logbook.json

{
  "schema_version": 1,
  "title": "Reproduction: On the Coordination of Value-Maximizing Bidders",
  "emoji": "📊",
  "space_id": "snaykey/repro-value-max-bidders",
  "paper": {
    "openreview_id": "mfBKYcsFmi"
  },
  "tags": [
    "icml2026-repro",
    "paper-mfBKYcsFmi"
  ],
  "updated_at": "2026-08-01T00:00:00Z",
  "root": {
    "slug": "index",
    "title": "Reproduction: On the Coordination of Value-Maximizing Bidders",
    "file": "pages/index.md",
    "children": [
      {
        "slug": "executive-summary",
        "title": "Executive summary",
        "file": "pages/executive-summary/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "under-assumption-1-the-coalition-s-top-two-bidders-remain-competitive-against-outside-bi",
        "title": "Under Assumption 1 (the coalition's top two bidders remain competitive against outside bids), the coordination mechanism guarantees each bidder in the coalition achieves higher value and lower Return-on-Spend constraint violations than independent bidding, with probability at least 1 - exp(-Δ²T/32B²N²) (Theorem 3.1).",
        "file": "pages/under-assumption-1-the-coalition-s-top-two-bidders-remain-competitive-against-outside-bi/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "the-coordination-mechanism-in-algorithm-2-has-only-the-coalition-s-highest-value-bidder-",
        "title": "The coordination mechanism in Algorithm 2 has only the coalition's highest-value bidder submit positive bids while all other coalition members bid zero against outside bidders.",
        "file": "pages/the-coordination-mechanism-in-algorithm-2-has-only-the-coalition-s-highest-value-bidder-/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "when-coalition-members-run-a-mirror-descent-bidding-algorithm-coordination-yields-strict",
        "title": "When coalition members run a mirror-descent bidding algorithm, coordination yields strictly higher total coalition value than independent bidding in the limit as the number of rounds T approaches infinity (Theorem 4.1).",
        "file": "pages/when-coalition-members-run-a-mirror-descent-bidding-algorithm-coordination-yields-strict/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "on-the-real-world-ipinyou-dataset-with-n-4-bidders-over-20-000-rounds-coordinated-biddin",
        "title": "On the real-world iPinYou dataset with N=4 bidders over 20,000 rounds, coordinated bidding raises average per-bidder value from 0.614±0.016 (independent) to 0.929 and utility from -0.040 to 0.156±0.012 (Table 1).",
        "file": "pages/on-the-real-world-ipinyou-dataset-with-n-4-bidders-over-20-000-rounds-coordinated-biddin/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "on-synthetic-i-i-d-settings-coordination-improves-utility-by-roughly-0-23-0-30-and-total",
        "title": "On synthetic i.i.d. settings, coordination improves utility by roughly 0.23-0.30 and total value by 2-4% relative to independent bidding across N=2 and N=4 bidder configurations (Table 1).",
        "file": "pages/on-synthetic-i-i-d-settings-coordination-improves-utility-by-roughly-0-23-0-30-and-total/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "the-theoretical-results-extend-to-non-i-i-d-value-distributions-across-bidders-where-coo",
        "title": "The theoretical results extend to non-i.i.d. value distributions across bidders, where coordination is shown to improve total coalition utility by ΔT/2 (Theorem 5.1 and 5.2).",
        "file": "pages/the-theoretical-results-extend-to-non-i-i-d-value-distributions-across-bidders-where-coo/page.md",
        "children": []
      },
      {
        "slug": "conclusion",
        "title": "Conclusion",
        "file": "pages/conclusion/page.md",
        "children": []
      }
    ]
  }
}