",
+      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 12645 of 1996 | Madan Mohan Rajgarhia v. Messrs Mahendra R. Shah And Brothers And Another",
       "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED",
       "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED",
-      "case_record": "The appellant was charged with transferring by sale 10 High Denomination Bank Notes of Rs. 1,000 each on July 11, 1953, contravening Section 4 and punishable under Section 7 of the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No III of 1946), read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The Ordinance was promulgated on January 12, 1946. The appellant's preliminary objection that the Ordinance was not in operation on the date of the alleged offence was overruled by the Presidency Magistrate, who convicted the appellant. The High Court of Judicature at Bombay upheld the conviction. The appellant, after his application for a certificate under Article 134 (1) (c) was dismissed, obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The core of the appeal hinges on the interpretation of Section 72 of the 9th Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Section 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, in relation to the Ordinance's duration. The India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946, declared the end of the emergency period on April 1, 1946, which was the period specified in Section 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940. The Ordinance was promulgated within this period.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts  \n1. The appellant was charged with selling ten high‑denomination bank‑notes of Rs. 1,000 each on **11 July 1953**.  \n2. The charge was under **Section 4** of the **High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946** (Ordinance No III of 1946), punishable by **Section 7** of that Ordinance read with **Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code**.  \n3. The Ordinance was **promulgated on 12 January 1946**.  \n4. The appellant argued that the Ordinance was **not in operation on the date of the alleged offence**; the Presidency Magistrate rejected this preliminary objection, convicted the appellant, and the conviction was affirmed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.  \n5. The appellant’s application for a certificate under **Article 134(1)(c)** of the Constitution was dismissed; he thereafter obtained **special leave to appeal** to the Supreme Court under **Article 136**.  \n6. The appeal turns on the interpretation of **Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935** and **Section 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940**, regarding the **duration of the Ordinance**.  \n7. The **India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946** declared the emergency to have ended on **1 April 1946**, which is the date prescribed in **Section 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940**.  \n8. The Ordinance was **promulgated within the emergency period** (January 1946, before 1 April 1946).  \n\n### Issues  \n1. **Whether the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 was still in force on 11 July 1953**, i.e., whether it survived the termination of the emergency on 1 April 1946.  \n2. **If the Ordinance had ceased to operate, whether the conviction of the appellant under that Ordinance is void**, necessitating reversal of the judgment of the lower courts.  \n\n### Rules  \n1. **Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935** – an Ordinance promulgated during an emergency *shall cease to have effect* on the termination of that emergency unless it has been **refreshed, ratified, or otherwise validated** by the competent legislature.  \n2. **Section 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940** – defines the period of the emergency and confers on the Governor‑General the power to promulgate Ordinances “*during the continuance of the emergency*”.  \n3. **India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946** – formally ended the emergency on **1 April 1946**.  \n4. **Doctrine of *nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege* (no crime, no penalty without law)** – a person cannot be convicted for an act that was not unlawful at the time it was performed.  \n5. **Supreme Court precedent** (e.g., *A.K. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal*, (1970) 1 SCC 139) – an Ordinance that lapses for lack of legislative ratification is treated as if it never existed for purposes of criminal liability.  \n\n### Analysis  \n1. **Existence of the Ordinance on the date of the offence (Fact 1, Issue 1).**  \n   - The Ordinance was promulgated on 12 January 1946 (Fact 3), which was **within** the emergency period that terminated on 1 April 1946 (Fact 7).  \n   - Under **Rule 1**, an emergency‑originated Ordinance automatically **ceases** on the termination of the emergency **unless** it is subsequently ratified or refreshed. The material facts contain **no indication** that the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance was ever ratified by the Legislature or otherwise revived after 1 April 1946.  \n   - Consequently, by **Rule 1** and **Rule 2**, the Ordinance **lapsed** on 1 April 1946.  \n\n2. **Effect of the lapse on the conviction (Fact 4, Issue 2).**  \n   - The appellant’s alleged conduct occurred on **11 July 1953** (Fact 1), **more than seven years after** the Ordinance had ceased to operate.  \n   - Applying **Rule 4**, a person cannot be punished under a law that was not in force at the time of the act.  \n   - Following **Rule 5**, Supreme Court precedent holds that where an Ordinance has lapsed for lack of ratification, it is treated as non‑existent for criminal prosecutions. Hence, the conviction under a non‑existent law is void.  \n\n3. **Procedural posture.**  \n   - The lower courts had erred in rejecting the preliminary objection that the Ordinance was not in operation on the date of offence. Their error is a legal error of *jurisdiction* and *misinterpretation* of Section 72 and the termination order.  \n   - The Supreme Court, exercising its jurisdiction under **Article 136**, must correct this error.  \n\n### Conclusion  \nThe High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 was no longer in force on 11 July 1953 because the emergency under which it was promulgated ended on 1 April 1946 and the Ordinance was never ratified thereafter. Accordingly, the appellant cannot be convicted for an act that was not unlawful at the time it was committed. The conviction is therefore invalid.\n\n**The appeal is ALLOWED.**",
-      "reference_judgment": "1957. February 12. The Judgment was delivered by BHAGWATI J.-This appeal with special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution raises the question whether the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No III of 1946) promulgated by the Governor- General of India on January 12, 1946, was in operation on July 11, 1953, when the offence under s. 7 read with s. 4 thereof was committed by the appellant herein.\nThe appellant who was the accused No. 1 before the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate's Court, Bombay, was charged along with the accused Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 with having on or about July II, 1953, transferred by sale 10 High Denomination Bank Notes of the Denomination of Rs. 1, 000 each to one Velji Lakhamshi Joshi for Rs. 1, 800 at the rate of Rs. 180 per note and thus contravened the provisions of s. 4 of the Ordinance and committed an offence punishable under s. 7 of the Ordinance read with s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code.\nA preliminary objection was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the said Ordinance was not in operation at the date when the offence was alleged to have been committed and that therefore the prosecution was not maintainable. This objection was overruled by the learned Presidency Magistrate and the trial ended in the conviction of the appellant along with the co-accused of the offence with which they had been charged. The appellant was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 8, 000 and in default suffer six months' rigorous imprisonment and the co-accused of the appellant were awarded varying sentences of fine with which however we are not concerned.\nThe appellant took an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay being Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1955. The State of Bombay, the respondent herein, also filed an application for enhancement of the sentence, being Criminal Revision Application No. 435 of 1955. The co- accused of the appellant had also filed appeals against their convictions and sentences of fine imposed upon them and all these appeals and the application of the respondent were heard together by a Division, Bench of the High Court. The High Court agreed with the learned Presidency Magistrate in regard to the finding of fact and held that the appellant had in fact transferred by sale 10 High Denomination Bank Notes of Rs. 1, 000 each to the possession of Velji Lakhamshi and his act fell within the prohibition enacted in s. 4 of the Ordinance. The High Court also overruled the contentions which were urged before it in regard to the Ordinance having lapsed and ceased to be in operation before July 11, 1953, the date on which the offence was alleged to have been committed. It accordingly confirmed the conviction recorded against the appellant by the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate. In regard to the sentence the High Court saw no ground for enhancing the same and confirmed the sentence of fine of Rs. 8, 000 and in default six months' rigorous imprisonment which had been awarded by the learned Presidency Magistrate to the appellant.The appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate under Art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. The said application was however dismissed by the High Court with the result that he applied for and obtained from this Court special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\nThe decision of this appeal turns on the construction of s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935 (25 and 26 Geo. 5 ch. 42 ) and s. 1 (3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940 (3 and 4 Geo. 6 ch. 33 ).\nSection 72 of the 9th sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, read as follows: \"The Governor-General may, in cases of emergency, make and promulgate ordinances for the peace and good Government of British India or any part thereof, and any ordinance so made shall, for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation, have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature; but the power of making ordinances under this section is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Indian Legislature to make laws; and any ordinance made under this section is subject to the like disallowance as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature, and may be controlled or , superseded by any such Acts.\" Section 1 (3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, ran as under: \"Section seventy-two of the Government of India Act, (which, as set out in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, confers on the Governor-General power to make Ordinances in cases of emergency) shall, as respects Ordinances made during the period specified in section three of this Act, have effect as if the words \"for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\" were omitted; and, notwithstanding the provision in the said section seventy-two that the power of making Ordinances thereunder is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Indian Legislature to make laws- (a) Ordinances may, during the said period, be made under that section affecting the Army Act, the Air Force Act, or the Naval Discipline Act; and (b) Section one hundred and eleven of the Government of India Act, 1935 (which exempts certain British subjects from certain Indian Laws) shall not apply to any ordinance made under the said section seventy-two during that period.\"Section 3 referred to hereinabove -was in the terms following:\" The period referred to in the preceding sections is the period beginning with the date of the passing of this Act and ending with such date as His Majesty may by Order in Council declare to be the end of the emergency which was the occasion of the passing of this Act.\"\nThe India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, was passed on June 27, 1940 , and was an Act to make emergency provisions with respect to Government of India and Burma. On April 1, 1946, was published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary His Majesty's Order in Council called \"The India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946\". By the said order the period of emergency referred to in s. 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, was declared to have ended on April 1, 1946. The period specified in s. 3 of the said Act thus extended from June 27, 1940, to April 1, 1946. The Ordinance in question was promulgated on January 12, 1946, and was therefore within the said period.\nThe argument which was addressed before us by the learned counsel for the appellant based on these provisions was (a) that as soon as the declaration that the emergency was at an end was made on April 1, 1946, the original position was restored and the Ordinance in question which had been promulgated in exercise of the emergency powers ipso facto lapsed when the emergency was declared to have ended, (b) that, in the alternative, s. 72. of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, having been thus restored with effect from April 1, 1946, one must look to its terms as they originally stood to justify the continuance of the ordinance in question after April 1, 1946, whensoever it may have been promulgated.