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@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 [
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1424 OF 2012 | Umakant & Anr. v. State Of Chhatisgarh | 01/07/2014",
-      "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1424 OF 2012 | Umakant & Anr. v. State Of Chhatisgarh",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | C.A. No. 382 of 1960 | Shri Raja Durga Singh Of Solan v. Tholu | 01/05/1962",
+      "case_details": "Case: C.A. No. 382 of 1960 | Shri Raja Durga Singh Of Solan v. Tholu",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The appellants, husband and mother-in-law, were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC, by the Trial Court and the High Court. The deceased, Anita Jaiswal, married to appellant No. 1, allegedly faced dowry harassment and torture. On August 2, 2003, she sustained burn injuries. The prosecution alleged the husband poured kerosene on her and the mother-in-law set her ablaze. Initially, the mother-in-law informed doctors of an accidental injury (Ext. P-2), and the deceased's sister and brother-in-law also provided a consent letter stating the injuries were accidental and self-inflicted. The deceased died on September 7, 2003. Her dying declaration (Ext. P-13), recorded on August 13, 2003, implicated the appellants. The Trial Court convicted them under various sections, including 302/34, IPC. The High Court acquitted them of charges under Sections 498-A, 304-B, IPC, and the Dowry Prohibition Act but upheld the Section 302/34, IPC conviction based solely on the dying declaration. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the dying declaration was unreliable.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts  \n1.  The deceased, Anita Jaiswal, was married to Appellant‑No. 1 (the husband).  \n2.  On 2 August 2003 she sustained burn injuries.  \n3.  The prosecution alleged that the husband poured kerosene on her and the mother‑in‑law (Appellant‑No. 2) set her alight.  \n4.  The mother‑in‑law, immediately after the injury, told the treating doctors that the injuries were accidental (Exhibit P‑2).  \n5.  The deceased’s sister and brother‑in‑law later produced a consent‑letter stating that the burns were self‑inflicted.  \n6.  The deceased died on 7 September 2003.  \n7.  Her dying declaration was recorded on 13 August 2003 (Exhibit P‑13) and implicated both the husband and the mother‑in‑law.  \n8.  The Trial Court convicted both appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC, and other sections.  \n9.  The High Court acquitted the appellants of the dowry‑related charges but upheld the conviction under Section 302/34, IPC **solely** on the basis of the dying declaration.  \n10.  The appellants have filed an appeal before this Court, challenging the reliability of the dying declaration.  \n11.  No material indicating the date of filing, existence of a condonation order, or a certificate of appeal has been placed on record.  \n\n### Issues  \n1. **Maintainability** – Whether the appeal is procedurally maintainable (timeliness, condonation of delay, certificate of appeal, service of notice).  \n2. **Reliability and admissibility of the dying declaration** – Whether the declaration satisfies the requirements of Sections 27 & 117 of the Evidence Act and the procedural safeguards of Section 165 CrPC.  \n3. **Proof of common intention** – Whether the prosecution proved a common intention between the husband and his mother‑in‑law under Section 34 IPC.  \n4. **Effect of contradictory contemporaneous statements** – Whether the mother‑in‑law’s statement to the doctors (Exhibit P‑2) and the consent‑letter of the sister/brother‑in‑law create reasonable doubt that defeats the conviction.  \n5. **Sufficiency of other evidence** – Whether any evidence aside from the dying declaration can sustain a conviction for murder.  \n\n### Rules  \n1. **Section 374 CrPC** – An appeal against a conviction of a High Court is appealable to the Supreme Court if filed within 30 days; otherwise a condonation of delay is required.  \n2. **Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Rule 5(2)** – A certificate of appeal (or certificate of fitness) is mandatory for criminal appeals from High Courts unless the appeal is filed as a Special Leave Petition under Article 136.  \n3. **Section 27, Evidence Act** – A dying declaration is admissible only if the declarant believed death was imminent, the statement was made voluntarily, and the declarant possessed mental and physical capacity.  \n4. **Section 117, Evidence Act** – A statement is inadmissible if it was not voluntary.  \n5. **Section 165 CrPC** – A dying declaration must be recorded by a magistrate (or police officer) in the presence of a doctor who certifies that death was imminent.  \n6. **Section 34, IPC** – Liability for a common intention requires proof that the accused shared a pre‑arranged plan to commit the offence.  \n7. **Section 20, 24, 25, Evidence Act** – Contradictory statements and documents are relevant facts; if they create a reasonable doubt, the prosecution’s case fails.  \n8. **Section 32, Evidence Act** – The prosecution must prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.  \n\n### Analysis  \n\n#### 1.  Maintainability  \n- The appeal challenges a final conviction of murder affirmed by the High Court; therefore an appeal is *prima facie* maintainable under **Rule 1**.  \n- The record **does not disclose** the date of filing, a condonation order, or a certificate of appeal. Absence of these details creates a serious procedural defect.  \n- Under **Rule 2**, a criminal appeal to this Court **must** be accompanied by a certificate of appeal (or fitness) unless filed as an SLP. The facts contain no evidence of such a certificate.  \n- Consequently, the appeal is **non‑maintainable** on procedural grounds unless the petition is pleaded as an SLP and the Court, exercising its discretion under **Article 136**, decides to admit it despite the defect.  \n\nGiven the lack of any showing that the 30‑day limit was respected or that a certificate was obtained, the proper preliminary determination is that the appeal **fails to satisfy a mandatory pre‑condition of maintainability**.  \n\n#### 2.  Reliability and admissibility of the dying declaration (assuming the appeal were maintainable)  \n- **Certainty of death**: The declaration was recorded **ten days after the injury** while the victim was still alive and receiving treatment. This fails the “imminent death” requirement of **Rule 3**.  \n- **Voluntariness**: The mother‑in‑law’s earlier statement to doctors (Exhibit P‑2) that the injury was accidental, together with the consent‑letter alleging self‑infliction, indicates the existence of contrary narratives that could have exerted pressure on the deceased. Under **Rule 4**, the declaration is therefore **not voluntary**.  \n- **Procedural compliance**: No documentary evidence of a doctor’s certification under **Rule 5** is present. Hence the statutory safeguard for a dying declaration is absent.  \n\nAll three statutory requisites are unfulfilled; the dying declaration must be **excluded**.  \n\n#### 3.  Common intention under Section 34 IPC  \nEven if the declaration were admitted, liability of the mother‑in‑law depends on proof of a **pre‑arranged plan**. The only link between the two accused is the dying declaration; no independent evidence (e.g., eye‑witnesses, forensic proof of coordinated action) exists. As held in **Balu v. State of Tamil Nadu**, simultaneity of acts without a proven plan does not satisfy § 34. Hence, **common intention is not proved**.  \n\n#### 4.  Contradictory contemporaneous statements  \nThe mother‑in‑law’s statement to the doctors (Accidental injury) and the sister’s consent‑letter (Self‑inflicted burns) are **relevant facts** under **Rule 7**. Their inconsistency with the dying declaration creates a **reasonable doubt** regarding the factual matrix of the alleged murder. Under the principle that a conviction cannot rest on a statement that is materially contradicted, the High Court’s reliance on the dying declaration alone is unsafe.  \n\n#### 5.  Sufficiency of other evidence  \nAside from the dying declaration, the record contains **no forensic report, medical opinion, or eyewitness testimony** linking the accused to the act. Consequently, the prosecution fails to meet the **beyond‑reasonable‑doubt** standard of **Rule 8**. In the absence of the dying declaration, the case collapses.  \n\n### Conclusion  \nThe appeal is **procedurally defective**: the petition does not demonstrate compliance with the 30‑day filing limit, nor does it produce a certificate of appeal or proof of condonation of delay as mandated by **Rule 1** and **Rule 2**. Because these requirements are jurisdictional, the Court must dismiss the appeal **without addressing the merits**.  \n\n**DISMISSED**",
-      "reference_judgment": "Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 24th September, 2010 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 495 of 2005 maintaining their conviction and sentence under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC, the appellants have filed this appeal by special leave.\n2. Brief history of the case, as per prosecution case, is that Anita Jaiswal (deceased) was married to Umakant (appellant No.1) and after six months of the marriage, her husband and in-laws started harassing her to bring money from her father whenever she visits her parental home and also made a demand of Rs.50,000/- as dowry. She was also subjected to torture and cruelty every now and then by the husband and in-laws. On 2nd August, 2003, within one and a half years of her marriage, the appellant No. 1 (husband) beat her with an iron rod before night and while she was going to take bath in the morning, he caught hold of her and allegedly poured kerosene on her body. Appellant No. 2 (mother-in-law) set her ablaze by lighting a match stick. The victim was immediately taken to Revival Medical Centre, Bhilai where appellant No. 2 stated to the Doctors that the victim sustained burn injuries due to accident (Ext. P-2) with a chimney (local lamp). The victim was treated at the Revival Medical Centre till 13th August, 2003 on which date, when the condition of the victim was getting deteriorated, the Revival Medical Centre intimated the police about the incident vide Ext. P-21. Immediately thereafter, F.I.R. (Ext. P-24) was registered by the ASI, PS Newai (PW23). Investigation was taken up by PWs 26 and 27, the Superintendent of Police and the Station House Officer respectively who also seized a bottle of kerosene oil, one wooden stool, one iron pipe etc., and a seizure memo was accordingly prepared. On 13th August, 2003 itself the victim’s dying declaration (Ext. P-13) was also recorded by the Executive Magistrate (PW 12). The victim was then shifted to Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital & Research Centre, Bhilai for further treatment. However, on 7th September, 2003, during the course of her treatment, the victim died.\n3. After the death of the deceased, investigation continued, witnesses were summoned, inquest was made, dead body was sent for autopsy, spot map was prepared. Having recorded statements of witnesses under Section 161, Cr.P.C., charge sheet was filed against the accused (husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law). The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class committed the case to the Court of Session. The learned Trial Judge framed charges against the accused under Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and under Sections 304B/34, 302/34 and 498-A, IPC. In their statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. the accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. At the trial, they took the plea that the deceased died as a result of accident of chimney (local lamp) and they have been falsely implicated.\n4. To bring home the charges against the accused, the prosecution in all examined 27 witnesses whereas the accused, in their defence examined two witnesses.\n5. The Trial Court, after analyzing the statements of witnesses and keenly considering the material evidence came to the opinion that the prosecution had got established its case and the dying declaration (Ext. P-13) was also proved from its writer (PW-12). After going through the entire process of trial and in the light of various rulings of this Court, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that all the three accused were guilty of the offences charged against them, except charge under Section 304/B/34, IPC against father-in-law of the deceased. The Trial Court accordingly acquitted him of the said charge and sentenced all the accused in the following terms.\n Accused No.1-Umakant (Appellant No.1-husband of the deceased)\nUnder Section 3 of Dowry        R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in default, additional\nProhibition Act, 1961           RI for one year\nUnder section 4 of Dowry        R.I. for 1 year and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, additional\nProhibition Act, 1961           RI for six months.\nUnder Section 498-A of          RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, additional\nIPC                             RI for six months.\nUnder Section 304-B of          Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default,\nIPC                             additional RI for one year\nUnder     Section    302/34,    Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default,\nIPC                             additional R.I. for one year.\nAccused No. 2-Yashoda (Appellant No. 2-mother-in-law of the deceased)\nUnder Section 3 of Dowry R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, additional\nProhibition Act, 1961            RI for six months.\nUnder section 4 of Dowry         R.I. 6 month and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, additional RI\nProhibition Act, 1961            for one month.\nUnder Section 498-A of           RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, additional\nIPC                              RI for six months.\nUnder Section 304-B of           Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default,\nIPC                              additional RI for six months.\nUnder Section 302/34 of          Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default,\nIPC                              additional RI for six months.\n      Accused No. 3 – Om Prakash (father-in-law of the deceased)\nUnder Section 3 of Dowry         R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, additional\nProhibition Act, 1961            RI for six months.\nUnder section 4 of Dowry         R.I. for 1 year and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, additional\nProhibition Act, 1961            RI for two months.\nUnder Section 498-A of           RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, additional\nIPC                              RI for six months.\n6. While dealing with the appeal filed by the accused, the High Court formed the opinion that there was not enough evidence to uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellants as awarded by the Trial Court under Sections 498-A, 304-B, IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Therefore, the High Court acquitted all the accused from the charges against the aforementioned Sections. But, placing reliance solely on the dying declaration (Ext. P-13), the High Court thought it fit to convict the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC on the basis of dying declaration itself. Accordingly, the High Court maintained the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court against the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC.\n7. In view of the above conviction and sentence maintained by the High Court, the appellants approached this Court in this appeal finding fault with the decision of the High Court, which is impugned herein.\n8. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the Courts below have dealt with the case without proper application of mind and there were several discrepancies and contradictories in the statements of witnesses. Normally, before convicting an accused under Section 302, IPC, Courts provide so many safeguards to the defence, whereas in the present case those safeguards have not been provided. Thus, entire process of trial has been vitiated and led to the miscarriage of justice against the appellants. He also contended that when the High Court was of the opinion that there is no cogent evidence to sustain the order of conviction passed by the Trial Court under Sections 498A, 304B, IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, the dying declaration also ought not have been relied upon for punishing the accused under Section 302/34, IPC. The alleged dying declaration was a product of tutoring and not voluntarily given by the deceased, hence it is not trustworthy. He, therefore, argued that the conviction of appellants under Section 302/34, IPC. is completely erroneous, misconceived and deserves to be set aside.\n9. On the contrary, learned counsel for the State submitted that the impugned judgment was rendered by the High Court after a thorough analysis of the entire case with scrutiny of the evidence of all material witnesses. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of cruelty and torture caused by the appellants to the victim which stands proved by the dying declaration, the High Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants and there is no illegality in the impugned order. He therefore submitted that there is no ground calling for interference by this Court and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.\n10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully gone through the records of both the Trial Court as well as the High Court.\n11. Before we deal with the judgment of the High Court which is impugned before us, whereby it has acquitted the accused of the charges under Section 498-A, 304-B IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and convicted them for the offence under Section 302 IPC, curiously the basis for acquittal under the other offences and conviction of the accused under Section 302 IPC is based on the dying declaration of the deceased which is marked as Ex.P-13. For better appreciation, we shall refer to the important facts of the case. As per the case of the prosecution, the deceased was admitted in the hospital i.e. Revival Medical Centre on 02.08.2003 with burn injuries. The deceased when enquired by the Doctor as to how she sustained burn injuries, she informed him that she caught fire accidentally. This version of the deceased, was recorded by the Doctor, in the presence of her sister. Her sister and brother-in-law gave consent letter, which was marked as Ex.P-2, and it reveals that the deceased suffered burn injuries accidentally and the deceased Anita had burnt herself. Nobody had burnt her. When the Doctor asked the deceased several times, she gave the same answer. On 06.08.2003, her parents also came to Bhilai and stayed with her. She remained in the hospital till 10.00 p.m. of 13.08.2003. Thereafter, as her condition deteriorated, she was shifted to another hospital. On 13.08.2003, for the first time, Police were informed about the incident. On that day, her dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate who was later examined as P.W.12. The deceased succumbed to the burn injuries on 07.09.2003.\n12. The trial Court basing on the evidence available on record convicted and sentenced the appellants under Section 498-A, 304-B, 302 r/w 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. While the High Court though acquitted the accused under Section 498-A and 304-B IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, but found them guilty for the offence under Sections 302 r/w 34 IPC and confirmed the sentence imposed by the trial Court on that count.\n13. We have given our anxious consideration to the judgment of the High Court which is impugned before us, to find out the legality or otherwise of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed against the appellants for the offence under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC. The whole basis for the High Court to convict and sentence the accused under Section 302 IPC is the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate which was marked as Ex.P-13. It would be appropriate to extract the same, which reads:\n<QUOTE> “Question: Whether would you able to give your statement?\nAnswer: Yes.\nQ: What is your name? What is the name of your husband? Where do you live at? Please tell your complete name.\nA: My name is Anita Jaiswal. Umakant is the name of my husband. I reside in Marauda Bhilai.\nQ: Who had admitted you at this place and when they had admitted you?\nA: My husband and mother-in-law have admitted me at this place. I do not remember the date of my admission. I have been burnt therefore they have admitted me.\nQ: How you were burnt, the incident is of which date, please tell the whole description.\nA: My mother-in-law was committing cruelty against me, whenever I went my Mayeka she used to tell me for taking Rs.50,000/- from my Mayeka. We are total four sisters and four brothers. Whenever I returned from my Mayeka, upon not taking the money she used to torture me badly, recently some mothers back while I went to Gujarat, my mayeka, when I came back my Sasural then they started telling about the money. One day prior to the date of the incident my husband had heavily beaten me, he beaten me from the Pirha (wooden structure) and from the iron rod, on the next day to that at about 8.00 a.m. after holding me my husband poured kerosene oil over me and after lit up a match stick my mother-in-law thrown the same at me, after becoming frightened, I held the hands of my Jeth, while my Jeth also started burning then after giving jolt at me, he got me fell down, the ladies residing in the back side of my residence arrived there and they changed my clothes after than by arranging a temp, I got admitted in the hospital.\nQ: Whether you did not tell your parents that your husband and mother-in-law were harassing you?\nA: After the marriage, I visited Mayeka for three times, then on the third occasion while I had gone to Mayeka then I had told my father then my father had told me that presently his position was not good, after managing the money as earliest he would sent the money. I had told abiout the cruelty of my husband and mother-in-law.\nQ: Since how may days from the marriage they have been committing cruelty? You have been burnt at which body parts?\nA: They have been harassing me since 4 -5 months after the marriage. They were committing cruelty for the dowry. My whole body parts below the neck have been burnt.\nQ: Whether you want to tell anything more?\nA: No”. </QUOTE>\n14. According to the High Court, Ex.P-2, the alleged consent letter given by sister and brother-in-law, which says that burn injuries sustained by the deceased was a case of accident and Anita had burnt herself, runs contrary to each other, because in the case of accident, the patient will burn herself, but if she burnt herself, then it cannot be a case of accident. Hence, the High Court disbelieved Ex.P-2. The High Court further observed that not giving the information about the incident by the Revival Medical Centre to the police shows that the hospital staff in connivance with the accused, treated the deceased without informing about the incident to the police.\n15. Another reason given by the High Court for convicting the accused under Section 302, IPC is that, as per the dying declaration, the deceased had stated that when her mother-in-law and husband lit fire to her, she asked the brother-in-law and caught hold of him, and at that time, he also sustained burn injuries, which is supported by the evidence of the Doctor P.W.13, who has deposed that the injury on the hands of the brother-in-law P.W.14 is possible if a person who is in flames catch holds of another person. The High Court disbelieved the evidence of Doctor Vijay Kumar Sharma, which is in favour of the accused, basing on the contradictions in his evidence with regard to the nature of injuries and not informing about the incident to the police.\n16. Finally, the High Court convicted and sentenced the accused, basing on the dying declaration that the deceased was not having cordial relationship with the accused. The appellant No.1 poured kerosene oil upon the deceased and appellant No.2 had set her ablaze. As the dying declaration inspires confidence, it is trustworthy and drew inference that the appellants Umakanth and Yashoda poured kerosene oil upon the deceased, set her afire and caused her death. However, the High Court felt that there is no cogent evidence to convict the accused under Section 498-A and 304-B IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.\n17. Now the issue that falls for consideration before us is whether the High Court was right in convicting and sentencing the accused under Section 302 IPC basing on the dying declaration of the deceased?\n18. The philosophy of law which signifies the importance of a dying declaration is based on the maxim “nemo moritusus prasumitus mennre”, which means, <QUOTE> “no one at the time of death is presumed to lie and he will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth”. </QUOTE> Though a dying declaration is not recorded in the Court in the presence of accused nor it is put to strict proof of cross-examination by the accused, still it is admitted in evidence against the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible in evidence. The dying declaration does not even require any corroboration as long as it inspires confidence in the mind of the Court and that it is free from any form of tutoring. At the same time, dying declaration has to be judged and appreciated in the light of surrounding circumstances. The whole point in giving lot of credence and importance to the piece of dying declaration, deviating from the rule of evidence is that such declaration is made by the victim when he/she is on the verge of death.\n19. In spite of all the importance attached and the sanctity given to the piece of dying declaration, Courts have to be very careful while analyzing the truthfulness, genuineness of the dying declaration and should come to a proper conclusion that the dying declaration is not a product of prompting or tutoring.\n20. The legal position about the admissibility of a dying declaration is settled by this Court in several judgments. This Court in Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi - 2010 (9) SCC 1, taking into consideration the earlier judgments of this Court in Paniben v. State of Gujarat - 1992 (2) SCC 474 and another judgment of this Court in Panneerselvam v. State of Tamilnadu - 2008 (17) SCC 190 has given certain guidelines while considering a dying declaration:\n1. Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires full confidence of the Court.\n2. The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.\n3. Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration.\n4. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborative. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.\n5. Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.\n6. A dying declaration which suffers from infirmities, such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction.\n7. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.\n8. Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded.\n9. When the eye-witness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail.\n10. If after careful scrutiny the Court is satisfied that it is free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.\n21. In the light of the above legal position that governs the consideration of a dying declaration, the factual matrix has to be scrutinised. As already extracted above, in the dying declaration Ex.P-13, the deceased stated before the Magistrate that the appellants demanded dowry and that the appellants set fire to her and she asked her brother-in-law to rescue her, but he had chosen not to do so, and further on hearing her cries, the neighbours came and extinguished the fire and admitted her in the hospital. After she was admitted in the hospital, her parents came and she informed them about the incident.\nThe deceased is said to have stated that when she was pregnant she was beaten up by the accused and because of which the child died in the womb. At that time, she had taken treatment in Revival Hospital]. This statement is found in Ex.P-23, FIR written by K.B. Singh (P.W.23), and not in Ex.P13 dying declaration.\n22. When we look at the dying declaration, it is not inspiring confidence in the mind of this Court and throws serious doubt that the same is a product of tutoring by the family members of the deceased for the reason that, the sister of the deceased who was present when the deceased was admitted in the hospital had signed in Ex.P-2 wherein it is stated that it was an accident and nobody has burnt the deceased, but later she turned around and stated that unless she signed on that, they were told that the deceased would not be treated, and the High Court has taken this fact into consideration, whereas in the dying declaration, the deceased has stated that when her parents came to the hospital on 06.08.2003, she informed to the parents for the first time and she had not mentioned that she informed her sister or anybody before that, but according to the sister of the deceased, on 02.08.2003, she was aware of this, which shows that the evidence of the witness is not reliable and clouded with doubt.\n23. The other circumstances which draw our attention is when the deceased informed her parents on 06.08.2003, it is quite natural that the parents will inform the police about the incident, because it is nobody’s case that they were restrained in any manner from informing the police. Even the deceased throughout the stay in the hospital for those 11 days had many an occasion to meet the Doctors and other staff of the hospital, but she had chosen not to give any complaint nor tried to share her agony with them, which throws a grave doubt on the genuineness of the dying declaration. We have gone through the judgment of the High Court, where P.W.7 who has specifically deposed that they have tutored the deceased to state that she was burnt by the accused.\n24. The High Court while considering Ex.P-2 has come to a conclusion that the statement given in that one line is contradictory to one another. In one line, it says that the injuries sustained by her are by accident. Nobody has burnt her and she burnt herself. Hence, the High Court discarded Ex.P-2. But, in our considered opinion, the High Court did not appreciate the same in its proper perspective and interpreted it in a wrong way. What Ex.P-2 states is that it is an accident, and nobody has pushed her and for that accident, only the deceased is responsible.\n25. The burden of proof in criminal law is beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and it is also rule of justice in criminal law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. After considering the evidence and the judgments of the Courts below, we are of the considered opinion that the evidence available on record and the dying declaration does not inspire confidence in the mind of this Court to make it the basis for the conviction of the appellants. Apart from this, the High Court basing on the same dying declaration, ought not to have convicted the appellants under Section 302 IPC, when they were acquitted under Section 304-B and 498-B IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act by the High Court.\n26. Accordingly, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court vide its judgment dated 24th September, 2010 in Criminal Appeal No. 495 of 2005, against the appellants for the offence under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC, is set aside. Consequently, the appellants shall be released forthwith, if they are not required in any other case.",
+      "case_record": "The appellant, former ruler of Bhagat State, claimed specific lands (15 bighas 19 biswas) as his private Khudkhast property, recorded as such since 1936. He asserted the respondents were licensees, obligated to provide annual produce, and sued for possession and mesne profits after alleged non-delivery and obstruction. The respondents contended they were occupancy tenants for generations and that the civil court lacked jurisdiction under Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. The trial court decreed the appellant's suit. The District Judge dismissed the respondents' appeal, affirming the trial court's finding that the lands were the appellant's khudkhast and in his possession based on revenue records. The Judicial Commissioner, in second appeal, allowed the respondents' appeal, holding them to be occupancy tenants and that Section 77 barred the civil court's jurisdiction, directing the plaint be returned.",
+      "generated_judgment": "### **Facts:**\n1. **Parties and Property Allocation**: The appellant (Former Ruler of Bhagat State) declared **15 bighas 19 biswas** of land as his **private Khudkhast property**, recorded in revenue records since **1936**. The respondents alleged they were **occupancy tenants for generations**, claiming long-standing possession and usufruct.\n2. **Legal Status Under Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887**: The respondents argued that under this provision, **civil courts lack jurisdiction** over Khudkhast lands or disputes arising from them, mandatingOptional Land Settlement Procedure (or OLS) instead.\n3. **Claims and Pleadings**:\n   - The appellant sued the respondents for **possession and mesne profits** after alleging breach of their obligation to deliver annual produce and obstruction to his rights.\n   - The trial court ruled in favor of the appellant, finding the land was indeed Khudkhast in his possession.\n   - The **District Judge dismissed the respondents’ appeal**, affirming the trial finding without issuing Section 77 (civil court jurisdiction) checks.\n   - The **Judicial Commissioner (Second Appeal)**, reviewing an **archival case count**, reversed the judgment, declaring the civil court lacked jurisdiction and directing the lower courts to **return the plaint** under Section 77.\n4. **Order History**:\n   - **First Instance (Trial Court)**: Holder’s title confirmed via revenue records.\n   - **Second Appeal (District Judge)**: Restricted to a prior case count; affirmed the lower court’s judgment without reviewing civil jurisdiction.\n   - **Second Appeal (Judicial Commissioner)**: Explicitly ruled on Section 77 jurisdiction’s application for Khudkhast lands, warranting a return of the plaint.\n\n---\n\n### **Issues:**\n1. **Whether the civil court had jurisdiction over this Khudkhast land dispute, and if Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, precluded civil court resolution under Rule 12(a) CPC or analogous proviso in OLSM Schedules?**\n2. **Was the District Judgeoleatially obliged to investigate/examine Section 77 jurisdiction before finalizing the claim, despite an affirmance upon limited findings?**\n3. **Did the Judicial Commissioner commit a “curial error” by overriding the District Judge ad hoc conviction on Section 77, or was the reversal a correct exercise of appellate supervision?**\n*(Framed as a procedural issue vs substantive jurisdictional redemption.)*\n\n---\n### **Rules:**\n1. **Section 77, Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887**:\n   - Affirms that civil courts generally **lack jurisdiction over (i) Khudkhast lands, or (ii) tenancy disputes in OLS-provoked proceedings**.\n   (*The 1887 Act splintered law from state securities for tenure systems; subsequent 1930 *LL Act Amendment* codified these curials for juridical mercy.*).\n   - Mandates **adjudication smushing in OLS Procedures declare below Rule 12(a) CPC codification.matters requiring** plans/jurisdiction pre-eligibility screening/zero evidence**.\n2. **Procedure Such as CCP Rule 12(a)**:\n   - Defines court procedure requirements when **initial findings in dispute Ipse dijuris contest indicated; Pellicrimination approved by appellant courts like District Judge and Judicial Commissioner.**\n3. **Appeal Pointers under PP Code 351**:\n   - Appellate language has belated juris activism freed him to re-weigh merits **once new Section 77 admissibility facts were prima facie deduced** from records, even if the District Judge had allowed unclean rectifications.\n4. **Coexistence Rules with 2nd T.S. OLSM** (Optional Land Settlement Measures):\n   - Post-1930 LL Act statutes codified: Khudkhast reclassification shall reserve revenue privileges quasi from state structure. The **2nd Tenancy Schedule** affirmatively delineated occupation codes (e.g., Kukars vs Reeri) to gag unilateral civil tort’s entry over title. Section 53 RB of assumed revisional 1964 Act reiterated the **superceded motherland’s terms**, specifically for original tenaceries ensconced before 1930s.\n---\n\n### **Analysis:**\n1. **Key Jurisdictional Event & Precedent**:\n   Upon finding the land rantes of certainty (Khundhast footer), both District Judge and Judicial Commissioner correctly brought into perspective **Punjab Nature Act’s §77 scop drinking**. Though the lower court's affirmance embraced the title conclusion, its head responsibility rested directly in evaluating whether pliant respondents could play the role *in surprise* Rice believes fulfill mid-theocratic codec. Additionally,the District Judge’s unambiguous language on decisions $(\"# Place\", which indicated securities across 2021 have not coordinated with revenue Regiven's summarizing factums for class diffracts that would have propelled a latter criminal inquiry)—recognized a *link and found violation.\n\n2. **Procedure(\n2(a) —Steerage by Later Appeals):\n   The second-reviewed allowed redefinitive in deserted strangely the LHS was incorrect to invoke Section 77, leaving incomplete substantive assessments() routine appeals but chose against sanctioning subperject disputes as contradicting proper notice norms. The District Judge projected *inherently impelled toxicity* (veronicas still mailed, no interim stays granted—fulfilled to limit full testimomials) ensuring competent qualification validation prior adjudication happening—their permission triggered by knowledge even‐deans from the flavor of Conway institutions admonishment.\n\n2(b) —Proportion (and Reverse):\n   At **pari-passu**, *particular* conduct overseen remained reduced: The District Judge did effectively and **armchair-criintially test jurisdiction** (*“excutive must exercise”*), allowing verification under Price-Code RR12. As the 1887 fragment had aligned hands, even the augury model *adjudged fait objectionals on practice sides*—basic imaging distance taken since Historowicz’s original 1930 peer reviewed jurisprudence-debalance. Thus the appeal **allowed** on procedural correctness breaching contrageneral of law, wherein moot autonomy invoking taxation landmarks binds principal interest claimant personally to judi-Alternative Security Rules present.\n\n3. **Bill Participants Role in Lands-Jobs Misexports**:\n   Evidence tagged **%\"...\"** (**bill baap as defined at Rs 1,750 district disposition certified ~12 years**), shows plaint statement-signature likely conflated Fact Sheet error to “Always!” unreversal consequence—burdening zoning act PRC levels, accepted these power falblow proceedings. equally forms for hearings needed re-queryed (note proceeding 200 seeks OLS dis-quash impediment, no permissible reasons--> thus denying hearsays warrant—trenining legal certainty denied by The OLS-mafias-agenda mindset favored by review finalists.\n\n---\n### **Conclusion:**\n**The appellants’ second appeal is *DISMISSED* under Error 12(a) with no error noticed as executives’ specific Panel versions proper abridged ranking allowed affirmance. This could be prospective basis** under the same violation discovery whistle–blowing contemporary arbitees extend deemed primary 1887 govern-ment securities at law—rejecting actual Section 77 presumption operatives inherent in both court revenges vs plain arranging positioning precedents.\n\nHowever, **allow the respondent’s Suit recurrence correct on legal principles replying proper interdict reigns remediation;**—violating parliamentary legislature as per their systemic hierarchy making impeding tenant’s consolidation QT utilize, giving adds its jurisdiction and abusing executives. **fully ALLOW renew Plaint retrieverssocial-to-servicing sequence** leniency as requested on all adobe qualifications for punishment illegal prosecution blunder. **While the District Judge’s default jurisdiction adjudgment appropriately bared benchproof exam, second order duly only requested avoidance form checks**.",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : J. R. Mudholkar, J.\n1. In this appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh in second appeal two points have been urged on behalf of the appellant. The first is that the Court of the Judicial Commissioner was in error in interfering with a finding of fact of the District Judge and the second is that the Court of the Judicial Commissioner was wrong in holding that the suit was not triable by a civil court but is triable by a revenue court under s. 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (Punj. XVI of 1887) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which applies to Himachal Pradesh.\n2. In order to appreciate these points it is necessary to state some facts. The appellant who was plaintiff in the suit was the former ruler of the State of Bhagat, one of the Simla Hill states. The State of Bhagat and several other Simla Hill States were merged in Himachal Pradesh on July 1, 1947. As a consequence of the merger the ruler surrendered his sovereignty to the new States. Khasra Nos. 70, 80, 81, 167, 263/170, 171, 172, 173 and 2691177 measuring in all 15 bighas and 19 biswas, among other property, were declared to be the private property of the appellant. It is the appellant's case that these fields are his Khudkhast lands, that they are recorded as much in the revenue papers ever since the year 1936 and that the defendants were granted licence to cultivate these lands on his behalf with the obligation that the entire produce from the lands should be hamded over by them to the appellant at the end of every year.\n3. The consideration for the arrangement was a remission in rent and land revenue which the appellant had granted to the respondents with respect to certain other lands which were leased out by him to the respondents. Bulk of these lands were declared to be the State property as a result of the merger and presumably the respondents have now to pay full assessment or rent with respect to them. According to the appellant the respondents failed to hand over the annual produce from the fields in suit to him and, therefore, he leased out the lands at Rs. 500/- per annum to Chuku Koli for Rs. 500/- for a period of one year from October, 1950. The respondents, however, obstructed Choku in taking possession of the land and despite repeated demands by the appellant, they kept him out of possession. He therefore instituted a suit for possession and mesneprofits from Rabi 1950 to Kharif 1953 at m. 500 per annum and future profits in July, 1954.\n4. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that they were the occupancy tenants of these lands for the last two or three generations. that they were cultivating these lands jointly and severally and that the suit was not cognizable by a civil court. They also contended that had filed a suit against the appellant in the court of the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Solon for a declaration to the effect that they are in possession of the lands as occupation tenants and that, therefore, the appellant's suit should be stayed. The trial court decreed the suit of the appellant as against all the respondents including the claim for mesne profits. The respondents preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Mahau. He dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree of the trial court.\n5. They therefore preferred second appeal to the Court of Judicial Commissioner. The Judicial Commissioner allowed the appeal holding that the respondents were occupancy tenants of the lands and that consequently the provisions of s. 77 read with the first proviso thereto barred the jurisdiction of the civil court. On this finding the Judicial Commissioner set aside the decree granted by the trial court and affirmed by the District Judge and directed that the plaint be returned for presentation to proper court.\n6. It is contended before us by Mr. Achhru Ram for the appellant that for a suit to be barred under s. 77 of the Act from the cognizance of a civil court two conditions have to be satisfied. The first is that the suit should relate to one of the matters described in sub-s. 3 and the second is that the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant should be admitted by the parties. If these two conditions are not satisfied then, according to him, the suit is not barred from the cognizance of a civil court. In support of his contention he has relied upon the decision in Sham Singh v. Amarjit Singh Baru v. Nader ; (1942) I.L.R.24 Lah.191 F.B. Daya Ram v. Jagir Singh He has also relied upon certain observations of this Court in Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi (1962) 3 S.C.R. 673. S. 77 A.I.R (1956) Him. Pis. 61 and the first proviso there to run as follows: \"The following suits shall be instituted in, and heard and determined by Revenue Courts, and no other Court shall take cognizance of (1930) I.L.R 12 Lah. III any dispute or matter with respect to which, any such suit might be instituted:- Provided that-\n \"(1) Where in a suit cognizable and instituted in a Civil Court it becomes necessary to decide any matter which can under this sub-section be heard and determined only by a Revenue Court shall endorse upon the plaint the nature of the matter for decision and the particulars required by Order VII, rule 10, Code of Civil procedure and return the plaint for presentation to the Collector.\" We are not concerned with the second proviso. Below the second proviso the kind of suits which are triable by the revenue courts are set out in three groups. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the suit in question would fall under entry (e) in the second group. That entry reads thus:\n\"suits by a landlord to eject a tenant.\" They also contend that their suit before the revenue court was one under entry (d) which reads thus: \"Suits by a tenant to establish a Claim to a right of occupancy, or by landlord to prove that a tenent has not such a right.\" \n7. It would, however, appear that not only it can (d) and (e) but every other item in the three groups relates to a dispute between tenants on the one hand and the landlord on the other. There is no entry or item relating to a suit by or against a person claiming to be a tenant and whose status as a tenant is not admitted by the landlord. It would, therefore, be reasonable to infer that the legislature barred only those suits form the cognizance of a civil court where there was no dispute between the parties that a person cultivating land or who was in possession of land was a tenant. This is precisely what has been held in the two decisions of the Lahore High Court relied upon by Mr. Achhru Ran. In the first of these two cases Tek Chand J., observed:\n\" It is obvious that the bar u/cl. (4) is applicable to those cases only in which the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted and the object of the suit is to determine the nature of the tenancy i. e. whether the status of the tenant falls under sections 5, 6, 7 or 8 of the Act.\" \n8. In that case the suit was instituted by someone claiming to succeed to the tenancy of certain land on the death of the occupancy tenant. The learned Tudge observed:\n\" In a suit like the one before us the point for decision is not the nature of the tenancy, but whether the defendant is related to the deceased tanant and if so whether their common ancestor had occupied the land. If these facts are established, the claimant ipso facto succeeds to the occupancy tenancy. But if they are found against him, he is not a tenant at all.\" \n9. As this facts were not established the High Court held that the landlord was entitled to sue the defendant who had entered on the land asserting a claim to be a collateral of the deceased tenant but who failed to substantiate his claim. This view was affirmed by a Full Bench consisting of five Judges in the other, Lahore case. In Daya Ram v. Jagir Singh A.I.R. (1956) Him. Pra. 61 the same Judicial Commissioner who decided the appeal before us has expressed the view that where in a suit for ejectment the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant is not admitted by the' parties the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit and that such a suit did not fall under s. 77 (3) of the Act. In Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi A.I.R. (1956) Him. Pra. 61 this Court was considering the provisions of s. 17 A.I.R. (1956) Him. Pra. 61 of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1948 (3 of 1948). The provisions of that section run thus:\n\" Any dispute between the tenant and the landlord as regards, (a) tenant's possession of the land on the 1st day of September, 1947 and his right to the benefits under this Act, or (b) misuse of the land by tenant, or (c) failure or the tenant to cultivate the land properly, or (d) failure of the tenant to deliver to the landlord the rent accrued due within two months from the date on which it becomes payable, or (e) the quantity of the produce payable to the landlord as rent, shall be decided by the Collector on the application of either of the parties.\" \n10. It was contended in that case on behalf of the respondents who claimed to be tenants that suit for permanent injunction instituted by the appellant landlord was barred by the provisions of s. 7 A. I. R. (1959) S. C. 57. Dealing with this contention this Court observed as follows:\n\" In other words, s. 7 (1962) 3 S.C.R. 673 postulates the relationship of tenants and landlord between the parties and proceeds to provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector to try the five categories of disputes that may arise between the landlord and the tenant. The disputes which are the subject-matter of s. 7 (1962) 3 S.C.R. 673 must be in regard to the five categories. That in the plain and obvious construction of the words any dispute as regards'. On this construction it would be unreasonable to hold that a dispute about the status of the tenant also falls within the purview of the said section. The scheme of s. 7 (1962) 3 S.C.R. 673 is unam- biguous and clear.\nIt refers to the tenant and landlord as such and it contemplates disputes of the specified character arising between them. Therefore, in our opinion, even on a liberal construction of s. 7 (1962) 3 S.C.R. 673 it would be difficult to uphold the argument that a dispute as regards the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant falls to be determined by the Collector under s. 7 A. 1. R. (1959) S. C. 57 \".\n11. The observations of this Court would clearly apply to the present case also inasmuch as the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the parties to the suit is riot admitted by the appellant.\n12. Now we will come to the second point because the argument is that on the finding of the learned District Judge the respondents are tenants arid, therefore, their ejectment cannot be ordered by a Civil Court. As already stated the appellant challenged the finding of the Judicial Commissioner on the point on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to reverse the finding of the District Court because it was a finding of fact on the question. There is no doubt in our mind that the learned Judicial Commissioner was in error in reversing the finding of fact of the District Judge particularly so because the finding of the District Judge is based upon a consideration of entries in the record of rights from the year 1936 onwards showing that the lands were the khudkhast lands of the appellant and were in his possession, The learned Judicial Commissioner has omitted to bear in mind the provisions of s. 44 of the Act which give a presumptive value to the entries in revenue records. It was argued before us that there are prior entaries which are in conflict with those on which the learned District Judge has relied.\n13. It is sufficient to say that where there is such a conflict, it is the later entry which must prevail. Indeed from the language of s. 44 itself it follows that where a new entry is substituted for an old one it is that new entry which will take the place of the old one and will be entitled to the presumption of correctness until and unless it is established to be wrong or substituted by another entry. In Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya this Court held that a finding of fact arrived at by the District Judge on the consideration of all evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by the parties, cannot be set aside in second appeal. the question here is whether the respondents are the tenants of the appellant.\n14. Though for determining the question documentary evidence fell to be considered, the finding on the question is no less a finding of fact than may have been the case if the evidence to, be considered was merely oral. As was pointed out by this Court in that case as well as recently in Sir Chunilal V. Mohta &amp;amp; Sons Ltd., Bombay v. The Century Spinning &amp;amp; Manufacturing Co. Ltd, Bombay (1962) Supp. 3 S.C.R an issue of law does not arise merely because documents which are not instruments of title or otherwise the direct foundation of rights but are merely historical documents, have to be construed. Of course here, as we have already pointed out, the Judicial Commissioner has ignored the presumption arising from certain documentary evidence and, therefore, there is an additional reason vitiating its finding.\n15. Upon this view we set aside the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and restore that of the trial court as affirmed by the District Court. Costs throughout will be borne by the parties as incurred. \nAppeal allowed\n",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -113,26 +113,26 @@
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       "sample_id": "S021",
-      "case_id": "1309",
-      "experiment": "role_play_v3",
-      "model": "gpt-oss-120b-noreason",
-      "source_file": "S021__role_play_v3__gpt-oss-120b-noreason__1309.json",
+      "case_id": "974",
+      "experiment": "baseline_firac",
+      "model": "ministral-3b",
+      "source_file": "S021__baseline_firac__ministral-3b__974.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "01/07/2014",
-      "machine_error_stage": "analysis",
+      "judgment_date": "01/05/1962",
+      "machine_error_stage": "rules",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in reasoning"
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification"
     }
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   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 1812 of 1972 | Abdulla Bin Ali And Others v. Galappa And Others | 01/02/1985",
-      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 1812 of 1972 | Abdulla Bin Ali And Others v. Galappa And Others",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Ram Kumar Aggrawal | 02/11/1993",
+      "case_details": "Case: Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Ram Kumar Aggrawal",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The dispute centers on survey plots 149 and 150, originally owned by Galappa. In 1917, the appellants' father purchased these plots from Galappa's mother, Tayamma, acting as guardian for minor Galappa. In 1919, Tayamma's claim that the deed was a mortgage, not a sale, was rejected by the Tahsildar, who confirmed it as a sale, directing parties to a civil court. Saibanna, Galappa's brother, was subsequently inducted as a tenant. In 1982, the appellants' father obtained a civil court decree declaring his title against Galappa and Saibanna. After the appellants succeeded their father, Saibanna fell into rent arrears (1951-1954). The appellants initiated revenue proceedings for rent recovery and tenancy register correction. In both proceedings, Saibanna denied the appellants' title and his tenancy, leading the revenue courts to dismiss the applications and direct the appellants to a civil court due to the title dispute. Consequently, the appellants filed the present suit in civil court for possession and mesne profits, treating the defendants as trespassers. The defendants argued the civil court lacked jurisdiction under Sections 32 and 99 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court decreed the suit for the appellants, but the High Court set aside their judgment, holding the civil court lacked jurisdiction, interpreting the plaint as alleging a landlord-tenant relationship.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts  \n1. Survey plots 149 and 150 were originally the property of Galappa.  \n2. In 1917 the appellants’ father purchased the two plots from Galappa’s mother, Tayamma, who was acting as guardian for the minor Galappa.  \n3. In 1919 Tayamma claimed that the deed conveyed was a mortgage, not a sale. The Tahsildar rejected this claim, held that the deed was a sale and directed the parties to the civil court for determination of title.  \n4. Saibanna, Galappa’s brother, was subsequently inducted as a tenant of the land.  \n5. In 1982 the appellants’ father obtained a decree from a civil court declaring his title to the plots against Galappa and Saibanna.  \n6. After the father’s death the appellants succeeded to his interest. Saibanna fell into arrears of rent for the years 1951‑1954.  \n7. The appellants commenced revenue‑court proceedings for recovery of the unpaid rent and for correction of the tenancy register. Saibanna denied both the appellants’ title and his status as a tenant; the revenue courts dismissed the applications and remitted the parties to a civil court on the ground that the title dispute required civil jurisdiction.  \n8. The appellants then filed a suit in a civil court for **possession** of the plots and for **mesne profits**, treating the defendants as trespassers.  \n9. The defendants contended that the civil court bore **no jurisdiction** because the suit fell within the ambit of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, §§ 32 and 99, which govern landlord‑tenant disputes.  \n10. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court decreed in favour of the appellants.  \n11. The High Court set aside those decrees, holding that the civil court lacked jurisdiction, construing the plaint as a suit arising out of a landlord‑tenant relationship and therefore subject to the statutory scheme of the Tenancy Act.  \n\n### Issues  \n1. **Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit for possession and mesne profits when the dispute involved a landlord‑tenant relationship governed by the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (“the Act”).**  \n2. **Whether the plaint, by alleging a landlord‑tenant relationship and seeking possession, must be tried under the Act pursuant to §§ 32 and 99, rendering the civil suit barred.**  \n\n### Rules  \n1. **Section 32, Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act** – authorises a landlord to recover possession of agricultural land for non‑payment of rent, but the remedy is **exclusively** within the jurisdiction of the revenue authority designated under the Act; civil courts are **statutorily barred** from entertaining such eviction proceedings.  \n2. **Section 99, the Act** – bars the civil courts from entertaining any suit that arises out of a landlord‑tenant relationship covered by the Act; only the authority or tribunal prescribed by the Act may determine the dispute.  \n3. **Statutory Bar Doctrine** – when a statute provides a specialised remedial scheme, the ordinary civil jurisdiction is ousted to the extent the statute intends exclusive jurisdiction.  \n4. **Precedent** – *State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Lingam*, AIR 1973 SC 193; *K. K. Reddy v. B. M. Krishna*, (1990) 125 All ER 604, holding that eviction or possession suits based on tenancy under a state tenancy law must be instituted before the statutory authority and that civil courts lack jurisdiction.  \n5. **Doctrine of Continuity of Tenancy** – even after a transfer of title, a person who occupies the land as a tenant under the Act continues to enjoy statutory protection; any dispute over possession for rent arrears remains within the ambit of the tenancy legislation.  \n6. **Mesne Profits Connected with Possession** – where the claim for mesne profits is inseparable from a claim for possession of agricultural land held under a tenancy, the entire proceeding is governed by the Act; a separate civil suit for pure rent recovery may be permissible, but not when possession is also sought.  \n\n### Analysis  \n1. **Nature of the dispute (Facts 6‑8)** – The appellants’ claim is founded on Saibanna’s failure to pay rent for 1951‑1954 and on his continued occupation of the land. The suit therefore seeks to evict a statutory tenant and to recover rent (mesne profits). This falls squarely within the subject‑matter covered by §§ 32 and 99 of the Act.  \n\n2. **Effect of the 1982 decree (Fact 5)** – The decree merely confirmed the appellants’ ownership of the plots. Ownership does not extinguish the statutory tenancy that arose thereafter; under the Act the tenant’s right to occupy the land continues until the landlord obtains a decree **under the Act** for eviction for rent arrears. Hence, the issue before the court is not a pure title dispute but the exercise of a statutory right to possession.  \n\n3. **Statutory jurisdiction (Rules 1‑3)** – Because the Act expressly confers exclusive jurisdiction on the revenue authority for eviction on non‑payment of rent, the civil court is statutorily barred from hearing the suit. The High Court correctly applied the statutory bar doctrine.  \n\n4. **Precedent (Rule 4)** – The Supreme Court in *P. Lingam* held that where a tenancy Act provides a specific remedy for eviction, a civil suit for possession is a nullity. The present facts are on all fours with that authority.  \n\n5. **Mesne profits claim (Rule 6)** – The appellants’ claim for mesne profits is pleaded together with a claim for possession. Since the possession claim is barred, the mesne‑profits claim cannot be entertained separately in the same suit; it must be pursued in the proper statutory forum.  \n\n6. **Lower courts’ error (Facts 10‑11)** – The Trial Court and First Appellate Court ignored the mandatory jurisdictional bar of the Act and proceeded on the basis that a civil suit for possession was permissible. The High Court correctly reversed that view, interpreting the plaint as invoking the landlord‑tenant relationship and therefore requiring adjudication under the Act.  \n\n### Conclusion  \nThe civil court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit for possession and mesne profits because the dispute arose out of a landlord‑tenant relationship governed by the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, §§ 32 and 99. Accordingly, the High Court’s judgment setting aside the decrees of the lower courts is legally sound.  \n\n**The appeal is DISMISSED.**",
-      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : MISRA\nMISRA, J. : - The dispute in the present appeal by special leave centres round survey plots Nos. 149 and 150 measuring 17 acres 23 gunthas and 11 acres and 35 gunthas respectively. at Yadgir, District Gulbarga. The disputed plots admittedly belonged to one Galappa. The appellants' father purchased the aforesaid two plots under a registered sale deed from Galappa in 1917. As Galappa was a minor at that time the sale deed was executed by his mother, Tayamma as a guardian.\n2. In 1919 Tayamma filed an application before the Tahsildar alleging that she executed only a mortgage deed and not a sale deed in favour of the appellants' father. The Tahsildar, however, negatived her claim and came to the conclusion after investigation that Tayamma executed a sale deed and not a mortgage deed in favour of the appellants' father. She went up in appeal but the same was dismissed and the parties were directed to approach the civil court for a proper redress of the grievances. In the meantime, Saibanna the brother of Galappa, was inducted as a tenant. In 1982 the father of the appellants filed a suit for the declaration of his title and ownership in respect of the disputed lands against Galappa and his brother Saibanna which was decreed. The father of the appellants died and he was succeeded by the appellants. Saibanna continued to pay the rent for sometime but thereafter he fell in arrears for the period 1951 to 1954. The appellants, therefore, filed an application for recovery of the said amount in the court of the Tahsildar. In that proceedings Saibanna, however, denied the title of the appellants as also the tenancy. The appellants also initiated proceedings for the correction of tenancy register and there also the tenant denied the title of the appellants. The application. for the recovery of arrears of rent as well as for the correction of tenancy register were dismissed and the appellants were directed to approach the civil court as the dispute between the parties involved a question of title. In the circumstances the appellants were obliged to file a suit for possession and mesne profits treating the defendants-respondents as trespassers. Saibanna has since died and he is now represented by his son Shivappa.\n3. The suit was resisted by the defendants-respondents on a number of grounds but it is not necessary to refer to all those pleas for the disposal of the present appeal. One of the pleas though not specifically taken in the written statement but allowed by the Court to be urged was the question of jurisdiction. According to the defendants-respondents the civil Court had no. jurisdiction to try the suit on the own allegations made in the plaint inasmuch as the plaintiffs-appellants had pleaded that defendant No. 2 was the tenant of the disputed plots. They set up the bar of Ss. 32 and 99 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court decreed the suit deciding all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. The High Court, however, set aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below and held that the civil Court had no. jurisdiction to try the suit on the allegations of the plaintiffs in the plaint, In its opinion the plaintiffs-appellants could get the relief of possession only from the revenue Court under S. 32(1) of the said Act and that S. 99 stood as a complete bar to the entertainment of the suit by the civil Court on the allegations in the plaint and on that finding it dismissed the suit. Therefore, the only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit.\n4. It has already been pointed out that the plaintiffs-appellants had earlier initiated the proceedings for the recovery of the arrears of rent from the defendants-respondents and had also initiated a separate proceeding for the correction of the tenancy register. In both those proceedings the defendant No. 2 had denied the title of the plaintiffs-appellants and the revenue Court directed the plaintiffs to get their redress by filing a suit in the civil Court. Accordingly, the plaintiffs-appellants had no. option but to file the suit. Curiously enough this time the defendants took up the stand that the civil Court had no. jurisdiction to try the suit when in the earlier proceedings before the revenue Court too the defendants had raised an objection that the revenue, Court had no. jurisdiction. Thus, the plaintiffs-appellants had been running from pillar to post to get relief on account of the unreasonable attitude taken by the defendants-respondents.\n5. There is no. denying the fact that the allegations made in the plaint decide the forum. The jurisdiction does not depend upon the defence taken by the defendants in the written statement. On a reading of the plaint as a whole it is evident that the plaintiffs-appellants had filed the suit giving rise to the present appeal treating the defendants as trespassers as they denied the title of the plaintiffs-appellants. Now a suit against the trespasser would lie only in the civil Court and not in the revenue Court. The High Court, however, took the view that the plaintiffs-appellants had not claimed a declaration of title over the disputed plots and all that has been set up by them in the plaint is the relationship of landlord and tenant.\n6. In our opinion the High Court was not quite correct in observing that the suit was filed by the plaintiffs-appellants on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant. Indeed, when the defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs and the tenancy the plaintiffs filed the present suit treating them to be trespassers and the suit is not on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It is no. doubt true that the plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant No. 2 was a tenant but on the denial of the tenancy and the title of the plaintiffs-appellants they filed a suit treating the defendant to be a trespasser and a suit against a trespasser would lie only in the civil Court and not in the revenue Court.\n7. We are, therefore. of the considered opinion that on the allegations made in the plaint the suit was cognizable by the civil Courtand that the High Court has erred in law in non-suiting the plaintiffs-appellants on the ground that the civil Court had no. jurisdiction.\n8. The learned counsel for the appellants, Shri R. B. Datar, however, contended that the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court had decided all the issues involved in the case in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants and in case we come to the conclusion, as indeed we have come to that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not barred, the judgment of the first appellate Court should be confirmed and there is no. need to remand the case again to the High Court for deciding it afresh on merits.\n9. We are not inclined to accept the contention raised by the counsel for the appellants. A number of issues were involved in the case and the High Court has decided the case only on the ground of jurisdiction and no. other point has been dealt with. It will not he fair to the respondents to accept the finding of the first appellate Court without the same being examined by the High Court.\n10. For the reasons given above the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the other issues involved in the case on merits. However, this decision will be without any prejudice to the respondents rights, if any, under any other enactment. There shall, however, be no. orders as to costs.\n\n\n",
+      "case_record": "The assessee, a partnership firm, received Rs 32,25,550 from the liquidator of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. upon its voluntary liquidation. The Income Tax Officer and Appellate Assistant Commissioner included this sum in the assessee's income for assessment year 1956-57, treating it as a revenue receipt. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, however, ruled in favor of the assessee. Notably, the assessee had consistently treated its shares in Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. as stock-in-trade since 1949-50, even claiming trading losses on this basis. The assessee purchased all equity shares in 1945, and the company was converted to a private limited company in 1947. Before the High Court, the assessee argued its prior treatment of shares as stock-in-trade was erroneous and that the shares ceased to be stock-in-trade upon the company's conversion. The High Court rejected these arguments and held, following IRC v. George Burrell, that liquidation proceeds are capital, not income, and that a liquidator deals with company assets, not shareholder shares.",
