# Security policy ## Reporting a vulnerability If you find a security issue in Riprap, please report it privately so it can be triaged before disclosure. - Email: **msrahmanadam@gmail.com** (subject prefix: `[riprap-security]`) - Or open a [GitHub Security Advisory](https://github.com/msradam/riprap-nyc/security/advisories/new) on this repository. Please do not file a public GitHub issue for security reports. We aim to acknowledge reports within 72 hours and to ship a fix or a mitigation plan within two weeks of triage. If the report concerns a vulnerability in an upstream model or service Riprap depends on (IBM Granite, vLLM, Hugging Face Spaces, NYC Open Data endpoints), we will help coordinate disclosure with the upstream maintainer. ## Threat-surface notes Riprap is a citation-grounded synthesis layer over public-record data. By design, the runtime: - contacts only **public-record APIs** (NYC Open Data, FloodNet, USGS, NOAA, NWS, NYS DOH, MTA, NYCHA, NYC DOE, OpenStreetMap / Nominatim) and the configured inference Spaces; - does **not** authenticate against user accounts or store user-identifying data — the address bar is the only input; - runs the SvelteKit UI as a static SPA over a FastAPI backend with no persistent database. The vulnerability surface is therefore small. Plausible categories worth a report: - Prompt-injection paths via document content that escape the Mellea grounding loop and surface unverifiable claims as cited. - SSRF / abuse via crafted address strings that drive backend HTTP calls to unintended hosts. - Token leakage in proxy headers or SSE streams (`inference-vllm/proxy.py`, `web/main.py`). - Denial-of-service patterns that exceed the hosted Space's resource budget. - Supply-chain issues in pinned deps (`requirements.txt`, `web/sveltekit/package.json`). ## Out of scope - Self-hosted deployments running with custom configuration or custom datasets — please file those as regular bugs. - Findings that require physical or local-network access to a user's machine. - Issues in the lablab.ai or Hugging Face Spaces hosting platforms themselves; please report those upstream.