\nIt will be useful at this stage to see what was the scheme provided in the Government of India Act, 1935, for enacting legislative measures. It may be noted that the Act envisaged the establishment of the Federation of India. Part II, ch. 3 provided for the constitution of the Federal Legislature which was to consist of two chambers known respectively as the Council of States and the House of Assembly. The normal legislative procedure required a bill to be passed by both the Chambers of the Federal Legislature and assented to by the Governor-General. There was a distribution of legislative powers between the Federal Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures and the Federal Legislature was invested with the power to make laws for. the whole or any part of British India or for any Federated State with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Federal Legislative List and any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List. Power was however given, to the Federal Legislature, if the Governor- General in his discretion declared by a \"Proclamation of Emergency\" that a grave emergency existed whereby the security of India was threatened, whether by war or internal disturbance, to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List.. These were the powers of the Federal Legislature to enact legislative measures.The Governor-General was, however, conferred certain legislative powers in Part II, ch. 4. Power was conferred upon him to promulgate Ordinances if at any time when the Federal Legislature was not in session he was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate action. Ordinances thus promulgated were to have the same force and effect as Acts of the Federal Legislature assented to by the Governor-General. But every such Ordinance would cease to operate at the expiration of six months from the re-assembly of the Legislature. Similar power was conferred upon the Governor-General to promulgate Ordinances if at any time he was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate action for the purpose of enabling him satisfactorily to discharge his functions in so far as he was required in the exercise thereof to act in his discretion or to exercise his individual judgment. Such Ordinances also were to have the same force and effect as the Acts of the Federal Legislature assented to by the Governor-General and were to continue in operation for such period not exceeding six months as may be specified therein but could by subsequent Ordinances be extended for a further period not exceeding six months. Power was also conferred upon the Governor-General if at any time it appeared to him that for the purpose of enabling him satisfactorily to discharge his functions in so far as he was required in the exercise thereof to act in his discretion or, to exercise his individual judgment it was essential that provision should be made by legislation, to enact\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS Governor-General's Acts which when enacted were to have the same force and effect as Acts of the Federal Legislature assented to by the Governor-General. These were the special legislative powers conferred upon the Governor-General which could be exercised by him when the normal legislative procedure could not be resorted to. It is worthy of note however that howsoever and under whatever circumstances the legislative powers vested in the Governor-General were exercised by him, the Governor-General's Acts thus enacted and the Ordinances thus promulgated were equated with the Acts of the Federal Legislature assented to by the Governor- General.Part XIII enacted Transitional Provisions. A period of time was bound to elapse between the commencement of Part III of the Act which related to the Governor's Provinces and the establishment of the Federation and s. 317 of the Act continued in force certain provisions of the Government of India Act with amendments consequential on the provisions of the Act set out in the 9th Sch. thereof until the estab- lishment of the Federation. Section 72 above quoted formed part of the 9th Sch. under the caption \"Indian Legislature\" and conferred upon the Governor-General power to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good Government of British India or any part thereof in cases of emergency. Ordinances thus promulgated by the Governor-General in exercise of the power thus conferred upon him were to continue in operation for the space of not more than six months from the date of their promulgation and were to have the like force of law as Acts passed by the Indian Legislature. They were also equated with the. Acts passed by the Indian Legislature by having resort to the normal legislative procedure set out in the Government of India Act.\nEven though the Governor-General's Acts and the Ordinances promulgated by him were thus equated with the Acts passed by the Federal Legislature or the Indian Legislature as the case may be, the period of duration thereof had to be determined. Every statute for which no time is limited is I SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] called a perpetual Act, and its duration is prima facie perpetual. It continues in force until it is repealed. (Vide Craies on Statute Law, 5th Ed. p. 374; Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Ed., Vol. XXXI, p. 511, para. 664). If an Act contains a proviso that it is to continue in force only for a certain specified time, it is called a Temporary Act. This result would follow not only from the terms of the Act itself but also from the fact that it was intended only as a temporary measure. This ratio has also been applied to emergency measures which continue during the subsistence of the emergency but lapse with the cessation thereof. It was therefore contended that Ordinances promulgated under the emergency powers vested in the Governor-General would be in operation during the period of emergency but would cease to be in operation once the emergency was declared to have ended. In the instant case before us the Ordinance in question was promulgated in exercise of the emergency powers vested in the Governor- General under s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, and it was urged that the Ordinance thus promulgated would cease to be in operation after the emergency was declared to have ended on April 1, 1946, by the India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946, in spite of the words of limitation \"for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\" having been omitted from s. 72 by s. 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940.Reliance was placed in support of this contention on the observations of Vardachariar C. J. in King Emperor v. Benoari Lall Sharma and others([1943] F.C.R. 96 , 137.): \"Legislation by Ordinance has no doubt been given the same effect as ordinary legislation and the ambit as to the subject-matter is the same in both cases. But there are two fundamental points of difference which have a material bearing on the present question: One is that by the very terms of s.72 of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution Act, the operation of the Ordinance is limited to a period of six months (and even now it is only temporary, though the particular limit has been removed), and secondly, it is avowedly the exercise of a special power intended to meet an emergency.\"\nZafrulla Khan J. also had expressed himself to the same effect in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee ([1944] F.C.R. 1 , 12.): \"The legislature can at any time enact a measure and such measure can remain in force without any limit of time; but the exercise of the Ordinance-making power is limited in two ways (1) by the limitation as to the circumstances in which it can be exercised, and (ii) by the limitation as to the time during which any measure so enacted can remain in operation. The existence of an emergency is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power. The fact that the Court cannot go behind a declaration of emergency made by the Ordinance-making authority cannot affect this question. The power was intended to be availed of and could be availed of only in an emergency, whereas ordinary legislation is not governed by any such limitation. Similarly, an Ordinance is necessarily of limited duration, whether under s. 72 or under the terms of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1940.\"\nAn argument was accordingly addressed before us that even though the Ordinance in question had been promulgated during the period specified in a. 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, viz., between June 27, 1940, and April 1, 1946, and s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, was to be read with the omission of the words \"for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\" therefrom, the effect of such omission was not to continue the duration of the Ordinance in question in any event beyond April 1, 1946. The Ordinance lapsed or ceased to be in operation on the, declaration having been made on April 1, 1946, that the emergency had ended.This argument however ignores the fact that whatever Governor-General's Acts were enacted or Ordinances promulgated by him in exercise of his special legislative powers or in exercise of the emergency power conferred upon him by s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, were all equated with the Acts of the Federal Legislature or the Indian Legislature, as the case may be, assented to by the Governor-General. If there was a limitation to be found in the Acts or the Ordinances themselves in regard to the duration thereof the same was to prevail. But if no time was limited in the enactment itself for its duration it was to continue in force until it was repealed. If by the operation of s. 1 (3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, the words \"for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\" were omitted from s. 72 during the period specified in s. 3 of that Act, viz., June 27, 1940 to April 1, 1946, there was no limitation of the period of duration of the Ordinance in question and the Ordinance having the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature without any limitation on its duration was to continue in force until it was repealed. The emergency under which the Governor-General was invested with the power to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good government of British India or any part thereof under s. 72 was the condition of the exercise of such power, by the Governor- General and did not impose any limitation on the duration of the Ordinances thus promulgated. For determining the duration of such Ordinances one had to look to the substantive provisions of s. 72 which in terms enacted and laid down the limitation of \"not more than six months from its promulgation\" on the life of the Ordinance. If these words had not been omitted by s. 1 (3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, the Ordinances thus promulgated -would have been of a duration of not more than six months from their promulgation. Once these words were omitted by a. 1 (3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, would read as under:- The Governor-General may, in cases of emergency, make and promulgate ordinances for the peace and good government of British India or any part thereof and any ordinance so made shall.................. have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature; but the power of making ordinances under this section is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Indian Legislature to make laws; and the like disallowance as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature, and may be controlled or superseded by any such Act. \"The effect of the deletion of these words from s. 72 leaving the section to be read as above had the necessary effect of equating the Ordinances which were promulgated between June 27, 1940, and April 1, 1946, with Acts passed by the Indian Legislature without any limitation of time as regards their duration. Ordinances thus promulgated were perpetual in duration and continued in force until they were repealed. This position was considered by the Federal Court in J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., (Rampur) Ltd. and others v. King Emperor ([1947] F.C.R. 141 , 161.) where Spens C. J. observed:-\" These Ordinances were made under the powers conferred on the Governor-General by s. 72 of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution Act, as amended by the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940 (3 &amp; 4 Geo. 6, Ch. 33 ). Under the said s. 72, as it originally stood, Ordinances were limited to an effective life of six months only from the date of promulgation. Sub-section (3) of s. I of the said Act, however, provided that in respect of Ordinances made under s. 72 during the period specified in s. 3 of the Act, s. 72 should have effect as if the words , for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\"were omitted. The period specified in s. 3 of the Act is\" the period beginning with the date of the passing of this Act and ending with such date as His Majesty may by Order in Council declare to be the end of the emergency which was the occasion of the passing of this Act. \"The date of `the passing of the said Act was the 27th June, 1940, and the emergency was not notified to have come to an end on the 1st April, 1946.\nIt was contended on behalf of the appellants that the true construction to be given to s. 72 as so amended was in effect to substitute in s. 72 in respect of the duration of an Ordinance, -the period specified in s. 3 of the Act for the original six months' period and that accordingly on the expiration of that period, viz., on the 1st April, 1946, Ordinances made after the passing of the Act automatically came to an end. It was not made very clear how one could arrive at such a construction. It appears to be based on the suggestion that the power to promulgate an Ordinance under s. 72 was by the section confined to the existence of an emergency, Cf: the words in the sub-section \"in cases of emergency\", and that the Act was intituled an Act to make emergency provision with respect to the Government of India and Burma and defined the period of emergency. Unless therefore the construction contended for by the appellants was accepted no period would be provided for the continuance of these Ordinances, and that could not have been the intention of the legislature, as the ordinance-making power of the Governor-General was recognised as temporary only. In our opinion, the emergency on the happening of which an Ordinance can be promulgated is separate and distinct from and must not be confused with the, emergency which occasioned the pawing of the Act and the clear effect of the words of the, Act on s. 72 is that Ordinances promulgated under that subsection during the period specified in s. 3 of the Act are subject to no time limit as regards their existence and validity, unless imposed by the Ordinances themselves, or other amending or repealing legislation, whether by Ordinance or other. wise. In our judgment, it is clear that the second Lahore Tribunal did not cease to exist or to have jurisdiction in the case under appeal by reason of the expiration on the 1st April, 1946, of the period specified in s. 3 of the Act in question.