{
  "schema_version": 1,
  "title": "Repro: The (Marginal) Value of a Search Ad — Repeated Second-price Auctions",
  "emoji": "chart",
  "space_id": "snaykey/repro-spa-binary-feedback",
  "paper": {
    "openreview_id": "UflglraWRa"
  },
  "tags": [
    "icml2026-repro",
    "paper-UflglraWRa"
  ],
  "updated_at": "2026-07-25T22:40:00+00:00",
  "root": {
    "slug": "index",
    "title": "Repro: The (Marginal) Value of a Search Ad — Repeated Second-price Auctions",
    "file": "pages/index.md",
    "children": [
      {
        "slug": "executive-summary",
        "title": "Executive summary",
        "file": "pages/executive-summary/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "claim-1-thm1-spa-binary-regret",
        "title": "Under binary feedback, the proposed algorithm for repeated second-price auctions achieves regret O(√(dT) log³T + d log⁵T), where d is the feature dimension and T the horizon (Theorem 1).",
        "file": "pages/claim-1-thm1-spa-binary-regret/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "claim-2-thm2-lower-bound",
        "title": "A matching minimax lower bound of Ω(√(dT)) holds for T ≥ d², even when the bidder has perfect knowledge of the competing-bid CDF (Theorem 2).",
        "file": "pages/claim-2-thm2-lower-bound/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "claim-3-spa-vs-fpa-binary",
        "title": "Under binary feedback, second-price auctions admit Õ(√(dT)) regret while first-price auctions are limited to Õ(T^(2/3)) regret, showing the payment rule strictly improves achievable regret (Section on regret comparison).",
        "file": "pages/claim-3-spa-vs-fpa-binary/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "claim-4-full-info-both-sqrt",
        "title": "Under full-information feedback, both second-price and first-price auctions achieve the same Õ(√(dT)) regret rate, so the SPA advantage is specific to the binary-feedback setting (Section on regret comparison).",
        "file": "pages/claim-4-full-info-both-sqrt/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "claim-5-interval-splitting-hob",
        "title": "Section 3 introduces an interval-splitting technique to estimate the highest-other-bid (HOB) directly from the observed payment in a won second-price auction (Section 3).",
        "file": "pages/claim-5-interval-splitting-hob/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "conclusion",
        "title": "Conclusion",
        "file": "pages/conclusion/page.md",
        "children": []
      }
    ]
  }
}