+      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The assessee, a partnership firm, received Rs 32,25,550 from the liquidator of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. upon its voluntary liquidation.\n2. The Income Tax Officer and Appellate Assistant Commissioner included this sum in the assessee's income for assessment year 1956-57, treating it as a revenue receipt.\n3. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, deciding that the sum was not income.\n4. The assessee had consistently treated its shares in Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. as stock-in-trade since 1949-50 and claimed trading losses on this basis.\n5. The assessee purchased all equity shares in 1945, and the company was converted to a private limited company in 1947.\n6. The High Court held that the liquidation proceeds were capital, not income, following IRC v. George Burrell.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Was the sum of Rs 32,25,550 received by the assessee from the liquidator of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. properly characterized as income for the assessment year 1956-57?\n2. Did the conversion of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. into a private limited company in 1947 change the nature of the assessee's shares from stock-in-trade to capital assets?\n3. Can the assessee's historical treatment of its shares as stock-in-trade since 1949-50 justify the classification of the liquidation proceeds as income rather than capital?\n4. Is the ruling of the High Court, following IRC v. George Burrell, that liquidation proceeds are capital, not income, legally binding and applicable in this context?\n\n### Rules:\n1. Proceeds from liquidation are typically considered capital receipts rather than income, as they are returns on investment rather than revenue generated from business operations.\n2. The classification of shares as stock-in-trade is crucial in determining whether proceeds upon their sale are treated as income or capital, based on their use (trading vs. capital investment).\n3. The conversion of a company from public to private limited company can affect the nature of investment, potentially impacting whether such investments are treated as stock-in-trade or capital assets.\n4. Precedents such as IRC v. George Burrell establish legal interpretations on the nature of liquidation proceeds, influencing current decisions.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Maintainability**: The appeal is maintainable as it raises significant legal questions about the correct characterization of liquidation proceeds and the relevance of historical treatment of shares.\n\n2. **Issue 1 (Income vs. Capital)**: According to the High Court's interpretation of IRC v. George Burrell, liquidation proceeds are to be considered capital rather than income. This precedent supports the assessee's position that the proceeds do not constitute taxable revenue income.\n\n3. **Issue 2 (Conversion Impact)**: The conversion of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. into a private limited company in 1947 could reasonably lead to reclassification of the shares from stock-in-trade to capital assets. This change possibly affected the tax nature of proceeds from the liquidation, aligning with capital rather than revenue treatment.\n\n4. **Issue 3 (Historical Treatment)**: While the assessee treated shares as stock-in-trade since 1949-50, a consistent but erroneous treatment does not bind the legal classification of proceeds if the nature of the asset fundamentally changed due to the company's conversion.\n\n5. **Issue 4 (Applicability of Precedent)**: The ruling in IRC v. George Burrell is legally binding and applicable in this context. Given the established precedent that liquidation proceeds are capital, it supports the High Court's conclusion.\n\n### Conclusion:\nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The ruling of the High Court, supported by the precedent in IRC v. George Burrell and the nature of the proceeds, suggests that the liquidation proceeds are rightly classified as capital, not income. The conversion of the company and the erroneous historical treatment by the assessee do not warrant reclassification of these proceeds as income.",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.- This appeal arises from the judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court answering the questions referred to it in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The assessment year concerned herein is 1956-57. The three questions referred at the instance of Revenue, for the opinion of the High Court are:\n\"(1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified i n investigating the nature of the shares held by the assessee in Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. when both the assessee and the Income Tax Authorities had treated them as the stock- in-trade of the assessee as a dealer in share for every assessment year since 1949-50 and proceeded on the same basis for the instant assessment year?\n(2) Whether on the facts and in the circu mstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the shares held by assessee in Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. were not its stock-in-trade for dealing in shares?\n(3) If the answer to question (2) be in the negative then whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of Rupees Thirty- two lakhs twenty-five thousand and five hundred and fifty was not assessable in the hands of the Assessee?\"\n2. The assessee is a partnership firm. The accounting year relevant to A.Y. 1956-57 was the year ending on December 31, 1955. The Income Tax Officer made an assessment on a total income of Rs 36, 41, 544 which included a sum of Rs 32, 25, 550 representing the surplus which the assessee received during the previous year from the liquidator of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. which went into voluntary liquidation in the year 1955. The assessee preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner objecting to the inclusion of the said surplus amount. The appeal was dismissed. But on further appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal agreed with its contention.\n3. The assessee was a regular dealer in shares. In the year 1945, it purchased all the equity shares of Chrestian Mica Co. Ltd. which was then a public limited company. The assessee took over its management. In 1947, the company was converted into a private limited company. For the A.Y. 1949-50, the assessee claimed a trading loss of Rs 20, 88, 735 stated to be the\nloss suffered on account of depreciation of the value of the shares of the said company. This claim was made on the basis that all the shares of the company were held by it as stock-in-trade. Its claim was allowed by the Tribunal on appeal. In all the subsequent assessments, the said shares were treated as its stock-in-trade and value of those shares as claimed by the assessee was adopted.\n4. In the assessment proceedings relating to the assessment year concerned herein (1956-57), the assessee admitted that the shares of the said company were held by it as stock-in-trade. On that basis, the said surplus amount received by it from the liquidator was included in its total income by the ITO and the AAC. On appeal, however, there was a difference of opinion between the Judicial Member and the Accountant Member whereupon the matter was referred to the Vice-President. He upheld the assessee's plea. Then followed the reference to the High Court.\n5. Before the High Court, the counsel for the assessee contended that the admission and concession made by the assessee to the effect that the said shares were held by it as stock-in-trade was erroneous and was, therefore, not binding upon it. Some decisions relating to adventure in the nature of trade were relied upon in that behalf. The said contention was, however, rejected by the High Court and rightly in our opinion. It was then argued for the assessee that the said shares ceased to be stock-in-trade of the assessee the moment the company was converted from a public limited company to a private limited company. This contention was also rejected by the High Court. The High Court then considered the question whether the amount received by the assessee from the liquidator was in lieu of the shares held by it. Following the decision of the House of Lords in IRC v. George Burrell' it held that whatever is received by a shareholder on the liquidation of a company is not the income of the property but the property it self. The High Court referred to certain other English and Indian decisions and observed that as a general rule, what is distributed in a liquidation is capital whatever may have been its source. It also observed that there was no sale or transfer of the shares held by the assessee \"the liquidator sells the assets of the company and not the shares of the shareholders\" , it observed. Reference was also made to the provisions of Section 211 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and Section 511 of the Companies Act, 1956. For all the said reasons, the questions referred were answered in favour of the assessee. Dipak Kumar Sen, J. delivered a separate concurring opinion. The learned Judge did not place much reliance upon the English decisions. He pointed out that in none of the English decisions relied upon before them, did the assessee hold the shares as stock- in-trade. The main ground upon which he held in favour of the assessee runs thus: \"Where a limited liability company is liquidated and the liquidator distributes the surplus assets, there is no transaction in the trading sense between the liquidator and the shareholders. Irrespective of the decision\n1 9 Tax Cases 27 : (1924) All ER Rep 672 : (1924) 2 KB 52 205 of the shareholders the liquidator has to carry out his duties and obligation as laid down in the Companies Act. No consideration passes from the liquidator to the shareholder as in the case of sale. Nor can it be said that the liquidator in distributing the surplus assets is realising or redeeming the shares. In law, a shareholder may technically continue to be a shareholder even after he gets his share of the surplus. Till the company is struck off the register, he remains a shareholder in law. He retains his share Scripps. By virtue of his holding, a shareholder is entitled to surplus assets on the liquidation of company and such surplus assets appear to me to be in the nature of an accretion to his share.\"\n6. Shri G.C. Sharma, learned counsel for the Revenue characterised the view taken by the High Court as unsustainable in law besides being unrealistic and hypertechnical. Learned counsel submitted that the assets which a shareholder receives on the liquidation of a company is in lieu of and on account of the shares held by him. Once a company goes into liquidation and the liquidator distributes the assets among the shareholders (after discharging the liabilities, if any) the company ceases to exist, though technically speaking it may continue as such until its name is struck off the register of companies. It is not necessary, submitted the learned counsel, that there should be a sale or transfer of shares for the income to arise. Once the shares get converted into money (or other assets), by whatever means it may be, the money (or assets) received by the holder of such shares must be held to have realised the value of the said shares.\n7. Though the respondent was duly served and was represented by Shri P.K. Mukherjee, it was represented by the learned counsel on the last date of hearing that in spite of repeated letters by him, the assessee was not responding and, therefore, he was obliged to report 'no instructions'. Thereafter, he did not participate in the hearing of the appeal.\n8. Whether shares of a company held by a person constitute his capital or his stock-in-trade, is not a pure question of law but essentially one of fact. While one person may hold the shares of a company by way of investment, the other may hold them as his stock-in-trade. In this case, it is clear beyond any doubt that the assessee has been holding the shares of the aforesaid company as its stock-in-trade. In the earlier years, it claimed a trading loss on the footing that they represented its stock-in-trade. Even in the assessment proceedings for the A.Y. 1956-57 (concerned herein), it took the very same stand though at the stage of Tribunal and High Court, it sought to wriggle out of the said admission unsuccessfully. The High Court has held rightly that it cannot do so and that it is bound by its admission and its course of conduct over the past several years. The High Court, it may be recalled, has also rejected its further submission that the said shares ceased to be its stocking trade on the conversion of the company from a public limited company to a private limited company. If so, it follows that if the assessee receives any surplus amount in lieu of the said shares, it must be held to be a revenue receipt in his hands. It cannot be denied that the amount received by the assessee from the liquidator in this case was in lieu of its share-holding.\nIn effect and in truth, the amount received by it represented the recompense for its shares, even though it is true there was no transfer of shares from the assessee to the liquidator or to anyone else. It was a case of return for the money paid by the assessee for acquiring the said shares. In one case, the return may be more than what the holder paid for them while in another it may be less; the character of the receipt remains the same. The High Court has however held in favour of the assessee opining that (i) whatever is received by the shareholder on liquidation of a company is \"no income of the property but the property itself'; (ii) that whatever is disturbed in a liquidation is capital, whatever may have been its source, as held in Brogan (Inspector of Taxes) v. Stafford Coal and Iron Co.Ltd'; (iii) in the course of liquidation of the company the liquidator sells the assets of the company and not the shares of the shareholders; and (iv) where a limited company is liquidated and the liquidator distributes the surplus assets, there is no transaction in the trading sense between t he liquidator and the shareholders. By virtue of his holding, a shareholder is entitled to surplus assets on the liquidation of the company and such surplus assets are in the nature of an accretion to the shares held by him.\n9. The question is whether the opinion of the High Court is correct in law? We find it difficult to say so. Section 51 1 of the Companies Act applies to every voluntary winding up. It says that:\" 511. Subject to the provisions of this Act as to preferential payments, the assets of a company shall, on its winding up, be applied in satisfaction of its liabilities paripassu and, subject to such application, shall, unless the articles otherwise provide, be distributed among the members according to their rights and interests in the company. \"The concluding words of this section indicate that the assets of a company, on its liquidation, shall be distributed among the shareholders according to their rights and interests in the company which necessarily means according to their share-holding. What each shareholder gets is proportionate to his share-holding in the company.\nOnce the distribution takes place, the shares and the share- holding come to an end. The fact that the shares may technically continue until the name of the company is struck off the register of the company is of little significance.\nAfter the distribution of the assets, nothing remains of the shares. To say that the assets a shareholder receives on the liquidation of the company are unrelated to his share- holding is to be blind to the reality. Such an argument ignores the basic reality recognised by Section 511 of the Companies Act. The same comment holds good about the argument that the amount received is an accretion to the shares. It is true that a liquidator does not sell the shares. It is equally true that there is no transfer of shares by the shareholder to the liquidator or to any other person. That is not really necessary. So long as money is received in lieu of shares, there is a receipt and where an assessee is a dealer in shares, any surplus amount received by him constitutes his income. As stated above, where a company2 41 Tax Cases 305 : (1963) 3 All ER 277 : (1963) 1 WLR 905 \ngoes into liquidation and the liquidator distributes the assets of the company among the shareholders, what each shareholder gets is in lieu of his shareholding. That is the worth, the value and the price of his share-holding. A shareholder participates in the distribution of the assets of a company on its liquidation by virtue of and because of his share-holding. We, therefore, find it difficult to agree with the High Court that a shareholder participates in the distribution of assets on the liquidation of the company decors his shareholding. Once this is so, it follows that the money received by the assessee in lieu of its share- holding partakes of the same character in which he held the shares. If he held the shares as stock-in-trade, the money received by it represents his income, i.e., a revenue receipt in its hands. If it held them by way of investment, the money it receives represents a capital receipt by it.\n10. It would be appropriate at this stage to consider the decisions cited by Shri G.C. Sharma and those referred to in the judgment of the High Court. In CIT v. Madan Gopal Radhey Lal3, it was held that though the assessee held certain shares of a company as stock-in-trade, the bonus shares issued by the company and received by him were received by him as capital. On the facts of that case, however, it was held that since the assessee had converted the same into his stock-in-trade, the sale proceeds of the said bonus shares represented his business receipts. We are unable to see any relevance of the said proposition to the question at issue herein. At the relevant time, under the Income Tax Act, 1922, issue of bonus shares by capitalisation of the accumulated profits was not treated as distribution of dividend. It is the said circumstance which seems to have influenced the decision of this Court. The learned counsel for the Revenue brought to our notice a passage from the opinion of Lord Evershed in Brogan2. At page 333 (All ER p. 283) , the following statement occurs:\" It cannot now be in doubt that surplus assets in the hands of the liquidator of a limited liability company whether limited by share capital or by guarantee are in his hands capital. Such a conclusion was laid down by the Court of Appeal in IRC v. Burrell' and it has never since been questioned. The terms of Section 302 of the Companies Act, 1948, are entirely consistent with this vie w, for they speak of the 'property of the company' being distributed as therein stated. I agree that the fact that the surplus assets of a company on its winding-up are capital in the hands of the liquidator is not conclusive on the question whether the respective shares of them handed out to the members are likewise in their respective hands capital also. But prima facie beyond doubt they are. Some businesses may consist of dealing with capital assets; for example a company whose business is that of buying and selling real property or stocks and shares. In the case of such a company, no doubt the capital share of the surplus assets in a liquidation would be no less a trading receipt than the proceeds of sale of any other of the assets it had acquired for the purposes of its business.\"\n3 (1969) 73 ITR 652 : AIR 1969 SC 840 : (1969) 2 SCR 7 \n11. The learned counsel says that the said statement of law runs counter to the decision of this Court in Madan Gopal Radhey Lal3. He also invited our attention to Hari Prasad Jayantilal &amp;Co. v. V.S. Gupta, ITO4 to contend that the principle of this decision also runs counter to the decision in Madan Gopal Radhey Lal3. It is unnecessary for us to go into the said aspect as in our opinion the principle of Madan Gopal Radhey Lal3 has no application to the facts herein.\n12. The High Court has placed strong reliance upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in IRC v. Burrell'. In that case, the respondents-assessees were partners in a firm which held shares in a number of single ship companies. On the sale or loss of each ship, each of the companies went into voluntary liquidation, and its surplus assets, including reserves set aside out of profits, and other undivided profits, accumulated and current, were distributed by the liquidator among the shareholders. On those facts, it was held that on the liquidation of a company undistributed profits can no longer be distinguished from the capital and that such portion of the assets distributed by the liquidator as represents undistributed profits is not income in the hands of the shareholders which they are required to include in their returns of tot al income for super-tax purposes. Firstly, it is not a case where the assessees or the firms of which they were partners held the shares as stock-in-trade. Secondly, the said decision cannot mechanically be applied to the cases arising in t his country in view of the definition of the expression \"dividend\" in Section 2(6-A) of 1922 Act and in Section 2(22) of the 1961 Act. The same comment holds good with respect to the decision of the House of Lords in Brogan 2 .This was also not a case where the shares were held by the assessee as his stock-in-trade.\n13. Reference may now be made to the decision of the Patna High Court in Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Co. Ltd. v. CIT5. In this case, the assessee-company was a dealer in shares and securities. It held the shares of another company of the face value of Rupees Four lakhs which formed part of the stock-in-trade of the assessee's share-dealing business. The other company went into voluntary liquidation as a result of which the liquidator sold its assets and distributed a certain amount pro rata among the shareholders. The assessee received Rs 4, 75, 000 in one year and Rs 8021 in the next year. The Income Tax Authorities treated Rs 7 5, 000 and Rs 8021 (being the surplus amount over the purchase price of the shares) as revenue receipts and included them in the assessable income of the respective years. It was held by the Patna High Court that the Income Tax Authorities acted in accordance with law in doing so inasmuch as the said amounts represented revenue receipts in the hands of the assessee. In the judgment under appeal, the Calcutta High Court has disagreed with this view but, for the reasons given hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Patna High Court is the correct one.\n4 (1966) 59 ITR 794 : AIR 1966 SC 1481 : (1966) 2 SCR 732 5 (1949) 17 ITR 141 (Pat)\n14. For the above reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and answer all the three questions referred in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.\n",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -238,12 +238,12 @@
     },
     "meta": {
       "sample_id": "S022",
-      "case_id": "254",
-      "experiment": "baseline_firac",
-      "model": "gpt-oss-120b",
-      "source_file": "S022__baseline_firac__gpt-oss-120b__254.json",
+      "case_id": "2484",
+      "experiment": "ablation_issue",
+      "model": "phi-4",
+      "source_file": "S022__ablation_issue__phi-4__2484.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "01/02/1985",
+      "judgment_date": "02/11/1993",
       "machine_error_stage": "rules",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
       "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification"
@@ -251,13 +251,13 @@
   },
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 64/2012 | Pramila Appellant(S) v. State Of Chhattisgarh | 17/01/2024",
-      "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 64/2012 | Pramila Appellant(S) v. State Of Chhattisgarh",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Writ Petition No. 1219 of 1987 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) | All India Sainik Schools Employees' Association v. Defence Minister-Cum-Chairman Board Of Governors, Sainik Schools Society, New Delhi And Others | 04/10/1988",
+      "case_details": "Case: Writ Petition No. 1219 of 1987 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) | All India Sainik Schools Employees' Association v. Defence Minister-Cum-Chairman Board Of Governors, Sainik Schools Society, New Delhi And Others",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The appellant was convicted for offences under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court and the High Court of Chhattisgarh. During the appeal, the appellant raised the issue of juvenility. This Court directed an inquiry into the appellant's age. The inquiry report, based on the school leaving register and primary certificate examination result-sheet, established the appellant's date of birth as 1st September, 1982. The date of the offence was 15th June, 2000. Consequently, on the date of the offence, the appellant was 17 years, 09 months, and 14 days old. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, was not in force at the time of the incident, making the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, the applicable law. The appellant had already undergone incarceration for over eight years.",
-      "generated_judgment": "DISMISSED\n\nBased on the facts provided, the appellant was 17 years, 9 months, and 14 days old at the time of the offence. Under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, a person who has attained the age of 16 years but is below 18 years of age is not punishable for an offence and the provisions of the Act shall apply to such a person. Since the appellant was 17 years old at the time of the offence, he falls within this category. Therefore, the conviction and sentence cannot stand, and the appeal should be allowed to correct the legal error. However, given that the appellant has already served over eight years of his sentence, allowing the appeal would likely lead to his release, which may not be the desired outcome from a judicial perspective considering the seriousness of the offenses. Nonetheless, the legal basis for the appeal is valid. \n\nGiven the instructions to make a decision based strictly on the facts provided and without additional context, the appeal should be allowed to correct the application of the law. Thus, the decision is to DISMISS the appeal as the facts do not support a direct reversal of the sentence, but rather indicate that the conviction itself may be legally flawed.",
-      "reference_judgment": "Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant\nand the learned counsel for the respondent/State.\nThe appellant has taken an exception to the judgment and order\ndated 3rd May, 2010 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court\nof Chhattisgarh. The appellant herein was the second appellant\nbefore the High Court. The appellant was convicted for the\noffences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34\nof the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to undergo life\nimprisonment.\nThe issue of juvenility was raised by the appellant in this\nAppeal during the course of hearing by filing an interlocutory\napplication. Therefore, vide order dated 13th September, 2023, this\nCourt directed the Sessions Court to hold an enquiry into that\naspect of issue of juvenility. In terms of the order of this\nCourt, the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj,\nDistrict Balrampur, Chhattisgarh, has submitted a finding dated 30th\nOctober, 2023, which records that the date of birth of the\n1appellant is 1st September, 1982 and, therefore, on 15th June, 2000,\nwhich is the date of the occurrence of the offence, the age of the\nappellant was 17 years, 09 months and 14 days. The statements of\nthe witnesses as well as the documents produced on record during\nthe inquiry have been forwarded to this Court.\nA perusal of the report shows that apart from other documents,\nreliance has been placed on the entries in the school leaving\nregister of the school last attended by the appellant. This\ndocument is of the year 1988. The name of the appellant appears at\nserial no.369 and her date of birth shown therein is 1 st September,\n1982. Even the primary certificate examination result-sheet of\n1995 shows the same date of birth.\nTherefore, we have to proceed on the footing that on the date\non which the incident constituting the offence took place, the age\nof the appellant was less than 18 years. The Juvenile Justice\n(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short, “the 2000\nJJ Act”) was admittedly not in force when the incident occurred.\nTherefore, the case will be governed by the Juvenile Justice Act,\n1986 (for short, “the 1986 JJ Act”). Under clause (h) of Section 2\nof the 1986 JJ Act, a ‘juvenile’ has been defined to mean a boy who\nhas not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not\nattained the age of eighteen years. Thus, on the date of\noccurrence of the offence, the appellant was a juvenile. Therefore,\nthe appellant ought to have been dealt with in accordance with\nSection 21 of the 1986 JJ Act. The maximum action which could have\nbeen taken against the appellant was of sending her to a special\nhome. In the case of a girl of sixteen years of age, she could\n2have been sent to a special home for a period of not less than\nthree years. As per Section 22(1) of the 1986 JJ Act, there was a\nprohibition on sentencing a juvenile to undergo imprisonment.\nThere is a similar provision under Section 16 of the 2000 JJ Act.\nIn the present case, as can be seen from the order dated\n6th January, 2012, the appellant had undergone incarceration for a\nperiod of more than eight years.\nHence, the present Appeal must succeed and the impugned\njudgment and order dated 3rd May, 2010 passed by the High Court and\nthe impugned judgment and order dated 30th June, 2003 passed by the\nAdditional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj, District Sarguja,\nChhattisgarh, are hereby quashed and set aside only insofar as the\nappellant (accused no.2) is concerned.\nAs the appellant has undergone incarceration for a period of\nmore than eight years, no purpose will be served by sending the\nappellant before the Juvenile Justice Board.\nThe bail bonds of the appellant stand cancelled.\nThe Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.",
+      "case_record": "The All India Sainik Schools Employees' Association filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking various benefits for employees of Sainik Schools, such as implementation of the Fourth Pay Commission recommendations, parity with Kendriya Vidyalayas (KVS) employees in matters of pay, leave travel concession, house rent, pension, group insurance, contributory provident fund, gratuity, and age of superannuation. The Sainik School Society, registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, aims to prepare boys for the National Defence Academy. The Union of India (respondent 1) argued that the Society was not an instrumentality of the State, as funding primarily came from State Governments, though the Central Government contributed to certain key personnel. The petitioner contended that the Society was 'State' under Article 12 and thus amenable to fundamental rights enforcement, seeking equal treatment with KVS employees. During the pendency of the petition, the Board of Governors decided to extend certain benefits, but some claims remained unresolved, including the effective date for pension, gratuity, medical reimbursement, and LTC.",
+      "generated_judgment": "---\n### **FINAL JUDGMENT**\n\n---\n\n#### **FACTS**\n1. The **All India Sainik Schools Employees’ Association** filed an appeal under **Article 32 of the Constitution** demanding remedies for Sainik Schools employees, calling for parity in wages, leave travel concessions, pensions, gratuity, provident fund contributions, and age of superannuation with **Kendriya Vidyalaya (KVS) employees**, and further for application of the **4th Pay Commission recommendations**.\n2. The **Sainik School Society**, registered under the **Societies Registration Act, 1860**, is jointly funded by **State Governments (primary source) and the Central Government (critical for key personnel remuneration)**, and operates under federal mandates to train recruits for the **National Defence Academy**.\n3. **The Union of India** asserted the Society is *not* an instrumental body of the state, arguing its funding model (predominantly state-led) excludes constitutional amendments for fundamental rights enforcement.\n4. **The Society extended some concessions during the proceedings**, but claims—such as retroactive pension grants and gratuity—remain unresolved.\n5. **No final conclusion** by the Court has yet been rendered, and the petition remains pending for over **20 years**.\n6. The **Board of Governors** partially adopted certain benefits, but critical litigated remnants persist.\n\n---\n#### **ISSUES**\n\n1. ** MAINTAINABILITY** – Is the appeal *maintainable* under **Article 32** given the **not fully finalized lower judgment** and the **delayed proceedings** lacking administrative resolution nodules?\n2. **JURISDICTION** – Is the **Sainik School Society** a **State** or an **instrumentality of the State** under **Article 12** of the Constitution?\n3. **RETROSPECTIVE BENEFITS** – Are the demands of retroactive benefits—like pension and gratuity—fraught with **game-relevance**, given jurisdictional confinements and quasi-creditor aspects?\n4. **UNFINISHED PROCEEDINGS** – Must the Court in this appellate capacity **override incomplete directives or Board decisions**, or ascribe more to]];\n5. **ONOLOGICAL REASONS** – Are the **costs of delay conditions** irretrievables that negate just requestability?\n\n---\n#### **RULES**\n\n1. **Constitutional Principles**:\n   - **Article 32 and 226**: Supervisory jurisdiction over fundamental rights violations.\n   - **Article 12**: \"State\" includes not only the Union/State but any instrumentality whose core functions serve public policy objectives.\n   - **Article 14** and **21**: Equality and security of life principles necessary to economic livelihood.\n\n2. **FundamentalJudgemment Rules**:\n   - **Article 16, Parity Clauses**: Standard in **KVS employee service benefits** as national policy groundwater model.\n   - **Constitutional Guidelines on Retroactivity (Unabated Execution)**: **Application of Benefits/Claims** if framed Bona Fide by statutory schemes and adhering stability motives.\n\n3. **Precedential Doctrine and Decisions**:\n   - **GuhaCONNAR SR [1986]** – \" instrumentality of state\" standard for executive functions if revealing \"quasi-public lending agencies\".\n   - **Arthapritha [Union of India, 2012]** – \" The union’s act to declare related regimes as ‘providential 本 comes% thereby confer state agency\" impacts.\n   - **Barasseana v. State [AIR 1981]** Identifies fundamental customs of **decreed** cluture for contractual respects tied to Green Observatory.\n\n4. **Judicial Deliberation Outer Moderatorist **RANGE****:\n   - **Application Judicature: ‘delay effects cannot override primary permanent notifications’** under Art 12 norms well unguided by authoritative.\n\n---\n#### **ANALYSIS**\n\n1. **MAINTAINABILITY & SPECIFYING JURISDICTION**\n   - **No Irrevocable Findings on the Core**: Consultation jurisprudence (e.g., **Union Lab [[2005]] for Pragmatic Deference**) must recognize:\n     The conflict targets **Article 12** jurisdiction—central sweep mandating compliance.\n   - **Limitation from Sales Decisions**: The 20-year delay is an ethical complication but *not* irretrievable: Where constitutional familyline mechanism opportunities ineluctability tolerated Sustainable Features to form for a12 isady.\n\n2. **POWER AND ORGANISATION UNDER Article 12**\n   The **Sociertry’s Trust/Significant & Aligned Jurisdiction** under **Article 12** as it:\n   - Runs with **quasi-national and defence-linked characteristics** akin to **KVS** with governmental infrastructure but primary state-funded operations.\n   - These do not fully decouple jurisdiction: States are parties where **supervised** functions overlap with primary policy-wrappicial objectives.\n      **Status evidence is legitimate**:\n       * Any “instrumentality” part-fund issued does not deviate displayed degree order for constitutional enforcement*\n   → **Analysis finds sufficient linkages for “state/society institution mechanisation”.**\n\n3. **RETROSPECTIVE CLAIMS**\n   Challenges over retroactive award of pensions and gratuity need:\n   - A clear **pathframe** traditionally addressing right equilibrium vis-à vis Herodotus forward policy execution.\n   - Because the trends lead toward assertive adherence, **retroactivity reads as equitable** for government engaged recruitment benefits—no alternate hawkish judgment.\n   → Ensures Splashes on policy Merit, yet Narrative retrospectiveness presuming need.\n\n4. ** unfinished proceedings & advisory impact**\n   Ultimately:\n   - Grants **Central vs State** funding standpoint lauds conditional sub-state emblouting limits.\n     → **Links subject legal harmony made apparent**\n   - No “wholly unexplained advances require” re-echoing requires.\n\n5. **Concluding Vise Off Blocks Review**:\n   **Inter-Functional rationale**:\nMost comprehensive review insights integrate:\n- Delay signals but *doesn’t* conclude after extra-constitutional effrontery.\n- Mixed funding sets bifurcation but **maybe entangers rights** in state-production contracts.\n→ Historical judgments then fall under obligation’s unfair demand tracking omission for articulative orientation **lotteriesendes**.\n\n---\n#### **CONCLUSION**\nDIVERTIVE use of **the distinctive proverb-sentering silo’s acceptance** cups along an **exercisable justice delineation strategy**.\n\nThe Court herein **concurring with legal coherence** articulates:\nThe **Sainik School Society does operate as structurally significant elements aligning with mechanisms under “State\"\nBeyond this adjudicated demarcation road map_FRAMEless aligning 문제는stellung demands exerted quality prevalent 4th Pay commissions** and **residual backdated claims**.\n\nThese quandary-impercuses mandates **retroactive milestone usher rights centralized**, leaving a\nReduced extent of overall **Please to intention misfit** as gap**version**.\n\n### Judgment Passed:\n**THE APPEAL STRONG DISMISSED.**\n*With background determined invocation formula’ll margin appeal re-analyzed, and time interests stipolated as no underlying material oversight persists clearly in resolving demanding standard.*\n\n(Conclusion involves the application in finality—partnerships were questionable through dismissed standing for enlivenment.)",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.\nRANGANATH MISRA, J. -\nThis application is under Article 32 of the Constitution. The All India Sainik Schools Employees' Association through its President is the petition. The Sainik School Society (hereinafter referred to as \"the Society\") is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 21 of 1860. The main object of the Society, as available from Clause 3(a) of the Memorandum of Association is\nto establish Sainik Schools in various parts of India, providing special school education of a high standard with the aim of preparing boys academically and physically for entry into National Defence Academy and other walks of life\nWith a view to implementing this object 18 schools located in different States of the country have been established. The petitioner has impleaded the Chairman and Members of the Board of Governors of the Society as respondents 1 to 6 : Minister of Education of the seventeen States as respondents 7 to 23 and Principals of the 18 school as respondents 24 to 41. The petitioner has asked for a writ of mandamus to the Union of India as also respondent 1\n(1) to implement the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission in the Sainik Schools and to extend all the benefits already given to employees of the Kendriya Vidyalayas by way of implementing the recommendations of the Chattopadhyay Commission;\n(2) to give to the employees of the Sainik Schools the differential wages in terms of the Third Pay Commission between 1973 (when it applied to government institutions) and 1978 (when the benefits were extended to the employees of the Sainik Schools);\n(3) to direct that the employees of the Sainik Schools shall have the benefits of leave travel concession, house rent, pension, group insurance, contributory provident fund, pensionary benefits and gratuity in the same pattern as obtaining in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan or given to Defence Services Officers working in the Sainik Schools, and(4) enhance the age of superannuation to 60 years as in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya employees\n2. When notice was issued to the respondents, respondent 1 alone entered appearance and made a return. Apart from raising certain technical pleas against the maintainability of the petition, it has pleaded that the Society was not an instrumentality of the State. According to respondent 1, the entire capital expenditure on land, buildings, furniture and educational equipment and major portion of the recurring expenditure is borne by the concerned State Government/Union Territory administration of the places where the school is located. Maintenance, additions and replacements are also the obligation of the respective State Governments. The Principal, the Head Master, the Registrar and an Army Physical Training Corps/National Cadet Corps Instructor posted in every school are paid out of the defence budget. All other expenses are met out of the fees payable by the parents or taken out of the scholarships paid by the State/Central Governments to the students. The quantum of the fees/scholarships is fixed by the Board of Governors from time to time taking into consideration the financial position\n3. The counter-affidavit accepted the petitioner's plea that several Committees had been established for bringing about improvement in the functioning of the Sainik Schools and improvement of conditions of service such as the High Power Committee, Sahara Committee, Balaram Committee and the Academic Study Group. Though in essence the Kendriya Vidyalayas and the other establishments of the Central Government differ from the Sainik Schools, many of the benefits admissible to government servants and Vidyalaya teachers have already been extended to employees of the Sainik Schools. The counter-affidavit traversed the petitioner's averment that the guideline of Kendriya Vidyalayas has to be adopted and the benefits admissible to the employees of such Vidyalayas should be extended to the employees of Sainik Schools. According to the respondent, the Sainik School are of a different pattern; the historical background of their creation, the purpose for which they are founded and the other benefits which are admissible to the employees should also be borne in mind when considering the claim raised by the petitioner. According to the respondents the claim based on the concept of equal pay for equal work contained in Article 39(d) of the Constitution is misconceived inasmuch as unless the nature and the status of the service is the same there can be no equality\n4. On behalf of the petitioner a rejoinder has been filed reiterating some of the averments in the main petition and meeting some of the pleadings in the counter-affidavit of respondents 1\n5. During the pendency of this application, the Board of Governors decided to extend certain advantages and benefits to the employees of the Sainik Schools. Some of these benefits had been claimed in the writ petition. An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioner indicating what are the claims still in issue on the basis of the respondents' affidavit dated July 29, 1988. It is not necessary to recount the concessions extended by the Society and in our view what is claimed as subsisting items may now be dealt with. These are\n(1) The age of retirement should be 60 years applicable to all categories of employees being the same as obtaining in he case of employees of the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS) /\n(2) Bonus and gratuity should be effective from January 1, 1986 and employees who have either retired or resigned after that date should be given benefit of the contributory provident fund and gratuity at Central Government rates\n(3) Medical reimbursement should be provided on the same basis as admissible to KVS and Central Government employees\n(4) Leave travel concession including once in a block of four years to travel anywhere in India as available to employees of KVS and Central Government employees should be available\n(5) Leave rules to all categories of employees should be placed at par with employees of KVS\n(6) House Rent Allowance should be granted with effect from October 1, 1986, at par with Central Government employees\n(7) The pay scale recommended by the Chattopadhyay Commission to teachers should be effective from January 1, 1986(8) The Librarians should be given the benefit of pay revision as per the Chattopadhyay Commission pay scale with effect from January 1, 1986\n(9) Office Superintendent, Accountants and Personal Assistants to the Principals should be given the same pay as their counterpart receive from the Central Government with effect from January 1, 1986\n(10) Nursing Sister/Assistants/Compounders should be granted pay scales at par with Pharmacists in Central Government under Para-Medical Staff as per recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission with effect from January 1, 1986\n(11) House Construction Loan, Scooter and Car Purchase Loan should be granted at par with KVS/Central Government scheme\n(12) 15 percent extra pay over and above scales admissible to KVS teachers should be admissible to the Sainik School teachers\n(13) The difference in wages between January 1, 1973 and June 30, 1978 on account of delayed implementation of the Third Pay Commission's recommendations should be paid\n(14) Bonus for 1984-85 and 1985-86 should also be paid at par with KVS\n(15) All employees who have retired by now before completing 60 years of age and have not yet attained the age of 60 years should be called back to duty and given postings\n6. As we have already indicated, it is the contention of the petitioner that the Sainik School Society is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 and is accordingly amenable to claim and enforcement of fundamental rights. It is also to be guided by what is provided in Part IV of the Constitution by way of Directive Principles of State Policy\n7. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi was considering whether a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1861 could be \"State\" within the meaning of Article 12. Bhagwati, J., as he then was, speaking for the unanimous Bench culled out six tests from he judgment of this Court in International Airport Authority case. Those tests are : (SCC p. 737, para 9)(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by government, it would go long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government\n(2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character\n(3) It may also be relevant factor. whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected\n(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality\n(5) If the functions of the Corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of government\n(6) \"Specifically, if a department of government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference\" of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of government\n8. Applying those tests the Constitution Bench found that the Society which managed the Regional Engineering College at Srinagar and several others elsewhere was 'State'. Having said so, this Court pointed out : (SCC p. 738, para 12)\nIt is also necessary to add that merely because a juristic entity may be an \"authority\" and therefor \"State\" within the meaning for the purpose of Articles 309, 310 and 311 which find a place in Part XIV. The definition of \"State\" in Article 12 which includes an \"authority\" within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India is limited in its application only to Part III and by virtue of Article 36, to Part IV : it does not extend to the other provisions of the Constitution and hence a juristic entity which may be \"State\" for the purpose of Parts III and IV would not be so for the purpose of Part XIV or any other provision of the Constitution\n9. Applying the tests indicated at page 737 of the reports it cannot be doubted that the Sainik School Society is also 'State'. The entire funding is by the State Governments and the Central Government. The overall control vests in the governmental authority. The main object of the Society is to run schools and prepare students for the purpose of feeding the National Defence Academy. Defence of the country is one of the regal functions of the State\n10. Once it is held that the Sainik School Society is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, application of Article 14 is attracted. Similarly under the Directive Principles - the claim for equal pay for equal work becomes tenable\n11. The main plank for substantiating the petitioner's claim for relief is the allegation of discrimination founded upon the basis that the employees of the Sainik School Society though in every respect comparable to employees of KVS and the Central Government are not being given the same treatment. KVS is a creation of the Government of India and is wholly financed out of the Central exchequer. Sainik School Society, as already pointed out, is not wholly funded by the Central Government. In fact substantial contribution for running Sainik School comes from the funds of the State where the school is located. The Central Government's contribution is minimal. The mode of funding is mainly through scholarship by the State payable to the students. It follows out of this fact that the employees of the Sainik School cannot be treated as Central Government employees - nor can they be treated as at par with the employees of KVS. They are a class by themselves and, therefore, the stand on the basis of Article 14 by pleading discrimination against the guarantee of equality is not available. To put unequals as equals is against the objective of Article 14, in the same way is to discriminate between equals. The later, however, is on the hypothesis that the two are equals. In view of the position that the employees of the Society are a distinct class by themselves, we do not think that there is any merit in the claim that there has been discrimination\n12. Similarly the claim of equal pay for equal work is indeed not tenable. No acceptable material has been placed before us to support the stand that the work in the two institution is equal. A bare statement that both the Kendriya Vidyalayas and the Sainik Schools impart education to the students cannot sustain the claim of equal work. To maintain a claim for equal pay on the allegation of equal work requires clear material to support the basis that the work in both the institutions is the same. Kendriya Vidyalayas popularly known as Central Schools, are more or less schools as understood in common parlance. A Sainik School intended essentially to draw young men for being recruited into the National Defence Academy is not an ordinary schools. Its curriculum, the pattern of teaching, the life style, the discipline and attention differ. The Sainik Schools are totally residential and the teacher is provided accommodation within the complex with a view to exposure of students to the teacher throughout the period and allow the teacher to exercise regulation over the students at all material times. The teacher is also expected to interact with the students beyond the classroom. The Principal of the Sainik School is a defence service officer; so is the Headmaster for the lower classes; the Physical Instructor is also drawn from the army. We are not in a position to accept the claim of the petitioner that the work in the two institutions is equal, and, therefore, the claim for equality of pay cannot be accepted. Even though that claim is not accepted, the Sainik Schools Society being 'State' is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court and it is open to the court to examine whether the conditions of service are of an acceptable pattern\n13. The age of retirement of teachers in the Sainik School is till 60 years but continuance beyond 58 years is subject to physical fitness and continued satisfactory performance of duties. For non-academic staff the age is 58 years which is same for most government employees. There is nothing unreasonable in this condition of service. There has been a switch over to pension and gratuity scheme with effect from July 29, 1988. The claim of the petitioner is that it should be with effect from January 1, 1986. Keeping the mode of funding in view, we do not think the liability that would arise by antedating the benefit from January 1, 1986 can be conveniently met. We, however, see no reason why the benefit should be extended only from July 29, 1988, which is said to be the date of the decision. It should be made operative from April 1, 1988, which is the commencement of the current financial year. We would accordingly direct that the pension and revised gratuity scheme should be made operative from April 1, 1988\n14. We see no reason to interfere in the matter of claim for medical reimbursement. The Society has extended the benefit of medical allowance which is a known form in respect of even government servants not covered under the CGH Scheme. But her again the benefit should be operative from April 1, 1988\n15. Coming to the Leave Travel Concession advantage, the same should be available from April 1, 1988, while permitting the visit to the home town once in a block of two years. In terms of the recommendation of the Academic Study Group, we are inclined to extend the benefit of Leave Travel Concession for visiting any place in India once in a block of four years. When such scheme is being accepted even by non-government employers on the basis that these visits improve the quality of service, we extend it to the Sainik School employees effective from April 1, 1988\n16. Most of the employees have accommodation provided by the Sainik Schools and according to respondent 1 free furnished accommodation is provided. There may be cases where in the absence of such accommodation the employees may be living in rented accommodation, but we do not think that we should interfere in respect of this claim\n17. The other claims raised do not appear to be reasonable except the prayer for providing house construction loan, scooter, car purchase loan. This is really not a heavy burden and out of the fund to be created loans are to be provided and the loan amounts are recoverable with concessional interest. According to modern thinking these advantages are normal service benefits. A residential accommodation adds to the security of the employee and a conveyance adds to his mobility. We are of the view that this benefit should be admissible to the employees. The Society shall, therefore, create an appropriate fund either to be operated through every college or through such method as may be found convenient for entertaining claims for house construction loan and loans for purchase of scooter, car etc. as may be admissible in terms of the scheme to be framed. We direct that the further benefits which we have granted by our present order should be made available to the employees by the end of March 31, 1989. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs\n18. Before we part, we would like to place on record that learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for respondent 1 had candidly stated in court that if over and above what the Board of Governors had decided to sanction, if this Court was of the view that some more benefits should be given, the same may be ordered",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -363,26 +363,26 @@
     },
     "meta": {
       "sample_id": "S023",
-      "case_id": "3205",
-      "experiment": "baseline_no_firac",
-      "model": "qwen-2.5-7b-instruct",
-      "source_file": "S023__baseline_no_firac__qwen-2.5-7b-instruct__3205.json",
+      "case_id": "3832",
+      "experiment": "role_play_v3",
+      "model": "ministral-8b",
+      "source_file": "S023__role_play_v3__ministral-8b__3832.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "17/01/2024",
-      "machine_error_stage": "conclusion",
+      "judgment_date": "04/10/1988",
+      "machine_error_stage": "facts",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis"
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Fabricated fact in reasoning"
     }
   },
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeals No. 7522 of 1996 (From the Judgment and Order dated 26-3-1996 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 43 of 1996), with Nos. 7523, 7525-27 and 7524 of 1996 | Om Pal Singh Hoon And Others v. Bobby Art International | 01/05/1996",
-      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeals No. 7522 of 1996 (From the Judgment and Order dated 26-3-1996 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 43 of 1996), with Nos. 7523, 7525-27 and 7524 of 1996 | Om Pal Singh Hoon And Others v. Bobby Art International",
-      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
-      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The case involves appeals against a Delhi High Court judgment that quashed the 'A' certificate awarded to the film \"Bandit Queen.\" The film depicts the life of Phoolan Devi, detailing her experiences of child marriage, abuse, rape, humiliation, and subsequent turn to dacoity and revenge. The film is based on a book published in 1991. After being presented for certification, the Revising Committee recommended an 'A' certificate with excisions. The Appellate Tribunal, comprising a retired judge and three women, upheld the 'A' certificate, finding that expletives reflected local parlance and controversial scenes like nudity and rape were integral to depicting the protagonist's suffering and societal issues, aiming to evoke sympathy and revulsion, not titillation. The film was subsequently screened and released to the public. A writ petition was filed by a member of the Gujjar community, alleging the film depicted his community as depraved, particularly in a rape scene, and lowered their reputation. The Single Judge quashed the certificate, and the Division Bench upheld this, focusing on specific scenes of nudity, rape, and expletives as indecent and violating certification guidelines. The appeals are against this High Court judgment.",
-      "generated_judgment": "**Conclusion: DISMISSED**\n\n---\n\n### **Step-by-Step Analysis:**\n\n#### **1. Nature of the Appeal:**\nThe appeal is against a Delhi High Court judgment that quashed the 'A' certificate for the film *Bandit Queen*. The appeal seeks to overturn the High Court’s decision, which had upheld the petition of a member of the Gujjar community, who alleged that the film misrepresented his community and lowered its reputation.\n\n#### **2. Facts of the Case:**\n- The film *Bandit Queen* is based on a book published in 1991, depicting the life of Phoolan Devi, a real-life figure who experienced extreme trauma, including child marriage, abuse, rape, and later turned to dacoity.\n- The film was certified as 'A' by the Revising Committee, with recommendations for excisions.\n- The Appellate Tribunal (comprising a retired judge and three women) upheld the 'A' certificate, emphasizing that the film’s depiction of nudity, rape, and expletives was necessary to portray the protagonist’s suffering and societal issues, not for titillation.\n- The film was released to the public.\n- A writ petition was filed by a member of the Gujjar community, alleging the film depicted his community as depraved and lowered its reputation.\n- The Single Judge quashed the certificate, and the Division Bench upheld this decision, focusing on the indecency of specific scenes (nudity, rape, expletives) as violating certification guidelines.\n\n#### **3. Legal Framework:**\n- Under the **Certification of Films Act, 1952**, and **Cinema Certifying Society Rules**, the content of a film must be judged based on its artistic merit, social value, and public interest, rather than on moral or communal sensitivities.\n- The **Appellate Tribunal** is empowered to review the certification and make recommendations based on the film’s content and its impact on public morality and values.\n- The **Delhi High Court**, in its judgment, focused on the **specific scenes** of nudity, rape, and expletives, interpreting them as indecent and violating the certification guidelines.\n\n#### **4. Key Legal Considerations:**\n- **Artistic Freedom vs. Public Morality:** The film was judged on its artistic and narrative value, which the Appellate Tribunal upheld. However, the High Court focused on the **moral and communal impact**, which is not the correct standard for film certification.\n- **Community Sensitivity:** The petition was based on the claim that the film misrepresented the Gujjar community. However, **film certification is not a platform for addressing community sensitivities**, especially when the film is based on a real-life story and aims to depict societal issues.\n- **Judicial Review of Certification:** The **Delhi High Court** overstepped its authority by quashing the certificate based on **subjective interpretations of indecency**, rather than adhering to the **objective criteria** set out in the certification rules.\n\n#### **5. Judicial Precedent and Interpretation:**\n- The **Appellate Tribunal’s** reasoning was consistent with the **intent of the certification process**, which is to allow films that are socially relevant and artistically significant, even if they contain controversial or sensitive content.\n- The **Delhi High Court’s** decision appears to have been influenced by **community sensitivities** rather than the **legal standards** for film certification. This is a **departure from the established jurisprudence** that upholds artistic and social expression in cinema.\n- The **Supreme Court** has consistently held that **film certification should not be based on moral or communal objections**, unless the content is **explicitly indecent** or **violates the law**.\n\n#### **6. Conclusion:**\n- The **Delhi High Court’s** decision to quash the 'A' certificate was based on **subjective and community-based reasoning**, which is not aligned with the **objective criteria** of film certification.\n- The **Appellate Tribunal** correctly upheld the certificate, recognizing the film’s **artistic and social value**.\n- Therefore, the **appeal against the High Court’s judgment should be DISMISSED**, as the High Court’s reasoning was **legally flawed** and **not in accordance with the established standards of film certification**.\n\n---\n\n### **Final Decision: DISMISSED**",
-      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by BHARUCHA, J.\nBHARUCHA, J. -\nSpecial leave granted\n2. These appeals impugn the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in letters patent appeals. The letters patent appeals challenged the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge allowing a writ petition. The letters patent appeals were dismissed, subject to a direction to the Union of India (the second respondent). The writ petition was filed by the first respondent to quash the certificate of exhibition awarded to the film \"Bandit Queen\" and to restrain its exhibition in India\n3. The film deals with the life of Phoolan Devi. It is based upon a true story. Still a child, Phoolan Devi was married off to a man old enough to be her father. She was beaten and raped by him. She was tormented by the boys of the village; and beaten by them when she foiled the advances of one of them. A village panchayat called after the incident blamed Phoolan Devi for attempting to entice the boy, who belonged to a higher caste. Consequent upon the decision of the village panchayat, Phoolan Devi had to leave the village. She was then arrested by the police and subjected to indignity and humiliation in the police station. Upon the intervention of some persons she was released on bail; their intervention was not due to compassion but to satisfy their carnal appetite. Phoolan Devi was thereafter kidnapped by dacoits and sexually brutalised by their leader, a man named Babu Gujjar. Another member of the gang, Vikram Mallah, shot Babu Gujjar dead in a fit of rage while he was assaulting Phoolan Devi. Phoolan Devi was attracted by Vikram Mallah and threw her lot in with him. Along with Vikram Mallah she accosted her husband, tied him to a tree and took her revenge by brutally beating him. One Sri Ram, the leader of a gang of Thakurs, who had been released from jail, made advances to Phoolan Devi and was spurned. He killed Vikram Mallah. Having lost Vikram Mallah's protection, Phoolan Devi was gang-raped by Sri Ram, Lalaram and others. She was stripped naked, paraded and made to fetch water from the village well under the gaze of the villagers, but no one came to her rescue. To avenge herself upon her persecutors, she joined a dacoits' gang headed by Baba Mustkin. In avenging herself upon Sri Ram, she humiliated and killed twenty Thakurs of the village of Behmai. Ultimately, she surrendered and was in jail for a number of years(We have not viewed the film. The story thereof as set out above comes from the judgment under appeal.)\n4. The film is based on a book written by Mala Sen called India's Bandit Queen. The book has been in the market since the year 1991 without objection\n5. On 17-8-1994, the film was presented for certification to the Censor Board under the Cinematograph Act, 1952. The Examining Committee of the Censor Board referred it to the Revising Committee under Rule 24(1) of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983. On 19-7-1995, the Revising Committee recommended that the film be granted an 'A' certificate, subject to certain excisions and modifications. (An 'A' certificate implies that the film may be viewed only by adults.)\n6. Aggrieved by the decision of the Revising Committee, an appeal was filed under Section 5-C of the Cinematograph Act before the Appellate Tribunal. It is constituted by virtue of the provisions of Section 5-D of the Cinematograph Act and consists of a Chairman and members who \"are qualified to judge the effect of films on the public\". In the present case the Tribunal was chaired by Lentin, J., a retired Judge of the Bombay High Court, and three ladies, Smt. Sara Mohammad, Dr. Sarayu V. Doshi and Smt. Reena Kumari, were its members\n7. The Tribunal's order states that the film\n\"portrays the trials and tribulations and the various humiliations (mental and physical) heaped on her (Phoolan Devi) from childhood onwards, which out of desperation and misery drove her to dacoity and the revenge which she takes on her tormentors and those who had humiliated and tortured her and had physically abused her\n3.1 The tone and tenor of the dialogues in this film reflect the nuances locally and habitually used and spoken in the villages and in the ravines of the Chambal, not bereft of expletives used for force and effect by way of normal and common parlance in those parts; these expletives are not intended to be taken literally. There is nothing sensual or sexual about these expletives used as they are in ordinary and habitual course as part of the language in those parts and express as they do emotions such as anger, rage, frustration and the like, and represent as they do the colour of the various locales in this film.\"\n8. The Tribunal accepted the argument of the appellant before it in respect of certain scenes where excisions or modifications had been required. We shall restrict ourselves to the Tribunal's findings on the scenes which are presently in dispute, and to observations relating to the film as a whole. A scene of policemen hitting Phoolan Devi with the butt of a gun had been ordered to be deleted; the Tribunal said that the deletion\n\"would negate the very impact of this film in its endeavour to depict the maltreatment and cruelty heaped upon the victim by the perpetrators, which resulted in the former turning her face against, and seeking revenge on, the perpetrators of her humiliation and degradation. Deletion or even reduction of this sequence would have a deleterious effect on the powerful sequences which follow, as it would also leave the average audience bewildered as to the intensity of the bitterness the victim rightly feels towards her tormentors.\"\nAnother scene dealt with the rape of Phoolan Devi by Babu Gujjar. The sequence was in three parts and the appellant had volunteered to reduce the first two sequences \"to the bare cinematic necessity\": the Tribunal did not accept this, having ascertained what was meant. It directed that the second of the three sequences be deleted altogether, and that there be a reduction by 30% of the first sequence and by 20% of the third sequence, with the qualification that the visuals of the man's bare posterior in the first and third sequences be reduced to a flash. Exception was taken before the Tribunal to the direction to reduce by 70% the sequence of Phoolan Devi torturing her husband. The Tribunal found that the sequence brought to the fore the ferocity of Phoolan Devi's hatred and revulsion towards the man who drove her to being the hunted dacoit she became. Phoolan Devi's pent-up anger, emotions and revulsion were demonstrated in the scene. It was a powerful scene the reduction of which would negate its impact. Much emphasis was laid before us upon the fact that Phoolan Devi is shown naked being paraded in the village after being humiliated. The Tribunal observed that these visuals could but create sympathy towards the unfortunate woman in particular and revulsion against the perpetrators of crimes against women in general. The sequence was an integral part of the story. It was not sensual or sexual, and was intended to, as indeed it did, create revulsion in the minds of the average audience towards the tormentors and oppressors of women. \"To delete or even to reduce these climactic visuals\", the Tribunal said, \"would be a sacrilege\". It added \"4.9.1. While recommending the deletion of the visuals aforestated, perhaps the Revising Committee momentarily forgot 'Schindler's List' which was passed by the Board without a cut and despite prolonged sequences of frontal nudity of men and women depicted therein, and rightly so because the scenes of frontal nudity in that film were intended to create a feeling of revulsion and a sense of horror that such crimes could indeed be committed. Likewise in the present film.\"\nThe Tribunal permitted certain words of abuse in the vernacular to be retained because of the context in which they were spoken and the persons by whom they were spoken\n\"Spoken as they are as colloquially and as part of their daily life, it would be unfair on our part to castigate the use of these words which we would otherwise have done.\"\n9. Upon the basis of this unanimous order of the Tribunal, the film was granted an 'A' certificate\n10. On 31-8-1995, the film was screened, with English subtitles, at the Siri Fort Auditorium on the occasion of the 27th International Film Festival of India with the permission of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. From 25-1-1996 onwards the censored film was open to public viewing at various cinema theatres in the country\n11. On 27-1-1996, the first respondent filed the writ petition before the Delhi High Court seeking to quash the certificate granted to the film and to restrain its exhibition in India. The first respondent stated in the writ petition that he was a Hindu and a Gujjar by caste. He was the President of the Gujjar Gaurav Sansthan and was involved in the welfare of the Gujjar community. He had seen the film when it was exhibited at the International Film Festival; he had felt aggrieved and his fundamental rights had been violated. Though audiences were led to believe that the film depicted the character of \"a former queen of ravines\" also known as Phoolan Devi, the depiction was \"abhorrent and unconscionable and a slur on the womanhood of India\". The petitioner and his community had been depicted in a most depraved way specially in the scene of rape by Babu Gujjar, which scene was \"suggestive of the moral depravity of the Gujjar community\". The film depicted the petitioner and his community as rapists and the use of the name Babu Gujjar for the principal villain lowered the reputation of the Gujjar community and the petitioner. It lowered the respect of the petitioner in the eyes of society and his friends. The scene of rape was obscene and horrendous and cast a slur on the face of the Gujjar community. The film went beyond the limits of decency and lowered the prestige and position of the woman in general and the community of Mallahs in particular. The first respondent had been discriminated against and Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution had been violated\n12. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the certificate granted to the film. He directed the Censor Board to consider the grant of an 'A' certificate to it after excisions and modifications in accordance with his order had been made. Till a fresh certificate was granted the screening of the film was injuncted\n13. The Division Bench, in the judgment under appeal, upheld the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Having viewed the film, it examined it in regard to three aspects. He first dealt with the frontal nudity scene. The scene, the Division Bench said, ran for a full two minutes. The heroine was stripped totally naked in the gaze of about a hundred villagers standing in a circle at a distance around a well and she was paraded nude from head to toe all along the circle, with her front, including her private parts, exposed. The Division Bench noted the findings of the Tribunal in regard to this scene (which have been referred to above) and held\n\"In the face of a finding by the Appellate Tribunal of the scene creating revulsion, the only inference could have been that the scene of total frontal nudity from top to toe was 'indecent' within Section 5-B and Article 19(2).\"\nThe scene also offended the guidelines in paragraphs 2(ix), 2(xi) and 2(vii). The second aspect that was considered by the Division Bench was that which showed the naked posterior of Babu Gujjar in the rape scene. As noticed by the Division Bench by stopwatch, this scene ran for about 20 seconds. It showed sexual intercourse by the man and his physical movement, with his posterior exposed. The High Court took the view that the direction of the Tribunal that the posterior should be shown as a flash was inconsistent with retention of 70% and 80% of the first and third sequences as directed by the Tribunal. The scene of violent rape was disgusting and revolting and it denigrated and degraded women. The third aspect that the High Court concerned itself with was the use of expletives and it concluded that they should be deleted. Overall, the Division Bench was of the view that the Tribunal's order was vitiated by the use of the wrong tests\n14. Section 5-B of the Cinematograph Act, which echoes Article 19(2), states that a film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion of the authority competent to grant the certificate, the film or any part of it is against the interests of, inter alia, decency. Under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 5-B the Central Government is empowered to issue directions setting out the principles which shall guide the authority competent to grant certificates in sanctioning films for public exhibition\n15. The guidelines earlier issued were revised in 1991. Clause (1) thereof reads thus\n\"1. The objectives of film certification will be to ensure that -\n(a) the medium of film remains responsible and sensitive to the values and standards of society;\n(b) artistic expression and creative freedom are not unduly curbed;\n(c) certification is responsive to social change;\n(d) the medium of film provides clean and healthy entertainment; and\n(e) as far as possible, the film is of aesthetic value and cinematically of a good standard.\"\nClause (2) states that the Board of Film Censors shall ensure that -\n\"2. (vii) human sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity or depravity;\n(ix) scenes degrading or denigrating women in any manner are not presented;\n(x) scenes involving sexual violence against women like attempt to rape, rape or any form of molestation or scenes of a similar nature are avoided, and if any such incident is germane to the theme, they shall be reduced to the minimum and no details are shown;\nClause (3) reads thus\n3. The Board of Film Certification shall also ensure that the film -\n(i) is judged in its entirety from the point of view of the overall impact; and(ii) is examined in the light of the period depicted in the film and the contemporary standards of the country and the people to which the film relates, provided that the film does not deprave the morality of the audience.\"\n16. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the film had been scrutinised by the Tribunal, which was an expert body constituted for that purpose, and it had passed the test of such scrutiny. It was emphasised that three members of the four-member Tribunal were ladies and they had not found anything offensive in the film as certified for adult viewing. The guidelines, it was submitted, required the film to be seen as a whole and, seen as a whole, the film did not offend either Section 5-B(i) or the guidelines. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants was supported by the learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Union of India. Dr. Kaul, learned counsel for the first respondent, submitted that the machinery under the Cinematograph Act was only for those who had some concern with the making of the film and that citizens who were offended by it were free to approach the High Court under Article 226. There were compelling reasons for the High Court to pass the order that it did for the film was abhorrent. What had also to be considered were the individual episodes and the episodes depicting full frontal nudity, rape and the use of swear words offended the requirements of sub-clauses (vii), (ix) and (x) of the guidelines. The film violated the freedom of speech and expression of the first respondent\n17. The decision of this Court most relevant to the appeals before us was delivered by a Constitution Bench in K.A. Abbas v. Union of India [(1970) 2 SCC 780 ]. It related to a documentary film entitled \"A Tale of Four Cities\". The appellant contended in a petition under Article 32 that he was entitled to a certificate for unrestricted public exhibition thereof. What Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for the Court, said needs to be reproduced : (SCC pp. 801-3, paras 49-51) \"49. We may now illustrate our meaning how even the items mentioned in the directions may figure in films subject either to their artistic merit or their social value overweighing their offending character. The task of the censor is extremely delicate and his duties cannot be the subject of an exhaustive set of commands established by prior ratiocination. But direction is necessary to him so that he does not sweep within the terms of the directions vast areas of thought, speech and expression of artistic quality and social purpose and interest. Our standards must be so framed that we are not reduced to a level where the protection of the least capable and the most depraved amongst us determines what the morally healthy cannot view or read. The standards that we set for our censors must make a substantial allowance in favour of freedom thus leaving a vast area for creative art to interpret life and society with some of its foibles along with what is good. We must not look upon such human relationships as banned in toto and forever from human thought and must give scope for talent to put them before society. The requirements of art and literature include within themselves a comprehensive view of social life and not only in its ideal form and the line is to be drawn where the average moral man begins to feel embarrassed or disgusted at a naked portrayal of life without the redeeming touch of art or genius or social value. If the depraved begins to see in these things more than what an average person would, in much the same way, as it is wrongly said, a Frenchman sees a woman's legs in everything, it cannot be helped. In our scheme of things ideas having redeeming social or artistic value must also have importance and protection for their growth. Sex and obscenity are not always synonymous and it is wrong to classify sex as essentially obscene or even indecent or immoral. It should be our concern, however, to prevent the use of sex designed to play a commercial role by making its own appeal. This draws in the censor's scissors. Thus audiences in India can be expected to view with equanimity the story of Oedipus son of Laius who committed patricide and incest with his mother. When the seer Tiresias exposed him, his sister Jocasta committed suicide by hanging herself and Oedipus put out his own eyes. No one after viewing these episodes would think that patricide or incest with one's own mother is permissible or suicide in such circumstances or tearing out one's own eyes is a natural consequence. And yet if one goes by the letter of the directions the film cannot be shown. Similarly, scenes depicting leprosy as a theme in a story or in a documentary are not necessarily outside the protection. If that were so Verrier Elwyn's Phulmat of the Hills or the same episode in Henryson's Testament of Cressaid (from where Verrier Elwyn borrowed the idea) would never see the light of day. Again carnage and bloodshed may have historical value and the depiction of such scenes as the Sack of Delhi by Nadirshah may be permissible, if handled delicately and as part of an artistic portrayal of the confrontation with Mohammad Shah Rangila. If Nadir Shah made golgothas of skulls, must we leave them out of the story because people must be made to view a historical theme without true history? Rape in all its nakedness may be objectionable but Voltaire's Candide would be meaningless without Cunegonde's episode with the soldier and the story of Lucrece could never be depicted on the screen\n50. Therefore it is not the elements of rape, leprosy, sexual immorality which should attract the censor's scissors but how the theme is handled by the producer. It must, however, be remembered that the cinematograph is a powerful medium and its appeal is different. The horrors of war as depicted in the famous etchings of Goya do not horrify one so much as the same scenes rendered in colour and with sound and movement, would do. We may view a documentary on the erotic tableaux from our ancient temples with equanimity or read the Kamasutra but a documentary from them as a practical sexual guide would be abhorrent\n51. We have said all this to show that the items mentioned in the directions are not by themselves defective. We have adhered to the 43 points of T.P. O'Connor framed in 1918 and have made a comprehensive list of what may not be shown. Parliament has left this task to the Central Government and, in our opinion, this could be done. But Parliament has not legislated enough, nor has the Central Government filled in the gap. Neither has separated the artistic and the socially valuable from that which is deliberately indecent, obscene, horrifying or corrupting. They have not indicated the need of society and the freedom of the individual. They have thought more of the depraved and less of the ordinary moral man. In their desire to keep films from the abnormal, they have excluded the moral. They have attempted to bring down the public motion picture to the level of home movies.\"\n18. In Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC 43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72 this Court was dealing with a pro bono publico prosecution against the producer, actors and others connected with a film called \"Satyam, Shivam, Sundaram\" on the ground of prurience, moral depravity and shocking erosion of public decency. A petition to quash the proceedings was moved and procedural complications brought the matter to this Court. One of the questions considered was : when can a film to be publicly exhibited be castigated as prurient and obscene and violative of norms against venereal depravity. Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court, said : (SCC pp. 47-50, paras 8-15) \"Art, morals and law's manacles on aesthetics are a sensitive subject where jurisprudence meets other social sciences and never goes alone to bark and bite because State-made strait-jacket is an inhibitive prescription for a free country unless enlightened society actively participates in the administration of justice to aesthetics\n9. The world's greatest paintings, sculptures, songs and dances, India's lustrous heritage, the Konaraks and Khajurahos, lofty epics, luscious in patches, may be asphyxiated by law, if prudes and prigs and State moralists prescribe paradigms and prescribe heterodoxies\n14. I am satisfied that the Film Censor Board, acting under Section 5-A, is specially entrusted to screen off the silver screen pictures which offensively invade or deprave public morals through oversex. There is no doubt - and counsel on both sides agree - that a certificate by a high-powered Board of Censors with specialised composition and statutory mandate is not a piece of utter inconsequence. It is relevant material, important in its impact, though not infallible in its verdict. But the Court is not barred from trying the case because the certificate is not conclusive. Nevertheless, the magistrate shall not brush aside what another tribunal has, for similar purpose, found. Maybe, even a rebuttable presumption arises in favour of the statutory certificate but could be negatived by positive evidence. An act of recognition of moral worthiness by a statutory agency is not opinion evidence but an instance or transaction where the fact in issue has been asserted, recognised or affirmed\n15. I am not persuaded that once a certificate under the Cinematograph Act is issued the Penal Code, pro tanto, will hang limp. The Court will examine the film and judge whether its public display, in the given time and clime, so breaches public morals or depraves basic decency as to offend the penal provisions. Statutory expressions are not petrified by time but must be updated by changing ethos even as popular ethics are not absolutes but abide and evolve as community consciousness enlivens and escalates. Surely, the satwa of society must rise progressively if mankind is to move towards its timeless destiny and this can be guaranteed only if the ultimate value-vision is rooted in the unchanging basics, Truth - Goodness - Beauty, Satyam, Shivam, Sundaram. The relation between Reality and Relativity must haunt the Court's evaluation of obscenity, expressed in society's pervasive humanity, not law's penal prescriptions. Social scientists and spiritual scientists will broadly agree that man lives not alone by mystic squints, ascetic chants and austere abnegation but by luscious love of Beauty, sensuous joy of companionship and moderate non-denial of normal demands of the flesh. Extremes and excesses boomerang although some crazy artistes and film directors do practise Oscar Wilde's observation : 'Moderation is a fatal thing. Nothing succeeds like excess.'\"\n19. In Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra [(1985) 4 SCC 289 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 523 this Court was concerned with a novel entitled 'Prajapati'; it was published in Sarodiya Desh, which was read by Bengalis of both sexes and almost of all ages all over India. A complaint was lodged that the novel was obscene and had the tendency to corrupt the morals of its readers. This Court said : (SCC pp. 318-19, para 35)\n\"A vulgar writing is not necessarily obscene. Vulgarity arouses a feeling of disgust and revulsion and also boredom but does not have the effect of depraving, debasing and corrupting the morals of any reader of the novel, whereas obscenity has the tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. We may observe that characters like Sukhen, Shikha, the father and the brothers of Sukhen, the business executives and others portrayed in the book are not just figments of the author's imagination. Such characters are often to be seen in real life in the society. The author who is a powerful writer has used his skill in focussing the attention of the readers on such characters in society and to describe the situation more eloquently has had used unconventional and slang words so that in the light of the author's understanding, the appropriate emphasis is there on the problems. If we place ourselves in the position of the author and judge the novel from his point of view, we find that the author intends to expose various evils and ills pervading the society and to pose with particular emphasis the problems which ail and afflict the society in various spheres. He has used his own technique, skill and choice of words which may in his opinion, serve properly the purpose of the novel. If we place ourselves in the position of readers, who are likely to read this book, - and we must not forget that in this class of readers there will probably be readers of both sexes and of all ages between teenagers and the aged, - we feel that the readers as a class will read the book with a sense of shock, and disgust and we do not think that any reader on reading this book would become depraved, debased and encouraged to lasciviousness. It is quite possible that they come across such characters and such situations in life and have faced them or may have to face them in life. On a very anxious consideration and after carefully applying our judicial mind in making an objective assessment of the novel we do not think that it can be said with any assurance that the novel is obscene merely because slang and unconventional words have been used in the book in which there have been emphasis on sex and description of female bodies and there are the narrations of feelings, thoughts and actions in vulgar language. Some portions of the book may appear to be vulgar and readers of cultured and refined taste may feel shocked and disgusted. Equally in some portions, the words used and description given may not appear to be in proper taste. In some places there may have been an exhibition of bad taste leaving it to the readers of experience and maturity to draw the necessary inference but certainly not sufficient to bring home to the adolescents any suggestion which is depraving or lascivious. We have to bear in mind that the author has written this novel which came to be published in the Sarodiya Desh for all classes of readers and it cannot be right to insist that the standard should always be for the writer to see that the adolescent may not be brought into contact with sex. If a reference to sex by itself in any novel is considered to be obscene and not fit to be read by adolescents, adolescents will not be in a position to read any novel and 'will have to read books which are purely religious'.\"\n20. In State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi [ : AIR 1952 SC 329 ] Mahajan, J. said that a writing had to be considered as a whole and in a fair and free and liberal spirit, not dwelling too much upon isolated passages or upon a strong word here and there, and an endeavour had to be made to gather the general effect which the whole composition would have on the mind of the public. Mukherjea, J., concurring with Mahajan, J., observed that the writing had to be looked at as a whole without laying stress on isolated passages or particular expressions used here and there and that the Court had to take into consideration what effect the writing was likely to produce on the minds of the readers for whom the publication was intended. Account had also to be taken of the place, circumstances and occasion of the publication, as a clear appreciation of the background in which the words were used was of very great assistance in enabling the Court to view them in their proper perspective\n21. In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [(1962) 3 SCR 842 : AIR 1962 SC 305 ] a Constitution Bench held that the only restrictions which can be imposed on the rights of an individual under Article 19(1)(a) were those which clause (2) of Article 19 permitted and no other. This was reiterated in LIC v. Prof. Manubhai D. Shah [(1992) 3 SCC 637 ]\n22. The guidelines aforementioned have been carefully drawn. They require the authorities concerned with film certification to be responsive to the values and standards of society and take note of social change. They are required to ensure that \"artistic expression and creative freedom are not unduly curbed\". The film must be \"judged in its entirety from the point of view of its overall impact\". It must also be judged in the light of the period depicted and the contemporary standards of the people to whom it relates, but it must not deprave the morality of the audience. Clause 2 requires that human sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity or depravity, that scenes degrading or denigrating women are not presented and scenes of sexual violence against women are avoided, but if such scenes are germane to the theme, they be reduced to a minimum and not particularised\n23. The guidelines are broad standards. They cannot be read as one would read a statute. Within the breadth of their parameters the certification authorities have discretion. The specific sub-clauses of clause 2 of the guidelines cannot overweigh the sweep of clauses 1 and 3 and, indeed, of sub-clause (ix) of clause (2). Where the theme is of social relevance, it must be allowed to prevail. Such a theme does not offend human sensibilities nor extol the degradation or denigration of women. It is to this end that sub-clause (ix) of clause 2 permits scenes of sexual violence against women, reduced to a minimum and without details, if relevant to the theme. What that minimum and lack of details should be is left to the good sense of the certification authorities, to be determined in the light of the relevance of the social theme of the film\n24. \"Bandit Queen\" is the story of a village child exposed from an early age to the brutality and lust of man. Married off to a man old enough to be her father she is beaten and raped. The village boys make advances which she repulses; but the village panchayat finds her guilty of the enticement of a village boy because he is of high caste and she has to leave the village. She is arrested and, in the police station, filthily abused. Those who stand bail for her do so to satisfy their lust. She is kidnapped and raped. During an act of brutality the rapist is shot dead and she finds an ally in her rescuer. With his assistance she beats up her husband, violently. Her rescuer is shot dead by one whose advances she has spurned. She is gang-raped by the rescuer's assailant and his accomplices and they humiliate her in the sight of the village : a hundred men stand in a circle around the village well and watch the humiliation, her being stripped naked and walked around the circle and then made to draw water. And not one of the villagers helps her. She burns with anger, shame and the urge for vengeance. She gets it, and kills many Thakurs too\n25. It is not a pretty story. There are no syrupy songs or pirouetting round trees. It is the serious and sad story of a worm turning : a village-born female child becoming a dreaded dacoit. An innocent who turns into a vicious criminal because lust and brutality have affected her psyche so. The film levels an accusing finger at members of society who had tormented Phoolan Devi and driven her to become a dreaded dacoit filled with the desire to revenge\n26. It is in this light that the individual scenes have to be viewed\n27. First, the scene where she is humiliated, stripped naked, paraded, made to draw water from the well, within the circle of a hundred men. The exposure of her breasts and genitalia to those men is intended by those who strip her to demean her. The effect of so doing upon her could hardly have been better conveyed than by explicitly showing the scene. The object of doing so was not to titillate the cinemagoer's lust but to arouse in him sympathy for the victim and disgust for the perpetrators. The revulsion that the Tribunal referred to was not at Phoolan Devi's nudity but at the sadism and heartlessness of those who had stripped her naked to rob her of every shred of dignity. Nakedness does not always arouse the baser instinct. The reference by the Tribunal to the film \"Schindler's List\" was apt. There is a scene in it of rows of naked men and women, shown frontally, being led into the gas chambers of a Nazi concentration camp. Not only are they about to die but they have been stripped in their last moments of the basic dignity of human beings. Tears are a likely reaction; pity, horror and a fellow-feeling of shame are certain, except in the pervert who might be aroused. We do not censor to protect the pervert or to assuage the susceptibilities of the oversensitive. \"Bandit Queen\" tells a powerful human story and to that story the scene of Phoolan Devi's enforced naked parade is central. It helps to explain why Phoolan Devi became what she did : her rage and vendetta against the society that had heaped indignities upon her\n28. The rape scene also helps to explain why Phoolan Devi became what she did. Rape is crude and its crudity is what the rapist's bouncing bare posterior is meant to illustrate. Rape and sex are not being glorified in the film. Quite the contrary. It shows what a terrible, and terrifying, effect rape and lust can have upon the victim. It focuses on the trauma and emotional turmoil of the victim to evoke sympathy for her and disgust for the rapist\n29. Too much need not, we think, be made of a few swear words the like of which can be heard everyday in every city, town and village street. No adult would be tempted to use them because they are used in this film\n30. In sum, we should recognise the message of a serious film and apply this test to the individual scenes thereof : do they advance the message? If they do they should be left alone, with only the caution of an 'A' certificate. Adult Indian citizens as a whole may be relied upon to comprehend intelligently the message and react to it, not to the possible titillation of some particular scene\n31. A film that illustrates the consequences of a social evil necessarily must show that social evil. The guidelines must be interpreted in that light. No film that extols the social evil or encourages it is permissible, but a film that carries the message that the social evil is evil cannot be made impermissible on the ground that it depicts the social evil. At the same time, the depiction must be just sufficient for the purpose of the film. The drawing of the line is best left to the sensibilities of the expert Tribunal. The Tribunal is a multi-member body. It is comprised of persons who gauge public reactions to films and, except in cases of stark breach of guidelines, should be permitted to go about its task\n32. In the present case, apart from the Chairman, three members of the Tribunal were women. It is hardly to be supposed that three women would permit a film to be screened which denigrates women, insults Indian womanhood or is obscene or pornographic. It would appear from its order that the Tribunal took the view that it would do women some good to see the film\n33. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had viewed the film in its true perspective and had, in compliance with the requirements of the guidelines, granted to the film an 'A' certificate subject to the conditions it stated. We think that the High Court ought not to have entertained the first respondent's writ petition impugning the grant of the certificate based as it was principally upon the slurs allegedly cast by the film on the Gujjar community. We find that the judgment under appeal does not take due note of the theme of the film and the fact that it condemns rape and the degradation of and violence upon women by showing their effect upon a village child, transforming her to a cruel dacoit obsessed with wreaking vengeance upon a society that has caused her so much psychological and physical hurt, and that the scenes of nudity and rape and the use of expletives, so far as the Tribunal had permitted them, were in aid of the theme and intended not to arouse prurient or lascivious thoughts but revulsion against the perpetrators and pity for the victim\n34. The appeals are allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. The first respondent's writ petition is dismissed. The 'A' certificate issued to the film \"Bandit Queen\" upon the conditions imposed by the Appellate Tribunal is restored\n35. The first respondent shall pay to each appellant the costs of his appeal",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9295 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9296 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9297 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9298 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9299 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9300 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9301 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9302 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9303 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9304 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9305 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9306 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9307 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9308 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9309 OF 2017 | Commissioner Of Income Tax – 1, Mumbai v. M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. | 03/08/2017",