\" In our opinion, the above observations of Spens C. J. enunciate the correct position. The Ordinance in question having been promulgated during the period between June 27, 1940, 'and April 1, 1946, was perpetual in duration and continued in force until it was repealed. Our attention has not been drawn to any subsequent Ordinance or Act of the Indian Legislature amending or repealing the said Ordinance with the result that it continues to be in force and was in operation on July 11, 1953, the date on which the offence in question was committed by the appellant.\nThis position was recognized in the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, issued under -the Constitution Of India. In the Second Schedule to the said Order were contained several Central Ordinances enacted between 1940 and 1946 including the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. III of 1946) where in s.. II thereof the words \"Part A States and Part C States\" were to be sub- stituted for \"the provinces\". It is not necessary to refer to the other Ordinances appearing in this compilation but suffice it to say that in respect of all the Ordinances which were thus promulgated by the Governor-General in exercise of the power conferred upon him under s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of India Act, 1935, the continuance thereof even after April 1, 1946, was predicated and the adaptations prescribed in the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, issued under the Constitution of India were made applicable thereto.\nThis position is further supported by referring to the relevant provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (II of 1934). Section 26 of that Act provided ill (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), every bank note shall be legal tender at any place in India in payment or on account for the amount expressed therein, and shall be guaranteed by the Central Government.(2)On recommendation of the Central Board the Central Government may, by notification in the Gazette of India, declare that, with effect from such date as -may be specified in the notification, any series of bank notes of any denomination, shall cease to be legal tender save at such office or a agency of the bank and to such extent as may be specified in the notification. Under s. 1 (2) of the Act as it stood, the Act extended to whole of India excepting the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The' High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. III of 1946) declared that Denomination Notes of the denominational value of Rs. 500, Rs. 1, 000 or Rs. 10, 000 ceased to be legal tender in payment or on account at any place in British India on the expiry of January 12, 1946. The Ordinance having continued in operation even after the declaration of the emergency having come to an end was made on April 1, 1946, the said notes continued to be ineffective as legal tender in India, though the position in Jammu and Kashmir in regard to the same could not be affected by reason of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, not having been made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir as stated above. On September 25, 1956, however, the Jammu and Kashmir (Extension of Laws) Act, 1956 (LXII of 1956) being an Act to provide for the extension of certain laws to the State of Jammu and Kashmir was passed by the Parliament. In the Schedule to that Act was contained the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (II of 1934). The words \"except the State of Jammu and Kashmir\" were omitted from s. 1, sub-s. (2) and s. 26A was added after s. 26 of the Act.\nSection 26A provides:- , , Notwithstanding anything contained in section 26, no bank note of the denominational value of five hundred rupees, one thousand rupees or ten thousand rupees issued before the 13th day of January, 1946, shall be legal tender in payment or on account for the -amount expressed therein.The law in the State of Jammu and Kashmir with regard to these High Denomination Bank Notes issued before January 13, 1946, was thus brought into line with the law as it obtained in the rest of India. This would certainly have not been done but for the acceptance of the position that the Ordinance in question continued in operation even after April 1, 1946, and was in operation right throughout even after April 1, 1946. The alternative argument addressed before us by the learned counsel for the appellant need not detain us at all, for the simple reason that reading s. 72 in the manner suggested would be tantamount to giving a retrospective effect to the section as it originally stood in regard to Ordinances which had been promulgated between June 27, 1940, and April 1, 1946. There is nothing to justify such retrospective operation. As regards such Ordinances the period of their duration had to be determined having regard to the provisions of s. 72 as they stood with the omission of the words \"for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation\" therefrom during tHe period specified in s. 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, and the Ordinance in question was therefore not limited to the space of not more than six months from the date of its promulgation but was perpetual in its duration with the result that it continues in operation until it is repealed. There is no warrant for reading the provisions of s. 72 with the omitted words restored to their original position after April 1, 1946, while determining the duration of the Ordinances which had been promulgated between June 27, 1940, and April 1, 1946.\nBoth the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the appellant before us having thus failed, it follows that the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetization) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. III of 1946) was in operation on July 11, 1953, the date on which the offence was committed by the appellant and the appellant was rightly convicted by both the courts below. The appeal will accordingly stand dismissed.\n",
+      "case_record": "The appellant, engaged in the purchase and sale of shares, utilized the services of the respondent, a broker at the Bombay Stock Exchange. A dispute arose, leading the appellant to file a suit for recovery of Rs. 5,63,334/-. Upon receiving summons, the respondent filed an application under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking to stay the proceedings on the ground that an arbitration provision covered the dispute. The learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted this contention and stayed the suit. The appellant's First Appeal against this order was dismissed. The appellant then filed the present appeal by way of special leave petition. The bills for transactions contained two arbitration clauses: one on the front, defining 'non-member' to 'include a remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom the members shares (brokerage)', and another on the back, stating 'In the event of any claim... arising between you and us out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration'. The appellant contended that as he was not a remisier, authorized clerk, or employee, nor did he share brokerage, he was not covered by the definition of 'non-member', arguing that 'any other person' should be interpreted narrowly (ejusdem generis).",
+      "generated_judgment": "To evaluate the appeal, we need to assess whether the arbitration clause should apply to the appellant under the principles of contractual interpretation, particularly considering the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which the appellant has invoked. Here are the critical steps:\n\n1. **Understanding the Dispute and Legal Framework**:\n   - The dispute involves the appellant and the respondent, a broker at the Bombay Stock Exchange, regarding the recovery of a certain sum.\n   - The respondent invoked Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, to stay court proceedings, arguing that an arbitration clause covered the dispute.\n   - The arbitration clause defines 'non-member' and contains provisions that may apply to the appellant.\n\n2. **Interpretation of the Arbitration Clause**:\n   - The arbitration clause includes two parts:\n     - A definition on the front of the bills: \"non-member\" to \"include a remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom members share (brokerage).\"\n     - An arbitration agreement on the back: \"In the event of any claim... arising between you and us out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration.\"\n   - The appellant argues that he does not fall within the definition of 'non-member' as he is not a remisier, authorized clerk, or employee, nor does he share brokerage. Here, he relies on the ejusdem generis principle, which suggests that where general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are construed to apply only to items of the same kind.\n\n3. **Application of Ejusdem Generis**:\n   - The specific items listed are \"remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom members share (brokerage).\"\n   - 'Any other person' is the general term following this list. Under ejusdem generis, 'any other person' should be interpreted as similar to the specific items preceding it, which are specifically related to brokerage or employment in broker-related roles.\n   - The appellant’s situation must be evaluated to see if he fits within this context. If his activities do not involve brokerage or employment in a related role, the ejusdem generis argument suggests he may not be covered by the arbitration clause.\n\n4. **Judicial Precedents and Interpretation**:\n   - Courts typically look to the intention of the parties when interpreting contract terms. If the language is ambiguous, they may lean towards a narrower interpretation unless clearly stated otherwise.\n   - The intention behind arbitration clauses is often to provide a streamlined dispute resolution process, but they must clearly specify the parties they cover.\n\n5. **Decision**:\n   - Given the appellant’s argument and the principle of ejusdem generis, there is a valid reason to believe that the arbitration provision might not encompass the appellant if he does not fit the specific categories or a similar context.\n   - Previous court decisions often favor the party not drafting ambiguous terms unless explicitly stated otherwise. Here, the ambiguity exists concerning whether the term 'any other person' extends to the appellant's role and activities.\n\nBased on the above analysis, the appeal hinges on how the term 'any other person' is interpreted within the arbitration clause. Given the appellant’s strong argument based on ejusdem generis and the ambiguity around 'any other person,' it seems fair that this matter should be considered, potentially in a non-arbitral forum, unless the clause is unequivocally applicable.\n\n**Conclusion**: The appeal is **ALLOWED** to provide a more thorough examination of whether the arbitration clause applicability, as contested by the appellant, should indeed exclude him based on the principles of contractual interpretation and ejusdem generis.",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Order of the Court is as follows\n1. The appellant herein was engaged in the business of purchase and sale of shares and for that purpose he had been utilizing the services of the defendant, who is a broker at the Bombay Stock Exchange. The appellant herein filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 5,63, 334/- against M/s. Mahendra R. Shah &amp; Bros., who are the respondents herein. The respondents herein on receipt of the summons in the suit, filed an application under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 for staying the proceeding on the ground that there is a provision for arbitration as regards the dispute in the suit. The learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the contention of the respondents herein and directed the stay of proceedings of the suit. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the First Appeal from the said order, which was dismissed. It is against the said order of the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal by way of special leave petition.\n2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that the arbitration clause printed on the bills does not include the persons like plaintiff and, therefore, the appellant being a non-member is not required to seek arbitration. We do not find any merit in the contention. One clause of the Bill, which is printed on the front, reads as under:\n \"All the claims (whether admitted or not) difference and disputes between a member and a non-member or a non-member (the terms \"non-member\" shall include a remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom the members shares (brokerage) arising out of or in relation to dealing transactions and contracts made subject to the rules and bye-laws and regulations of the Exchange or with reference to anything incidental thereto or in pursuance thereof or relating their construction, fulfillment or validity or relating to the rights, obligation and liabilities of remisier, authorised clerk, employees or any other persons with whom the member shares brokerage in relation to such dealings, transactions and contracts shall be referred to and decided by arbitration as provided in the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Exchange.\" \n3. Another clause of the Bill, which is printed on the back side, reads as under:\n \"In the event of any claim (whether admitted or not) difference or dispute arising between you and us out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration in Bombay as provided in the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Stock Exchange, Bombay\". \n4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that a non-member will only be covered if he falls under the definition of a non-member. Since the appellant is neither a remisier or authorised clerk or employee or shares any brokerage with the member, he cannot be covered by the said definition and, therefore, the said rules, definition and bye-laws do not apply to him. In fact, the argument is that the words 'any other person\" should take colour from the preceding words, namely, 'remiser, authorised clerk or employee' and since the appellant is not one of those mentioned, he does not fall within the expression 'any other person'. T he reading of clause quoted above, as a whole, would clearly show that this clause is quite wide and comprehensive enough to cover the case of the plaintiff. In order to make it comprehensive, unauthorised clerk and employee and other persons like remisier, who are or have been receiving brokerage form the members of the Exchange have been included in the definition of non-member person. In fact by including these categories, the definition of a 'non-member' has been widened. The inclusion of such persons does not mean that no person like the appellant who is not a member of the Exchange has been excluded from the definition of the non-member. This aspect may be examined from another angle. The other Clause in the same bill puts the matter beyond doubt. The said clause shows that any claim (whether admitted or not) difference or dispute arising between you and us' out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration in Bombay as providing in the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Stock Exchange. It does not show that what does it contemplate as regards arbitration clause printed on the front of the Bill, and that it provides for arbitration and the persons like appellant are included therein.\n5. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the appeal. It, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -988,26 +988,26 @@
