shinroute / src /shared /utils /inputSanitizer.ts
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/**
* Input Sanitizer β€” FASE-01 Security Hardening
*
* Detects prompt injection patterns and redacts PII from LLM requests.
* Configurable via environment variables or dashboard settings.
*
* @module inputSanitizer
*/
// ─── Prompt Injection Patterns ───────────────────────────────────────
/** @type {Array<{name: string, pattern: RegExp, severity: string}>} */
const INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
{
name: "system_override",
pattern:
/\b(ignore|disregard|forget)\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior|above|earlier)\s+(instructions?|prompts?|rules?|context)/i,
severity: "high",
},
{
name: "role_hijack",
pattern:
/\b(you\s+are\s+now|act\s+as\s+if|pretend\s+(to\s+be|you\s+are)|from\s+now\s+on\s+you\s+are)\b/i,
severity: "medium",
},
{
name: "system_prompt_leak",
pattern:
/\b(reveal|show|display|print|output|repeat)\s+(your\s+)?(system\s+prompt|instructions?|initial\s+prompt|hidden\s+prompt)/i,
severity: "high",
},
{
name: "delimiter_injection",
pattern: /(\[SYSTEM\]|\[INST\]|<<SYS>>|<\|im_start\|>|<\|system\|>|<\|user\|>)/i,
severity: "high",
},
{
name: "jailbreak_dan",
pattern: /\b(DAN|do\s+anything\s+now|jailbreak|developer\s+mode|enable\s+developer)\b/i,
severity: "medium",
},
{
name: "encoding_evasion",
pattern:
/\b(base64\s+decode|rot13|hex\s+decode|unicode\s+escape)\b.*\b(instruction|prompt|command)\b/i,
severity: "medium",
},
];
// ─── PII Patterns ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** @type {Array<{name: string, pattern: RegExp, replacement: string}>} */
const PII_PATTERNS = [
{
name: "email",
pattern: /\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z|a-z]{2,}\b/g,
replacement: "[EMAIL_REDACTED]",
},
{
name: "cpf",
pattern: /\b\d{3}\.\d{3}\.\d{3}-\d{2}\b/g,
replacement: "[CPF_REDACTED]",
},
{
name: "cnpj",
pattern: /\b\d{2}\.\d{3}\.\d{3}\/\d{4}-\d{2}\b/g,
replacement: "[CNPJ_REDACTED]",
},
{
name: "credit_card",
pattern: /\b(?:\d{4}[-\s]?){3}\d{4}\b/g,
replacement: "[CARD_REDACTED]",
},
{
name: "phone_br",
pattern: /\b\(?\d{2}\)?\s?\d{4,5}-?\d{4}\b/g,
replacement: "[PHONE_REDACTED]",
},
{
name: "ssn_us",
pattern: /\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b/g,
replacement: "[SSN_REDACTED]",
},
];
// ─── Configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Get sanitizer configuration from environment.
* @returns {{ enabled: boolean, mode: string, piiRedaction: boolean }}
*/
function getConfig() {
return {
enabled: process.env.INPUT_SANITIZER_ENABLED !== "false",
mode: process.env.INPUT_SANITIZER_MODE || "warn", // "warn" | "block" | "redact"
piiRedaction: process.env.PII_REDACTION_ENABLED === "true",
};
}
// ─── Core Functions ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* @typedef {Object} SanitizeResult
* @property {boolean} blocked - Whether the request should be blocked
* @property {boolean} modified - Whether the content was modified (PII redacted)
* @property {Array<{pattern: string, severity: string, match: string}>} detections
* @property {Array<{type: string, count: number}>} piiDetections
* @property {Object} [sanitizedBody] - Modified body (if PII redaction active)
*/
/**
* Extract all message content strings from a chat body.
* Supports both `messages[]` (OpenAI/Claude) and `input[]` (Responses API).
