[{"doc_id": "2006 INSC 216", "case_name": "SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. v UMADEVI AND ORS.", "year": "2006", "cite_indeg": 110, "issue": "", "held": ": There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service-Doctrine of legitimate expectation is not applicable in such cases-Employment on daily wages did not amount to forced labour-State action in not regularizing such employees was not unfair within theji-amework of the rule of law-Hence, a mandamus could not be issued in favour of the employees direr:ting the Government to make them permanent since the employees could not show that they have an enforceable legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the State has a legal duty to make them permanent-Administrative Law. Doctrines: \"Doctrine of Legiti1nate Expectation\"-Explained The respondents were temporarily engaged on daily wages in the 953 F G H 954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R. A Commercial Taxes Department and claimed that they worked in the department based on such engagement for more than lO years and hence they were entitled to be made permanent employees of the department entitled to all the benefits of regular employees. They were engaged for the first time in the years 1985-86 inspite of orders not to make such appointments issued in B the year 1984. The Administrative Tribunal dismissed their claim for regularization. However, the High Court held that the respondents were entitled to wa"}, {"doc_id": "1955 INSC 36", "case_name": "THE BENGAL IMMUNITY COMPANY LIMITED v THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS.", "year": "1955", "cite_indeg": 105, "issue": "", "held": ", (per curiam) (i) that the High Court was not right in hold- ing that the petition under Art. 226 was misconce,ived. In so hold- ing the High Court overlooked the fact that the petitioners' contention was that the Act, in so far as it. purported to tax a non-resident in respect of inter-State sales or purchases of goods was ultra vires the Constitution. There are various provisions in the Act laying down certain conditions, which dealers must comply with or submit to. They consti_tuted restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed to every citizen of India by Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and these onerous conditions could not be justified as reasonable restrictions within the meaning of clause (6) of Art. 19 and further the remedy under the Act cannot be said to be adequate and was indeed useless if the Act providing for such remedy was itself ultra vires and void : (ii) that there is nothing in the Constitution which prevent& the Supreme Court from departing fron1 a previous decision of its own if the court is satisfied of its error and its baneful effect on the general interests of the public. ~t..feld, per S. R. DAs, AcTr~c C. J., V1v1AN BosE, BHAGW.ATI and fAFER IMAM JJ. (JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AvYAJ. and B. P. S1NHA JJ., Jisse,,ting) that the present is\u00b7 a fit case for reviewing the previous majority decision of the Supre1ne Court in The State of Bombay v. Th"}, {"doc_id": "2020 INSC 294", "case_name": "INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC.", "year": "2020", "cite_indeg": 104, "issue": "", "held": ": s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 deals with a situation only where the award has been made five years or more before the commencement of the Act, but physical possession of the land has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid \u2013 As regards the collation of the words used in s.24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed \u2013 General rule of statutory interpretation of positive and negative conditions are that positive conditions separated by \u2018or\u2019 are read in the alternative but negative conditions connected by \u2018or\u2019 are construed as cumulative and \u2018or\u2019 is read as \u2018nor\u2019 or \u2018and\u2019 i.e. the expression \u2018or\u2019 has to be read as conjunctive and conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled \u2013 Thus, the word \u2018or\u2019 used in s.24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as \u2018nor\u2019 or as \u2018and\u2019 \u2013 This would mean that the deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under s.24(2) takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the Act of 2013, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid \u2013 Thus, A B C D E F G H 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse \u2013 Interpretation of statutes. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) \u2013 Interpreting \u201cor\u201d under s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 di"}, {"doc_id": "1952 INSC 1", "case_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL v ANWAR ALI SARKAR", "year": "1952", "cite_indeg": 97, "issue": "", "held": ", per FAZL Au, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, \u00b7CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and BosE JJ. (PATANJALI SAsTRI C. ]., dissenting)-Sec- tion 5 ( 1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Acti, 1950, contra- venes Art. 14 of the Constitution and is void inasmuch as (per FAZL Au, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.) the procedure laid down by the Act for the trial by the Special Courts varied substantially from that laid down for the trial of offences generally by the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Act did not classify, or lay down any basis for classification, of the cases vthich may be directed to be tried by the Special Court, but left it to the uncontrolled discretion of the State Government to direct any case which it liked to be tried by the Special Court. DAs ].-Section 5 ( 1 )of the Act, in so far as it empowered the State Government to direct \"offences\" or \"classes of offences\" or \"classes of cases\" to be tried by a Special Court, does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government but by necessary implication contemplates. a proper classification and is not void. That part of the section which empowered the Government to direct \"cases\" as distinct from \"classes of cases\" to be tried by a Special Court is void. PATANJALI SAsTRI C. ].-Section 5 (I) ot the Act is not void or unconstitutional wholly or even in part. Per FAZL Au, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKH"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 506", "case_name": "SMT. SARLA VERMA & ORS. v DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION & ANR.", "year": "2009", "cite_indeg": 90, "issue": "", "held": ": Income of the deceased towards future prospects could be taken into account - Standardization thereof - Deduction o towards personal and living expenses - Guidelines given - Selection of multiplier - Criteria laid down - Computation of compensation taking into account future pay revisions - ff claimants delay the proceedings they can rely upon revised higher pay scales that may come into effect during such E pendency - However, promptness cannot be punished in this manner - Hence revision in pay scale subsequent to death and before final hearing cannot be taken into account for determining the income for calculating compensation - Personal and living expenses determined - Enhancement of F compensation and interest thereon allowed - Enhanced compensation awarded to be taken by the widow exclusively. The appeal has been filed against the High Court judgment. It sought higher compensation. On the basis of the contentions raised by the appellants and G respondents, the following questions arose for consideration: (i) Whether the future prospects can be taken into H 1098 \\. SARLA VERMA & ORS. v. DELHI TRANSPORT 1099 ) CORPORATION & ANR. account for determining the income of the deceased ? If A so, whether pay revisions that occurred during the pendency of the claim proceedings or appeals therefrom should be taken into account ? (ii) Whether the deduction towards personal and B liv"}, {"doc_id": "1994 INSC 112", "case_name": "KARTAR SINGH v STATE OF PUNJAB", "year": "1994", "cite_indeg": 85, "issue": "", "held": "Acts fall within the competence of Parliament-Acts held covered by Entry 1 of List I oj Seventh Schedule to Constitution. Terrorism is not mere 'Public Order'-It contemplates grave emergent situation affecting sovereignty and integrity of country. Substantive Offences under the Acts require intention on the part of persons committing terrorist acts-Principle of speedy trial is contemplated and manifested under TADA Acts. E F 'Public Order'--Scope of-!t is confined to disorders of lesser gravity G having impact within boundaries of State-Activities of serious nature threatening security and integrity of the country are related to defence of India. 17ie Terrorist and Dismptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987: Section 2( J)(a)(i}-'Abetment'-What iS-Clause held impermissibly vague-lnten- tion is necessary to prove abetment 375 H 376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R. A Section 2(l)(f)-'Notified area'-Declaration as to- Government should make pen\u00b7odic review. Section 3 (as amended by TADA (Prevention) Amendment Act, 1993) and Section 4-Te\"orist Acts-Dismptive Activities-Offences also covered by ordinary laws-Provision for harsh punishment under TADA Act-In view B \u00b7 of the object and purpose of Act Sections held not violative for absence of guiding principle whether to proceed under ordinary law or TADA. c D E F G Section 5-Mere possession of arms and ammunition-Whether suffi- c"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 454", "case_name": "T.M.A. PAl FOUNDATION AND ORS. v STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.", "year": "2002", "cite_indeg": 79, "issue": "", "held": ": in case of private unaided educational institution Government can put conditions pertaining to academic and educational matters and welfare of students and teachers only, but not in the D matter of administration-In case of private aided educational institutions, once aid is granted, Government as a condition of grant of aid, can put fetters on the freedom in the matter of administration and management of the institution-But such institutions cannot be treated as wholly owned and controlled by Government-Hence Government cannot interfere. w~th constitution of governing bodies-Autonomy of aided institution would be E less than that of an unaided institution. ' Articles 29(2) and 30(1)-Right of Aided Private Minority Institution to Administer itself-Government regulation-Extent of applicability to- Held, right under Article 30(1) is not absolute although right to administer includes right to grant admission to students of its choice-But when such F minority institution is granted aid, Article 29(2) would apply-Hence one of the rights of administration of the minorities i.e. right to grant admission would be eroded to some extent-However, there is an interplay between the two Articles-Such an institution should admit non-minority students based on merit to a reasonable extent, whereby minority character of the institution G is not annihilated and at the same time rights granted "}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 53", "case_name": "PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ANR. v HARAKCHAND MISIRIMAL SOLANKI & ORS.", "year": "2014", "cite_indeg": 75, "issue": "", "held": ": Subject land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed u/s 24(2) of the 2013 Act - Deposit of the amount of compensation in the government treasury is not equivalent to the amount of compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested and liability of State to pay interest subsists till the amount has E not been deposited in court - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s. 11 - Interpretation of statute. s.114(2) - Repeal and savings - Held: Sub-s. (2) of s. 114 makes s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1891 applicable F with regard to the effect of repeal but this is subject to the provisions in the 2013 Act - Under s.24(2) land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, by legal fiction, are deemed to have lapsed where award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and G possession of the land is not taken or compensation has not been paid - The legal fiction uls 24(2) comes into operation as soon as conditions stated therein are satisfied - General Clauses Act, 1897 - s. 6. 783 H 784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R. A A notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of the lands of the respondents was published on 30.09.2004. On 26.12.2005, the declaration u/s 6 was published in the official gazette. On 31.01.2008 the Special Land Acquisition Officer made the award u/s 11 B of the 1894 Act. In the instant a"}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 142", "case_name": "CHANDRAPPA AND ORS. v STATE OF KARNATAKA", "year": "2007", "cite_indeg": 74, "issue": "", "held": ", where two views are possible on record, one favourable to the accused should be adopted-On facts, the view taken by the trial court cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law- Hence, order of acquittal passed by trial court restored. D Prosecution filed a charge-sheet before trial court against appellants- accused for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 324, 302 r/w Section 149 IPC. The trial court, considering the contradictions and ;., discrepancies in deposition of eye witnesses and non-examination of main witness, acquitted the appellants giving them a benefit of doubt. In an appeal ~ E against the order of acquittal, the High Court reversed the order of the trial court. In appeal, the appellants contended that the High Court, in an appeal under section 378 Cr.P.C. can set aside the order of acquittal of the trial court only if it is satisfied that the reasons recorded are non-existent, extraneous, F perverse, acquittal palpably wrong, totally ill-founded or wholly misconceived; and that, on facts, the view taken by the trial court on the basis of evidence ~ was legal, proper and in consonance with law and hence, the High Court erred in reversing the order of acquittal. Respondent State contended that the High Court has all the powers which G were exercised by the trial court and it is open to it to re-appreciate and review the evidence and co"}, {"doc_id": "1994 INSC 283", "case_name": "TATA CELLULAR v UNION OF INDIA", "year": "1994", "cite_indeg": 71, "issue": "", "held": ", in the facts and circumstances of the case selection E is not vitiated by bias-Doctrine of necessity-Applicability of Constitution of India-Articles 14 and 299 Government contract-Ar- bitrariness-Govemment invited tenders for operation of cellular mobile phone service-Cenain criteria not in the tender introduced to eliminate F tenders-Held, it does not vitiate award of contract as all criteria could not have postulated at the beginning itself Constitution of India-Article 14 and 299-Government con- tract:-Whether technical i\"egularity can be condoned without violation Ar- ticle 14-Govemment invited tenders for operation of cellular mobile phone G service-Terms prohibiting change in the proposed foreign collaborator-One tenderer dropping name of one collaborator out of three-Held, does not amount to change in collaborator. Constitution of India-Article 14 and 299-Government con- H tract:-Govemment inviting tenders for operation of Cellular mobile phone 122 TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1. 123 service-One tenderer initially selected was later on dropped without assigning A any reasons therefore or hearing-Held, not hearing the tenders violates Natural Justice-Administrative Law. The Department of Telecommunication, Government oflndia invited tenders from India Companies for grant. of licence for the operation of B cellular mobile telephone service in Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. "}, {"doc_id": "1998 INSC 183", "case_name": "SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION v UNION OF INDIA", "year": "1998", "cite_indeg": 71, "issue": "", "held": ": Such power is inherent and by virtue of Art. 142(2) is subject to law made by Parliament-But such law cannot take away the inherent jurisdiction of Supreme Court-Contempt of Courts Act does not deal with the powers of the Supreme Court to punish a contemner-Hence, Supreme Court exercises this power under Art. 129 rlw Art. 142-However, D the nature of punishment prescribed under that Act may act as a guide for the Supreme Court--But the extent of punishment prescribed under that Act can apply only to High Court-S. 15 of the Act prescribes procedural mode for taking cognizance of criminal contempt but is not a substantive provision- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, S. 15. E Articles 129, 142 and 144-Punishment of an advocate for contempt of court-Jurisdiction of Supreme Court-Different from jurisdiction for punishment of an advocate for professional misconduct-Punishment for contempt of court is conferred on Supreme Court by Art. 129 rlw Art. 142- Punishment for professional misconduct is conferred exclusively on Bar Council of India or State Bar Councils under Advocates Act-While punishing F an advocate for contempt of court, Supreme Court cannot suspend his licence to practice-Such a punishment can only be imposed by State Bar Councils-Supreme Court cannot impose it even under S. 38-Bar Council should \"act in aid of the Supreme Court\" while proceeding against an advocate for pro"}, {"doc_id": "2000 INSC 339", "case_name": "KUNHAYAMMED AND ORS v STATE OF KERALA AND ANR.", "year": "2000", "cite_indeg": 71, "issue": "", "held": "maintainable. E Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order 47-Rule I-Expression 'no appeal has been preferred' Scope of F Kera/a Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act. 1971: Section 8-C (as inserted by Amendment Act No. 36 of 1986)-Scope of Doctrine of Merger-Nature and scope of-Applicability of the Doctrine-Held it is not a Doctrine of Unlimited Application-Its applicability depends on the nature <?(Jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the G subject matter of challenge. Practice and procedure-Appeal-Raising fresh plea-Permissibility of The Forest Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Kerala H Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 passed an order dated .,__ 538 KUN HAY AMMED v. STA TE 539 . 