     },
     "meta": {
       "sample_id": "S018",
-      "case_id": "1335",
-      "experiment": "baseline_firac",
-      "model": "gpt-oss-120b-noreason",
-      "source_file": "S018__baseline_firac__gpt-oss-120b-noreason__1335.json",
+      "case_id": "172",
+      "experiment": "baseline_cot",
+      "model": "phi-4",
+      "source_file": "S018__baseline_cot__phi-4__172.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "12/02/1957",
+      "judgment_date": "31/07/2003",
       "machine_error_stage": "rules",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misinterpretation"
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication"
     }
   },
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 755 of 1967, decided on August 3, 1972. | Daulat Rao Jai Ram Ji (Since Dead) L. Rs v. Harish Chandra And Others | 03/08/1972",
-      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 755 of 1967, decided on August 3, 1972. | Daulat Rao Jai Ram Ji (Since Dead) L. Rs v. Harish Chandra And Others",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl) No.4661 of 2007) | S.K. Alagh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others | 15/02/2008",
+      "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl) No.4661 of 2007) | S.K. Alagh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "Plaintiff Daulat Rao sought a declaration that he had not adopted the third defendant, Harishchandra, who claimed adoption on January 5, 1955. The trial court found the adoption untrue and invalid, but the High Court reversed this, upholding the adoption. A partition had occurred between the plaintiff and his brother (Defendant No. 1) in 1948. The plaintiff, in his plaint, averred his intention to separate from the third defendant if the adoption was upheld and had expressed this intention in a notice on January 29, 1955. He also sought an alternative relief for partition of his 1948 share. No proper issue was raised on this partition plea in the lower courts. The plaintiff had no sons but a daughter, and Harishchandra is his brother's son. An adoption deed was written on January 5, 1955, and registered on January 7, 1955, and a photograph was taken immediately after the alleged adoption. The plaintiff admitted his signatures on the deed but claimed fraud/unconsciousness. He also executed other gift deeds around the same time. The Hindu Succession Act came into force before the plaintiff's death in 1969. The third defendant admitted the plaintiff's right to a share in his written statement.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. Daulat Rao (the plaintiff) sought a declaration that he had not adopted Harishchandra (the third defendant) on January 5, 1955.\n2. The trial court found the adoption untrue and invalid, but the High Court reversed this and upheld the adoption.\n3. A partition occurred between the plaintiff and his brother (Defendant No. 1) in 1948.\n4. The plaintiff expressed his intention to separate from Harishchandra if the adoption was upheld, in a notice dated January 29, 1955.\n5. An adoption deed was written on January 5, 1955, and registered on January 7, 1955, with a photograph taken immediately after the alleged adoption.\n6. The plaintiff admitted his signatures on the deed but claimed fraud/unconsciousness.\n7. The plaintiff had no sons but a daughter, and Harishchandra is his brother's son.\n8. The Hindu Succession Act came into force before the plaintiff's death in 1969.\n9. No proper issue was raised on the plaintiff's alternative plea for partition of his 1948 share in lower courts.\n10. The third defendant admitted the plaintiff's right to a share in his written statement.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Did the High Court err in reversing the trial court's finding that the adoption was untrue and invalid?\n2. Should the plaintiff's request for separation from Harishchandra be granted, given his notice of intention to separate?\n3. Did the lower courts err in not properly addressing the plaintiff's alternative plea for partition of his 1948 share?\n4. Does the plaintiff's status (adoptive father or not) impact his daughter's rights to intestate succession under the Hindu Succession Act?\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Adoption and Succession** (Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956)\n   - An adoption shall be invalid if it is made with the intention of disowning the adopted son from his rights of inheritance (Section 7).\n   - An adoption will not cause a person to have more heirs by succession than he would have had if he had died intestate on the date of adoption (Section 11).\n2. **Partition** (Indian Partition Act, 1891)\n   - Any person interested in the Partition may apply for an order for partition (Section 6).\n3. **Notice** (Principles of Indian Law)\n   - A notice of intention expresses the sender's current intention and may be revoked or modified.\n   - A notice can serve as an expression of intention in certain legal contexts.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Appeal maintainability**: The plaintiff has challenged the High Court's decision to uphold the adoption. He has also raised two fringe issues—the notice of separation and the alternative plea for partition. These issues create a prima facie case for appeal, but considering the primary focus on the adoption's validity, **the appeal is maintainable**.\n\n2. **Issue 1**: The High Court's reversal of the trial court's order should be examined for error.\n   - **Sub-issue 2.1**: The plaintiff's admission of his signature on the adoption deed, coupled with his claim of fraud/unconsciousness, creates an inconsistency. However, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to establish these contentions. The trial court, after assessing evidence, found the adoption untrue and invalid. The High Court reversed this based on its assessment of the same evidence. Since both courts have considered the evidence, no clear error is apparent.\n   - **Sub-issue 2.2**: The notice of intention to separate does not automatically invalidate the adoption, as it post-dates the adoption. However, it may be considered alongside other evidence to determine the plaintiff's state of mind and intention at the time of adoption.\n\n3. **Issue 2**: Even if the adoption is upheld, the plaintiff's notice of intention to separate suggests his disapproval of the adoption.\n   - The notice was given promptly after the adoption and indicates a clear intention to disown Harishchandra if the adoption was upheld. However, it was not communicated to the parties involved in the adoption process, raising questions about its effectiveness as a contemporaneous expression of intention.\n\n4. **Issue 3**: The lower courts' failure to address the partition plea might constitute an error.\n   - The plaintiff raised the partition plea in his plaint, but it was not properly addressed in the lower courts. Despite this oversight, the court should consider the merits of the partition claim, especially if the adoption is upheld.\n\n5. **Issue 4**: The plaintiff's status impacts his daughter's rights to intestate succession.\n   - If the adoption is invalidated, the plaintiff's daughter would revert to being his sole heir according to his share from the 1948 partition, as per Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.\n\n### Conclusion:\nConsidering the analyses above, the appeal is maintainable. However, there is no clear error in the High Court's reversal of the trial court's order on the adoption's validity. The notice of separation may not be sufficient to invalidate the adoption but should be considered in assessing the plaintiff's intentions. The lower courts' oversight in not addressing the partition plea is an error, and the partition claim should be reconsidered. Finally, the plaintiff's status impacts his daughter's intestate succession rights. Therefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED** without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to pursue the partition claim or other remedies based on the adopted son's treatment.",
-      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by HEGDE, J. :\nHEGDE, J. for the This is a plaintiffs' appeal by certificate. Plaintiff Daulat rao who died during the pendency of this appeal sought several reliefs in suit No. 5-A of 1955 in the Court of the Second Additional District Judge, Amravati. But at present we are primarily concerned with relief No. 1 claimed in the plaint viz :\n\"That it be declared that defendant No. 3 has no right or title to the property in Schedules A, B and 1/2 share in Schedule D and permanent injunction be issued to him not to interfere with plaintiff's enjoyment and possession of property shown in Schedules A, B and 1/2 share in Schedule D.\"\n2. The relief claimed does not properly bring out the controversy between the parties. The plaintiff really wanted a declaration that he had not adopted the third defendant, Harishchandra and as such the said Harishchandra has no interest in the plaintiff's properties. The third defendant claimed that he had been adopted by the plaintiff on January 5, 1955. The trial court held that the adoption pleaded by the third defendant is neither true nor valid. The High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench) reversing the judgment of the trial court upheld the adoption put forward by the third defendant.\n3. There was a controversy between the parties as to whether the plaintiff and his brother Champatrao, defendant No. 1 were members of an undivided family or whether they were divided. Both the trial court as well as the High Court came to the conclusion that there was partition between the plaintiff and his brother in the year 1948. That conclusion was not even challenged before the High Court. Hence there is no need to go into it.\n4. In paragraph 7 of the plaint, the plaintiff had definitely averred that if the court is pleased to uphold the adoption put forward by the third defendant, he does not wish to remain joint with the third defendant. It was further averred therein that in the notice issued by him on January 29, 1955 to Defendants 1 and 3, he had expressed his intention to separate and he had effected severance between him and the third defendant. As an alternative relief he claimed partition of the properties that fell to his share in 1948 between himself and the third defendant. No proper issue was raised on this plea. Evidently the trial court having granted the main relief in favour of the plaintiff did not think it relevant to go into the alternative relief asked for. No arguments relating to that relief appear to have been advanced before the High Court. The High Court has also not considered that question. But in this Court Mr. V. S. Desai appearing for the appellants pressed that alternative contention. We shall consider that contention at a later stage.\n5. In order to decide the question whether the third defendant was in fact adopted by the plaintiff on January 5, 1955, and whether the adoption pleaded was a valid one, it is necessary to state a few more facts. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant Champatrao are direct brother. They are the sons of one Jairam. The plaintiff had two wives, Mankarnika (Defendant 4) and Deokabai (Defendant 5). He had no sons. But he had a daughter by name Vatsala (Defendant 6). This daughter had a son and a daughter. The plaintiff had also a mistress by name Savitri, who was defendant No. 7 in the suit. Champatrao had three sons : Abarao (Defendant 2), Harishchandra (Defendant 3) and Vasant (Defendant 8). Vasant had been adopted by one Khushalrao Deshmukh.\n6. The case for Defendants 1 to 3 is that the plaintiff adopted defendant No. 3 on January 5, 1955 at Amravati in the compound of Dr. Mudaliar's nursing home. Thereafter a photo was taken. A deed of adoption was also written up on that day and registered on January 7, 1955. The plaintiff and Defendants 4, 5 and 6 denied the adoption pleaded. According to them the plaintiff had a paralytic stroke sometime in the year 1954. At that time he was treated by Dr. Mudaliar but he was nursed by his brother defendant No. 1. In about the beginning of January 1955, he had attack of pneumonia. Hence he was brought to the hospital of Dr. Mudaliar. While he was in that hospital, he was unconscious for several days; taking advantage of the physical and mental condition of the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 got up the adoption deed as well as several other documents.\n7. The burden of establishing that there was a valid adoption which deflected the ordinary course of succession is undoubtedly on the party who pleads the case of adoption. In the instant case, there is almost conclusive evidence to show that the plaintiff had adopted the third defendant on January 5, 1955. Immediately after the adoption, as is usual in Maharashtra, a photograph of the adoptive father, the adopted boy as well as of other relations had been taken. The photographer has been examined. he has also produced the negative. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the photographer. The photograph in question completely falsifies the story of the plaintiff that at about the time of the adoption, he was unconscious. It is seen from the photograph that the plaintiff was well-dressed when the photograph was taken. He was sitting erect and alert. Though he looks old and weak in the photograph, he looks quite cheerful. As regards the state of his health at about the time of adoption, the plaintiff has given various versions each contradicting the other. At one stage of his evidence he stated that he was only mentally feeble at that time because of the illness; at another place he deposed that he was unconscious for four or five days but he later asserted that he was unconscious for one full month. Hardly any reliance can be placed on the testimony of the plaintiff. The best witness who could have spoken to the physical and mental condition of the plaintiff was Dr. Mudaliar. Dr. Mudaliar has not been examined. No reason is forthcoming for his non-examination. Curiously enough instead of examining Dr. Mudaliar, the plaintiff has chosen to examine his compounder, whose evidence clearly discloses that he knew very little about the nature of the plaintiff's ailment. Some records said to have been maintained in Dr. Mudaliar's dispensary had been produced. Naturally the High Court was not able to attach any importance to those documents. Nor do we attach any importance to them.\n8. We next come to the question of the adoption deed. The plaintiff admits that the signatures found therein are his. His explanation is that the said signatures were obtained by practising fraud on him and that he did not know the contents of the document when he signed the same. This is clearly falsified by the testimony of the Sub-Registrar who registered the document. The Sub-Registrar deposed that the adoption deed was presented before him by the plaintiff on January 7, 1955 and that the plaintiff admitted before him the correctness of its contents. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the Sub-Registrar who appears to be an independent witness. In addition to the evidence of the Sub-Registrar, the third defendant has examined two of the attestors to the adoption deed. One of the attesters to the adoption deed is a common relation of the plaintiff as well as of the first defendant.\n9. The story put forward by the plaintiff as regards the execution of the deed is extremely artificial. It may be noted that at about the time, the plaintiff executed the adoption deed, he had also executed gift deeds in favour of his two wives, his mistress and his daughter. He himself presented all those documents for registration. Apart from averring in the plaint that those documents were fictitiously got up by the 1st defendant, the plaintiff has not even challenged the validity of those documents. Apparently he stood by those documents. The 1st defendant could not have had any interest in getting gift deeds in favour of the plaintiff's wives, his mistress and the daughter. The execution of these deeds undoubtedly go to strengthen the case of the third defendant that the plaintiff voluntarily executed the adoption deed.\n10. Now coming to the factum of adoption, firstly there is an admission of that fact in the adoption deed executed by the plaintiff. Then we have the evidence of the photographer who speaks to the fact that a photograph of the persons who participated in the adoption was taken by him very soon after the adoption. Added to this we have the evidence of the priest who officiated at the adoption. As many as six witnesses had attested the adoption deed. Out of them, two have been examined. They speak to the adoption ceremony. They speak to the giving and taking of the boy. The High Court has accepted their testimony. We see no reason to differ from the conclusions reached by the High Court.\n11. Some comment was made on the facts that the adoption is said to have taken place in the compound of Dr. Mudaliar's hospital and that too very near a latrine; no invitations had been issued for the adoption, there was no music and that there was no reception. In addition, it was also alleged that the ladies of the house who were alleged to have been present at the time of the adoption do not appear in the photo and that circumstance indicates that there was no adoption. These circumstances undoubtedly show that the adoption in question was not done with the concurrence of the wives of the plaintiff. It may be that the plaintiff had adopted the third defendant without the knowledge of his wives and with a view to avoid any obstruction by them he had gone to Amravati and adopted the third defendant. Possibly under the influence of his wives, he had later tried to resile from the adoption made.\n12. This Court ordinarily attaches great deal of importance to the findings of fact reached by the High Courts. The findings reached by the High Court are probabilised by the circumstances appearing in the case and are supported by oral and documentary evidence. Under these circumstances, we are not called upon to reassess the evidence minutely. In the result we agree with the High Court that the plaintiff had adopted the third defendant on January 5, 1955. We do not agree with the trial court that there is no satisfactory evidence as regards giving and taking of the boy.\n13. This takes us to the alternative relief asked for in the plaint. Obviously parties to the suit as well as the trial court as well as the High Court had exclusively focussed their attention on the question of adoption. The trial Judge having decided the main question in favour of the plaintiff probably thought it unnecessary to examine the alternative relief claimed. It must also be said that the issues framed did not directly touch the said relief. The High Court in its judgment after dealing with the question of adoption clearly says that \"no other issue was canvassed in the appeal.\" But all the same, the plaintiff had clearly declared his intention to be separated from the third defendant in paragraph 7 of the plaint. He had also claimed that a partition be effected by metes and bounds through court. In his written statement, the third defendant has admitted the plaintiff's right to get a share. The plaintiff's right to get a share is not open to any dispute. The plaintiff stood separated from the third defendant by the time the suit was filed. His share had to be determined as on the date he got separated from the third defendant. The plaintiff died in 1969 during the pendency of the litigation. His share devolved on his heirs according to law. It was contended on behalf of the contesting respondents that the plaintiff having not pressed the alternative relief claimed before the High Court, we should not go into that question at this stage and the parties should be allowed to work out their rights in a separate suit. We see no justification for that course. The deceased plaintiff was entitled to have his share worked out in the present suit itself. He having died during the pendency of the litigation his share devolved on his heirs. It is but appropriate that the rights inter se between his heirs should be worked out in this very litigation. We were told at the bar that the plaintiff died in 1969 after the Hindu Succession Act came into force. It is not possible for us to work out the rights of the parties in this Court. We think that under the circumstances of the case, it is appropriate to remand this case to the trial court to ascertain as to what was the share of the deceased plaintiff on the date he got separated from the third defendant, who are all his heirs and to what share each one of them is entitled to. The trial court will also divide by metes and bounds not merely the shares inter se between the deceased plaintiff and the third defendant but also between the heirs of the deceased plaintiff. Unless there was any disposition made by the deceased plaintiff of his share, the third defendant is also admittedly one of the heirs of the deceased plaintiff.\n14. In the result this appeal is partly allowed and the case remanded to the trial court to carry out the directions given above. So far as the costs of the trial court and the High Court are concerned, the High Court has already directed the parties to bear their own costs throughout. We make a similar order as to the costs in this Court. In other words, the parties shall bear their own costs in this Court also.",
+      "case_record": "M/s. Akash Traders was an Area Wholesale dealer for Britannia Industries Limited (the Company). The dealership was terminated. Despite this, the complainant sent two demand drafts totaling Rs. 1,68,000/- on 14.09.2000 for goods. The company reiterated the termination of the dealership. The proprietor of M/s. Akash Traders filed a complaint under Section 406 IPC against the appellant (Managing Director of the Company), but the company was not made an accused. The demand drafts were in the company's name. After the complainant's death and substitution, the Magistrate summoned the appellants. The Magistrate discharged the accused under Section 245(2) CrPC, finding no criminal intent due to the delay in returning the drafts being attributable to banking processes and the fact that the drafts were eventually received back by the complainant. The revisional court allowed the complainant's revision, stating the Magistrate erred by not allowing evidence under Section 244 CrPC. The High Court dismissed the appellant's application under Section 482 CrPC, finding a prima facie case.",
+      "generated_judgment": "In evaluating the appeal, it's essential to consider the sequence of legal proceedings and the reasoning provided by the courts at different levels.\n\n1. **Initial Complaint and Discharge**: The complainant, M/s. Akash Traders, filed a complaint under Section 406 IPC. The Magistrate discharged the accused, finding no criminal intent. This was based on the conclusion that the delay in returning the drafts was due to banking processes and that the drafts were eventually returned to the complainant.\n\n2. **Revision by Complainant**: The complainant appealed, and the revisional court found that the Magistrate erred by not allowing evidence under Section 244 CrPC. As a result, the revision was allowed.\n\n3. **High Court's Decision**: The High Court dismissed the appellant's application under Section 482 CrPC, indicating that there was a prima facie case to be answered. This suggests that the High Court found merit in the revisional court's decision to allow the revision, implying that the Magistrate's decision to discharge might have been premature or without sufficient regard to evidence that could have been presented.\n\nConsidering these facts, the sequence of judicial decisions indicates that the higher courts found procedural and substantive grounds to question the Magistrate's discharge of the accused. The High Court's dismissal of the Section 482 CrPC application further supports the position that a prima facie case existed, warranting further examination.\n\nTherefore, based on the facts provided and the decisions of the revisional court and the High Court, the appeal should be **DISMISSED**.",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE S. B. SINHA\n1. Leave granted.\n2. M/s. Akash Traders was an Area Wholesale dealer of Britannia Industries Limited (the Company) for Azamgarh, U.P. Dealership of Respondent No.2 was terminated by the said company. It was earlier informed that goods will be delivered only upon receipt of demand drafts issued by it. Complainant sent two demand drafts for a sum of Rs.18, 000/- and Rs.1, 50, 000/- for supply of goods on 14.9.2000 despite the fact that the dealership had been terminated earlier.\n3. The said demand drafts were sent to the appellant through the local Sales In-charge of the Company. It is stated that the complainant refused to take the same back.\n4. A new Area Wholesaler for Azamgarh was appointed by the company.\n5. A demand was made by the complainant to deliver goods by a letter dated 24.9.2000 stating that the company owes him a sum of Rs.1, 00, 000/-. The stand of the company that his dealership had been terminated was reiterated by a letter dated 25.9.2000.\n6. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, purported to be the proprietor of the firm M/s. Akash Traders, filed a complaint petition in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh against the appellant herein for commission of an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Britania Industries Ltd. was not impleaded as an accused therein.\n7. On or about 17.2.2001, i.e., after filing of the complaint petition, the dealer accepted the said demand drafts being dated 8.1.2002 for a sum of Rs.1, 68, 000/-. On or about 25.2.2001, Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, the original complainant expired. A substitution application was filed by the second respondent-Alok Kumar Aggarwal on or about 19.4.2001.\n8. Inter alia, relying on or on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint petition that 'the company with mala fide intention neither sent the goods, nor returned the money'; an order for summoning the appellants was passed on 8.5.2001. A publication to that effect was also made in an article in a local newspaper.\n9. An application for recalling the order summoning before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was filed by the appellant. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, by an order dated 13.12.2001 discharged the accused in terms of Section 245(2) of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, holding :\n \"From the perusal of the record, this fact has come to light that in between the complainant M/s. Akash Traders, Azamgarh and Britannia Industries Ltd., Kolkata an agreement was made. M/s. Akash Traders were the authorized agent of Britannia Industries Ltd. and according to terms and conditions of the Agreement, Britannia Industries Ltd. used to supply biscuit to M/s. Akash Traders, Azamgarh. On 8.9.2000, Britannia Industries Ltd. terminated the agency regarding agreement as a result of which in between the parties dispute arose. It is the submission of the complainant that on 13.9.2001 bank draft of Rs.1, 68, 000/- was sent in favour of Britannia Industries Ltd. but on behalf of the accused the above amount did not return till 7.2.2001 to the complainant. The pleading on behalf of the accused is that the bank draft of Rs.1, 68, 000/- was returned to M/s. Akash Traders on 8.1.2001 and its payment was received by the complainant on 19.2.2001 under protest. Both the parties regarding the above reference after the case being decided this legal position has been made clear that if in any matter civil or criminal case is made out then on the basis of obtaining civil relief the proceedings of the suit could not be terminated. In the present matter, it has to be decided that whether in between both the parties during the business transactions prima facie criminal case was found? If in the present case any criminal case is not found then under Section 245(2) Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the accused could be released at any stage. After the termination of agreement in between the accused and the complainant regarding agency on 13.9.2001 bank draft for an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/- was sent to Britannia Industries Ltd. for the supply of biscuits. Prior to this also agreement dated 8.9.2000 has already been terminated regarding the agency in favour of M/s. Akash Traders Azamgarh. The complainant for receiving back an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/- sent letters dated 11.10.2000 and 21.10.2000 but till 7.2.2001, the complainant did not receive back the above amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/-. But from the perusal of the photo copy of the letter enclosed with the file of bank draft of State Bank of India, Keshavpuram, Delhi it has become clear that bank draft No.597805 dated 8.1.2001 for an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/ had already been prepared in favour of M/s. Akash Traders, Azamgarh and after the departmental proceedings of clearance on 19.2.2001 the complainant had received back the amount on 19.2.2001. Thus, it is clear that the applicant/accused had transferred an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/- on 8.1.2001in favour of the complainant M/s. Akash Traders through Bank Draft, thus, in transaction whatever delay was made in returning back the amount of bank draft that has been committed due to proceedings relating to payment being done due to banking process and looking to the aforesaid facts it becomes clear that on the side of applicant/accused there was no intention of criminal misappropriation and, thus, there is no appropriate basis to initiate any action against the accused. Therefore, under Section 245(2) Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the proceedings of the case are terminated and the accused is released.\" \n10. A revision application was filed thereagainst by the complainant which, by reason of an order dated 5.6.2002, was allowed, stating :\n \"It is clear from the perusal of the file that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in the impugned order dated 13.12.2001 has not granted any opportunity of adducing the evidences in detail under the provisions of Section 244 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 but by not granting any opportunity to adduce the evidences by the complainant under Section 244 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has passed the impugned order under the provisions of Section 245(2) Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which is not legal and proper. Under the provisions of Section 244 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973the complainant must be granted opportunity of filing the evidences in detail as per the law. Under the above, provisions, the charges are framed against the accused persons after the evidences are taken on record otherwise not, that is to say, passing of order under Section 245 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would be proper and justifiable.\" \n11. An application filed by the appellant before the High Court in terms of Section 482 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment, stating :\n \"From the perusal of the allegations made against the applicants and from the perusal of the impugned order, it appears that prima facie offence is made out against the applicant and there is no procedural mistake in taking cognizance and summoning the applicants, therefore, the prayer for quashing the impugned orders dated 8.5.2001 passed by the learned Magistrate, Azamgarh and 5.6.2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.2, Azamgarh is refused.\nThe interim stay order dated 3.7.2002 is vacated.\nAccordingly, this application is dismissed.\" \n12. The short question which arises for consideration is as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, disclosed an offence as against the appellant under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.\n13. Section 405 defines 'criminal breach of trust' to mean :\n Section 405.'Criminal breach of trust'\nWhoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits \"criminal breach of trust\".\" \n14. Appellant No.1 is the Managing Director of the Company. Respondent No.3 was its General Manager. Indisputably, the company is a juristic person. The demand drafts were issued in the name of the company. The company was not made an accused. The dealership agreement was by and between M/s. Akash Traders and the company.\n15. Mr. Pramod Swarup, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Responent No.2, in support of the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate as also the High Court, submitted that as, prima facie, the appellant was in charge of and was in control of the business of the company, he would be deemed to be liable for the offence committed by the company.\n16. Indian Penal Code, 1860, save and except some provisions specifically providing therefor, does not contemplate any vicarious liability on the part of a party who is not charged directly for commission of an offence.\n17. A criminal breach of trust is an offence committed by a person to whom the property is entrusted.\n18. Ingredients of the offence under Section 406 are :\n \"(1) a person should have been entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property;\n(2) that person should dishonestly misappropriate or convert to his own use that property, or dishonestly use or dispose of that property or willfully suffer any other person to do so;\n(3) that such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust.\" \n19. As, admittedly,drafts were drawn in the name of the company, even if appellant was its Managing Director, he cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. If and when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides specifically therefor. In absence of any provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence committed by the company itself.{See Sabitha Ramamurthy and Anr. v. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya [(2006) 10 SCC 581]} .\n20. We may, in this regard, notice that the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 etc. have created such vicarious liability. It is interesting to note that Section 14A of the 1952 Act specifically creates an offence of criminal breach of trust in respect of the amount deducted from the employees by the company. In terms of the explanations appended to Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, a legal fiction has been created to the effect that the employer shall be deemed to have committed an offence of criminal breach of trust. Whereas a person in charge of the affairs of the company and in control thereof has been made vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company along with the company but even in a case falling under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 vicarious liability has been held to be not extendable to the Directors or officers of the company. {See Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and Ors. [2007 (11) SCALE 318]} .\n21. The High Court, therefore, committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment.\n22. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. Respondent No.2 is liable to bear the costs of the appellant for causing harassment to him which is quantified at Rs.1, 00, 000/- (Rupees one lac only).",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -1113,12 +1113,12 @@
     },
     "meta": {
       "sample_id": "S019",
-      "case_id": "3051",
-      "experiment": "ablation_issue",
-      "model": "mistral-nemo",
-      "source_file": "S019__ablation_issue__mistral-nemo__3051.json",
+      "case_id": "6471",
+      "experiment": "baseline_no_firac",
+      "model": "phi-4",
+      "source_file": "S019__baseline_no_firac__phi-4__6471.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "03/08/1972",
+      "judgment_date": "15/02/2008",
       "machine_error_stage": "issues",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
       "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue omission"
@@ -1126,13 +1126,13 @@
   },
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Appeal (Crl.) 230 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl.) No. 1409 of 2006) | Ashfaq Khan And Another v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others | 01/02/2008",
-      "case_details": "Case: Appeal (Crl.) 230 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl.) No. 1409 of 2006) | Ashfaq Khan And Another v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 317 of 1976. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th February, 1976 of the Jammu &Kashmir High Court in Election Petition No. 2 of 1972. | Bashir Ahmed Magrey v. Ghulam Quadir Mir And Others | 02/12/1976",
+      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 317 of 1976. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th February, 1976 of the Jammu &Kashmir High Court in Election Petition No. 2 of 1972. | Bashir Ahmed Magrey v. Ghulam Quadir Mir And Others",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The appellant challenged a First Information Report (FIR) lodged against them for offences under Sections 420 and 424 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 2 and 3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986. The appellant contended that the FIR, on its face, did not constitute cheating or an offence under the Prevention Act, but at most, a case of tax evasion. The High Court had previously disposed of numerous similar writ petitions, categorizing cases and formulating guidelines. However, the High Court's order in the present case did not explain how its prior rulings were relevant to the appellant's situation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and remitted the matter back to the High Court to consider the applicability of its previous decisions to the facts of this case, explicitly stating that no opinion on the merits was expressed.",
-      "generated_judgment": "**Judgment**\n\n---\n\n### **Facts**\n1. An appellant appeals against a High Court order disposing a Writ Petition dismissing charges under Sections 420 and 424 of the Indian Penal Code (cheating and dishonesty-inducing delivery of property) and Sections 2 and 3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986.\n2. The High Court categorized these charges under tax evasion rather than flagging them as established offences under Section 420 IPC or the Gangsters Act, sneaking alternate allegations of suboptimal prosecution logistics.\n3. The High Court had previously handled numerous similar disputes and applied its own directives, but conspicuously failed to consistently integrate its prior case-law rulings into the factual analysis for this specific case.\n4. Despite labeling this appeal “aptly reasonable,” the **Supreme Court** unique remanded matters for the High Court to repeat articulating how its prior jurisprudence aligns with facts before it.\n\n---\n\n### **Issues**\n1. **Maintainability**:\n   - Did the remand order result from a legally correct renewal—specifically, was the High Court instructed to apply its rulings without substantial merit input (or were errors steeped into lack of contextual reasoning)?\n   - Did the High Court achieve its ends by robes and policy messages properly, or did it imply an unfaithful recitation of precedents?\n   - What loopholes remained unresolved by procedural flaws in making appeasin Нашканна *конститутуальтіine dispute?\n\n2. **Measures contrary to durable precedent**\n   - Was the appeal tranéeed by invalid preconcgenerated duties must incompetent compulsion? Last to *BG Counteroccasive standard, SC reverting agvity snatched.*\n\n---\n\n### **Rules**\nThe applicable legal principles are extracted from **constitutional law, judicial bank procedures, fooling-informed certiorary review, and/or notions of the Ratio Decidenti in specific sects**:\n1. **The Supreme Court Reto ujurus-cable issue:** Factually bound review focus remand's viability in resultant influence to prior writ-rulings. If those mechanisms which examined factors into place, alter mounts \"plausibly embbergen\" contempt, declines upgrade (*BCUT v. State 8%8%8 Case Lite*).\n2. Certiorary operations (Artic/226) warrant scrupulous scrutiny—a writ should not overstep due procedural adhesion or procedural drafting.\n3. When applicationping precedent for Intented legal reason formulations the fail action sucles fact-manifestion ***ust hold equal steps*.\n\n   *(Exemplarily cited*: *David Alexander v. State*, sscribing great damage if clear mandate drops rarity-managed party's preference of societially said proceedings for finding new arguments.)\n\n---\n\n### **Analysis**\n\n#### **Faimaintaining Issue analysis**\n1. **Maintainability Blunder #1: Null-deferred Rechtprecedent Match**\n   The High Court swallowed its unresolved \"thresholds to taxonomic establishing\" Twitter-like last nestin' words. A remand connoise—at this level—expects not winging proof-to-quotation but specific pointer text to deploy **efficient and intelligible** mechano pretense's bounds fore-dellavery's semantic anchors.\n   - The SC emanated \"tips opening pari bus\" requiring the HC to reference its Hollie Precedents **unlated*. That found viol American’s prima-fecial-banced clauses preceding roles *to grapes_. Vide SC’s Tribunal Scanning strangles veril hag as acting against a requisite consecutives' baseline con regime. The likelihood that HC followed a particular dry reasoning capable of formative opportually relevance (CSS) ≈-> A case modified as dispatching appealing-building-trail's orientation potential, with retreatbacks distributing adjoined justifications.\n\n---\n\n2. **Judicial Disaffiliate Reasonable Rules from precedent**\n   - HC stung lacks public-logical/original-response mechanism: Treaty imports เสviously-ranked anomalies circulating actual recriminoxy analysis“*Rising Violation*constituted was retruded: Should courts reject unless those judged emergencies are subservily mirrored? Dominant opinion maps to *Clarifying Precedes continuation*—like inter-N2-provenance's isomorphism (absive hatswood); replacing.{Case-yellow / Validation: precisely went [*BCUT totalling*]\n---\n\n#### **Manifestley Anti-Lad Conclusions From Conservantิดation Configuration gallery**\nHigh Court overlooked essentials:\n(a) **Certain remand terms**: SC demanded new articulation on theories to inves­tic fidicate paradigm span fields—**HC failed to compromise intellectual candidate hub**; rendering categorical dismissive without nuanced tailoring.\n(b) **Unshown Connection**: Hardly provided these explanations; rather belaboured popular argumeti polyphonic ecclesiastical, bold-liberate that **dismissions enforced *\n(review portrayed as non-judicial fashion, say).\n\n---\n\n### **Conclusion**\nThe High Court’s judgement is, thereby, **absent titles resulting square or straws rendering accountability mainy viable**.\nDue to being teetered upon ^{technical} over-aggregate in these ~maintainability, s وجود hegemony decay—**The court ejects appeal on this side issue fundamental violations of due process**.\n\n---\n**DISMISSED**",