+      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9295 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9296 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9297 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9298 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9299 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9300 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9301 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9302 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9303 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9304 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9305 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9306 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9307 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9308 OF 2017, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9309 OF 2017 | Commissioner Of Income Tax – 1, Mumbai v. M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.",
+      "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED",
+      "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED",
+      "case_record": "The Commissioner of Income Tax filed appeals against assessees engaged in bottling Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders for domestic use. The assessees claimed deductions under Sections 80HH, 80-I, and 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, arguing that their LPG bottling activity constituted 'production' or 'manufacturing'. The Assessing Officers (AOs) and the Commissioner (Appeals) disallowed these claims, stating that bottling did not change the chemical composition of LPG. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) reversed this, deeming LPG bottling a complex, technical activity essential for marketability, and citing Rule 2 (xxxii) of the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004, which defines ‘manufacture of gas’ to include cylinder filling. The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision. The AO had relied on the Gujarat High Court's ruling in *State of Gujarat v. Kosan Gas Company* and general definitions of manufacture, concluding that value addition alone does not constitute manufacture. The assessees countered by emphasizing the complexity of the bottling process, the creation of a new commercial product for domestic use, and the broader interpretation of 'production' as per Supreme Court rulings like *Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd.* and *Sesa Goa Ltd.* They also referred to the definition of 'manufacture of gas' in the Gas Cylinders Rules and a notification under Section 80-IB listing 'Gas distribution and bottling' as an eligible industry. The process involves receiving bulk LPG, compressing it into liquid form, filling it into cylinders, and sealing them.",
+      "generated_judgment": "### Facts  \n\n1. The assessees are engaged in bottling Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders for domestic use.  \n2. They claimed deductions under Sections 80‑HH, 80‑I and 80‑IA of the Income‑Tax Act, 1961, contending that LPG bottling constitutes “production”/“manufacturing” within the meaning of these provisions.  \n3. The Assessing Officers (AOs) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) disallowed the deductions, holding that bottling does not alter the chemical composition of LPG and therefore is not “manufacture” or “production”.  \n4. The AO’s reasoning relied on the Gujarat High Court decision in **State of Gujarat v. Kosan Gas Co.** and on a general definition of manufacture that requires a change in the essential character of the raw material.  \n5. The Income‑Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) reversed the disallowance, characterising LPG bottling as a “complex, technical activity” essential for marketability and citing **Rule 2 (xxxii) of the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004**, which defines “manufacture of gas” to include cylinder‑filling.  \n6. The High Court upheld the ITAT’s decision.  \n7. The assessees further relied on:  \n\n   a. The Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of “production” in **Arihant Tiles & Marbles P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax** and **Sesa Goa Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax**;  \n\n   b. The definition of “manufacture of gas” contained in the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004;  \n\n   c. A notification under Section 80‑IB that expressly includes “gas distribution and bottling” as an eligible industry for deduction.  \n\n8. The bottling process involves receipt of bulk LPG, compression to liquid form, filling into cylinders, and sealing – a transformation that renders the gas suitable for domestic consumption and creates a distinct commercial product.\n\n### Issues  \n\n1. Whether the activity of bottling LPG cylinders falls within the meaning of “manufacture”/“production” for the purposes of Sections 80‑HH, 80‑I and 80‑IA of the Income‑Tax Act, 1961.  \n2. Whether the disallowance of the claimed deductions by the AO and the Commissioner was legally erroneous in view of the statutory definition in the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004 and the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence.\n\n### Rules  \n\n1. **Section 80‑HH, 80‑I and 80‑IA** – permit deductions for income earned from “production” or “manufacture” of goods in a specified industry, provided the activity qualifies under the definition of “manufacture/production” under the Act.  \n2. **Section 2(17) of the Income‑Tax Act** – defines “manufacture” as “the process of changing the essential character of any article or material, in whole or in part, into a different article or material, in any form, by rendering it usable for a particular purpose”.  \n3. **Section 2(2) of the Income‑Tax Act** – defines “production” to include “fabrication, processing, or any other kind of transformation of an article or material”.  \n4. **Rule 2 (xxxii) of the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004** – states that “manufacture of gas” includes the filling of gas cylinders.  \n5. **Section 80‑IB Notification** – specifically lists “gas distribution and bottling” as an eligible industry for deduction, evidencing legislative intent to treat bottling as a manufacturing activity.  \n6. **Supreme Court precedents**:  \n\n   a. **Arihant Tiles & Marbles P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax**, (2009) 239 ITR 1 – held that the term “production” should be given a liberal, purposive construction covering activities that add value and create a marketable product even if the raw material’s chemical identity is unchanged.  \n\n   b. **Sesa Goa Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax**, (2009) 239 ITR 761 – affirmed that transformation involving a change in form, packaging, or processing that renders the product usable for a specific purpose qualifies as “manufacture”.  \n\n7. **State of Gujarat v. Kosan Gas Co., (2004) 71 GLR 191** – held that mere filling of LPG without alteration of chemical composition does not constitute manufacture; however, this decision is confined to the context of the Gujarat Gas Act and not directly to the Income‑Tax statutory scheme.  \n\n8. **Principle of statutory interpretation** – when a special enactment (e.g., Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004) defines a term, that definition prevails over a generic dictionary meaning, provided it is consistent with the purpose of the principal legislation (Income‑Tax Act).  \n\n### Analysis  \n\n**Issue 1 – Does LPG bottling qualify as “manufacture/production”?**  \n\n- **Rule 2** (Gas Cylinders Rules) expressly includes cylinder‑filling within “manufacture of gas”. This is a **statutory definition** issued under the relevant regulatory framework governing LPG. Under Rule 2, the activity the assessees perform is *statutorily* a form of manufacture.  \n- **Rule 1** (Sections 80‑HH, 80‑I, 80‑IA) requires that the activity qualify as “manufacture” or “production” under the Income‑Tax Act. The **definition in Section 2(17)** is not limited to chemical alteration; it speaks of “changing the essential character… into a different article … rendering it usable for a particular purpose”. Bottling converts bulk LPG (a bulk commodity) into individually sealed cylinders that are **usable for domestic consumers** – a distinct commercial article. The essential character for the end‑user is changed: from bulk gas to a safely contained, portable product.  \n- The **Supreme Court’s liberal approach** in *Arihant Tiles* and *Sesa Goa* upholds that transformation, packaging, and processing that renders a product marketable constitute “production/manufacture”. The bottling process satisfies this test: it involves compression, precise filling, safety sealing, and testing – all technical steps that add value and create a new marketable product.  \n- The **Section 80‑IB notification** specifically lists “gas distribution and bottling” as an eligible industry, evidencing Parliament’s intent to treat bottling as a manufacturing activity for the purpose of tax incentives. Legislative intent is decisive; it cannot be overridden by a narrow reading of the generic definition.  \n\n**Issue 2 – Was the AO/Commissioner’s disallowance erroneous?**  \n\n- The AO relied on *Kosan Gas* and a generic definition of manufacture that demands a change in chemical composition. However, *Kosan Gas* was decided under a different statutory regime (the Gujarat Gas Act) and does not bind the Income‑Tax authority when a specific definition in a central rule (Rule 2 of the Gas Cylinders Rules) expands the term.  \n- The AO ignored **Rule 2** and the **Section 80‑IB notification**, both of which are *integral* to the statutory scheme governing deduction claims. By discounting these, the AO’s decision conflicted with the clear legislative scheme.  \n- The **ITAT** correctly applied the purposive approach, holding that bottling is a “complex, technical activity” essential for creating a marketable product, aligning with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  \n- The **High Court’s affirmation** further confirms that the appellate authority’s view is consistent with the hierarchy of law.  \n\nGiven the statutory definition in the Gas Cylinders Rules, the explicit inclusion of bottling in the Section 80‑IB notification, and the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of “production/manufacture”, the AO’s reliance on *Kosan Gas* is legally insufficient. The disallowance therefore represents an erroneous application of the law.\n\n### Conclusion  \n\nThe appeal is **ALLOWED**. The activity of bottling LPG cylinders constitutes “manufacture”/“production” within the meaning of Sections 80‑HH, 80‑I and 80‑IA of the Income‑Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the deductions claimed by the assessees are valid and the disallowance by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner is set aside.",
+      "reference_judgment": "The question of law that arises of consideration in all these appeals, which are filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai, is identical. The respondents-assessees in these appeals are engaged in the process of bottling Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinders meant for domestic use. They are claiming benefit of Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Admissibility of benefit under the aforesaid provision depends upon the question as to whether bottling of LPG is an activity which amounts to ‘production’ or ‘manufacturing’ for the purposes of the aforesaid provisions of the Act.\n2) The Assessing Officers (AOs) had disallowed the deduction claimed by the assessees holding that they did not engage in the production or manufacture activity because of the reason that LPG was produced and manufactured in refineries and thereafter there was no change in the chemical composition or other properties of the Gas in the activity of filling the cylinder. This view was affirmed by Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), however, upset the aforesaid view of the AOs after finding that LPG produced in the refineries cannot be directly supplied to households without bottling of the LPG into the Cylinders and insofar as LPG bottling is concerned, it is a complex activity which can only be carried out by experts. In this light, it was noted that the process involved LPG suction, vapour distribution, de-classification, compression of LPG vapour, external and internal cleaning, hydro pressure testing refilling, sealing, quality control etc. and hence the activity would be a ‘manufacturing activity’. In this hue, the Tribunal also referred to the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004 and in particular Rule 2(xxxii) thereof which defines ‘manufacture of gas’ to mean filling of a cylinder with any compressed gas and also includes transfer of compressed gas from one cylinder to any other cylinder. On that basis, it was concluded by the Tribunal that the activity of filling of cylinder with compressed gas amounts to ‘production’ or ‘manufacture’ for the purposes of Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA of the Act as well. The High Court has concurred with the view of the ITAT. This is how the Department is before this Court and insists that the process of bottling LPG cylinder in domestic use does not amount to manufacture.\n3) Before discussing the aforesaid central issue which has arisen for consideration, it may be noted that Section 80-I of the Act provides for certain amount of deductions in respect of profits and gains derived from an industrial undertaking or a ship or the business of a hotel or the business of repairs to ocean-going vessels or other powered craft to which the said section applies. Section 80-IA gives similar benefits to those industrial undertakings or enterprises which are engaged in infrastructure development. Section 80HH, on the other hand, entitles deduction in respect of profits and gains from a newly established undertaking or a hotel business in backward areas.\n4) As mentioned above, all the assessees are in the business of bottling LPG cylinder and according to them they are industrial undertakings and the aforesaid process amounts to production or manufacture. Since, manufacture or production of articles is sine qua non for treating these assessees as industrial undertakings and for the applicability of the aforesaid provisions, it is essential to establish that the assessees are industrial undertakings. It is in this context the question mooted above has arisen for consideration.\n5) Learned counsel appearing for the Revenue opened his arguments by referring to the order of the AO in Civil Appeal No. 9295 of 2017. He pointed out that before passing the Assessment Order, the AO had issued a questionnaire to the assessee to explain:\n(a) the process of LPG manufacturing;\n(b) activities carried out in the Bottling Plants; and\n(c) detailed submission on the issue of eligibility and allowability of such case.\n6) Insofar as process of LPG manufacturing is concerned, the AO noted that the assessee had narrated the same in the following form:\n<QUOTE> “LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas), which is used as a fuel for domestic purposes as well as in commercial and industrial establishments is obtained by refining of crude in the crude distillation units and Catalytic Crackers of the refinery. It generally consists of butane, propane and butane and propane mixtures. In the refinery, the plant is fed with natural gas and crude oil. The feed gas and the gas undergoes a chilling up to a temperature of 22 degree centigrade and 37 degree centigrade. In the first stage, when it is chilled to 22 degree centigrade, the liquefied hydrocarbon formed is separated out and the vapour is further chilled to 37 degree centigrade.\nThe liquefied hydrocarbons from both stages are then fractionated in two stages. The heavier fractionation is obtained from the bottom of first fractionators, the top product from the second column is LPG, which is sent for bottling.” </QUOTE>\n7) Response of the assessee to the question pertaining to activities carried out in the bottling plants was as under:\n<QUOTE> “The LPG is generally used for commercial/industrial applications as well as for domestic applications. “While LPG is marketed to industrial customers by filling the same into the LPG tanks/tankwagens directly from the refineries, the LPG for domestic applications has to be necessarily filled into the LPG Cylinders. Unless LPG is filled into the cylinders, the same cannot be used as a domestic fuel, since LPG which is a gaseous substance in ambient temperature has to be compressed into liquefied stage, the flow of which shall be controlled by the value fitted on to the cylinder. Accordingly, in order to facilitate the convenience of handling as well as to make it usable as domestic fuel, bulk LPG from the refineries are transported to the LPG bottling plants situated in different places, (more proximate to the customers’ place) and then filled into the cylinder by a very sophisticated process. The activity carried out in the various LPG Bottling Plants are as below:\nReceipt of bulk LPG through tankers/tank wagons, its unloading and storage into spheres/bullets.\nReceipt of LPG Cylinders from manufacturers, distributors and repairers.\nReceipt of valves, regulators and consumable spare for operation/running of the plants.\nRefilling/bottling of LPG in cylinders by compressing the same into liquid.\nStorage of LPG packed cylinders.\nDespatch of packed cylinders to LPG.\nDistributors for – illegible.\nMaintenance/upkeeping of plant equipment to ensure smooth operation of plant.\nImparting necessary training to employees, contract workmen and transporters crew to ensure safe operation/handling of LPG/LPG cylinders in plant and enroot.” </QUOTE>\n8) After taking note of reply to the aforesaid two questions, the AO proceeded to decide as to whether the assessee was an industrial undertaking and whether it is manufacturing or producing article. He noted the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Kosan Gas Company, wherein identical facts are involved, viz. the assessee therein after purchasing LPG from M/s. HPCL was refilling the same into small cylinders and the High Court held that the said process did not amount to manufacture. The AO, thereafter, dealt with the contention of the assessee predicated on Section 10A of the Act wherein explanation (iii) mentions that manufacture includes assembling as well and, therefore, assessee’s case was covered by the definition of ‘manufacture’ under Section 10A of the Act. This contention was, however, rejected by the AO by pointing out that the definition of ‘manufacture’ as given in the explanation (iii) to Section 10A of the Act is for limited purposes in the context of newly established industrial undertakings in free trade zone and the very explanation starts with the phrase ‘for the purposes of this section’. The AO further noticed that the word ‘manufacture’ is not defined in the Act. He, therefore, proceeded to turn to the legal and general definitions available elsewhere and referred to corpus juris secundum and also certain cases of this Court dealing with the issue. On that basis, the AO concluded that ‘manufacture’ can said to be a process or activity which brings into existence a new identifiable and distinctive goods and the commodity which is subjected to the process of manufacture can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but is recognised in the trade as a new and distinct commodity. The AO also referred to the legal dicta laying down the principle that the test is not whether what is produced as a result of the process carried out in the plant becomes more saleable from an otherwise less saleable article. Simply because a process carried out on a particular article adds to its value or improves its marketability on account of processes like shining, polishing, removal of impurities etc., meant by itself be sufficient to hold that the product so finished is commercially different from the one on which such a process had been carried out. The value addition, therefore, does not amount to production or manufacture. On that basis, the AO concluded that since no new product had come into existence after going through the process undertaken by the assessees and it remained the same product, namely, LPG, the process of filling up of the gas into cylinder was not a manufacturing process.\n(1992) 87 STC 236\n9) Heavily relying upon the aforesaid reasoning of the AO, the learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that this view is consistently taken in catena of judicial pronouncements and, therefore, should be accepted. He also referred to the following judgments in support of his contention: Servo-Med Industries Private Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai and Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala v. Tara Agencies.\n(2015) 14 SCC 47\n(2007) 6 SCC 429\n10) The aforesaid submissions were refuted by Mr. Tarun Gulati, learned counsel appearing for the assessee M/s. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited. He explained the LPG bottling process by pointing out that the traditional source of LPG is oil refineries where crude oil is processed. LPG vapour is one of the lighter fractions produced by oil refining and petrochemical processes. Since LPG typically consists of a mixture of propane, propylene, butane and butylene (containing 3 or 4 carbon atoms per molecule), these hydrocarbons are easily liquefied by moderate compression at ambient temperature. Unlike natural gas which can be piped to the consumer, LPG has to be transported in the liquid phase at ambient temperature and, therefore, required to be handled in specially designed pressure vessels. Once the LPG vapour is subjected to moderate pressure to achieve liquefaction, the resultant liquid must be contained within a pressurized system or a pressure vessel until it is required as gas by the consumer. In the vapour phase, LPG exists as a heavier gas and on liquefaction, its volume reduces considerably.\nSee “A Background to Liquefied Petroleum Gases, Their Sources and Safe Handling, and Safe Use as Fuels”, Advanced Petrochemicals, Dr. G.N. Sarkar.\n11) Learned counsel submitted that Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA of the Act use the expression ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’, therefore, whenever industrial undertaking is either manufacturing or producing an article, it will be entitled to the benefit of the aforesaid provisions, subject to satisfying other conditions laid down in those Sections. His argument was that the activities undertaken by the assessees in their bottling plant results in the production of a new commercial product which is made suitable for domestic use, which would otherwise not be possible without undergoing such processes. Gas produced by refineries is not usable as such by the consumer for domestic use. It requires several complex processes to bottle the gas in cylinders to make it usable by domestic consumers. After LPG is bottled in cylinders the product obtains a different name, character and use which is different from its original components. A domestic consumer identifies bottled LPG as a product different from the LPG produced in the refinery or from the empty cylinder. Even otherwise, the word ‘production’ is wider than the word ‘manufacture’ and any activity which makes a product marketable and usable to the consumer would be covered by the word ‘production’. Learned counsel referred to the judgment of this Court in Income Tax Officer v. Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd. wherein this Court has held that the word ‘production’ is wider in ambit and has a wider connotation than the word ‘manufacture’. He also sought to draw sustenance from the judgment of this Court in Vadilal Chemicals Ltd. v. State of A.P. & Ors. wherein this Court held that bottling of ammonia amounts to manufacture. He also took support from the definition of ‘manufacture of gas’ occurring in Rule 2 (xxv) of the erstwhile Gas Cylinders Rules, 1981 issued under the Explosives Act, 1881 which defines the aforesaid expression to mean filling of a cylinder with any compressed gas and also includes transfer of compressed gas from one cylinder to any other cylinder. He further pointed out that even Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004 which superseded the aforesaid Rules of 1981 contain identical definition of ‘manufacture of gas’ in Rule 2 (xxxii). His submission was that this definition itself provides legislative intent as well as that of the Central Government treating the process as manufacture of gas. Mr. Gulati also argued that for the purposes of Section 80-IB of the Act, which provides a deduction for industrial undertaking established in the North Eastern region, the Central Government has notified vide Notification No. 627(E) dated August 4, 1999, eligible industries and the following entry is relevant for the purposes of the instant appeals:\n<QUOTE> “13. Gas based intermediate products industry manufacturing or producing –\n(i) Gas exploration and production;\n(ii) Gas distribution and bottling;\n(iii) Power generation;\n(iv) Plastics;\n(v) Yarn raw materials;\n(vi) Fertilizers;\n(vii) Methanol;\n(viii) Formal debycle and FR Resin Melamme and MF Resin;\n(ix) Methylamine, hexamethiene, tetranine, ammonium bi-carbonate;\n(x) Nitrite acid and ammonium nitrate;\n(xi) Carbon black;\n(xii) Polymer chips.\n(Emphasis Supplied)” </QUOTE>\nIt was contended that from the above, it is clear that an undertaking engaged in bottling of gas is considered to be involved in manufacture or production for the purpose of deductions under the Act and this view has been taken by the Central Government itself.\n(2010) 320 ITR 79 (SC)\n(2005) 6 SCC 292\n12) Learned counsel argued that the findings of the Tribunal, as upheld by the High Court, were not assailed by the Department and, therefore, there was no question of law involved. He also referred to the few judgments of different High Courts which have taken the view that LPG bottling would amount to manufacture and pointed out that in those cases, no appeal was preferred by the Department. Learned counsel also endeavoured to distinguish the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Kosan Gas Company’s case as well as the judgments of this Court which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the Revenue and submitted that those judgments have no applicability. He, thus, pleaded that the appeals of the appellant/Revenue deserve to be dismissed.\n13) Mr. Parijat Sinha, who appeared for some other assessees, argued almost on the same lines.\n14) We have given adequate consideration to the respective submissions of both the parties, which they deserve. As is clear from the facts and arguments noted above, the question of law which is involved (already mentioned) is:\nWhether bottling of LPG, as undertaken by the assessee, is a process which amounts to ‘production’ or ‘manufacture’ for the purposes of Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA of the Act?; and if so, whether the respondents/assessees are entitled to claim the benefit of deduction under the aforesaid provisions while computing their taxable income?\n15) At the outset, it needs to be emphasised that the aforesaid provisions of the Act use both the expressions, namely, ‘manufacture’ as well as ‘production’. It also becomes clear after reading these provisions that an assessee whose process amounts to either ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ (i.e. one of these two and not both) would become entitled to the benefits enshrined therein. It is held by this Court in Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd. case that the word ‘production’ is wider than the word ‘manufacture’. The two expressions, thus, have different connotation. Significantly, Arihant Tiles judgment decides that cutting of marble blocks into marble slabs does not amount to manufacture. At the same time, it clarifies that it would be relevant for the purpose of the Central Excise Act. When it comes to interpreting Section 80-IA of the Act (which was involved in the said case), the Court was categorical in pointing out that the aforesaid interpretation of ‘manufacture’ in the context of Central Excise Act would not apply while interpreting Section 80-IA of the Act as this provision not only covers those assessees which are involved in the process of manufacture but also those who are undertaking ‘production’ of the goods. Taking note of the judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax, Goa v. Sesa Goa Ltd. which was rendered in the context of Section 32A of the Act and which provision also applies in respect of ‘production’, the Court reiterated the ratio in Sesa Goa Ltd. to hold that the word ‘production’ was wider than the word ‘manufacture’. On that basis, finding arrived at by the Court was that though cutting of marble blocks into marble slabs did not amount to ‘manufacture’, if there are various stages through which marble blocks are subjected to before they become polished slabs and tiles, such activity would certainly be treated as ‘production’ for the purpose of Section 80-IA of the Act. In this context, relevant discussion contained in Arihant Tiles case needs to be reproduced, which is as under:\n<QUOTE> “16. In the present case, we have extracted in detail the process undertaken by each of the respondents before us. In the present case, we are not concerned only with cutting of marble blocks into slabs. In the present case we are also concerned with the activity of polishing and ultimate conversion of blocks into polished slabs and tiles. What we find from the process indicated hereinabove is that there are various stages through which the blocks have to go through before they become polished slabs and tiles. In the circumstances, we are of the view that on the facts of the cases in hand, there is certainly an activity which will come in the category of “manufacture” or “production” under Section 80-IA of the Income Tax Act.\n17. As stated hereinabove, the judgment of this Court in Aman Marble Industries (P) Ltd. [(2005) 1 SCC 279 : (2003) 157 ELT 393] was not required to construe the word “production” in addition to the word “manufacture”. One has to examine the scheme of the Act also while deciding the question as to whether the activity constitutes manufacture or production. Therefore, looking to the nature of the activity stepwise, we are of the view that the subject activity certainly constitutes “manufacture or production” in terms of Section 80-IA.\n18. In this connection, our view is also fortified by the following judgments of this Court which have been fairly pointed out to us by learned counsel appearing for the Department.\n19. In CIT v. Sesa Goa Ltd. [(2004) 13 SCC 548 : (2004) 271 ITR 331], the meaning of the word “production” came up for consideration. The question which came before this Court was whether ITAT was justified in holding that the assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 32-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in respect of machinery used in mining activity ignoring the fact that the assessee was engaged in extraction and processing of iron ore, not amounting to manufacture or production of any article or thing.\n20. The High Court in Sesa Goa case [(2004) 13 SCC 548 : (2004) 271 ITR 331], while dismissing the appeal preferred by the Revenue, held that extraction and processing of iron ore did not amount to “manufacture”. However, it came to the conclusion that extraction of iron ore and the various processes would involve “production” within the meaning of Section 32-A(2)(b)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and consequently, the assessee was entitled to the benefit of investment allowance under Section 32-A of the Income Tax Act. In that matter, it was argued on behalf of the Revenue that extraction and processing of iron ore did not produce any new product whereas it was argued on behalf of the assessee that it did produce a distinct new product.\n21. The view expressed by the High Court that the activity in question constituted “production” has been affirmed by this Court in Sesa Goa case [(2004) 13 SCC 548 : (2004) 271 ITR 331] saying that the High Court's opinion was unimpeachable. It was held by this Court that the word “production” is wider in ambit and it has a wider connotation than the word “manufacture”. It was held that while every manufacture can constitute production, every production did not amount to manufacture.\n22. In our view, applying the tests laid down by this Court in Sesa Goa case [(2004) 13 SCC 548 : (2004) 271 ITR 331] and applying it to the activities undertaken by the respondents herein, reproduced hereinabove, it is clear that the said activities would come within the meaning of the word “production”.” </QUOTE>\n(2004) 271 ITR 331 (SC)\n16) Keeping the aforesaid distinction in mind, let us take note of the process of LPG bottling that is undertaken by the assessees herein and about which there is no dispute. It has come on record that specific activities at assessees’ plant include receiving bulk LPG vapour from the oil refinery, unloading the LPG vapour, compression of the LPG vapour, loading of the LPG in liquefied form into bullets, followed by cylinder filling operations. The stages of these activities are as under:\n(a)Bulk LPG is received in the bottling plant through road tankers/rail wagons;\n(b) The LPG is unloaded into spheres/bullets through LPG compressors which use variable levels of pressure for suction, unloading and vapour recovery;\n(c) Refilling/bottling of LPG in cylinders by compressing the same into liquid form; and\n(d) Capping, fixing of seals and safety valves prior to storage and loading of filled cylinders.\n17) Thus, after the bottling activities at the assessees’ plants, LPG is stored in cylinders in liquefied form under pressure. When the cylinder valve is opened and the gas is withdrawn from the cylinder, the pressure falls and the liquid boils to return to gaseous state. This is how LPG is made suitable for domestic use by customers who will not be able to use LPG in its vapour form as produced in the oil refinery. It, therefore, becomes apparent that the LPG obtained from the refinery undergoes a complex technical process in the assessees’ plants and is clearly distinguishable from the LPG bottled in cylinders and cleared from these plants for domestic use by customers. It may be relevant to point out that keeping in view the aforesaid process, the ITAT arrived at the specific findings in support of its decision, which are as under:\n(a) There is no dispute that the LPG produced in the refinery cannot be directly supplied to the consumer for domestic use because of various reasons of handling, storage and safety.\n(b) LPG bottling is a highly technical and complex activity which requires precise functions of machines operated by technically expert personnel.\n(c) Bottling of LPG is an essential process for rendering the product marketable and usable for the end customer.\n(d)The word ‘production’ has a wider connotation in comparison to ‘manufacture’, and any activity which brings a commercially new product into existence constitutes production. The process of bottling of LPG renders it capable of being marketed as a domestic kitchen fuel and, thereby, makes it a viable commercial product.\n18) In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid activity would definitely fall within the expression ‘production’. We agree with the submission of the learned counsels for the assessees that the definition of ‘manufacture of gas’ in Rule 2 (xxxii) of the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004 also supports the case of the assessees inasmuch as gas distribution and bottling is treated as manufacturing or producing gas. We are also inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the assesses that various High Courts have, from time to time, decided that bottling of gas into cylinder amounts to production and, therefore, claim of deduction under Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA would be admissible. Another important aspect which was highlighted by learned counsels for the assessees was that identical issue whether bottling of gas into cylinder amounts to production for claim of deduction under the Act has been considered by various High Courts and decided in the affirmative but those decisions were not challenged by the Department. The cases specifically referred were M/s. Puttur Petro Products Pvt. Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Mangalore and Central U.P. Gas Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur.\n(2014) 361 ITR 290\nIncome Tax Appeal No. 224 of 2014 decided by High Court of Allahabad and reported in MANU/UP/2895/2016.\n19) From the submissions made by learned counsel for the Revenue, who banked on the reasoning given by the AO, it can be gathered that the entire thrust of the AO was that the process involved in filling up the gas into cylinders does not amount to ‘manufacture’ inasmuch as the said process does not bring into existence a new identifiable and distinctive goods. In the first instance, no distinction was drawn between manufacture and production and the matter was not looked into from the angle as to whether the aforesaid process would amount to production or not. Other reason which prevailed with the AO and which was also the argument of the learned counsel for the Revenue was that, on identical facts, the Gujarat High Court had held that refilling the LPG after purchasing from M/s. HPCL into small cylinders would not amount to manufacture. That was a case which was decided in the context of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969. The Court held that transfer of LPG from bulk containers into cylinders did not amount to process of manufacture. It is pertinent to point out that Section 2(16) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 defines ‘manufacture’ and, therefore, the entire case was examined keeping in view the said definition of ‘manufacture’ and the issue was as to whether the process amounted to manufacture or not. As pointed out above, the question as to whether it amounts to ‘production’ as well did not arise for consideration. The AO committed manifest error in relying upon the said decision inasmuch as the provisions with which we are concerned in the instant case use the words ‘manufacture or production’ and are not limited to ‘manufacture’ alone.\n20) Judgment in the cases of Servo-Med Industries Private Limited and Tara Agencies, which were cited by the learned counsel for the Revenue, may not apply to the present case. They dealt with the provision of the Central Excise Act and, therefore, test of ‘manufacture’ propounded on that case would not be applicable when dealing with the cases under the provisions of Sections 80HH, 80-I and 80-IA of the Act which use both the expressions ‘manufacture’ and ‘production’. It has already been clarified in Vadilal Chemicals Ltd. judgment. Insofar as judgment in Tara Agencies is concerned, the factual scenario therein was totally different where three different stages in relation to tea were examined by this Court. The Court held that the procedure of blending of different qualities of tea would amount to ‘processing of tea’ and it did not amount to ‘manufacture or production of tea’. Here, the case set up by the assessees is not that bottling of LPG is ‘processing’ as distinguished from ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’. We may, at this juncture, refer to the judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Vinbros and Company where bottling and blending of alcohol is held to be ‘manufacture or production’ for the purpose of Section 80-IB of the Act.\n(2015) 14 SCC 483\n21) We, thus, find that the view of the ITAT as affirmed by the High Court is correct and, therefore, there is no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -488,26 +488,26 @@
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-      "experiment": "baseline_cot",
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-      "source_file": "S024__baseline_cot__qwen3-8b-noreason__1101.json",
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+      "source_file": "S024__baseline_firac__gpt-oss-120b__3086.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "01/05/1996",
-      "machine_error_stage": "rules",
+      "judgment_date": "03/08/2017",
+      "machine_error_stage": "conclusion",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
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-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO.4465 of 2005 | Union Of India & Ors. v. Ex-Gnr Ajeet Singh | 02/04/2013",
-      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO.4465 of 2005 | Union Of India & Ors. v. Ex-Gnr Ajeet Singh",
-      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
-      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The respondent was enrolled in the Army on December 15, 2000. Between February 26, 2002, and September 27, 2002, he committed several offences, including absence without leave and theft of arms and ammunition, some of which occurred after he turned 18 on April 20, 2002. He was apprehended on October 4, 2002, with stolen arms. Following proceedings, including a Court of Inquiry and summary of evidence, he was charged under the Army Act. Initially pleading not guilty, he later changed his plea to guilty for all six charges. A General Court Martial (GCM) awarded him dismissal from service and 7 years rigorous imprisonment on April 3, 2003, which was confirmed by the Chief of Army Staff. The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court, arguing that the joint trial of offences committed as a juvenile and as an adult vitiated the entire GCM proceedings. The High Court agreed, quashing the punishment but allowing a fresh GCM for offences committed after attaining majority. The Army (appellant) appealed this decision.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts  \n1. The respondent enlisted in the Army on 15 December 2000.  \n2. Between 26 February 2002 and 27 September 2002 he committed a series of offences – notably absence without leave (AWL) and theft of arms and ammunition.  \n3. The respondent attained the age of majority on 20 April 2002; consequently some of the offences were committed while he was a minor and some after he became an adult.  \n4. He was arrested on 4 October 2002 in possession of the stolen weapons.  \n5. A Court of Inquiry was held, a summary of evidence was prepared and the respondent was charged under the Army Act for six distinct offences.  \n6. At the General Court Martial (GCM) he initially entered a not‑guilty plea but subsequently pleaded guilty to all six charges.  \n7. The GCM, on 3 April 2003, sentenced him to dismissal from service and to rigorous imprisonment for seven years; the sentence was confirmed by the Chief of Army Staff.  \n8. The respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court contending that the joint trial of offences committed while he was a juvenile and offences committed after he became an adult vitiated the GCM proceedings.  \n9. The High Court agreed, quashed the sentence and ordered that a fresh GCM be held only for the offences committed after the respondent attained majority, leaving the juvenile offences to be dealt with under the appropriate juvenile procedure.  \n10. The Army (the appellant) filed an appeal against the High Court’s order.\n\n### Issues  \n1. Whether the trial of the respondent for offences committed both as a minor and as an adult in a single General Court Martial violates the statutory provisions governing the trial of juvenile offenders under the Army Act (or the applicable military‑justice legislation).  \n2. Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the original GCM conviction and directing a fresh trial limited to the post‑majority offences, thereby annulling the dismissal and imprisonment awarded.  \n\n### Rules  \n1. **Statutory provision on juvenile offenders in the Armed Forces** – The Army Act (or the relevant military‑justice code) provides that any person who is a minor at the time an offence is committed shall be tried in accordance with the *Juvenile Justice* provisions, which prescribe a separate, less severe procedure and preclude the imposition of the full adult penal regime (e.g., dismissal from service, rigorous imprisonment).  \n2. **Section 9 of the Army Act (or equivalent)** – Stipulates that when a service‑person commits distinct offences at different ages, each offence must be tried according to the law applicable at the time of its commission; a single court‑martial cannot concurrently apply adult and juvenile procedures.  \n3. **Doctrine of *nulla poena sine lege* and *fair trial* guarantees** – A conviction that amalgamates juvenile and adult offences in a single proceeding infringes the principle that the accused must be tried under the law applicable to each individual offence.  \n4. **Precedent – *State v. R. M.* (2005) 4 SCC 123** – The Supreme Court held that a soldier who committed offences both before and after attaining majority could not be tried in a single court‑martial; the juvenile offences must be remitted to a juvenile board, and only the adult offences may be tried by a General Court Martial.  \n5. **Precedent – *Army v. K. S.* (2010) 7 SCC 512** – The Court upheld the High Court’s power to quash a military sentence where procedural non‑compliance (including improper joinder of juvenile offences) rendered the trial infirm.  \n6. **Appellate jurisdiction** – Under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 31 of the Army Act, the High Court’s decision is reviewable on limited grounds of jurisdiction, error of law, or procedural irregularity.  \n\n### Analysis  \n1. **Application of Rule 1 & Rule 2 to Facts** – Facts 2‑3 show that the respondent was a minor for the offences committed up to 20 April 2002 and an adult thereafter. By trying him for all six charges in a single GCM (Fact 6), the trial ignored the statutory requirement that juvenile offences be dealt with under the juvenile procedure. Hence, the joint trial contravenes the mandatory statutory segregation (Rule 1 & 2).  \n\n2. **Consistency with Precedent** – The situation is squarely covered by *State v. R. M.* (Rule 4), where the Supreme Court declared such a joint trial invalid and ordered separate proceedings. The High Court’s approach mirrors that precedent, reinforcing its correctness.  \n\n3. **Fair‑trial and *nulla poena sine lege* considerations** – By imposing adult‑type penalties (dismissal, seven‑year rigorous imprisonment) for offences committed while the respondent was a minor, the GCM breached the principle that punishment must correspond to the law in force at the time of the offence (Rule 3). This further substantiates the High Court’s quashing of the sentence.  \n\n4. **Effect of the High Court’s order** – Under *Army v. K. S.* (Rule 5), a High Court may set aside a military conviction where procedural defects are fatal. The order to conduct a fresh GCM only for post‑majority offences is a permissible remedial measure, not a usurpation of military discretion.  \n\n5. **Scope of the appellant’s challenge** – The appellant’s appeal rests solely on the claim that the High Court erred in its interpretation of the juvenile‑trial provisions. Given the clear statutory language (Rule 1) and the controlling Supreme Court precedent (Rule 4), the appellant’s contention lacks merit. Moreover, the appellate court’s jurisdiction to review the High Court’s decision on a question of law is well‑founded (Rule 6).  \n\n6. **No indication of any other error** – The record does not reveal any procedural lapse by the High Court other than the contested point, and the High Court supplied an appropriate remedy. Accordingly, the appeal fails on the merits.  \n\n### Conclusion  \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court correctly held that the joint trial of juvenile and adult offences violated the statutory and jurisprudential requirements, and its order directing a fresh General Court Martial for the post‑majority offences is lawful. The Army’s conviction and sentence are therefore set aside, and the matter shall proceed, if at all, with a separate trial of the offences committed after the respondent attained majority.",
-      "reference_judgment": "1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order, dated 8.3.2004, passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (Civil) No.8573 of 2003 by way of which the High Court has set aside the order dated 3.4.2003 passed by the General Court Martial (hereinafter referred to as ‘GCM’), that had awarded the punishment of dismissal from service and 7 years rigorous imprisonment (hereinafter referred to as ‘RI’) to the respondent. The High Court held that, under the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the JJ Act’) the respondent could not be tried by GCM for the charges related to the period when he was juvenile and therefore, the GCM proceedings stood vitiated in entirety. However, the High Court has given liberty to the appellant to hold a fresh GCM, on the charges related to offences committed by the respondent after he attained the age of 18 years.\n2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:-\nA. The respondent was enrolled in the Army on15.12.2000, and was posted to 77 Medium Regiment. He absented himself without leave from 26.2.2002 to 8.3.2002 i.e. (11 days). The respondent, while on Sentry duty on 17/18.3.2002 at the Ammunition Dump of the said Regiment, committed theft of 30 Grenades Hand No.36 High Explosive and 160 rounds of 5.56 MM INSAS. The respondent once again absented himself without leave from 12.6.2002 to 2.9.2002 (81 days). The respondent absented himself without leave from 4.9.2002 to 26.9.2002 (23 days) yet again. The respondent also committed theft of a Carbine Machine Gun 9 MM on 27.9.2002. He was apprehended by the Railway Police Phulera (Rajasthan) with the said Carbine Machine Gun, and an FIR No.56/2002 was registered by the Railway Police on 4.10.2002.\nB. On 11.10.2002, the respondent was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur, who passed an order for handing over the respondent to the Military Authorities, and it was later at his instance that the buried, stolen ammunition i.e. 30 Grenades and 5.56 MM INSAS rounds were recovered on 13.10.2002. A Court of Inquiry was ordered and summary of evidence was recorded.\nC. The chargesheet was served upon the respondent on 11.3.2003, and it contained six charges, under the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as `the Army Act’). After the conclusion of the GCM proceedings, the respondent was awarded punishment vide order dated 3.4.2003, as has been referred to hereinabove.\nD. The sentence awarded in the GCM was confirmed by the Competent Authority, i.e. Chief of the Army Staff, while dealing with the petition under Section 164(2) of the Army Act. After such confirmation of sentence, the respondent was handed over to the civil jail at Agra to serve out the sentence. The respondent filed a post confirmation petition against the said order of punishment.\nE. During the pendency of the post confirmation petition, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court, challenging the said order dated 3.4.2003, mainly on the ground that he was a juvenile at the time of some of the charged offences and in view of the provisions of the JJ Act, the joint trial of those offences that he had allegedly committed as a juvenile and other offences that he had allegedly committed after attaining majority had vitiated the GCM proceedings in entirety.\nF. The appellant contested the said writ petition on the grounds that some of the offences with which the respondent had been charged, were of very serious nature, and they had been committed by the respondent after attaining the age of 18 years. Moreover, the respondent had not raised the plea of juvenility when the GCM proceedings were in progress.\nG. The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the aforesaid punishment, and holding that the entire GCM proceeding stood vitiated, as the GCM could not be held for the offences alleged to have been committed by him as a juvenile. The High Court, therefore, directed release of the respondent forthwith. However, in relation to particular charges that were related to offences committed by him after attaining the age of 18 years, the appellant was given liberty to proceed in accordance with law against him de novo.\nHence, this appeal.\n3. Shri Paras Kuhad, learned ASG appearing for the appellants, has submitted that the High Court has committed an error by holding that the entire GCM proceedings stood vitiated, for the reason that serious offences had been committed by the respondent after attaining the age of 18 years, and that at least with respect to such specific charges, the GCM proceeding could not be considered to have been vitiated. Additionally, even if the High Court had observed that the respondent was a juvenile at the time of some of the charged offences at most the sentence could have been quashed; the conviction should have been sustained. Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.\n4. Per contra, Shri S.M. Dalal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has opposed the appeal contending that the High Court has taken into consideration all relevant facts and law, particularly the provisions of the JJ Act, and has interpreted the same in correct perspective, because the GCM could not have been conducted for charges relating to offences that the respondent had committed as a juvenile, owing to which, the entire proceedings stood vitiated. Therefore, no interference with the impugned judgment is called for.\n5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.\n6. Relevant parts of the chargesheet issued to the respondent read as under:-\ni) Charged under Army Act Section 52(a)- theft of 30 Grenade Hand No.36 High Explosive and160 rounds of 5.56 MM INSAS on 17/18.3.2002.\nii) Charged under Army Act Section 52(a) - theft of carbine machine gun 9 MM on 27.9.2002.\niii) Charged under Army Act Section 39(a) – absent from duty without leave from 26.2.2002 to 8.3.2002.\niv) Charged under Army Act Section 39(a) – absent from duty without leave from 12.6.2002 to 2.9.2002.\nv) Charged under Army Act Section 39(a) – absent from duty without leave from 4.9.2002 to 27.9.2002.\nvi) Charged under Army Act Section 69 – possessing counterfeit seal with intent to commit forgery contrary to Section 473 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as `IPC’).\n7. We have summoned the original record of the GCM proceeding that makes it clear that the respondent was provided with a defense counsel, namely, Dr. Balbir Singh, a practicing advocate at the aforesaid GCM proceedings. Secondly, it also becomes clear that no witness was called in the defence by the accused. Thirdly, it is evident that he did not cross examine the court witnesses, and thus Rule 141(2) and 142(2) of the Army Rules were complied with. Upon being asked in question 16 whether the accused wanted to address the Court, he answered in the affirmative and stated:\n<QUOTE> “……… that I am really ashamed of my acts and really regret my acts. The past seven months I have been attached to this Regiment and the misery and embarrassment which I am undergoing is more than a punishment. My family is also dependent on me for a permanent source of income. I have a younger sister whose marriage’s responsibility is also on my shoulders. I am a soldier and have just started my career. I request the Honourable Judges to have mercy on me and give me a chance to serve, I shall never repeat such acts. I further request the Honourable Judges not to close all the ends of my career and life at this early age of service and give mea chance to redeem my prestige as well as keep up the aspirations of my parents.” </QUOTE>\n8. Furthermore, it is evident from the record that the respondent had confessed before the Commanding Officer with respect to having stolen the arms and ammunition as mentioned in the chargesheet. It was the information furnished by him that led to the recovery of the stolen ammunition. He had also admitted to having sold 140 rounds of 156 mm INSAS to a civilian named Wasim Ali, for a sum of Rupees 30, 000, though he later asserted that he had fabricated these details.\nIn his prayer for mitigation of punishment, the respondent has stated that he was only 22 years of age, and that his entire life lay before him. His parents were old, and that he was the sole bread earner of the house. He had the responsibility of getting his sister married. From the initial stages of the proceeding, he had admitted to his crimes, and that any mistake he had made was only because of his immaturity. Further, he stated that he understood the serious nature of his crime.\n9. The original record of the proceeding reveals that the respondent had initially pleaded not guilty to all 6 charges that had been framed against him. It was only on the 1st of April, 2003, during the examination of the fifth witness for the prosecution (Major S.R. Gulia), the respondent had requested for grant of audience for defence. At that stage, he had stated:\n<QUOTE> “I wish to withdraw my plea of ‘Not Guilty’, and to plead ‘Guilty’ to all six charges, as are contained in the charge sheet (B-2) against me, and therefore, that the Prosecution Witness present before the Court, may please be allowed to retire.” </QUOTE>\nHe further stated that he had wanted to accept his guilt from the very beginning of the Court Martial, but had been misguided by his parents and other relatives to plead ‘Not Guilty’.\nAt this point, the Judge Advocate changed the plea of the accused from ‘Not Guilty’ to ‘Guilty’, and referred to Rules 52(2) and (2A); 54 and 55 Army Rules. It was duly pointed out by the Judge Advocate that the accused had the right to change his plea at any point during the trial, so long as the effect of doing so is properly explained to him.\n10. Undoubtedly, given the date of birth of the respondent as per the service record is 20.4.1984, he attained 18 years of age on 20.4.2002. Accordingly, the charge nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6 relate to offences that the respondent committed after attaining the age of 18 years. Admittedly, during the GCM proceeding, the respondent did not raise the plea of being a juvenile, even though he was a juvenile at the time of commission of some of the offences.\n11. The relevant Army Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as `Army Rules’), which may be attracted in this appeal read as under:-\n<QUOTE> “51. Special plea to the jurisdiction. — (1) The accused, before pleading to a charge, may offer a special plea to the general jurisdiction of the court, and if he does so, and the court considers that anything stated in such plea shows that the court has no jurisdiction it shall receive any evidence offered in support, together with any evidence offered by the prosecutor in disproof or qualification thereof, and, any address by or on behalf of the accused and reply by the prosecutor in reference thereto.\nxx xx xx xx\n52. General plea of “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”\n(1) ……..\n(2) If an accused person pleads “Guilty”, that plea shall be recorded as the finding of the court; but before it is recorded, the presiding officer or judge-advocate, on behalf of the court, shall ascertain that the accused understands the nature of the charge to which he has pleaded guilty and shall inform him of the general effect of that plea, and in particular of the meaning of the charge to which he has pleaded guilty, and of the difference in procedure which will be made by the plea of guilty, and shall advise him to withdraw that plea if it appears from the summary of evidence that the accused ought to plead “Not Guilty”.\nxx xx xx xx\n65. Sentence. - The Court shall award a single sentence in respect of all the offences of which the accused is found guilty, and such sentence shall be deemed to be awarded in respect of the offences in each charge in respect of which it can be legally given and not to be awarded in respect of any offence in a charge in respect of which it cannot be legally given.\n72. Mitigation of sentence on partial confirmation. -\n(1) ………\n(2) Where a sentence has been awarded by a court-martial in respect of offences in several charges and has been confirmed, and any one or such charges the finding thereon is found to be invalid, the authority having power to mitigate, remit, or commute the punishment awarded by the sentence shall take into consideration the fact of such invalidity, and if it seems just, mitigate, remit or commute the punishment awarded according as it seems just, having regard to the offences in the charges which with the findings thereon are not invalid, and the punishment as so modified shall be as valid as if it had been originally awarded only in respect of those offences.\n79. Separate charge-sheets. —\n(1) xx xx xx\n(2) xx xx xx\n(3) xx xx xx\n(4) xx xx xx\n(5) Where a charge-sheet contains more than one charge, the accused may, before pleading, claim to be tried separately in respect of any charge or charges in that charge-sheet, on the ground that he will be embarrassed in his defence if he is not so tried separately; and in such case the court unless they think his claim unreasonable, shall arraign and try the accused in like manner as if the convening officer had inserted the said charge or charges in different charge-sheets.” </QUOTE>\n(Emphasis added)\n12. Unfortunately, the attention of the High Court was not drawn to the aforesaid relevant rules and to the scope of their application to the facts of the present case. The High Court has decided the case in a laconic manner, without considering the gravity of the charges against the respondent and without deliberating on whether, in light of such a fact-situation, any prejudice had been caused to the respondent. Questions with respect to whether there has been any failure of justice in the present case and whether in light of the facts of the case, the entire GCM proceedings actually stood vitiated, as the respondent indeed could not be tried by the GCM for those charges that had been committed when the respondent was a juvenile.\n13. Though the case is labeled as a civil appeal, in fact it is purely a criminal case. GCM is a substitute of a criminal trial. Thus, the case ought to have been examined by the High Court keeping in mind, the principles/ law applicable in a criminal trial. The respondent is governed by the Army Act and Army Rules, and not by the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the `Cr.P.C.’). However, Cr.P.C. basically deals with procedural matters to ensure compliance of the principles of natural justice etc. Thus, the principles enshrined therein may provide guidelines with respect to the misjoinder of charges and a joint trial for various distinct charges/offences as there are similar provisions in the Army Rules. Section 464 Cr.P.C., provides that a finding or sentence would not be invalid merely because there has been a omission or error in framing the charges or misjoinder of charges, unless a “failure of justice” has in fact been occasioned.\n14. In Birichh Bhuian & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1120, this Court has held, that a case of misjoinder of charges is merely an irregularity which can be cured, and that the same is not an illegality which would render the proceedings void. The court should not interfere with the sentence or conviction passed by a court of competent jurisdiction on such grounds, unless the same has occasioned a failure of justice, and the person aggrieved satisfies the court that his cause has in fact been prejudiced in some way.\nA similar view has also been reiterated in Kamalanantha & Ors. v. State of T.N., AIR 2005 SC 2132; and State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 372.\n15. The JJ Act that came into force on 1.4.2001 repealed the JJ Act 1986, and provides that a juvenile will be a person who is below 18 years of age.\nSection 6 of the JJ Act contains a non-obstante clause, giving overriding effect to any other law for the time being in force. It also provides that the Juvenile Justice Board, where it has been constituted, shall “have the power to deal exclusively” with all the proceedings, relating to juveniles under the Act, that are in conflict with other laws. Moreover, non-obstante clauses contained in various provisions thereof, particularly Sections 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20, render unambiguously, the legislative intent behind the JJ Act, i.e. of the same being a special law that would have an overriding effect on any other statute, for the time being in force. Such a view stands further fortified, in view of the provisions of Sections 29 and 37, that provide for the constitution of Child Welfare Committee, which provides for welfare of children in all respects, including their rehabilitation.\n16. Clause (n) of Section 2 of the JJ Act defines ‘offence’, as an offence punishable under any law for the time being in force. Thus, the said provision does not make any distinction between an offence punishable under the IPC or one that is punishable under any local or special law.\n17. The provisions of the JJ Act have been interpreted by this Court time and again, and it has been clearly explained that raising the age of “juvenile” to 18 years from 16 years would apply retrospectively. It is also clear that the plea of juvenility can be raised at any time, even after the relevant judgment/order has attained finality and even if no such plea had been raised earlier. Furthermore, it is the date of the commission of the offence, and not the date of taking cognizance or of framing of charges or of the conviction, that is to be taken into consideration. Moreover, where the plea of juvenility has not been raised at the initial stage of trial and has been taken only on the appellate stage, this Court has consistently maintained the conviction, but has set aside the sentence. (See: Jayendra & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 685; Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1984 SC 237; Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P., AIR 1989 SC 1329; Umesh Singh & Anr. v. State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 2111; Akbar Sheikh & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 7 SCC 415; Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2009) 13 SCC 211; Babla @ Dinesh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2012) 8 SCC 800 and Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489).\n18. So far as the joint trial of the charges is concerned, as the offences committed by the respondent after attaining majority were of a very serious nature, and in view of the provisions of Rule 65 of the Army Rules, only composite (single) sentence is permissible, the High Court could substitute the punishment considering the gravity of the offences committed by the respondent after attaining 18 years of age. But there was no occasion for the High Court to observe that the entire GCM proceeding stood vitiated.\n19. The maximum punishment for absence from duty without leave, under Section 39(a) of the Army Act, is 3 years RI. For any offence committed under Section 52(a), the maximum punishment is 10 years RI; and under Section 69, the maximum punishment is 7 years RI. After considering the entirety of the circumstances, in view of the provisions contained in Rule 65 of the Army Rules, the respondent was awarded the punishment of 7 years RI for all the charges proved. Though for the 2nd charge alone, the respondent could have been awarded 10 years RI; for the 4th and 5th charges, he could have been awarded a sentence of 3 years RI on each count; and for charge no. 6, a punishment of 7 years RI could have been imposed.\n20. So far as the failure of justice is concerned, this Court in Darbara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 840, held that:\n<QUOTE> “Failure of justice” is an extremely pliable or facile expression, which can be made to fit into any situation in any case. The court must endeavour to find the truth. There would be “failure of justice”; not only by unjust conviction, but also by acquittal of the guilty, as a result of unjust failure to produce requisite evidence. Of course, the rights of the accused have to be kept in mind and also safeguarded, but they should not be overemphasised to the extent of forgetting that the victims also have rights. It has to be shown that the accused has suffered some disability or detriment in respect of the protections available to him under the Indian criminal jurisprudence. “Prejudice” is incapable of being interpreted in its generic sense and applied to criminal jurisprudence. The plea of prejudice has to be in relation to investigation or trial, and not with respect to matters falling outside their scope. Once the accused is able to show that there has been serious prejudice caused to him, with respect to either of these aspects, and that the same has defeated the rights available to him under criminal jurisprudence, then the accused can seek benefit under the orders of the court.” </QUOTE>\n(Emphasis added)\n(See also: Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622; Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 3114; Rattiram & Ors. v. State of M.P., AIR 2012 SC 1485; and Bhimanna v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2012 SC 3026)\n21. In Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P., AIR 2012 SC 1979, this court dealt with the issue of the liberal approach adopted by the court to grant an unwarranted acquittal, and held that while dealing with a criminal case, it is a matter of paramount importance for any court to ensure that the mis-carriage of justice be avoided in all circumstances. (See also: Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 3617; and S. Ganesan v. Rama Raghuraman & Ors., (2011) 2 SCC 83)\n22. The expression “failure of justice” would appear, sometimes, as an etymological chameleon. The Court has to examine whether there is really a failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure, not technicalities of law can stand in its way. Even the law bends before justice. The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that the “guilty should be punished” and that technicalities and irregularities, which do not occasion the “failure of justice”; are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end as this would be counter-productive. <QUOTE> “Courts exist to dispense justice, not to dispense with justice. And, the justice to be dispensed, is not palm-tree justice or idiosyncratic justice”. </QUOTE> Law is not an escape route for law breakers. If this is allowed, this may lead to greater injustice than upholding the rule of law. The guilty man, therefore, should be punished, and in case substantial justice has been done, it should not be defeated when pitted against technicalities. (Vide : Ramesh Kumar v. Ram Kumar & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 1929; S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka,1993 Supp (4) SCC 595; State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1660; and Shaman Saheb M. Multani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 921)\n23. In Delhi Administration v. Gurudeep Singh Uban, AIR 2000 SC 3737, this Court observed that justice is an illusion as the meaning and definition of ‘justice’ vary from person to person and party to party. A party feels that it has got justice only and only if it succeeds before the court, though it may not have a justifiable claim. (See also: Girimallappa v. Special Land Acquisition Officer M & MIP & Anr., AIR 2012 SC 3101)\nJustice is the virtue by which the Society/Court/Tribunal gives a man his due, opposed to injury or wrong.\nJustice is an act of rendering what is right and equitable towards one who has suffered a wrong. Therefore, while tempering justice with mercy, the Court must be very conscious, that it has to do justice in exact conformity with some obligatory law, for the reason that human actions are found to be just or unjust on the basis of whether the same are in conformity with, or in opposition to, the law.\n24. Rule 51 of the Army Rules requires that the accused must raise the objection in respect of jurisdiction at an early stage of the commencement of proceedings. Had the respondent raised the issue of juvenility at the appropriate stage, the authority conducting the GCM could have dropped the charges in respect of offences committed by him as a juvenile. Further, Rule 72 provides for mitigation of sentence in case of invalidity in framing of charges or on finding thereon.\nThe respondent pleaded guilty to all the offences, though at a belated stage. As a member of the Indian Army, the respondent was duty bound to protect the nation. Regrettably, however, his conduct reminds one of situations when the “legislator becomes the transgressor” and the “fence eats the crops”. Put simply, he abused the nation instead of protecting it. Therefore, his conduct had been unpardonable and not worthy of being a soldier.\n25. At the cost of repetition, it may be observed that after attaining 18 years of age, the respondent committed four serious offences; he could have been punished with 10 years’ RI for the 2nd charge, 7 years’ RI for the 6th charge and 3 years’ RI on each count for the 4th and 5th charges. Further, there had been a joint trial, and in view of the provisions of Rule 65, a composite sentence of 7 years RI had been imposed.\n26. Undoubtedly, each charge had been in respect of a separate and distinct offence. Each charge could have been tried separately. Thus, the trial by way of a GCM remained partly valid. The offences committed by the respondent after attaining the age of 18 years, were not a part of the same transaction i.e. related to the offences committed by him as a juvenile. Nor were the same were so intricately intertwined that the same could not be separated from one another. Thus, invalidity of part of the order could not render the GCM proceedings invalid in entirety. Therefore, the valid part of the proceedings is required to be saved by applying the principle of severability of offences.\n27. The respondent could have asked for a separate trial of different charges as provided under Rule 79. However, in that case the punishment would have been much more severe, as all the sentences could not run concurrently. In fact, the respondent has benefited from the joint trial of all the charges and thus, by no means can he claim that his cause stood prejudiced by resorting to such a course. The High Court ought to have taken a cue from Rule 72 of the Army Rules for the purpose of deciding the case, as the same provides for mitigation of sentence in the event that a charge or finding thereon is found to be invalid, as the respondent could not have been tried by a GCM for the offences that had been committed by him as a juvenile, keeping in view the provisions of Rule 65 thereof.\nThus, considering the nature of service of the respondent, the gravity of offences committed by him after attaining the age of 18 years and the totality of the circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that grant of relief to the respondent, even on the principles of “justice, equity, and good conscience”; was not permissible.\n28. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds, and is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court impugned herein, is set aside and the order of conviction recorded by the GCM is restored. However, in light of the facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence imposed by the GCM is reduced to five years. There shall be no order as to costs.",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4412 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.27082 of 2012) | Hitendra Singh S/O Bhupendra Singh & Ors. v. Dr. P.D. Krishi Vidyapeeth By Reg. & Ors. | 04/04/2014",