11.8.1982 holding that the land in question did not vest in the Government. A Appeal preferred by the State of Keral:i before the High Court was dismissed on 17.12.1982. As there was no statutory remedy of appeal, revision or review provided against the order of the High Court the State filed a special leave \u00b71 petition before the Supreme Court. By its order dated 18.7.1983 Supreme Court dismissed the petition on merits. By Amendment Act No. 36of1986 Section SC was inserted in the 1971 Act giving it a retrospective effect from B 19.11.1983. This Section empowered the Government to file appeal or application for review in certain cases. In January, 1984 St"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 711", "case_name": "M. NAGARAJ AND ORS. v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "year": "2006", "cite_indeg": 67, "issue": "", "held": ": Principles set out in the Constitution should D be interpreted by adopting a purposive approach- Secularism, democracy, reasonableness. social justice are overarching principles providing linking factor for fundamental rights-Validity of amendments in the Constitution is judged by app(ving the principle of basic structure-Equality is the essence of democracy and thus a basic feature of the Constitutio~Fundamental rights could be abridged but not destroyed-Object and purpose of the particular E feature and consequences of its denial on the integrity of the Constitution has to be determined/tested in order lo ascertain whether it forms part of the basic structure of the Constitutio~onjlicting claim of individual right under Article 16(!) and preferential treatment given to a backward class have to be balanced-Application of concept of equality in public ef!lployment depend F upon quantifiable data in each case-Since backward class seeks justice and general class seeks equity in public employment, reservation has to be used in a limited sense else it would perpetuate criticism-Exercise of power by the State may be arbitrary if it fails to identifY and measure backwardness and inadequacy keeping in view the efficiency of service in terms of Article 335 of the Constitution-Equality in terms of Article 16(2) is individual specific- G However, reservation as provided under Articles "}, {"doc_id": "1997 INSC 288", "case_name": "L. CHANDRA KUMAR ETC. ETC. v THE UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC.", "year": "1997", "cite_indeg": 67, "issue": "", "held": ", sub-Clause (d) of clause (2) of Article 323A and sub-Clause (d) of clause (3) of Article 323B are unconstitutional to the extent they exclude the jwisdiction of High Courts D under Anicle 2261227 and that of Supreme Court under A1ticle 32. Articles 32, 136 and 226/227-Judicial review-Held, power of judicial review vested in Supreme Court and High Court is an integral and essential f ea tu re of the Constitution constituting part of its inviolable basic struc- ture-Tribunals created pursuant to Articles 323A and 323B cannot exercise E power of judicial review of legislative action to the exclusion of High Courts and Supreme Court-They cannot act as substitutes for High Cowts and ~ Supreme Court-However, they are competent to test the vires of statutory provisions except the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal and they may pe.\u2022f onn a supplemental role in this respect: but their decisio11S will be F subject to High Courts' writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 before a Division Bench-No appeal will directly lie before Supreme Court under A1ticle 136-171ese directions will apply prospectivel)--Theory of altemative institutional mechanism, reviewed. Doctrine o.fprospective ovenuling-Applicabi/ity of. G Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985: ss.3(t), 5(2), 5(6)-Tribunals-<:omposition of-Held, s.5(6) is valid and constitutiona~Sub-Sections (2) and (6) of s.5 to be hann"}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 61", "case_name": "R. P. KAPUR v THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "year": "1960", "cite_indeg": 65, "issue": "", "held": ", that no case for quashing the proceedings was made out. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The following are some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction could and should be exercised to quash proceedings: (i) where there was a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint did not make out the offence alleged ; and . (iii) where either there was no legal evidence adduced in support of the charge or the evidence adduced clearly or mani- festly failed to prove the charge. In exercising its jurisdiction under s. 56r-A of the Code the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not. In the present case there was no legal bar to the institution of the proceedings or to their continuance; the allegations made in the first information report did constitute the offences alleged and it C?uld not be contended that on the face of the record the charge was unsustainable. In re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar, A.LR. r928 Born. r84, Jagat Chandra Mozu.mdar v. Queen Empress, (r899) LL.R. 26 Cal. 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1954) 56 Punj. L.R. 54, Nripendra Bhu"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 853", "case_name": "SWAMY SHRADDANANDA @ MURALI MANOHAR  MISHRA v STATE OF KARNATAKA", "year": "2008", "cite_indeg": 63, "issue": "", "held": ": The murder was planned and cold blooded and for highly D depraved motive - But in view of certain facts of the case and in view of larger issues such as inept criminal justice system and want of uniformity in the sentencing process by the Courts etc., death penalty substituted to imprisonment for life - Since the sentence of imprisonment for fourteen years which is con- E sidered as life imprisonment, does not commensurate to the crime of the convict, direction not to release the convict tiff the rest of his. life - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 201. Life sentence - Computation of - Held: Life imprison- F ment means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict - s. 57 /PC does not limit the life imprisonment for a term of twenty years - A convict undergoing life imprisonment has no right to claim remission -Remission granted to fife convicts under Prison Manuals by deemed conversion of life impris- onment into one for fixed term of twenty years is without any G sanction and against the mandate of Supreme Court deci- sions - There has to be a special category where death pen- alty is substituted by imprisonment for life or. for a term in ex- cess of fourteen years and that category is required to be put 93 H 94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R. ,.. A beyond application of remission - Sentence of life imprison- ment as a substitute for death penalty, to be carried"}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 526", "case_name": "M/S. S.B.P. AND CO. v M/S. PATEL ENGINEERING LTD. AND ANR.", "year": "2005", "cite_indeg": 63, "issue": "", "held": ": Judicial. Held, Per majority: Once a statute creates an authority, confers on it powers to adjudicate and makes its decision final, the decision cannot be termed as purely administrative decision-The ground a/ensuring minimum judicial E interference by itself is not a ground to hold the power so conferred is only an administrative power-When the power is conferred so as to decide on the existence of the conditions justifying appointment of an arbitrator/arbitral tribunal and is conferred on judicial authority/Chief Justice unless shown otherwise, the Chief Justice has to act judicially-When Chief Justice is F called upon to decide on the existence of arbitration agreement/appointment of arbitrawr!constitution of tribunal and confronted with two different points of view contended for by the rival parties in deciding so he .cannot be said to be performing administrative function-Issuance of Notice to opposite party cannot be construed to be merely an intimation but it really gives an G opportunity of being heard-Since the Chief Justice has necessarily to apply his mind before coming to a conclusion to appoint/not to appoint an arbitrator, the decision so arrived at could appropriately be termed as judicial decision. Chief Justice exercising power to appoint an arbitrator/constitute \u00b7 H arbitral tribunal-Interference by the tribunal-Held: Tribunal cannot go 688 ( S.B.P. AND CO. "}, {"doc_id": "2019 INSC 95", "case_name": "SWISS RIBBONS PVT. LTD. & ANR. v UNION OF INDIA & ORS.", "year": "2019", "cite_indeg": 61, "issue": "", "held": ": Provisions of the Code passes constitutional muster. ss. 5(7), 5(8), 5(20), 7(1), 7(4), 7(5), 8 and 9 \u2013 Classification between financial creditor and operational creditor \u2013 Whether discriminatory, arbitrary, and violative of Art. 14 \u2013 Held: Preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern, while ensuring maximum recovery for all creditors being the objective of the Code, financial creditors are clearly different from operational creditors \u2013 Thus, there is an intelligible differentia between the two which has a direct relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Code \u2013 Thus, there is no discrimination \u2013 Constitution of India \u2013 Art. 14. ss. 3, 3(9)(c), 214(e), 60, 65, 75, 7, 8 and 9 \u2013 Notice, hearing, and set-off or counterclaim qua financial debts \u2013 Triggering of insolvency resolution process by financial creditors and operational creditors \u2013 Submission that the difference in the triggering process at behest of financial creditors and operational creditors is discriminatory and arbitrary \u2013 Held: A financial creditor has to prove \u201cdefault\u201d as opposed to an operational creditor who merely \u201cclaims\u201d a right to payment of a liability or obligation in respect of a debt which may be due \u2013 In view thereof, the differentiation in the triggering of insolvency resolution process by financial creditors u/s. 7 and by operational creditors u/ss. 8 and 9 becomes clear \u2013 Insolvency "}, {"doc_id": "2017 INSC 1068", "case_name": "NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v PRANAY SETHI AND ORS.", "year": "2017", "cite_indeg": 58, "issue": "", "held": ": s. I 68 deals with concept ofjust compensation and the same is to be decided on the foundation of fairness. reasonableness and equitabilizv on acceptable legal standard - The determination has to he on the foundation of evidence as regards the age and income of deceased and !herea.fier apposite multiplier to be applied - Formula relating to multiplier would he as indicated in *Sarla Verma case and approved in **Reshma Kumari case - For grant <![just compensation principle of standardization is approved so that a specific and c~rtain multiplicand is determined for applying the multiplier on the basis of age - The principle would include in its ambit addition of fi1t11re prospects on the proven income at presenr - The principle of standardization will also apply to the selfemplo.ved or a person having.fixed salary. and determination of income would include fi1ture prospects - While determining income of deceased having perman\u00b5nt Joh. an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income towards .fi1t11re prospects where the deceased was below age of 40 years. addi1ion of 30\u00b0{, if the age of deceased was between 40 and 50 years and addition of 15% would be made if the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years - If the deceased is selF employed or on .fixed salary. addition of income towards .fi1ture prospects would be 40% of income where deceased was he/ow 40 years of age; .P5\u00b0"}, {"doc_id": "2017 INSC 801", "case_name": "JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.), AND ANR. v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.", "year": "2017", "cite_indeg": 57, "issue": "", "held": ": The judgment in M P Sharma holds essentially that in the absenc~ of a provision \u00b7similar to the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, the right to privacy cannot E be read into the pmvisions of An.20(3) of the Indian Constitution - F The judgment does not specifically adjudicate on whether a right to privacy would arise from any of the other provisions of the rights guaranteed by Part lTl including Art.21 and Art.19- The observation that privacy is not a right guaranteed by the Indian Constitution is not reflective of the correct position - M P Sharma is overruled to the extent to which it indicates to the confrary. G (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Constitution of India - Art.21 ..:. Right to privacy - Kharak \u00b7 Singh judgment - Correctness of - Held: In the first part of decision in Kharak Singh, it was correctly held that the content of the expression 569 H \u2022 570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 10 S.C.R. A B c 'life' under Art.21 means not merely the right to a person's \"animal existence\" and that the expression 'personal liberty' is a guarantee against invasion into the sanctity of a person's home or an intrusion into personal security - Kharak Singh also correctly laid down that the dignity of the individual must lend content to the meaning. of 'personal liberty' - Thus, the first part of the decision in Kharak Singh which invalidated domiciliary visits at night on the ground"}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 256", "case_name": "ZAHIRA HABIBULLA H SHEIKH AND ANR. v STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.", "year": "2004", "cite_indeg": 56, "issue": "", "held": ": Such course is permissible-Section 391 is an exception lo Section 386-These Sections have to be harmoniously considered-Recourse F to either of the Sections in disposing of the appeal would depend on the facts of the case. ~ Criminal trial-Role of Court in evidence-collecting process-Held: Courts should take a participa/OJy role in trial and should not act as a mere tape recorder. G Practice and Procedure: Order of High Court-Order passed indicating that reasons to follow f\" subsequently-Permissibility of-Held: Such course is not permissible by High Court because its order is subject to appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court. H 1050 .. \u2022 Z.H.H. SHEIKH v. STATE OF GUJARAT 1051 Words and Phrases: A \"Criminal trial\", \"Fair. tria/\"-Meaning of Respondents-Accused were alleged to be part of unruly mob who burnt down a business concern. The incident resulted in death of 14 persons. Appellant and many other persons were eye-witnesses to the B incident. During trial, the purported eye-witnesses resiled from their statements made during investigation. Trial Court acquitted the accused persons. Thereafter appellant-witness filed affidavits and made statements before Human Rights Commission alleging that during trial she was forced by politicians to depose falsely and she turned hostile on account of threats C by them. State filed appeal before High Court against the acquittal order. Si"}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 229", "case_name": "P. RAMAKRISHNAM RAJU v UNION OF INDIA & ORS.", "year": "2014", "cite_indeg": 56, "issue": "", "held": ": The Judges, who are appointed under Article 217(2)(a) being members of the Judicial Service, even if they serve as a Judge of the High Court for only one or two years, get full pension benefits because of the applicability of Rule 26B or E because of their earlier entry into judicial service - However, the Judges of the High Court, who are appointed from the Bar do not get similar benefit of full pension - This is arbitrary and discriminatory - s. 14 of the HCJ Act and Clause 2 of Part I of the First Schedule which governs the pension payable to F Judges gives rise to unequal consequences - The existing scheme treats unequally the equals, which is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution - lffespective of the source from where the Judges are drawn, they must be paid the same pension just as they have been paid same salaries G and allowances and perks as serving Judges - If the service of a judicial officer is counted for fixation of pension, there is no valid reason as to why the experience at Bar cannot be treated as equivalent for the same purpose - Thus, fixation H 562 P. RAMAKRISHNAM RAJU v. UNION OF INDIA 563 of higher pension to the Judges drawn from the Subordinate A Judiciary who have served for shorter period in contradistinction to Judges drawn from the Bar who have served for longer period with less pension is highly discriminatory and breach of Article "}, {"doc_id": "1997 INSC 604", "case_name": "VISHAKA AND ORS. v STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.", "year": "1997", "cite_indeg": 56, "issue": "", "held": ", such incidents result in violation of 'gender equality' as also Right to /if e and liberty and the right to practice profession or to carry out occupation, trade or business. Arlie/es 51 ( c ), 253--f'ower of Parliament to enact laws-Absence of domestic law occupying the field-Value and significance of the International D Convention and norms-Held, the International Convention and norms are of great significance and Parliament has the power to enact laws for im- plementing the same. Arlie/es 32, 141-Power of the Supreme Coult to enforce Fundamental E Rights-To lay down guidelines and nonns in the absence of any legisla- tion-Held, Supreme Coult has power to lay down guidelines and norms for due observance in work places or institutions, until a legislation is enacted and such norms would be treated as law. The present petition was filed for the enforcement of fundamental F rights of working women under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It was brought as a class action by certain social activists and NGOs with the aim of focussing attention towards societal. aberration and assisting in finding suitable methods for realisation of the true concept of 'gender equality'; to prevent sexual harassment of working women in all G work phces through judicial process, and to fill the vacum in existing legislation. The immediate cause for the filing of present petition "}, {"doc_id": "1958 INSC 18", "case_name": "VIRSA SINGH v THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "year": "1958", "cite_indeg": 54, "issue": "", "held": ", that the prosecution must prove the following before it can bring a case under s. 300 Indian Penal Code third clause. (1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. (2) The nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations. ( 3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. ( 4) It must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. The third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code consists of two parts. Under the firsi part it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found to be present and under the second part it must be proved that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The words \"and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted\" are merely descriptive. All this means is, that it is not enough to prove that the injury