-      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT\n1. Leave granted.\n2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellant.\n3. The facts in a nutshell are as follows:\nA Writ Petition was filed before the High Court for quashing the First Information Report (in short the 'FIR') lodged for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 and 424 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and Sections 2 and 3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti- Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (in short the 'Prevention Act'). The stand in the writ petition was that even if the FIR is taken at its face value, there is no scope for holding that the appellants committed cheating or an offence punishable under the Prevention Act. At the most it may make out a case for evasion of tax for which action is permissible under the concerned Trade Tax Act.\n4. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that in the cases referred to, a Division Bench of the High Court had disposed of large number of cases involving more or less similar prayers to quash the FIR in each case. It is pointed out that the High Court had categorised different type of cases and one of such categories was where no previous case was pending under any other law prior to initiation of investigation under the Prevention Act. It is also submitted that the appellants' case falls within the following parameters and guidelines formulated by the High Court:\n \"(a) It is expected that the investigation will be completed by the police within the prescribed limit under the general law i.e. Section 167 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by filing the charge-sheet or final report, if the accused is in custody within that period;.\n(b) It is expected that the Special Court will conclude the hearing of the cases, where rate of crime is not so higher by applying a summary procedure preferably within a period of 3-6 months from the date of filing the charge-sheet before the Court depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case;\n(c) In case of pendency of Appeal/Revision/Review by an accused, Special Court will be empowered to split up the file in respect of other co-accused to avoid delay in hearing the case;\n(d) If any person applied or surrendered or produced before the Court in connection with the matters where rate of crime is not higher, the Special Court expeditiously dispose it of following the principles as laid down in Smt. Amarawati and Anr. vs. State of U.P.\n(e) In case the Special Court found that the crime case is not so negligible nor the rate of crime is lower in nature, it will proceed strictly in accordance with law;\n(f) It will be solemn duty of the Special Courts and the police authorities to follow the guidelines for the sake of investigation viz-a-viz personal liberties.\" \n5. The order of the High Court does not show as to how the ratio of the decision in a batch of writ petitions disposed of had any application or relevance so far as the present case is concerned.\n6. In the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter to it to consider as to how the facts involved in Writ Petition No.10500 of 2005 and/or the ratio of that decision had any relevance so far as the present dispute is concerned. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.\n7. The appeal is allowed.",
+      "case_record": "In March 1972, the appellant was declared elected to the J&K State Legislative Assembly from Rajpura constituency with 9,079 votes, while Respondent No. 1 secured 8,248 votes. Respondent No. 1 filed an election petition seeking to void the appellant's election and declare himself duly elected. The petition alleged improper rejection of votes cast for Respondent No. 1 and improper reception of votes for the appellant at various polling stations. The High Court declared the appellant's election void, finding 59 votes for Respondent No. 1 improperly rejected and 901 votes improperly polled (351 for appellant, 550 unclear beneficiaries). The High Court did not declare Respondent No. 1 elected. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, and Respondent No. 1 filed cross-objections. The Supreme Court ordered its Registrar to scrutinize the disputed ballot papers to ascertain beneficiaries.",
+      "generated_judgment": "Based on the given facts, the appeal should be **DISMISSED**. Here’s the detailed reasoning:\n\n1. **Initial Election Outcome**: In March 1972, the appellant was declared elected to the J&K State Legislative Assembly from Rajpura constituency with 9,079 votes, while Respondent No. 1 secured 8,248 votes. This establishes the initial electoral outcome.\n\n2. **Election Petition**: Respondent No. 1 filed an election petition alleging improper rejection of votes and improper reception of votes at various polling stations. This led to a dispute over the election results.\n\n3. **High Court Decision**: The High Court, after considering the evidence and arguments, declared the appellant's election void. The reasons provided were that 59 votes for Respondent No. 1 were improperly rejected, and 901 votes were improperly polled (351 for the appellant and 550 unclear beneficiaries). Importantly, the High Court did not declare Respondent No. 1 as the duly elected candidate.\n\n4. **Supreme Court Order**: The Supreme Court ordered its Registrar to scrutinize the disputed ballot papers to ascertain the beneficiaries. This indicates that the Supreme Court acknowledged the need for further scrutiny but did not directly overturn the High Court's decision.\n\n5. **Appeal and Cross-Objections**: The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, and Respondent No. 1 filed cross-objections. However, the facts do not indicate that these appeals and objections have resulted in a change in the High Court's decision.\n\n6. **Conclusion**: Given that the High Court declared the appellant's election void and did not declare Respondent No. 1 as the duly elected candidate, and the Supreme Court’s order for further scrutiny does not imply a change in the High Court's decision, the appeal should be dismissed.\n\nTherefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by\nKHANNA, J. During the general elections held in March 1972 five candidates, namely, the appellant and respondents No. 1 to 4, contested tile election for the Jammu &amp;Kashmir State Legislative Assembly from Rajpura constituency. There was a sixth candidate, namely, Mohamed Abdullah Sheikh, respondent No. 5, but his nomination paper was rejected. The appellant secured 9, 079 votes and was declared elected. Respondent No. 1 was the nearest rival and he secured 8, 248 votes. Respondents 2 to 4 secured 1, 340, 1, 126 and 1, 217 votes respective ly. 2, 034 votes were declared invalid at the time of counting. After the declaration of the result of the election, respondent No. 1 filed election petition out of which the present appeal arises. Two prayers were made in the election petition: (1) that the election of the appellant be declared to be void; and (2) that respondent No. 1 be declared to have been duly elected. The High Court accepted the first prayer and declared the e lection of the appellant to be void. The second prayer that respondent No. 1 be declared to have been duly elected was not granted. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of the High Court insofar as it has declared his election to be void. Cross-objections have been filed by respondent No. 1 and it has been prayed on his behalf that he be declared to have been duly elected.\nThe elect ion petition was founded on the following three grounds:\n(1 ) Improper rejection of the nomination paper of respondent No. 5.\n(2) Improper rejection of the votes which had been cast in favour of respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the respondent); and\n(3) Improper reception of the votes in favour of the appellant on the day of polling at the following polling stations:1. Lassipora--Polling station No. 49\n2. Nowpora Pain--Polling station No. 50\n2 99\n3. Drubgham-B--Polling station No. 24 4.\nDrubgham-A--Polling station No. 23\n4. Drugbham-A--Polling station No.23\n5. Aliaipora--Polling station No. 51\n6. Chandgham--Polling station No. 46\n7. Arihal--Polling station No. 35, and\n8. Tikan Batapora--Polling station No. 26.\nAccording to the case of the respondent as set up in the election petition, the result of the election was materially affected because of the improper rejection at the time of counting of the votes which had been cast in his favour and by the improper reception of t he votes in favour of the appellant on the day of polling. Giving particulars in respect of the third ground, namely, that there was improper reception of votes in favour of the appellant on the day of polling, th e respondent stated that the total number of votes at Lassipura (polling station No. 49) was 824. All those votes were shown to have ben polled, although 162 voters registered in that area did not cast their votes. The figure of 162 included 16 persons who were dead before the date of polling. Electoral numbers of those 162 voters, including 16 dead persons, were also mentioned in the petition. The votes of 162 persons were thus stated to have been improperly received. Similar allegations were made in respect of Nowpora Pain (polling station No. 50), Drubgham B (polling station No. 24), Drubgham A (polling station No. 23), Alaipora (polli ng station No. 51), Chandgam (polling station. No. 46), Arihal (polling station No. 35) and Tikan Batapora (polling station No. 26).\nWe may add at this stage that the first ground, namely, that relating to the improper rejection of the nomination paper of respondent No. 5, was not pressed at the trial of the election petition, and as such no 1onger survives.The election petition was resisted by the appellant and he denied the various allegations made by the respondent. He also pleaded that the allegations in the election petition were vague, indefinite and uncertain. Objection was also raised regarding the maintainability of the petition on the grounds that it had not been properly verified and there war misjoinder of parties.\nThe petition was initially heard by Wasi-ud-Din J. It thereafter came up for hearing before Jalal-ud-Din J. Ultimat ely, it came up for hearing before Mufti Baha-ud-Din Farooqi J. who finally decided the petition and gave the judgment under appeal.\nDuring the pendency of the petition, orders were made on three occasions for inspection of the ballot papers. The first order was made by Wasi-ud-Din J. on August 13, 1973. The learned Judge, considered the prayer for inspection of ballot papers under three heads:\n\"(1) Request for inspection of ballot papers which were rejected at the time of counting;\n(2) Request for inspection a ballot paper account (Form No. 16) in respect of the various polling stations and of the ballot papers relevant thereto;\n(3) Request for inspection of marked copies of electoral rolls at polling stations Lassipora, Drubgham A &amp;B, Achan, Chandgham, Afthal, Nowpora Pain, Tikam Batopora, Alaipora.\"\nPrayer under the first and third heads was rejected but that under the second head was allowed to the extent of the inspection of form No. 16 in respect of Lassipora, Nowpora Pain, Drubgham B, Drubgham A, Alaipora, Chandgham, Arihal and Tikan Batopora polling stations. Inspection of a few ballot papers, of which the numbers were specified, relating to some of the polling stations was allowed. On November 2, 1973 the learned Judge amplified his previous orders in these words: \"My order as it stands should be read to Clearly signify which I am amplifying here also that the sorting of the ballot papers will be done by the Deputy Registrar but in the presence of the learned counsel for both the parties. The learned counsel for the parties will not be allowed to handle the ballot papers until they are sorted out by the Deputy Registrar and after this is done, the respective learned counsel for the parties can handle and inspect the ballot papers.\"\nOn June 13, 1974 the learned Judge, on an ap plication made by the respondent, allowed inspection of ballot papers of two more polling stations, viz., Chandgham and Alaipora. The respondent also made prayer for leave to inspect the ballot papers of other polling stations, but the prayer in that behalf was rejected. The following directions were further issued by the learned Judge:\n\"The petitioner has also made a prayer that the Deputy Registrar be given directions to ascertain if the 34 series of two inspected polling stations Nos. 24 and 50 are not mixed in the fourth trunk which has been produced. The Deputy Registrar will of course see to this and such other discrepancies which may come to his notice, he will make a separate note and he will also make a note on the envelope if he found the discrepancy.\"\nAfter Wasi-ud-Din J. relinquished his office, the case was assigned to Jalal-ud-Din J. An application was then made on July 29, 1974 by the respondent seeking permission to inspect ballot papers and other documents pertaining to the various polling stations, This application was disposed of by Jalal-ud-Din J. as per order dated January 6, 1975 in these words:\n\"I, therefore, allow the application of the petitioner for inspection of ballot papers in respect of four veiling stations, namely, 26 Tikan Batapora from serial No. 0150 51 to 15700, 35 Arihal-A from serial No. 020901 to 021550, 49 Lassipora from serial No. 031051 to 031900, 23 Drubgham from serial No. 013201 to 013800 and also the counterfoils of 15 Nowpora Pain, 24 Drubgham B. 46 Chandgham and 51 Alaipora, the polling stations of which the ballot papers have already been inspected by the petitioner. 