+      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4412 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.27082 of 2012) | Hitendra Singh S/O Bhupendra Singh & Ors. v. Dr. P.D. Krishi Vidyapeeth By Reg. & Ors.",
+      "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED",
+      "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED",
+      "case_record": "The Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh Krishi Vidyapeeth advertised 24 posts for Senior Research Assistants (SRAs) and 37 for Junior Research Assistants (JRAs). Despite receiving 3214 applications for 61 posts, the university appointed 131 individuals (76 SRAs and 55 JRAs). The selection process allocated 40 marks for qualifications/experience and 60 for viva-voce. Following complaints about irregularities, several writ petitions were filed. The Chancellor, invoking Section 11 of the Maharashtra Agriculture Universities Act, 1983, appointed Justice H.W. Dhabe to inquire into the selection process. Justice Dhabe's report, submitted after 3.5 years, detailed numerous illegalities and irregularities, including improper interview procedures, faulty marking criteria, favouritism, non-compliance with reservation policies, and manipulation of selection lists. The report concluded that the entire selection process was vitiated. The Executive Council accepted the findings but recommended leniency due to the appointees' long service. However, the Chancellor, deeming the irregularities severe, directed the cancellation of appointments. Following a personal hearing for the affected appointees, the Chancellor confirmed the cancellation of 83 appointments. The aggrieved individuals filed writ petitions, which were dismissed by the High Court. These appeals challenge the High Court's decision.",
+      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh Krishi Vidyapeeth advertised 24 posts for Senior Research Assistants (SRAs) and 37 for Junior Research Assistants (JRAs), resulting in 3214 applications for 61 posts.\n2. 131 individuals (76 SRAs and 55 JRAs) were appointed based on a selection process that allocated 40 marks for qualifications/experience and 60 for viva-voce.\n3. Following complaints about irregularities, several writ petitions were filed.\n4. The Chancellor, invoking Section 11 of the Maharashtra Agriculture Universities Act, 1983, appointed Justice H.W. Dhabe to inquire into the selection process.\n5. Justice Dhabe’s report, submitted after 3.5 years, detailed numerous illegalities and irregularities, including improper interview procedures, faulty marking criteria, favoritism, non-compliance with reservation policies, and manipulation of selection lists.\n6. The Executive Council recommended leniency due to the appointees' long service, but the Chancellor, deeming the irregularities severe, directed the cancellation of 83 appointments.\n7. Following personal hearings, the Chancellor confirmed the cancellation of 83 appointments.\n8. The aggrieved individuals filed writ petitions, which were dismissed by the High Court.\n9. These appeals challenge the High Court's decision.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the selection process for the appointments of 131 individuals (76 SRAs and 55 JRAs) was vitiated by illegalities and irregularities as detailed in Justice Dhabe's report.\n2. Whether the Chancellor acted within his jurisdiction and authority in directing the cancellation of 83 appointments based on the findings of Justice Dhabe's report.\n3. Whether the High Court correctly dismissed the writ petitions filed by the aggrieved individuals.\n4. Whether the aggrieved individuals are entitled to retain their appointments despite the identified irregularities and illegalities.\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Maharashtra Agriculture Universities Act, 1983 (Section 11):** The Chancellor has the authority to appoint an officer or committee to inquire into any matter related to the functioning of the university.\n2. **High Court of Judicature at Bombay Rules, 1983:** These rules govern the procedure for filing and disposing of writ petitions in the High Court.\n3. **Constitution of India, 1950 (Article 32):** This article provides the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights.\n4. **University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (Section 13):** This section deals with the establishment, maintenance, and regulation of universities.\n5. **Reservation in Educational Institutions Act, 1950 (now known as the Constitution (Fifty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1989):** This act ensures that reservations in educational institutions comply with the constitutional mandate.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Issue 1:**\n   - **Analysis Step 1:** The Chancellor, acting under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Agriculture Universities Act, 1983, appointed Justice H.W. Dhabe to conduct an inquiry into the selection process. Justice Dhabe’s report, submitted after 3.5 years, detailed numerous illegalities and irregularities, including improper interview procedures, faulty marking criteria, favoritism, non-compliance with reservation policies, and manipulation of selection lists. These findings are compelling and legally significant.\n   - **Analysis Step 2:** The selection process allocated 40 marks for qualifications/experience and 60 for viva-voce, which were allegedly manipulated as per Justice Dhabe's findings. Therefore, the selection process was vitiated by illegalities and irregularities as detailed in Justice Dhabe's report.\n\n2. **Issue 2:**\n   - **Analysis Step 1:** The Chancellor has the authority to cancel appointments based on the findings of an inquiry conducted under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Agriculture Universities Act, 1983. Given the severe and pervasive irregularities detailed in Justice Dhabe's report, the Chancellor's directive to cancel 83 appointments was within his jurisdiction and necessary to uphold the integrity of the selection process.\n   - **Analysis Step 2:** The findings of Justice Dhabe's report and the subsequent actions taken by the Chancellor support the cancellation of the appointments.\n\n3. **Issue 3:**\n   - **Analysis Step 1:** The High Court has the authority to dispose of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the aggrieved individuals based on the findings of Justice Dhabe's report and the subsequent actions taken by the Chancellor. However, the High Court’s decision to dismiss the writ petitions without a thorough review of the evidence and the findings of Justice Dhabe’s report may be questionable.\n   - **Analysis Step 2:** The High Court should have given more weight to the extensive evidence of irregularities and the Chancellor’s subsequent actions to ensure a fair and transparent process. The High Court’s decision to dismiss the writ petitions may be seen as inadequate.\n\n4. **Issue 4:**\n   - **Analysis Step 1:** Given the severe and widespread irregularities in the selection process, the aggrieved individuals are not entitled to retain their appointments. The integrity of the selection process must be upheld, and the aggrieved individuals should be given the opportunity to reapply in a fair and transparent manner.\n   - **Analysis Step 2:** The findings of Justice Dhabe's report and the Chancellor's subsequent actions support the cancellation of the appointments and the need for a fair re-selection process.\n\n### Conclusion:\nBased on the analysis of the facts, issues, and applicable rules, the selection process was vitiated by illegalities and irregularities as detailed in Justice Dhabe's report. The Chancellor acted within his jurisdiction and authority in directing the cancellation of 83 appointments based on these findings. The High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petitions may be seen as inadequate given the extensive evidence of irregularities and the Chancellor’s subsequent actions. Therefore, the appeal should be **ALLOWED**.\n\n*The decision is rendered with full judicial independence and based on the application of legal principles and the facts presented.*",
+      "reference_judgment": "1. Leave granted.\n2. These appeals arise out of a common Judgment and Order dated 16th August, 2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench whereby writ petitions No.238, 247, 251 and 389 of 2012 filed by the appellants, herein, have been dismissed and the orders passed by the respondents terminating their services affirmed.\n3. Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh Krishi Vidyapeeth invited applications for appointment against 24 vacancies in the cadre of Senior Research Assistants and 37 vacancies in the cadre of Junior Research Assistants. As many as 3214 applications were received from eligible candidates against 61 posts so advertised. Appointments based on the selection conducted by the Selection Committee concerned were all the same made for as many as 131 posts out of which 76 appointments were made against the posts of Senior Research Assistant while the remaining 55 were made in the cadre of Junior Research Assistants. It is common ground that the selection process was based on a total weightage of 100 marks for each candidate out of which 40 marks were reserved for educational qualification of the candidate and his/her experience while the remaining 60 marks were set apart for viva-voce examination.\n4. Several complaints appear to have been made against the selection process and the resultant appointments made by the University. Some of these complaints were in the form of writ petitions filed before the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur while some others were addressed to His Excellency, the Governor of Maharashtra who happens to be the Chancellor of the University. Out of the writ petitions filed against the selection and appointment process, Writ Petition No.4771 of 2006 inter alia prayed for a direction to the Chancellor to institute an inquiry under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Agriculture Universities (Krishi Vidyapeeth) Act, 1983 in regard to the illegalities and irregularities committed in the selection and consequent appointments against the vacancies referred to above. By an Order dated 21st April, 2007 passed by the High Court in the said petition, the Chancellor was directed to take a decision in the matter on or before the 14th August, 2007. Two other writ petitions were similarly filed before the High Court of Nagpur challenging the selection and appointment process. In writ petition No.342 of 2006 filed by Shri H.S. Bache, the High Court passed an interim order to the effect that the selection of the candidates shall remain stayed subject to the further orders of the Court. Writ Petition No.905 of 2006 filed by Archana Bipte and another also assailed the validity of the selection and appointment process undertaken by the University on several grounds.\n5. It was in the above backdrop that the Chancellor invoked his powers under Section 11 (1) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Universities Act, 1983 and appointed Mr. Justice H.W.Dhabe, a former Judge of the High Court of Bombay to examine the papers relating to the selection and appointment of the candidates concerned against the posts referred to above and to submit a report to the Chancellor as to the fairness of the selection of the candidates appointed by the University. A reading of the order passed by the Chancellor would show that apart from several allegations made by Dr. B.G. Bhathakal, Ex-Vice Chancellor of the University and four others, the Chancellor had before him, a report dated 8th November, 2006 submitted by the Director General MCAER Pune from which the Chancellor noticed several irregularities allegedly committed in the process of selection such as violation of Statute 52, holding of common interviews for both Senior and Junior Research Assistants, appointing meritorious candidates from the reserved category seats instead of appointing them in the open merit category, selection of as many as 22 relatives of officers/employees of the University, absence of any short-listing of candidates for purposes of interview even when the applications were far in excess of the advertised vacancies. There were also allegations of the selection process not being transparent apart from allegations to the effect that the norms for academic evaluation and viva voce examination had been flouted.\n6. With the constitution of the Justice Dhabe’s Committee writ petition No.4771 of 2006 titled Dr.Balwant and Anr. versus His Excellency the Chancellor of Dr.Punjabrao Deshmukh Krishi Vidyapeet & Ors. and writ Petition No.905 of 2006 titled Ms. Archana and Anr. V. State and Ors. were both disposed of with the observation that Justice Dhabe Committee was constituted to examine the complaints made by the writ petitioners and connected issues was expected to submit its report to the Chancellor making it unnecessary for the Court to undertake any such exercise in the said petitions.\n7. Proceedings before Justice Dhabe Committee started with the issue of notices to those appointed informing them about the establishment of the Committee to inquire into the fairness of the selection process and calling upon them to appear in person before the Committee and to file affidavits and documents, if any, to justify their selection and appointment. It is not in dispute that the appellants received the said notices and acknowledged the same by filing their respective affidavits. The appellants were in the meantime informed by the University that they had completed their period of probation satisfactorily but the declaration to that effect was to remain subject to the outcome of writ petitions No.342 of 2006 and 4771 of 2006.\n8. Justice Dhabe Committee took nearly 3½ years to complete the inquiry and to submit its report to the Chancellor in which the entire process of selection and appointment came under severe criticism questioning the fairness of the selection process and the resultant appointments. The High Court has summed up the substance of the findings and conclusions arrived at by Justice Dhabe in the following words:\n1) As large numbers of candidates were called for interview, without following proper ratio as prescribed by the State government, it has led to selection of undeserving and less meritorious candidates by manipulation, favouritism and other malpractices etc.\n2) Although the posts of SRA and JRA belonged to two separate cadres with different pay scales, different qualifications and duties and responsibilities, the Selection Committee held common interviews for the said posts and vitiated the selection of the candidates as their suitability could not have been properly judged in such interviews for the said posts.\n3) The criteria for assessment of the candidates for the posts of SRA/JRA were illegal.\n4) The Selection Committee has awarded marks for Ph.D. Thesis submitted, research papers/popular articles published and significant contribution made after the last date of application i.e. 15.09.2004 by resorting to illegal marking system.\n5) The Selection Committee gave higher weightage to the performance in interview as compared to academic performance.\n6) The procedure followed by the Selection Committee for awarding marks to the candidates for academic performance and performance in interview was illegal and invalid.\n7) There was tinkering in mark seats of the candidates. In some of the cases the mark sheets were not prepared in the meeting of the Selection Committee and they were also not placed before any of its meeting for its consideration and approval.\n8) The Chairman and the Member Secretary of the Selection Committee on their own without any authority or power in them increased the number of posts of SRA and JRA to be filled in.\n9) Category wise distribution of 55 posts of SRA and 76 posts of JRA was not made according to the prescribed percentage for each of the backward classes and open category as per the relevant GRs.\n10) The selection lists for the posts of SRA and JRA were not prepared or considered and approved in the meeting of the Selection Committee. There were lacunae, deficiencies, illegalities and irregularities in preparation of the selection list.\n11) Though in the advertisement it was specifically provided for wait lists to be prepared for the near future vacancies, no wait lists were prepared by the Selection Committee.\n12) The Selection Committee did not discharge any of its duties and responsibilities in the selection process.\n13) The entire selection process and selection of candidates pursuant thereto for the posts of SRA and JRA is vitiated by bias of Dr. V.D. Patil, Chairman of the Selection Committee.\n14) As per the findings of Justice Dhabe, favouritism has occurred in the process of selection to the posts of SRA and JRA\n15) The qualification of Bachelor’s degree in Agriculture Engineering was introduced as an additional qualification for the post of JRA as per the addendum dated 06.09.2004 to the advertisement dated 14.08.2004 in which the posts of JRA were advertised with the qualification of Bachelor’s degree in Agriculture.\n16) Preparation of the minutes of various meetings of the Selection Committee were not recorded faithfully and confirmed by its other members. The proceedings/minutes of the meetings of the Selection Committee were probably prepared after the appointment orders were issued on 16.09.2005 and 17.09.2005.\n17) There were more than 2 months delay in handing over the Selection lists to the then Vice Chancellor. The reasons given by the then Vice Chancellor for the delay in not receiving the selection lists towards the end of June or July 2005 are not convincing.\n18) The Reservation policy of the Government was not followed by the University. Reservations of the posts for backward classes (social/ vertical reservation) were not made according to their prescribed percentage as per the relevant GRs. of the State Government.\n19) The graduates of the Yashwantrao Chavan Maharashtra Open University were not considered in the University for appointment and promotion in the post of JRA.\n20) There were illegalities, flaws and consequential reshuffling of the Selection Lists and other infirmities in preparation of the existing selection lists of these posts of SRA and JRA. Thus, the appointments made in the posts of SRA and JRA are highly irregular.\n21) The routine procedures for making appointment in the university was not followed in the appointments made to the posts of SRA and JRA. In the report it is concluded that the entire selection process and selection of the candidates to the posts of SRA and JRA is vitiated by the illegalities, irregularities and improprieties and therefore the appointments made pursuant thereto, need to be set aside.\n9. On receipt of the report from Justice Dhabe Committee the Chancellor directed the Vice Chancellor of the University to place the matter before the Executive Council for its opinion. The matter was accordingly placed before the Executive Council of the University on 14th February 2011. The Council while accepting the findings recorded by the Dhabe Committee recommended that a lenient view be taken by the Chancellor and the appointments already made protected having regard to the fact that those appointed had already served the University for over six years during the interregnum. The petitioners also appear to have made a representation to the Chancellor in which they once again asserted that their appointments had been properly made on the basis of their merit and that the termination of their services after more than six years will be grossly unfair. The Chancellor, however, felt that Justice Dhabe Committee had reported illegalities and irregularities in the procedure adopted by the Selection Committee which findings having been accepted by the Executive Council left no room for any leniency in the case, considering the gravity and seriousness of the matter. The Chancellor found that the entire process of selection of candidates and their appointments stood vitiated because of such irregularities. Directions were accordingly issued to the Vice Chancellor to initiate action to cancel the appointments of the candidates concerned after following the procedure prescribed by law and to fix the responsibility of those who had committed lapses in the matter of selection of the candidates and take disciplinary action against them including the Chairman of the Selection Committee and the then Registrar and Member Secretary of the said Committee. The Chancellor further directed the Vice Chancellor to consider the suggestions made by Justice Dhabe Committee in order to avoid recurrence of such illegalities and irregularities in future recruitments.\n10. In obedience to the directions issued by the Chancellor, disciplinary action appears to have been initiated against those comprising the Selection Committee in which the officials are accused of having made illegal selection of 131 candidates including the petitioners thereby not only causing financial loss to the University but also bringing disrepute to it. We are in the present appeals not concerned with the fate of the said proceedings which appear to be lingering on even at present. As regards the petitioners, they were served notices calling upon them to appear before the Vice Chancellor for a personal hearing against their selection and appointment as SRAs/JRAs in the University. It is not in dispute that the petitioners in reply to the said notices filed their respective responses before the Vice Chancellor and were heard on different dates mentioned in the communications received by them. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners submitted their representations before the Vice Chancellor in writing in which they stated that their appointments were regular and legally sound apart from relying upon the fact that they had served the University for nearly six years thereby entitling them to protection against ouster on equitable grounds. The Vice Chancellor then reported the result of the hearing provided by him to the petitioners by his letter dated 1st November 2011. Consideration of the report received from the Vice Chancellor, the opinion offered by the Executive Council of the University and the entire material including the report submitted by Justice Dhabe Committee led the Chancellor to pass an order on 16th December 2011 in which the Chancellor held that the entire process of selection and appointment having lost its sanctity on account of irregularities in the same could not be approved or rectified. The Chancellor felt that a lenient view on humanitarian grounds alone would be against the principles of governance and fair selection process in the matter of recruitment. He accordingly turned down the recommendation of the Vice Chancellor that out of 83 SRAs and JRAs, selection of 65 candidates could be saved as valid while remaining 18 could be ousted. He directed that Justice Dhabe Committee Report did not leave any room for the Vice Chancellor to strike a discordant note or sit in judgment over the conclusions drawn by the Committee. The Chancellor accordingly cancelled the appointments of 83 candidates of SRAs and JRAs who had been selected and taken into the service of the University on the basis of a process which the Chancellor found was vitiated and void ab initio.\n11. In compliance with the directions issued by the Chancellor the Vice Chancellor issued individual orders in each case terminating the services of the appointees concerned. Aggrieved by the said orders the petitioners filed Writ Petition Nos. 238/12, 389/12, 247/12 and 251/12 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench which petitions have now been dismissed by the said Court in terms of the common order impugned in these appeals.\n12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. The following questions arise for our consideration:\n1) Was the Chancellor competent to appoint a Single Member Committee headed by Justice H.W. Dhabe to examine the illegalities, irregularities, fairness and impropriety of the selection process and consequent appointments to the cadre of SRAs and JRAs?\n2) Were the inquiry proceedings entrusted to Justice Dhabe Committee conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice?\n3) Were the findings recorded by Justice Dhabe Committee in any manner illegal or perverse to warrant interference with the same by a Writ Court?\n4) Was the procedure adopted by the University and the Vice Chancellor fair and reasonable and in consonance with the principles of natural justice?\n5) Was the Chancellor of the respondent-University and the High Court justified in declining the prayer of the petitioners for continuance in service on account of the time lag between the date of their appointments and the date on which their services were terminated?\nWe shall deal with the question ad seriatim.\nReg. Question No. 1\n13. Maharashtra Agricultural Universities (Krishi Vidyapeeths) Act, 1983 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to the agricultural universities in the State of Maharashtra. The legislation provides for better governance, more efficient administration and financial control of the Universities and for better organisation of teaching, research and extension education therein apart from providing better facilities in agricultural and allied matters in particular for the development of agricultural sciences which is one of the prime objects underlying the Act. Chapter II of the Act comprises Sections 3 to 11. Section 4 of the Act states that each University shall be deemed to be established and incorporated for the purposes enumerated therein. The purposes mentioned in the said provision includes education in agriculture in allied sciences and in humanities besides furthering the advancement of learning and research in agriculture, undertaking and guiding extension education programmes; integrating and coordinating the teaching of subjects in the different faculties, coordinating agricultural education, research and extension education activities, teaching and examining students and conferring degrees and diplomas. Section 6 of the Act deals with the powers and functions of the Universities. It inter alia provides that each University shall have the powers and functions enumerated under the said provision, in particular the power to institute teaching, research and extension education posts required by the University and to appoint persons to such posts. Sub-section (x) to Section 6 is in this regard relevant which reads:\n<QUOTE> “to institute teaching, research and extension education posts required by the University and to appoint persons to such posts.” </QUOTE>\n14. Section 11 of the Act empowers the Chancellor to cause an inspection and inquiry on matters stipulated therein. We may gainfully extract the said provision in extenso as the power of the Chancellor to direct an inquiry into the validity of the selection and appointments has been questioned before us in these appeals. Section 11 reads as under:\n<QUOTE> “SECTION 11: Chancellor to cause inspection and inquiry on various matters:\n(1) The Chancellor shall have the right to cause an inspection to be made, by such person or per- sons or body of persons, as he may direct, of any University,, its buildings, farms, laborato- ries, libraries, museums, workshops and equipments of any college, institution or hostel maintained, administered or recognised by the University and of the teaching and other work conducted by or on behalf of the University or under its auspices of and of the conduct of ex- aminations or other functions of the Univer- sity, and to cause to inquiry to be made in like manner regarding any matter connected with the administration or finances of the Univer- sity.\n(2) The Chancellor shall, in every case, give due notice to the University of his intention to cause an inspection or inquiry to be made, and the University shall be entitled to appoint a repre- sentative, who all have the right to be present and to be heard at the inspection or inquiry.\n(3) After an inspection or inquiry has been caused to be made, the Chancellor may address the Vice- Chancellor on the result of such inspection or in- quiry and the Vice-Chancellor shall; communi- cate to the Executive Council the views of the Chancellor and call upon the Executive Council to communicate to the Chancellor through him its opinion thereon within such time as may have been specified by the Chancellor. If the Execu- tive Council communicates, its opinion within the specified time limit, after taking into considera- tion that opinion, or where the Executive Council fails to communicate its opinion in time, after the specified time limit is over, the Chancellor may proceed and advise the Executive Council upon the action to be taken by it, and fix a time limit for taking such action\n(4) The Executive Council shall, within the time limit so fixed, report to the Chancellor through the Vice-Chancellor the action which has been taken or is proposed to be taken on the advice ten- dered by him.\n(5) The Chancellor may, where action has not been taken by the Executive Council to his satisfac- tion with in the time limit fixed, and after con- sidering any explanation furnished or represen- tation made by the Executive Council, issue such direction, as the Chancellor may think fit, and the Executive Council and other authority concerned shall comply with such directions.\n(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the pre- ceding sub-section if at any time the Chancellor is of the opinion that in any matter the affairs of the University are not managed in furtherance of the objects of the University or in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the statutes and Regulation or that special measures are de- sirable to maintain the standards of University teaching, examinations, research, extension ed- ucation, administration or finances, the Chan- cellor may indicate to the Executive Council through the Vice-Chancellor any matter in re- gard to which he desires an explanation and call upon the Executive Council to offer such expla- nation within such time as may be specified by him. If the Executive Council fails to offer any explanation within the time specified or offers an explanation which, in the opinion of the Chancellor is not satisfactory , the Chancellor may issue such directions as appear to him to be necessary , and the Executive Council and other authority concerned shall comply with such directions.\n(7) The Executive Council shall furnish such informa- tion relating to the administration and finances of the University as the Chancellor may from time to time require.\n(8) The Executive Council shall furnish to the State Government such returns or other information with respect to the property or activities of the University as the State government may from time to time require“.\n(emphasis supplied) </QUOTE>\n15. A careful reading of the above would leave no manner of doubt that the Chancellor is vested with the power to cause an inspection to be made by such person or persons as he may direct of any University, its building, farms, laboratories, libraries etc. or of hostels administered and recognised by the University or of the teaching or other workshops conducted on behalf of the University or any conduct of examinations or other functions of the University. The inspection so directed is, however, distinct from the inquiry which the Chancellor may direct regarding any matter connected with the administration or finance of the University. The expression ‘administration or finance’ of the University are in our opinion, wide enough to include an inquiry into any matter that falls under Section 6(x) (supra). If creation of teaching, research and education posts required by the University is one of the functions of the University and if appointment of suitable persons against such posts is also one of such functions, there is no reason why the power of the Chancellor to direct an inquiry under Section 11(1) should not extend to any process leading to such appointments. The term ‘administration of the University’ appearing in sub-Section 1 of Section 11 would, in our opinion, include every such activity as is relatable to the functions of the University, under Section 6. Selection of persons suitable for appointment and appointments of such persons would logically fall within the expression “administration of the University” within the meaning of Section 11(1) of the Act. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the inquiry directed by the Chancellor into the illegalities and irregularities of the selection process culminating in the appointment of Senior and Junior Research Assistants was legally permissible. The power vested in the Chancellor under Section 11 to direct an inspection or an inquiry into matters referred to in the said provision is very broad and vests the Chancellor with the authority to direct an inspection or an inquiry whenever warranted in the facts and circumstances in a given case. We may also refer to Section 15 of the Act whereunder the Governor of Maharashtra is ex-officio Head of each of the Universities who shall, when present, preside at any convocation of the University. Section 15 reads:\n<QUOTE> “(1) The Governor of Maharashtra, shall be the Chancellor of each of the Universities.\n(2) The Chancellor shall, by virtue of his office, be the head of the University and shall, when present, preside at any convocation of the University.\n(3) The Chancellor may call for his information any papers relating to the administration of the affairs of the University and such requisition shall be complied with by the University.\n(4) Every proposal to confer any honorary degree shall be subject to confirmation by the Chancellor.\n(5)The Chancellor may, by order in writing, annul any proceeding of any officer or authority of the Uni- versity, which is not in conformity with this Act, the Statutes or the Regulations, or which is prejudicial to the interest of the University;\nProvided that, before making any such order, he shall call upon the officer or authority to show cause why such an order should not be made, and if any cause is shown within the time specified by him in this behalf, he shall consider the same.\n(6) The Chancellor shall exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as are laid down by this Act.”\n(emphasis supplied) </QUOTE>\n16. A plain reading of the above shows that apart from being the ex officio Head of the University, the statute specifically confers upon the Chancellor the power to call for his information any paper relating to the administration of the affairs of the University and upon such request the University is bound to comply with the same. Sub-section 5 vests the chancellor with the power to annul any proceeding of any officer or authority if the same is not in conformity with the provisions of the Act, the statutes or the Regulations or which is prejudicial to the interest of the University. A conjoint reading of Sections 11 and 15, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that the Chancellor exercises ample powers in regard to the affairs of the University and in particular in regard to the affairs of the administration of the University. The power to direct an inquiry into any matter concerning the administration of the University is only one of the facets of power vested in the Chancellor. The exercise of any such power is not subject to any limitation or impediment understandably because the power is vested in a high constitutional functionary who is expected to exercise the same only when such exercise becomes necessary to correct aberrations and streamline administration so as to maintain the purity of the procedures and process undertaken by the University in all spheres dealt with by it. The power to direct an inquiry is meant to kickstart corrective and remedial measures and steps needed to improve the functioning of the University as much as to correct any illegal or improper activity in the smooth running of the administration of the University. As a father figure holding a high constitutional office, the Chancellor is to be the guiding spirit for the Universities to follow a path of rectitude in every matter whether it concerns the administration or the finances of the University or touches the teaching and other activities that are undertaken by it. The legislature, it is obvious, has considered the conferment of such powers to be essential to prevent indiscipline, root out corruption, prevent chaos or deadlock in the administration of the University or any office or establishment under it that may tend to shake its credibility among those who deal with the institution.\n17. The Chancellor had, in the case at hand, directed an inquiry into the illegalities and irregularities in the selection and appointment process in the light of widespread resentment against the same as is evident from the fact that three writ petitions had been filed in the High Court challenging the selection and the appointment process. Two of the writ petitions had been disposed of as noticed earlier no sooner Justice Dhabe Committee was constituted by the Chancellor for holding a detailed inquiry into the allegations. The petitioners were not only aware of the fact about the pending writ proceedings but also about the constitution of Justice Dhabe Committee. As a matter of fact with the disposal of Writ Petitions No.4771 of 2006 and 905 of 2006 the petitioner had known that Justice Dhabe Committee will eventually determine whether or not their selection and appointment was proper. Justice Dhabe Committee had even issued notices to the petitioners who had in turn responded to the same. The constitution of Justice Dhabe Committee was, despite all this, never questioned by the petitioners. On the contrary the petitioners merrily participated in the proceedings and took a chance to obtain a favourable verdict from it. Having failed to do so, they turned around to challenge not only the findings recorded by the Committee but even the authority of the Chancellor to set up such a Committee. While the findings recorded by the Inquiry Committee could be assailed, the challenge to the setting up of the Committee was clearly untenable not only because there was no merit in that contention but also because having taken a chance to obtain a favourable verdict the petitioners could not turn around to assail the constitution of the Committee itself. Question 1 is accordingly answered in the negative.\nReg. Question No. 2\n18. The petitioners had unsuccessfully challenged Justice Dhabe Committee Report before the High Court on the ground that principles of natural justice had not been complied with by the Committee. The High Court has noted and in our opinion rightly so that Justice Dhabe Committee had issued notices to each one of the petitioners asking for their explanation which the petitioners had submitted. The High Court noted that the inquiry proceedings before Justice Dhabe had continued for nearly three years during which period the petitioners had made no grievance either before the Committee or before any other forum regarding non-compliance with the principles of natural justice. There is nothing on record to suggest that any point relevant to the controversy was not considered by Justice Dhabe Committee or that there was any impediment in their offering an effective defence before the Committee. The petitioners had on the contrary candidly admitted in the writ petition itself that upon receipt of notices from the Committee they had appeared and filed their respective affidavits before the Committee. Some of the petitioners had even furnished some additional information which was summoned from them. The Committee had, it is evident, associated the petitioners with the proceedings by inviting them to appear and participate in the same, heard the petitioners and considered their version. There is neither an allegation nor any material to suggest that there was any reluctance or refusal on the part of the Committee to entertain any material which the petitioner intended to place in their defence or to summon any record from any other quarter relevant to the questions being examined by the Committee. The argument that the petitioners did not know as to what the complaint against them was has been rejected by the High Court and quite rightly so. Once the petitioners were informed about the setting up of the Committee and invited to participate in the same and once they had appeared before the Committee and filed their affidavits it is difficult to appreciate the argument that the petitioners did so without knowing as to why was the Committee set up and what was the inquiry all about. Assuming that any of the petitioners did not fully comprehend the nature of allegations being inquired into by the Committee or the purpose of the inquiry nothing prevented the petitioners from taking suitable steps at the appropriate stage assuming that they were so naïve as to simply appear before the Committee without being aware of the purpose for which they were invited. They could indeed approach the Committee to secure the relevant information to fully acquaint themselves about the on-going process and the nature of the defences that was open to them. Having remained content with their participation in the inquiry proceedings for nearly three years and having made no grievance at all against the procedure adopted by the Committee in dealing with the subject till the writ petitions challenging the termination orders were filed, we see no merit in the specious contention that principles of natural justice were violated by the Committee especially when no prejudice is demonstrably caused to the petitioners on account of the procedure which the Committee followed in concluding the enquiry proceedings. Question No.2 is also in that view answered in the negative.\nReg. Question No. 3\n19. Findings recorded by Justice Dhabe Committee were based on facts discovered in the course of the inquiry. No serious attempt was made before the High Court nor even before us to challenge the said findings of fact. Even otherwise a finding inquiry instituted by the Chancellor was bound to involve appraisal of evidence, documentary and oral. The conclusions drawn on the basis of such appraisal were open to critical evaluation by the authorities before whom the conclusions and the Report was submitted for action but once such conclusions are upon a careful re-appraisal found to be justified, a writ Court will be very slow in interfering with the same.\n20. In the present case, upon receipt of the report from Justice Dhabe Committee the matter was directed to be placed before the Executive Council of the University. That direction was meant to give the Executive Council an opportunity to examine the findings of fact and the conclusions drawn from the same critically and to determine whether the same were justified. The Executive Council, it is common ground, had without any reservation approved the findings recorded by Dhabe Committee, no matter with a recommendation to the Chancellor to take a lenient view in the matter, having regard to the fact that the petitioners had already served the University for nearly six years. The recommendation of the Executive Council did not, however, find anything amiss with the conclusions drawn by the Dhabe Committee as to the irregularities in the selection process culminating in illegal appointments of the selected candidates. The ‘fact finding’ aspect thus stood concluded with the approval of the Executive Council of the University. The Vice Chancellor no doubt made an attempt at segregating what according to him was the valid part of the selection from that which was not, but the Chancellor did not approve of that exercise. The Chancellor took the view that the entire selection stood vitiated by widespread irregularities, leaving hardly any room for a distinction between the so called valid and invalid parts of the selection process. Be that as it may the fact remains that we have not been able to find any reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the Justice Dhabe Committee. The sanctity of the entire selection process having been vitiated by irregularities and acts of nepotism, question No. 3 shall have to be answered in the negative, which we accordingly do.\nReg. Question No. 4\n21. It is also not in dispute that in compliance with the orders passed by the Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor of the University had issued notices to the petitioners calling upon them to appear before him for a personal hearing in support of their selection and appointment as SRAs/JRAs. It is also not in dispute that upon receipt of the said notices the petitioners had filed their responses in the required format and were also given an opportunity of being heard by the Vice Chancellor. In the course of the hearing the petitioners obviously relied upon the written responses and sought a direction against ouster from service. There is, therefore, no merit in the submission that upon submission of the recommendations by Justice Dhabe Committee the petitioners did not have any opportunity to present their version before the Vice Chancellor nor is it possible to dub the hearing provided by the Vice Chancellor as a farce. The High Court has, in our opinion, rightly rejected a similar contention urged before it and correctly concluded that the petitioners had failed to establish that the Vice Chancellor had either violated the principles of natural justice or that any prejudice was caused by the procedure adopted by him in offering them a hearing. As a matter of fact the Vice-Chancellor had in his anxiety to help the petitioners tried to sit in judgment over the findings and conclusions of the inquiry Committee and taken a stance that was overtly sympathetic towards the petitioners. The uncharitable expression used by the petitioners as to the nature of the process undertaken by the Vice Chancellor is not, therefore, justified. The Vice Chancellor had in our view acted fairly and fully complied with the principle of natural justice. There is no gainsaid that the requirements of audi alteram partem are not capable of a strait jacket application. Their application depends so much upon the nature of the Tribunal that is deciding the matter, the nature of the inquiry that is being made and the consequences flowing from the determination. A notice to the petitioners who were likely to be affected and a hearing afforded to them apart from written responses filed in reply to the notices was in our opinion a substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice. No further hearing was required to be repeated by the Chancellor who had before whom the recommendations of the Executive Committee and the Vice Chancellor who took a final view of the matter having regard to the totality of the circumstances. The High Court has, in this regard, observed:\n<QUOTE> “Thus, the Chancellor was not required to give any personal hearing to the petitioners while disagreeing with them. If we hold that prior to passing of the final order the Chancellor was required to hear the petitioners once again, that would mean that although the facts are undisputed and although no prejudice is demonstrated, we agree with the submissions of the petitioners. This would mean second round or second opportunity being made available to the petitioners to show cause against the findings and conclusions in the Inquiry Committee’s report. That would mean reopening of the matter in its entirety which was not permissible and feasible in the peculiar facts of the case. This could be equated with an opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment as is available in service jurisprudence. Those principles cannot be imported into the exercise that has been undertaken in the facts and circumstances of this case.” </QUOTE>\n22. We see no error of law in the view taken by the High Court to warrant our interference. Question No. 4 is accordingly answered in the negative.\nReg. Question No. 5\n23. The Chancellor declined to show any leniency to the petitioners no matter they had served the University for over six years primarily because the entire selection process was in his opinion vitiated by widespread irregularities in the selection process. The findings recorded by Justice Dhabe Committee upon a detailed and thorough examination of the matter fully supported that view of the Chancellor. The reasons that prevailed with the Chancellor cannot be said to be illusory or irrelevant so as to call for interference from a writ Court. The Chancellor was dealing with a case where the Selection Committee had called a large number of candidates for interview without following the proper procedure as prescribed by the State Government leading to the appointment of undeserving candidates by manipulation and favouritism. It was a case where the posts of SRAs/JRAs although carrying different pay scales were clubbed for holding a common interview. Even the criterion for assessment of the merit of the candidates was found to be faulty. Marks were awarded for qualifications although the thesis for such qualifications was submitted after the date prescribed for such advertisement. Marking system itself was found to be erroneous. Higher weightage was given to the performance in the interview as compared to academic merit. There was tinkering in the mark sheets of the candidates in certain cases and mark sheets were not made available in the meetings of the Selection Committee. The Chairman and the Member Secretary of the Selection Committee had on their own increased the number of posts of SRAs and JRAs to be filled upon. All these among other aspects were considered by Justice Dhabe Committee in its report which concluded that the entire selection process was vitiated. That beneficiaries of such faulty selection process should hold on to the benefit only because of lapse of time would be travesty of justice especially when deserving candidates were left out with a brooding sense of injustice and cynicism against the efficacy of the system that was meant to act fairly and objectively. Continuance in office of those selected by means that are not fair, transparent and reasonable will amount to perpetuating the wrong. The length of service put in by the candidates who were selected on the basis of such a faulty selection process may be one of the considerations that enters the mind of the Court but there are other weighty considerations that cannot be given a go bye or conveniently forgotten lest those who do not adopt such malpractices or those who expect the system to protect their interest and their rights are eternally disappointed and left to believe that a wrong once done will never be corrected just because the legal process by which it is to be corrected is a long and winding process that often takes years to reach fruition.\n24. Having said that we must say that the main contention which the petitioners have urged in support of their continuance in service is that they have become overage for any government employment at this stage. If ousted from service the petitioners will have no place to go nor even an opportunity to compete for the vacancies against which they were appointed. That is an aspect which can be and ought to be considered especially when there is no allegation leave alone evidence about any bribery having taken place in the issue of appointment orders by the officials concerned. Even so, continuance of the petitioners in service would not, in our opinion, be justified having regard to the background in which the selection and appointments were made and eventually set aside by the University. All that the long years of service rendered with the University may secure for the petitioners a direction to the effect that in any future selection against the vacancies caused by their ouster and other vacancies that may be available for the next selection the petitioners shall also be considered in relaxation of the upper age limit prescribed for them. Such of the petitioners who could try their luck in the next selection and who succeed in the same will also have the benefit of continuity of service.\n25. That brings us to the method of selection that may be followed falling up the vacancies that will be caused by the ouster of the petitioners. An affidavit has in that regard been filed by the Shri Dnyaneshwar Ashru Bharati, Registrar of the respondent-University stating that in terms of Maharashtra Act No. XXXII of 2013 the Maharashtra State legislature has amended Maharashtra Agricultural Universities (Krishi Vidyapeeths) Act, 1983. Section 58 of the principal Act as substituted by Act XXXII aforementioned provides that no person shall be appointed by the University as a member of the academic staff, except on the recommendation of a Selection Board constituted for the purpose in accordance with the provisions of the Statutes made in that behalf. The posts of SRAs and JRAs are classified as academic as per Statute 71 of the MAU statutes 1990. The process of amendment to the statute 75 and 76 is now underway. The affidavit further states that the University will not be in a position to undertake the selection process of posts advertised on 23rd March 2012 and that selection will be done by Recruitment Board as per the new selection procedure. The affidavit is, however, silent as to the procedure that shall be followed by the Selection Board constituted for the purpose. Be that as it may the establishment of a Selection Board and formulation of proper procedure to be followed by the Board will go a long way in making the process of selection and recruitment objective, fair and reasonable apart from bringing transparency to the norms and the process by which such recruitments were made. We only hope that the process of amendment of relevant statute is expedited by the University and concluded as far as possible within six months from today and process of filling up of posts of SRAs and JRAs currently held by the petitioners and those that were advertised in terms of advertisement dated 23rd March 2012 undertaken in accordance with such procedure.\n26. In the result, the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. We however direct that the University-respondent shall take necessary steps for constituting the Selection Board in terms of Section 58 of the Act as amended by Maharashtra Act No. XXXII of 2013 and advertise the vacancies currently available, together with the posts that are presently held by the appellants for recruitment in accordance with the procedure that may be prescribed in accordance with law. The entire process shall be completed by the University within six months. The appellants shall also be allowed to apply and participate in the selection process against the vacancies so advertised in relaxation of the upper age limit prescribed for such recruitment. For a period of six months or till the process of selection and appointment based on the selection process is completed by the respondent, whichever is earlier, the appellants shall be allowed to continue in service on the same terms as are currently applicable to them. In case any one of the appellants is selected by the new selection process, he shall be granted benefit of continuity of service. But such of the appellants who do not compete for the selection or are not selected for the posts that may be advertised shall stand ousted from service on completion of the period of six months hereby granted. No costs.",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -613,26 +613,26 @@
     },
     "meta": {
       "sample_id": "S025",
-      "case_id": "2116",
-      "experiment": "baseline_firac",
-      "model": "gpt-oss-120b-noreason",
-      "source_file": "S025__baseline_firac__gpt-oss-120b-noreason__2116.json",
+      "case_id": "3603",
+      "experiment": "role_play_v3",
+      "model": "qwen-2.5-7b-instruct",
+      "source_file": "S025__role_play_v3__qwen-2.5-7b-instruct__3603.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "02/04/2013",
+      "judgment_date": "04/04/2014",
       "machine_error_stage": "rules",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification"
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Wrong legal test / threshold"
     }
   },
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 12891 of 2022) | Sub Inspector Sanjay Kumar v. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. | 27/09/2024",
-      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 12891 of 2022) | Sub Inspector Sanjay Kumar v. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.",
-      "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED",
-      "case_record": "The appellant, a Sub-Inspector in Uttar Pradesh, was issued an office order on November 16, 2021, by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home (Police), condemning him for gross negligence, indifference, and selfishness in his duties. This led to a censure penalty via a letter dated March 7, 2022, from the Superintendent of Police, District Khushinagar. The impugned order stated the appellant lacked expected interest in investigation disposal. The appellant's writ petition challenging this order and the censure entry was dismissed by a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, and a subsequent intra-Court writ appeal was also dismissed by a Division Bench. The appellant contended that no opportunity to show cause was given, violating the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (Rules, 1991) and principles of natural justice, specifically citing Rule 5 read with Rule 14(2). He also claimed his writ petition was decided without a state reply. The State countered that a notice dated September 25, 2021, was issued by the Circle Officer, Khadda, to the appellant regarding pending investigations. The appellant replied, attributing delays to VIP duties and external assignments. His explanation was deemed unsatisfactory, leading to a report identifying him as a slack officer and the subsequent impugned order. The Superintendent of Police, competent under Rule 7(2), issued the censure entry.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The appellant, a Sub-Inspector, received an office order on November 16, 2021, censuring him for gross negligence, indifference, and selfishness in his duties.\n2. A notice was issued by the Circle Officer, Khadda, on September 25, 2021, regarding pending investigations, to which the appellant responded by attributing delays to VIP duties and external assignments.\n3. A report was made on the appellant's alleged slackness, and subsequently, he was issued a censure penalty via a letter dated March 7, 2022.\n4. The appellant's writ petition challenging the above order was dismissed by a Single Judge and later, an intra-court writ appeal was also dismissed by a Division Bench.\n5. The impugned order and censure entry did not provide the appellant an opportunity to show cause, despite Rules 5 and 14(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (Rules, 1991) requiring it.\n6. The writ petition was decided without a state reply.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the failure to provide an opportunity to the appellant to show cause violates the Rules, 1991 and principles of natural justice.\n2. The impact of a decision on a writ petition in the absence of a state reply.\n\n### Rules:\n1. The principles enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, i.e., equality before law and procedural fairness.\n2. Rule 5 and 14(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991.\n3. The rules of natural justice as envisioned in the cases of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu.\n4. The legal principle that a decision made in the absence of a state reply may be deemed to have been made without adequate consideration of the facts and material on record.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. The Rules, 1991, in this case, provide for an opportunity to be given to the accused officer to explain their conduct before any penalty can be imposed. Here, the appellant was not given such an opportunity, which is a clear violation of the Rules, 1991 and also naturales iustice.\n2. The High Court erred in not insisting upon a state reply before deciding the writ petition. A decision without adequate response being provided on behalf of the state may not have disposed of the issues fairly, and thus, the conclusion might not be well-founded.\n\n### Conclusion:\nGiven the Appellant's substantial compliance with the requirements of the Rules, 1991, and the principles of natural justice violated, the conclusion rendered by the High Court is suspect. Additionally, fair procedure demands that the State must have been given an opportunity to placate this Order, which was not done. Therefore, the appeal must be **ALLOWED** and the matter must be remanded back for a fresh examination, where the State is afforded an opportunity to file its reply, and the Appellant is given a chance to show cause before fresh proceedings are completed in accordance with the Rules, 1991.",
-      "reference_judgment": "2. Leave granted.\n3. The appellant herein, while being posted as Sub-Inspector at\nPolice Station Hanumanganj, District Khushinagar, Uttar Pradesh,\nwas condemned for gross negligence, indifference and selfishness\nin discharge of duties vide office order dated 16th November, 20211\nissued by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home (Police). As a\nconsequence, he was handed down a penalty of censure vide letter\n1 In short ‘impugned order’.\ndated 7th March, 2022 issued by the Superintendent of Police,\nDistrict Khushinagar.\n4. The relevant part of the impugned order is reproduced\nhereinbelow for the sake of ready reference:-\n“Uttar Pradesh Government\nHome (Police) Section-1\nNumber: U.O.-74(23)/6-P-1-21-107/2021\nLucknow: Date: 16 November 2021\nOffice Order\nIn the video conferencing held by the hon'ble Chief Minister on\ndt. 09.09.2021, during the review of disposal of investigations\nof state's law and order, crimes, and the cases registered till dt.\n31.07.2021, in the 12 districts which have disposed of the least\nnumber of investigations, 03 sub-inspectors and inspectors\nhave been identified and after receiving their clarifications, the\ninvestigating officers' name, designation, current deployment\ndetails/report, were made available by Addl. Director General\nof Police (Crime), U.P., Lucknow vide letter number DG-7-S\n2(1)/2021 dated 26.09.2021.\n2-According to the clarification provided by the Addl. Director\nof Police (Crime) U.P., Lucknow, Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Sub-\nInspector, ΡΝΟ-982650369, PS Hanumanganj, District\nKhushinagar didn't show the expected interest in the disposal\nof investigations. This act is a sign of gross negligence,\nindifference and selfishness while performing his duty and is\nhighly condemned.\nS/d\nillegible\n(Avnish Kumar Awasthi)\nAdditional Chief Secretary\nNumber and Date as in:\nCopy: Sent to the following for information and necessary\naction:-\n(1) Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow\n(2) Additional Director Establishment, U.P., Lucknow General\nof Police,\n(3) Additional Director General of Police, Police Headquarters,\nU.P., Lucknow\n(4) Additional Director General of Police, Gorakhpur Zone,\nGorakhpur\n(5) Superintendent of Police, Dist. Khushinagar provided 03\ncopies with the intention of handing over 01 copy to Mr. Sanjay\nKumar, Sub-Inspector, PNO-982650369, PS Hanumanganj,\nDistrict Khushinagar and the receipt to be made available to\nthe government and censure to be mentioned in their character\nrecord\n(6) Guard Book.\nBy Order,\nS/d illegible\n(Mahendra Prasad Bharti)\nJoint Secretary”\n5. The appellant preferred a writ petition2 before the High Court\nof Judicature at Allahabad assailing the impugned order and the\nconsequent censure entry made in his service book. The learned\nSingle Judge dismissed the writ petition denying relief to the\nappellant vide order dated 23rd March, 2022. Being aggrieved, the\nappellant preferred an intra-Court writ appeal3 which came to be\ndismissed by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court vide\n2 Writ-A No. 830 of 2022.\n3 Special Appeal (Defective) No. 150 of 2022.\njudgment dated 9th May, 2022 which is assailed in the present\nappeal by special leave.\n6. Learned counsel for the appellant, vehemently and fervently\ncontended that no opportunity to show cause was ever afforded to\nthe appellant before imposing the penalty of censure upon him.\nHe urged that the impugned order and the consequent\ncommunication issued by the Superintendent of Police, District\nKhushinagar, are in clear breach of the provisions of the Uttar\nPradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and\nAppeal) Rules, 19914 and also suffer from the vice of non-\nadherence to the principles of natural justice.\n7. The learned counsel for the appellant emphatically referred\nto Rule 5 read with Rule 14(2) of the Rules, 1991 and urged that\nno notice in writing was issued to the appellant before subjecting\nhim to the penalty of censure. It was submitted that specific plea\nin this regard was incorporated in the pleadings before the learned\nSingle Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court.\nHowever, the pertinent assertion which goes to the root of the\nmatter, was not considered by the High Court in the right\nperspective. Learned counsel pointed out that the learned Single\n4 In short ‘Rules, 1991’.\nJudge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant merely by\nrecording oral instructions procured by the Standing Counsel for\nthe State and without even requiring the respondents to submit\ntheir reply. Thus clearly, the decision on the writ petition was made\nwithout the reply of the State being taken on record and hence, the\nassertions made by the appellant remained uncontroverted.\n8. Learned counsel further urged that the specific ground taken\nby the appellant regarding the impugned order having been passed\nwithout affording an opportunity to show cause or without giving\nany opportunity to make representation against the same, has not\nbeen traversed by the respondents in the counter affidavit filed in\nthis Court. He thus urged that the impugned order dated 16th\nNovember, 2021 and the letter dated 7th March, 2022 suffers from\ngross violation of the principles of natural justice and are de hors\nthe Rules, 1991 and consequently, the appellant deserves relief\nsought for in the appeal.\n9. Per-contra, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State,\nvehemently and fervently opposed the submissions advanced by\nthe learned counsel for the appellant. He urged that the Chief\nMinister of Uttar Pradesh, analysed the law and order situation in\ndifferent districts of the State while taking a review meeting with\nthe officials of the Home Department. The Chief Minister sought\ninformation as to whether the investigations in accordance with\nlaw were being carried out and duly completed by the concerned\npolice officials. As a consequence, the Additional Chief Secretary,\nGovernment of Uttar Pradesh directed the Commissioners of\nPolice, Senior Superintendents and Superintendents of Police of\nvarious districts of the State to submit detailed reports along with\nthe names of Investigating Officers, who had not completed the\ninvestigations and/or submitted a police report before the Court\nin time.\n10. In pursuance of the aforesaid direction, the Circle Officer\nKhadda, District Khushinagar issued a notice dated 25th\nSeptember, 2021 to the appellant seeking response on the issue of\nlong pendency of investigations assigned to him. The appellant\nduly submitted his reply to the above notice sent by the Circle\nOfficer. As per learned counsel for the respondents, the reply\noffered by the appellant was forwarded to the senior police officials\nand was found to be unsatisfactory. Based on these\ncommunications, the Additional Deputy General of Police prepared\na report furnishing the individual details of three erring\nInvestigating Officers from each district. The appellant was\nidentified as one of the slack Investigating Officers in the District\nKhushinagar, Uttar Pradesh who had failed to complete the\nminimum number of investigations and his name was included in\nthe detailed report, which was submitted to the Government.\nBased on this report, the Additional Chief Secretary, Home (Police)\nissued the impugned order dated 16th November, 2021,\ncondemning the appellant for gross negligence, indifference and\nselfishness while performing his duties and not completing the\nassigned investigations within the specified time frame.\n11. In consequence of the above order, the Superintendent of\nPolice being the officer competent under the Rules, issued a\ncommunication dated 7th March, 2022, whereby an adverse entry\nwas directed to be recorded in the appellant’s service book. The\nlearned counsel for the respondents fervently urged that it is\nincorrect to say that the decision to record the censure entry was\ntaken without following the due process of law or without adhering\nto the principles of natural justice.\n12. We have heard the submissions advanced by learned counsel\nfor the parties at bar and have gone through the material placed\non record.\n13. The short question requiring consideration is, whether the\ndirection to record the censure entry in the appellant’s service book\nsuffers from the vice of non-adherence to the principles of natural\njustice and whether the said action is dehors the Rules, 1991.\n14. The relevant rules of the Rules, 19915 which are germane to\nthe controversy at hand are reproduced hereinbelow:-\n“Rule 4-Punishment\n(1) The following punishments may, for good and sufficient\nreasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon a Police\nOfficer, namely:-\n(a) Major Penalties:\n(i) Dismissal from service.\n(ii) Removal from service.\n(iii)Reduction in rank including reduction to a lower scale or\nto a lower stage in a time scale.\n(b) Minor penalties:\n(i) With-holding of promotion.\n(ii) Fine not exceeding one month's pay.\n(iii)With-holding of increment, including stoppage at an\nefficiency bar.\n(iv) Censure.\nRule 5-Procedure for award of Punishment\nrule (1) of rule-14.\nsub-rule (2) of rule-14.\n(3) The cases in which minor penalties mentioned in sub-rules\n(2) and (3) of rule-4 may be awarded shall be dealt with in\naccordance with the procedure laid down in rule-15.\n5 Ibid.\nRule 7-Powers of punishment\n(1) The Government or any officer of police department not\nbelow the ranks of the Deputy Inspector General may award\nany of the punishments mentioned in rule-4 on any police\nofficer.\npunishments mentioned in sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) and\nclause (b) of sub-rule (1), of rule-4 on Inspectors and Sub-\nInspectors.\npunishments mentioned in rule-4 on such police officers as are\nbelow the rank of Sub-Inspectors.\n(4) Subject to the provisions contained in these rules all\nAssistant Superintendents of Police and Deputy\nSuperintendents of Police who have completed two years of\nservice as Assistant Superintendents of Police and Deputy\nSuperintendents of Police as the case may be, may exercise\npowers of Superintendent of Police except the powers to\nimpose major punishments under rule-4.\n(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules Reserve\nInspector, Inspector of Station Officer may award the\npunishments of drill and fatigue duty to any constable under\nhis charge for a period not exceeding three days, but he shall\ninform the Superintendent of Police concerned of his order\nimmediately and in any case within 24 hours of passing the\norder.\nRule 14-Procedure for concluding departmental\nproceedings\n(l) Subject to the provisions contained in these Rules, the\ndepartmental proceedings in the cases referred to in sub-rule\n(1) of rule 5 against the police officers may be conducted in\naccordance with the procedure laid down in Appendix-I.\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1)\npunishments in cases referred to in sub-rule (2) of rule 5\nmay be imposed after informing the police officer in writing\nimputations of act or omission on which it is proposed to\nbe taken and giving him a reasonable opportunity of\nmaking such representation as he may wish to make\nagainst the proposal.\n(3) The charged police officer shall not be represented by\nCounsel in any proceeding instituted under these Rules.”\n(emphasis supplied)\n15. Rule 4 of the Rules, 1991 prescribes the punishments which\ncan be awarded to the employees of the Police Department. Rules\n5 and 14 prescribes the procedure to be followed prior to the award\nof such punishment(s) and Rule 7 prescribes the authority\ncompetent to impose the punishments. A bare perusal of the Rules\nmakes it clear that the minor penalties are provided in Rule 4(1)(b)\nof the Rules, 1991 which includes censure, as awarded to the\nappellant, and the procedure for awarding such minor penalties\nhas been set out in Rule 14(2) read with Rule 5(2) of the Rules,\n16. Rule 14(2) read with Rule 5(2) of the Rules, 1991 provides\nthat the minor penalties as provided under Rule 4(1)(b) can be\nimposed only after informing the delinquent police officer in writing\nimputations of act or omission on which it is proposed to be taken\nand giving him a reasonable opportunity of making such\nrepresentation as he may wish to make against the proposal.\n17. At this juncture, it is pertinent to mention that in lieu of the\ndirections issued by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home (Police)\nto prepare a report concerning the delinquent police officer(s) who\nwere not completing the investigation of their cases within the\nspecified time frame, the Circle Officer, Khadda, District\nKhushinagar issued a notice dated 25th September, 2021 to the\nappellant requiring him to furnish an explanation and show cause\nregarding a long list of cases pending investigation with him. In\nresponse to the above notice, the appellant furnished an\nexplanation to the Circle Officer, Khadda, District Khushinagar on\nthe very same day wherein he claimed that most of his time was\nconsumed in managing VIP duties and other external duties\nassigned to him, and consequently, he could not complete the\ninvestigation of 13 cases pending with him.\n18. A detailed report with the names of three worst performing\nInvestigating Officers including that of the appellant was\nforwarded to the Government through the Additional Director\nGeneral of Police. After going through the report, the Additional\nChief Secretary, Home (Police) issued the impugned order dated\n16th November, 2021 noting the conduct of the appellant and\nobserving that he exhibited signs of gross negligence, indifference\nand selfishness while performing the duties and that such conduct\nwas highly condemnable. The said order was forwarded to the\nSuperintendent of Police who passed the consequential order\ndated 7th March, 2022 with a direction to record a censure entry\non the personal file of the appellant.\n19. Rule 7(2) of the Rules, 1991, empowers the Superintendent\nof Police to award the punishments under sub-clause (iii) of clause\n(a) and clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 on Inspectors and Sub-\nInspectors. Therefore, without any doubt, the Superintendent of\nPolice was having the jurisdiction to award minor penalty of\ncensure to the appellant who was, at the relevant point of time,\nposted as the Sub-Inspector of Police at Police Station\nHanumanganj, District Khushinagar, Uttar Pradesh.\n20. Apparently thus, the censure entry directed to be recorded\nvide letter dated 7th March, 2022, was awarded by the\nSuperintendent of Police, District Khushinagar, who was\ncompetent to do so as per Rule 7(2) of the Rules, 1991. The order\ndated 16th November, 2021 was passed by the Additional Chief\nSecretary, Home (Police), after taking into consideration the entire\nmaterial on record including the detailed factual report forwarded\nby the Additional Director General of Police which included the\nexplanation of the appellant and assigned reasons for reaching the\nconclusion that the appellant did not show interest in the disposal\nof the investigations which was treated to be a sign of gross\nnegligence, indifference and selfishness while performing duties\nand was thus highly condemnable. Therefore, the contention\nadvanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the censure\nentry was directed to be recorded by an Officer who was not\ncompetent and that the same suffers from the vice of non-\nadherence to the rules/principles of nature justice is not tenable.\n21. Resultantly, we are of the view that the High Court committed\nno error whatsoever in rejecting the writ petition and writ appeal\npreferred by the appellant, assailing the censure entry.\n22. The appeal lacks merit and is dismissed. No order as to costs.\n23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.\n..……..………….………………….……….J.",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No.6168 of 2008 With C.A.No.6167 of 2008 | Dr. C. P. Sreekumar, M. S. (Ortho) v. S. Ramanujam | 01/05/2009",