found to be present is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature; it must in addition be shown that the injury found to be present was the injury intended"}, {"doc_id": "1955 INSC 27", "case_name": "RAI SAHIB RAM JAWAYA KAPUR  AND OTHERS v THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "year": "1955", "cite_indeg": 54, "issue": "", "held": "that the action of the Government, whether it was good or bad, does not amount to an infraction of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. Jn the present case no fundamental rights of the petitioners were violated by the notifi- cations and the acts of the executive Government of the Punjah done by them in furtherance of their policy of nationalisation of the text books for the school students. A mere chance or prospect of having particular customers can- not be said to be a right to property or to any interest or under- taking within the meaning of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution and no question of payment of compensation can arise because the petitioners have been deprived of the same. Articles 73 and 162 of the Constitution do not contain any definition as to what the executive function is and what activities would legitimately come within its scope. They are concerned pri\u00b7 marily with the distribution of executive power between the Union on the one band and the component States on the other. They do not mean that it is only when Parliament or the State Legislature has legislated on certain items appertaining to their respective lists that the Union executive or the State executive,\u00b7 as the case may be, can proceed to function in respect of them. On the other hand, the language of Art. I 62 dearly indicates that the powers of the State executh\u00b7e"}, {"doc_id": "1957 INSC 38", "case_name": "VADIVELU THEVAR v THE STATE OF MADRAS", "year": "1957", "cite_indeg": 52, "issue": "", "held": ", that the question whether in such a case the court could convict l::im depended upon the facts and circumstances of the case and unless corroboration was a statutory requirement, a court could act upon such evidence, though uncorroborated, except in \u00b7 cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself required, as a matter of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, as in the case of a child witness, an accomplice or \u00b7 any o~hers of an analogous character. Where the court has recorded an order of conviction the question of sentence must be determined, not by the volume or character of the evidence adduced, b'.lt on a consideration of any extenuating circumstances which could mitigate the enormity of the crime. Mohamed Sugul Esa Mamasan Rer Ala/ah v. The King, A.LR. (1946) P.C. 3 and Vemir~ddy Satyanarayan Reddy and three others v. The State of Hyderabad, (1956) S.C.R. 247, distinguished. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 24 and 25 of 1957. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 25, 1956, of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 247 & 248 of 1956 and Referred Trial No. 41 of 1956 arising out of the judg- ment and order dated March 28, 1956 of the Court of Sessions, East Tanjore Division at Nagapatam, in r.ase S.C. No. 5 of 1956. Apiil It. 1957 V odive[u T lunar v. TkSt-u~of Madrru Sinn\u2022 ]. 9"}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 221", "case_name": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH  AND OTHERS v BABU RAM UPADHYA", "year": "1961", "cite_indeg": 52, "issue": "", "held": ", (per Sarkar, Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ.) that the order of dismissal was illegal as it was based upon an enquiry The State of Uttar held in violation of r. I of Para 486 of the Police Regula- PYadesh & Othet's tions. v. The facts alleged in the complaint made out a cognizable Babu llam offence under s. 405 Indian Penal Code against the respondent, Upadhya and the provisions of r. I of Para. 486 were applicable to it. A Police Officer making a search of a person was 'entrusted' with the money handed over by the person searched. Rule III of Para. 486 did not deal with cognizable offences, it dealt with offences falling only under s. 7 Police Act and to non-cognizable offences. Rule III did not provide an alternative procedure to that prescribed under r. I. The position with regard to the tenure of public servants and to the taking of disciplinary action against them under the present Constitution was as follows: (i) Every person who was a member of a public service described in Art. 310 of the Constitution held office during the pleasure of the President or the Governor. (ii) The power to dismiss a public servant at pleasure was outside the scope of Art. 154 and, therefore, could not be dele- gated by the Governor to a subordinate officer, and could be exercised by him only in the manner prescribed by the Con- stitution. (iii) This tenure was subject to the limitations or qua"}, {"doc_id": "2010 INSC 219", "case_name": "SIDHARTHA VASHISHT @ MANU SHARMA v STATE (NCT OF DELHI)", "year": "2010", "cite_indeg": 51, "issue": "", "held": ": Prosecution has established its case peyond doubt - Appellate court has all the necessary powers to evaluate the evidence Jet in before the trial court and the conclusions reached by it - High Court has given cogent and adequate reasons for reversing the order of acquittal - Presence of accused at the scene of crime E proved by ocular testimonies and corroborated by Exhibits - Conclusions arrived at by the High Court upheld. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 24 - Public prosecutor - Duties and F responsibilities - Duty of Court to ensure that Public Prosecutor does his duties to the utmost level of efficiency and fair play - Interference by Courts - Limitations - Discussed. Section 154 - First Information Report - Cryptic telephone message of a cognizable offence not to be treated as FIR. 103 G H 104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R. A Sections 170, 172 - Conduct of investigation - Duties of investigation officer vis-a-vis rights of accused - Discussed - Constitution of India, Articles 14, 19. Sections 293, 294 - Proof of documents - Documents sought to be relied on must be originals - Photocopy of the 8 original documents - Acceptance of, procedure to be followed. Section 313 - questions put to the accused - If accused furnishes false answers as regards proved facts, court can draw an adverse inference qua him - Such inference would C become an additional circums"}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 21", "case_name": "HARDEEP SINGH v STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.", "year": "2014", "cite_indeg": 51, "issue": "", "held": ": Power u/s 319(1) can be' exercised at anytime after th'e charge-sheet A B c is filed and before the pronouncement of judgment - s. 319 uses the expressions 'inquiry'..and 'trial'..- Stage of inquiry D commences, insofar 'as the. court is. concerned, with. filing of charge-sheet and consideration of material collected by prosecution, that is. mentioned in the charge-sheet for the purpose of trying the. accused. -, As a trial c.ommences. after - framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a E . pre-trial inquiry - Inquiries u/ss 200, 201, 202 and uls 398 are species of the in.quiry. contemplated bys. 319 '.'.\"\" In order to invoke the power uls 319, it is only a Court of Session or a Court of Magistrate performing the duties as a court under Cr.P.C. that can utilize the material beforeit for the purpose F of the said Section'.'.\"\" The stage of committal is.neither.an inquiry nor a trial -The view in Dharamp Pal (CB) that.after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken by Court of Session u/s 193 Cr.P.C against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the G papers filed by the police after completion of investigation and Sessions Judge need not wait till 'evidence' uls 319 Cr.P.C. \u2022 becomes available for summoning an additional accused, is \u00b7 concurred with - 'Trial' commences only on charges being 1 H 2 SUPREME COURT REP"}, {"doc_id": "1989 INSC 192", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ANR. v RAGHUBIR SINGH (DEAD) BY LRS. ETC.", "year": "1989", "cite_indeg": 50, "issue": "", "held": "applies to awards made by the Collector or Court bet- ween April 30, 1982 and Sept. 1984 and not before-Benefit extends to appeals taken from such awards only. Constitution of India-Articles 145, 137 and 141-Decision of a D Division Bench rendered earlier in point of time-Whether binding on a subsequent Division Bench comprised of equal number of Judges or of more Judges. E A common question of law having arisen in this group of cases for determination by this Court, they were heard together. Lands of Respondents in Civil Appeal Nos. 2839-40 of 1989 were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector made the award for compensation on March 30, 1963 and on a reference, being made under Section 18 of the Act, the Additional District Judge enhanced the compensation by his order dated June IO, 1968. The I ->.._ F Respondents appealed to the High Court seeking further enhancement. -J: During the pendency of the appeal, Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill 1982 \u00b7 was introduced on April 30, 1982 and became an Act on Sept. 24, 1984. The High Court disposed of the appeal on Dec. 4, 1984 and apart from raising the quantum of compensation, also awarded a solatium at 30 per cent in terms of the Amendment Act 1984. The State appealed to this G Court. The matter initially came up before ll Division Bench on Septem- ber 23, 1985. The Bench had before it two decisions of this Court wher"}, {"doc_id": "1958 INSC 17", "case_name": "M. P. V. SUNDARARAMIER & CO. v THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANOTHER", "year": "1958", "cite_indeg": 50, "issue": "", "held": "(Sarkar J. (iissenting), thats. 22 of the Madras General ramter & Co. Sales Tax Act, 1939, did in fact impose a tax on the class of sales v. covered by the Explanation to Art. 286(1)(a) but that it was ThtJStateof conditional on the ban enacted on Art 286(2) being lifted by law Andhra Pradesh of Parliament as provided therein, and that it was therefore validated by s. 2 of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act. 1956. . The construction put upon the Explanation to Art. 286( 1) (a) of the Constitution in The Bengal Immunity Company case that it merely prohibited the outside States from imposing a tax on the class of sales falling within the Explanation and did not confer on the delivery State any power to impose a tax on such sales has no application to a taxing statute of a State the object of which was primarily to confer power on the State to levy and collect tax. Section 22 and s. 2(h) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act must be read together as defining the sales which are taxable under the Act. Mettur Industries Ltd. v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 362, The Mysore Spinning an(l Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Madras, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 368 and Dial Das v. P. S. Talwalkar, A.J.R. )957 Bom. 71, approved. Mathew v. Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue, A.LR. 1957 T. C. 300, Cochin Coal Co. Ltd. v. The State of Travancore- Cochin, (1956) 7 Sales Tax Cases "}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 28", "case_name": "I. R. COELHO (DEAD) BY LRS. v STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "year": "2007", "cite_indeg": 50, "issue": "", "held": ": a law that abrogates or abridges rights guaranteed by Part Ill of the Constitution and also violates the basic structure D doctrine, whether by amendment of any Article of Part Ill or by an insertion in Ninth Schedule, such law will have to be invalidated in exercise of power of judicial review of the Court-All amendments to the Constitution made on or after 24.4.1973 by which Ninth Schedule is amended by inclusion of various laws therein can be tested on the touchstone of basic or essential features of Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with E Articles 14 and 19 and the principles underlying them by application of the \"right test\" and the \"essence of the right test\"-While laws may be added to the Nfnth Schedule, once Article 32 is resorted to the legislation concerned must answer to the complete test of fundamental rights-Article 31-B after 24.4.1973, despite its wide language, cannot confer unlimited F or unregulated immunity- If infraction affects the basic structure, such a law will not get protection of Ninth Schedule -Saving-If validity of any A. Ninth Schedule law has already been upheld by Supreme Court, it would not be open to challenge again on principles declared in this judgment- Action taken and transactions finalized as a result of impugned Acts shall :' G not be open to challenge-Constitutionalism-Doctrine of separation of powers-Doctrine of basic str"}, {"doc_id": "2018 INSC 115", "case_name": "INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.", "year": "2018", "cite_indeg": 50, "issue": "", "held": ": The Act addresses the concern of farmers and of those whose livelihood is dependent upon the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for myriad reasons, including urbanization, rural electrification et al., in a timely and transparent manner. (Per majority) s.24(1) \u2013 Word \u2018paid\u2019 \u2013 Connotation of \u2013 Held: The word \u2018paid\u2019 in s.24 of the Act of 2013 has the same meaning as \u2018tender of payment\u2019 in s.31(1) of the Act of 1894 \u2013 They carry the same meaning \u2013 The expression \u2018deposited\u2019 in s.31(2) is not included in the expressions \u2018paid\u2019 in s.24 of the Act of 2013 or in \u2018tender of payment\u2019 used in s.31(1) of the Act of 1894 \u2013 The words \u2018paid\u2019/tender\u2019 and \u2018deposited\u2019 are different expressions and carry different meanings within their fold \u2013 Land Acquisition Act, 1894 \u2013 s.31(1), (2). (Per majority) s.24(2) \u2013 Failure to deposit compensation, effect \u2013 Non- deposit of compensation in court under s.31(2) of the Act of 1894 does not result in a lapse of acquisition under s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 \u2013 Due to the failure of deposit in court, the only consequence at the most in appropriate cases may be of a higher rate of interest on compensation as envisaged under s.34 of the Act of 1894 and not lapse of acquisition \u2013 Land Acquisition Act, 1894 \u2013 s.31(2). (Per majority) s.24(2) \u2013 Protection under, when there is refusal to accept compensation \u2013 Once the amount of"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 808", "case_name": "SANTOSH KUMAR SATISHBHUSHAN BARIYAR v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "year": "2009", "cite_indeg": 48, "issue": "", "held": ": The pardon granted by the Sessions Judge was legal and ..... valid. SENTENCING: ~ D - Death sentence - Rarest of rare cases - Special reasons ~\u00b7Mitigating factors - Discussed - On the facts of the case - Held: There are no special reasons to record the death penalty and the mitigating factors are sufficient to place it out E of the rarest of rare category - Thus, it is not a case where death penalty should be imposed - Instead of death penalty appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life - Code of +- Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sections 235(2) and 354(3) - \u00b7- Constitution of India, Articles 14, 21. F DOCTRINES: Doctrine of Prudence - Doctrine of Proportionality - Applicability of. G In these appeals, the principal questions which arose for consideration were: ~\u00b7 -- (i) Whether the Sessions Judge acted illegally in granting pardon to an accomplice (PW1 ); and ..... H 90 I SANTOSH KUMAR SATISHBHUSHAN BARIYAR v. 91 STATE OF MAHARASHTRA i (ii) Whether the case falls under 'rarest of rare A -~ cases' so as to enable the Courts below to award death penalty. Dismissing the appeals and reducing the death sentence to rigorous imprisonment for life, the Court B :l<, HELD: 1.1. The order of Sessions Judge dated 3rd April, 2002 shows that the Judge not only applied his mind on the application (Ext. P-7) for grant of pardon filed by the Investigating Officer but also examined the app"}, {"doc_id": "1956 INSC 28", "case_name": "CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC. v THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS.", "year": "1956", "cite_indeg": 48, "issue": "", "held": ", (1) that the impugned Act and the notifications issued thereunder were intra vires the State Legislature, did not infringe any fundamental rights of the petitioners nor violated the provi\u00b7 sions of Art. 301 of the Constitution and the petitions must be dis\u00b7 missed; (2) that the Central Acts in respect of sugar and sugarcane and the notifications thereunder having been enacted and made by the Central Government in exercise of concurrent jurisdiction under Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act of 1954; the State Legislature was not deprived of its jurisdiction thereunder and no question of legislative incompetence of the U.P. Legislature or its trespassing upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the centre in enact- ing the impugned Act could arise; (3) that the provisions of the impugned Act compared to those of the Central Acts clearly showed that the impugned Act was solely concerned with the regulation o! the supply and purchase of sug<l.rcane and in no way trenched upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre with regard to sugar and the U.P. Legislature was, therefore, quite competent to enact it; (4) that no question of repugnancy under Art. 254-of the Constitution could arise where Parliamentary Legislation and State Legislation occupied different fields and de,Jt with separate and distinct matt"}, {"doc_id": "1957 INSC 35", "case_name": "R.M.D.CHAMARBAUGWALLA v THE UNION OF INDIA", "year": "1957", "cite_indeg": 48, "issue": "", "held": ", that the validity of the restrictions imposed by ss. 4 and 5 and rr. 11 and 12 of the Act as regards gambling competi- tions was no longer open to challenge under Art. 19( 6) of the Constitution in view of the decision of this Court that gambling did not fall within the purview of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Consti- tution. The S!Ote of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala, (1957) S.C.R. 87 4, followed. On a proper construction there could be no doubt that the Prize Competitions Act ( 42 of 1955), in defining the word 'prize competition' as it did in s. 2(d), had in view only such competi- tions as were of a gambling nature and no others. In interpreting an enactment the Court should ascertain the intention of the legislature not merely from a literal meaning of the words used but also from such matters as the history of the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress. The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and others. (1955) 2 S.C.R. 603, referred to. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 931 Even assuming that. prize competition as defined by s. 2( d) 1937 of the Act included not merely gambling competitions but also R.M. D. CharM\u2022 others in which success depended to a considerable degree on skill, baugwal/a the restrictions imposed by ss. 4 and 5 and rr. 11 and 12 of the v. Act were clearly severable in their application to the two distinct The Union 1if"}, {"doc_id": "1993 INSC 316", "case_name": "MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL, HYDERABAD ETC. ETC. v B. KARUNAKAR AND ORS. ETC. ETC.", "year": "1993", "cite_indeg": 47, "issue": "", "held": "applicable to all employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, G public or private-Rule in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case is applicable prospec- tively-Only Exception is where the rules themselves provide for supply of copy of report to employees-Grant of relief by Supreme Court to parties in Ramzan Khan's case held per incuriam. By an order dated 5th August, 1991 passed in Managing Director, H Electronic Corporation of India v. B. Karunakar, J.T. 1992 (3) S.C. 605, a 576 l MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL v. KARUNAKAR 577 three Judge Bench of this Court referred that matter for being placed A before a larger bench, as the Bench found a conflict in the two decisions of this Court, viz., Kai/ash Chander Asthana etc. etc. v. State of U.P and Ors etc. etc., [1988] 3 S.C.C. 600 and Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, [1991] 1 S.C.C. 588. Accordingly that matter along with other connected matters were heard by the Constitution Bench on the question B whether the Report of the Inquiry Officer/Authority who/which is ap- pointed by the Disciplinary Authority to hold an inquiry into the charges against the delinquent employee, is required to be furnished to the employee to enable him to make proper representation to the disciplinary authority before such authority arrives at its finding with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the employee and the punishment, if any,"}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 80", "case_name": "SANTOSH HAZARl v PURUSHOTTAM TIWARl (DEAD) BY LRS", "year": "2001", "cite_indeg": 47, "issue": "", "held": ", j11risdic1ion of the High c Court /u hear a second appeal is restricted lo substantial queslion of la\\11 involved in the case-Substantial question of la\\V involved in the appeal not ' l~ stwed in lhe me111vrundum of second appeal-Dismissal hy High Court holding ~ that no question of la\\11 arose for determinaliun-legality of-Held, an opport11ni1y lo fi\"ame such queslion should have been afforded lo the appellant D unless the deficiency was brought to lhe notice of the appellant by lhe Regislry or the Court and yet lhe appellant had persisted in his default-- Subslantial question of law fi\"amed-Case remilted back to High Courl for hearing and deciding the second appeal afresh Subs1antial queslion of law-Meaning of-Held, to be 'subslantial', a -~ E question of law must be debatable, not previously sell led by law of the land or a binding precedenl and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, in su far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned- It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case or not. F First appeal-Firs/ appellate courl-Duty as a court of first appeal- Exercise of-Principles governing. staled-Held, the whole case being open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law, lhe judgement of the first appellate court must reflect its conscious application of"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 748", "case_name": "LALITA KUMARI v GOVT. OF U.P. AND ORS.", "year": "2013", "cite_indeg": 46, "issue": "", "held": ": A B c The condition sine qua non for.registering FIR is that there 0 must be information and the information discloses commission of cognizable offence - The reasonableness or credibility of information is not a condition precedent for the registration of FIR - The provision u/s. 154 is mandatory and therefore it is mandatory for the police officer to register FIR E on the basis of information disclosing cognizable offence - Registration of the FIR is not in contravention of Art. 21 of the Constitution - However, there may be instances where preliminary inquiry may be necessary before registration of FIR e.g. matrimonial disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases etc. - However, such inquiry would be only to ascertain as to whether the information reveals any cognizable offence - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21. F ss.39 and 154(1) - Mandate u/s. 39 to inform about G commission of an offence - Implication of - Held: It would be incongruous to suggest that u/s. 39 it is duty of every citizen to inform about commission of an offence, but it is not 713 H 714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R. A obligatory for the Officer incharge of the Police Station to register the report uls. 154. s .. 154, 4(2) and 5 - Registration of FIR - Rules in CBI Crime Manual, regarding preliminary inquiry - Applicability 8 of - To s. 154 - The concept of hol"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 419", "case_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS. ETC. v MC. DOWELL & CO. AND ORS. ETC.", "year": "1996", "cite_indeg": 45, "issue": "", "held": ", con- stitutionally valid-Retrospective operatio11 to amending Act w.e.f date of commencement of Pri11cipal Act is valid. Constillttio11 \u00b7of !11dia. A1ticles 14, 19(1)(g), 19(6), 47, 24fr-7th Schedule (Entry 8 read with Entry 6 and Entry 24 of List II and Enfly 52 of List !)--Intoxicating li- quors--!'Janufacture, production, conszunption, sale and possession of-Prohibition of by Andhra Pradesh Prohibitio11 Act, 1995-He/d intoxicat- D i11g liquors fall under Entry 8 of list II, and State Legislalltre is competent to E enact law on the subject-Entry 52 of List I does not impinge upon Entry 8 of List II-A citizen has no right to trade in intoxicating liquors-Act is not violative of Article 14-Grounds on which an enactment ca1i be st1uck down-Explained . Doct1ine of 'pith and substance'-Applicability of F Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 : Schedule 1, Item 26--Fennentation Industries-Prohibition of manufacture of intoxicating li- quors by State Legislantre-Held, the item must be read subject to Entry 8 and EntJy 6 in List II of 7th Schedule to the Constitution-State Legislature G has power to make law in order to prohibit manufacture, production con- sumption, sale and possession of intoxicating liquor. The manufacturers of intoxicating liquors, whose licences the Government of Andhra Pradesh refused to renew after the enforcement of the Andhra Pradesh prohibitio"}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 100", "case_name": "KAVALAPPARA KOTTARATHIL KOCHUNI  AND OTHERS v THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS", "year": "1960", "cite_indeg": 45, "issue": "", "held": "(per Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao and Shah, JJ.) that the three tests laid down by the Act were contrary to the well-settled principles of Marumakkathayam Law with regard to which there could be no scope for doubt and as such not only not germane but extraneous to the object it sought to achieve. They were a device to deprive the sthanam of its properties and vest them in the tarwad and as such directly hit by Art. 19(r)(f) and could not be saved by Art. 1915). Assuming that the Sthanam properties were held in janmam right and as such were estates within the meaning of Art. 31A, tbe impugned Act was immune from challenge. That Article, properly construed, envisages agrarian reform and provides for the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of proprietory and various other kinds of subordinate rights in a tenure called the estate solely for that purpose arid must be limited to it. Although it may not be permissible to refer to the statement of objects and reasons of its amendment for purposes of construction, it can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time and purpose underlying the amendment. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] S.C.R. 1, con- sidered. There is no substance in the argument that since the impugned Act seeks to regulate the rights of the Sthanee and the junior members of the tarwad inter se it falls withi"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 253", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA v ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS AND ANR.", "year": "2002", "cite_indeg": 44, "issue": "", "held": ", even then the Election Commission has power under Article 324 which is reservoir of power and plena1y in character- limitation on such plenary character of power is when legislature makes a valid law relating to election-Representation of People Act, 1951-Conduct D of Election Rules, 1961. Articles 32, 141and142-Power of Court to issue direction on subject regarding which Act and Rules are silent-Authority implementing the law has constitutional and statutory power to implement the same-Held, Court can issue directions or orders on such subject to fill the vacuum or void till E suitable law is enacted-legislation-Need for-Directions by Court mean while. F Article 19(a/--Scope and ambit of-Right to know about candidates contesting elections-Held, freedom of speech and expression would include such right within its ambit. Words and Phrases-\"Superintendence, direction and control\", \"conduct of all election\" and \"elections\"-Meaning of in the context of Article 324(/) of Constitution of India, 1950. Respondent tiled Writ Petition for direction to implement the G recommendation made by l 70th Report of Law Commission and Vohra Committee Report and for a direction to the Election Commission to provide information by amending Form 2A to 2E prescribed under the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. High Court directed the Election Commission to secure the voters the H 696 ....._ \u2022 )L - r U"}, {"doc_id": "1957 INSC 10", "case_name": "GARIKAPATTI VEERAYA v N. SUBBIAH CHOUDHURY", "year": "1957", "cite_indeg": 44, "issue": "", "held": ", (per Das C.J., Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha and S. K. Das JJ., Venkatarama Ayyar J. dissenting) that the contention of the applicant was well-founded, that he had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court on and from the date of the suit and the application for special leave should be allowed. The vested right of appeal was a substantive right and, although it could be exercised only in case of an adverse decision, it was governed by the law prevailing at the time of commenttment of the suit and comprised all successive rights of appeal from court to court, which really constituted one proceeding. Such a right could be taken away only by a subsequent enactment either cxprCssly or by necessary intendment. Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) A.C. 369, followed. Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin, (1929) I.L.R. 56 Cal. 512 and ln re Vasudeva Samiar, (1928) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 361, relied on. Casc~law \u00b7reviewed. Article 133 of the Constitution had no application to such cases. It was not intended to have retrospective operation so as co tak~ a.way this vested right nor did it do so either in express terms or by necessary intendment. Correctly construed it should be read as restricted to only those judgments, decrees and final orders of a High Court in respect of which there was no such S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 489 vested right of appeal, as otherwise cl. 20 of the Adaptation "}, {"doc_id": "1952 INSC 2", "case_name": "N. P. PONNUSWAMI v RETURNING OFFICER, NAMAKKAL CONSTITUENCY and OTHERS", "year": "1952", "cite_indeg": 43, "issue": "", "held": "by the Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI, C. J., FAZL Au, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHAR.A AiYAR JJ.) that in view of the provisions of articles 329 (b) of the Constitu- tion and sec. 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Returning Officer. The word uelection\" has by long usage in connection with the process of selection of proper representatives in democratic institutions acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning. In the ,_ '\u00b7 4' .. .. S.~.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 219 narrow sense it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate \u00b7 1952 which may embrace the. \u00b7result of the poll when there is polling or a particular candidate being returned unopposed when there is N. P. Ponnu- no poll. In the wide sense, the word is used to connote the entire f.Wam1 process culminating in a candidate being declared elected and it\" .v. is in this wide sense that the word is used in Part XV of the Returmng Officer, Constitution in which article 329 (b) occurs. Namak,k,al Constituency a1ld The scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the Repre- Others. sentation of the People Act, 1951,' seems to . be that any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up' only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner be- fore a special tribunal and should not be brought up at an inter"}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 129", "case_name": "IQBAL SINGH MARWAH v MEENAKSHI ETC.", "year": "2005", "cite_indeg": 42, "issue": "", "held": ": The said Section would be applicable only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document _after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis-Offence committed should be of such type which directly D affects the administration of justice-However, Court is not bound to make a complaint in this regard-Such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Interpretation of statutes-Headings vis-a-vis Marginal Notes-Held : Language employed in a heading cannot be used to give a different effect to E clear words of the Section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning-They are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactments- They constitute an important part of the Act itself, and may be read not only as explaining the Sections which immediately follow them. F Words and phrases-Expression \"when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in a Court\"-Connotation of-In the context of Section 195(l)(b)(ii) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In a probate proceedings, the appellant no. I filed a will allegedly G executed by his deceas"}, {"doc_id": "2017 INSC 452", "case_name": "STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v LALU PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD Y ADAY", "year": "2017", "cite_indeg": 42, "issue": "", "held": ": Though there is one general conspiracy, offences are distinct for different periods - Defalcations are from different treasziries for different financial years by exceeding the amount of each year which was allocated for Animal Husband1y Department - Amount involved is different, fake vouchers, fake allotment letters, fake supply orders had been prepared with the help of different sets of accused persons - Separate charges for distinct offences must be framed separately and they cannot be clubbed together for more than one year - Thus, the di-der passed by the High Court is set aside_. Art. 20(2) - Scope of - Held: No person to be prosecuted G and punished for the same offence more than once - This is called docti\u00b7ine of double jeopardy - Constitution bars double punishment for the same offence - Conviction for such offence does not bar for subsequent trial and conviction for another offence and it does not matter even if some ingredients of these two offences are common. H 630 STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH SP, CBI v. LALU 631 PRASAD @ LALU PRASAD Y ADAY Delay/laches - Delay in filing the appeals by CBI - Applications for condonation of delay on account of departmental, administrative procedures involved in filing SLP s - Held: Delay A has been sufficiently explained - Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, gravamen of matter and Jhe -divergent views taken by the s"}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 244", "case_name": "MARDIA CHEMICALS LTD. ETC. ETC. v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC.", "year": "2004", "cite_indeg": 41, "issue": "", "held": ": Act enacted for speedier recovery of dues declared as Non performing Assets, better availability of capital liquidity and economic growth of the country-Though some of the provisions have harsh effect on borrowers but they get reasonable protection under the Act-Hence, Act constitutionally valid except sub-section (2) of section 17-Constitution D of India, I950-Artic/e 14. Enactment of Act of 2002 for securitisation of debts and faster recovery of Non performing assets when Act of 1993 already in operation-Validity of-Held: On account of mounting dues of banks, recovery through court being time consuming, Act of 1993 failed to bring desired results and also E recommendation of expert committees to have such law, enactment of Act of 2002 not uncalled for nor superimposition of undesired law-Also legitimacy of such Act relating to financial policy which is in public interest cannot be tested-There is presumption of constitutionality inf avour of such enactment provided person aggrieved gets fair deal-Recovery of Debts due to Banks F and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 13, 13(2), (4) and 34-Enforcement of secured assets without ,( , intervention of court under section 13_:.0bjections/dispute raised by borrower against recovery-Adequate and effective mechanism to resolve dispute- Determination of-Held: In terms of Section 13(2) it is mandatory to serve 60 G days notice "}, {"doc_id": "1999 INSC 282", "case_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB v BALDEV SINGH", "year": "1999", "cite_indeg": 41, "issue": "", "held": ": It is imperative and obligatory for the Investigating Officer to inform the suspect of his right to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate-However, it is not necessary to give this information in writing; it is sufficient if it is communicated orally-Omission to give such information D would not vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of illicit article illegal-The conviction and sentence, if recorded on the sole basis