1, however, do not accede to the request of the petitioner to inspect electoral roll and counterfoils and from 16 of the entire constituency. The inspection as ordered will be held by and in presence of the counsel for the parties. But the Deputy Registrar will see that neither the candidate nor their counsel shall, handle the record. The Deputy Registrar will further make a separate note and record of the discrepancies found, if any. The inspection will be held during vacation on a date to be fixed by the Deputy Registrar.\" In the judgment under appeal the learned Judge held that 59 votes validly polled in favour of the respondent were improperly rejected at the time of counting. It was further found that 901 votes, including 28 votes of dead voters, were improperly polled.. Out of 901 votes, 351 votes were found to have been polled in favour of the appellant. Details of those 351 votes were as under:\nAlaipora polling station No. 51\n200\nArihal polling station No. 35\n51\nTakin Batapora P.S. No. 26 100\nRegarding the remaining 550 votes, the learned Judge found that the evidence was not clear, and observed as under:\n\"The evidence, however, is not clear as regards the fate of the remaining 550 such votes. But having regard to overall circumstances of the case it will not be unreasonable to conclude that respondent No. 1 was the greatest beneficiary of these 550 votes although the precise number by which he was benefited out of those votes may not be easily ascertainable. To these circumstances may be added the circumstance that 59 votes validly polled in favour of the petitioner were improperly rejected at the time o f counting, as held by me before. The cumulative effect of these circumstances is that the respondent No. 1 was able to get an undue advantage of no less magnitude and may be, even greater than that reflected in his declared success over the petitioner by 831 votes. In this view it must be held that the result of the election, insofar as respondent No. 1 is concerned, was materially affected by the improper rejection of votes in favour of the petitioner at the time of counting and the improper reception of votes on the day of poll and that his election must be declared to be void. But that should not entitle the petitioner to a declaration that he was duly elected as the total number of the votes improperly received in favour of respondent No. 1 on the date of poll could not be exactly worked out. The prayer for such declaration must be rejected.\" In the result, the election of the appellant was declared to be void. The prayer of the respondent for a declaration that he be declared to have been elected was rejected.\nWhen this appeal came up for hearing before this Court on September 3, 1976, we passed an order wherein we referred to the finding of the High Court that it cannot be said as to who was the beneficiary of the 550 votes which were found to have been improperly polled. We thereafter stated in that order:\n\"In our opinion, it is necessary to find out as a result of further inspection as to how many d those 550 votes were in favour of the appellant, and how many, in favour of respondent No. 1 and the other contesting candidates. For this purpose, we depute the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court to make an inspection in the presence of the parties and their counsel and submit a report to this Court within six weeks from today. The Registrar may also have to locate the 55 ballot papers referred to in the judgment of the High Court at pages 31-51 of the cyclostyled judgment. He may also, if necessary, refer to the reports of the Deputy Registrar of the High Court. The appeal should be put up for further hearing as soon as the report is ready.\"\nThe Registrar of this Court thereafter submitted his report dated September 15, 1976. The Registrar dealt with most of the matters but in respect of some of the matters he sought further directions. Necessary directions were thereafter issued by this Court on September 17, 1976. As a result of those directions, the Registrar had to scrutinise 571 ballot papers in all instead of 550 votes. The final report of the Registrar is dated September 24, 1976. The result of the reports of the Registrar taken along with the findings of the High Court may be set out:(1) Votes found by the High Court to have been improperly received in favour of the appellant\n351\n(2) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the appellant as per the first report of the Registrar\n286\n(3) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the appellant as per the second report of Registrar.\n141\nTotal\n778\n(4) Total number of votes polled by the appellant as per the results of the election\n9, 079\n(5) Valid votes polled by the appellant\n9, 079-778=8301\n(6) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the respondent as per the first report\n25\n(7) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the respondent as per the second report\n19\nTotal\n44\n(8) Total votes polled by the respondent as per the result of the election\n8, 248\n(9) Votes validly polled in favour of the respondent which were found by the High Court to have been improperly rejected at the time of counting\n59\n(10) Total number of votes thus polled by the respondent\n8, 248+59=8, 307\n(11) Valid votes polled by the respondent\n8, 307- 44=8, 263\n(12) Excess of votes validity polled in favour of the appellant over those of of the respondent.\n38\nSome votes were found by the Registrar to have been improperly received in favour of respondents 2 to 4, but it is not necessary to set out those votes.\nIn appeal before us Mr. Phadke on behalf of the appellant has urged that in view of the final picture as it emerges from the reports of the Registrar, the appeal should be allowed and the election petition be dismissed as the appellant secured more valid votes than the respondent. The above stand has been controverted by the respondent, who has argued the case in person. At an earlier hearing we requested Mr. Gambhir to argue the case amicus curiae in view of the fact that the respondent was not represented by counsel. The respondent thereafter stated that he Would like the matter to be argued by counsel of his own choice. Mr. Shaukat Hussain thereafter appeared on behalf of the respondent. At the final hearing the respondent, as mentioned above, chose to argue the case in person.Perusal of the election petition filed by the respondent shows that apart from the ground not subsequently pressed of the improper rejection of the nomination paper of respondent No. 5, the only ground on which the respondent challenged. the election of the appellant was the improper reception of votes in favour of the appellant and the improper rejection of the votes cast in favour of the respondent. This ground is based upon sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 108 of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act, 1957 (Act 4 of 1957) corresponding to sub -clause (iii) of clause (d) of sub- section (1) of section 100 of the Representation of the People, Act 1951 fact 43 of 1951). According to the above provision, if the High Court is of the opinion that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote of the reception of any vote which is void, the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. Keeping the above provision in view, we may now turn to the facts of the present case. The High Court found that 351 votes had been improperly received in favour of the appellant. The High Court further found that 59 votes which had been validly polled in favour of the, respondent were improperly rejected at the time of counting. In addition to. that, the High Court found that 550 votes had been improperly received, but it was not possible on the material on record to find out as to who was the beneficiary of those votes. The High Court all the same was inclined to believe that the appellant must have been the major beneficiary of those 550 votes. This necessarily involved an element of surmise and conjecture. To find out the exact position, we directed the Registrar of this Court to scrutinise the 550 ballot papers in question and to make a report as to how many of those votes were cast in favour of the appellant and how many in favour of the respondent and the other candidates. The Registrar thereafter submitted reports and we have already set out the outcome of those reports taken along with the findings of the High Court. It would appear from the figures set out above that, excluding all the votes which were found to have been improperly received by the appellant and also giving credit to the respondent for 59 votes which were found by the High Court to have been improperly rejected at that time of counting, the net result still is that the appellant has a lead of 38 votes over the respondent. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the election of tile appellant should be upheld. In an election petition founded upon the ground that the result of the election was materially affected by the improper reception or rejection of votes, the court has first to decide whether certain ballot papers were improperly received or were improperly rejected. Once , that controversy is resolved, the rest is purely a matter of arithmetical calculation. If the result of arithmetical calculation is that the returned candidate has still a lead over his nearest rival , his election would not be declared to be void on the ground of improper reception or improper rejection of votes. Improper reception or improper rejection of votes can result in invalidating an election only if such improper reception or improper rejection materially affects the result of the election.In the course of his arguments, the respondent has submitted that a number of improprieties were committed in the con duct of election and therefore the election of the appellant be declared to be void. Although it does appear from the material on record to which our attention was invited by the respondent that irregularities were commit ted in the conduct of the election, the respondent cannot derive any benefit on that account. As already mentioned, the respondent sought to challenge the election of the appellant only on the ground of improper reception and improper rejection of certain votes. The election of the appellant was not challenged on the ground of any irregular- ity or non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitu- tion or of the R epresentation of the People Act or of any rules or orders made thereunder. Nor was the election of the appellant assailed on the ground of being vitiated by corrupt practice. As it is not permissible to widen the scope of an election petition beyond the grounds actually set up in the election petition, the respondent cannot seek relief on grounds which were not taken by him in the elec- tion petition.\nIt has also been urged by the respondent that the number of votes which were improperly received was larger than that found by the High Court. Nothing cogent has, however, been brought to our notice in support of the above sub mission to induce us to interfere with the finding of the High Court in, this respect.\nLastly, the respondent submits that 153 ballot papers of Lassipora polling station cast in favour of the appellant should be rejected as they bore the initials and not the full signatures of the presiding officer. Our attention in this respect is invited to clause (h) of rule 56(2) of the Jammu and Kashmir Conduct of Election Rules, 1965, according to which the returning officer at the time of counting shall reject a ballot paper if it does not bear both the mark and the signatures which it should have borne under the provisions of sub-rule (1) of rule 3 8. According to sub-rule (1 ) of rule 3 8, every ballot paper shall before issue to elector, be stamped by such distinguishing mark as the Election Commission may direct, and be signed in full on its back by the presiding officer. It is not disputed that the ballot papers in question bore the distinguishing mark. The only contention of the respondent, as already mentioned, is that the ballot papers in question b ore the initials and not the full signatures of the presiding officer. In this respect we find that no express ground on that score was set up by the respondent in the election petition. This apart, we that the matter is covered by the first proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 56 which reads as under; \"Provided that where the returning officer is satisfied that any such defect as is mentioned in clause (g) or clause (h) has been caused by any mistake or failure on the part of a presiding officer or polling officer, the ballot paper shall not be rejected merely on the ground of such defect.\"\nThe above proviso which is based upon the principle that a vote validly cast should not be excluded from consideration because of the mistake or omission of the presiding or polling officer, makes it plain that where the returning officer is satisfied that any defect mentioned in clause (h) has been caused by the mistake or failure on the part of a presiding officer or polling officer, the ballot paper shall not be rejected merely on the ground of such defect. The fact that the returning officer in the present case did not reject the ballot papers in question on the ground that they bore only the initials and not the full signatures of the presiding officer would go to show that the returning officer was satisfied that the alleged defect was caused by the mistake or failure on the part of the presiding officer: Ther e can indeed be hardly any doubt on the point that the defect referred to by the respondent occurred because of the mistake or failure of the presiding officer. We, therefore, see no cogent ground to exclude from consideration 153 ballot papers polled in favour of the appellant.\nBefore we conclude, we may observe that some other contentions were also advanced on behalf of the appellant. In view of the fact that the appeal in any case has to be allowed because of the arithmetical calculations referred to above, it is not necessary to go into those contentions.\nAs a result of the above, we accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of , the High Court and dismiss the election petition. Cross objections filed by the respondent are dismissed. Looking to all the facts, we leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.\n",
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@@ -1238,15 +1238,15 @@
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-      "experiment": "role_play_v3",
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-      "judgment_date": "01/02/2008",
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       "machine_error_stage": "facts",
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 ]
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