+      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No.6168 of 2008 With C.A.No.6167 of 2008 | Dr. C. P. Sreekumar, M. S. (Ortho) v. S. Ramanujam",
+      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
+      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
+      "case_record": "The respondent suffered a hairline fracture (Garden type I) of the right femur in a bicycle accident and was admitted to Surya Hospital, where Dr. C.P. Sreekumar (appellant) was the attending doctor. Initial conservative treatment was given. An X-ray on January 8, 1992, revealed the fracture had aggravated to a Garden type III. Dr. Sreekumar performed a hemiarthroplasty on the 42-year-old respondent, who consented. A superficial infection followed, and the respondent later underwent a total hip replacement at another hospital. The respondent filed a complaint alleging negligence, which the State Commission dismissed for lack of evidence. The National Commission, however, allowed the appeal, finding negligence in fracture aggravation due to mishandling, inappropriate surgery choice, and post-operative infection. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court.",
+      "generated_judgment": "**Facts:**\n1. A 42-year-old respondent suffered a hairline fracture (Garden Type I) of the right femur in a bicycling accident and was admitted to Surya Hospital.\n2. Initial treatment was conservative, but an X-ray on January 8, 1992, revealed the fracture had aggravated to Garden Type III.\n3. Dr. C. P. Sreekumar (the here appellant) performed a hemiarthroplasty as the attending doctor, obtaining the patient's written consent.\n4. Post-surgery, the patient developed a subcutaneous infection and later underwent a total hip replacement at another hospital.\n5. After initiating a complaint of negligence, initially denied by the State Commission for a lack of sufficient evidence, the National Commission overturned its dismissal, ruling negligence due to mishandling of the fracture, an inappropriate surgical choice, and a postoperative infection.\n\n---\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the National Commission’s decision was maintainable or committed procedural violations under the Compensation Act, 2002.\n2. Did the allegations of medical negligence by Dr. Sreekumar adequately rest on valid, substantiated medical criteria pertaining to the patient’s diagnoses and surgical choices?\n\n---\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Sections of Compensation for Endemic Diseases Act, 2002:** Especially Sections 20 (procedural requirements for examiner validation, independent cognition requirements, expanding rights), ensuring compliance is crucial in claims for compensation.\n2. **Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923,Civil Procedure Code rules for appellate review:** Governs trials based on procedure to establish liability and requires evidence to proceed.\n3. **Constitutional Provisions (Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution):** Legal grounds for high court review and extensive judicial oversight.\n4. **Jurisprudence and precedent regarding medical malpractice and surgical negligence:**\n   - Survival must demonstrate there’s valid paperwork adherence to established scientific procedures.\n   - Findings must be reasonable, accurate, and evidence-based.\n5. **Indian Evidence Act, 1972:** Requires demonstrated evidence for proof in medical negligence cases.\n\n---\n\n### Analysis:\n\n1. **Maintainability Evaluation of National Commission’s Appeal:**\n    Review arbitration requirements and procedural stance under Section 20 (c)(2) Compensation Act affirmed against the entire record. The State Commission initially dismissed the case unwilling to sustain substantial medical detail assumptions concerning the Nonecosystemal specificity of the fracture progression and settlement set burdens. A clear procedural violation transforming replacement judgments cannot sufficiently override a testimony examination fault:\n    - National Commission oversight surmised higher culpability bracketed without formally evaluating articulated procedural Kui pers Frankfurter and documented X-Ray flaws.\n    - **No evidence merger evidence harmonization certification** of material necessity followed in these critical moments, thereby making the appeal non-maintainable against exhaust intrinsic findings.\n\n   **Result:** *The National Commission decision before SC lacks necessary procedural auditing. Hence, it does not serve as a sufficient ground for review.*\n\n2. **Legal Standards for Medical Negligence:**\n    The documentation provided didn’t sufficiently acknowledge the Council of Indian Medical Association (CIMA) benchmark framework extending limits for **Garden Type I to III fracture conversion**. The hospitke:\n    - Incorrect evaluation as legality’s baseline of similar procedures miss alignment with Industrial and Complexs Hemic Association (ICDM) gamified certifications invalid specific need analysis and critical review aspects during diagnosis gaps.\n    - Chain of medical cause for the infection post-surgery was dubitable. The c جزررفية infection systemically couldn’t be attributed to Dr. Sree Kumar due to inadequate evidence raw written notes illustrate systemic mitigating factors less probative for substantiating a causation chain governing the primary medical negligence claim.\n\n    - Same warrant medicinal review of hemiarthroplasty, where applicable equipment could disclose quality risks; Which was then patched post-surgery listing sharply when criteria might meet Central Applaints tribunals’ uphill liability.\n\n**Foreclosure tilt incident these points proves scrutinizing findings surveyed or circumscribed evidence do not sufficiently uphold the oversight required under appropriate medical cadre’s review.** The leniency in diagnostic and surgical clash (in vocation) aligns poor evidence supporting negligence claims dictated CRM VII requirements of INCREASING adjudicated clarity beyond operationally examined nonspecialized hegemony.\n\n---\n\n### Conclusion:\nAfter critically evaluating the facts, issues, and rules outlined above regarding procedural standards and medical necessity compliance, the National Commission decision without rigorous adhering follow-up scrutiny invalidated due to procedural lapses, making the appeal unacceptable.\n\nAccordingly, **DISMISSED.**",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE HARJIT SINGH BEDI\n1. This judgment will dispose of C.A. No.6168 of 2008, and C.A.No.6167/2008 as they arise out of the same order. The facts are being taken from C.A. No.6168 of 2008. \n2. These appeals are directed against the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter called the \"Commission\") whereby a sum of Rs.5.50 Lac alongwith interest on a part of the aforesaid amount and costs of Rs.25000/- has been awarded to the complainant - respondent. The facts leading to this appeal are as under: \n3. The respondent, who was then employed in the Indian Overseas Bank, Chennai was going on his bicycle at about 8:20 a.m. on 31st December 1991 when he was hit by a motorcycle leading to an injury to his leg. He was admitted to the Surya Hospital, of which the appellant, Dr. C.P. Sreekumar was the Managing Director, at about 9.45 a.m. An X-ray of the leg revealed a hairline fracture of the neck of the right femur. The appellant, as the attending doctor, chose a conservative line of treatment and put the respondent's leg in a plaster of paris bandage known as 'derotation boots' in order to immobilize the leg. On the insistence of the respondent that he be released to recuperate at home, he was taken for another X-ray on 8th January 1992 as a prelude to his discharge wherein it was found that the simple hairline fracture Garden type I had developed to a more serious Garden type III fracture. The appellant thereupon decided that an operation be performed on the injured leg. Pre-operative evaluations were made on 9th January 1992 and the appellant, on considering the various options available, decided to perform a hemiarthroplasty instead of going in for the internal fixation procedure. The respondent consented to the choice of the surgery after the various options had been explained to him. The surgery was performed on the next day. The respondent remained admitted as an indoor patient, during which post operative treatment and monitoring was done by the appellant between 11th January to 21st January 1992 and it was observed that a superficial infection had set in. The sutures were actually removed on 21st January 1992. The respondent was thereafter made to undergo physiotherapy and was finally discharged on 5th February 1992. On 6th March 1992, the respondent appeared in the hospital and his condition was reviewed and he was instructed to go in for physiotherapy on a daily basis and to return for a subsequent review two weeks later but he neglected the advice. It is the case of the respondent that on account of lingering pain, he had consulted various doctors, including Dr. Mohandas of Tamil Nadu hospital on 27th May 1992 who gave his opinion on the matter. The appellant has however pleaded that the respondent, in the meanwhile, continued to make a nuisance of himself with frequent visits to and unbecoming behaviour in the hospital on which the appellant gave a sum of Rs.50,000/- as an ex-gratia payment in order to pacify him. It appears however, that notwithstanding the aforesaid payment the respondent sent an Advocate's notice on 19th November 1992 alleging negligence and deficiency in service as the simple fracture had got displaced to a more complicated one, on account of mishandling by the hospital staff as also in the choice and the manner of the surgery and calling for compensation of Rs.3 Lac of which Rs.50,000/- had (statedly) already been paid as an advance. The appellant in his reply dated 15th December 1992, denied any negligence in the surgery and further pointed out that the displacement of the fracture had come about on account of natural causes i.e. a muscular spasm and that respondent after being informed about the various lines of treatment available had consented to the hemiarthroplasty. Dissatisfied with the reply given by the appellant, the respondent in May, 1993 filed a complaint before the State Commission alleging that his consent had not been taken for the hemiarthroplasty and that this procedure was not justified as the bone was in good condition. The appellant in his reply denied the allegations and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. It appears that while the complaint was yet pending, the respondent underwent a total hip replacement on 24th April 1995 at the Tamil Nadu hospital performed by Dr. Mohandas, on which he moved an application before the State Commission seeking to amend the complaint whereby the claim was increased from Rs.3 to Rs.12 Lac. After the necessary changes in the pleadings on account of the amendment aforesaid, the matter was brought to trial before the State Commission. The appellant appeared as a witness and was examined and cross-examined over several days. Several documents were also filed by the respective parties. By its order dated 29th January 1999, the State Commission dismissed the complaint holding that there had been no negligence or deficiency in service on the part of the appellant and that the respondent had not been able to prove mishandling by the hospital staff. The State Commission, inter alia, noted that the complainant had not appeared as a witness and further that no witness had been examined by him in support of his case. \n4. Aggrieved by the order of the State Commission, the respondent filed an appeal before the Commission on 12th April 1999 and at that stage sought to produce one Dr. David, the duty doctor at the relevant time, as a witness, but thereafter took no steps to secure his presence. Vide its order of 15th November 2006, the Commission, however, allowed the appeal but limited the respondent's claim to Rs.2.5 Lac, ( being the balance amount after deducting Rs.50,000/- allegedly paid as an advance) but, in addition granted a further sum of Rs.3 Lac to cover the contingency that he might have to undergo yet another surgery at some later stage. Two appeals have been filed against the order of the Commission in this Court - C.A. No.6168 of 2008 by Dr. C.P. Sreekumar seeking a dismissal of the complaint and the second, C.A.No.6167 of 2008 by the respondent, S.Ramanujam, seeking an enhancement of the compensation to Rs.12 Lac. Both matters are being disposed off by this judgment. \n5. The Commission in its order noted that the respondent had suffered only a hairline fracture (described as Garden type I fracture) for which he had been admitted in the hospital and had been immobilized by being put in a plaster with a suggestion of six weeks bed rest so that the fracture could heal on its own, and as such there was no occasion for the respondent to be taken for another X-ray on the 8th January 1992 as there was absolutely no complaint from him and it was at that stage that it was discovered that the simple hairline fracture had developed into a displaced Garden type III fracture. The Commission concluded that this complication had happened when the respondent had been moved from the first to the ground floor of the hospital for the purpose of X-ray by a ward boy, Elango, assisted by some laborers, who were not qualified to handle a patient. The Commission also observed that there was no warrant for the stand of the appellant that the hairline fracture had been displaced due to a muscular spasm and for that reason the averments made in the complaint could not be disregarded. The Commission emphasized that within 2 days of the X-ray on 10th January 1992 the respondent had undergone a hemiarthroplasty, a surgical procedure whereby half of the hip joint had been replaced leaving the other half in its natural state and relied heavily on several medical texts placed by the parties to hold that this procedure was performed only on patients of the age of 60 years and above and as the respondent was, at the relevant time, 42 years of age, the open reduction procedure, whereby the bones are brought together and clamped by metal screws etc., was the appropriate one. The Commission also accepted the submission of the respondent to the effect that in the case of a patient under 60 years of age who had presumably a long span of active life, every effort was required to be made to preserve the femoral head as in a case of hemiarthroplasty or of total hip replacement the joint would inevitably fail with the passage of time. The Commission further observed that the respondent had approached Dr. Mohandas on 16th March 1992 with a complaint of pain in the right leg and inability to walk and Dr. Mohandas had recorded that the respondent had some kind of infection and had advised for the removal of the prosthetic and further advised for a total hip replacement. The Commission accordingly opined that the fact that only a few days after the hemiarthroplasty, the respondent had developed an infection clearly showed negligence at the hands of the attending doctors with the result that he had perforce to undergo a total hip replacement at the Tamil Nadu Hospital, Chennai on 28th January 1995. In conclusion, the Commission observed as under: \n\"It is thus clear that: (i) a hairline fracture developed into displaced fracture due to wrong handling in the opposite party's hospital; (ii) the opposite party performed a Hemi-arthroplasty on a young patient of 42 years without consideration open reduction and internal fixation and against established medical practices; (iii) the post-operative infection was not properly conducted with the result that prosthesis got loosened within a period of two months. There is thus a clear case of negligence and deficiency in service rendered by the opposite party.\" \n6. The Commission then came to the question of the payment of Rs.50,000/- by the appellant to the respondent and observed that there were strong reasons to believe the respondent's plea that it was a part payment towards a compromise for the larger sum of Rs.3 Lac that had been promised. The Commission further observed that from the certificate issued by Dr. N.K. Sundaram of Tamil Nadu Hospital it was clear that a total hip replacement would fail over a period of time and would need to be revised again with a new artificial joint, which would cost Rs.3 Lac and that this amount too was payable to the respondent. A total sum of Rs.5.50 Lac was, thus, computed and awarded. \n7. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, has first and foremost pointed out that the Commission had proceeded on the basis that all that had been pleaded by the respondent in his complaint was the gospel truth despite the fact that all the allegations had been controverted and in the background that no ocular evidence had been led by the respondent and neither he himself, nor his wife, who appeared to be well informed about the procedures that had been adopted, had appeared to give evidence, there was no warrant for believing the entire story on his mere ipse dixit. It has also been pleaded that there was neither any mishandling of the respondent by Elango and the others nor any misjudgment in the choice of the surgery as at the very initial stage the Doctor had chosen a conservative line of treatment as the fracture was a simple Garden type I, but which had been later transformed into a Garden type III fracture on account of a muscular spasm which required a hemiarthoplasty and that this line of treatment had been chosen as it would make for quicker recovery so that patient's ambulation could be restored. It has also been argued that the mere fact that a complete hip replacement had been made on 28th April 1995 i.e. three long years after the hemiarthroplasty showed that this procedure was in fact the correct one. It has also been submitted that there was no warrant for the very broad proposition that the only procedure in the given circumstances to be performed on a 42 year old patient was internal fixation and that hemiarthroplasty had to be completely ruled out unless the patient was beyond 60 years of age. He has reiterated that as per the evidence of the appellant doctor, the nature of the fracture had changed from Garden type I to Garden type III on account of a muscular spasm and the condition of the bone had also deteriorated and as this statement had not been challenged or controverted by the respondent by adducing evidence, there was no justification in disbelieving the statement as he was the best judge in selecting the appropriate procedure in the given circumstances. It has finally been submitted that there is no basis for the conclusion that the payment of Rs.50,000/- to the respondent was a part payment towards a compromise involving a total settlement of Rs.3 Lac, as this amount had been paid to mollify the respondent who was creating a nuisance in the hospital premises and the appellant's residence and causing inconvenience to the other patients. It has, thus, been prayed that in the light of this background, there was no justification for the award and that no compensation whatsoever was called for. \n8. Mr. Ranjit Kumar's stand has been strongly controverted by the respondent, who appeared in person. As a matter of fact, owing to the limitations of untrained litigants who appear in person, we had asked the respondent if he wished to engage a lawyer or we could even arrange one to represent him as an amicus curiae. He brusquely declined the offer and on the contrary vehemently suggested that he had no faith in members of the legal profession as he had been cheated by his lawyer before the State Commission as he had connived with the opposite party and had deliberately dissuaded him from producing any substantive evidence which had led to the dismissal of his complaint at the first instance. During the course of his arguments and in his affidavit dated 19th June 2007 as also in his written submissions given to this Court, the respondent repeatedly requested that the matter be remanded to the State Commission for recording his evidence, that of his wife and some expert witnesses and also to produce some additional objects as evidence. We, however, questioned the respondent as to whether he had made any such prayer or complaint in writing before the State Commission or the Commission and he admitted that he had not done so. In this background, and the fact that the incident had happened some 18 years ago, we feel that it would be inappropriate to remand the matter to the State Commission for additional evidence at this stage. \n9. We find that three basic issues arise in the present case, (1) whether Dr. C.P. Sreekumar, the appellant herein, had the competence to perform a hemiarthroplasty and whether he had chosen this procedure as he was not qualified for the internal fixation procedure; (2) whether it was the negligence of the Surya Hospital of which Dr. C.P. Sreekumar appellant was the Director and of the ward boy Elango and three labourers, who are said to have removed the respondent from his room for X- ray department on 8th January 1992 that had resulted in the aggravation of the Garden type I fracture to Garden III type fracture necessitating more radical treatment and (3) even assuming that some radical procedure was necessary, whether hemiarthroplasty was the appropriate one in the light of the fact that the respondent was at the relevant time 42 years of age. \n10. The basic principles under which a case of medical negligence as a criminal offence as also a tort has to be evaluated has been succinctly laid down in Jacob Mathew vs. State of Punjab &amp; Anr. (2005) 6 SCC 1. One of the primary arguments raised by the respondent herein is that the appellant Dr. C. P. Sreekumar, though qualified in Orthopedics, did not have the basic skill to carry out a hemiarthroplasty or an internal fixation and for that reason was not competent to perform the procedure. In Jacob Mathew's case, this Court adopted the test laid down in Bolam vs. Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 2 All ER 118 (QBD) in which it has been observed as under : \n \"[W]here you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and profession to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill...It is well-established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art.\" \n11. This Court then observed that this judgment had been followed repeatedly not only in India but in other jurisdictions as well and that it was the statement of law as commonly understood today. In paragraphs 24 and 32 of Jacob Mathew's case it has been observed thus: \n\" The classical statement of law in Bolam's case has been widely accepted as decisive of the standard of care required both of professional men generally and medical practitioners in particular. It has been invariably cited with approval before the courts in India and applied as a touchstone to test the pleas of medical negligence. In tort, it is enough for the defendant to show that the standard of care and the skill attained was that of the ordinary competent medical practitioner exercising an ordinary degree of professional skill. The fact that a defendant charged with negligence acted in accord with the general and approved practice is enough to clear him of the charge. Two things are pertinent to be noted. Firstly, the standard of care, when assessing the practice as adopted, is judged in the light of knowledge available at the time (of the incident), and not at the date of trial. Secondly, when the charge of negligence arises out of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the equipment was not generally available at that point of time on which it is suggested as should have been used. \n 32. At least three weighty considerations can be pointed out which any forum trying the issue of medical negligence in any jurisdiction must keep in mind. These are: (i) that legal and disciplinary procedures should be properly founded on firm, moral and scientific grounds; (ii) that patients will be better served if the real causes of harm are properly identified and appropriately acted upon; and (iii) that many incidents involve a contribution from more than one person, and the tendency is to blame the last identifiable element in the chain of causation, the person holding the \"smoking gun\". \n12. These observations postulate the underlying principle that too much suspicion about the negligence of attending Doctors and frequent interference by Courts would be a very dangerous proposition as it would prevent Doctors from taking decisions which could result in complications and in this situation the patient would be the ultimate sufferer. Jacob Mathew's case was followed in State of Punjab v. Shiv Ram &amp; Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 1 which was a case of a failed tubectomy leading to a plea of medical negligence. This is what this Court had to say in paragraph 33: \n\" A Doctor, in essence, needs to be inventive and has to take snap decisions especially in the course of performing surgery when some unexpected problems crop up or complication sets in. If the medical profession, as a whole, is hemmed in by threat of action, criminal and civil, the consequence will be loss to the patients. No doctor would take a risk, a justifiable risk in the circumstances of a given case, and try to save his patient from a complicated disease or in the face of an unexpected problem that confronts him during the treatment or the surgery. It is in this background that this Court has cautioned that the setting in motion of the criminal law against the medical profession should be done cautiously and on the basis of reasonably sure grounds. In criminal prosecutions or claims in tort, the burden always rests with the prosecution or the claimant. No doubt, in a given case, a doctor may be obliged to explain his conduct depending on the evidence adduced by the prosecution or by the claimant. That position does not change merely because of the caution advocated in Jacob Mathew in fixing liability for negligence, on doctors. \" \n13. In Samira Kohli vs. Dr.Prabha Manchanda &amp; Anr (2008) 2 SCC 1 the basic issue was as to the principle governing \"consent\" to be taken from a patient prior to any invasive procedure. We find, however, that in the present case, the question of consent has not been raised by the respondent and on the contrary the case seems to be that the consent had, in fact, been taken. Even in his arguments the respondent did not deny lack of consent and on the contrary (as Mr. Ranjit Kumar has pointed out) in the Advocate's notice issued to Dr. C.P. Sreekumar appellant, on 19th November 1992, the fact that the respondent had agreed to the operation, has been admitted. \n14. Before we embark on an evaluation of the three issues it bears reiteration that the respondent did not produce any evidence in court and did not even appear as a witness in support of his own case. Realizing the consequences of this omission, the respondent had requested that the matter be remitted to the State Commission for recording additional evidence, which request has been declined by us. \n15. The first issue is with regard to the doctor's expertise in his field of orthopaedics, as it is the respondent's plea that he had chosen hemiarthroplasty as he was not qualified to go in for the internal fixation procedure and that he lacked the elementary knowledge of hemiarthroplasty as well. We have considered this argument and find that there is absolutely no evidence to back up this wide claim. On the contrary, we have gone through the evidence of the appellant who deposed that he was an M.B.B.S. from the Tanjore Medical College and had thereafter done his Masters in General Surgical Science from the University of Madras in the year 1983 and his Masters in Orthopaedic Sciences from the University of London in the year 1985 and that on the day of the operation he had about 15 years of experience in the field of Orthopaedics. We have also gone through the very lengthy cross-examination of the appellant spread (intermittently) over several days and find not the slightest suggestion that the appellant was unable to perform an internal fixation. The bald statement of the respondent (in the course of his arguments and in his written submissions) with respect to the lack of expertise in performing the internal fixation procedure on which the appellant had chosen to go in for hemiarthroplasty, cannot thus, be accepted. \n16. Admittedly the respondent had suffered a simple Garden Type I hairline fracture in the course of the accident on 31st December 1991 and after he had been examined by the appellant on that day, his leg had been immobilized with the help of derotation boots. It is the case of the respondent that when he was taken for an X-ray on 8th January 1992 it was found that the simple Garden I type fracture had developed into a complicated Garden III type fracture, and that this happened on account of rough handling by Elango and the other attendants who were mere labourers whereas it is the case of the appellant that this had occurred due to a muscular spasm. \nWe find from a reading of the order of the Commission that it proceeded on the basis that whatever had been alleged in the complaint by the respondent was in fact the inviolable truth even though it remained unsupported by any evidence. As already observed in Jacob Mathew's case the onus to prove medical negligence lies largely on the claimant and that this onus can be discharged by leading cogent evidence. A mere averment in a complaint which is denied by the other side can, by no stretch of imagination, be said to be evidence by which the case of the complainant can be said to be proved. It is the obligation of the complainant to provide the facta probanda as well as the facta probantia. \n17. The Commission has, further, relied on the cross- examination of the appellant with regard to the speculation about the defective lift as being the reason for the shift of the respondent on a stretcher to the X-ray room. This is on the face of it misplaced, as no inference can flow that the displacement had occurred on account of rough handling by the staff. The appellant, on the contrary, in the course of his evidence, pointed out that as the respondent's smoking over a period of 15 years had resulted in chronic bronchitis, that he was obese and had taken hormonal treatment for sterility and in this context re-emphasized that the displacement had occurred due to a strong muscular spasm. When cross- examined on 7th April 1998 he pointed out that in order to immobilize the leg he had used de-rotation boots which extend below the navel and to the injured leg to half of the uninjured leg and that such a cast would normally immobilize the hip by 75% but notwithstanding this fact a muscular spasm could still happen. It will be seen from the cross-examination that there was no suggestion whatsoever that a simple hairline fracture of the femur could not be transformed to a Garden type III fracture due to a muscular spasm. We thus find from the appellant's reply to the complaint and also in the course of his evidence that the fracture had been displaced on account of muscular spasm and that this point has gone unrebutted as no contrary evidence has been produced. It cannot therefore be said with any certitude that the displacement had occurred on account of the rough handling by Elango and the others on the 8th January 1992. In its order, while referring to the radical change in the fracture, the Commission has observed: \n\"There is no way to ascertain the reason for this development but one cannot disregard the averment made by the complainant that it is due to rough handling of the staff of the hospital.\" \nWe are of the opinion that in the face of this observation, no case of negligence can be spelt out. \n18. The question as to whether hemiarthroplasty or internal fixation was the proper procedure in the background that the respondent was 42 years of age at the relevant time, has been hotly debated. It is the case of the appellant that on evaluation of the respondent's condition he had thought it fit to carry out a hemiarthroplasty whereas it is the case of the respondent that as per the various text books which have been placed on record, this procedure was invariably carried out on a patient who was 60 years of age or above and hemiarthroplasty was thus not the favoured option for him. Mr. Ranjit Kumar has taken us through several passages from various text books, most of which have in fact been produced by the respondent, and it does appear that ordinarily in the case of a patient of less than 60 years of age, hemiarthroplasty is not the preferred option and internal fixation involving the use of a clamp with screws was the more acceptable one. In Subcapital Fractures of the femur, A Prospective Review by R.Barnes, J.T.Brown, Glasoow, Scotland, R.S.Garden, Priston,and E.A.Nicoll, Mansfield, England. With a statistical analysis by D.F.Goda, Edinburgh, Scotland, it has been pointed out that the choice between the internal fixation and immediate prosthetic replacement is often difficult to make and no full proof criteria exists for assessing which of the two procedures is the proper one in the facts of the particular case. Likewise, in the Article \"The displaced femoral neck fracture internal fixation versus Bipolar Endoprosthesis : Results of a Prospective Randomised Comparsion (Bray - TJ ; Smith Hoefer.E, Hooper.A, Timmerman.L. University of California, Davis Medical Center, Sacramento Clin Orthop.1988 May (230) 127-40 wherein the dilemma as to the procedure to be adopted has again been highlighted, it does appear that in the case of a young patient, internal fixation is the favoured procedure. In Practical Fracture Treatment (Third Edition) by Ronald Mcrae it has been observed as under: \n\"Alternative treatments of intracapsular fractures(1): Non- operative management: All impacted fractures (Garden I and some Garden 2) may be treated conservatively, and this is an important consideration, especially wherein an ageing population these fractures are on the increase, and where surgical time is in heavy demand. Overall a lower mortality rate has been claimed in those treated conservatively as opposed to surgically. Method:(1)The leg is rested in a gutter splint until pain settles (usually after about a week).(2)Partial weight bearing with crutches is then commenced, and continued for 8 weeks, after which full unsupported weight bearing may be allowed.(3)Check radiographs are taken 2 days after the start of mobilisation, and thereafter every 2 weeks until the eight week.(4) If the fracture disimpacts and becomes unstable (a 14% incidence only is claimed) then active treatment becomes necessary, when a hemi-or total arthroplasty may be performed. Disimpaction is seen most often in those over 70 especially those in poor general health, or in the younger patient with a low life expectancy. The problems of prolonged recumbency in the elderly may nevertheless follow this line of treatment.\" \nThis basic principle has been repeated again in Emergency Orthopaedics and Trauma by Andrew Unwin and Kirsten Jones in which it has been observed as under: \n\"Subcapital fractures of the neck of the femur: \nThese common fractures have been classified according to the Garden classification. \nGarden I \nImpacted fractures with an incomplete facture line. \nTrabeculae through fracture angulated as the head is abducted. \nGarden 2 \nImpacted fracture with a complete fracture line. \nThe trabeculae appear interrupted but not angulated. \nGarden 3 \nFemoral head is displaced. \nThe trabeculaeare interrupted and angulated. \nGarden 4 \nFemoral head is more displaced (fallen off). \nTrabeculae may appear parallel as the head may not be abducted. \nThis classification system corresponds with increasing insult to the blood supply of the femoral head. Grades 1and 2 are relatively undisplaced fractures with a lower risk of avascular necrosis than the more displaced Grades 3and 4. The system also allows a treatment strategy(see below). \nSubcapital fractures are prone, in addition to other complications associated with all femoral neck fractures, to two particular problems: \n(a) avascular necrosis of the femoral head - this is unpredictable, but generally the prognosis is worse with greater displacement and with proximal fractures; and \n(b)non-union of the fracture. \nThe treatment of these fractures is controversial. Many centres now adopt the following protocol: \n1. All young patients undergo internal fixation as a surgical emergency in an attempt to reduce the fracture, decompress the intracapsular haematoma and fix the fragments. Subsequent avascular necrosis or non- union is treated on its merits, often with a total hip replacement.(Primary total hip replacement as an emergency treatment is regarded by many to have an unacceptable complication rate,although this policy is adopted by some). \n2. In older patients:- \nGarden 1 and 2 fractures are internally fixed. \nGarden 3 and 4 fractures are assumed to have a high risk of complication with internal fixation, and so as to avoid multiple operations, undergo a hemi-arthroplasty, replacing the head of the femur whilst leaving the acetabulum intact (Fig.20.9). A risk of hemiarthroplasty is that the metallic femoral head may 'bore' its way into the acetabulum, causing pain and erosion. For this reason, with their softer bone, hemiarthroplasty should be avoided in patients with rheumatoid arthritis. \n3. In the very old or frail patient,all femoral neck fractures are recommended to undergo hemiarthroplasty.\" \nIn Intracapsular Fractures of the Neck of the Femur By C.E.Ackroyd.G.C.Bannister and V.G.Langkamer, it has been observed as under: \nIndications for internal fixation If undisplaced fractures are managed without fixation, 12 per cent displace and are therefore less likely to unite. The trabecular bone is already impacted and fixation with two screws is sufficient to maintain stability. \nBritish and Danish controlled trials suggest that in patients over 70 years of age with displaced fractures, primary prosthetic replacement results in lower morbidity, fewer reoperations and comparable mortality over 6 months when compared with internal fixation. However,femoral head replacement results in progressive acetabular erosion and after 5 years 20 per cent of survivors have undergone total hip replacement. \nInternal fixation may reasonably be offered to mentally alert, independent and fully mobile patients, whose life expectancy is likely to exceed 5 years provided that the fracture can be accurately reduced in patients under 60 years of age every effort must be made to preserve the femoral head. Prosthetic replacement will inevitably fail with the passage of time. \nFixation devices \nThe profusion of fixation devices is testimony to the poor union rate of intracapsular fractures and the endeavours to improve this by more secure fixation.The literature is confused by reports quoting wide differences in results between individual authors and from different institutions but when randomized prospective controlled trials have been carried out by some authors, results are all very similar. \nThe evidence suggests that displaced subcapital fractures unite better with adequate internal fixation. \nTwo implants are better than one, and a screw can be inserted with less trauma than a nail and is less likely to disturb the reduction. In Standard Orthopaedic Operations, \nThird Ediction by J.Crawford Adams Comment \nEfficient internal fixation of femoral neck fractures is not always simple and it demands considerable precision. The slogan should be: \"Get it right first time\". All too often the operator accepts an inferior reduction, an imperfect position of the nail or screw, or incorrect length of the fixation devices. Defeat must not be accepted perseverance is well rewarded. \nTrouble is often experienced with the radiographic control. Unless the setting up of the apparatus is supervised by the surgeon himself films that are virtually useless may be produced. In particular, they often fail to show the femoral head adequately in the lateral projection. The reason for this is usually that the cassette is not pushed firmly enough into the loin, or that the beam is wrongly directed. These points must be checked every time a film is exposed. The same remarks apply to the use of the image intensifier. \nIf the correct rotational position of the limb is not insisted upon it often happens that the lateral radiographs show the femur semi-obliquely rather than in the true lateral projection. Acceptance of such an incorrect position makes accurate insertion of the nail and screw unnecessary difficult. \nChoosing the correct length of the nail and of the screw should not present any special problem because the length of the guide wire within the bone can be determined accurately by measuring the amount still protruding, and to this may be added or from it subtracted an amount as measured on the check radiographs. One necessary precaution needs to be mentioned, however, that is, to measure the length of the nail directly with a ruler before it is inserted, and not to rely simply on the figure engraved upon it: the length as engraved is not always the effective length that will enter the bone, for it may include the head of the nail. \nA hazard that needs further mention is that of inadvertently driving the guide wire forwards with the nail. This can present a very serious difficulty if the wire is driven across the hip joint into the iliacfossa, for the guide wire may be broken off by repeated hammer blows upon the nail. In such a case the only way of retrieving the broken-off part of the guide wire is by exposing the iliac fossa and locating the tip of the wire from within the pelvis. This dilemma is, however, easily avoided if the precaution is taken of examining the guide wire repeatedly while the nail is being driven in. This entails removal of the cannulated punch and measurement of the protruding part of the guide wire to see whether it is being driven on. At the same time is wise to grip the guide wire in a hand chuck and to rotate it to and fro: if the wire is being gripped dangerously by the point of the nail it will not rotate freely, and at this danger signal the wire should be promptly withdrawn. \nAll these points of detail are important: neglect of any one of them may easily lead to failure. Alternative Techniques \nIt is not universally accepted that fixation by a nail and a screw is the most effective method. The compression hip screw, the use of which is described.\" \nIn Watson-Jones Fractures and Joint Injuries, Edited by J.N.Wilson, Sixth Edition, Vol.I it has been observed as under: \nTreatment \nThe choice of treatment for femoral neck fractures depends upon three factors: \n1.The age and fitness of the patient \n2.The type of fracture \n3.The degree of displacement \nUndisplaced fractures are treated by protected weight bearing until union occurs or by internal fixation in situ to prevent displacement. If it is decided not to operate, regular radiographs are needed to be sure that the position does not change. \nDisplaced fractures can be treated by internal fixation or prosthetic replacement. \nInternal Fixation. The fracture can be held with several fine pins, a pair of crossed nails or a dynamic compression screw and plate. This device compresses the fracture site and is the preferred treatment in most centres. All of these are inserted under image intensifier control. Internal fixation is particularly suitable for the larger fragments caused by basal fractures. Accurate reduction and fixation is more difficult in severely displaced fractures and those with small fragments. \nIndications. \nInternal fixation: fit; young, little displacement \nProsthesis: unfit, old, displaced fractures Results \nInternal fixation: better long term result. More complications. May need second operation. Slow rehabilitation. \nProsthesis: early mobilization. Long- term complications are rarer but more serious. A good guideline is to fix the fractures of fit patients under 65 and replace the rest. \nThe fracture must be protected from full weigh bearing after fixation, which is difficult in the elderly patient. \nIf successful, internal fixation of the fracture produces an almost perfect hip if the fracture is complicated by aseptic necrosis or non-union, a second operation will be required to replace the head with a prosthesis. The femoral head may also collapse onto the pins, damaging the acetabulum. Prosthetic replacement. Immediate replacement of the head with a Thompson or Austin-Moore prosthesis avoids the complications of non-union and aseptic necrosis and allows immediate full weight bearing. \nEarly mobilization has many advantages, but the prosthesis may loosen or the femoral head may erode the floor of the acetabulum. If either complication occurs, a total hip replacement will be needed. The wound may also become infected, making excision arthroplasty necessary. \nAs always with prosthetic replacement, the results are better than other techniques t when they are successful but far worse when they are not.\" \n19. Mr. Ranjit Kumar and the respondent have filed some additional texts alongwith their written submissions but as they are largely repetitive they need not be referred to. In view of the aforesaid decisions, we find that no firm conclusion as to the preference of one or the other procedure can be drawn but for a Garden type III fracture on a young person, internal fixation is ordinarily the favoured but not the only option as some of the texts afore-referred also proceed on a school of thought which prescribe that in order to avoid long drawn out recovery and other complications, it is advisable to go in for a hemiarthroplasty notwithstanding the age factor. It has also been observed that condition of the patient and of the bone would be relevant determining factors in the choice which the doctor wishes to make. The appellant, in his evidence, explained as to why he had chosen hemiarthroplasty over internal fixation in the following words: \n\"During the surgery I was assisted by Dr. Naivasivayam who was a Surgeon for 20 years of experience attached to Government General Hospital, Madras. One Dr. Gopinath was a stand-by during the Surgery. He was the Doctor who had treated him for infertility. From the 1st X- ray it was found that the fracture was garden type I. From the second X-ray it was found that the fracture was garden type III. During the operation I found the head of femur to be unhealthy. The size of the prosthesis is a measure from the head of the femur removed from the patient during the course of surgery by a special measuring device. I was satisfied with my whole procedures.\" \n20. In cross-examination, he further stated that due to deterioration of the fracture site, he had decided to go in for surgery instead of internal fixation. It is also relevant that though the respondent had sought the opinion of Dr. Ajit Yadav of the Tamil Nadu Hospitals on 30th May 1992, he produced no evidence to off-set the appellant's evidence as to why he had chosen hemiarthroplasty over internal fixation. It is equally significant that the respondent had taken the advice of several renowned doctors including Dr. Mohan Das and Dr. Nand Kumar, but none of them in their treatment notes observed adversely about the choice of treatment nor any negligence in the actual operation. In the light of the fact that there is some divergence of opinion as to the proper procedure to be adopted, it cannot be said with certainty that the appellant, Dr. Sreekumar was grossly remiss in going in for hemiarthroplasty. In Jacob Mathew case (supra) it has observed as under: \n\" 48(1) Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The definition of negligence as given in Law of Torts, Ratanlal &amp; Dhirajlal (edited by Justice G.P. Singh), referred to hereinabove, holds good. Negligence becomes actionable on account of injury resulting from the act or omission amounting to negligence attributable to the person sued. The essential components of negligence are three: \"duty\", \"breach\" and \"resulting damage \". \n (2) Negligence in the context of the medical profession necessarily calls for a treatment with a difference. To infer rashness or negligence on the part of a professional, in particular a doctor, additional considerations apply. A case of occupational negligence is different from one of professional negligence. A simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident, is not proof of negligence on the part of a medical professional. So long as a doctor follows a practice acceptable to the medical profession of that day, he cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative course or method of treatment was also available or simply because a more skilled doctor would not have chosen to follow or resort to that practice or procedure which the accused followed.\" \n21. It would, thus, be seen that the appellant's decision in choosing hemiarthroplasty with respect to a patient of 42 years of age was not so palpably erroneous or unacceptable as to dub it as a case of professional negligence. \n22. We thus, allow Civil Appeal No. 6168 of 2008 and dismiss the respondent's complaint. Ipso facto Civil Appeal No.6167 of 2008 is dismissed. In the light of the fact that the respondent had appeared in person and is physically handicapped, we direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to him free of cost to his address under Registered cover.",
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@@ -738,26 +738,26 @@
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+      "case_id": "1188",
+      "experiment": "role_play_v3",
+      "model": "ministral-3b",
+      "source_file": "S026__role_play_v3__ministral-3b__1188.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "27/09/2024",
-      "machine_error_stage": "rules",
+      "judgment_date": "01/05/2009",
+      "machine_error_stage": "issues",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misinterpretation"
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue misframing"
     }
   },
   {
     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 581 OF 2023 | Sarabjit Kaur v. The State Of Punjab & Anr. | 01/03/2023",
-      "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 581 OF 2023 | Sarabjit Kaur v. The State Of Punjab & Anr.",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 216 of 2017 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 3998 of 2011) | State Of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu | 03/02/2017",
+      "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 216 of 2017 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 3998 of 2011) | State Of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The appellant entered into an agreement to sell a plot of land on 27.05.2013 and subsequently entered into an Agreement to Sell the same plot to Sarabjit Kaur (wife of respondent No. 2) on 18.11.2013. The appellant received ₹5,00,000/- as earnest money, and the sale deed execution date was initially fixed for 25.06.2014, later extended to 24.12.2014. The agreement explicitly stated the appellant was not the owner at that time. Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint on 30.09.2015 against property dealers, not the appellant, seeking recovery of ₹29,39,500/-. An investigation opined the dispute was civil, and no police action was required. Respondent No. 2 filed a second complaint on 05.10.2016 with similar allegations, which was consigned to record on 23.01.2017. A third complaint was filed by respondent No. 2 on 15.06.2017, leading to the registration of F.I.R. No. 430 dated 16.10.2017 under Sections 420, 120-B, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition to quash the F.I.R. The F.I.R. was registered nearly three years after the last date fixed for the sale deed. Respondent No. 2 did not initiate civil proceedings or issue notices for sale deed registration.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Step-by-Step Analysis of the Appeal\n\nThe key question for this appeal revolves around **whether the F.I.R. was properly registered based on the factual matrix**, particularly since the agreement to sell the property was signed in 2013-2014, and the F.I.R. (Fruit of Investigation No. 430) was registered in 2017. The Indian **Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973** governs the registration of F.I.R.s, specifically under **Section 158 (Summons by Police Officer)** and **Section 159 (Investigation when offence registered without summons).** The following are the critical elements where the appellant’s appeal may rest:\n\n---\n\n#### **1. Legal Premises around F.I.R. Registration**\nThe F.I.R. under Sections **420 (Cheating), 120-B (Criminal Abetment), and 506 IPC (Criminal conspiracy)** arise only if there is a **prima facie case of criminal wrongdoing** by the appellant (or someone the appellant ought to have perpetrated abuse). To establish this, the police must be **convinced** of their guilt based on incriminating material evidence. Here is how we examine the facts:\n\n##### **A. Availability of Criminal Evidence by the Appellant**\nSince the **Agreement to Sell** explicitly states that the appellant *was not the owner* but stood in a position of tendering a sale (as the **dealer/mediator**), it follows that the **prime suspect is the Respondent No. 2 and her relations (especially Sarabjit Kaur)** who bought the property under false claims of ownership.\n\n- **No prior criminal proceedings:** The Appellant had never been implicated in legal areaves involving this property; the `Response No. 2’s own legal disputes (₹29,50,000) were civil actions and **had nothing to do with the Appellant**.\n- **Ascertainable Price:** Typically, agents/platforms facilitating \"buy-sell\" dealings are prone to charges of cheating for exploitation or fraudulent inducement. Given there was no proof of a knockdown price under which the property was shuffled, there’s a suspicion that Respondent No. 2 **exploited the arrangement**.\n- **Open documentation timeline:** The Appellant and Respondent No.2 stood to sweat without litigation. The **earnest money receipt (₹5 lakh)** itself may be considered suspicious for how it mandated return if the sale did not follow, yet Respondent No.2 had delayed to push for the first instance (after 2015).\n\n#### **Deterioration Lacks Triggering Events**\nNothing outright eradicates culpability suspicions—**paid assistance deals are fertile grounds for legal contest**—but prospectively it would require development of tangible crime theories against the Appellant whom Sarabjit never or rarely pointed towards. Hence, FIR rested solely on someone else’s delayed requests.\n\n---\n\n#### **B. Timing: Was the Absolute delay Merely casual posture for conspiracy or breach context?**\n- **No relevant pre-FIR hearing evident:** Despite repeated launches of suits/financial outreach, no initial cases had accused the Appellant repeatedly in the Response No.2’s complex actions.\n- The civil suits bore unrelated plans, thus **no creeping momentum warranted vesting culpability on A in criminal steps.**\n\n---\n#### **C. The High Court's critique re: Appellant weakness**\nHigh Courts remain politically bias-free—or challenged—due to constitutional procedure fidelity. Having amended given allegation **zero factual viability in Appellant vs. Respondent exercises**, and by ** lógica alone the FIR should be scrutinized for pitching charges on the voluntary curve.**\n\n---\n\n#### **Ultimately Guiding Step Rule**\n**Without accusations in any recorded case, civil nor prima facie targets (Statement in progress being excepted),** the timeline does not fail **only materialism**—beyond basic applicability wires for accumulated mischief.\n\n---\n### **Appellate Judgement Ponderation**\n\n**Limited Merit in Impact of Delayed Registration Varies on Proportion**\n- While traumatisms behind delayed chrisal could exacerbate kleidering (further issues & doubtful incidents), the slump (three years, what was 2014? an enrollment glitch?) either (1) Bolsters flagrant reality hints toward **buried evidences intentionally preserved by apprehended wrongs in Respondent No.2** or (2) **be on the suggestively revolutionary route of mere procedural error in court procedural promulgations.**\n\nBoth routes Ultimately proved:\n**When Series of actions or instructions only rang of a cumbersome need for Suspicions to convert into Criminal Evaluations**—Delays might tinge assessment **too far away** from the basis of result in this particular case. After evaluation of **material breakdown**, it suggests more culpability resting on Respondents with their civil-dotted cross bandages.\n\n---\n\n### **Decision: DISMISSED**\n\nThe final conclusion cannot support this appeal beyond blatant transitional proofs related to Buttons, Planks, and Theory of Guilt owing to configurable elements exhausted before crime subscription; therefore the F.I.R through judicial lens remains unchallenable and **DISMISSED** of plea over improve tabulation of upon denunciation charges of defendant Appellant; judged beyond procedural efforts consisting merely of unmerged ambiguity either hindered by Respondents' twined explanations or shadowed by approximations on their behalf.",
-      "reference_judgment": "1. The Appellant having failed before the High Court has filed the present appeal. A prayer was made for quashing of F.I.R. No.430 dated 16.10.2017 under Sections 420, 120- B and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The petition filed before the High Court seeking quashing thereof was dismissed.\n2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant entered into an agreement to purchase a plot measuring 1 (Kanal) on 27.05.2013 with Malkit Kaur, wife of Surender Singh resident of Dhillon Colony, Near Electricity Grid, G.T. Road, Moga, Jagraon, District Ludhiana, Punjab on 27.05.2013. On the basis thereof appellant entered into an Agreement to Sell the same to Sarabjit Kaur wife of Darshan Singh (respondent No.2) on 18.11.2013. The date for execution of sale deed was fixed as 25.06.2014. It was categorically mentioned in the Agreement to Sell that at present the vendor was not the owner of the property. The appellant received a sum of ₹ 5,00,000/- as earnest money and the date of registration of sale deed was fixed as 25.06.2014. The date for execution of sale deed was extended to 24.12.2014 on receipt of additional sum of ₹ 75,000/-. A complaint was filed by Darshan Singh (complainant/ respondent No.2), son of Jangir Singh on 30.09.2015 with reference to the same alleged Agreement to Sell however against property dealers Manmohan Singh, son of Prakash Singh and Ranjit Singh alias Billa, son of Pal Singh. In the aforesaid complaint, reference was made to two other transactions entered into by Darshan Singh and prayer was that an amount of ₹ 29,39,500/-be got recovered from the property dealers.\n3. The aforesaid complaint was investigated and finally on 18.05.2016, it was opined that the dispute being civil in nature, no police action was required. Darshan Singh made another complaint on 05.10.2016 with the same allegations without disclosing the fate of his earlier complaint. Referring to the earlier enquiry made, the aforesaid complaint was consigned to record on 23.01.2017. Thereafter, another complaint was made by Darshan Singh against the appellant, Ranjit Singh and Manmohan Singh. It is on the basis thereof that F.I.R. in question was registered under Sections 420, 120-B and 506 IPC against the appellant, Manmohan Singh and Ranjit Singh.\n4. The argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant is that the respondent No.2 who claims himself to be the husband of vendee had filed two complaints earlier with the same set of allegations and those were consigned to record on the basis of the legal opinion received opining the case to be of civil nature. In the first such complaint, there were no allegations against the appellant. In fact the dispute is purely civil in nature. In case the appellant failed to execute the sale deed for which admittedly the last date fixed was 24.12.2014. Respondent No.2 could have availed of his appropriate remedy of specific performance of Agreement to Sell but no suit was filed. However, third complaint was filed without disclosing the fate of earlier two complaints. The F.I.R. in question was registered on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent No.2 on 15.06.2017 i.e. nearly three years after the date fixed for execution of sale deed. The respondent No.2 had never issued any notice prior to the filing of the compliant with the police seeking any remedy. A perusal of three complaints filed by respondent No.2 clearly suggest that from the initial prayer for return of the amount paid by him, subsequently the allegations of cheating was made. In the first complaint while referring to different transactions, the allegation was only against the property dealers not against the appellant whereas in subsequent complaint improvement was made and she was also involved.\n5. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the chargesheet having been filed, the appellant can raise all the pleas before the court below. It is not a case for quashing of the F.I.R.\n6. Despite service of notice, respondent No.2/complainant has not appeared.\n7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book.\n8. On the material placed on record by the parties, it is evident that an Agreement to Sell was executed by the appellant in favour of the wife of respondent No.2, namely Sarabjit Kaur for sale of plot measuring 1 (kanal). The agreement to Sell specifically mentions the fact that appellant/ the vendor gets entitled to the property on the basis of the Agreement to Sell executed in her favour by Malkit Kaur on 27.05.2013. The last date fixed for registration of sale deed was 25.06.2014 which was extended to 24.12.2014. There is nothing placed on record by the complainant or the State to show that besides filing of the criminal complaint, respondent No.2 had initiated any civil proceedings for execution of sale deed on the basis of Agreement to Sell or in the alternative return of the earnest money.\n9. A perusal of the first complaint made by respondent No.2 on 30.09.2015 shows that the prayer was made for return of the amount paid by him with no allegation of cheating. It was filed only against Manmohan Singh and Ranjit Singh, the property dealers. Reference in the aforesaid complaint was made to the Agreement to Sell executed between the parties. In addition, there was a reference to two other Agreements to Sell executed in total. A prayer was made for getting an amount of ₹29,39,500/- refunded from the property dealers. Though, in the aforesaid complaint reference was made to the Agreement to Sell in question, however there was no complaint made against the appellant. The aforesaid complaint was investigated by the Economic Offences Wing and a report was submitted to the Senior Superintendent of Police on 22.03.2016. A report was submitted on the basis of which the legal opinion was sought from the District Attorney who opined that no criminal offence was made out and the complainant shall be at liberty to invoke jurisdiction of the civil court. The aforesaid opinion was accepted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana (Rural) on 18.5.2016.\n10. Thereafter, Darshan Singh (respondent No.2) made another complaint to DIG, Ludhiana on 05.10.2016 which again was enquired into and a finding that earlier identical complaint was filed as no criminal offence was made out and the second complaint was consigned to record. In the second complaint, there was no reference made to the earlier complaint filed by Darshan Singh.\n11. Still not satisfied as the result of the earlier complaint was not to the liking of the respondent No.2. He filed another complaint on 23.01.2017. Thereafter, another complaint was filed by the respondent No.2 on 15.06.2017 on the basis thereof F.I.R. in question was registered. On the facts of the case in hand, it is evident that the effort of respondent No.2 was merely to put pressure on appellant while involving her in a criminal case to get his money back whereas there is nothing pleaded that respondent No. 2 that he was ever ready and willing to get the sale deed registered. There was no effort made by the respondent No.2 or the vendee in the Agreement to Sell to initiate any civil proceedings to get the sale deed executed on the basis of the Agreement to Sell. In fact, the last date fixed for execution of the sale deed even after extension was 24.12.2014.\n12. There is nothing on record to suggest that any notice was issued by the respondent No.2 or the vendee to the appellant to get the sale deed registered just either before expiry of the last date fixed for executed of sale deed or immediately thereafter. No civil proceedings were also initiate rather the respondent No.2 proceeded only by filing complaints with the police two of which were earlier filed. Had there been any civil proceedings initiated, the question of readiness and willingness of the vendee is also an aspect to be examined by the Court.\n13. A breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. From the facts available on record, it is evident that the respondent No.2 had improved his case ever since the first complaint was filed in which there were no allegations against the appellant rather it was only against the property dealers which was in subsequent complaints that the name of the appellant was mentioned. On the first complaint, the only request was for return of the amount paid by the respondent No.2. When the offence was made out on the basis of the first complaint, the second complaint was filed with improved version making allegations against the appellant as well which was not there in the earlier complaint. The entire idea seems to be to convert a civil dispute into criminal and put pressure on the appellant for return of the amount allegedly paid. The criminal Courts are not meant to be used for settling scores or pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. Wherever ingredients of criminal offences are made out, criminal courts have to take cognizance. The complaint in question on the basis of which F.I.R. was registered was filed nearly three years after the last date fixed for registration of the sale deed. Allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court.\n14. Hence, in our opinion the impugned order passed by the High Court deserves to be set aside. The petition filed by appellant for quashing of F.I.R. is ordered to be allowed. As a consequence, F.I.R. No.430 dated 16.10.2017 and all the subsequent proceedings therewith are ordered to be quashed. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.",
+      "case_record": "The State of Rajasthan filed appeals against a Rajasthan High Court judgment that set aside charges framed by a Special Judge against Fatehkaran Mehdu (Mining Engineer) and Kishan Singh Rawat under Section 13(1)(d) & 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 120B of IPC. The case originated from allegations that Fatehkaran Mehdu, while serving as Mining Engineer, facilitated illegal mining by Kishan Singh Rawat. Specifically, it was alleged that Mehdu granted a quarry licence for 80,000 sq. ft. of 'gap fat' land to Kishan Singh Rawat, despite only 52,272 sq. ft. being available in Plot No. 1345124. Furthermore, Mehdu allegedly cancelled Smt. Sushma Devi's quarry licence, which covered adjacent land, to benefit Kishan Singh Rawat and permit unauthorized mining. Smt. Sushma Devi had to appeal the cancellation, which was allowed by the Appellate Authority. The chargesheet detailed Mehdu's alleged collusion with Rawat to cause loss to the State and tenure holders by allotting land beyond the permitted area and through improper cancellation of licenses. The Special Judge framed charges, finding a prima facie case. However, the High Court quashed these charges, opining that there were no allegations of Mehdu obtaining any advantage by corrupt or illegal means and that the discrepancy in the land area was not substantiated, citing a certification from another Mining Engineer. The High Court also viewed the cancellation of Sushma Devi's license and her subsequent appeal success as administrative issues, not criminal misconduct.",
+      "generated_judgment": "**DISMISSED**\n\nReasoning:\nTo determine whether the appeal should be allowed, we need to carefully examine the facts and the legal basis provided.\n\n1. **Original Charges**: The Special Judge framed charges against Fatehkaran Mehdu and Kishan Singh Rawat for corruption under Sections 13(1)(d) & 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 120B of the IPC. These charges were based on allegations of facilitating illegal mining and allotting more land than was actually available.\n\n2. **High Court Decision**: The Rajasthan High Court quashed these charges. The High Court's primary reasons for this decision were:\n   - There were no allegations that Mehdu obtained any advantage by corrupt or illegal means.\n   - The discrepancy in the land area (80,000 sq. ft. vs. 52,272 sq. ft.) was not substantiated, as per a certification from another Mining Engineer.\n   - The cancellation of Sushma Devi’s license and its subsequent reversal by the Appellate Authority were viewed as administrative issues rather than criminal misconduct.\n\n3. **Analysis of Appeal Grounds**:\n   - **Corruption Allegations**: The High Court found no evidence of Mehdu obtaining any advantage illegally or corruptly. This directly addresses one of the core elements of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which requires proof of obtaining an advantage by corrupt or illegal means.\n   - **Land Area Discrepancy**: The certification from another Mining Engineer suggests that the discrepancy in the land area was resolved, supporting the High Court's view that the issue did not amount to criminal misconduct.\n   - **Administrative Issues**: The High Court considered the cancellation of Sushma Devi’s license and its reversal as administrative matters, not criminal misconduct. This indicates that even if there were irregularities, they did not rise to the level of criminal activity.\n\nGiven these points, the High Court's decision appears to be well-founded based on the evidence and the applicable laws. The State of Rajasthan has not presented sufficient new evidence or arguments to overturn the High Court's decision. Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.",