of possession of such illicit article, would be unsustainable-S.50 provides for a reasonable, fair and just procedure which must be honoured Section 50(1)-Searcli-\"If such person so requires \"-Meaning of- E Held : If the person (suspect) concerned requires to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Ojficer or a Magistrate, the empowered officer is obliged to do so or else the conviction and sentence based solely on the recovery of illicit article would be bad-Court must give opportunity to the \u00b7prosecution to establish due compliance with S.50 and must be satisfied p about such compliance. Sections 50 and 54-Search-Jn violation of S.50-Jllicit article seized during such search-Use of-Held : Cannot by itself be used as evidence of proof of unlawful possession-Other material recovered during that search can, however, be relied upon by the prosecution in other proceedings against G an accused-An illegal search cannot entitle th"}, {"doc_id": "2012 INSC 428", "case_name": "RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 v --", "year": "2012", "cite_indeg": 41, "issue": "", "held": ": Merely because a review of the F judgment of Supreme Court in a case had been filed and withdrawn and in the recital of Reference, the narration pertains to the said case, the same would not be an embargo or impediment for exercise of discretion to answer the Reference. G Art. 143 (1) - Presidential Reference - Notice - Practice and procedure. Art. 143(1) - Presidential Reference subsequent to decision of Supreme Court in \"2G Case\" - Maintainability of 311 H 312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R. A - Held: The Reference is maintainable, notwithstanding its effect on the ratio of 2G Case, as long as the decision in that case qua tis inter partes is left unaffected - By the Reference, Court's opinion is sought on the limited point of permissibility of methods other than auc.tion for alienation of natural B resources, other than spectrum - It has been stated on behalf of Government of India that it is not questioning the correctness of directions in 2G Case, in so far as a/location of spectrum is concerned and, in fact, Government is in the process of implementing the same, in letter and spirit - As long c as the decision with respect to allocation of spectrum licenses is untouched, the Court is within its jurisdiction to evaluate and clarify ratio of the judgment in 2G Case. Art. 141 - Law declared by Supreme Court - Held: The 'law declared' in a judgment, which is binding u"}, {"doc_id": "2003 INSC 176", "case_name": "PEOPLE'S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (PUCL) AND ANR. v UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.", "year": "2003", "cite_indeg": 40, "issue": "", "held": ": right of voter to know antecedents of contesting candidate is a fundamental right under Article 19(J)(a)-Such right could be abridged by passing legislation under Article 19(2)-lmpugned provision not justified or saved under Article 19(2)-Hence illegal, null and void-Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 245 and 19(J)(a). E Issuance of directions to Election Commissiun with regard to furnishing of info!\"mation by contesting candidates in Association for democratic reform's case by Supreme Court-Election Commission directing wrongful information would lead to rejection of nomination paper-Justification of- Held: Such direction not justified- Commission directed to revise instructions. F Constitution of India, 1950: G H Article 245-Legislature-Powers-Scope of-Held: Legislature can remove the defect which is the cause for invalidating law by the Court by appropriate legislation subject to legislative competence-However, it cannot ask instrumentalities of State to disobey decisions given by Court. Article 19(/)(a): Freedom of speech and expression-Right to know antecedents of candidates-Held: ls facet of Article /9(J)(a)-Such information to voter is necessary for free and fair election in turn for survival of democracy-Further 1136 ~\\ PEOPLE'S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIFS (PUCL) v. U.0.1. 113 7 such right is independent of statutory right under election law-Merely because A right to "}, {"doc_id": "1993 INSC 40", "case_name": "UNNI KRISHNAN, J.P. AND ORS. Etc. irrc v STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS. ETC. ETC.", "year": "1993", "cite_indeg": 40, "issue": "", "held": ": Every child/citizen has a right to free education up to the age oj 14 years and thereafter it is subject to limits of economic capacity and development -of the State-State obliged to follow directions contained in Article 45-,4.rticle 21 to be construed in the light of Articles 41, 45 and 46. D Article 21-Right to Education-Whether implicit under tlie Ar- ticle-Whether flows from right to life and personal liberty-Extent' and con- tent of the right. Parts JU and IV-Fundamental Rights and Directive Principia-- Whether complementary to each other-Whether a right could be f'eCognised E as a fundamental right even though not expressly mentioned. ---( - Articles 14, 15, 21, 41, 45 and 46--l'rivate unaided recognised affiliated educational insti\"'tions running professional courses -lilui engineering and medic_al courses-Whether entitled to charge a fee higher than that charged by IF Government instituti~eld: Entitled to charge a higher fee but such a fee cannot exceed the ceiling fixed in this reganJ--However, commerrialisation of education riot pennissibl~apitation fee-Meaning of. ,...-- -- Whether private aided recogniSed/affiliated educational institutions governed by rules and regulations framed by GovP.mment in matters of G admission of students and fee chargeable as also recruitment and conditions of service etc., vf teachers and staff. Whether private recognised/affiliated i"}, {"doc_id": "2003 INSC 241", "case_name": "OIL & NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD. v SAW PIPES LTD.", "year": "2003", "cite_indeg": 40, "issue": "", "held": ": when liability to pay compensation in lieu of damages for breach of any term of the contract by the other party is stipulated clearly and unambiguously, and in the absence of evidence proving the compensation claimed as unreasonable, arbitral tribunal could not ignore clear terms of the agreement to determine liability of the defaulting party-It is not necessary for the claimant to produce evidence proving damages/loss suffered by him- D Burden is on the contending party to prove that claim is unreasonable-Since contending party agrPed to pay damages, he cannot deny the same-Loss actually suffered by the purchaser need not be proved-Indian Contract Act,- Sections 73 and 74. Claim-Deduction of compensation/claim by the purchaser from the bill of the contractor in lieu of damages for breach of agreeme/1/-Nature of- Held: such claim would be treated as disputed claim-Arbitrator to decide it-Under the facts and circumstances of the case, Arbitrator holding the claim as undisputed on the ground that goods were received and bill was no/ E disputed-Such finding of the Arbitrator unjust and unreasonable. \u00b7 F Award by the arbitral tribzmal-lnterference with-Jurisdiction of the Court-Ambit and scope of-Held: arbitral tribunal is empowered lo decide the dispute referred to ii in accordance with the provisions of the Ac/- Procedural law provides relief against the right-Award passed in c"}, {"doc_id": "1953 INSC 89", "case_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL v SUBODH GOPALBOSE AND OTHERS", "year": "1954", "cite_indeg": 40, "issue": "", "held": ", per PATANJALI SAsm1 C.J.-Artick 19 (!) (\u00a3) has no application to this case. 1\"he vvord \"hold\" in the article means O\\VIl. rfhe said sub-clause (\u00a3) gives the citizen of India the abstract right to acquire, O\\Vn and dispose of property. This article does not deal with the concrete rights of the citizens of India in respect of the property so acquired and o\\vned by him. These concrete rights are dealt with in art. 31 of the Constitution. Under the scherne of the Constitution all those broad and basic freedo1ns inherent in the status of a citizen as a free 1nan are e1nbodied and protected fro1n invasion by the State under cl. (I) of art. 19, the powers of State regulation of those free- don1s in public interest being defined in relation lo each of those freedoms by els. (2) to (6) of that article, while rights of private property are separately dealt with and their protection provided for in art. 31, the cases where social control and regulation could extend to the deprivation of such rights being indicated in para. (ii) of sub-clause (b) of cl. (5) of art. 31 and exempted fron1 liability to pay compensation under cl. (2). Held, per PATANJALI SASTRI C.J. (Mnrn CHAND MAHAJAN and G!!ULAM HASAN JJ. concurring).-(i) Article 31 protects the right to property by defining the litnitations on the power of the State to take away private property without the consent of the ovvner. Clauses "}, {"doc_id": "1950 INSC 14", "case_name": "ROMESH THAPPAR v THE STATE OF MADRAS", "year": "1950", "cite_indeg": 39, "issue": "", "held": ", by the Full Court (i) (overruling o preliminary objections) -TJnder the Constitution the Supreme Court is constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, con\u00b7 sistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking prota:tion against infringement of such right$,. although such applications are made to the Court in the first instance without resort to a High Court having concurrent juris-dic- tion in the matter. Urguhar v. Brown (205 U. S. 179.) and Hooney v. Kolohan (294 U. S. 103) distinguished. (ii) Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propogation of ideas and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation. Ex parte /ackson (96 U. S. 727) and Lovell v. City of Griffin (303 U. S. 444) referred to. Held per KANIA C. J., PATANJAL.I SAsTRJ, MEHR CttAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs IJ.-(FAzL Au J. dissenting): (i) Apart from libel, slander etc. unless a law restricting freedom of speech and expressiofi is directed solely against the undermin- ing of the: st:curity of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under cl. (2) of the Art. 19 of the Constitution, although the restrictions \\vhich it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of public order. Sec- tion 9 0-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, XXXlll of 1949, whic"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 473", "case_name": "ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "year": "2008", "cite_indeg": 39, "issue": "", "held": "not D violative - However, in so far as \"private unaided\" educational institutions are concerned, the question left open to .be decided .. in appropriate case. Constitutional validity in view of definition of \"backwaid E \u00b7class\" - Whether identification of such \"backward class\" based on \"caste\" is constitutionally valid - \u00b7Held; Valid. Constitutional validity of since the Amending Act does not prescribe any time limit for its operation and no periodical review is contemplated - Held, valid, but a periodical review F can qe made at the end of every ~ years . . \u00b7 . \u00b7 Whether the quantum of reservation provided in the Act . is valid and whether 27% of seats for SEBC was\u00b7 required to be made - Held valid - Parliament must be deemed to have . taken into consideration all relevant circumstances while fixing G the 27% reservation. Articles 15( 4) and 15(5) - Held not mutually contradictory. .. Articles 14 and 15(5) - Exclusion ofminority educational 1 H 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 4 S.C.R. A institutions from Article 15(5) - Not violative of Article 14. Article 15 and s.2(g) of the Act 5 of 2007 - Creamy layer - Creamy fayer is to be excluded from SEBS - Parameters for determining the \"creamy layer' group - Applicability of the 0. M. dated 8. 9. 1993 - Applicability of \"creamy layer principle\" B to SC/ST - Held not applicable. Article 15(5) - Principles of reservation or other affi"}, {"doc_id": "1954 INSC 125", "case_name": "H. N. RISHBUD AND INDER SINGH v THE STATE OF DELHI", "year": "1955", "cite_indeg": 39, "issue": "", "held": ", that s. 5(4) and proviso to s. 3 of the Prevention of Cor- ruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947) and the corresponding s. 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption (Second Amendment) Act, 1952 (LIX of 1952) are mandatory and not directory and that an investigation Conducteq in violation thereof is illegal. If cognizance is in fact taken on a police report in breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, the resul~ which fol\u00b7 low cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation c.an be sh.own to have brought about a iniscarriage of justice. It is well-settled \u00b7 that an\u00b7 illegality committed in the course of an investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for trial and where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. When any breach of thi! mandatory provisions relating to irivestigation is brought to the notice of the Court at an early stage of the trial the Court will have to consider the nature and _extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such reinvestigation as thay be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer as it con\u00b7 s~ders appropriate with reference to the requirements of s. -5-A of the Prevention of Corruption (Second Amendmen"}, {"doc_id": "2018 INSC 646", "case_name": "COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (IMPORT), MUMBAI v M/S. DILIP KUMAR AND COMPANY & ORS.", "year": "2018", "cite_indeg": 39, "issue": "", "held": ": Exemption Notification should be interpreted strictly \u2013 The burden to prove the applicability of the exemption Notification would be on the assessee \u2013 In case of ambiguity, benefit of such ambiguity would go to Revenue and not to assessee - *Sun Export case wherein it was held that benefit of ambiguity would go to assessee is overruled. Taxing statute and Exemption Notification \u2013 Interpretation of \u2013 Held: There is distinction in interpreting a charging provision of a taxation statute and in the interpretation of exemption Notification \u2013 Any ambiguity in charging provision enures to the benefit of the assessee, but any ambiguity in the exemption clause or exemption Notification would go in favour of Revenue. Interpretation of Statutes: General principles of interpretation \u2013 Purpose of interpretation \u2013 Tools of interpretation \u2013 Discussed. Interpretation of fiscal statutes \u2013 Held: While interpreting fiscal statutes court has to apply strict rule of interpretation. \u2018Plain meaning rule\u2019 of interpretation \u2013 Held: When language in the statute is plain and unambiguous, Court has to seal and understand the plain language as such, and there is no scope of interpretation. [2018] 7 S.C.R. 1191 1191 A B C D E F G H 1192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 7 S.C.R. \u2018Strict interpretation\u2019 and \u2018Literal interpretation\u2019 \u2013 Distinction between \u2013 Held: All cases of literal interpretation would involve "}, {"doc_id": "2012 INSC 419", "case_name": "GIAN SINGH v STATE OF PUNJAB & ANOTHER", "year": "2012", "cite_indeg": 38, "issue": "", "held": ": Power of compounding of offences given to a court u/s 320 is materially 0 different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction - In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in s. 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby; whreas the E formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment - The words \"nothing in this Code\" occurring in F s.482 means that it is an overriding provision and none of the provisions orthe Code limits or restricts the inherent power - Decisions in the cases of B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji alias Pappu do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or G complaint in exercise of its inherent power uls 482 of the Code, and s. 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court u/s 482 - It cannot be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in the said cases, the Court has 753 H 754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R. A compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly - Principles emerging from various decisions cu"}, {"doc_id": "1951 INSC 52", "case_name": "COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, BOMBAY v GORDHANDAS BHANJI", "year": "1952", "cite_indeg": 38, "issue": "", "held": ", (i) that there was nothing in the letter dated 16th July, 1947, to indicate that the decision was not that of the Commis- sioner himself given in the bona fide exercise of the discretion vested in him. The sanction was not consequently invalid merely because the Commissioner decided to accept the advice of the Cinema Advisory Committee even though without that advice be would not have granted the permission. (ii) There was no valid cancellation of the licence because (a), the order of cancellation communicated to the respondent was one made by the Government of Bombay and not by the Comq:iissioner on his own authority ; he acted in the matter only as a transmitting agent ; (b), under the rules framed under 1951 No11. 23. 136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [J:95.2] :1951 Conimissio.ner of Police, Bombay section 22 (1) (f), (l) (g) and (n) of the City of Bombay Police Act 1902 the Government of Bon1bay had no power to \u00b7cancel a licence once issued. The only person vested with authority to grant or refuse a licence for the erection of a building to be v. Gordhandas Bhanji. used for purposes of public amuse1nent is the Commissioner of Police. (iii) The relief sought by the respondent of an injunction to direct the Commissioner of Police to grant permission for the erection of a cineina could not be granted because he had already granted permission and there \\\\\"as no valid order of can- ce"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 148", "case_name": "RAM GOVIND UPADHYAY v SUDARSHAN SINGH AND ORS.", "year": "2002", "cite_indeg": 38, "issue": "", "held": ", High Court ought to have taken note of facts on record including the second FIR and charge-sheet thereon-No specific reason given for grant of bail especially when bail was rejected just a month ago-Hence High Court was in error. D Appellant's brother was a candidate contesting election for the post of Pradhan. While the polling was in progress informant was prohibited from casting his vote. Appellant's brother interfered and the torture fell on to him /..;.. which resulted in his death. FIR was lodged and accused persons were arrested. Accused person then filed bail application. Both the trial court and \u00b7 E High Court dismissed the application. Subsequent bail applications filed before the Sessions Judge were also rejected. Against this order accused persons filed I application for bail before High Court. Subsequently another FIR was registered and charge-sheet was filed. Bail applications was allowed and against this order, an application for cancellation of bail was filed, which was rejected. Hence the present appeal. >-- F Allowing the appeal, the Court , HELD: 1. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order-but, however, ~alls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be \\ G sustained. However, grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of -,; the matter being dea"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 952", "case_name": "VELLORE CITIZENS WELFARE FORUM v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.", "year": "1996", "cite_indeg": 38, "issue": "", "held": ": even though such indust1ies were of vital impo1tance to count1y, they could not be pennitted to continue their production unless pollution control devices were set up by, them-Having regard to pollution caused by them, principle of Sustainable D Development had to be accepted as a balancing concept--Precautiona1y Principle and Polluter Pays P1inciple acceptable as part of environmental law of country and should be implemented--Precautiona1y environmental measures should be taken by State Govemment and statut01y authorities and lack of scientific certainty could not be ground for postponing such measures to prevent environmental degradati011~\"0mts of proof' was on polluting E industlies to show that their actions were environmentally benign-Such polluting industlies liable to pay compensation for past pollution generated by them-Pollution fine of Rs. JO, IJOO imposed on each tannery-Money to be deposited in \"Environment Protection Fund\" to be utilised for compensating affected persons and rest01ing damaged envilVnment. p A1ticles 32 and 226-Public Interest Litigation-Environmental Pollu- tion-Caused by ta111te1ies in State of Tamil Nadu-Comprehensive directions issued by Supreme Cowt---However, instead of Supreme Cowt itself mo11ito1' ing the matter any fwther, Madras High Court advised to constitute a \"Green Bench\" to deal with all environmental matters in future-Such \"Green "}, {"doc_id": "1958 INSC 5", "case_name": "NAGENDRA NATH BORA & ANOTHER v THE COMMISSIONER OF HILLS DIVISION  AND APPEALS, ASSAM AND OTHERS", "year": "1958", "cite_indeg": 38, "issue": "", "held": "further; that w 1ere an appellate Authority as in the fH'll D \u00b7 \u00b7 . , . ' ' d h h\" \u2022 ' 0 I .S IUISJ01J \u00b7nstaltt case, IS constitute t e 1~hest authonty by the statute cS- Appeals \u00b7 Assam ~or decidin~ as bet~veen . the c\\~lffiS Of rival parties, its powers and O;hers ' cannot be c1rcums;nbed ~o~ c~n ~t be hehl to. have acted in excess of its powers or. w1thout JUn_sdlctlOn on considerations foreign to the statute or .the rules. . . . . . . . . . . Rainmt and Raman Ltd. v. The State of J.l!adra.s, [rgs6] S.C.R. zs6, referred to. . ' . ! . In the absence of anything to show that the appellate Authority had contravened any rules of natural justice, which must be understood in the context of tl~ rules Jaid down by the statute itself, it would be wrong to say that \u00b7 there has been a :failure of natural justice simply because the .view it took of the matter might not be acceptable to another tribunal. New Prakas!J Transport .co. Ltd. v. New Suu::ama Transport Co. Ltd., [I957] S.C.R. g8, rehed on. \u00b7 \u00b7 ' \u2022 \u00b7 The question ~vhether an \u00b7administrative authority functions merely in .an administrative. or quasi~judicial capacity .must be determined on an examination of the statute and its rules under \\vhich it acts, and there can be no doubt on such examination that the Authorities mentioned in s. g of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910, as amended by Assam Act 23 of 1953, are no "}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 211", "case_name": "THE HINGIR-RAMPUR COAL CO., LTD.  AND OTHERS v THE STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS", "year": "1961", "cite_indeg": 38, "issue": "", "held": "(per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Subba Rao and Mudhol- kar, JJ.), that the cess imposed by the Act was a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and the Constitutional validity of the impugned Act was beyond question. Although there. can be no generic difference between a tax and a fee since both are compulsory exactions of money by public 11u~horities, there is this distinction between them that whereas a tax is imposed for public purposes and requires no considera- tion to support it, a fee is levied essentially for services rendered and there must be an element of quid pro quo between the person November 111. 538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] z960 who pays it and the public authority that imposes it. While a tax invariably goes into the consolidated fund, a fee is earmark- Th\u2022 Hingir- ed for the specified services in a fund created for the purpose. Rampur Coal Co .. Whether a cess is one or the other would naturally depend on Lid. &- Others the facts of each case. If in the guise of a fee, the Legislature v. imposes a tax, it is for the Court on a scrutiny of the scheme of The Slat\u2022 of the levy, to determine its real character. The distinction is Orissa ..S- Olhers recognised by the Constitution which while empowering the appropriate Legislatures to levy taxes under the Entries in the three lists refers to their power to levy fees"}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 186", "case_name": "KAILASH v NANHKU AND ORS.", "year": "2005", "cite_indeg": 37, "issue": "", "held": ", trial of an election petition commences from the date of receipt of election petition and continues till date of its decision -Receiving written statement being part of trial, time can be extended-This power emanates from the Act itself and the Rules framed for D the purpose of the Act and resort to provisions ofCPC is not called for-Even otherwise, power of Court to extend time for filing written statement beyond the time schedule provided by Order VIII Rule I is not completely taken away-Constitu:fion of fndia-,Article 225-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Section 129, Order Vlll, Rule I. . .. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : E Order Vil/, Rule I, proviso-Time schedule to file written statement- Power qf Court to extend the time-Held, the provision is directory and not mandatory-Jn exceptional circumstances, on a written prayer, Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, has power to extend the time to avoid grave F \u00b7 injustice. An election petition challenging \"the election of the returned candidate, the appellant, was filed in the High Court under Section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Written statement was filed with an application for condonation of delay. The High Court rejected the G application and refused to .take the written statement on record as it was filed after 90 days from the date of service of summons, i.e., beyond the period of limitation"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 165", "case_name": "ALL INDIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION AND ORS. v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.", "year": "2002", "cite_indeg": 37, "issue": "", "held": ", Commission's Report accepted subject to modifications in the judgment. The question for consideration before this Court was whether the recommendations of First National Judicial Pay Commission presided by _Mr. D Justice K.J. Shetty (Shetty Commission) should be accepted. This Court in All India Judges Association v. Union of India and Ors., (1992) 1 sec 119 (main case) had given certain directions with regard to working conditions and certain benefits to be conferred on the members of subordinate judiciary. In review against the same, the Court in All India Judges E Association and Ors. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., [1993) 4 SCC 288 (review case) maintained the directions given in the main judgment. However, in addition to the directions, it recommended for setting up of an independent Commission for reviewing service conditions of judicial officers. It also held that the service conditions of the judges could not be compared with those of administrative executive as the parity of status of judges could only be with F political executives. G The question with regard to pay scales of judicial officers was first referred to Fifth Central Pay Commission but subsequently the reference was withdrawn from the Commission and in pursuance ofrecommendation of the Court in review case, Union of India constituted Shetty Commission. The report of the Fifth Central Pay Commission was "}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 4", "case_name": "NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v SWARAN SINGH AND ORS.", "year": "2004", "cite_indeg": 37, "issue": "", "held": ": Motor Vehicles Act is a social welfare legislatio,'1 extending relief to victims/third party by awarding compensation-Breach of policy condi1ions by the insured could be raised as defence but such breaches have to be established by the insurer-The Insurer must also establish that the breaches D had contributed to the cause of the accident to absolve himself from liability- !nvalid driving licence/disqualification of the driver not available as defences to insurer-If vehicle, at the time of accident, driven by a person having learner's licence, insurer would be liable to satisfy the decree. Power of the Motor Vehicles Tribunal-Held: Empowered to adjudicate E all claims in respect of Motor Vehicles accidents-It cannot be restricted to decide such claims inter se between the claimants on one side and the, insured/ insurer and driver on !he other--Awards enforceable/executable in terms of Section 174 of the Act-If insurer satisfactorily proves its defence, 1he Tribunal may issue a certificate to the Cof/ector directing rccove1y of compensation! F 01her amounts from the insured-If determination of rights of the parties inter se delays adjudication of the case of the victims, the Tribunal could relegate them before regular court. Words and Phrases: The rule of main purpose' and the concept of 'fundamental breach'- G Meaning of in the context of Section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 452", "case_name": "M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION v M/S NEPC INDIA LTD. AND ORS.", "year": "2006", "cite_indeg": 36, "issue": "", "held": ": When civil remedies are available in law and the party had taken recourse to such remedies, remedy under criminal law is not barred nor the party estopped from seeking such remedy-Criminal proceedings should not be D quashed in view of the pendency of civil proceedings-Teo\u00b7t is not whether civil remedy is availed or available, bur whether the allegations in complaint disclose criminal offence or not. E Section 482-Quashing of complaints and criminal proceedings- Exercise of jurisdiction--General principles-Stated.. Penal Code, 1860: Sections 378, 403, 405, 415 and 425-Dispute arising from breach of contract-Debtor hypothecating aircrafts in favour of creditor for securing payment towards Juel supplied to it-Failure to pay amounts towards fuel-Civil suit for recovery of amount-On the allegation that debtor removed parts of hypothecated aircrafts, complaint under sections F 378, 403, 405, 415 and 425-Sustainability of-Held: Allegations in the complaint sufficient to constitute offences under sections 415 and 425-No case made out under sections 378, 403 and 405-Thus, order of High Court quashing the complaint under sections 415 and 425 set aside-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Sections 482 and 200. G H Judicial deprecation: Civil disputes and claims not involving any criminal offe11ce-Effort to settle under criminal law-Held: In such cases criminal prosecution should be depreca"}, {"doc_id": "2012 INSC 68", "case_name": "CENTRE FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND  OTHERS v UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "year": "2012", "cite_indeg": 36, "issue": "", "held": ": While making recommendations on 28.8.2007, TRAI itself had recognised that spectrum was a scarce commodity - It, however, completely ignored that spectrum was to be F utilised efficiently, economically, rationally and optimally - The decision of the Council of Ministers in 2003 that the Do T and the Ministry of Finance should discuss and finalise the spectrum pricing formula was ignored by TRAI - The entire approach adopted by TRAI was lopsided and contrary to the G decision taken by the Council of Ministers and its recommendations became a handle for the then Minister of C&IT and the officers of the Do T who virtually gifted away the important national asset at throw away prices by willfully 147 H 148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R. A ignoring the concerns regarding fairness and transparency in spectrum allocation raised from various quarters including the Prime Minister, Ministry of Finance and also some of its own officers - This is also clear from the fact that soon. after obtaining the licences, some of the beneficiaries off-loaded B their stakes to others, in the name of transfer of equ/fy or infusion of fresh capital by foreign companies, and thereby made huge profits - There was no merit in the reasoning of TRAI that the consideration of maintaining a level playing field prevented a realistic reassessment of the entry fee - The C material produced clearly showed"}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 432", "case_name": "S.M.S. PHARMACEUTICALS LTD v NEETA BHALLA AND ANR.", "year": "2005", "cite_indeg": 36, "issue": "", "held": ", specific averments against a person are necessary in a complaint-Director of a company cannot D be deemed to be liable unless there is specific averment in the complaint- Signatory of a cheque and/or the Managing Director of the company are deemed to be liable for prosecution. A two Judge Bench of this Court made a reference for determination of the following questions. by a larger Bench: E \"(a) whether for purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it is sufficient if the substance of the allegation read as a whole fulfil the requirements of the said section and it is not necessary to specifically state in the complaint that the persons accused was in charge F of, or responsible for, the conduct of the business of the company. (b) Whether a director of a company would be deemed to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for conduct of the business of the company and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary. G (c) even if it is held that specific averments are necessary, whether in the absence of such averments the signatory of the cheque and or the Managing Directors of Joint Managing Director who admittedly would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct 371 H 372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A of its business could be proceeded against.\" Answering the Reference"}, {"doc_id": "1952 INSC 10", "case_name": "KATHI RANING RAWAT v THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA", "year": "1952", "cite_indeg": 36, "issue": "", "held": ", per PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J., FAZL Au, MuKHF.llJEA and D1i.s JJ.-(:~.1EHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CttANDRASEKnA:n.A A1YA1t and BosE Jj. dissenting)-That the impugned Ordinance in so far as it authorised the State Government to Jirect offences or classes of offences or ch1sses of cases to be tried by the Special Court did not contravene the provisions of Art. 14 and was not ultra vireJ or void. The notification i~sued under the Ordinancr. w::i.s also not void. PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-All legislative differentiation is not. nece$sarily di$criminatory. Discrimination invol\\'es an element of unfavourable bias, and it is in that sense that the i;:xpression has to he understood in the context. Equal protection claims under Art. J 4 arc exan1incd 'vi th the presun1ption that the State action is reasonable and justified. 1'hough differing procc-durcs might involve disparity in treatn1cnt of per'.'ons trie<l under then1, such disparity is 11Dt in it<:clf sufficient to out\\\\'eigh this presumption and e::.tahlish discrimination unless the <legree of disparity goes beyond what the reason for its existence demands, ~.g., 'vhen it an1ounts to a denial of a fair and impartial trial. 