logbook.json (verbatim titles)

logbook.json

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+{
+ "schema_version": 1,
+ "title": "Repro: The (Marginal) Value of a Search Ad — Repeated Second-price Auctions",
+ "emoji": "chart",
+ "space_id": "snaykey/repro-spa-binary-feedback",
+ "paper": {
+  "openreview_id": "UflglraWRa"
+ },
+ "tags": [
+  "icml2026-repro",
+  "paper-UflglraWRa"
+ ],
+ "updated_at": "2026-07-25T22:40:00+00:00",
+ "root": {
+  "slug": "index",
+  "title": "Repro: The (Marginal) Value of a Search Ad — Repeated Second-price Auctions",
+  "file": "pages/index.md",
+  "children": [
+   {
+    "slug": "executive-summary",
+    "title": "Executive summary",
+    "file": "pages/executive-summary/page.md",
+    "children": []
+   },
+   {
+    "slug": "claim-1-thm1-spa-binary-regret",
+    "title": "Under binary feedback, the proposed algorithm for repeated second-price auctions achieves regret O(√(dT) log³T + d log⁵T), where d is the feature dimension and T the horizon (Theorem 1).",
+    "file": "pages/claim-1-thm1-spa-binary-regret/page.md",
+    "children": []
+   },
+   {
+    "slug": "claim-2-thm2-lower-bound",
+    "title": "A matching minimax lower bound of Ω(√(dT)) holds for T ≥ d², even when the bidder has perfect knowledge of the competing-bid CDF (Theorem 2).",
+    "file": "pages/claim-2-thm2-lower-bound/page.md",
+    "children": []
+   },
+   {
+    "slug": "claim-3-spa-vs-fpa-binary",
+    "title": "Under binary feedback, second-price auctions admit Õ(√(dT)) regret while first-price auctions are limited to Õ(T^(2/3)) regret, showing the payment rule strictly improves achievable regret (Section on regret comparison).",
+    "file": "pages/claim-3-spa-vs-fpa-binary/page.md",
+    "children": []
+   },
+   {
+    "slug": "claim-4-full-info-both-sqrt",
+    "title": "Under full-information feedback, both second-price and first-price auctions achieve the same Õ(√(dT)) regret rate, so the SPA advantage is specific to the binary-feedback setting (Section on regret comparison).",
+    "file": "pages/claim-4-full-info-both-sqrt/page.md",
+    "children": []
+   },
+   {
+    "slug": "claim-5-interval-splitting-hob",
+    "title": "Section 3 introduces an interval-splitting technique to estimate the highest-other-bid (HOB) directly from the observed payment in a won second-price auction (Section 3).",
+    "file": "pages/claim-5-interval-splitting-hob/page.md",
+    "children": []
+   },
+   {
+    "slug": "conclusion",
+    "title": "Conclusion",
+    "file": "pages/conclusion/page.md",
+    "children": []
+   }
+  ]
+ }
+}