* @param {Object} body
* @returns {string[]}
*/
function extractMessageContents(body) {
const contents = [];
const messages = body.messages || body.input || [];
for (const msg of messages) {
if (typeof msg === "string") {
contents.push(msg);
} else if (typeof msg.content === "string") {
contents.push(msg.content);
} else if (Array.isArray(msg.content)) {
for (const part of msg.content) {
if (typeof part === "string") {
contents.push(part);
} else if (part.text) {
contents.push(part.text);
}
}
}
}
// Also check system prompt
if (typeof body.system === "string") {
contents.push(body.system);
} else if (Array.isArray(body.system)) {
for (const s of body.system) {
if (typeof s === "string") contents.push(s);
else if (s.text) contents.push(s.text);
}
}
return contents;
}
/**
* Scan content for prompt injection patterns.
* @param {string} text
* @returns {Array<{pattern: string, severity: string, match: string}>}
*/
function detectInjection(text) {
const detections = [];
for (const rule of INJECTION_PATTERNS) {
const match = text.match(rule.pattern);
if (match) {
detections.push({
pattern: rule.name,
severity: rule.severity,
match: match[0].slice(0, 50), // truncate for logging
});
}
}
return detections;
}
/**
* Scan and optionally redact PII from text.
* @param {string} text
* @param {boolean} redact - If true, replaces PII with placeholders
* @returns {{ text: string, detections: Array<{type: string, count: number}> }}
*/
function processPII(text, redact = false) {
const detections = [];
let processed = text;
for (const rule of PII_PATTERNS) {
const matches = text.match(rule.pattern);
if (matches && matches.length > 0) {
detections.push({ type: rule.name, count: matches.length });
if (redact) {
processed = processed.replace(rule.pattern, rule.replacement);
}
}
}
return { text: processed, detections };
}
/**
* Sanitize a chat request body.
*
* @param {Object} body - The chat completion request body
* @param {Object} [logger] - Logger instance (defaults to console)
* @returns {SanitizeResult}
*/
export function sanitizeRequest(body, logger = console) {
const config = getConfig();
const result = {
blocked: false,
modified: false,
detections: [],
piiDetections: [],
sanitizedBody: null,
};
if (!config.enabled) return result;
const contents = extractMessageContents(body);
const fullText = contents.join("\n");
// ── Prompt Injection Detection ──
const injections = detectInjection(fullText);
if (injections.length > 0) {
result.detections = injections;
const highSeverity = injections.filter((d) => d.severity === "high");
const logLevel = highSeverity.length > 0 ? "warn" : "info";
if (logger[logLevel]) {
logger[logLevel](
`[SANITIZER] Prompt injection detected: ${injections.map((d) => d.pattern).join(", ")}`
);
}
if (config.mode === "block" && highSeverity.length > 0) {
result.blocked = true;
return result;
}
}
// ── PII Detection / Redaction ──
if (config.piiRedaction) {
const piiResult = processPII(fullText, config.mode === "redact");
result.piiDetections = piiResult.detections;
if (piiResult.detections.length > 0) {
logger.warn?.(
`[SANITIZER] PII detected: ${piiResult.detections.map((d) => `${d.type}(${d.count})`).join(", ")}`
);
if (config.mode === "redact") {
// Deep clone and replace message contents with redacted versions
result.sanitizedBody = redactBody(body);
result.modified = true;
}
}
}
return result;
}
/**
* Deep clone body and replace message contents with PII-redacted versions.
* @param {Object} body
* @returns {Object}
*/
function redactBody(body) {
const clone = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(body));
const messages = clone.messages || clone.input || [];
for (const msg of messages) {
if (typeof msg.content === "string") {
msg.content = processPII(msg.content, true).text;
} else if (Array.isArray(msg.content)) {
for (const part of msg.content) {
if (typeof part === "string") {
const idx = msg.content.indexOf(part);
msg.content[idx] = processPII(part, true).text;
} else if (part.text) {
part.text = processPII(part.text, true).text;
}
}
}
}
if (typeof clone.system === "string") {
clone.system = processPII(clone.system, true).text;
}
return clone;
}
// ─── Exports for Testing ──────────────────────────────────────────────
export { detectInjection, processPII, extractMessageContents, INJECTION_PATTERNS, PII_PATTERNS };