+      "reference_judgment": "Leave granted.\n\n2. These two appeals have been filed against the common judgment dated 16.11.2010 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur allowing S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 592/2009 Fatehkaran Mehdu versus State of Rajasthan and S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 598/2009 Kishan Singh Rawat versus State of Rajasthan. The High Court vide its order, allowing the Criminal Revisions, set aside the order dated 05.05.2009 passed by the Special Judge Anti Corruption Cases, Udaipur, framing charges against both the respondents under Section 13(1)(d) & 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120B of IPC.\n\n3. The brief facts of the case, as emerged from materials on record, need to be noted for deciding the issueS raised in these appeals. Both the appeals having arisen out of First Information Report No. 342/2001 and order dated 05.05.2009 framing charges, the facts being common, it shall be sufficient to refer the facts from Criminal Appeal No.......of 2017 @ SLP(Cr.) No. 3998 of 2011, State of Rajasthan versus Fatehkaran Mehdu.\n\n4. The Respondent, Fatehkaran Mehdu was working as Mining Engineer at Tehsil Bijolia, District Bhilwara, State of Rajasthan in the year 1997­98. One Smt. Sushma Devi had submitted an application for the grant of quarry licence for a mineral (Sand Stone) as per the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as Rule 1986). The application was made for grant of quarry licence for Khatedari land situated at Nayanagar in different plots, including Plot No. 1181/124. She deposited a banker's cheque of Rs. 1,75,000/­ dated 23.4.1998 and the quarry licence for 4.95 hectare (30 bigha and 12 biswas) was prepared in the name of Smt. Sushma Devi Dhakad and Shri Manoj Kumar Sandhya on 06.05.1998. On noticing that the quarry licence issued on 06.05.1998 contained various cuttings, she contacted Fatehkaran Mehdu and handed him the licence for issue of fresh licence. Shri Mehdu after taking all papers from Smt. Sushma Devi did not issue her a fresh licence, whereas, Smt. Sushma Devi had started mining operations. On 18.07.1998 one Shri K. K. Boda, inspected the area and stopped the mining activities informing Smt. Sushma Devi that no quarry licence was issued in her favour. On 11.08.1998, Mining Engineer Fatehkaran Mehdu directed Smt. Sushma Devi to stop the mining activities; Fatehkaran Mehdu was transferred in August 1998 out of Tehsil Bigolia.\n\n5. Aggrieved by non­issuance of quarry licence Sushma Devi filed a Writ Petition No. 166 of 1999 before the High Court of Rajasthan which was dismissed by order dated 08.03.1999 due to availability of alternate remedy of filing an appeal under the Rules 1986. Smt. Sushma Devi filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority and Appellate Authority vide order dated 29.04.1999 allowed the appeal and restored the quarry licence of Smt. Sushma Devi.\n\n6. On the other hand, Sri Kishan Singh Rawat, the respondent was also granted quarry licence on gap­land in Block No. 263A and 264A which contained a condition that the said approval shall not be effective outside Plot No. 1345/1185/124.\n\n7. Kishan Singh Rawat alongwith certain other persons had filed a suit against the consenting party of Khatedari Land No. 1238/125 on 23.06.1998 for stopping Sushma Devi from carrying on mining operations. Another suit No. 1181/24 was filed on 13.7.1998 by Kishan Singh against the Khatedars of Plot No. 1181/124 restraining them from interfering in mining operation on Plot No. 1345/1185/124 area 3 bigha.\n\n8. After holding a Preliminary Enquiry No. 7 of 2000 against Fatehkaran Mehdu, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Prevention of Corruption Bureau of Udaipur, lodged a First Information Report against the Fatehkaran Mehdu and Kishan Singh Rawat under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120B of IPC.\n\n9. After conducting the investigation, a chargesheet No. 208/2005 dated 24.10.2005 was submitted. The Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Udaipur vide order dated 05.05.2009 framed charges against both the Respondents under Section 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and 120B IPC. Aggrieved by order dated 05.05.2009, Fatehkaran Mehdu filed S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 592 of 2009 and Kishan Singh Rawat filed S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 598 of 2009. The High Court of Rajasthan vide its judgment and order dated 16.11.2010 set aside the order dated 05.05.2009 allowing the Revision against which these two appeals have been filed by the State of Rajasthan.\n\n10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there were sufficient materials on record against the respondent, relying on which learned Special Judge has framed the charges and the High Court committed an error by interfering with the charges framed, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. It is submitted that there was no ground made out for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. for quashing the charges framed. It was proved on the materials on record that the Respondent Mehdu had facilitated Shri Kishan Singh Rawat to carry on illegal mining by which, he obtained illegal benefits to the detriment of State of Rajasthan as well as Smt. Sushma Devi. The quarry licence granted to Sushma Devi was cancelled by Mehdu to facilitate Kishan Singh Rawat to carry on illegal mining on the plot, which was included in the quarry licence of Sushma Devi. Shri Mehdu being a public servant has committed an offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2).\n\n11. Learned counsel for the Respondent, refuting the submission of appellant contends that the High Court on valid grounds has set aside the order framing the charge, since there was no allegation before the Special Judge on which, it can be said that any offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) and 120B was made out. The allegation against Shri Mehdu that he has granted quarry licence of 80,000 Sq. ft. to Kishan Singh Rawat, was factually incorrect since Kishan Singh Rawat was sanctioned quarry licence of only 25,000 Sq. ft. It is submitted that cancellation of licence of Smt. Sushma Devi by Shri Mehdu cannot amount to any offence within the meaning of aforesaid sections and the order of Appellate Authority, setting aside the cancellation order does not lead to any presumption that an offence was committed by Shri Mehdu.\n\n12. Before we proceed to examine the respective contentions, it is necessary to look into the chargesheet to find out the nature of allegations made against the respondents. The chargesheet has been brought on record as Annexure A­9. It is relevant to note some of the allegations, as recorded in the chargesheet against the respondent. The chargesheet notices the following:\n\n<QUOTE> \"whereas it is also pertinent to mention here that area of plot No. 1345/1185/124 is three bigha 52272 Sq. ft. whereas, Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu Mining Engineer, Bijolia has granted sanction of 80,000 Sq. ft. as gap fat. Thus, Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu Mining Engineer in collusion with Shri Kishan Singh Rawat granted sanction for 80,000 Sq. ft land as against 52272 Sq. ft. available land, by which obviously proceeding for giving land to Shri Kishan Singh Rawat out of plot No. 1181/124 of Smt. Sushma Devi situated neighbouring has been done by collusion.” </QUOTE>\n\n13. Further, after noticing the facts, pertaining to grant of quarry licence to Kishan Singh Rawat and Smt. Sushma Devi following was stated:\n\n<QUOTE> “By investigation it was also found that illegal mining was done on plot No. 1185/124 of Shri Kishan Singh Rawat for years. In the year 1997 the Mining Enginner in collusion under gap fat policy with view to provide undue profit by back door got surrendered 3 bigha land out of 5 bigha in favour of State Government and recorded without name so that gap fat could be approved under above policy. Under rules lease can be granted only on land of without name. To land so surrendered plot No. 1345/1185/124 was given rest of two bigha land of khatedar property No. 1185/124 was given which presently is recorded as khatedari land in name Dhiru son of Limbu Bheel R/o Suradiya Tehsil Beawar in khata which is ancestral village of Kishan Singh Rawat. Plot No. 1185/124 combined rakba 2 bigha land is also recorded as khatedari therefore, gap fat permission can not be accorded under gap fat policy but Mining Engineer in files of office accorded approval of plot No. 1345/1185/124 rakba 3 bigha, entry in which regard was made with special stipulation on quarry licence but in technical map told about according approval on plot No. 1185/124 combined so that if anytime measurement is carried out then same could be found according to technical map and according to same Shri Kishan Singh Rawat could get illegal profit. On spot Shri Kishan Singh Rawat in present time is also doing mining work on plot No. 1185/124 com. Rakba 2 bigha land and whenever question for measurement arises then he shows being approval on the basis of department's technical map whereas, in quarry lincence and files permission is accorded only to plot No. 1345/1185/124, total area of which comes to be 52472 Sq.ft whereas, according to technical map area 80,000 Sq. ft is shown. Under khatedari policy Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu only with view to cause loss to tenure holders of plot No. 1181/124 situated in south of plot No. 1185/124, called back issued quarry licence of Smt. Sushma Dhakad in name of correcting same by violating all rules, cancelled quarry licence and information in which regard was not given to licence holders.” </QUOTE>\n\n14. There was a clear allegation in the chargesheet that quarry licence to Kishan Singh Rawat was given by Shri Mehdu in furtherance of object and purpose of illegally benefitting Kishan Singh Rawat. It was further stated that although, approval for quarry licence on Plot No. 1345/1185/124 area 3 bigha was granted, total area of which comes to only 52,272 Sq. ft., whereas in the technical map, area was shown 80,000 Sq. ft. dishonestly benefiting Kishan Singh Rawat.\n\n15. Considering the chargesheet and other materials on record, the charges have been framed. In Para 1 of the order, the learned Special Judge has noted the following facts:\n\n<QUOTE> \"1. It is worth­mentioning that total area of land No. 1345/1185/124 is total three bigha i.e. 52272 Sq. ft. while Fatehkaran Mehdu issued sanction of 80,000 Sq. ft. in the form of gap fat area and thus, accused Fatehkaran Mehdu connived with Kishan Singh Rawat, he connived in the proceedings for getting alotted more land to Kishan Singh Rawat out of the land of neighbour Sushma Devi, on which on establishing the prima facie case making out, the then Additional Superintendent of Police of Prevention of Corruption Bureau, Udaipur, sent an First Information Report without numbering to the Headquarter, on which case First Information Report No. 342/01 was registered on 18.09.2001 and was received for investigation.” </QUOTE>\n\n16. Further in para 2, the order states:\n\n<QUOTE> “2. From the investigation it was established that Smt. Sushma Devi, Manoj Kumar Sandhya and Jitmal Balai submitted application on 01.05.1998 in prescribed form. Landowners of concerning khasra numbers expressed their consent in favour of applicants, thereafter, on 06.05.1998 Shri Mehdu granted approval for issuing quarry licence and licence were issued. Smt. Sushma Devi checked quarry licence on 08.05.1998, then came to know that serious nature of lacunae were found. At the same time Smt. Sushma Devi contacted Fatehkaran Mehdu, Mineral Engineer about the abovesaid, then he issued directions for making correction the quarry licence and handed over letters etc. to the Office Assistant Sohanlal. Stating excessive cuttings, Shri Mehdu instead of taking all the papers from Smt. Sushma Devi for issuing new quarry licence, with intentions to get other person Kishan Singh unlawfully benefits, connived with him and malafide and issued licence.” </QUOTE>\n\n17. In para 2, it has further been noted:\n\n<QUOTE> “2. Under the quarry licence passed by Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu, Shri Kishan Singh undertook unauthorized mining work for years on five bigha land in place of three bigha land due to which State Government suffered loss of annual rent etc. and Kishan Singh earned unlawful profits. On account of conspiracy hatched with him and connivance forgetting Kishan Singh benefitted, it established that Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu allotted land to Kishan Singh Rawat contrary to rules or in the form of gap & fat due to which the present charge sheet under section 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and section 120 Indian Penal Code was filed in which Kishan Singh Rawat, beneficiary was also made accused.” </QUOTE>\n\n18. The Special Judge after considering the contention putforth by the learned counsel for the parties noted the charge that against the total area of 52,272 Sq. ft. available, Shri Mehdu has issued sanction for 80,000 Sq. ft. in the form of 'gap area' to Kishan Singh Rawat to unduly benefit him, and the same can be decided after recording oral and documentary evidence. The Special Judge found, a clear prima facie case of framing charges. It is relevant to extract the findings from Para 6 of the order. In Para 6 of the order, following has been stated:\n\n<QUOTE> “Prima facie charge has been framed against accused persons that with the intentions to cause loss to Khatedars of land No. 1181/124 situated in the southern side of land No. 1185/124, on which licence issued to Smt. Sushma Dhakar, Shri Fatehkaran Mehdu called for the same in the name of rectifying the same, he canceled the quarry licence in violations of all the rules and its information was not conveyed to the licence holders. Shri Mehdu did not try to settle the disputes on the spot rather he issued licence to parties without any acceptable demaraction and canceled without adopting process. Dispute prevailing between land No. 1185/125 and 1181/124 could have been settled earlier by carrying out measurement in detail through the Department of revenue, but no any effort was made in this context, consequently, Kishan Singh Rawat has undertaken unauthorized mining work on five bigha area of land No. 1185/124 in place of three bigha land due to which State Government has suffered loss of annual rent etc.. it also established in the investigation that Fatehkaran Mehdu had got the intentions behind cancelling of quarry licence of Smt. Sushma Dhakar that Kishan Singh Rawat be benefited by allotting land to Kishan Singh Rawat neighbour of Smt. Dhakar in the name of gap fat and Shri Mehdu has got Kishan Singh Rawat financially benefitted unlawfully by allotting land in the form of gap fat having misused his post and powers. It is universal principle of law that court is supposed to see at the stage of framing of charge as to whether prima facie case worth triable makes out on the basis of evidence and the facts putforth by the prosecution or not. Final disposal of the charges framed against accused on merits does not require at the said stage.” </QUOTE>\n\n19. In view of what has been noted above, whether the High Court was right in quashing the order framing charges by Special Judge on 05.05.2009, is the question to be answered in these appeals. What is the basis for quashing the charges by the High Court, has to be found out from the order of the High Court, allowing the Criminal Revisions.\n\n20. The High Court, after noticing the few allegations against the respondent observed that there was no allegation made by the prosecution against the respondent to the effect that by any corrupt or illegal means Shri Mehdu obtained any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person. With regard to alleged allotment of 80,000 Sq. ft. in favour of Kishan Singh Rawat, it was held prima facie not to be correct since concerned Mining Engineer had certified that there was no allotment of 80,000 Sq. ft. by Mehdu to Kishan Singh Rawat. It is useful to extract para 8 and 9 of the judgement of the High Court which is to the following effect:\n\n<QUOTE> \"8. Having gone through the aforesaid provision and judgments cited at the bar and upon perusal of the order dated 5.5.2009, this Court does not find any allegation made by the applicant or prosecution against the present petitioner that by any corrupt or illegal means he obtained any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any other person. Even alleged allotment of 80,000 Sq. ft. land in favour of petitioner no. 2 Kishan Singh was prima facie found to be incorrect since concerned Mining Engineer himself certified that there was no allotment of 80,000 sq. ft. area by the present petitioner in favour of petitioner No. 2 Kishan Singh and only allotment made was way back in 1997­98 of 25,000 sq. ft. Mere fact that application Smt. Sushma Devi had to file appeal before the competent authority under the Mining Act against the alleged illegal cancellation of her quarry licence and succeeded therein does not amount to any criminal charge against the present petitioner under the purview of Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Obviously, these proceedings are quasi judicial in nature undertaken in exercise of powers conferred upon the Mining Engineer under the said Act and any error which can be corrected by appellate or revisional authority does not amount to a criminal charge established against the said authority. This Court does not find any allegation of taking bribe or any other allegation of that nature which would come within the ambit of words employed in Section 13 (1) (d) namely; “by corruption or illegal means obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.” </QUOTE>\n\n<QUOTE> \"9. In the absence of any such allegation, this court cannot appreciate how the charge under Section 13(1) (d) and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120B IPC has been framed against the present Petitioners.” </QUOTE>\n\n21. The High Court based its judgement for quashing the charges on the aforesaid conclusion, as recorded in para 8 and 9. Section 13(1) (d) & 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 under which charges have been framed, are to the following effect:\n\n<QUOTE> “13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant:\n(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,­\n..... ....... .......\n(d) if he,­\n(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or\n(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or\n(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or\n..... ....... ......\n(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.” </QUOTE>\n\n22. What are the allegations against Mehdu to frame charge under Section 13(1) (d) read with 13(2) has to be found out from the Chargesheet and other materials. We have already extracted the relevant allegations, made against Shri Mehdu in the chargesheet as well as the facts noticed by the learned Special Judge. While framing the charge, the substance of the allegation against Mehdu is that he has granted a quarry licnece to Kishan Singh Rawat on three bigha area of plot No. 1345/1185/124, total area of which comes to 52,272 Sq. ft. whereas, he was sanctioned 80,000 Sq.ft. Further allegation is that Mehdu permitted Kishan Singh Rawat to indulge in unauthorised mining over the larger area than that of granted to him putting the Government as well as Smt. Sushma Devi to loss. The High Court in its order has observed that it has been certified by the present Mining Engineer that Mehdu had never sanctioned alleged 80,000 Sq.ft. in favour of Kishan Singh Rawat for which observation, the High Court based a letter dated 13.11.2009 filed as Annexure A­11 in the appeal, which was also taken on the record by the High Court. The said letter was addressed to Fatehkaran Mehdu in reply to his querry, as to whether, Kishan Singh Rawat was granted quarry licence for 80,000 Sq. ft. The answer given in the said letter dated 03.11.2009 is to the following effect:\n\n<QUOTE> \"As per the information sought with regard to the captioned subject, as per the record available in the office no licence of 80,000 Sq. ft. has been granted to Shri Kishan Singh Rawat in Arazi No. 1185/124 Mauza village Nayanagar, Tehsil Bijoliya, District – Bhilwara. In the circumstances, it is not possible to give the copy. In the year 1997­1998, the quarry licence holder in Plot No. 263 A and 264 A of Arazi No. 1185/124 Shri Gopal Singh Rawat S/o Shri Anna Singh Rawat R/o Suradia Tehsil Byawar, District Ajmer (Rajasthan) was granted permission and quarry licence of total 12500­12500 Sq. ft. The said quarry licence was transferred in the name of Kishan Singh Rawat S/o Devi Singh Rawat resident of Suradia, Tehsil Byawar District Ajmer (Rajasthan), which is not effective at present.” </QUOTE>\n\n23. The Respondents have brought on record the copy of the quarry licence granted to Kishan Singh Rawat as Annexure A­3 and A­4 which indicates that two quarry licences were for 12500 Sq. ft each. It appears that the High Court failed to advert the substance of allegation against Shri Mehdu, as we have already noticed from the chargesheet that Shri Mehdu although, granted quarry licence only for three bigha gap land in Plot No. 1345/1185/124, but technical map issued by Shri Mehdu was to an area of 80,000 Sq. ft, which was a source for Kishan Singh Rawat to carry on unauthorised mining over the larger area than that of actually allotted to him.\n\n24. In the chargesheet following has been specifically noted :\n\n<QUOTE> \"....On spot Shri Kishan Singh Rawat in present time is also doing mining work on plot No. 1185/124 com. Rakba 2 bigha land and whenever question for measurement arises then he shows being approval on the basis of department's technical map whereas, in quarry lincence and files permission is accorded only to plot No. 1345/1185/124, total area of which comes to be 52472 Sq.ft whereas, according to technical map area 80,000 Sq. ft is shown.” </QUOTE>\n\n25. As noted above, learned Special Judge had observed that final adjudication of charge cannot be made unless oral and documentary evidence are received. The High Court has not adverted to the technical map which mentions 80,000 Sq. Ft. and without adverting to that allegation, has erroneously observed that there is no allegation which may come within the meaning of 13 (1) (d) read with 13(2) of the Act. Both chargesheet and order of the learned Special Judge have specifically noted the allegations, which clearly makes out an offence under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Prevention and Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120B I.P.C.\n\n26. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference under Section 397 Cr.P.C. at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n27. Now, reverting to the limit of the scope of jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr. P.C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding.\n\n28. It is useful to refer to judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor and Ramesh Chander and Another, (2012) 9 SCC 460, where scope of Section 397 Cr. P.C. have been succinctly considered and explained. Para 12 and 13 are as follows:\n\n<QUOTE> \"12.Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well­founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.” </QUOTE>\n\n<QUOTE> “13. Another well­accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” </QUOTE>\n\n29. The Court in para 27 has recorded its conclusion and laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in context of quashing of charge framed under Section 228 Cr. P. C. Para 27, 27(1), (2), (3), (9), (13) are extracted as follows:\n\n<QUOTE> \"27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:\n\n27.1) Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.\n27.2) The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.\n\n27.3) The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.\n\n27.9) Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.\n\n27.13) Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.” </QUOTE>\n\n30. Applying the above tests, we are of the considered opinion that High Court erred in quashing the charges framed by the order dated 05.05.2009. In result, both the appeals are allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and the order dated 05.05.2009 is restored. The learned Special Judge may proceed with the trial in accordance with the law expeditiously.\n",
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           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -863,26 +863,26 @@
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-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 94 of 1959. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated May 7, 1957, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Revision Application No. 144-D of 1957. | Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury | 05/12/1961",
-      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 94 of 1959. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated May 7, 1957, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Revision Application No. 144-D of 1957. | Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Appeal (Civil) 2440 of 2007, Civil Appeal No. 2440 of 2007 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11391 of 2005) | Messrs Gas Authority Of India Limited And Another v. Messrs Keti Construction (I) Limited And Others | 11/05/2007",
+      "case_details": "Case: Appeal (Civil) 2440 of 2007, Civil Appeal No. 2440 of 2007 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11391 of 2005) | Messrs Gas Authority Of India Limited And Another v. Messrs Keti Construction (I) Limited And Others",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The appellants, sons of Gauri Shankar, owned a bungalow at 5, Haily Road, New Delhi. The respondent was a tenant in this bungalow. The appellants filed a suit for eviction, alleging the respondent sub-let a portion of the bungalow to Dr. Mohani Jain after the commencement of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, without the landlord's written consent, violating Section 13(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The respondent contended that the original tenancy agreement from 1940 allowed sub-letting and that the sub-tenancy began in 1951, before the Act came into force. No written consent was proven. The trial court found the sub-tenancy was created after the Act's commencement and decreed the suit. The Additional District Judge upheld this decision, categorically stating the sub-tenancy commenced after the Act, and any prior occupancy was as a guest. A revision petition was filed in the High Court under Section 35(1) of the Act. The High Court's single judge, believing he could reconsider concurrent findings of fact, held that the sub-tenancy commenced before the Act, making written consent unnecessary, and that the lower courts had not considered all evidence.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The appellants are the sons of Gauri Shankar, owners of a bungalow at 5, Haily Road, New Delhi.\n2. The respondent was a tenant in this bungalow.\n3. The appellants filed a suit for eviction, alleging the respondent sub-let part of the bungalow to Dr. Mohani Jain after the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 came into force, in violation of Section 13(1)(b)(i) of the Act.\n4. The respondent claimed the original tenancy agreement from 1940 allowed sub-letting and argued the sub-tenancy began in 1951, before the Act became effective.\n5. No written consent from the landlord for the sub-tenancy was provided.\n6. The trial court determined the sub-tenancy commenced post-Act, decreeing the appellants' suit.\n7. The Additional District Judge upheld the trial court's decision, stating sub-tenancy started after the Act, with previous occupancy as a guest.\n8. The High Court, in a revision petition under Section 35(1), concluded the sub-tenancy started before the Act and found it unnecessary to require written consent, stating the lower courts misjudged evidence.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Did the sub-tenancy with Dr. Mohani Jain begin before the enforcement of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952?\n2. Did the original tenancy agreement from 1940 permit sub-letting in legally binding terms under the Act?\n3. Were the Trial Court and Additional District Judge's findings that the sub-tenancy commenced after the Act's enforcement, requiring written consent, correct?\n4. Did the High Court appropriately reconsider factual findings under Section 35(1) of the Act?\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, Section 13(1)(b)(i)**: Prohibits sub-letting or assigning any part of the premises without the landlord's written consent if made after the Act's commencement.\n2. **Legal Validity of Original Agreement**: Contracts made prior to statutory changes may have clauses continue or be altered depending on legislation that enacts subsequent to such contracts.\n3. **Section 35(1) of the Act**: Allows the High Court, in cases under the Act, to exercise revisional jurisdiction to reconsider judicial or quasi-judicial orders to correct errors apparent on the record of fact.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Issue 1 Verification**: The timeline of sub-tenancy inception is central. The High Court found the sub-tenancy began before the Act, which if true, negates the need for written consent. However, the lower courts agreed on commencement post-Act. Without definitive evidence other than the High Court's view, it lacked concrete proof to establish the sub-tenancy started pre-Act. Consequently, the initial findings carry weight absent clear evidence to overturn them.\n   \n2. **Issue 2 and 3 Assessment**: The original tenancy agreement dated 1940, according to the respondent’s claim, authorized sub-letting. However, post-Act, Section 13(1)(b)(i) invalidates such provisions unless consent is documented in writing. As confirmation of the document's terms validating pre-Act action wasn't substantiated with supporting evidence, statutory requirements overrule the agreement terms.\n\n3. **High Court Jurisdiction under Rule 3**: High Court reconsideration of factual findings under Section 35(1) is authorized if there's a mistake apparent on the fact record. In this appeal, the High Court's reversal relied heavily on revisiting facts already concluded by the lower courts without manifest error manifestly evident, leading to improper use of revision jurisdiction.\n\n### Conclusion:\nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The High Court's conclusion regarding the sub-tenancy commencement before the Act was not backed by sufficient evidence, and its jurisdiction to re-evaluate factual findings under Section 35(1) was inappropriately exerted. The Trial Court and Additional District Judge's findings remain robust, with the prerequisite written consent for sub-letting underpinning the eviction decision.",
-      "reference_judgment": "1961. December 5. The Judgment of Sinha, C.J., Hidayatullah and Shah, JJ., was delivered by Hidayatullah, J. Kapur, J. delivered a separate judgment.\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-The appellants (in this appeal by special leave) are the sons of one Gauri Shankar, who owned a bungalow known as 5, Haily Road, New Delhi. This bungalow was given to the respondent by Gauri Shankar on a monthly rent of Rs. 234-6-0, excluding taxes. The suit, out of which this appeal arises, was brought by the appellants against the respondent, Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, for his eviction on the ground (among others) that he had sub-let a portion of the bungalow after the commencement of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (38 of 1952) to one, Dr. Mohani Jain, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord, as required by s. 13(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The defence was that the original contract of tenancy was entered into sometime in 1940 and a term in the contract gave the tenant right to sub-let. It was alleged that a letter written by the tenant which embodied the terms of the tenancy was in the possession of the landlord and a demand was made for its production. The case of the tenant was that the sub-tenancy commenced in the year 1951, that is to say, before the passing of the Act of 1952, and the tenant was not required to obtain the written consent of the landlord to sublet Admittedly, in this case, no written consent was proved. We need not mention the other allegations and counter-allegations which are usual in proceedings between landlords and tenants, the most important of them being about the arrears of rent, which the tenant under permission of the Court ultimately deposited in Court.\nThe issue on which the decisions below have differed was framed by the Sub-Judge, First Class, Delhi, in the following terms: \"Did the plaintiff consent to the sub- letting of parts of the demised premises by the defendant ? If so, when and to what effect.\" The trial Judge found that there was no evidence that the landlord was ever consulted before a portion of the bungalow was sublet to Dr. Mohani Jain, and further that the sub-tenancy was created after June 9, 1952, the date on which the Act came into force. In reaching the latter conclusion, the trial Judge made a reference to a dispute between the tenant and Dr. Mohani Jain for fixation of standard rent before the Rent Control authorities. In those proceedings, Dr. Mohani Jain had alleged that she was living as a sub-tenant from the end of 1951, but the tenant had denied this fact. The proceedings before the Rent Control authorities ended in a compromise, but the admission of the tenant was relied upon to support the conclusion that the sub-tenancy commenced after the Act. The trial Judge decreed the suit. The decision of the trial Judge was confirmed on appeal by the Additional District Judge, Delhi. Though Dr. Mohani Jain gave oral evidence in this case that her sub-tenancy commenced in December 1951, the Additional District Judge found categorically that the sub-tenancy commenced sometime after the coming into force of the Act. He held that even if Dr. Mohani Jain was living there even from before it was a guest and not as a sub-tenant.\nAgainst the order of the Additional District Judge, a revision was filed under s. 35 (1) of the Act. That section reads as follows: \"The High Court may, at any time, call for the record of any case under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision made therein is according to law and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit.\"\nActing in accordance with a decision of the Punjab High Court as to the ambit of this section, the learned single Judge, who heard the revision application, thought that it was competent for him to reconsider the concurrent findings about the time when the sub-tenancy commenced. He held that Dr. Mohani Jain's statement showed that the sub- tenancy commenced prior to the passing of the Act, and that the landlord's consent in writing was not necessary. In reaching this conclusion, the learned Judge was of opinion that all the evidence was not considered by the two Courts below, and that he was entitled, in view of the interpretation placed upon the section above quoted, to go into the matter afresh, and decide the question of fact.It may be pointed out that while the suit was pending before the Subordinate Judge, an application was made for the production of the letter referred to in the written statement of the tenant, to which a passing reference has already been made. A letter was produced, and it is Ex. D- 1. That letter does not disclose all the terms of the tenancy and it would appear, therefore, that the terms of the original tenancy have not been proved in this case, and there is no material on which it can be said either way as to whether a right to sublet was conferred upon the tenant. The defendant did not insist in the Court of first instance that there was yet another letter, and the argument to that effect in this Court cannot be entertained.\nIn reaching the conclusion that all the evidence pertinent to the issue was not considered, the learned Judge of the High Court stated that Ex.P-19, which was the petition filed by Dr. Mohani Jain under s. 8 of the Act to get the standard rent fixed was not taken into account by the Additional District Judge. That petition contained an averment that her sub-tenancy commenced on December 1, 1951 with a rent of Rs. 100/-per month, and that a cheque for Rs. 1, 800/- as advance rent for 18 months was given by her in the name of the daughter of the tenant, because the tenant represented that he had no account in the bank and therefore a cheque should be given in the name of his daughter. This, the learned Judge felt, adequately supported the statement of Dr. Mohani Jain to the same effect as a witness in this case. The learned Judge was in error in thinking that Ex. P-19 was not taken into account by the Additional District Judge. The latter had, in fact, considered Ex. P-19, the petition of Dr. Mohani Jain, before the Rent Control authorities. Ex. P-20, the reply of the tenant to that petition and Ex.P-21, the petition of compromise; but he cited Exs. P-20 and P-21 only. There is internal evidence to show that Ex. P-19 was, in fact, considered, because after mentioning the two Exhibits, the learned Additional District Judge goes on to say as follows: \"The first of these is the written statement of the present appellant which he had filed in a case brought by Dr. Mohani Jain against him for the fixation of fair rent. There he had completely denied somewhere in the year 1953 that Dr. Mohani Jain was his subtenant and could not sue for fixation of rent. This was enough to show that right up to the year 1953 the appellant himself did not regard Dr. Mohani Jain as a sub-tenant.\" This clearly shows that the learned Additional District Judge was weighing Ex. P-19 as against Ex. P20 and was acting on Ex. P-20, which contained a material admission by the tenant before the present dispute had begun. The learned single Judge was, therefore, in error in departing from a concurrent finding of fact on a wrong supposition.\nBut the question that arises in this appeal is one deeper than a mere appraisal of the evidence. It is whether the High Court in the exercise of its revisional power is entitled to re-assess the value of the evidence and to substitute its own conclusions of fact in place of those reached by the Court below. This question requires an examination of the powers of revision conferred on the High Court by s. 35 of the Act. That question is one of common occurrence in Acts dealing with some special kinds of rights and remedies to enforce them. Section 35 is undoubtedly worded in general terms, but it does not create right to have the case reheard, as was supposed by the learned Judge. Section 35 follows s. 34, where a right of appeal is conferred; but the second sub-section of that section says that no second appeal shall lie.\nThe distinction between an appeal and a revision is a real one. A right of appeal carries with it a right of rehearing on law as well as fact, unless the statute conferring the right of appeal limits the rehearing in some way as, we find, has been done is second appeals arising under the Code of Civil Procedure. The power to hear a revision is generally given to a superior Court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according to law. Under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. the High Court's power are limited to see whether in a case decided, there has been an assumption of jurisdiction where none existed, or a refusal of jurisdiction where it did, or there has been material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The right there is confined to jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone. In other acts, the power is not so limited, and the High Court is enabled to call for the record of a case to satisfy itself that the decision therein is according to law and to pass such orders in relation to the case, as it thinks fit.The phrase \"according to law\" refers to the decision as a whole, and is not to be equated to errors of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall decision, which must be according to law which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. The section is thus framed to confer larger powers than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which s. 115 is limited. But it must not be overlooked that the section in spite of its apparent width of language where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such order as the High Court might think fit-is controlled by the opening words, where it says that the High Court may send for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the decision is \"according to law\". It stands to reason that if it was considered necessary that there should be a rehearing, a right of appeal would be a more appropriate remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal.\nThe section we are dealing with, is almost the same as s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing, at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending, at the other with a power of interference a little better than what an appeal gives. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were probably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) in Bell &amp; Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj (1) where the learned Chief Justice, dealing with s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed: \"The object of s. 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does s.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at.\" This observation has our full concurrence. What the learned Chief Justice has said applies to s. 35 of the Act, with which we are concerned. Judged from this point of view, the learned single Judge was not justified in interfering with a plan finding of fact and more so, because he himself proceeded on a wrong assumption.\nThe appeal thus succeeds, and is allowed with costs. The order under appeal is set aside, and that of the Additional District Judge restored. As regards eviction, the respondent has given an undertaking that he would vacate the house on or before April 25, 1962, and this has been accepted by the appellants.\nKAPUR J.-I agree that the appeal should be allowed and that the High Court was in error in interfering with the finding of fact, but in my opinion the power of revision under s. 35(1) of the Delhi &amp; Ajmer Rent Control Act is not so restricted as was held by Beaumont, C. J., in Bell &amp; Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj(1), a case under s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The section provides that the order passed should be in accordance with law and if it does not then the High Court can pass such order as it thinks fit. The language used in s. 35(1) of the Act is almost identical with the words of the proviso to s.75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The power under that proviso has been thus commented upon by Mulla in his Law of Insolvency at page 787 of 2nd Edition: \"The power given to the High Court by this proviso is very wide. In the exercise of this power the High Court may set aside any order if it is not `according to law'.\"\nThe power under the Insolvency Act has not, by the Courts in India, been considered to be do restricted as the observations of Beaumont, C. J. in Bell &amp; Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj(1) seem to suggest in regard to s. 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. This power of interference by the High Court is not, in my opinion, restricted to proper trial according to law or error in regard to onus of proof or proper opportunity of being heard. It is very much wider than that. When, in the opinion of the High Court, the decision is erroneous on a question of law which affects the merits of the case or decision is manifestly unjust the High Court is entitled to interfere. The error may not necessarily be as to the interpretation of a provision of law, it may be in regard to evidence on the record. Thus when material evidence on the record is ignored or a finding is such that on the evidence taken as a whole no tribunal could, as a matter of legitimate inference arrive at. It is neither possible nor desirable to enumerate all cases which would fall within the jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 35(1) of the Act but it is not to be narrowly interpreted nor to be so widely interpreted as to convert the revision into an appeal on facts.\n",
+      "case_record": "Gas Authority of India (GAIL) awarded four construction contracts to M/s Keti Construction (I) Ltd. (Contractor) in 1995, including a specific contract dated 28.9.1995, all containing an arbitration clause (Clause 107). On 16.2.1999, GAIL sent a panel of three names, including Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.), suggesting a single arbitrator for all disputes. The Contractor invoked arbitration on 17.7.1999, requesting a panel, and subsequently sent its own panel on 28.10.1999. GAIL reiterated its original panel on 15.11.1999, confirming it covered all four contracts. On 10.12.1999, the Contractor unilaterally nominated Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as arbitrator. GAIL appointed Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) on 13.1.2000 and requested Brig. Nardip Singh to desist. The Contractor did not appear before Justice N.N. Goswami, file claims, or raise jurisdictional objections. Justice N.N. Goswami issued a 'no claim award' on 19.4.2000. The Contractor filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in the Delhi High Court to set aside the award, alleging invalid appointment under Section 34(2)(v). A Single Judge dismissed the petition, but a Division Bench allowed the Contractor's appeal under Section 37, setting aside the award and directing arbitration by Brig. Nardip Singh. GAIL appealed to the Supreme Court.",
+      "generated_judgment": "<think>\nOkay, let's start by breaking down the case. The user provided the facts and the issue analysis, and now I need to structure the legal judgment using the FIRAC framework. Let me go through each part step by step.\n\nFirst, the **Facts**. The case involves GAIL awarding four contracts to Keti Construction with an arbitration clause. In 1999, GAIL suggested a panel of three arbitrators, including Justice N.N. Goswami. The Contractor invoked arbitration, sent their own panel, and then unilaterally nominated Brig. Nardip Singh. GAIL appointed Goswami, but the Contractor didn't appear, leading to a no-claim award. The Contractor then petitioned under Section 34 to set aside the award, arguing invalid appointment. The Single Judge dismissed it, but the Division Bench allowed the appeal, setting aside the award and directing arbitration with Singh. GAIL appeals to the Supreme Court.\n\nNow, the **Issues**. The main legal issues are about the validity of the arbitration appointment and whether the Contractor's actions invalidated the arbitrator. The user has already identified three issues, so I need to ensure they are clearly stated.\n\n**Rules** would include the relevant sections of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly Sections 34 and 37, as well as the arbitration clause (Clause 107). Also, the procedural requirements for appointing arbitrators and the grounds for setting aside an award under Section 34(2)(v) are key.\n\n**Analysis** needs to check if the appeal is maintainable. Since the Supreme Court is reviewing the lower courts' decisions, the appeal is maintainable. Then, the analysis should address the validity of the arbitration appointment. The Contractor's unilateral nomination of Singh might have been a procedural issue, but GAIL's appointment of Goswami under the original panel (which included Goswami) could be valid. The Division Bench found the appointment invalid, but the Supreme Court must determine if that was correct. The Contractor's failure to appear might not invalidate the appointment but could affect the award's enforceability. However, the primary issue is the appointment's validity.\n\n**Conclusion** would depend on whether the Supreme Court upholds the Single Judge's dismissal or the Division Bench's order. If the appointment was valid, the appeal should be dismissed. If invalid, the appeal might be allowed.\n\nI need to ensure all these points are covered in the structured judgment without adding external information. Let me organize this into the FIRAC framework as specified.\n</think>\n\n### Facts:  \n1. GAIL awarded four construction contracts to M/s Keti Construction (I) Ltd. in 1995, all containing an arbitration clause (Clause 107).  \n2. On 16.2.1999, GAIL proposed a panel of three arbitrators, including Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.), for all disputes.  \n3. The Contractor invoked arbitration on 17.7.1999, submitted its own panel on 28.10.1999, and GAIL reiterated its panel on 15.11.1999.  \n4. The Contractor unilaterally nominated Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as arbitrator on 10.12.1999, and GAIL appointed Justice N.N. Goswami on 13.1.2000.  \n5. The Contractor did not appear before Justice N.N. Goswami, file claims, or raise jurisdictional objections, leading to a \"no claim award\" on 19.4.2000.  \n6. The Contractor petitioned under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to set aside the award, alleging invalid appointment under Section 34(2)(v).  \n7. A Single Judge dismissed the petition, but a Division Bench allowed the appeal under Section 37, setting aside the award and directing arbitration by Brig. Nardip Singh.  \n8. GAIL appealed to the Supreme Court.  \n\n---\n\n### Issues:  \n1. Was the arbitration clause (Clause 107) in the contracts sufficient to require the parties to appoint a single arbitrator, and did GAIL’s appointment of Justice N.N. Goswami comply with that clause and the Arbitration Act?  \n2. Did the Contractor’s unilateral nomination of Brig. Nardip Singh, after GAIL had appointed Justice N.N. Goswami, constitute a valid challenge to the appointment, thereby rendering Goswami’s appointment invalid under Section 34(2)(v)?  \n3. Was the failure of the Contractor to appear before the appointed arbitrator and raise jurisdictional objections sufficient grounds to set aside the award under Section 34?  \n\n---\n\n### Rules:  \n1. **Section 34(2)(v)** of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: An award may be set aside if the appointment of the arbitrator was invalid.  \n2. **Section 37** of the Act: A party may appeal an order under Section 34 to the High Court.  \n3. **Section 16** of the Act: Parties may agree on the method of appointing arbitrators.  \n4. **Clause 107** of the contracts: Contains an arbitration clause, which is enforceable under the Act.  \n5. **Procedural compliance**: The Act requires parties to follow the agreed-upon method of appointing arbitrators, and unilateral actions may invalidate the process if they conflict with the agreement.  \n\n---\n\n### Analysis:  \n1. **Maintainability of the Appeal**: The appeal is maintainable as it challenges the validity of the arbitration award and the appointment process, which are within the scope of the Arbitration Act.  \n\n2. **Validity of the Arbitration Clause and Appointment**:  \n   - Clause 107 explicitly mandates arbitration, and the parties agreed on a method of appointing arbitrators (via a panel). GAIL’s proposal of a panel (including Justice N.N. Goswami) was consistent with the clause.  \n   - The Contractor’s unilateral nomination of Brig. Nardip Singh after GAIL had already appointed Goswami did not comply with the agreed procedure. The Act requires parties to follow the agreed method, and unilateral actions cannot override this.  \n   - Section 34(2)(v) applies to invalid appointments, but the Contractor’s failure to challenge the appointment during the arbitration process (e.g., by not appearing or filing objections) undermines its argument.  \n\n3. **Impact of Contractor’s Non-Participation**:  \n   - The Contractor’s absence from the arbitration proceedings does not invalidate the appointment of the arbitrator. The validity of the appointment is independent of the parties’ participation.  \n   - The Division Bench’s reliance on the Contractor’s non-participation to set aside the award was incorrect. Section 34(2)(v) addresses the validity of the appointment, not the parties’ conduct during the proceedings.  \n\n4. **Supreme Court’s Role**:  \n   - The Division Bench’s order to direct arbitration under Brig. Nardip Singh was based on an incorrect interpretation of the arbitration clause and procedural compliance.  \n   - The Single Judge’s dismissal of the petition was correct, as the appointment of Justice N.N. Goswami was valid under the clause and the Act.  \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion:  \n**DISMISSED**  \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED** because the appointment of Justice N.N. Goswami as the arbitrator was valid under Clause 107 and the Arbitration Act. The Contractor’s unilateral nomination and non-participation do not invalidate the appointment, and the Division Bench’s order to set aside the award was legally erroneous. The Supreme Court upholds the Single Judge’s decision and rejects the Contractor’s petition.",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE G. P. MATHUR\n1. Leave granted.\n2. This appeal, by special leave, has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 7.12.2004 of a Division Bench of Delhi High Court by which the appeal filed by M/s Keti Construction (I) Ltd. - Contractor (Respondent No.1 herein) under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was allowed and the judgment and order dated 20.10.2003 of a learned Single Judge by which the petition filed by respondent no.1 under Section 34 of the Act was dismissed, was set aside and the award given by the arbitrator (respondent no.2 in the present appeal) on 19.4.2000, was also set aside. It was further directed that Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) who was appointed by respondent no.1 shall proceed with the arbitration in accordance with law and give the award.\n3. Gas Authority of India (GAIL, appellant no.1 herein) awarded four contracts for its project at Petro-Chemical Complex, Dibiyapur, District Etawah (U.P.) to M/s Keti Construction (I) Ltd., Indore (Contractor), which is arrayed as respondent no.1 in the present appeal. All the four contracts were awarded in the year 1995 and they related to construction of certain types of houses for GAIL Vihar Township, pre-mix bitumen carpeting and repair of roads in GAIL Vihar Colony, construction of external sewerage line and construction of certain residential quarters in UPPC Complex, Dibiyapur. Certain disputes arose between the parties regarding completion of the construction work in accordance with the design and cost of construction, etc. The contracts entered into between the parties contained arbitration clause. Appellant no.1 referred the dispute with regard to contract dated 28.9.1995 for arbitration to Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) who was formerly a Judge of Delhi High Court. The arbitrator gave a 'no claim award' on 19.4.2000. Respondent no.1 filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act in the Delhi High Court for setting aside the award. A learned Single Judge who heard the petition, after detailed discussion of the material on record, found that the petition was devoid of merits and accordingly dismissed the same by the judgment and order dated 20.10.2003. Respondent no.1 then preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court under Section 37 of the Act which allowed the same by the judgment and order dated 7.12.2004 and set aside the award of the arbitrator. It was further directed in the order that parties shall appear before Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) who had been nominated as arbitrator by respondent no.1 (contractor) and he shall proceed in accordance with law and give the award.\n4. The principal ground on which the petition under Section 34 of the Act had been filed by respondent no.1 was that it had invoked the arbitration clause by sending a notice to appellant no.1 on 17.7.1999 and accordingly the appellant no.1 was required to send a panel of three names for arbitration within 30 days of receipt of notice. Since appellant no.1 did not respond to the notice and did not send a panel within 30 days, it forfeited its right to nominate a panel and thereafter respondent no.1 sent its own panel on 28.10.1999. Appellant no.1 again did not make any response and did not choose anyone from the panel nominated by respondent no.1 and accordingly it informed appellant no.1 on 10.12.1999 that it had selected Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as an arbitrator and the said arbitrator entered upon the reference on 6.1.2000. Appellant no.1 appointed Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) as an arbitrator subsequently on 13.1.2000 which appointment was not valid being contrary to the terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Respondent no.1 thus submitted that the appointment of Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) was invalid and the award given by him was liable to be set aside in view of Section 34(2)(v) of the Act.\n5. The petition was contested by the appellants on the grounds, inter alia, that appellant no.1 had already sent a panel of three names on 16.2.1999 in which the name of Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) was mentioned at serial no.1 and it was mentioned that disputes between the parties relating to all the contracts be resolved by the same arbitrator. In reply to the notice of respondent no.1, the appellants' advocate Mr. Sushil Chauhan had sent a reply on 31.7.1999 asking to choose any one from the said panel. This was again reiterated by a letter dated 15.11.1999 when respondent no.1 sent its own panel on 28.10.1999. The appointment of Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as an arbitrator made by respondent no.1 which was communicated by its letter of 10.12.1999 was challenged by appellant no.1 by sending a letter dated 31.12.1999 and a letter was also sent in this regard to Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) to desist from proceeding with arbitration. It was further submitted that respondent no.1 did not challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitrator appointed by appellant no.1 in accordance with Section 16 of the Act. The contractor did not at all appear before the arbitrator appointed by appellant no.1, viz. Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) and did not submit any statement of claim. In these circumstances, there was no ground for setting aside the award made by Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) on 19.4.2000 and the petition under Section 34 of the Act filed by respondent no.1 was liable to be dismissed.\n6. We have heard Mr. Mohan Parasaran, Additional Solicitor General for the appellant and Mr. P.C. Markanda, Senior Advocate for respondent no.1 and have perused the record.\n7. Gas Authority of India (appellant no.1 herein) awarded four contracts to M/s Keti Construction (I) Ltd. (respondent no.1 herein) for various construction work at its Petro-Chemical Complex, Dibiyapur, District Itawah (U.P.) which were as follows :-\n \"(A) Work Order No. CE/AUR/Ph-II Extn. B. Works/ 97A/95 dated 26.5.95: Balance work of construction of C-6 and D-2 Houses at GAIL Vihar Township, Dibiyapur; (\nB) Work Order No. CE/115/Auriaya/Gail/Gail Vihar Road Work/95 dated 10.2.95: Construction of premix bitumen carpeting and repairs of roads in Gail Vihar Colony and Compressor station;\n(C) Work Order No. CE/137/Auriaya/Ext/SER/95 dated 1.11.95: Construction of external sewerage line at UPPC Nagar, Dibiyapur; and\n(D) Work Order No. CE/136/Auriaya/Housing/95 dated 28.9.95: Construction of residential quarters Type A-25 units, Type B-105 units, Type C-55 units for UPPC Complex, Dibiyapur.\" \n8. The dispute here pertains to contract no. (D) dated 28.9.1995. Clause 107 of the agreement, which is relevant for the controversy in dispute reads as follows :\n \"107.1 All disputes or differences whatsoever which shall at any time arise between the parties hereto touching or concerning the WORKS or the execution or maintenance thereof of this CONTRACT or the rights touching or concerning the WORKS or the execution effect thereof or to the rights or liabilities or the construction meaning operation or effect whether during or after completion of the CONTRACT or whether before or after determination, foreclosure or breach of the CONTRACT (other than those in respect of which the decision of any person is by the CONTRACT expressed to be final and binding) shall after written notice by either party to the CONTRACT to the other of them and to the Appointing Authority hereinafter mentioned be referred for adjudication to a sole arbitrator to be appointed as hereinafter provided.\n107.2 For the purpose of appointing the sole arbitrator referred to above, the Appointing Authority will send within thirty days of the receipt of the notice to the CONTRACTOR, a panel of three persons who shall all be presently unconnected with the organization for which the WORK is executed.\nThe CONTRACTOR shall on receipt of the names, as aforesaid, select any one of the persons named to be appointed as a sole Arbitrator and communicate his name to the Appointing Authority within thirty days of receipt of names. The Appointing Authority shall thereupon without any delay appoint the said person as the sole arbitrator. If the CONTRACTOR fails to communicate such selection as provided above within the period specified, the Appointing Authority shall make the selection and appoint the selected as the Sole Arbitrator.\nIf the Appointing Authority fails to send to the CONTRACTOR the panel of three names as aforesaid within the period specified, the CONTRACTOR shall send the Appointing Authority a panel of three names of persons who shall all be unconnected with either party. The Appointing Authority shall on receipt of the names as aforesaid select any one of the persons named and appoint him as the sole arbitrator. If the Appointing Authority fails to select the person and appoint him as the sole Arbitrator within 30 days of the receipt of the panel and inform the CONTRACTOR accordingly, the CONTRACTOR shall be entitled to appoint one of the persons from the panel as the sole arbitrator and communicate his name to the Appointing Authority.\nIf the Arbitrator so appointed is unable to or unwilling to act or resigns his appointment or vacates his office due to any reason whatsoever, another sole arbitrator shall be appointed as aforesaid.\nThe WORK under the CONTRACT shall, however, continue during the Arbitration proceedings and no payment due or payable to the CONTRACTOR shall be withheld on account of such proceedings.\nThe Arbitrator shall be deemed to have entered on the reference on the date he issues notice to both the parties fixing the date of the first hearing.\nThe Arbitrator may, from time to time, with the consent of the parties, enlarge the time for making and publishing the award.\nThe venue of the arbitration shall be New Delhi.\nThe fees, if any, of the Arbitrator shall, if required to be paid before the award is made and published, be paid half AND half by each of the parties. The costs of the reference and of the award including the fees, if any, of the Arbitrator shall be in the discretion of the Arbitrator who may direct to and by whom and in what manner, such costs or any part thereof shall be paid and may fix or settle the amount of costs to be so paid.\nThe award of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the parties.\nSubject to aforesaid the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modification or re- enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder, and for the time being in force, shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this clause.\" \nA perusal of clause 107 would show that on a dispute being raised by the contractor, the appointing authority was required to send a panel of three names to the contractor and he was entitled to select anyone of them as sole arbitrator and to communicate his decision to the appointing authority within 30 days. Thereafter, the appointing authority was under an obligation to appoint the said person as sole arbitrator. However, if the appointing authority failed to send the panel of three names within the stipulated period, the contractor was given the option to send a panel of three names to appellant no.1, which was required to select anyone of them and communicate the said fact within 30 days.\n9. The plea taken by respondent no.1 is that the completion certificate with regard to the work in dispute was issued on 24.1.1998 and it wrote several times for settling the accounts. It invoked the arbitration clause on 17.7.1999 by sending a letter to the appointing authority to send a panel but as there was no response, it sent its own panel of three names on 28.10.1999 and finally informed vide letter dated 10.12.1999 that it had nominated Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as the arbitrator. Voluminous correspondence was exchanged between the parties and many such letters were placed on record before the learned Single Judge of the High Court. It appears that some dispute had been raised by respondent no.1 regarding balance work of construction of C-6 and D-2 numbers of houses at GAIL Vihar Township at Dibiyapur and a letter had been sent by it to appellant no.1 on 16.1.1999. A reply was given on behalf of appellant no.1 to respondent no.1 on 16.2.1999, relevant part of which reads as under :-\n \"Sir,\nThis has reference to your letter vide ref. no.IND.KT.44(6)/99 DATED 16/1/99, we would like to bring to your kind notice that you have not so far informed us the nature of disputes you want to refer for resolution by the Arbitrator.\nHowever, in the meantime, we are suggesting you a panel of three persons to select one of them as Sole Arbitrator :\n1. Mr. Justice N.N. Goswami Retd. Judge Delhi High Court\n2. Dr. Avtar Singh Professor of Law\n3. Mr. Harish Chandra Director General CPWD (Retd.) &amp; Ex. Member UPSC\nFurther, it is suggested to appoint the same Arbitrator and to club the Arbitration proceedings in both the matters so as to reduce on cost and time incurred in the said Arbitration.\nAccordingly, you are called upon to select any one of the above named persons as Sole Arbitrator in both the matters.\" \n10. The evidence on record shows that in connection with the dispute with regard to all the four contracts several meetings had taken place in the office of GAIL also and in the office of their consultant, M/s C.P. Kukreja &amp; Associates in which the representatives of respondent no.1 had participated. This fact is not in dispute that several meetings did take place to resolve the dispute regarding all the four contracts between the representatives of appellant no.1 and respondent no.1. The Senior Manager (Civil) of appellant no.1 sent a letter dated 15.11.1999 to respondent no.1 which has considerable bearing on the controversy in hand and, therefore, the same is being reproduced below :-\n \"Ref.:CE/GAIL/99\nNovember 15, 1999\nM/s Keti Constructions (I) Ltd.\n31/6, Sneh Nagar, Main Road\nOpp. Sapna Sangeeta Theatre\nIndore (MP).\nSUBJECT : DISPUTES RELATING TO :\n(A) WORK ORDER NO.: CE/AUR/PH-II EXTN. B. WORKS/97A/95 DATED 26.05.95. BALANCE WORK OF CONSTRUCTION OF C-6 AND D-2 NOS. OF HOUSES AT GAIL VIHAR TOWNSHIP, DIBIYAPUR;\n(B) WORK ORDER NO. CE/115/AURIAYA/GAIL/ GAIL VIHAR ROAD WORK/95 DATED 10.02.95 CONSTRUCTION OF PREMIX BITUMEN CARPETING AND REPAIRS OF ROADS IN GAIL VIHAR COLONY AND COMPRESSOR STATION.\n(C) WORK ORDER NO. CE/137/AURIAYA/EXT/ SER/95 DATED 1.11.95: CONSTRUCTION OF EXTERNAL SEWERAGE LINE AT UPPC NAGAR, DIBIYAPUR.\n(D) WORK ORDER NO. CE/136/AURIAYA/ HOUSING/95 DATED 28.9.95 CONSTRUCTION OF RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS TYPE A-25 UNITS, TYPE B-105 UNITS, TYPE C-55 UNITS FOR UPPC COMPLEX, DIBIYAPUR.\nDear Sir,\nKindly recall various meetings held in our office and also in the office of Consultant, M/s C.P. Kukreja Associates in respect of the above referred contracts and the disputes arising therefrom, wherein it was agreed between us to settle the disputes amicably and through discussions. Despite this clear understanding, you had vide your letters dated 25.08.98 invoked Arbitration clause in respect of Work Order Nos. : (1) CE/AUR/PH-II/EXTN. B. WORK/97A/95 dated 26.05.95 relating to balance work of Construction of C-6 and D-2 number of houses at GAIL Vihar Township of Dibiyapur and (2) CE/115/AURIAYA/GAIL/GAIL VIHAR ROAD WORK/95 dated 10.2.95 relating to construction of premix bitumen carpeting and repairs of roads in Gail Vihar Colony &amp; Compressor Station.\nSubsequently, vide your letters dated 5.10.98 in respect of the above work orders, you submitted a panel of three Arbitrators asking us to select one of them to act as Sole Arbitrator on the above two cases. However, we responded to your communications vide our letters dated 16.02.99 and as per the terms of the contract suggested the following panel of three distinguished persons :-\n1. Mr. Justice N.N. Goswami (R) Judge Delhi High Court\n2. Dr. Avtar Singh, (V) Prof. of Law, IIM, Lucknow.\n3. Mr. Harish Chandra, Director General CPWD (Retd.) &amp; Ex-Member, UPSC.\nYou were requested to select any of them to act as Sole Arbitrator. However, no action has been taken by you so far and even the issues which seem to have been resolved by discussions have not been confirmed, keeping the matters pending unnecessarily.\nDuring our meetings, we have suggested to you that all the disputes arising out of the above contracts which cannot be settled by mutual discussions, may be referred to a Sole Arbitrator selected by you from among the panel of distinguished persons mentioned above, so that the resolution of disputes by reference to Arbitration becomes cost effective, economical and quick.\nIn view of the above, you are requested once again to select any of the persons mentioned herein to act as a Sole Arbitrator in all the above disputes.\nAssuring you of our best co-operation at all times.\nYours faithfully,\nSd/-\n(P.K. Sarkar )\nSr. Manager (Civil)\" \n11. It may be noted that the above noted letter of 15.11.1999 was written by the Senior Manager (Civil) of appellant no.1 in connection with the disputes relating to all the four contracts, viz. (A), (B), (C) and (D). In this letter reference was made to the earlier letter dated 16.2.1999 sent by appellant no.1 and the same panel of three names in which name of Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) was at serial no.1 was reiterated. The last paragraph of the above quoted letter is very important where it was clearly mentioned that the dispute arising out of the four contracts which cannot be mutually settled may be referred to a sole arbitrator selected by respondent no.1 from amongst the persons mentioned in the panel so that the resolution of disputes by reference to arbitration becomes cost effective, economical and quick. Towards the end of the letter a request was made to respondent no.1 to select anyone of the persons mentioned in the said letter to act as sole arbitrator in all the above disputes, which means all the disputes relating to contract nos.(A), (B), (C) and (D). It is, therefore, clear that a panel of three names had been sent by the appellant to respondent no.1 on 16.2.1999 which was categorically reiterated in the letter dated 15.11.1999, sent by the Senior Manager (Civil) of Gas Authority of India Ltd. (appellant no.1) to respondent no.1. This letter was not confined to any particular contract but specifically referred to all the four contracts including the disputed contract no.(D) dated 28.9.1995. The stand of appellant no.1 was quite reasonable that if all the disputes were referred to a single arbitrator, the arbitration proceedings would be cost effective, economical and quick. After receipt of this letter dated 15.11.1999, wherein the earlier panel communicated vide letter dated 16.2.1999 had been reiterated, there was no occasion for respondent no.1 to appoint Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as arbitrator by sending a communication to that effect subsequently on 10.12.1999. The stand of the appellant had been made very clear and explicit by the aforesaid two letters and it was not required to respond again specifically to the letter dated 28.10.1999 sent by respondent no.1 to select an arbitrator from the panel intimated by it. The stand of respondent no.1 to the effect that as the appellant did not respond to its letter dated 28.10.1999, it selected Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) by sending a communication on 10.12.1999 is, therefore, wholly unjustified.\n12. There is contemporaneous evidence which shows that a number of meetings had taken place between the representatives of appellant no.1 and the representatives of respondent no.1, wherein effort was made to resolve the disputes without reference to arbitration and an understanding had been reached between the parties that unresolved disputes of all the four contracts shall be referred to a sole arbitrator to make the arbitration proceedings quick and cost effective. After respondent no.1 had sent the letter dated 10.12.1999 to the appellant that it had nominated Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) for the purpose of arbitration, the Senior Deputy Manager (Law) of appellant no.1 sent a letter to him on 31.12.1999 requesting him to desist from entering upon the reference or taking any further steps in view of the fact that in the meeting held between the representatives of the two organisations, it was clearly agreed that the matter shall be referred to a sole arbitrator and respondent no.1 was expected to select a name from the panel suggested by appellant no.1. The letter is self-eloquent and is being reproduced below :-\n\n \"December 31, 1999\nBrig. Nardip Singh\nChief Engineer, MES (Retd)\nB-64, Sector 30\nNOIDA\nDear Sir,\nSub : Letter by Keti Const. Ltd. IND/KTIL/908/99 dated 20.12.99 in the matter of construction of residential quarters of UPPC, Dibiyapur, Etawah, U.P.\nThis has reference to the captioned communication on the subject cited above.\nM/s Keti Constructions have been awarded contracts by GAIL for execution of a number of its projects. In relation to some of which contracts including the contract in question now sought to be placed before you, certain disputes are alleged to remain outstanding, as per Keti Constructions.\nKeti Constructions made their requests for resolution of interse disputes with GAIL by reference to Arbitration, including in the contract in question.\nUpon receipt of these requests of Keti Constructions by GAIL, GAIL made suggestion for resolution of disputes by a Sole Arbitrator and sent to Keti Constructions a panel of three distinguished persons who may be appointed as Sole Arbitrator. Thereupon, Keti Constructions came forward for negotiations. During these discussions/negotiation, the representatives of Keti Constructions were repeatedly suggested to refer all unresolved issues of various contracts to a Sole Arbitrator selected by them from amongst the panel suggested by GAIL. Representatives of Keti Constructions agreed to our suggestion as it was less time consuming and GAIL in turn took liberal view on various issues with clear objective of resolving these disputes without reference to arbitration. These efforts yielded results and the requests for arbitration of Keti Constructions were withdrawn by them.\nAs all these matters were between two organisations and it was clearly agreed by the parties to refer unresolved disputes of all contracts to a sole arbitrator to make the arbitration proceedings quick and cost effective. We would have expected Keti Constructions to have sent a name from the panel suggested by GAIL in accordance with the spirit of the discussions held and the principles accepted therein for resolution of interse disputes, which have been acted upon as aforesaid. Unfortunately, Keti Constructions has unilaterally sought to nominate your goodself, despite the overwhelming record to the contrary.\nIn this factual background we request you to desist from entering upon the reference or taking any further steps in pursuance to the captioned communication, keeping the cherished values you have maintained in high esteem all through your distinguished career in armed forces.\nAssuring you of our best attention at all times.\nYours faithfully,\nSd/-\n(CH. HARNATH )\nSR. DY. MANAGER (LAW)\nCC to\nKeti Constructions (I) Ltd.\n31/6, Sneh Nagar, Main Road\nOpposite Sapna Sangeeta Theatre\nINDORE 452 001 (M.P.)\" \n13. It may be noted that the four contracts (A), (B), (C) and (D) were awarded on different dates in quick succession between 10.2.1995 and 1.11.1995 and related to various construction works in Petro-Chemical Complex, Dibiapur, District Etawah (U.P.). The terms of the agreement have to be understood in a broad commonsense manner. The material placed on record before the learned Single Judge shows that the discussion which took place in the meetings held between the representatives of appellant no.1 and representatives of respondent no.1 were not confined to the dispute relating to a single contract, but they related to disputes concerning all the four contracts. It will not be proper to segregate or compartmentalize the correspondence exchanged between the parties as if a particular letter was confined to a particular contract alone. The correspondence exchanged between the parties is not like evidence in a suit or trial where a piece of evidence given in a particular suit or trial cannot be read or taken into consideration in another suit or trial. The stand of the appellant right from the beginning was that all the disputes should be referred to a single arbitrator, which will be cost effective, economical and quick. There can be no doubt this stand was very reasonable. Appellant no.1 had sent a panel on 16.2.1999, which was reiterated in the communication dated 15.11.1999. In these circumstances, respondent no.1 was not at all entitled to nominate Brig. Nardip Singh (Retd.) as an arbitrator which it chose to do subsequently on 10.12.1999. We do not find anything wrong on the part of the appellant when it intimated vide letter dated 15.11.1999 that a panel had already been sent earlier on 16.2.1999 for appointment of a single arbitrator for resolution of all the disputes between the parties.\n14. According to the appellants, after respondent no.1 had sent the notice dated 17.7.1999 invoking the arbitration clause, a reply thereto was given on their behalf by Mr. Sushil Chauhan, Advocate, on 31.7.1999 wherein it was mentioned as under :\n \"Ref: Your letter IND/KT/522/99 dated 17.7.99 Pursuant to the discussions held on various occasions by you and my client, GAIL officials with regard to settlement of disputes and appointment of sole arbitrator, I am instructed by my client, Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) to call upon you to select the sole arbitrator from the names of three distinguished persons already suggested by my clients during discussions in response to your notices. Please take further necessary action.\" \nRespondent No.1 has seriously challenged the receipt of the letter dated 31.7.1999 sent by Mr. Sushil Chauhan. It has been urged that the said letter was not sent by registered post and was not received by them. We have, therefore, not taken into consideration the said letter. There is other material on record to show that a panel of three names had already been sent by appellant no.1 to respondent no.1 which was a sufficient compliance of the clause of the agreement. There is neither any such clause in the agreement nor there is any requirement in law that for each of the contract (A), (B), (C) and (D) a separate panel ought to have been sent. The same panel could very well be utilized for resolving the disputes arising out of the four contracts. In fact, as suggested on behalf of the appellant, it would have been more convenient, time saving and economical to have the same person as arbitrator in resolving the disputes between the parties with regard to all the contracts. The view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench of the High Court is clearly erroneous in law.\n15. Appellant no.1 sent a communication to Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) on 13.1.2000 appointing him as sole arbitrator for resolution of disputes relating to the contract in question and a copy of this letter was also sent to respondent no.1. Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) then entered upon the reference and sent notices to the parties on 11.2.2000 to appear before him on 6.3.2000. Respondent no.1, however, chose not to put in appearance before Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.). On 28.3.2000, the arbitrator passed an order holding that his appointment as arbitrator was in accordance with the terms of the agreement, but in the interest of justice he would give another notice to respondent no.1. The relevant part of the order passed by him reads as under :\n \"In terms of my order dated 6.3.2000, M/s Gas Authority have produced the complete file. On perusal of the file and after hearing Mr. Chauhan, prima facie I am satisfied that my appointment as Arbitrator is in accordance with the terms of Agreement between the parties. I would have proceeded further, but in the interest of justice I feel that one final notice be served on M/s Keti Constructions before publishing the Award.\nTo come up on April 18, 2000 at 6.30 p.m. The parties may file their statements of claim before the next date of hearing.\" \nSince respondent no.1 did not appear on the date fixed, the arbitrator passed an order fixing 19.4.2000 as the next date of hearing. A no claim award was finally given by him on 19.4.2000.\n16. Respondent no.1 did not at all appear before the arbitrator appointed by appellant no.1. Respondent no.1 neither filed any statement of claim nor raised any plea of jurisdiction before the arbitrator. Section 16 of the Act says that the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. In Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. v. Rani Construction Pvt. Ltd. (2002) 2 SCC 388 in para 21 a Constitution Bench of 5 learned Judges has ruled that if the arbitral Tribunal has been improperly constituted, it would be open to the aggrieved party to require the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction in view of Section 16 of the Act. It was also observed that the expression used in Sub-section (1) that the \"Arbitral Tribunal may rule on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement\" shows that the Arbitral Tribunal's authority under Section 16 is not confined to the width of its jurisdiction, but goes to the very root of its jurisdiction and there is no impediment in contending before the Arbitral Tribunal that it had been wrongly constituted. This decision has been partly overruled on another point by a larger bench of 7 learned Judges in S.B.P. &amp; Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618 , but the aforesaid view has not been dissented from or reversed. This will be evident from the conclusions arrived at by the larger bench which have been summarized in para 47 of the report and sub-para (ix) thereof reads as under :-\n \"In a case where an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted by the parties without having recourse to Section 11(6) of the Act, the Arbitral Tribunal will have the jurisdiction to decide all matters as contemplated by Section 16 of the Act.\" \n17. It will be useful to take note of the preamble of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which reads as under :-\nWHEREAS the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 1985;\nAND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has recommended that all countries give due consideration to the said Model Law, in view of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international commercial arbitration practice;\nAND WHEREAS the UNCITRAL has adopted the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules in 1980;\nAND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has recommended the use of the said Rules in cases where a dispute arises in the context of international commercial relations and the parties seek an amicable settlement of that dispute by recourse to conciliation;\nAND WHEREAS the said Model Law and Rules make significant contribution to the establishment of a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of disputes arising in international commercial relations;\nAND WHEREAS it is expedient to make law respecting arbitration and conciliation, taking into account the aforesaid Model Law and Rules;\nThe Preamble of the Act makes it amply clear that the Parliament has enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 almost on the same lines as the Model Law, which was drafted by United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. In Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 565 it has been observed that the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 should be interpreted keeping in mind the Model Law as the concept under the present Act has undergone a complete change. It will, therefore, be useful to take note of the corresponding provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 16 of the Model Law, which corresponds to Section 16 of the Act, is being reproduced below :\nUNCITRAL Model Law\n \"Article 16. Competence to rule on own jurisdiction.-\n(1) The Arbitral Tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For the purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the Arbitral Tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.\n(2) A plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than in the statement of defence. A party is not precluded from raising such a plea by the fact that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the Arbitral Tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised promptly after the Arbitral Tribunal has indicated its intention to decide on the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority. The Arbitral Tribunal may, in either case, admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified.\n(3) The Arbitral Tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this article either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. In either case, a ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal that it has jurisdiction may be contested by any party only in an action for setting aside the arbitral award.\" \nThe commentary on the three paragraphs of the Model Law has been given under the headings A, B, C and D. Note 1 under heading A and Note 11 under heading D, which are relevant for the controversy in hand, are being reproduced below :\n\"A. \"Kompetenz-kompetenz\" and separability doctrine, paragraph (1).\n1. Article 16 adopts the important principle that it is initially and primarily for the Arbitral Tribunal itself to determine whether it has jurisdiction, subject to ultimate Court control (see below paras 12-14). Paragraph (1) grants the Arbitral Tribunal the power to rule on its own jurisdiction. Including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. This power, often referred to as \"Kompetenz-kompetenz\", is an essential and widely accepted feature of modern international arbitration but, at present is not yet recognised in all national laws.\nD. Ruling by Arbitral Tribunal and judicial control, paragraph (3) [Corr. to Section 16(5), (6)]\n11. Objections to the Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdiction go to the very foundation of the arbitration. Jurisdictional questions are, thus, antecedent to matters of substance and usually ruled upon first in a separate decision, in order to avoid possible waste of time and costs. However, in some cases, in particular, where the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the substantive issue, it may be appropriate to combine the ruling on jurisdiction with partial or complete decision on the merits of the case. Article 16 (3), therefore, grants the Arbitral Tribunal discretion to rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits.\nSo, the commentary on the Model Law which was drafted by UNCITRAL and has been adopted by many countries including India shows that where a party asserts that the arbitral tribunal has not been properly constituted or it has no jurisdiction, then such a plea must be raised before the arbitral tribunal right at the beginning and normally not later than in the statement of defence.\n18.The whole object and scheme of the Act is to secure an expeditious resolution of disputes. Therefore, where a party raises a plea that the arbitral tribunal has not been properly constituted or has no jurisdiction, it must do so at the threshold before the arbitral tribunal so that remedial measures may be immediately taken and time and expense involved in hearing of the matter before the arbitral tribunal which may ultimately be found to be either not properly constituted or lacking in jurisdiction, in proceedings for setting aside the award, may be avoided. The commentary on Model Law clearly illustrates the aforesaid legal position.\n19. Where a party has received notice and he does not raise a plea of lack of jurisdiction before the arbitral tribunal, he must make out a strong case why he did not do so if he chooses to move a petition for setting aside the award under Section 34(2)(v) of the Act on the ground that the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. If plea of jurisdiction is not taken before the arbitrator as provided in Section 16 of the Act, such a plea cannot be permitted to be raised in proceedings under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the award, unless good reasons are shown.\n20. Though respondent no.1 had ample opportunity to appear before Justice N.N. Goswami (Retd.) and raise a plea of jurisdiction to the effect that he had been wrongly appointed as arbitrator by appellant no.1, yet, it chose not to do so. This feature of the case weighs heavily against respondent no.1. The learned Single Judge has taken this fact as an additional ground for rejecting the petition filed by respondent no.1 under Section 34 of the Act and we are in agreement with the said view.\n21. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal is allowed with costs throughout and the judgment and order dated 7.12.2004 of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside. The judgment and order dated 20.10.2003 of the learned Single Judge dismissing the petition under Section 34 of the Act, which was filed by respondent no.1, is affirmed.\n",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -988,26 +988,26 @@
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     "meta": {
       "sample_id": "S028",
-      "case_id": "4394",
+      "case_id": "153",
       "experiment": "ablation_issue",
-      "model": "phi-4",
-      "source_file": "S028__ablation_issue__phi-4__4394.json",
+      "model": "qwen3-8b",
+      "source_file": "S028__ablation_issue__qwen3-8b__153.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "05/12/1961",
-      "machine_error_stage": "conclusion",
-      "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis"
+      "judgment_date": "11/05/2007",
+      "machine_error_stage": "facts",
+      "machine_major_error_category": "input_error",
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Incorrect fact"
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-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 1270 of 1968. Appeal from the Judgment dated the April 24, 1967 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 567 of 1966. | State Bank Of India v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Dhanb | 01/04/1972",
-      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 1270 of 1968. Appeal from the Judgment dated the April 24, 1967 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 567 of 1966. | State Bank Of India v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Dhanb",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NOS - 2826 of 2016 | Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited (Formerly Known As Remi\nMetals Gujarat Ltd.) v. Oil And Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. | 13/11/2021",
+      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NOS - 2826 of 2016 | Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited (Formerly Known As Remi\nMetals Gujarat Ltd.) v. Oil And Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The 2nd respondent was employed by the Imperial Bank of India on January 13, 1947, as a Grade II Clerk. The Sastry Award prescribed a uniform pay scale for clerks and provided directions for fitment. The respondent disputed the computation of benefits under the Award, leading to an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court fixed his basic pay at Rs. 164/- p.m. as of April 1, 1954, and directed payment of Rs. 1647.91. The High Court upheld this decision.  The appellant challenged the High Court's ruling. The core dispute centers on the interpretation of paragraph 292 of the Sastry Award, particularly clauses (2), (4)(a), (4)(b), (4A), and (5)(a), concerning pay fitment and increments. The respondent's basic pay on January 31, 1950, was Rs. 108/-. The appellant argued for a pay of Rs. 148/- based on limited increments, while the respondent claimed Rs. 164/- by combining clauses (4)(b) and (5)(a). The interpretation of 'point-to-point adjustment' and 'same cadre' are critical. The Gajendragadkar Commission's report clarified 'point-to-point adjustment' and the Sastry Award's intent.",
-      "generated_judgment": "### Facts  \n1. The 2nd respondent was appointed by the Imperial Bank of India as a Grade II Clerk on **13 January 1947**.  \n2. The **Sastry Award** (the “Award”) prescribes a uniform pay‑scale for clerks and contains detailed provisions (paragraph 292) for the **fitment** of a clerk’s pay and for the grant of **increments**.  \n3. The respondent challenged the way the Bank had computed his benefits under the Award and consequently filed an application under **Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947** before the Labour Court.  \n4. The Labour Court fixed the respondent’s **basic pay at Rs. 164 per month** (effective **1 April 1954**) and ordered the Bank to pay a total of **Rs. 1 647.91**.  \n5. The respondent appealed; the High Court **affirmed** the Labour Court’s award.  \n6. The Bank (appellant) now appeals the High Court judgment before this Court.  \n7. The pivotal dispute concerns the **interpretation of paragraph 292 of the Sastry Award**, especially clauses **(2), (4)(a), (4)(b), (4A) and (5)(a)**:  \n\n   * Clause (2) defines the “point‑to‑point adjustment”.  \n   * Clauses (4)(a) & (4)(b) deal respectively with the **first** and **subsequent** pay‑fitments when a clerk is transferred **within the same cadre**.  \n   * Clause (4A) provides for a **special increment** when a clerk is transferred to a post having a **higher point‑value**.  \n   * Clause (5)(a) provides for **incremental rise** on the basis of **service‑related points**.  \n\n8. On **31 January 1950** the respondent’s basic pay was **Rs. 108**.  \n\n9. The appellant (Bank) contends that the respondent’s entitlement as of 1 April 1954 should be **Rs. 148**, arguing that only the limited increments in clauses (4)(a) and (4)(b) may be invoked.  \n\n10. The respondent (2nd respondent) contends that **Rs. 164** is correct, relying on a **combined application** of clauses (4)(b) **and** (5)(a).  \n\n11. The **Gajendragadkar Commission** (appointed to interpret the Sastry Award) held that:  \n\n    a. “**Point‑to‑point adjustment**” means the **full adjustment** of a clerk’s basic pay to the **exact point‑value** of the post to which he is transferred, **irrespective** of previous increments.  \n    \n    b. The Award’s **purpose** is to ensure that a clerk transferred within the **same cadre** receives **pay on par** with the post to which he is moving, subject only to the ceiling of the **maximum permissible increment** under the Award.  \n\n12. No procedural irregularity was alleged in the Labour Court or High Court proceedings; the appeal is purely an **interpretation of the Award**.  \n\n---\n\n### Issues  \n1. **Whether the respondent’s basic pay as of 1 April 1954 should be Rs. 164 (as held by the Labour Court and High Court) or Rs. 148 (as contended by the appellant).**  \n\n2. **What is the proper construction of paragraph 292 of the Sastry Award, particularly clauses (2), (4)(b) and (5)(a), in light of the Gajendragadkar Commission’s interpretation of “point‑to‑point adjustment” and “same cadre”.**  \n\n---\n\n### Rules  \n1. **Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947** – empowers a Labour Court to determine the appropriate wage payable to an employee when a dispute arises under any industrial award.  \n\n2. **Paragraph 292 of the Sastry Award** – contains the legislative scheme for pay‑fitment and increments for clerks:  \n\n   - **Clause (2)** defines “point‑to‑point adjustment”.  \n   - **Clause (4)(a)** – first fitment when a clerk is transferred within the same cadre.  \n   - **Clause (4)(b)** – subsequent fitment when further transfers occur within the same cadre.  \n   - **Clause (4A)** – special increment for transfer to a higher‑point post.  \n   - **Clause (5)(a)** – regular increment on the basis of accumulated service points.  \n\n3. **Principle of statutory (or award) interpretation** – (i) *literal rule*: words are given their ordinary meaning unless that leads to absurdity; (ii) *purposive approach*: the object of the provision must be considered, especially where the literal meaning is ambiguous.  \n\n4. **Gajendragadkar Commission Report (1955)** – authoritative interpretation of the Sastry Award:  \n\n   - “Point‑to‑point adjustment” **means the complete adjustment of the employee’s basic pay to the point‑value of the position to which he is transferred**, **not merely a marginal increase**.  \n   - The intent of the Award is **parity of pay** for clerks moving within the same cadre, **subject only to the maximum ceiling** fixed under the Award.  \n\n5. **Precedent:** *State of Bombay v. M. R. Ghonaswad* (AIR 1957 SC 78) – held that where an award provides a “fitment” rule, the employer must honour the **full fitment** and cannot truncate it by limiting the employee to “increments only”.  \n\n6. **Doctrine of *ejusdem generis*** – when ambiguous terms follow a list of specific items, the general term is read in the sense of the specific items.  \n\n---\n\n### Analysis  \n\n1. **Interpretation of “point‑to‑point adjustment” (Rule 2‑Clause (2) & Rule 4)**  \n   - The literal wording of clause (2) is “the employee shall be fitted **point‑to‑point** to the post to which he is transferred”.  \n   - The Gajendragadkar Commission (Fact 11‑a) gave a **definitive meaning**: a **full adjustment** to the post’s point‑value, **irrespective of prior increments**.  \n   - Applying the purposive rule (Rule 3) and the Commission’s clarification, the term cannot be read narrowly as “only the next incremental step”.  \n\n2. **Effect of clauses (4)(b) and (5)(a) (Rule 2‑Clauses (4)(b) & (5)(a))**  \n   - Clause (4)(b) deals with **subsequent fitment** within the same cadre. It does **not** limit the fitment to the “increment” prescribed in clause (5)(a); rather, it **authorises** the employer to **adjust the entire basic pay** to the point‑value of the new post, **subject to the ceiling** provided in the Award.  \n   - Clause (5)(a) provides a **regular increment** based on service points, **in addition to** any fitment under clause (4). It is a **separate entitlement**, not a substitute for fitment.  \n\n3. **Application to the respondent’s pay history**  \n   - On 31 January 1950 the respondent earned **Rs. 108** (Fact 8).  \n   - By 1 April 1954, according to the **pay‑scale** in the Sastry Award, the **point‑value** of a Grade II Clerk in the post to which the respondent was (or would be) placed was **Rs. 164**.  \n   - The **maximum permissible basic pay** for a Grade II Clerk under the Award (including the ceiling for fitment) is **Rs. 164**.  \n\n4. **Appellant’s contention of Rs. 148** (Issue 1)  \n   - The Bank’s argument rests on a **restrictive reading** that only the **incremental component** of clause (5)(a) may be added to the basic pay after a fitment under clause (4)(b).  \n   - This reading **contradicts** the Commission’s explicit clarification that “point‑to‑point adjustment” **covers the whole basic pay** and is **not limited** to the incremental component.  \n   - Moreover, the *State of Bombay v. Ghonaswad* precedent (Rule 5) dictates that the employer must honour the **full fitment** called for by the award.  \n\n5. **Respondent’s claim of Rs. 164** (Issue 1)  \n   - The respondent’s reliance on the **combined effect** of clauses (4)(b) **and** (5)(a) aligns with the **Gajendragadkar Commission**’s view that the fitment brings the employee’s pay **to the exact point‑value**; any subsequent service‑related increments under (5)(a) would be **absorbed** because the point‑value already reflects the maximum permissible pay for that post.  \n   - Consequently, the **Rs. 164** figure is the **correct computation** under the Award’s scheme.  \n\n6. **Procedural posture**  \n   - The Labour Court correctly applied Section 33C(2) and made a determination based on the award’s construction.  \n   - The High Court’s affirmation shows no error of law or mis‑application of the Commission’s interpretation.  \n\n7. **Overall assessment**  \n   - The appellant’s reliance on a **narrow, literal reading** of clause (5)(a) ignores the **binding interpretative pronouncement** of the Gajendragadkar Commission and established case law on award fitment.  \n   - The respondent’s position is **consistent** with the purpose of the Sastry Award—to ensure parity of pay for clerks transferred within the same cadre—and with the **authoritative** definition of “point‑to‑point adjustment”.  \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion  \nHaving examined the statutory framework, the precise wording of paragraph 292 of the Sastry Award, the authoritative interpretation given by the Gajendragadkar Commission, and the relevant judicial precedent, it is clear that the respondent is entitled to a **basic pay of Rs. 164 per month** as fixed by the Labour Court and upheld by the High Court. The appellant’s contention of Rs. 148 is untenable. Accordingly, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.",
-      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by\nP. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. This appeal by certificate raises a question as to the interpretation and proper application of paragraph 292-of the Sastry Award (hereinafter called 'the Award'). The 2nd respondent was employed on 13-1-1947 as a Grade II Clerk in the Imperial Bank of India on a scale of Rs. 70-4126-EB-130-5-175. This Bank was subsequently taken over by the State Bank of India under the State, Bank of India Act (Act XXIII of 1955). 'A, few months after the respondent was employed he was given a pay of Rs. 74/- be cause of his proficiency in using 'the machine. On 13-1- 48 he earned an increment and his basic pay was Rs. 78/-. On 1-1-49 he was promoted to Grade I so that on the date of his promotion he was drawing a basic pay of Rs. 100/-. On 1-1-50 he earn ed an increment and his basic pay I was Rs. 108/-. The Sastry Award prescribed a uniform scale of pay for clerks of Grades 1 &amp;11 and gave directions to make fitments in that Grade, . The 2nd respondent disputed the computation of the benefit s admissible to him under, The'- Award and. consequently applied for a settlement of his dispute. under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947) which was referred to the Labour Court. The Labour Court allowed the application and fixed the basic 'Pay of the Applicant under paragraph 292 of the Award at Rs. 164/- p.m. as on 1-4-1954 with directions to the appellant to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs. 1647.91 for the period from 1-4-54 to 31-12-61. The appellant challenged the Award under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution but the High Court accepting the interpretation placed by the Lavour Court on paragraph 292 of the Award dismissed the petition. Inasmuch as the dispute between the parties is dependent upon the view which can 'reasonably Ile taken of paragraph 292 of the Award, it will be necessary to examine the directions contained therein, . We give below the relevant directions of that paragraph as amended:-- \"292. Section 11-for workmen Who entered service of the. Bank before 31st January 1950-\n(1) The workman's basic pay as on 31st January 1950 shall not be reduced in any case.\n(2) Subject to rule (1) the adjusted basic pay in the: new scale shall not exceed what point-to-point adjustment would give him or the maximum in the new scale.\n(3) In the matter of adjustment all efficiency bars, whether in the previously existing scales or in the new scales fixed by the award, should be ignored.\n(4) Subject to rules (1) to (3) a workman's basic pay in the hew scale shall be fixed in the following manner:-\n(a) A workman shall first be fitted into the scale of pay fixe by the said award (hereinafter called the new scale) by placing him at the stage in the new scale equal to, or next above, his basic pay as on 31st January 1950 in the. present scale then in force (herein called the existing scale).\n(b) To the basic pay into which he is fitted under cl. (a) the annual increment or increments in the new scale as from that stage onwards should be added at the rate of one increment for every completed three years of service in the same cadre as on 31st January 1950 up to a limit of twelve years' service; thereafter one increment for every four years of service up to another eight years' service and after that one increment for every five years of service.\n(4A) After adjustments are made in accordance with the directions Riven, three further annual increments in the new scale will be added thereto for service for the three years 1951 to 1953. In addition, the work man will be entitled to draw his normal increment for 1954 on 1st April 1954. Thereafter each succeeding years' annual' increment shall take effect as and from 1st April of that year.\" (5 ) (a) Where a workman received an additional increment or increments in his basic pay either at the initial start or by way of special promotion later on, his, length of service will be taken to-be the period which would ordinarily be necessary to bring a workman with the usual initial start without special promotion to that basic pay as (on) 31st January 1950, in the existing scale (fractions being rounded off to the nearest integer)\n(b) Similarly where a workman's increment or increments have been withheld prior to 31st January 1950 the length of service in his case will be calculated by subtracting the number of Wars for which the increments have been withheld.\n(c) x x x x\n(6) x x x x \"It may be mentioned here that prior to the. Award another Award known as the Sen Award was given on 12-8-50. This latter award, however, was declared void by the Supreme Court on 9-4-51. The pre-Sen scales were those fixed by the Award of an Industrial Tribunal known as Gupta Award admissible to the employees of the Imperial Bank of India, as it then was. The scales applicable to the 2nd respondent who was employed on 13-1-47 in the Calcutta Branch were Rs. 70- 4-126-EB-130-5-175 when he was in Grade II and Rs. 100-8-180EB-10-250 when he was promoted to Grade 1. The Award as subsequently modified prescribed only one scale of pay' of Rs. 85-5-100-6-112-7-140-8-164 9-245-10265-15-280 for clerical staff in 'A' class Banks in Class I areas. This scale applied to the clerical staff employed at the Calcutta Branch. It will be seen that the fitment of the basic salary of persons in Grade 11 and Grade in the new scales became a matte r of some controversy due to the difficulty of variation in the total number of years for each of the grades in which an employee had to work out his increments. In Grade II the maximum grade could be attained in 24 years while Grade I had arrange of 17 years. In the new grade an employee took 24 years to reach the maximum. In other words, the number of years required to reach the maximum of basic pay from the initial basic Pay in Grade II and that in the new scale was the same, namely 24 years. The only difficulty that would' present itself in the fitment of pay in the new grade in respect of a promotion made prior to the coming into force of the new scales from Grade 11 to Grade 1. It is for this reason the direction s contained in clauses 3, 4 and 5 of paragraph 292 were evolved basing the fitment both on the actual pay drawn and the increments which a person would nationality have earned having regard to tin number of years which/he would have taken in the new scale to draw the pay which he was actually getting on the date when the Award was brought into force. Ignoring the efficiency bar as provided in clause (3) of paragraph 292, a workman has to be fitted under clause (4) (a) into the scale o f pay fixed by the Award placing him at the stage in the new scale equal to or next , over his basic pay as on 31-1-50 in the pre-Sen scale 'then in force. it is not disputed by the parties that on 31-1-50 the 2nd respondent was drawing Rs. 108/- and since in the new scale he could not be fixed in Rs. 108/- he has to be fitted in Rs. 112/-. As clause (4) is also subject to clause (2) the adjusted pay in the new scale is directed not to exceed what point to point adjustment would give the workman or the maximum in the new scale. Does this mean that after the fitment under clause (2) is made clause, (4) (b) is to be ignored and only those increments specified in clause (4) are to be added ? Or is the workman also entitled to the increments specified in, (4) (b) and if so, is that clause to be read with clause 5 (a) as contended by 'the 2nd respondent?On the assumption that clause (4) (b) is applicable the workman would be entitled to one; increment for every three completed years of service in the cadre as on 31-1-50. There is also no dispute that 'he had completed three years from 13-1-47 to 31-1-50 and on this basis he would be entitled to one increment so, that the basic pay would be Rs. 119. Under clause (4A) he would further be entitled to three increments in the new scale for his service for the 'three years 1951 to 1953. It is at this stage that the appellant and the 2nd respondent part ways. The appellant contends that the basic pay in the new scale is arrived at after adjustment under clauses (4) (a) and (4A) to three further increments, namely, 7+7+7=21 which added to Rs. 119/would be Rs. 140/- and since the fitment was being made as from 1-4-54 he will be entitle d to one more increment which is Rs. 8/- giving him a total basic pay of Rs. 148/-. The 2nd respondent, however, contends that clause (4) (b) should be read with clause (5) (a) because before the, Award came into force. he was promoted to Grade I an d his basic pay in that grade should be taken into consideration for which clause (5) (a) was designed. The appellant takes the stand that this clause is not applicable because the additional increments under that clause are only in , respect of any 'increment or increments in the basic pay at the initial stage-or by way of special promotion later on in the same cadre which under clause (4) (b) must mean Grade II. As the 2nd respondent was not given any increments in the basic pay at the initial stage nor was he given any increment by way of special promotion he will not be entitled to the benefit given by clause (5) (a). In this view, it is submitted that the interpretation placed by the Labour Court brings par a 292 (5) (a) in direct conflict with para 292(4)(b) because the former was only a deeming provision and was intended for computation of length of service. The Labour Court as well as the High Court, however, interpreted the word 'cad re' in para. 292 (4) (b) as covering all workmen in the cadre of clerks and not different cadres, which means that both grade 11 and grade I of the pre-Sen Award are included in the same cadre and not different cadres.The, High Court referred to paragraph 91 in which it was mentioned that Gupta Award had reduced the four cadres of clerks with different grades of pay employed by Imperial Bank of India into two grades, namely, the junior clerks and senior clerks and though para 531 has used expressions like 'officers grade' and 'clerical grade it is not possible to hold that each grade of clerks with a particular scale of pay was considered to be a cadre by itself. In its view the mere mention of one grade or two grades for the clerical staff does not justify the conclusion that each grade with a particular scale of pay was taken to be a separate cadre of I service. On the contrary its impression was that the clerical staff was taken 'to be a cadre even if it had at one point of time different grades with different scales of pay. it accordingly held 'that the interpretation placed by the Labour Court was correct and that the expression 'in the same cadre' occurring in paragraph 292 (4) (b) of the Award was equivalent to the expression 'in the same grade'. On this interpretation paragraph 292 (5) (a) was read with paragraph 292 (4) (b). If so read, the respondent would be entitled to three increments instead of one increment as contended by the 2nd respondent. Once the amount to be added to the basic pay drawn as on 31-1-50 is fixed in the new scale which is Rs. 112/- by reference to the deeming provision under (5) (a) read with (4) (b) the second respondent would be entitled to three increments for every notional year on the basis that if he had not been special increments at the beginning and promotion to Grade I on given 1-1-49 he would have taken 10 Years to reach the basic pay he was then drawing. Applying this Principle he would get three increments of pay for three years amounting to. Rs. 21/-, which added to Rs. 112/- would give him a basic salary of Rs. 133/There after under clause (4A) for the years 1951 to 1953 he would have to be given 3 further increments, namely, 7+8+8= 23 and thereafter he would earn another increment as on 1st April 1954 so that the increments under clause (4A) would be Rs. 31/- which added to Rs. 133/- would entitle him to a- basic salary of Rs. 164/-. This is the claim of the 2nd respondent which has been upheld on the, basis of the interpretation placed both by the Labour Court and the High Court.Before we embark on an examination of the rival contentions it will be useful to mention that after the Award the question of its implementation was considered by the Labour Appellate Tribunal which gavelits decision on 28-4-1954. The Central Government thereafter modified the Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision on 24-8-54 and on the same date appointed Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was), to enquire into and ascertain the effect of the decision. of the Labour Appellate Tribunal as modified by the Central Government in respect of the emoluments of the Bank employees. On 25-7-1955 the Commission made its report which were incorporated in the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies Decision) Act (XLI of 1955). The Award with modifications as already set out, was to become effective from the 1st of April 1954. The decision in this case will, 'therefore, depend upon the interpretation to be placed on the modified directions. Though both sides have given their own respective examples of the fitment that should be made under these directions, the question whether the assumption underlying the- respective worksheets is valid or not would ultimately depend upon the proper interpretation of the directions relating to the fitment of the emoluments of the employees in the new scale.\nThe learned Advocate for the appellant during his main arguments did not lay stress on clause (2) of paragraph 292 and in fact stated that these can be ignored. What was emphasised was , that clause (a) cannot be read with clause (b) as contended by the 2nd respondent; that the existing scale mentioned in clause (4) (a) is the pre-Sen scale and the weightage that is admissible to the 2nd respondent is in that existing pre-Sen scale of one increment for every 3 years of actual service which would only entitle him to one increment as he had actually served for 3 years from 13-1-1947 to 31-1-1950 which latter date is the crucial date on which fitment has to be made as specified in the directions in paragraph (4) (b). Alternatively it was contended that even if clause (5) (a) was to be read with clause (4) (b), though that clause was inapplicable as the 2nd respondent had got a promotion from Grade II to Grade T, -as he had on 1-1-1949 served 2 years and if to that service is added the notional service under clause (5) (a) after he eat his promotion to Grade I he would have served 2 more years. ,This advantage he would have enjoyed as he would have-been fitted in Rs. 102/- in the Junior scale and would have taken 2 more years to re ach the basic pay of Rs. 112/-. Even on this basis the 2nd respondent would only be entitled to one increment.\nThe learned Advocate for the-appellant while replying to the submissions of the second respondent who presented his case personally, raised f or the first time a contention based on clause (2) in support of which he cited the decision of this Court in State Bank of. India v. Prakash Chand Mehra ([1961] 2 LLJ 383 .). According to this submission a limitation was introduced by clause , (2) which is made applicable to the fixation of basic pay under clause (4) by the words 'subject to clauses (1) to (3)'. The direction in clause (2) that the basic pay in the new scale shall not exceed what point-to-point adjustment would have given him in the new scale, it is said, excludes clause (4) (b) and the 2nd respondent would not be entitled to any increment, for every completed three years of service in the same cadre as on 31-1-50. If this view is accepted the 2nd respondent would merely be entitled to 4 increments at the rate of Rs. 7/- each in the new scale as on 1-4-54, and his pay will have to be fixed at Rs. 140/- and not as earlier contended on behalf of the appellant, at Rs. 148/-. There is no difficulty in so far as clause (4) (a) is concerned because the basic pay of the 2nd respondent in the existing scale of Grade I which was Rs. 108/- would be fitted in the new scale in that next nearest basic pay of Rs. 112/-. As we stated earlier, the pre-Sen scale for Clerks was comprised of both Grade I and Grade 11. In the Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K. L. Kharbanda ([1962] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 977 .), this Court had said that the Sastry Award provided one grade for all clerical workmen by whatever name they were known in the Bank. It cannot be disputed t hat a workman in Grade 11 as well as in Grade I is nonetheless in the pre-Sen scale which are in the same cadre. Clause 4(b) directs that to the basic pay into which he is fitted under clause (a) one increment for every completed 3 years of hi s service in the same cadre as on 31-1-50 should be added. This in our view is an additional advantage which is sought to be given and is not to be restricted by clause (2) which on the interpretation suggested would terminate the advantage of placing him in the new scale with clause (4) (a) itself.- Some meaning has to be given to the words 'to the basic pay' in clause (4) (b) which can only- be additional increment or increments based on the length of service. It is true that in St ate Bank of India v. Prakash Chand Mehra, it, was observed:\" Giving as we must, natural meaning to the words used in rules 2 and 4, we are of opinion that in no case can the basic pay be fixed at a higher figure than what the point-to-point adjustment would, give to the workman or the maximum in the new scale. Under rule 4 (a) the workman's basic pay is Rs. 90 and under rule 4(b) to this basic pay has to be added two increments, in respect of the new scale so that the basic pay 2, at Rs. 100. If that were correct, the salary would be Rs. 126 on 1 April 1954. There is however the limitation introduced by rule 2 which is made applicable to the fixation of t he basic pay under rule 4 by the words \"subject to rules 1 to 3\". Admittedly, point-to-point. adjustment would give the respondent a basic pay of Rs. 90. This limit cannot therefore be, exceed; and so, in spite of rule 4 (b) ' the basic pay for applying the new scale would be Rs. 90 and not Rs. 100 \".\nIn that case the respondent had entered the Bank's service on, 20-2-43 and on the 31st January 1950 he was getting a salary of. Rs. 86/- p.m. On 1-4-54 he was employed at Abohar Branch of the Imperial Bank of India and on 15-5-54 he was transferred to Amritsar. Under the classification in the Bank Award, Abohar was class IV area while Amritsar was a Class 11 area. On the basis that Abohar was a class IV area the respondent's salary was fixed by the Bank on 1-4-54 at Rs. 112/ p.m. and on his transfer to Amritsar, a class II- area, in consideration of his length of service he wa s given three increments and 'his salary was fixed at Rs. 133/-. The respondent's case was that he was entitled to three increments over Rs. 126/- which it is said he was drawing at Abohar, i.e. Rs. 148/- p.m. On a dispute being referred under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court, Delhi accepted the respondent's case that his pay should be fixed at Rs. 148/- p.m. Though the court did not apply clause (4) (b) it nonetheless came to the same conclusion. on the basis that Abohar was treated as a class IV area with retrospective effect from 1-4-54 and the calculation on that basis would fix his basic salary at Rs. 126/- on 1-4-54 and on transfer from that area to Amritsar, a class 11 area, he would g et an increment and his salary would be fixed at Rs. 133/-. In that case the meaning and significance of the term 'point-to-\" point adjustment' mentioned in clause (2) was not discussed nor has there been anything said. as to the contingencies in which those directions were to be applied. If point-to- point adjustment signifies the fixation of the workman at the stage in the new scale equal to or above his basic pay as on 31-1-50, clause (4) (a) itself has provided for that and there was no need for clause (2) or clause (4) (b). A perusal of 'the report of the Gajendragadkar Commission in this respect, however, furnishes a clue to this enigma. In paragraphs 109 to, 111 the Commission sets out directions in the Award, the modification made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Government's decision thereon. A reference to paragraph 109. would not only show the nature of the scheme proposed in the Award but indicates what in fact was, meant by point-to-poi nt adjustment. It is there observed as follows: \"109. In fitting the existing staff in the revised pay structure the Sen Tribunal gave employees the benefit of what virtually amounted to point to point adjustment that is, the placing of each employee at the stage in the new scale to which he would have risen by reason of the length of his service had he entered service on the new scale. After a careful consideration of the various aspects of the question raised by the provisions contained in the Sen Award the Sastry Tribunal by and large followed the recommendations of the Central Pay Commission that when persons on the existing scale of pay were brought on to the new scales recommended for them, their initial pay should be fixed at the stage i n the proposed scale next above the pay they were, drawing in the existing scale and special increments added to it at the rate of one increment in the proposed scale for every three completed years of service subject to certain ceilings in regard to the increase to be allowed. The Sastry Tribunal recommended that a workman should first be fitted into the scale o f pay fixed by its award at the stage in the new scale equal to or next above his basic pay as on the 31st January 1950 in the existing scale (pre-Sen scale) and annual increments in the new scale as from that stage onwards added at the rate of one increment for every completed three years of his service subject to a maximum of 4 increments. It also recommended that two further annual increments in the new scale should be added to the basic pay fixed in the manner described above for service or the two years 1951 and 1952 and the worker should be entitled to draw his norm al increment for 1953 and succeeding years from 1st April of each year. There were, besides, certain other recommendations aimed at giving protection to a workman's basic pay and emoluments as on the 31st January 1950, and covering cases of special increments granted or increments withheld etc. It also recommended. that subject to a workman's basic pay as on the 31st January 1950 not, being reduced in any case the adjusted, basic, pay in the new scale should not exceed What point to point adjustment would give' him or the maxi mum in the new scale\" .The Labour Appellate Tribunal agreed with the scheme of adjustment given by the Award except in regard to the weightage in respect of which it recommended the removal of the 12 years' limit for adding one increment for every three years. In its place it proposed a tapering off of the weightage after 12 years, by the addition of one increment for every 4 years in the next 8 years and one increment for every 5 years for the next five years. Though the Government modified the Labour Appellate Tribunal's recommendation by confirming the Award, it decided to adopt what was proposed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in respect of the weightage of one increment for every three years. The Commission, however, did not accept the Government's decision but made the following recommendations in para 112:--\n\"112. The question raised by the modification thus made by Government is not likely to affect a very large number of employees. On the merits, it seems to me that much can be said in favour of the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. If, in adjusting employees in the new wage structure, they are entitled to have their previous service taken into account, it is difficult to appreciate why a line should be drawn at the end of twelve years' service and it should be held that an employee would not be entitled to claim any credit for any period of service beyond the said line. The modification made by Government confirms the provisions made by the Sastry Tribunal, and these provisions, as I have just indicated, allow certain increments in lieu of twelve years' service. If fairplay and equity. Justify these provisions, it would seem to follow that the same considerations would justify the additional provisions that have been made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal decision. On the merits, therefore, I am inclined to agree with the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal\" .It would appear clear from the above recommendation that 'What the Award meant in clause (2) when it referred to point-' to-point adjustment is the placing. of each employee at the stage 'in the new scale to which he would have risen by reason of the length of service had he entered service in the new scale. What was sought to be ensured by clause (2) was that the adjusted basic pay in the new scale shall not exceed the point-to-point adjustment or the maximum of the scale. If the meaning given to the phrase point-to-point adjustment, is what is stated by the Commission in the report, then there, would be no impediment in giving effect to the directions in clause (4) (b). It would not therefore, be right to say that clause (4) (b) is to be ignored Or that the advantage ends only with that given in clause (4) (a).\nThe next question is what is it that clause (5) (a) Provides for ? Does it provide for computing the length of service for the purposes of giving One increment for every three Years of notional service worked out on the basis of the service that would be required for a workman to Mach the basic pay which lie was drawing in the existing scale ? The contention of the 2nd respondent is sat taking the basic pay drawn by him as on 31st January 1950 to the nearest integer the length of service should be computed on the basis of the number of years which he would have to serve in the junior scale to draw that amount of basic pay. It appears to us on a careful examination of the terms of clause (5) (a) that the directions in this clause are inapplicable to him. Clause (5) (a) provides for only the, cases of those who start on a higher initial basic pay by getting additional increments or are, given advance increments in any scale whether junior or senior. In such contingencies how the length of service for the purposes of clause (4) (b) is to be computed was provided for in clause (5) (b). The directions given in that clause are that the length of service in the scale in which he is and in which he got an increment or increments either at the initial start or by special promotion should be that which he would have taken to reach the basic pay which he would draw on 31st January 1950 with the initial start. The condition precedent to the applicability of the directions in this clause is the receipt of increments or increment by way of special promotion. An increment is in the same scale while a promotion is from one scale to a higher scale. A promotion from a lower grade to a higher grade though both the grades may be in the same cadre is not an increment or increments by way of special promotion. The use of the word 'special' would itself show that what is contemplated is advance increments in the same grade. What is sought to be taken into account by the Award is the actual service of the workman or where he has been given increments in the same scale he is sought to be compensated by giving him a corresponding advantage in the new scale. This is sought to be effected by taking into account the increment or increments earned in the cadre in computing the length of service under clause (4) (b). As the 2nd respondent did not get any increment or increments in the existing scale which was Grade I either at the initial start or by way of special promotion, the actual service in the cadre has to be computed for the purposes of clause (4) (b). The words 'same cadre' in that clause as explained earlier would refer to both Grade IT and Grade 1. The actual service in both the grades will alone be considered for giving him an increment for every three years of service which in his case works out to one increment in respect of his 3 years.' service: from 13 -1-47 to 31-1-50. Even if the initial. increment of Rs. 4/- in Grade II which was given to him for being proficient in the working of a machine is taken into account under clause: (5) (b) that would add one more year to the three years of actual service rendered .by him but that does, not give him any further advantage. He will, only be entitled to one increment under clause (4) (b). In the result we. hold that the 2nd respondent has to be fitted in the new scale on a basic pay of Rs. 148/- and on that basis the emoluments to which he would be entitled will have to be worked out. We accordingly direct the Labour Court to give the necessary direction in this regard.The appeal is, , therefore, allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court affirming the Award of the Labour Court is set aside but in the circumstances, without costs.\n",
+      "case_record": "Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited (formerly Remi Metals Gujarat Ltd.) appealed against the High Court of Uttarakhand's decision to set aside an arbitration award in its favor against Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC). The dispute arose from purchase orders (POs) issued by ONGC to Remi Metals for seamless steel casing pipes. The POs stipulated delivery within 16-40 weeks and included clauses stating time was of the essence and allowing for liquidated damages (LDs) at 0.5% per week for delayed supplies, up to 5% of the contract price. During contract execution, ONGC granted several extensions to Remi Metals, and during these extensions, ONGC deducted US $8,07,804.03 and Rs. 1,05,367/- as LDs. Remi Metals claimed these LDs, along with other amounts, before an Arbitral Tribunal. The Tribunal found that time was not of the essence, and therefore, LDs could not be granted, but allowed ONGC to retain Rs. 2,09,28,995/- representing actual damages. The District Court largely upheld the Tribunal's findings but modified arbitration costs. The High Court, however, reversed the Tribunal and District Court, holding that time was of the essence and ONGC was justified in recovering LDs, as the Arbitral Tribunal and District Judge had erred in requiring proof of actual loss.",
+      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited (formerly Remi Metals Gujarat Ltd.) entered into purchase orders (POs) with Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC) for the supply of seamless steel casing pipes.\n2. The POs stipulated delivery within 16-40 weeks and included clauses stating that time was of the essence and allowed for liquidated damages (LDs) at 0.5% per week for delayed supplies, up to 5% of the contract price.\n3. During contract execution, ONGC granted several extensions to Remi Metals, but during these extensions, ONGC deducted US $8,07,804.03 and Rs. 1,05,367/- as LDs.\n4. Remi Metals claimed these LDs, along with other amounts, before an Arbitral Tribunal.\n5. The Arbitral Tribunal found that time was not of the essence and thus LDs could not be granted, but allowed ONGC to retain Rs. 2,09,28,995/- representing actual damages.\n6. The District Court largely upheld the Tribunal's findings but modified arbitration costs.\n7. The High Court of Uttarakhand reversed the Tribunal and District Court, holding that time was of the essence and ONGC was justified in recovering LDs, as the Arbitral Tribunal and District Judge had erred in requiring proof of actual loss.\n8. Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited appealed against the High Court's decision.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Arbitral Tribunal's award by holding that time was of the essence and that ONGC was justified in recovering LDs without proof of actual loss.\n2. Whether the Arbitral Tribunal and District Court correctly interpreted the contract terms regarding time being of the essence and the applicability of LDs.\n\n### Rules:\n1. **Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Section 34)**: A court may set aside an arbitral award if it finds that the award is in conflict with the public policy of India, including the principles of natural justice.\n2. **Contract Law Principles**: The interpretation of \"time is of the essence\" clauses depends on the intent of the parties and the circumstances of the case. Courts generally uphold such clauses unless there is evidence of waiver or estoppel.\n3. **Liquidated Damages**: Liquidated damages are enforceable if they are a genuine pre-estimate of loss and not a penalty. The party seeking to enforce LDs must show that the conditions for their application were met.\n4. **Precedents on Arbitral Awards**: Courts should not lightly interfere with arbitral awards unless there is a clear error of law or procedural impropriety (e.g., *ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd.*, 2003).\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Interpretation of \"Time is of the Essence\" (Fact 2, Issue 1, Rule 2)**:\n   - The POs explicitly stated that time was of the essence, which is a strong indication that the parties intended strict adherence to delivery timelines.\n   - The Arbitral Tribunal's finding that time was not of the essence may have been based on ONGC's grant of extensions (Fact 3), which could imply a waiver or estoppel. However, the High Court correctly noted that extensions do not necessarily negate the \"time is of the essence\" clause unless there is clear evidence of a waiver.\n   - The High Court's decision aligns with established contract law principles that such clauses are enforceable unless waived.\n\n2. **Enforceability of Liquidated Damages (Fact 3, Issue 1, Rule 3)**:\n   - The LDs clause was clearly defined in the POs, and ONGC deducted amounts in accordance with the agreed terms.\n   - The Arbitral Tribunal erred in requiring proof of actual loss, as LDs are enforceable without such proof if the conditions for their application are met (e.g., *Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co.*, 1915).\n   - The High Court correctly held that the Tribunal's requirement for actual loss was inconsistent with the nature of LDs.\n\n3. **Judicial Deference to Arbitral Awards (Fact 6, Issue 2, Rule 4)**:\n   - While courts should generally defer to arbitral awards, they may intervene if the award is patently illegal or against public policy.\n   - The High Court's intervention was justified because the Tribunal's interpretation of the contract and LDs was legally flawed, not merely a factual dispute.\n\n### Conclusion:\nThe High Court correctly set aside the Arbitral Tribunal's award by upholding the \"time is of the essence\" clause and the enforceability of liquidated damages. The Tribunal's error in requiring proof of actual loss for LDs was a clear legal mistake, warranting judicial intervention. Therefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.",
+      "reference_judgment": "1. Leave granted in SLP (C) No. 19203 of 2012.\n2. Civil Appeal Nos. 2826-2827 of 2016, preferred by Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited (formerly known as Remi Metals Gujarat Ltd.) hereinafter referred to as 'Remi Metals' for the sake of brevity and clarity, have been filed impugning the judgments and orders dated 14.10.2008 and 27.07.2010 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in AO Nos.472 and 466 of 2005 and Review Petition No. 1340 of 2008 in AO No. 472 of 2005 respectively. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 19203 of 2012, preferred by Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'ONGC' for the sake of brevity and clarity), has been filed impugning the judgment and order dated 27.07.2010 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Review Petition No. 1340 of 2008 in AO No. 472 of 2005.\n3. The short question which arises for determination by this Court is whether the impugned judgment was correct in setting aside the arbitration award in favour of the ONGC.\n4. Before we analyse the case at hand, it is necessary for us to have a brief understanding of the facts. A global tender was floated by the ONGC for purchase of aggregate quantity of 3,93,297 metres of seamless steel casing pipes. Remi Metals was a successful bidder. It claims that it had bid to supply pipes as a supplier on behalf of Volski Tube Mills, Russia. In furtherance of the same, 4 purchase orders (POs) No. 275, 276, 277 and 286 were issued in the following manner:\n5. It was mentioned in the POs that the delivery period will commence within 16 weeks and will be completed in 40 weeks, or earlier, from the date of the PO.\n6. Some of the important conditions mentioned in the POs, which were common to all the POs, are as under:\n9. i) The time and date of delivery is the essence of the supply order and delivery must be completed not later than the date specified therein. ii) It must be noted that delayed supplies even delivery and/or accepted by the purchaser will be treated as supplied/effected after schedule period without prejudice to Failure and Termination Clause. iii) Even when extension in delivery period is granted, such acceptance of extension as the case may be will be without prejudice to claim damages under Failure and Termination Clause unless purchaser clearly waives his right in writing to recover such damages with the approval of competent authority.\n7. Further, relevant provisions of the General Terms and Conditions appended with the POs are as follows:\n10. FAILURE AND TERMINATION CLAUSE/LIQUIDATED DAMAGES: Time and date of delivery shall be essence of the contract. If the contractor fails to deliver the stores, or any instalment thereof within the period fixed for such delivery in the schedule or at any time repudiates the contract before the expiry of such period, the purchaser may, without prejudice to any right or remedy, available to him to recover damages for breach of contract :- (a) Recover from the contractor as agreed liquidated damages and not by way of penalty, a sum equivalent to 1/2% (half percent) of the contract price of the whole unit per week for such delay or part thereof (this is an agreed, genuine pre- estimate of damage duly agreed by the parties) which the contractors has failed to deliver within the period fixed for delivery in the schedule, where delivery thereof is accepted after expiry of the aforesaid period. It may be noted that such recovery of liquidated damages may be up to 5% of the contract price of whole unit of stores which the contractor has failed to deliver within the period fixed for delivery; or (...) (e) It may further be noted that the clause (a) above provides for recovery of liquidated damages on the cost of contract price of delayed supplies whole unit at the rate of 1/2% (half percent) of the contract price of the whole unit per week for such delay or part thereof up to a ceiling of 5% of the contract price of delayed supplies (whole unit). Liquidated damages for delay in supplies thus accrued will be recovered by the paying authorities of the purchaser specified in the supply order, from the bill for payment of the cost of material submitted by the contactor or his foreign principals in accordance with the term of supply order or otherwise.\n8. During the execution of contract, there were certain delays in meeting the obligation as required under the contract. In this context, various extensions were given by the ONGC to fulfil their obligation. The extensions were granted as follows: Remi Metals accepted the aforesaid extensions and satisfied the contract.\n9. In this context, it may be noted that the ONGC had deducted an aggregate amount of US $8,07,804.03 and Rs.1,05,367/- as liquidated damages from various bills submitted by the Remi Metals. There were other claims which were disputed by the Remi Metals which were claimed before a panel of arbitrators.\n10. In detail, the Remi Metals' claims were hereunder: CLAIM TITLE AMOUNT Refund of Liquidated damages claimed by ONGC US $807,804.03 and Rs. 1,05,367/- Customs Duty Reimbursement Rs. 1,90,43,037/- Interest on Delayed Payments US $2,44,121.03 and Rs. 5,76,244.31 Amount Short Received under invoices Rs. 18,11,456.72 Failure to Furnish \"C\" forms US $2,44,649.39 Handling Charges Payable on ONGC Rs. 24,86,369.86 Wrongful reduction of price for balance 8.55% (16,174.78m) under PO No. 275 US $83,324.38 Award of the above amounts - with 18% interest from the date on which it ought to have been paid by ONGC and further interest till date of payment\n11. The Arbitral Tribunal, on hearing the parties, had framed 17 issues, of which we are concerned only with the following: (i) Was time the essence of the Agreement to make supplies under the four Purchase Orders and was the delivery date to be reckoned from the date of the supply order? (ii) Was ONGC justified in recovering liquidated damages of US $8,07,804.03 and Rs.1,05,367/-? (iii) Was the Claimant entitled to extension of delivery dates without levy of liquidated damages on account of force majeure condition as stated in paragraphs 12.D.3 and 12.D.4 of the Statement of Claim? (iv) Was ONGC entitled to impose liquidated damages on the basis of the entire value of the Purchase Orders? (v) Is the Claimant entitled to refund of any part of the amount recovered by ONGC as liquidated damages? (vi) Is the Claimant entitled to US $2,44,121.03 and Rs.5,76,244.21 as interest on delayed payment as in Exhibit 'H' to the Statement of Claim? (vii) Whether the Claimant is entitled to any interest? If so, at what rate and for what period?\n12. The Arbitral Tribunal, at the outset, held that merely having a clause in the contract making time the essence of it would not be determinative; rather, an overall view having regard to all the terms of contract are to be taken into consideration. Further, they noted that contracts containing provision for extension of time or payment of penalty on default would dilute the obligation of timely performance and render the clauses imbuing time as essence of the contract ineffective. Additionally, the Arbitral Tribunal also noted that generally, under construction contracts, time is not the essence. Ultimately, on this issue, the Arbitral Tribunal noted as under: \"43.29. It may also be stated that the supply of material in the instant case was not for any specific purpose or urgent requirement. The tender was a global tender for general requirement as stated by Mr. K. Bhattacharya (RW-1). 43.30. Besides, the contract provides for imposition of LD and/or termination of the contract. It may also be noticed that ONGC could extend the time for delivery and in fact ONGC did extend the delivery period without levying any LD. These and other stipulations in the contract are a clear indication that the time was not the essence of contract.\"\n13. On the aspect of liquidated damages, the Arbitral Tribunal held that liquidated damages, which are pre-estimated damages, cannot be granted as there was no breach of contract due to the fact that time was not the essence. Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal proceeded to determine the actual damages based on the evidence furnished.\n14. It was ONGC's estimation that there were four categories of tangible losses, namely: (i) revenue loss; (ii) loss due to the use of higher ppf/grade casing; (iii) loss due to intra/inter- regional transportation; and (iv) loss due to foreign exchange fluctuation. In total, such losses were estimated to be to the tune of Rs.3,80,64,830/-. The estimation was as follows: AMOUNT CATEGORY Revenue loss Rs.95,72,332/- Loss due to the use of higher/ppf grade casing Rs.10,97,883/- Loss due to intra/inter-regional transportation Rs.90,09,950/- Loss due to foreign exchange fluctuation Rs.1,83,84,668/- Total: Rs.3,80,64,833/-\n15. The said estimation was accepted by the Arbitral Tribunal. However, it was also held that ONGC would not be entitled to claim any damage for losses incurred during the extended period of delivery where liquidated damages were expressly waived. The losses claimed during such period without imposition of liquidated damages are to the tune of Rs.1,71,35,838, which were excluded from the total computation of loss by the Arbitral Tribunal. Ultimately, it was held that ONGC would be entitled to retention of Rs.2,09,28,995/- or its equivalent in US dollars at the rate as on date of the award, i.e. US $ 440,610.42/-1, out of the total liquidated damages (US $ 8,07,804.03 and Rs.1,05,367/-) recovered. 1 https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=15268 1 USD = 47.5 INR end of year 2002-03\n16. Aggrieved by the award of the Arbitral Tribunal, the ONGC filed a Section 34 petition before the District Court claiming that the award of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in tune with the contract, which is a justifiable ground for interference. They sought to address the concern on delayed acceptance by stating that such acceptance was valid and permissible under contract law and the liquidated damages imposed on such acceptance was legally valid. Further, they pointed out that liquidated damages could have been given as the same was a genuine and reasonable pre- estimate of the possible damages negotiated between the parties at the time of entering into contract.\n17. The District Court, by order dated 19.07.2005, held that the Tribunal was correct in holding that time was not the essence of the contract and only the losses actually suffered could be granted. However, the District Judge modified the costs of arbitration from Rs.25 lakhs to Rs.9,40,000/-.\n18. Both parties, aggrieved by the order of the District Judge, appealed the same before the High Court of Uttarakhand in AO Nos.472 of 2005 and 466 of 2005 under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The High Court, by impugned order dated 14.10.2008 held that both the arbitral award and order of the District Judge erred in construction of the contract with respect to whether time was the essence or not. Further, the High Court has reasoned that the Arbitral Tribunal as well as District Judge committed gross error in arriving at a conclusion that ONGC had to prove loss suffered before recovering any damages. Moreover, the decree in respect of cost of arbitration was upheld by the High Court. Accordingly, AO No.472 of 2005 filed by ONGC was allowed and AO No.466 of 2005 filed by Remi Metals (now Welspun) was dismissed.\n19. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, review petitions being Review Petition Nos.1340 of 2008 and 1339 of 2008 were filed which were disposed of with the following observation: \"...The judgement and order passed by the District Judge, Dehradun, in Arbitration Case No.31 of 2004 th dated 19 July, 2005, is modified to the extent that the appeal with regard to Claim Nos. 1 and 2 is th allowed, while the judgement and order dated 19 July, 2005, passed by the District Judge, Dehradun, shall remain intact with regard to claim Nos. 3 to 7...\"\n20. Aggrieved by the order passed in the review petitions, both parties have filed these appeals before this Court.\n21. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, appearing for Remi Metals (now Welspun), has submitted that: The view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal was reasonable, plausible and can be sustained. Time was not the essence of the contract, as the contract provided for extension of time as well as for liquidated damages. Further, once ONGC waived the liquidated damages in the first two extensions, they could not have claimed liquidated damages for further extensions of delivery date. This Court should not interfere or set aside awards in a casual manner, while doing so this Court should come to a clear understanding that the award was patently illegal. [See Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (AIR 2015 SC 620) pg. 67]\n22. Learned Counsel appearing for ONGC has submitted that: That the imposition of liquidated damages has already been upheld under similar circumstance by earlier judgment in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705 : (AIR 2003 SC 2629). The award cannot be sustained as in a contract having provision for liquidated damages, unliquidated damages cannot be given. Reading of the contract makes it clear that the time was of the essence, which was also signified in every extension given. The award interprets the contractual clauses in a manner which is not reasonable and plausible.\n23. Before we analyse the award, we need to first ascertain the scope of Section 34 of Arbitration Act, before the 2015 amendment, which provided for certain specific grounds for challenge. Section 34, as it existed, reads as under: 34 Application for setting aside arbitral award. - (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if- ... (b) the Court finds that- (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. \n(Emphasis supplied)\n The limited grounds provided under Section 34 of the Act, has been interpreted by this Court on numerous occasions. In this case at hand, the challenge of award is based on the fact that the same is against the public policy and patent illegality. Public policy as a ground of challenge has always been met with certain scepticism. The phrase 'public policy' does not indicate 'a catch- all provision' to challenge awards before an appellate forum on infinite grounds. However, the ambit of the same is so diversly interpreted that in some cases, the purpose of limiting the Section 34 jurisdiction is lost. This Court's jurisprudence also shows that Section 34(2)(b) has undergone a lot of churning and continue to evolve. The purpose of Section 34 is to strike a balance between Court's appellate powers and integrity of the arbitral process.\n24. The first case, which expounded on the scope of 'public policy' was Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644 : (AIR 1994 SC 860), which inter alia provided that a foreign award may not be enforced under the said Act, if the court dealing with the case is satisfied that the enforcement of the award will be contrary to the public policy. After elaborate discussion, the Court arrived at the conclusion that public policy comprehended in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 is the \"public policy of India\" and does not cover the public policy of any other country. For giving meaning to the term \"public policy\", the Court observed thus:\n\"66. Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention of 1958 and Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act do not postulate refusal of recognition and enforcement of a foreign award on the ground that it is contrary to the law of the country of enforcement and the ground of challenge is confined to the recognition and enforcement being contrary to the public policy of the country in which the award is set to be enforced. There is nothing to indicate that the expression 'public policy' in Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention and Section 7(1)(b) (ii) of the Foreign Awards Act is not used in the same sense in which it was used in Article I(c) of the Geneva Convention of 1927 and Section 7(1) of the Protocol and Convention Act of 1937. This would mean that 'public policy' in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) has been used in a narrower sense and in order to attract the bar of public policy the enforcement of the award must invoke something more than the violation of the law of India. Since the Foreign Awards Act is concerned with recognition and enforcement of foreign awards which are governed by the principles of private international law, the expression 'public policy' in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act must necessarily be construed in the sense the doctrine of public policy is applied in the field of private international law. Applying the said criteria it must be held that the enforcement of a foreign award would be refused on the ground that it is contrary to public policy if such enforcement would be contrary to (i) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (ii) the interests of India; or (iii) justice or morality.\" In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 : (AIR 2003 SC 2629), the scope of Section 34 was expanded to include patent illegality as a ground for challenging the award and held as under :\n\"31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase 'public policy of India' used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term 'public policy' in Renusagar case [Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] : (AIR 1994 SC 860) it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The result would be-award could be set aside if it is contrary to: (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality, or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void. (...)\n74. In the result, it is held that: (A)(1) The court can set aside the arbitral award under Section 34(2) of the Act if the party making the application furnishes proof that: (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. (2) The court may set aside the award: (i)(a) if the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, (b) failing such agreement, the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in accordance with Part I of the Act, (ii) if the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with: (a) the agreement of the parties, or (b) failing such agreement, the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with Part I of the Act. However, exception for setting aside the award on the ground of composition of Arbitral Tribunal or illegality of arbitral procedure is that the agreement should not be in conflict with the provisions of Part I of the Act from which parties cannot derogate. (c) If the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is in contravention of the provisions of the Act or any other substantive law governing the parties or is against the terms of the contract. (3) The award could be set aside if it is against the public policy of India, that is to say, if it is contrary to: (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality; or (d) if it is patently illegal. (4) It could be challenged: (a) as provided under Section 13(5); and (b) Section 16(6) of the Act. Eventually, a three-Judge Bench in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Limited, (2014) 9 SCC 263 : (AIR 2015 SC 363), while upholding Saw Pipes case (supra), noted that 'illegality' of the award must go to root of the matter. Illegality of a trivial nature could not be held to violate the public policy.\n25. In Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1 : (AIROnline 2019 SC 1928) , this Court held:\n\"24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various Courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the Court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the Courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated.\n25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the Courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The Courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.\" With these observations and limitations set out above, we need to examine whether the award can be sustained under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.\n26. The main challenge to the award is against the imposition of unliquidated damages, when the matter of fact stood that the contract between parties stipulated for pre-estimated damages (liquidated damages). The concerned contract contained provisions for liquidated damages for breach of contract, particularly breach of deadlines set in the contract. Under Indian Contract law, such liquidated damages are recognized, subject to the same being reasonable. Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, provides that:\n74. Compensation for breach of contract where penalty stipulated for.-When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for.\n27. In order to examine whether the delayed execution of contract by the Remi Metals was liable for compensation, the tribunal examined whether time was of the essence in the contract. In our considered opinion, 'time not being the essence of the contract', as determined by the Arbitral Tribunal, was beyond reproach. Reliance on the contractual conditions and conduct of parties to conclude that existence of extension clause dilutes time being the essence of the contract, was in accordance with rules of contractual interpretation.\n28. In this context, the award concludes that as time was not the essence, liquidated damages could not be granted, in the following manner: \"Since time was not the essence of the contract, the measure of damages specified under Clause/ Liquidated damages, which was the essence of the contract, cannot be regarded as appropriate for determining the loss sustained by ONGC\" \n(Emphasis supplied)\n29. In order to consider the relevancy of time conditioned obligations, we may observe some basic principles: a. Subject to the nature of contract, general rule is that promisor is bound to complete the obligation by the date for completion stated in the contract. [Refer to Percy Bilton Ltd. v. Greater London Council, (1982) 1 WLR 794] b. That is subject to the exception that the promisee is not entitled to liquidated damages, if by his act or omissions he has prevented the promisor from completing the work by the completion date. [Refer Holme v. Guppy, (1838) 3 M and W 387] c. These general principles may be amended by the express terms of the contract as stipulated in this case.\n30. It is now settled that 'whether time is of the essence in a contract', has to be culled out from the reading of the entire contract as well as the surrounding circumstances. Merely having an explicit clause may not be sufficient to make time the essence of the contract. As the contract was spread over a long tenure, the intention of the parties to provide for extensions surely reinforces the fact that timely performance was necessary. The fact that such extensions were granted indicates ONGC's effort to uphold the integrity of the contract instead of repudiating the same.\n31. Clause 9(i) of the Purchase Order reproduced above makes it clear that time is the essence of the contract, subject to extension granted without prejudicing the right of ONGC to recover damages. These damages, by one reasonable interpretation, could be read as damages based on actual loss. Such conclusion was nd based on the Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of 2 para of Section 55 of the Contract Act, which reads as under: Effect of such failure when time is not essential.- If it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. (emphasis supplied) The Arbitral Tribunal construed the aforesaid provision to interpret the term 'loss' to mean actual tangible loss provable by evidence, instead of pre-estimated loss. Such interpretation, in the facts and circumstances, could be held to be a reasonable interpretation, as the other party was not able to impugn the same by pointing to any documents or correspondence to the contrary. When a standard form of a contract is utilised, ONGC is assumed in law to have the larger bargaining power to enter into a contract, unless clear intention is shown to the contrary. In this case at hand, a reasonable interpretation against ONGC may be utilised.\n32. In Saw Pipes case (supra), impugned clause for liquidated damages was considered and upheld by this Court in the following manner:\n46. From the aforesaid sections, it can be held that when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive compensation for any loss which naturally arises in the usual course of things from such breach. These sections further contemplate that if parties knew when they made the contract that a particular loss is likely to result from such breach, they can agree for payment of such compensation. In such a case, there may not be any necessity of leading evidence for proving damages, unless the court arrives at the conclusion that no loss is likely to occur because of such breach. Further, in case where the court arrives at the conclusion that the term contemplating damages is by way of penalty, the court may grant reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named in the contract on proof of damages. However, when the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous then its meaning is to be gathered only from the words used therein. In a case where agreement is executed by experts in the field, it would be difficult to hold that the intention of the parties was different from the language used therein. In such a case, it is for the party who contends that stipulated amount is not reasonable compensation, to prove the same. ...\n64. ... Under Section 73, when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive compensation for any loss caused to him which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. This section is to be read with Section 74, which deals with penalty stipulated in the contract, inter alia (relevant for the present case) provides that when a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, the party complaining of breach is entitled, whether or not actual loss is proved to have been caused, thereby to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named. Section 74 emphasizes that in case of breach of contract, the party complaining of the breach is entitled to receive reasonable compensation whether or not actual loss is proved to have been caused by such breach. Therefore, the emphasis is on reasonable compensation. ... But if the compensation named in the contract for such breach is genuine pre- estimate of loss which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it, there is no question of proving such loss or such party is not required to lead evidence to prove actual loss suffered by him.. ...\n66. In Maula Bux case [(1969) 2 SCC 554] : (AIR 1970 SC 1955) the Court has specifically held that it is true that in every case of breach of contract the person aggrieved by the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage suffered by him before he can claim a decree and the court is competent to award reasonable compensation in a case of breach even if no actual damage is proved to have been suffered in consequence of the breach of contract. The Court has also specifically held that in case of breach of some contracts it may be impossible for the court to assess compensation arising from breach. Although the aforesaid case was cited by the Arbitral Tribunal, it distinguished the same by observing that the aforesaid case was silent on the aspect. We need to accept the aforesaid distinction based on the different set of circumstances this case emanates from. In Saw Pipes (supra), the purchaser therein had extended the time for supply of goods subject to the specific condition that purchaser would recover the agreed stipulated damages from the contractor. Thus, the aspect of waiver is an important distinguishing factor, which was not dealt with in the earlier judgment.\n33. This brings us to the waiver. It may be noted that ONGC waived liquidated damages twice before giving extension with pre- estimated damages. The approach of the Arbitral Tribunal was to hold that once liquidated damages were waived in the first extension, subsequent extension could not be coupled with liquidated damages unless a clear intention flowed from the contract; while this Court recognizes the autonomy of the party to engage in contractual obligation. Such obligation must be contracted in clear terms. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the promisee (ONGC) waived the liquidated damages initially and the same cannot be imposed, unless such imposition was clearly accepted by parties. In this case, the interpretation of the Arbitral Tribunal could not be faulted as being perverse, for the reasons stated above.\n34. Mr. Shyam Diwan, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the Remi Metals, submitted that the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal was reasonable, as the loss sustained by ONGC is given on the basis of actual loss. In this situation, the interpretation of the law and the facts provided under the award is a reasonable interpretation, which can be sustained as being a plausible view.\n35. This Court cannot interfere with this award, as the award is a plausible view for the following reasons: a. The Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of contractual clauses having extension procedure and imposition of liquidated damages, are good indicators that 'time was not the essence of the contract'. b. The Arbitral Tribunal's view to impose damages accrued on actual loss basis could be sustained in view of the waiver of liquidated damages and absence of precise language which allows for reimposition of liquidated damages. Such nd imposition is in line with the 2 para of Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act. c. The Arbitral Tribunal was correct in distinguishing the dictum of this Court in Saw Pipes (supra), which validated imposition of liquidated damages in a similar contract. d. The High Court and District Court strayed beyond the limitation under Section 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. e. Other aspects of the award also do not require interference of this Court, in view of the law laid down in the Project Director, National Highways No.45E and 220, National Highways Authority of India v. M. Hakeem.2 2 SLP (CIVIL) NO.13020 OF 2020\n36. Therefore, we set aside the order of the High Court as well as the District Court's interference, and uphold the award of the Arbitral Tribunal. Accordingly, Civil Appeal Nos. 2826-2827 of 2016 are allowed and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) 19203 of 2012 is disposed of accordingly.\n37. Parties are to bear their own costs.",
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         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -1113,26 +1113,26 @@
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       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "01/04/1972",
-      "machine_error_stage": "issues",
+      "judgment_date": "13/11/2021",
+      "machine_error_stage": "rules",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue misframing"
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     "data": {
-      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No.43 of 2009 (Arising Out of S.L.P. (C)No.21204 of 2007) | Branch Manager, Federal Bank Limited v. N. S. Sabastian | 07/01/2009",
-      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No.43 of 2009 (Arising Out of S.L.P. (C)No.21204 of 2007) | Branch Manager, Federal Bank Limited v. N. S. Sabastian",
+      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 4029 of 2010 (@ SLP(C) No. 3883 of 2008) | Eureka Forbes Limited v. Allahabad Bank And Others | 03/05/2010",
+      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 4029 of 2010 (@ SLP(C) No. 3883 of 2008) | Eureka Forbes Limited v. Allahabad Bank And Others",
       "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
       "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
-      "case_record": "The complainant, a clerk at Federal Bank, presented a cheque for Rs. 9.85 lakhs drawn by Mr. M.P. Anil Kumar for collection and credit into his account. At the time of issue (April 3, 2000), Anil Kumar's account had less than Rs. 150, and he had made no deposits for over two years prior. The cheque was lost in transit. The bank advised the complainant to obtain a duplicate cheque. The Banking Ombudsman also informed the complainant there was no deficiency of service by the bank and advised him to obtain a duplicate cheque under Section 45-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, or pursue recovery from the drawer. Despite this, the complainant neither obtained a duplicate cheque nor initiated action against Anil Kumar. Instead, he filed a complaint with the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, which awarded 18% interest on the cheque amount. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission upheld this order.",
-      "generated_judgment": "**DISMISSED**\n\n**Reasoning:**\nThe facts do **not** contain the core grounds of a valid appeal under consumer law when faced with such incidents. While the complainant faced a deferred bank facility where the account holder had no funds at the time of the cheque's issue (breach of reliance or expectancy promise), the real consequential problems stem not from *borrowing* but from non-delivery of the cheque (elements of breach or procurement of a void cheque under vicarious claims).\n\nTo request redress under monetary alternatives like compensation is precisely the crux of the above contractual rights denied by **not obtaining a replacement cheque / attending the drawer**. While the **accounting** violation due to 'dishonor' along with its consequences in interest provision could potentially look loose but **does not advance a standard complaint** of that state contraversion. The financial authorities intervening while your initial complaints were resting shows this was perceived as frustration within scope without dimiage evidence. Thus, based on the facts alleged in their appeal **fundamentally lacking flimsy shifting Attitudes missed Ace borrowers system**, it was most assuredly false-like reworked unaware of correct redress. Judicial disallowance trimmably artifacts anew-focused recovery.",
-      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE B. N. AGRAWAL\n1. Leave granted.\n2. This appeal is directed against order dated 10th April, 2007 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short \"the National Commission\") whereby it dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant against the order dated 3.4.2002 of the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short \"the State Commission\") for award of interest @ 18% to the complainant-respondent on an amount of Rs.9.85 lakhs.\n3. A perusal of the record shows that while he was working as clerk at Chengannur branch of Federal Bank Limited (for short \"the bank\"), the complainant-respondent introduced one Mr. M. P. Anil Kumar who opened savings bank account in that branch with account no.12291. On 3.4.2000. the respondent presented a cheque drawn in his favour by Anil Kumar for a sum of Rs.9.85 lakhs before Kunchithanni branch of the bank for collection and crediting the same in his account. It is worth mentioning that on the date of issue of cheque. Anil Kumar had less than Rs.150/- in his account. The cheque was sent for collection to Chengannur branch of the bank through M/s. Professional Couriers but the same was lost in transit. The respondent complained to the Manager of Kunchithanni branch of the bank about non-credit of Rs.9.85 lakhs in his account and then filed a petition before the Banking Ombudsman for the State of Kerala. The Manager of the Kunchithanni branch of the bank, vide his letter dated 5th June. 2000, informed the respondent that the cheque was lost in transit and advised him to get a duplicate cheque in lieu of the lost instrument. Thereafter, the Banking Ombudsman issued communication dated 10th July, 2000 to the respondent that there was no deficiency of service on the part of the bank and that he may take necessary steps to obtain duplicate cheque from the drawer by invoking Section 45-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or approach a court/ appropriate forum for recovery of the money. However, instead of taking steps for obtaining duplicate cheque from the drawer, namely, Anil Kumar, the respondent filed a complaint before the State Commission claiming Rs.9.85 lakhs with interest @ 18% per annum. The bank contested the complaint by asserting that there was no deficiency of service because it had asked the complainant to obtain duplicate cheque which he failed to do. The bank also questioned the bona fides of the complainant-respondent by alleging that on the date of issue of cheque the drawer had a negligible amount of Rs. 112/ - in his account.\n4. The State Commission declined the respondent's prayer for award of Rs.9.85 lakhs but directed the bank to pay interest @ 18% per annum on the cheque amount from the date of its issue, i.e.. 03.04.2000 till the date of payment. The National Commission dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant and confirmed the order of the State Commission. Hence this appeal by special leave.\n5. Learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the zerox copy of the statement of account of Anil Kumar to show that between 28th March, 1998 and 29th September, 2000 he did not deposit any amount in the bank; that outstanding balance as on 28th March, 1998 was Rs.148/- and as on 29th September, 1998 total balance amount was Rs.87/- to his credit, and argued that the State Commission committed grave illegality in awarding interest to the complainant-respondent by presuming deficiency of service on the part of the appellant and ignoring the stark reality that on the date of presentation of the cheque and five months thereafter, there was no possibility of its encashment. He pointed out that in spite of the communications of the bank and letter dated 10th July, 2000 of the Banking Ombudsman, the respondent did not take steps to obtain duplicate cheque from the drawer apparently because he knew that the drawer did not have the requisite money for encashment of the cheque and argued the award of interest on Rs.9.85 lakhs, by the State Commission which has been confirmed by the National Commission is legally unsustainable. As against this, learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned orders and argued that the State Commission has not committed any error by awarding interest in lieu of the loss suffered by his client due to the appellant's failure to credit the cheque amount in his account.\n6. We have considered the respective submissions. In our view the State Commission was not at all justified in awarding interest to the respondent. Undisputedly the drawer, namely, Anil Kumar did not deposit any amount in the bank between 28th March, 1998 and the date on which the cheque is said to have been issued in favour of the respondent. Therefore, it was impossible for the respondent to get the amount credited in his account. If the cheque had not been lost in transit, the same would have been dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. On its part, the bank had advised the respondent to obtain duplicate cheque from the drawer. Banking Ombudsman gave similar advise to the respondent by pointing out that he can get duplicate cheque by resorting to Section 45-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. However, the respondent did not take any steps whatsoever for obtaining duplicate cheque from Anil Kumar. The reason for this is not far to see. Anil Kumar had sum less than Rs.200/- in his account at the relevant time. The appellant was aware of this and, therefore, he did not resort to Section 45-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Not only this, he did not take any action for recovery of Rs.9.85 lakhs from Anil Kumar either by filing a complaint before appropriate forum or by filing a suit before the competent civil court.\n7. This being the position, the direction given by the State Commission for payment of interest to the respondent is liable to be set aside. Consequently, the order of the National Commission is also liable to be set aside.\n8. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned orders are set aside and the complaint filed before the State Commission is dismissed. No costs.\n",
+      "case_record": "The appellant, Eureka Forbes Limited, entered into a leave and licence agreement with Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 for premises and machinery. Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 subsequently availed cash credit from Allahabad Bank (Respondent No. 1), hypothecating their raw materials, semi-finished, and finished products to the Bank. Due to non-payment of licence fees, Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 requested the appellant to take over possession of the premises and closing stock, authorizing the appellant to sell the stock to adjust arrears. The appellant took possession in August 1987. The Bank, via a letter dated August 21, 1987, informed the appellant that the stocks and machinery were hypothecated to them. Despite this knowledge, the appellant sold a CTC machine in March 1988 and other hypothecated stock. The Bank filed a suit in 1989 for recovery of Rs. 22,11,618.62 against all respondents, which was later transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT). The DRT passed an ex-parte judgment against the appellant in 1995.",
+      "generated_judgment": "**DISMISSED**\n\nIn evaluating the appeal based on the facts provided, it is important to consider the sequence of events and the knowledge of the parties involved:\n\n1. **Hypothecation Knowledge**: The Bank informed the appellant on August 21, 1987, that the stocks and machinery were hypothecated to them. This is a key piece of information indicating the appellant's awareness of the Bank's interest in the property.\n\n2. **Appellant's Actions**: Despite being informed of the hypothecation, the appellant proceeded to sell the CTC machine in March 1988 and other hypothecated stock. This action demonstrates that the appellant was aware of the Bank's interest but chose to proceed with the sale, potentially undermining the Bank's secured interest.\n\n3. **Legal Proceedings**: The Bank filed a suit for recovery in 1989, which was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The DRT passed an ex-parte judgment against the appellant in 1995, indicating that the appellant did not successfully contest the Bank's claims at that stage.\n\nGiven the appellant's knowledge of the hypothecation and subsequent actions, it is reasonable to conclude that the appellant acted against the interests of the Bank, whose secured interest was clearly communicated. The ex-parte judgment by the DRT further supports the Bank's position. Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.",
+      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : Hon'ble Justice Swatanter Kumar\n1. Leave granted.\n2. While pressing into service the definition of the word `debt' appearing in Section 2 (g) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short as the 'Recovery Act'), it is vehemently contended before us that the Debt Recovery Tribunal (for short the 'Tribunal') lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claim of the Bank against the appellant. The appellant was neither a borrower nor was there any kind of privity of contract between the two. As such, money claimed from them was not a 'debt' and, therefore, rigors of the recovery procedure under the provisions of the Recovery Act could not be enforced against the appellant. This is a submission which, at the first blush, appears to be sound and acceptable. But, once it is examined in some depth and following the settled canons of law, one has to arrive only at a conclusion that the contention is without any substance and merit. At the very outset, as a guiding principle we may refer to the maxim a verbis legis non est recedendum' but before we proceed to examine the merit or otherwise of the principal contention raised before us, it will be necessary for us to refer to the basic facts giving rise to the present appeal, particularly, in view of the fact that it has a wretched and long history which began in the year 1988.\nFACTS\n3. Appellant is a company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, while Respondent No. 1, Allahabad Bank is a body constituted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transport of Undertakings) Act, 1976. Respondent No. 3 in the present appeal is a proprietorship firm of Respondent No. 2. The appellant company is stated to have entered into an agreement on 16th August, 1983 with respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3, granting licence in their favour to use premises at Jainkunj at Goragachha Road, Kolkata (hereinafter referred to as `the premises') for a consideration of Rs. 12,000/- payable to the appellant, along with the plant and machinery as well as their trade mark \"OSBOURNE\". It is further the case of the appellant that they had no knowledge of the fact that, respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 had availed certain cash credit facility and had hypothecated their raw materials, semi-finished and finished products to Bank. However, on or about 28th February, 1987, the said respondents had requested the appellant to take over the possession of the said premises along with the closing stock lying therein. This was so requested because respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 had not paid the licence fee for the use and occupation of the premises, goods etc. as agreed and further vide letter dated 23rd July, 1987, they stated that appellant could sell the stocks as well as lathe machine lying in the factory premises and adjust the sale proceeds thereof towards the arrears of licence fee. After taking possession of the factory premises, the appellant prepared an inventory of the stock in possession and as alleged by them, they had no knowledge that these stocks had been hypothecated by the said respondents in favour of the Bank. The letter dated 7th August, 1987 has been annexed by the appellant in support of such averment. It appears from the record that the respondent Bank vide its letter dated 21st August, 1987 wrote to respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 raising an issue as to how the possession of the stocks and machinery was given to the appellant. This was done in response to the letter of respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 dated 18th August, 1987 and copy thereof was sent to the appellant while referring to the letter dated 7th August, 1987 addressed by the appellants to the other respondents. It will be useful to reproduce the relevant extract of the letter dated 21st August, 1987 which reads as under:\n \"We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 18.8.1987 along with enclosures.\nIn this regard we fail to understand as to how you have permitted M/s Eureka Forbes Limited to take possession of your factory at 1, Goragacha Road, Kolkata - 700 043, the stocks and machineries of which are already hypothecated to us. And again you are advising us not to visit the factory at the moment which we are requesting you to do the same reputedly. Since April, 1986, you are also not submitting the stock statement and you have virtually stopped all your banking operations through us. Now we observe from the stock statement forwarded to us as enclosure that there are good amount of stock still lying at the factory.\" \n4. To the above letter, the appellant responded vide its reply dated 23rd September, 1987 saying that the factory belongs to them and they had given the same on licence to respondent No. 3 and when the possession was handed over back to them certain stocks and machinery belonging to the respondent No. 3 were lying in the factory. They had made a specific request that these should be sold and adjusted towards the licence fee and the surplus money, if any, should be refunded to them. The respondent Bank claimed that they had a charge over the movable assets, in particular, the CTC machine which appellant had disposed off. For the sale of CTC machine, they had issued an advertisement on 12th March, 1988 and the same was sold for Rs.1,48,975/-.\n5. The Bank filed a suit in the District Court at Alipore against the present appellant and respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 claiming a sum of Rs.22,11,618.62. In this suit, the present appellant filed a written statement making a preliminary objection that there was no privity of contract between the Bank and the present appellant. That it was not a borrower of the Bank and had no dealings with them as such, the suit was barred for misjoinder of parties and in fact no suit could lie against the present appellant. The plea of suit being barred by time, the principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence was also taken. It was stated on merits, that neither they were aware of any transaction between plaintiff Bank and respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 nor of any charge over the machinery and equipment etc. The appellant denied the allegations made against them. Most of the paragraphs were denied for want of knowledge and emphasis was laid only on the above stated two averments. Appellant also averred that the Bank was trying to cover up lapses of its own officials by pressurizing them. It could not have accepted, as security, the factory or machinery as it was owned by the appellant and it had not given any consent for that purpose. This suit came to be transferred after the provisions of the Recovery Act came into force in the year 1994. Upon transfer it was numbered as T.A. No. 15/1994. The appellant was served with a notice from the Tribunal and it appointed one M/s Mallick and Palit as its Advocate to appear and pursue the case on its behalf. The appellant did not appear before the Tribunal and after some time the proceedings were carried on in their absence. The evidence was recorded and finally an ex-parte judgment was passed against the appellant on 15th June, 1995. In furtherance to the ex-parte judgment, a Recovery Certificate No. 48 of 1995 was issued by the competent authority under the provisions of the Act on 30th June, 1995. The appellant claims to have taken steps for setting aside the ex-parte judgment. They filed a writ petition before the High Court of Kolkata, (being Writ Petition No. 1804 of 1995), challenging the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Recovery Act and also prayed for stay of execution of the ex-parte judgment dated 15th June, 1995. An interim order dated 3rd November, 1995 was passed in favour of the appellant directing that the execution proceedings should go on, however no final order be passed without the leave of the Court. The Tribunal vide its Order dated 4th March, 1996, appointed a receiver to prepare an inventory of hypothecated goods and a warrant of attachment was also issued. The High Court of Kolkata, again on application filed by the appellant directed the receiver only to make inventory of the goods and not to take any further action. During the pendency of these proceedings, the Recovery Officer upon further application by the respondent Bank, directed the receiver to make inventory of all the properties vide its Order dated 17th August, 1996. This order was challenged by the appellant before the Calcutta High Court which stayed further proceedings.\n6. According to the appellant, it was advised to initiate proceedings to set aside the ex-parte decree and Recovery Certificate and hence an application was filed before the Tribunal for recalling the ex-parte order. Along with this, an application for condonation of delay was also filed. Consequent upon the dismissal of the application for condonation of delay, the appellant filed an appeal before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (for short the `Appellate Tribunal') against the order dated 19th August, 1999, passed by the Tribunal. The same was also dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal vide its judgment dated 1st June, 2001. This again was assailed before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The same was also dismissed by the High Court of Kolkata vide Order dated 28th November, 2001. Still unsatisfied, the appellant filed a Special Leave Petition before this Court, being SLP (C) No. 7883 of 2002 against the Order of the High Court of Kolkata which was dismissed as withdrawn by this Court vide Order dated 26th April, 2002. In other words, the Order of the Tribunal declining to set aside the ex-parte decree attained finality. The Revision Petition filed by the appellant before the High Court of Kolkata also came to be dismissed finally vide Order dated 2nd April, 2003. In furtherance to its zeal to somehow get the ex-parte decree set aside, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against the order of the Tribunal dated 15th June, 1995. The Order dated 16th April, 2004 of the Appellate Tribunal was challenged before the learned Single Judge of the High Court. In those proceedings, an application for amendment to bring the subsequent events on record, was filed which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide Order dated 11th June, 2004. Against this Order, an appeal was filed before the Division Bench of Kolkata High Court which also met the same fate. However, the Division Bench while dismissing the appeal observed that the Order passed by the learned Single Judge was correct in law but it would not prevent the appellant from resorting to any remedy which is available to it in accordance with law.\n7. In the Appeal preferred by the appellant, the Appellate Tribunal vide its Order dated 15th July, 2003 directed the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as condition precedent for entertaining the said appeal. This sum was deposited and a reply affidavit to this application was filed on behalf of the Bank. Vide Order dated 16th April, 2004, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The order dated 16th April, 2004 of the Appellate Tribunal was challenged in a Civil Revision Application before the High Court of Kolkata. The High Court vide its interim Order dated 11th June, 2004 directed the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.15,54,118.62 as a condition for hearing the appeal and the same was deposited. This application was against the interim order and the appeal remained pending before the Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal. Finally the appeal was allowed vide Order dated 28th December, 2006 by the Appellate Tribunal. While setting aside the ex-parte decree the Appellate Tribunal held as under:-\n \"Having said all that, to my mind, the net result is, the ex-parte decree in question passed against the appellant, Eureka Forbes Ltd. by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta, is without jurisdiction and therefore, the appeal must succeed. Consequently, the entire sum of money appropriated by the respondent-bank as per orders of the Hon'ble Court in C.O. No. 1568 of 2004 will be refundable together with interest at the lending rate also as per the said orders of the Hon'ble Court.\nAccordingly, the decree in question dated 15th June, 1995 in T.A. 15 of 1994 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta, and certificate in pursuance thereof as against the appellant, Eureka Forbes Ltd., is hereby set aside. The entire sum appropriated by the respondent bank in terms of the orders of the Hon'ble Court in C.O. No. 1568 of 2004 be refunded to the appellant by the bank together with interest at the lending rate within a period of three months from date. There shall be no orders as to costs.\" \n8. Respondent Bank challenged the Order of the Appellate Tribunal under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being C.O. No. 554 of 2007, before the learned Single Judge of the Kolkata High Court which vide its judgment dated 12th October, 2007, restored the judgment and the order of the Tribunal. Aggrieved therefrom, the appellant preferred the appeal before the Division Bench of Kolkata High Court which, vide its Order dated 11th February, 2008, dismissed the appeal and sustained the Order of the learned Single Judge giving rise to the present Special Leave Petition.\n9. The challenge to the impugned orders is inter alia on the ground that, Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application filed on behalf of the Bank as there was no privity of contract between the appellant and the Bank. Besides the issue of jurisdiction, the stand taken is that the Bank had not proved on record by way of any evidence that anything is due to it from the appellant. All the witnesses examined on behalf of the Bank have stated nothing to the above mentioned effect. In any case, in the subsequent proceedings the decree should have been set aside, as nothing in law could be stated to be due from the appellant. In the suit, which was decreed ex-parte by the Tribunal on 15th June, 1995, it was specifically averred in the plaint that, Respondent No. 3 along with other defendants illegally, erroneously, arbitrarily and whimsically had taken possession of the entire stock, machinery, equipments etc. without knowledge of the respondent Bank. The respondents had not allowed inspection of the factory and verification of the stock and other requisite elements. In fact, the appellant has misguided the Bank while informing vide their letter dated 18th August, 1987, that the workers had forcibly occupied the factory. Reference was also made to the fact that some stocks, plant and machine belonging to respondents had been given to the appellant for sale etc. as per the agreement between the parties. The goods, stocks were hypothecated to the Bank and according to the Bank, all the defendants in the suit were liable to pay the dues of the Bank. On this premise, the Bank prayed for decree for the entire amount and also interest @ 18.05% per annum. A specific prayer was made that the Bank has a valid and subsisting charge over the properties of defendant Nos. 1 &amp; 2 for the due repayment to it. A decree for realization of hypothecated goods by and under the direction of the Court was also prayed for. We have already noticed above that there was denial of the allegations made in the plaint.\n Merits of the case relatable to the factual matrix \n10. The main stand of the appellant was in relation to the jurisdiction and lack of knowledge of the fact that the goods in stock were hypothecated to the Bank along with the plant and machinery. The two important documents, dated 16th August, 1983 and 28th February, 1987, which have been placed on record, are of some significance. The agreement dated 16th August, 1983 states the conditions of the leave and licence agreement between respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 and the appellant. It was indicated therein that they could use the plant and machine in the premises and it was for a period of three years with a deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- and Rs.12,000/- per month as fee. Under Clause 6, the stocks at the relevant time were to be sold for a consideration of 0.75 lakhs and they were entitled to use the trade mark. However, vide letter dated 28th February, 1987, which is after the expiry of a period of more than three years, it was indicated by Respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 to the appellant that, they wanted to give back possession of factory and there were stocks of about Rs.7,00,000/- which included raw material, semi-finished and finished goods, lathe worth Rs.1,15,000/- which could be sold to a subsequent licencee. Relevant paragraphs of this letter can be usefully reproduced at this stage:\n \"2. We are having stocks worth about Rs.7 lacs which includes raw material, semi-finished &amp; finished goods. We would be grateful if your subsequent licencee agree to take oil the stocks plus one Lathe worth Rs. 1,15,000/- as we would be willing to negotiate with them.\n5. We would be pleased to settle our account with you as soon as the factory stocks are sold to your future licences and also the worker's retrenchment dues. We state this as we have suffered heavy losses due to continues agitations and non-payment of due by our customers and also cancellation of our orders.\" \n11. Another letter written by Respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 to the appellant on 23rd July, 1987 referred to certain telephonic conversation. It was specifically recorded in it that possession of the factory will be handed over on 31st July, 1987. It was also stated that there was financial crisis and that the stocks worth Rs.7,00,000/- and the lathe worth Rs. 1,15,000/- etc. could be sold and they will not be able to pay any licence fee in future. On 7th August, 1987, the possession of the premises was taken by the appellant and a list had been prepared, copy of the list placed on record shows the physical stock as on 7th August, 1987 and it contains bearings, plumber block, bearing of milling MC, GM Brass and Segment, old Osborn, C.I. of Milling M.C., C.I. components, AC IMCA machinery etc. It is interesting to note that all these correspondences and conversations between the parties had been without any intimation to the respondent Bank. In fact, all this had been done behind the back of the Bank. Besides this, the Bank had led oral and documentary evidence in support of its claim. The Bank had written the letter dated 21st August, 1987 in response to the letter of Respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 dated 18th August, 1987, but the letter dated 18th August, 1987 has not been placed on record. However, vide letter dated 21st August, 1987 copy whereof was sent to the appellant as well, the bank had informed them that it had given the financial assistance to respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 and the Bank was having charge over the stocks and machinery which had been hypothecated to the Bank. The Bank further expressed surprise as to how the appellant had taken possession of the unit. Another relevant aspect of the matter would be the conduct of the present appellant. We have serious issues that the appellant, after taking possession of the premises, had not come to know about the goods being hypothecated to the Bank. Advertisement for the sale of machinery was issued as late as on 12th August, 1988. In other words, they had sold goods, even machines, like CTC at a throw away price, even after having complete knowledge about the hypothecated goods. Thereafter, an ex- parte decree was passed, however they did not take any steps to get the same set aside, except when a recovery certificate had been issued by the competent authority. Thereafter, their prayer for setting aside ex-parte decree was rejected consistently by all the courts. When the High Court of Kolkata was dealing with the Revision Petition filed against the Order dated 1st June, 2001, passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the Court had specifically noticed the conduct of the appellant and had observed as under:-\n \"After hearing Mr. Mitra appearing on behalf of the petitioner and after going through the material on record I fully agree with the Tribunal below that the present proceedings have been initiated by the petitioner Balu: 10 with the sole object of delaying the execution of a decree passed in the year 1995. It has been rightly pointed out by those Tribunals that after filing written statement in the suit in 1989 till the decree was passed in 1998 the Tribunal below, the petitioner took no step in the original proceedings. There is no scope of doubt that notice of the proceedings was served through the Tribunal and the petitioner entered appearance through a lawyer. No reason has been assigned in the application what prevented the learned advocate-on record of the petitioner from contesting the proceedings before the Tribunal. In paragraph 5 of the application before the Tribunal it has simply been state that \"although the petitioner engaged Mr. H.P. Balu of M/s. Mallick &amp; Palit, solicitors to look after the petitioner's interest in the said matter, the said advocates chase not to appear in the proceedings for and on behalf of the petitioner and consequently the certificate was passed by the tribunal in favour of the plaintiff. It appears that the very same advocate- on-record has preferred writ application before this Court challenging the vires of the act and had also filed subsequent application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugning order passed in execution proceedings and the petitioner has obtained interim orders in those proceedings before this court. It is not the case of the petitioner that it has abandoned those proceedings and by the advice of the new lawyer has confined itself to the present proceedings. It appears that although those matters are still pending, the petitioner by filing instant proceedings has tried to find out an additional avenue for stalling the execution proceedings.\" \n12. After having lost upto this Court, another round of litigation started, claiming it to be in furtherance to the Order of Kolkata High Court, granting them liberty to take steps in accordance with law. It is in furtherance of this observation of the High Court that, the proceedings again started from the Appellate Tribunal and now the present petition has been filed before this Court. We have already noticed that owing to the sale of goods, complete knowledge, that the goods were hypothecated to the Bank is attributable to the appellant and hence, they could not have sold the said goods without permission of the Bank. Admittedly nothing of this kind was done and the Bank was kept in dark.\n13. The application for setting aside the ex-parte decree had been filed by the appellant along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the said application. However, the application for condonation of delay was rejected and subsequently the ex-parte decree was not set aside. This order of the Tribunal was neither interfered by the High Court nor by this Court in a Special Leave Petition preferred by the appellant. In view of the observations made by the High Court in the order, the appellant filed another application for setting aside the decree on the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction. The said application came to be allowed by the Appellate Tribunal which accepted the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. The reasoning recorded in the judgment of the Tribunal was that, it was a claim for damages in tort and was not a debt, and also that it was beyond the scope of the jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal under Section 17(1) of the Recovery Act, as there were insufficient allegations or evidence. No liability in terms of the debt can be fastened on the appellant. This reasoning of the Tribunal was set aside by the High Court of Kolkata in the impugned judgment and observed that, even claim for damages would fall well within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the facts of the case, and particularly, when the averments remained uncontroverted and no evidence was led by the appellant. The hypothecated goods at the place of business of Respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 were there at the time of handing over of the possession of the factory back to the appellant, and this fact can hardly be disputed on record. A finding was recorded in the proceedings that appellant was an intermeddler and there was collusion between the appellant and Respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3. Based on this finding, it was further held that the case of the Bank was fully covered under the expression \"debt\", \"any liability\", \"any person\" and accordingly, the Court set aside the judgment of the Tribunal. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are unable to find the stand of the High Court to be erroneous. Of course, to some extent, the entire suit could not have been decreed against the appellant. The respondent Bank was entitled to a limited relief, vis-a-vis, its hypothecated stocks, goods and machinery, if any. It was not even the case of the Bank before the Tribunal that the present appellant was a borrower and in discharge of its final liability towards Bank the entire suit was liable to be decreed. The cause of action in favour of the Bank and against appellant, at best, could be limited to the hypothecated stock and goods, as beyond that, there is no averment in the plaint which would justify grant of any larger relief in their favour. We would shortly discuss the legal aspects as well as the reasoning in law, in this regard. The Bank has examined merely four witnesses in support of its case. There is no statement or note of any of these witnesses for imposition of any liability upon the appellant, except to the extent of goods hypothecated; such a conclusion can even be drawn from the letters dated 28th February, 1987, 23rd July, 1987, 7th August, 1987 and 21st August, 1987. The correctness of these letters has never been disputed by any of the parties and it was admitted by the appellant that the advertisement for sale of goods was issued on 12th March, 1988. Certainly and apparently, the appellant had complete knowledge, that the entire stock, goods, machinery etc. had been hypothecated to the Bank. Certainly, there has been a definite lapse on the part of the Bank, as the loan facility was granted in the year 1984, i.e. subsequent to the execution of the leave and licence agreement dated 16th August, 1983. It is obvious from the facts appearing on record that the loan has been sanctioned in a most casual and undesirable manner without even verifying the basic securities of respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3.\n14. Besides the fact that the present appellant had earlier raised all the pleas in their application for setting aside the ex parte decree which was rejected by the Tribunal, High Court as well as this Court, it also needs to be noticed that except making vague denials in the written statement, which they had filed before the Tribunal at the relevant point of time, they had raised no specific or concrete defence in regard to the sale of hypothecated goods by them. The fact, as already noticed, cannot be disputed that the goods in question which were hypothecated or were under the charge of the Bank have been sold by the appellant. The advertisement issued by them clearly shows that they had invited offers for sale of CTC machines and spares, which itself demonstrates that a number of machines and other goods have been sold by them. It is an accepted precept of appreciation of evidence that a party which withholds from the Court best evidence in its power and possession, the Court would normally draw an adverse inference against that party. In any case, the bona fide of such a party would apparently be doubted. The appellant was possessed of best evidence in regard to the goods of which they had taken possession on 7th August, 1987, in fact were hypothecated to the Bank. These goods including machines were sold by the appellant prior and subsequent to the issue of the advertisement dated 12th March, 1988. Thus, the best evidence in this regard, was obviously in appellant's power and possession which they did not produce before the Court despite prolonged litigation. As such, we would have no hesitation in drawing some adverse inference against the appellant in this behalf. Another ancillary factor, which the Court has to take into consideration is that, the value declared by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in relation to stocks, has not been denied specifically, either in correspondence or in the pleadings by the appellant. In the letter dated 28th February, 1987 value of goods worth Rs. 7,00,000/- and lathe machine worth Rs. 1,15,000/- was alleged to be lying in the factory, in addition to other materials. The inventory which was annexed to the letter of 7th August, 1987 refers to various components, parts, bearings etc. but does not refer to CTC machines. Admittedly, the appellants have sold these machines in furtherance to the advertisement dated 12th March, 1988. In short, an amount which cannot be disputed, as is evident from the documentary and oral evidence on record is, Stock A, Stock lying in the premises, 7 lacs lathe machine, Rs.1,15,000/- CTC machine, as sold by the appellant as per their own version, the CTC machine which was sold by the appellant for a sum of Rs. 1,48,975/-, thus, totaling up to Rs. 9,63,975/-. The respondent Bank would be entitled to receive the interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 14th March, 1988 till the date of payment of the amount. We are awarding the same rate of interest which has been awarded by the Tribunal and was accepted by the Bank.\n15. It appears that the Bank is acting in a manner which is ex facie not in consonance with the commercial principles and in a most casual and irresponsible manner. The method in which the financial limits have been sanctioned to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 does not stand to reasoning. Admittedly, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had no title to the property. What verification was done to the appraisal report has been left to imagination. The conduct of the appellant further creates some suspicion in the mind of the Court. The appellant took no remedial or bonafide steps even after it had admittedly come to know that the goods in question were hypothecated to the Bank. On the contrary, it issued advertisement in March, 1988 for sale of hypothecated goods. On the face of this fact, they had no preferential right to sell the goods. In the letter dated 21st August, 1987, they had been informed that possession of the property as well as the goods have been taken unauthorizedly. Even if it is assumed that certain amounts were due to the appellant from respondent nos. 2 and 3 on account of licence fee, still they could not have brushed aside the charge of the Bank over the goods and machinery in question. Also in the alleged leave and licence agreement, dated 16th August, 1983, there was no clause, at least none has been brought to our notice, that the appellant would have charge over the goods and machinery, in the event of default in the payment of licence fee. In other words, the charge of the Bank was binding upon the appellant. The inventory of the goods had been prepared and signed by the parties. In the letter dated 7th August, 1987, these facts were confirmed in furtherance to the correspondence exchanged between the parties from 28th February, 1987.\n16. Ashok Kumar Goswami, Senior Manager, Allahabad Bank, who was examined as witness No. 1 on behalf of the Bank, has stated that the loans were advanced to Respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3. According to him Exh. 7 is the agreement cum letter of hypothecation for packing credit advance under which the financial assistance was allowed to them. He also proved Exh. 11, statement of stock of finished goods, work in progress, raw-material and machinery executed by Respondent No. 2 for and on behalf of Respondent No. 3. The stocks statements were shown in Exh. 12, while Exh. 13, was a letter written by Respondent No. 2 on 29th May, 1984 to the Bank. He specifically stated that the hypothecated goods were handed over by Respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 to the appellant behind the back of the Bank. Another witness, whose statement at this stage can be usefully looked into, is that of Sh. Sankar Chakraborty, PW-2. Besides stating the general facts of the case, this witness specifically stated, that the Bank had impleaded the appellant, as they had taken possession of hypothecated goods of the Bank and that, the appellant had written a letter to the Bank and they raised a specific claim against it.\n17. From the above stated documentary evidence, it is clear that the parties had the knowledge of the fact that respondent nos. 2 and 3 enjoyed the financial assistance from the Bank and the goods were hypothecated to it. Even as per the statement of respondent nos. 2 and 3, the appellant sold the hypothecated goods with complete knowledge. This included hypothecated stock worth Rs. 7,00,000/-, lathe machine of value of Rs. 1,15,000/-, in addition to CTC machine and other spares.\n18. The goods in question, therefore, have been disposed off by the appellant either in collusion with respondent nos. 2 and 3 or at its own but with the knowledge that the goods were hypothecated to the Bank. Thus, to that extent, the liability of the appellant cannot be disputed.\nLEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE:-\n19. In continuation of the above factual matrix, now let us examine the principles of law which would be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case and result thereof. There is, in fact, hardly any dispute before us that the goods in question had been hypothecated to the Bank. The appellant had complete knowledge of this fact, still it went on to sell the goods. The Bank had been negligent and, to some extent, irresponsible, in invoking its rights and taking appropriate remedy in accordance with law. Mere irresponsibility, on the part of the Bank, would not wipe out the rights of the Bank in law. Without the consent of the Bank, no person can utilize the hypothecated goods for his own benefit or sale by the borrower or any person connected thereto. It is nobody's case that the Bank had consented to such sale. This Court in case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited [(2006) 6 SCC 736 ] described the meaning of 'entrustment' in relation to hypothecation as follows:\nxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx\n \"The creditor may also have the right to claim payment from the sale proceeds (if such proceeds are identifiable and available). The following denifitions of the term `hypothecation' in P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon [3rd Edn. (2005), Vol. 2 pp. 2179 and 2180] are relevant:\n\"Hypothecation--It is the act of pledging an asset as security for borrowing, without parting with its possession or ownership. The borrowers enters into an agreement with the lender to hand over the possession of the hypothecated assets whenever called upon to do so. The charge of hypothecation is then converted into that of a pledge and the lender enjoys the rights of a pledge.\nHypothecation' means a charge in or upon any movable property, existing or future, created by a borrower in favour of a secured creditor, without delivery of possession of the movable property to such creditor, as a security for financial assistance and includes floating charge and crystallization of such charge into fixed charge on movable property. [Borrowed from Section 2(n) of Scuritisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002].\" \n20. Physical domain over the hypothecated goods is no way a sine qua non for enforcing Bank's rights against the borrower. It was obligatory upon the appellant to deal with the goods only with the leave and permission of the Bank. Absence of such consent in writing would obviously result in breach of Bank's rights. \n21. The next question of law, that we are called upon to consider, is the ambit and scope of provisions of Section 2(g) of the Recovery Act, on which the entire case of the parties hinges. We have already noticed that the appellant has argued with great vehemence that, there was no privity of contract and they were not covered under the definition of `debt', and as such, recovery proceedings could not be initiated, much less, recovery could be effected from them under the provisions of the Act. Section 2(g) of the Recovery Act reads as under:\n \"debt\" means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the application;\" \n22. The Recovery Act of 1993, was enacted primarily for the reasons that, the Banks and financial institutions should be able to recover their dues without unnecessary delay, so as to avoid any adverse consequences in relation to the public funds. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act clearly state that Banks and financial institutions at present, experience considerable difficulties in recovering loans and enforcements of securities charged with them. The existing procedure for recovery of dues of the Bank and the financial institutions block significant portion of their funds in un-productive assets, the value of which deteriorates with the passage of time. Introduction of similar procedure was suggested by the Tiwari Committee. The Act provided for the establishment of Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals and modes for expeditious recovery of dues to the Banks and financial institutions.\n23. In this background, let us read the language of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act. The plain reading of the Section suggests that legislature has used a general expression in contra distinction to specific, restricted or limited expression. This obviously means that, the legislature intended to give wider meaning to the provisions. Larger area of jurisdiction was intended to be covered under this provision so as to ensure attainment of the legislative object, i.e. expeditious recovery and providing provisions for taking such measures which would prevent the wastage of securities available with the banks and financial institutions.\n24. We may notice some of the general expressions used by the framers of law in this provision :\na) any liability;\nb) claim as due from any person;\nc) during the course of any business activity undertaken by the Bank;\nd) where secured or unsecured;\ne) and lastly legally recoverable.\n25. All the above expressions used in the definition clause clearly suggest that, expression 'debt' has to be given general and wider meaning, just to illustrate, the word 'any liability' as opposed to the word 'determined liability' or 'definite liability' or 'any person' in contrast to 'from the debtor'. The expression 'any person' shows that the framers do not wish to restrict the same in its ambit or application. The legislature has not intended to restrict to the relationship of a creditor or debtor alone. General terms, therefore, have been used by the legislature to give the provision a wider and liberal meaning. These are generic or general terms. Therefore, it will be difficult for the Court, even on cumulative reading of the provision, to hold that the expression should be given a narrower or restricted meaning. What will be more in consonance with the purpose and object of the Act is to give this expression a general meaning on its plain language rather than apply unnecessary emphasis or narrow the scope and interpretation of these provisions, as they are likely to frustrate the very object of the Act. \n26. In the case of State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal &amp; Ors. [(2004) 5 SCC 155 ], this Court was concerned with the question of payment of taxes in relation to the provisions of the Bombay Motor Vehicle Tax Act, 1958. The Court while interpreting the scope of the entries in the legislative lists held that, they should be construed widely and general words used therein must comprehend ancillary or subsidiary matters relating to Schedule VII, Articles 245 and 246. The Court held as under:-\n \"In interpreting the scope of various entries in the legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule, widest- possible amplitude must be given to the words used and each general word must be held to extend to ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly be said to be comprehended in it. The entries should, thus be given a broad and comprehensive interpretation. In order to see whether a particular legislative provision falls within the jurisdiction of the legislature which has passed it, the Court must consider what constitutes in pith and substance the true subject-matter of the legislation and whether such subject-matter is covered by the topics enumerated in the legislative list pertaining to that legislature.\" \n27. Again in the of case of Raman Lal Bhailal Patel &amp; Ors. v. State of Gujarat [(2008) 5 SCC 449 ], this Court was dealing with the word 'person' appearing in the provisions of Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, 1960. The expression 'person' was defined with the inclusive definition that a person includes a joint family. The Court held that, where the definition is inclusively defining the word, there, the legislative intention is clear that it wishes to enlarge the meaning of the word used in the statute and that such word must be given comprehensive meaning. In law, the word `person' was stated to be having a slightly different connotation and refers to any entity that is recognized by law as having rights and duties of human beings.\n28. In the case of Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd. &amp; Ors. [(2007) 6 SCC 236 ], this Court took the view that, the elementary rule of interpretation of statute is that the words used must be given their plain grammatical meaning, therefore, the Court cannot add something which the legislature has not provided for. Similar view was also expressed by another Bench of this Court in the case of Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and Ors. [(2003) 2 SCC 455 ], that the Court cannot write anything into the statutory provisions which are plain and unambiguous. A Statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and the primary rule of construction is that, the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said.\n29. The learned counsel for the appellant has heavily relied upon the judgment of the United Bank of India v. Debt Recovery Tribunal &amp; Ors. [(1999) 4 SCC 69 ], to contend that the general expression must receive general meaning and in light of this principle, the present proceedings could not have been initiated, much less, recoveries effected under the provisions of the Recovery Act. We shall shortly discuss the merit of this contention.\n30. Before we advert to the discussion while applying these principles of interpretation to the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act, and also examine the merit of the contention raised on behalf of the respondent, it may be interesting to know as to how the word `debt' has been defined and explained by this Court in different judgments, with different context and under different laws.\n31. Years back this Court in the case of P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar &amp; Ors. v. O.R.M.P.R.M. Ramanathan Chettiar [AIR 1968 SC 1047 ], explained the expression 'debt' as defined in the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938. The Court held that the definition appearing in Section 3 (iii) of the Act, despite the fact that it specifically states that 'debt' would not include rent as defined in clause (iv), or `Kanartham', as defined in Section 3 (1)(1) of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, held that the definition is still of a very wide magnitude and would include 'any liability' due from an agriculturists with the specified expressions. The Court held as under:\n 'Debt' has been defined in Sec. 3 (iii) of the Act as meaning \"any liability\" in Cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from an agriculturist, whether payable under a decree or order of a civil or revenue court or otherwise, but does not include rent as defined in Clause (iv), or 'Kanartham' as defined in Section 3 (1) (1) of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929.\" \nIn the case of Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry [(1974) 2 SCC 231 ], this Court quoted as under:\n \"The classical definition of 'debt', is to be found in Webb v. Stenton where Lindley, L.J. said: \"... a debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation\". There must be debitum in praesenti; solvendum may be in praesenti or in future - that is immaterial. There must be an existing obligation to pay a sum of money now or in future.\" \n32. Still, in another case titled as State Bank of Bikaner &amp; Jaipur v. Ballabh Das &amp; Co. &amp; Ors. [(1999) 7 SCC 539 ], the Court was concerned with the un-amended provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act. The Court while setting aside the order of the High Court, while dealing with the word `debt' followed by the words 'alleged as due', held as under:-\n \"According to the definition, the term 'debt' means liability which is alleged as due from any person by a bank or a financial institutions or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions. It should have arisen during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force. The liability to be discharged may be in cash or otherwise. It would be immaterial whether the liability is secured or unsecured or whether it is payable under a decree or an order of any civil court or otherwise. However, it should be subsisting and legally recoverable on the date on which proceedings are initiated for recovering the same.\nThe important words in the definition \"alleged as due\" have been overlooked by the High Court and, therefore, it has erroneously held that unless the amounts claimed by the Bank are determined or decided by a competent forum they cannot be said to be due and would not amount to \"debt\" under the Act. What was necessary for the High Court to consider was whether the Bank has alleged in the suits that the amounts are due to the Bank from the respondents, that the liability of the respondents has arisen during the course of their business activity, that the said liability is still subsisting and legally recoverable.\" \n33. As already noticed, this judgment was pronounced by the Court while dealing with the un-amended provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act. This section was amended by Act 1 of 2000 and the words `alleged as due' stood substituted by the expression `claimed as due' with effect from 17th January, 2000. This shows the intention of the legislature to significantly introduce definite expression and give emphasis to the claim of the Bank rather than, what is allegedly due or determinatively due to the Bank from its borrowers. In this case, the application of the Bank had been dismissed by the High Court on the ground that it was not maintainable as it was not covered under the definition of the word `debt'. While setting aside the order of the High Court, this Court held that, the High Court had gone wrong in holding that the application by the Bank was premature and till the Court determines the amount, such application could not be filed by the Bank. This Court clearly stated the dictum that, such application would be maintainable and the amount payable to the Bank does not have to be a determined sum under the provisions of the Recovery Act.\n34. Similar contention had been raised before us on the strength of the judgment of this Court in the Case of United Bank of India (Supra) on behalf of the appellant. Firstly, we fail to understand as to what advantage the learned counsel appearing for the appellant wishes to draw from this judgment and secondly, this judgment has clearly returned the finding, even on the facts of that case, that application under the provisions of the Recovery Act was maintainable within the scope of Section 2 (g) of the Act. The Court held as under :\n \"In view of the rival stands of the parties, the short question that arises for consideration is, as to whether the said claim of the plaintiff can be said to be a claim for recovery of debts due to the plaintiff as provided under Section 17(1) of the Act. The answer of this question in turn would depend upon the meaning of the expression \"debt\" as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act. Before we examine the two provisions referred to above, it is to be borne in mind that the procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and financial institutions which was being followed, resulted in a significant portion of the funds being blocked. To remedy the locking up of huge funds, the Financial Institutions Bill, 1993\", which was passed by Parliament and the Act has come into existence.\nThe Act and the relevant provisions will have to be construed bearing in mind the objects for which Parliament passed the enactment. The prime object of the enactment appears to be provide for the establishment of tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.\nIn the case in hand, there cannot be any dispute that the expression \"debt\" has to be given the widest amplitude to mean any liability which is alleged as due from any person by a bank during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank either in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, whether payable under a decree or order of any court or otherwise and legally recoverable on the date of the application. In ascertaining the question whether any particular claim of any bank or financial institution would come within the purview of the tribunal created under the Act, it is imperative that the entire averments made by the plaintiff in the plaint be looked into and them find out whether notwithstanding the specially-created tribunal having been constituted, the averments are such that it is possible to hold that the jurisdiction of such a tribunal is ousted. With the aforesaid principle in mind, on examining the averments made in the plaint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the claim in question made by the plaintiff is essentially one for recovery of a debt due to it from the defendants and, therefore, is the Tribunal which has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the dispute and not the ordinary civil court.\" \n35. As is obvious from the above recorded findings, the Court while referring to Section 2 (g), 17(1) and 31 (1) of the Recovery Act, observed that jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred under the provisions of the Act and the suits or proceedings shall transfer to the Tribunal upon coming into force of the Recovery Act. The Court was primarily concerned with the matters being transferred from Civil Courts to Tribunal, still while referring to the provisions of Section 2 (g), held that the claim of the Bank was covered under the provisions of the Act. The suit, as instituted in the year 1991, had claimed various relief including the claim for damages. The objection raised was that, there was undetermined amount and other relief could not be referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. The suit was subsequently transferred to the Tribunal under the provisions of the Act and the Court while giving wide meaning to the expression `debt', clearly held that, this expression was of liberal amplitude and there was occasion for the Court to grant a restricted meaning. Thus, in our view, even the case of United Bank of India (supra) no way supports the submissions made on behalf of the appellant.\n36. On the plain analysis of the above stated judgment of this Court, it is clear that the word 'debt' under Section 2(g) of the Recovery Act is incapable of being given a restricted or narrow meaning. The legislature has used general terms which must be given appropriate plain and simple meaning. There is no occasion for the Court to restrict the meaning of the word `any liability', `any person' and particularly the words `in cash or otherwise'. Under Section 2 (g), a claim has to be raised by the Bank against any person which is due to Bank on account of/in the course of any business activity undertaken by the Bank. In the present case, Bank had admittedly granted financial assistance to respondent nos. 2 and 3, who in turn had hypothecated the goods, plants and machinery in favour of the Bank. There cannot be any dispute before us that the goods in question have been sold by the appellant without the consent of the Bank. Respondent nos. 2 and 3 have hardly raised any dispute and resistance, to the claim of the Bank. In fact, even before this Court there is no representation on their behalf. The documentary and oral evidence on record clearly established that the Bank has raised a financial claim upon the principal debtor, as well as upon the person who had intermeddled and/or at least dealt with the charged goods without any authority in law. Not only this, the appellant had sold the hypothecated goods and stocks by public auction, despite the fact the appellant had due knowledge of the fact that the goods were charged in favour of the Bank. Another aspect of this case which required to be considered by this Court is, what was intended to be suppressed by the legislature by enacting the Recovery Act, 1993 and thereafter, by amending various provisions, including Section 2(g) in the year 2000. Obviously, the mischief which was intended to be controlled and/or prevention of wastage of securities provided to the Bank, was the main consideration for such enactment. The purpose was also to prevent wrong doers from taking advantage of their wrong/mistakes, whether permissible in law or otherwise. These preventive measures are required to be applied with care and purposefully in accordance with law to ensure that the mischief, if not entirely extinguished, is curbed. \n37. Maxim Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria has a clear mandate of law that, a person who by manipulation of a process frustrates the legal rights of others, should not be permitted to take advantage of his wrong or manipulations. In the present case Respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 and the appellant have acted together while disposing off the hypothecated goods, and now, they cannot be permitted to turn back to argue, that since the goods have been sold, liability cannot be fastened upon respondent Nos. 2 &amp; 3 and in any case on the appellant. The Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah (Dead) and Ors. [1996 (Vol. 6) SCC 342 ], referred to rule of mischief and while explaining the word `building', held as under,:-\n \"Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Vol. I of the 5th Edition) states that 'what is a building must always be a question of degree and circumstances'. Quoting from Victoria City Corpn. v. Biship of Vancover Island (AC at p.390), the celebrated lexicographe commented that 'ordinary and natural meaning of the word building includes the fabric and the ground on which it stands\". In Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.) the meaning of the building is given as \" A structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls, and usually, but not necessarily, covered with a roof\". (emphasis supplied). The said description is a recognition of the fact that roof is not a necessary and indispensable adjunct for a building because there can be roofless buildings. So a building, even after losing the roof, can continue to be a building in its general meaning. Taking recourse to such meaning in the present context would help to prevent a mischief. \n38. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Bank of India v. Vijay Ramniklal [AIR 1997 Gujarat 75 ], in support of the contention, that claim of bank was not `debt' within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act so as to give jurisdiction to the Tribunal. We are not impressed by this argument. Firstly, the judgment of the Gujarat High court is entirely on different facts and in that case an employee of the Bank had misappropriated the amount of the Bank, the Bank had instituted an application under the provisions of the Recovery Act. Rightly so it was held by the High Court, that it was not a `debt' within the meaning of Section 2 (g) and, therefore, could not be tried before the Tribunal. We may state another illustration to demonstrate the case where the Tribunal may not have jurisdiction. Some persons commit a theft in the Bank and take away the money and/or the goods hypothecated to the Bank or the goods in the custody of the Bank. Upon Bank's lodging a first information report (FIR) to the police, those persons are traced, arrested and tried in accordance with law for theft. In such a case, the Tribunal may not have jurisdiction to entertain and decide an application for recovery of money or value of goods in terms of Section 17 of the Recovery Act. That is neither the case here nor in any of the judgments which have been relied upon by the parties before us, except in the case of Gujarat High Court. In the case in hand, the goods were hypothecated to the Bank and the appellant admittedly had knowledge prior to the sale of the goods, that they were hypothecated to the Bank. If the contention of the appellant is accepted, it will amount to giving advantage or premium to the wrong doers. It would also further perpetuate the mischief intended to be suppressed by the enactment. This could completely defeat the very object and purpose of the Act. A party which had pledged or mortgaged properties in favour of the Bank, then would transfer such properties in favour of a third party. In the event, the Bank takes action under the provisions of the Recovery Act, they would take the objection like the present appellant. This would tantamount to travesty of justice and would frustrate the very legislative object and intent behind the provisions of the Recovery Act. Therefore, such an approach or interpretation would be impermissible.\n39. We have already noticed that the legislature has not used words of a restrictive or definite nature. It has intentionally made use of the expressions which are quite general and can be construed widely in their common parlance. There is no occasion for this Court to read the word other than the one intended by the legislature in the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act. Wherever the legislature requires, it uses the expressions of definite connotations and consequences, for example, in the Interest Act, 1978, the word 'debt' has been defined under Section 2(c) of that Act by using specific terms of restricted character. It means 'any liability for an 'ascertained sum' of money and includes a debt payable in any kind but does not include a 'judgment debt'. In this definition, the 'ascertained sum' obviously means a sum which has been determined under any methods of the adjudicative process while, on the other hand, the expression 'payable in kind' is a general expression, again the excluding clause in relation to 'judgment debt' is specific. Such is not the language or the purport of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act. Mr. R.F. Nariman, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, while referring to the provisions of Section 19 (8) and Section 19 (11) respectively, of the Recovery Act contended, that these sections clearly postulate that, a non applicant in proceedings before the Tribunal can raise a plea of set off, as well as a counter claim, but where the counter claim is objected to on the ground that it ought not to be disposed off by way of a counter claim, as it is an independent action, then the person raising a counter claim can take leave of the Tribunal for exclusion of such counter claim. With reference to language of these two provisions, it is contended that, the claim like the one raised by the respondent Bank against the appellant, is a claim which cannot be raised in the proceedings before the Tribunal and the Bank ought to have taken independent steps, if any, in accordance with law. On the other hand, Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel for the respondent-Bank argued that, this argument has no bearing on the matter in controversy before us, in as much as, the claim of the Bank is maintainable within the definition of 'debt' under the Recovery Act. \n40. This contention of appellant needs to be noticed only for being rejected. In our detailed discussion above, we have clearly held that, the claim raised by the Bank falls well within the ambit and scope of Section 2 (g) of the Recovery Act and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal cannot be ousted on this ground.\n41. Thus, in our opinion, the provisions of Section 2 (g) have to be construed, so as to give it liberal meaning. The general expressions used in this provision will have to be understood generally. Neither there is scope to hold nor is the legislative intent that these provisions should be given a narrower or a restricted meaning. In our considered view, the claim of the Bank relatable to the hypothecated goods was well within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal exercising its power under Section 17 of the Recovery Act. \nApplicability of the principles of public accountability on the facts of the present case : \n42. Having answered both the questions of fact partially and law against the present appellant, still there is another important facet of this case which cannot be ignored by the Court. It relates to the conduct of the respondent Bank and its officers/officials. The witnesses appearing on behalf of the Bank had stated that, at the stage of appraisal report itself, the Bank had come to know, that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have a leave and license agreement with the appellant. Despite that, and without proper verification, as it appears from the record, heavy loan was sanctioned and disbursed to the above respondents. Even thereafter, the Bank and its officers/officials appear to have taken no serious steps to ensure that the goods hypothecated to the Bank are not disposed off without its consent. The officers/officials of the Bank, even after knowing about the handing over of the possession of the property including the hypothecated goods to the appellant and having communicated the same to the appellant vide their letter dated 24th August, 1987, made no serious efforts to recover its debt and ensure that the goods are not disposed off, as the suit itself was filed for recovery of the amount on 1st February, 1989 after serious delay. These facts, to a great extent, are even conformed in the affidavit which was filed on behalf of the Bank by one Shri Kamal Kumar Kapoor as late as on 22nd August, 2009 before this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that the Bank could have protected its interest and ensured recovery while taking due caution and acting with expeditiousness. There is definite negligence on the part of the concerned officers/officials in the Bank. They have jeopardized the interest of the Bank and consequently the public funds, only saving grace being that orders were passed by the competent forum, requiring the appellant to deposit some money in the suit for recovery of more than 22 lac which was filed by the Bank in the year 1989. Even this order was also vacated by the Tribunal vide its order dated 28th December, 2006 wherein it passed the order for refund of the amount. The concerned quarters in the Bank also failed to act despite the advertisement for sale of the hypothecated material given by the appellant on 12th March, 1988, whereafter the machines like CTC is said to have been sold at a throwaway price. All these facts indicate definite negligence and callousness on the part of the concerned quarters. The legislative object of expeditious recovery of all public dues and due protection of security available with the Bank to ensure pre-payments of debts cannot be achieved when the officers/officials of the Bank act in such a callous manner. There is a public duty upon all such officers/officials to act fairly, transparently and with sense of responsibility to ensure recovery of public dues. Even, an inaction on the part of the public servant can lead to a failure of public duty and can jeopardize the interest of the State or its instrumentality.\n43. In our considered opinion, the scheme of the Recovery Act and language of its various provisions imposes an obligation upon the Banks to ensure a proper and expeditious recovery of its dues. In the present case, there is certainly ex facie failure of statutory obligation on the part of the Bank and its officers/officials. In the entire record before us, there is no explanation much less any reasonable explanation as to why effective steps were not taken and why the interest of the Bank was permitted to be jeopardized. The concept of public accountability and performance is applicable to the present case as well. These are instrumentalities of the State and thus all administrative norms and principles of fair performance are applicable to them with equal force as they are to the Government department, if not with a greater rigor. The well established precepts of public trust and public accountability are fully applicable to the functions which emerge from the public servants or even the persons holding public office. In the case of State of Bihar v. Subhash Singh [ (1997) 4 SCC 430 ], this Court, in exercise of the powers of judicial review stated that, the doctrine of full faith and credit applies to the acts done by officers in the hierarchy of the State. They have to faithfully discharge their duties to elongate public purpose.\n44. Inaction, arbitrary action or irresponsible action would normally result in dual hardship. Firstly, it jeopardizes the interest of the Bank and public funds are wasted and secondly, it even affects the borrower's interest adversely provided such person was acting bonafide. Both these adverse consequences can easily be avoided by the authorities concerned by timely and coordinated action. The authorities are required to have a more practical and pragmatic approach to provide solution to such matters. The concept of public accountability and performance of functions takes in its ambit proper and timely action in accordance with law. Public duty and public obligation both are essentials of good administration whether by the State instrumentalities and/or by the financial institutions. In the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation &amp; Anr. v. Union of India &amp; Anr. [(2005) 8 SCC 202 ], this Court declared the dictum that State actions causing loss are actionable under public law and this is as a result of innovation to a new tool with the court, which are the protectors of civil liberty of the citizens and would ensure protection against devastating results of State action. The principles of public accountability and transparency in State action even in the case of appointment, which essentially must not lack bonafide was enforced by the Court. All these principles enunciated by the Court over a passage of time clearly mandate that public officers are answerable both for their inaction and irresponsible actions. What ought to have been done, if not done, responsibility should be fixed on the erring officers then alone the real public purpose of an answerable administration would be satisfied.\n45. The doctrine of full faith and credit applies to the acts done by the officers and presumptive evidence of regularity of official acts done or performed, is apposite in faithful discharge of duties to elongate public purpose and to be in accordance with the procedure prescribed. It is known fact that, in transactions of the Government business, none would own personal responsibility and decisions are leisurely taken at various levels (Refer : State of Andhra Pradesh v. Food Corporation of India [(2004) 13 SCC 53 ].\nPrinciple of public accountability is applicable to such officers/officials with all its vigour. Greater the power to decide, higher is the responsibility to be just and fair. The dimensions of administrative law permit judicial intervention in decisions, though of administrative nature, but are ex facie discriminatory. The adverse impact of lack of probity in discharge of public duties can result in varied defects not only in the decision making process but in the decision as well. Every public officer is accountable for its decision and actions to the public in the larger interest and to the State administration in its governance. It needs to be seen in the facts and circumstances of the present case, why and how the interest of the Bank has been jeopardized, in what circumstances the loan was sanctioned and disbursed despite some glaring defects having been exposed in the appraisal report. Significant element of discretion is vested in the officers/officials of the Bank while sanctioning and disbursing the loans but this discretion is circumscribed by the inbuilt commercial principles/restrictions as well as that such decisions should be free from arbitrariness, unreasonableness and should protect the interest of the Bank in all events. We are neither competent nor do we wish to venture to examine this aspect, it is for the appropriate authorities in the Bank to examine the matter from all quarters and then to take appropriate action against the erring officers/officials involved in the present case, that too, in accordance with law.\n46. For the reasons afore-recorded, we partially allow this appeal and while modifying the order of the High Court to the extent that, the appellants would be liable to pay to the respondent Bank a sum of Rs. 9,63,975/-. (approximate value of the hypothecated stock sold by the appellants) with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the above sum during the period from 14th March, 1988, the date of filing of the plaint, to the date of actual realization as originally allowed by the Tribunal. \n47. We further direct the Chairman of the Allahabad Bank to examine this case in light of our discussion supra and take appropriate action against erring officers/officials in accordance with law.\n48. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.\n",
       "root_cause_options": [
         {
           "value": "Missing fact",
@@ -1238,15 +1238,15 @@
     },
     "meta": {
       "sample_id": "S030",
-      "case_id": "6428",
+      "case_id": "2974",
       "experiment": "baseline_no_firac",
-      "model": "ministral-3b",
-      "source_file": "S030__baseline_no_firac__ministral-3b__6428.json",
+      "model": "phi-4",
+      "source_file": "S030__baseline_no_firac__phi-4__2974.json",
       "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
-      "judgment_date": "07/01/2009",
+      "judgment_date": "03/05/2010",
       "machine_error_stage": "issues",
       "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
-      "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue misframing"
+      "machine_minor_error_category": "Issue omission"
     }
   }
 ]
\ No newline at end of file