111.e impugned Ordinance having been passetl to co1nbat the increasing tempo of cert:1.in types of regional crime~ the t\\vo-fold classification on thr- lines of type and territory adopted by the said Ordinance read with the"}, {"doc_id": "1998 INSC 400", "case_name": "WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, MUMBAI AND ORS.", "year": "1998", "cite_indeg": 36, "issue": "", "held": ", apparently concurrent-But in certain matters held mutually exclusive-Before \"which the proceeding concerned is pending\"- Held has to be treated Tribunal. Trade Mar hi-Registration of Trade Mark 'WHIRLPOOL' by appellant- . Initially renewal not obtained but subsequently obtained for three successive D periods-Jn the meantime registration of Trade Mark 'WHIRLPOOL' by Chinar Trust-Appellant's objection for registration dismissed-Appeal by appellant before High Court-Petition filed by appellant for removal of Trade Mark registered in favour of Chinar Trust-Appellant also filed a passing of suit against Chinar Trust-Grant of temporary injunction by High Court- Thereafter appellant filed an amendment application in passing off suit to E include the ground of infringement-During tendency of proceedings Chinar Trust approached Registrar-Consequently show cause notice under Section 56(4) issued to appellant for cancellation of certificate or renewal granted- Held, issue of notice was without authority and consequently quashed Trade MarhJ-Legislative history of-Discussion regarding Constitution F of India, 1950 : Article 226 High Court-Power to issue writ-Nature of -Power to refuse relief in case alternative remedy is al'ailable--Exception to-Show cause notice issued to appellant under Trade Mark Act-Challenge to notice in writ G jurisdiction-Held, permissible. Statutory lnterpretation"}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 358", "case_name": "P.A. INAMDAR AND ORS. v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.", "year": "2005", "cite_indeg": 35, "issue": "", "held": ", 'Minority' status is determinable with reference to a State and not by taking into consideration population of the country as a D whole-Articles 29 and 30 are intended to confer protection on minorities rather than an abstract right. Right to establish and administer educational institutions Minority educational institutions not taking any aid from the State and also not seeking any recognition would exercise their right unhampered by any \"restrictions excepting those which are in national interest. Minority unaided educational institutions seeking affiliation or recognition-Existence of infrastructure sufficient for its growth can be stipulated as a pre-requisite lo grant of recognition or affiliatior>-There cannot be interference in day-to-day administration-Non-minority unaided institutions can also be subjected to sbnilar restrictions which are found reasonable and in the interest of student community-Minorities or non~ minorities, in exercise of their educational rights in the field of professional education, have an obligation and a duty to maintain requisite standards of professional education by giving admissions based on merit and making education equally accessible to eligible students through a/air and transparent admission procedure and based on a reasonable fee-structure. E F G Admissions in minority institutions, aided or unaided, shall be at the H 603 604 SUPRE"}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 34", "case_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. v KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ORS.", "year": "2004", "cite_indeg": 35, "issue": "", "held": ", Per majority (Sinha, J. dissenting), levy of cesses is intra vires the Constitution-The cesses on coal bearing land and brick-earth bearing land, being tax on land, are covered by Entry 49 in List /I-Tax andfee not a subject dealt with by Mines and Minerals E (Development and Regulation) Act,1957 and power to levy tax and fee is available to States so long as they do not interfere with Centre's power of regulation and control of mines and minerals-Doctrine of occupied field- Doctrine of pith and substance-Doctrine of public trust-West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992-West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973, s. 78- West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976, s.4-Cess Act, 1880, F ss. 5 and 6-Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act,1957. Seventh Schedule,List II, Entries 5,23,49,50 and 66, List/, Entries 52 and 54-Uttar Pradesh Special Area Development Authorities Act,1986 and Shakti Nagar Special Area Development Authority (Cess on Mineral Rights) Rules, 1997 levying cess on mineral rights-Levy of cess challenged by stone G crushers-Held, Per majority (Sinha,J. dissenting), High Court rightly upheld levy of the cess as a tax covered by Entry 5 in list II-Besides, levy of the cess as a tax can also be upheld by reference to Entries 49 and 50 in list II- Although it is termed as \"cess on mineral right\", impact falls on the land \"' delivering the "}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 515", "case_name": "RAMESH KUMAR v STATE OF CHHATTISGARH", "year": "2001", "cite_indeg": 35, "issue": "", "held": ", such principle shall also be applicable when such declaration exonerates the accused unless material on record shows that deceased was trying to conceal truth or persuaded to do so. One 'S' was married to the accused-appellant and within one year of marriage, she committed suicide. She had left a suicide note and a letter to her husband in a diary. Her dying declaration was recorded by Tehsildar E .F G and Executive Magistrate. The families of father of deceased, her elder sister and accused-appellant were all residents of different localities in H 247 248. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 4 S.C.R. A Raipur and were on visiting terms. The finding of guilt as recorded by the Trial Court rests on the testimony of five witnesses, namely, parents, brother, sister and sister's husband of the deceased as also documentary evidence including an un- dated letter written by deceased to her father. The appellant was convicted B and sentenced for offences under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC. It was affirmed by the High Court. Hence this appeal. c D E F Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1. A very material piece of evidence in this case is an undated letter written by the deceased to her father. The letter has to be read as it is and inferences have to be drawn therefrom, based on expres- simi employed therein and in the light of other evidence adduced. The letter nowhere indic"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 532", "case_name": "KULDIP NAYAR v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.", "year": "2006", "cite_indeg": 34, "issue": "", "held": ": The legislative history of the Constitution reveals that residence has never. been the constitutional requirement for E constitution of the upper House-Residence is an incident of federalism which could be regulated by the Parliament as qualification, a subject matter under Article 84 of the Constitution-Amendment, so made, does not change the character of the Council of the States as the election remain the law, ihe elected member remain representatives of the State and the choice and the decision as to elect the representative would remain with the State F ~ Assemblies-It does not affect the role, fi1ture prerogatives of the members of the Council of States especially in the matter of legislation-Only the scope of consideration for election to the Council of States has been enlarged- It is passed by the Parliament in its legislative competence, without transgressing the provisions of Part-Ill of the Constitution or any other ~\u00b7 provisions of the Constitution, hence not unconstitutional. G \u00b7,~ Amendment in R.P. Act, 1951-Principle of Federalism-Effect of amendment-Held: Federal Principle dominant in the Constitu'ion and is one of its basic features but it is not territory related-It is not the requirement ,,,. ~ H 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. A of such principle that the representative of the States must belong to that State-It is the electorate who would re"}, {"doc_id": "1961 INSC 6", "case_name": "GOPAL VINAYAK GODSE v THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS", "year": "1961", "cite_indeg": 34, "issue": "", "held": ", that the petitioner had not yet acquired.any right to be released. A sentence of transportation for life could be undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorous imprisonment for life in a desig- nated prison in India. Section 53A of the Indian Penal Code, introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, r955, provided that any person sentenced to transportation for life before the Amendment Act would be treated as sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life. A prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment was bound to _ _serve the remainder of his life_ ill prison unless the sentence was commuted or remitte.d by the appropriate authority. Such a sentence could not be equated with any fixed term. The rules framed under the Prisons Act entitled such a prisoner to earn remissions but su-ch rernissions were to be taken into account only towards the end of the term. The ques- tion of remissions was exclusively within the province of the appropriate Government. In the present case though the Govern- ment had made certain remissions under s. 4or of the Code of Criminal_Procedure, it had not remitted the entire sentence. Pandit Kishori Lal v. King-Emperor, (r944) L.R. 72 I.A. r, referred to."}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 255", "case_name": "KUNNATHAT THATHUNNI MOOPIL NAIR v THE STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER", "year": "1961", "cite_indeg": 34, "issue": "", "held": ", (Sarkar, J., dissenting), that the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, infringed the provisions of Art. r4 of the Constitution of India. The Act obliged every person who held land to pay the tax at the fiat rate prescribed, whether or not he made any income out of the property, or whether or not the property was capable of yielding any income. Consequently, there was no attempt at classification in the provisions of the Act-and it was one of those cases where the Jack of classification created inequality. It was therefore hit by the prohibition to deny equality before the law contained in Art. r4. Section 5A of the Act which enabled the Government to make a provisional assessmeqt of the basic tax payable by the r \u2022 \\ l i I \\. r 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 79 holder of unsurveyed land imposed unreasonable restrictions on 1960 the rights to hold property safeguarded by Art. 19(1)(!) of the Constitution, inasmuch as (1) the Act did not impose an obliga- K. T. Moopil tion on the Government to undertake survey proceedings within 1Vair any prescribed or ascertainable period, with the result that a v. landholder might be subjected to repeated annual provisional State of Kerala assessments on more or less conjectural basis and liable to pay the tax assessed, and (2) the Act being silent as to the machinery and procedure to be followed in making the assessment left it to the Exec"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 189", "case_name": "RUPA ASHOK HURRA v ASHOK HURRA AND ANR.", "year": "2002", "cite_indeg": 33, "issue": "", "held": ", not maintainable-Superior Courts of Justice do not fall under the ambit of State or other authorities under Article 12. D Article 142-Reconsideration of Judgment of Supreme Court after dismissal of Review Petition-Permissibility under inherent powers-Held, Court may reconsider its judgments in exercise of its inherent powers in rarest \\ ~ of rare cases to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriage of justice-Grounds and procedure for such re-consideration laid down-Supreme E Court Rules, 1966-0rder XL VJJ Rule 6. Doctrines: Doctrine of Ex debito Justitiae-Applicability of - Doctrine of stare decisis-discussed ,_, F The common questions for consideration in the instant writ petitions were whether writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India could be maintained to question the validity of a Judgment of Supreme Court after the petition for review of the said judgment was dismissed; and whether the r order passed by this Court could be corrected under its inherent powers after G dismissal of the review petition on the ground that it was passed either without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice or due to unfair _......_ procedure giving scope for bias which resulted in abuse of the process of the ' Court or miscarriage of justice to an aggrieved person. Answering the questions, the Court H 1006 ... ' --' RUPAASHOKHURRAv "}, {"doc_id": "2000 INSC 34", "case_name": "G. SAGAR SURI AND. ANR v STATE OF C.P. AND ORS.", "year": "2000", "cite_indeg": 33, "issue": "", "held": ", power of High Court to be exercised with great care to see that civil proceedings not given cloak of criminal offence-Criminal proceedings are no short cut to other proceedings in law. Petition filed during pendency of application for discharge-Held, High Court can exercise jurisdiction to quash the proceedings. Appellants along with five others were alleged to have approached D the Complainant Finance Company and obtained a loan for an automobile company. The cheques issued in repayment of the said loan E were dishonoured and proceedings under Section 138, Negotiable Instru- ments Act were instituted against the Automobile Company and its directors including the appellants. Meanwhile the complainant lodged F.l.R. Criminal proceedings under Sections 406/420 l.P.C. were also instituted against the directors including the appellants. The appellants applied for their discharge in the criminal proceed\u00b7 ings instituted under Sections 406/420 I.P .C. They also moved the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. for quashing of those proceedings. The High Court dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal. Allowing the appeal, this Court F G HELD : 1.1. Jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. has to be exercised with great care. High Court is not to examine the matter superficially, it is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of civil H 417 418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000J 1 S.C.R A"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 136", "case_name": "PADMASUNDARA RAO (DEAD) AND ORS. v STATE OF T.N. AND ORS.", "year": "2002", "cite_indeg": 33, "issue": "", "held": ", limitation would start from the date of Notification and not from the date of order-Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967-Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. Interpretation of statutes-Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous-The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process-Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 6(1). Doctrines: Stare decisis-Applicability of when a judicial decision has been nulified by Judgment laying down law-Subsequent legislation. Ratio Decidendi-Applicability of-Courts not to place reliance thereon D E without considering the applicability of fact situation. F Notification u/s. 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) was issued before the commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 but after the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967. Notification for declaration under Section 6(1) was issued and published in the Official Gazette within the period of three years prescribed under proviso G thereto. The same was quashed by High Court. Thereafter subsequent notification under Section 6 was issued. Appellants challenged the same on the ground that it was barred by limitation as the limitation for such notification was to be counted from the date of Notification under Section 4(1). High Court relying on Narsimiah's case held that it was "}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 358", "case_name": "DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY v DIRECTOR, CENTERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &  ANR.", "year": "2014", "cite_indeg": 33, "issue": "", "held": ": Classification which is made in s. 6-A on the basis of status in the Government service is not permissible under Article 14 as it defeats the purpose of finding prima E facie truth into the allegations of graft, which amount to an offence under the PC Act, 1988 - There cannot be sound differentiation between corrupt public servants based on their status because irrespective of their status or position, corrupt public servants are corrupters of public power - The F classification made in s. 6-A neither eliminates public mischief nor achieves some positive public good, rather it advances public mischief and protects the crime-doer - There is no rational basis to classify the two sets of public servants differently on the ground that one set of officers is decision G making officers and not the other set of officers - If there is an accusation of bribery, graft, illegal gratification or criminal misconduct against a public servant, then the status of offender is of no relevance - The result of the impugned 873 H 874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R. A legislation is that the very group of persons, namely, high ranking bureaucrats whose misdeeds and illegalities may have to be inquired into, would decide whether the CBI should even start an inquiry or investigation against them or not - There will be no c'onfidentiality and insulation of the B investigating agency from politi"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 785", "case_name": "NOOR AGA v STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.", "year": "2008", "cite_indeg": 33, "issue": "", "held": ": Are ex faciedel not unconstitutional - A right to be presumed innocent has to be applied subject to exceptions - Such presumption is a human right and cannot be equated with fundamental right enshrined under Article 21 - Constitutionality of penal provision providing for reverse bur- G ..,. den of proof must be tested on the anvil of State's responsibil- + ity to protect innocent citizens - Procedural requirements are required to be strictly complied with -Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 25 - Customs Act, 1962 - ss. 108 and 1388 - International 379 H 380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R. A Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) - Article 14(2) - Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) - Article 12- Eutopean Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms- Article 6.2- Evidence - Reverse burden of proof B Evidence - Confession - Retracted confession - Reli- ance on - For con'viction under NDPS Act- Confession made under s. 108 of Customs Act - Plea of accused that confes- sion was not voluntary but under threat and distress - Held: Provisions of Customs Act cannot be applied for conviction C under any other statute - Customs Officer, by virtue of legal fiction would be deemed to be police officer - Thus confes- sion made to them would run counter to s. 25 of Evidence Act - s. 108 must give way to Article 20(3) of the Constitution - A retracted confe"}, {"doc_id": "2003 INSC 391", "case_name": "ISLAMIC ACADEMY OF EDUCATION AND ANOTHER v STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS", "year": "2003", "cite_indeg": 33, "issue": "", "held": ": There can be no fixing of a rigid fee structure by Government-Each institute has freedom to fix its own fee structure which should also generate surplus- But the surplu:; to be used only for the educational institutions and not for D personal gain or any other business or enterprise-Direction to set up a Committee in each State for considering fixation of fee~Minority and non- minority educational institutions do not stand on the same footing-For admission in unaided private professional colleges both minority and non- minority, merit is to be criteria-In case of non-minority institution only a E certain percentage of seats can be reserved for admission and the rest is to be filled on the basis of counselling by State Agencies according to local needs-In case of unaided minority professional colleges different percentage can be fixed keeping in mind the need of the particular community apart from the local needs-Private unaided professional colleges are not entitled to admit students by evolving their own method of admission-The management F of such institutions are to select students of their quota on the basis of common entrance test either conducted by State or by an Association of all colleges of a particular type in the State-Direction to State Government to appoint a Committee to ensure fair test conducted by the Association of colleges. G Pusuant to judgment in T.M.A. "}, {"doc_id": "2017 INSC 1026", "case_name": "M/S. DURO FELGUERA, S. A. v M/S. GANGAVARAM PORT LIMITED", "year": "2017", "cite_indeg": 33, "issue": "", "held": ": Since the dispute between the parties arose in 2016, the instant issue is governed by the amended provision of s. 11 (6A) as per which the power of the court is con.fined only to examine the existence of the arbitration agreement - On facts, there are five separate Letters of Award; five separate contracts awarded to applicant and FGJ; separate suliject matters; separate and distinct work; each containing separate arbitration clause signed by the respective parties to the contract - Original Package split into five different Packages, each having different works prima facie indicates the intention of the parties to split-up Original Package into jive different packages - Thus, when there are five separate contracts, one with foreign company and four with Indian subsidiary, each having independei1t existence with separate arbitration clauses, and Corporate Guarantee also contains an arbitration clause, there cannot be a single arbitral tribunal for \"International Commercial Arbitration\". Disposing of the matters, the Court HELD: Per Banumathi, J.: E F G 1.1 As per the amended provision of sub-section (6A) of H 285 286 A B c SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 10 S.C.R. Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015(Act 3 of 2016), the power of the court is confined only to examine the existence of the arbitration agreement. It further clarifies that the decision"}, {"doc_id": "1995 INSC 661", "case_name": "B.C. CHATURVEDI v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.", "year": "1995", "cite_indeg": 33, "issue": "", "held": ", delay is not fatal. E Service Law-Promotion pending inquiry-Held, cannot act as impedi- F G ment in penalizing the delinquent officer after inquiry. Service Law-Penalty-When can be substituted/altered by Cowt/Tribunal-Disciplinary authority imposing penalty of dismissal from se1vice--Held, can be inte1j'ered with on~r wizen it shocks conscience of the Court/Ttibuna/. Comtitution of India-Article 142-Whether power to do complete justice is available to the High CourtS-Constitution of Jndia-A1ticles 226 and 227. The appellant was an Income Tax Officer. An investigation was conducted against the appellant by the C.B.I. which disclosed that the appellant possessed assets disproportionate to his known source of in- come. As the evidence collected by the CBI was not found strong enough to lay prosecution under Section S(l)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption H Act, 1947(equivalent to Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption 644 B.C. CHATURVEDI v. U.0.1. 645 Act, 1988) it was suggested that a departmental enquiry may be initiated A against the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant was charged for violating various conduct rules and for misconduct. On inquiry, the Inquiry Ollicer found the charges against the appel- lant as having been proved. The appellant was thereafter dismissed from service after consultation with the UPSC. The Administrative Tribunal upheld the recording o"}, {"doc_id": "2018 INSC 790", "case_name": "NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR & ORS. v UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE", "year": "2018", "cite_indeg": 33, "issue": "", "held": ": s.377, so far as it criminalises even consensual sexual acts between competent adults, fails to make a distinction between non-consensual and consensual sexual acts of competent adults in private space which are neither harmful nor contagious to the society \u2013 s.377 subjects the LGBT community to societal pariah and dereliction and is, therefore, manifestly arbitrary, for it has become an odious weapon for the harassment of the LGBT community by subjecting them to discrimination and unequal treatment \u2013 Therefore, s.377 is liable to be partially struck down for being violative of Art.14 of the Constitution \u2013 In other words, s.377, so far as it penalizes any consensual sexual activity between two adults, be it homosexuals (man and a man), heterosexuals (man and a woman) and lesbians (woman and a woman), cannot be regarded as constitutional \u2013 However, if anyone, both a man and a woman, engages in any kind of sexual activity with an animal, the said aspect of s.377 is constitutional and it shall remain a penal offence under s.377 \u2013 Any act of the description covered under s.377 done between the individuals without the consent of any one of them would invite penal liability under s.377 \u2013 Constitution of India \u2013 Art.14 \u2013 Homosexual \u2013 LGBT. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Penal Code, 1860 \u2013 s.377 \u2013 Expression \u2018against the order of nature\u2019 \u2013 The expression \u2018aga"}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 568", "case_name": "MANOJ NARULA v UNION OF INDIA", "year": "2014", "cite_indeg": 32, "issue": "", "held": "unconstitutional in Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2013) 7 sec 653 Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) a disqualification under either sub-section shall not, in the case of a person who on the date of the conviction is a member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State, take effect until three months have elapsed from that date or, if within that period an appeal or application for revision is brought in respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal or application is disposed of by the court. Explanation.-ln this section- (a) \"Jaw providing for the prevention of hoarding or profiteering\" means any law, or any order, rule or notification having the force of law, providing for- (i) the regulation of production or manufacture of any essential commodity; (ii) the control of price at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold; (iii) the regulation of acquisition, possession, storage, transport, distribution, disposal, use or consumption of any essential commodity; (iv) the prohibition of the withholding from sale of any essential commodity ordinarily kept for sale; (b) \"drug\" has the meaning assigned to it in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940); (c) \"essential commodity\" has the meaning assigned to it in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (1 O of 1955); (d) \"food\" has the meaning assigned to it in the"}, {"doc_id": "1957 INSC 99", "case_name": "SRI VENKATARAMANA DEVARU AND OTHERS v THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS", "year": "1958", "cite_indeg": 32, "issue": "", "held": ", that the expression \"religious institutions of a public character\" occurring in Art. 25 (2) (b) of the Con- stitution contemplates not merely temples dedicated to the 114 1957 November &. 896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958] 1957 public as a whole but also those founded for the benefit . - of sections thereof and includes denominational temple\u2022 as Sri Venkataramana well. While Art. 25 (1) deals with the rights of individuals DevaruandOthcrs and Art. 26(b) with those of religious denominations, Art. Th Sv. if 25 (2) covers a much wider ground and controls both. Myso:. .\u2022 ~\"je/j1hm Article 26(b) must, therefore, be read subject to Art. 25(2) \u00b7 (b) of the Constitution. Although the right to enter a temple for purposes of worship protected by Art. 25 (2) (b) must be construed liberally in favour of the public, that does not mean that that right is absolute and unlimited in character. It must necessarily be subject to such limitation or regulation as arises in the process of harmonising it with the right pro- tected by Art. 26 (b). Where the denominational rights claimed are not such as can nullify or substantially reduce the right conferred by Art. 25 (2) (b), that Article should be so construed as to give effect to them, leaving the rights of the public in other respects unaffected. The expression 'matters of religion' occurring in Art. 26 (b) of the Constitution includes practices "}, {"doc_id": "1963 INSC 172", "case_name": "STATE OF ORISSA v M.A. TULLOCH AND CO.", "year": "1964", "cite_indeg": 32, "issue": "", "held": ", (1) that since the Central Act 67 of 1957 contains the rtquisite declaration by the Union Parlia1nent under Entry 54 and that ,.\\ct covers the san1e field as the :\\ct of 1948 in regard to mines and mineral development, the decision of this Court in 1-fingir~Ranipur Coal Co. v. State of Orissa concludes this 1natter unless there \\Vere any material difference between the scope and ambit of Central Act 53 of 1948 and that of the Act of 1957. Besides, sub\u00b7ss. (l) and (2) of s. 18 of the Central Act of l 917 are wider in scope and a111plitude and confer larger po\\vers on the (~entral Government than the corresponding proYisions of the ,\\ct of 1948: 1963 August 16 1963 State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch and Co. 462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] Hi11gir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Oris;a, [1961 J 2 S. C. R. 53i, followe<l. (2) that the test of t\\VO legislations containing contradictory provisions is not, hovvever, the only criterion of repugnancy, for if a cotnpetent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or im- pliedly eYinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature \\vhether passed before or after \\Vould be overborne on the ground of repugnance. Where such is the position the inconsistency is dcn1onstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the lnere existence of the two pieces of"}, {"doc_id": "1994 INSC 6", "case_name": "DHANANJOY CHATIERJEE @ DHANA v STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "year": "1994", "cite_indeg": 32, "issue": "", "held": "does not constitute FIR. Criminal Trial: Witnesses-Hostile witness-Testimony of-Not to be ignored completely-To be carefully examined-That part of the testimony which receives co\"oboration from other evidence on record could be ac- E cepted. Evidence Act, 1872 : Sections 25, 26 and 27-Disclosure statement made under Police Custody-Admissibility of that part of the Statement which distinctly relates to discovery of articles pursuant to disclosure statement. F Sections 11 and 106-Alibi-plea of-To be proved by cogent and satis- factory evidence-Possibility of accr-'sed's presence at the scene of occu\"ence at the relevant time-To be completely excluded by adducing necessary evidence. Penology: Measure of punishment-Factors to be considered-Retribu- tive aspect of punishment-Need fo,._..punishment to depend upon atrocity of crime-Appropriate punishment to be gi,ven keeping in view not only the rights of accused, but also rights of victims and society. G Words and Phrases : \"Facts discovered''-Meaning_pf-ln the context of H 37 38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) 1 S.C.R. A S. 27 of Evidence Act; 1872. The appellant was one of the security guards posted in an apartment. Be was teasing a girl living with her parents in one of the Oats there. Be once invited her to a cin~ma hall for seeing a movie. The girl complained B to her mother. Both the parents lodged a written complaint to the propr"}, {"doc_id": "2003 INSC 258", "case_name": "A.K. BINDAL AND ANR. v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.", "year": "2003", "cite_indeg": 32, "issue": "", "held": ": Generally, financial capacity of the Industry is a germane consideration for determination of the wage structure of the employees-Since PSEs have been s11ffering heavy losses contin11011s/y, the employees could not E legitimately claim revision in their pay sea/es-Non-revision of pay-scales wo11ld not amount to violation of f11ndamenta/ rights under Article 21- Companies Act-Sections 619 and 620. F Employees of PSEs-Stat11s of-They are not Government Servants- Hence not entitled to protection afforded 11nder Article 31 I. Employees exercising their option for 'Voluntary Retirement Scheme' and accepting payment thereof-S11bsequent claim for revision in pay scale- Justification of-Held: Since the employees accepted VRS witho11t any protest regarding revision of pay-scale from back date, there was a complete cessation of the Jura/ relationship between employer and employee-Hence employees G cannot claim revision of pay scale. Words and Phrases: 'Voluntary Retirement Scheme', 'Government Servant', 'Jura! H relationship between employer and employee', 'Financial capacity of the 928 A.K. llll\\D.\u00b7\\L \u00bb. lJ.0.1. 929 !ndus1ry' and 'Golden Handshake '~Meaning of Petitioners, employees of two sick Public Sector Undertakings- Fertilizer. Corporation of India (FCI) and Hindustan Fertilizer Corporation (HFC), filed writ petitions in the High Court which were transferred to this Court. They "}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 251", "case_name": "PURAN ETC. ETC. v RAMBILAS AND ANR. ETC. ETC.", "year": "2001", "cite_indeg": 32, "issue": "", "held": ", can be cancelled where the order granting bail is perverse-Case of dowry death-Evidence to show D complicity of the accused-Sessions Judge granted bail without giving reasons-High Court set aside the order of the Sessions Judge-Held, High Courts order was correct-Indian Penal Code-Sections 498-A and 304-B. Power of Court to cancel bail--Exercise of-Held, can be exercised on a petition by the prosecution, any aggrievgd party, or suo motu. E Sections 482 and 439(2)-lnterlocutory orders-Interference with- Power under-Bail granted by the Sessions Judge-Held, can be cancelled ;,. if it causes miscarriage of justice or is palpably illegal or is unjustified. The Appellants and the lady members of their family were charged .L. F under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the IP.C. It was alleged by the prosecution that P got married to the deceased on 24.11.1999. Dowry was demanded from the family of the deceased at the time of marriage and one month prior to the death of the deceased. The deceased died on 2.9.2000, within a year of the marriage. From the scene of offence, two handkerchiefs, two small cotton G balls and one bigger cotton ball were recovered. Pieces of broken bangles were also found. The wire of telephone was found broken and the telephone was lying on the bed. There were electric injuries on the body of the deceased. Blisters and abrasions were also found on the body of the d"}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 554", "case_name": "K.T. PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR v STATE OF KARNATAKA", "year": "2011", "cite_indeg": 32, "issue": "", "held": ": Power to withdraw exemption has not been conferred on the State Government, but evidently retained by the Legislature - The Legislature's apathy in granting is discernible from the E language used in sub-section (2) of s.107, which says that no person shall after the commencement of the Amendment Act acquire in any manner for the cultivation of Linaloe, land of an extent which together with the land cultivated by Linaloe, if any, already held by him exceeds ten units - Legislature, F therefore, as matter of policy, wanted to give only a conditional exemption for lands used for Linaloe cultivation and the policy was to empower the State Government to withdraw the same especially when the law is that no person can claim exemption as a matter of right - The legislative will was to make s. 107 subject to s. 110 and not the will of the delegate, hence, G overriding effect has to be given to s. 110 - The contention that s. 110 is void due to excessive delegation of legislative powers, is not acceptable - Further, the Act including s. 110 was placed in IXth Schedule in the year 1965 and, hence, H 636 K.T. PLANTATION PVT LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 637 KARNATAKA immune from challenge in a court of law - Land used for A linaloe cultivation would be governed by the provisions of the Act which is protected under Article 31 B of the Constitution having been included in the IXth Schedule - Th"}, {"doc_id": "1950 INSC 36", "case_name": "CHIRANJIT LAL CHOWDHURI v THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS.", "year": "1950", "cite_indeg": 32, "issue": "", "held": "per KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.- (i) that the impugned Act did not infringe any fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 31 (1), as it did nGt deprive the com. pany or the petitioner of any property save under authority of law; (ii) that the impu~ned Act did not infringe any fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 31 (2) inasmuch as it did not authorise the ''acquisition\" of any property of the company or of the share- holders or '' the taking possession \" of the property of the peti- tioner, namely, the shares which he held in the company, though he wag disabled from exercising some of the rights which &n ordinary shareholder in a. company could exercise in respect of his shares, such as the right to vote, to appoint directors, and to apply for winding up; and, if the Act had anthorised the \"taking possession\" of the proper~y of the company, the petitioner was not entitled to any relief on that score under Art. 32; (iii) that, as the Act did not impose any restrictions on the petitioner's right \"to acquire, hold and dispose of'' his shares, there was no infringement of Art. 19 (1) (f); and assuming that the restrictions imposed on the right of voting etc. were restric- tions on the right to acquire, hold or dispose of property within Art. 19 (1) (f), such restrictions were reasonable restrictions im- posed in the interests of the public, namely, to secure th"}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 487", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA v M/S. POPULAR CONSTRUCTION CO.", "year": "2001", "cite_indeg": 32, "issue": "", "held": ", Section 34 and the scheme of the \u00b71996 Act bars the applicability-Arbitration Act, 1940. C Words and Phrases-'But not thereafter'~Meaning of in the context of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Award passed by Arbitrator was forwarded to appellant, to be filed in the High Court for passing decree, under the impression that Arb!tra.fion and Conciliation Act, 1940 applied. When the Award was filed in the High Court for decree to be passed under 1940 Act, appellant challenged the Award under Section 30 read with Section 16 of the 1940 Act. Subsequently application was amended by inserting \"Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996\" in place of \"Arbitration Act, 1940\". The application challenging the Award was dismissed by a Single Judge on the ground that it was barred by limitation under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Division Bench upheld the findings of the Single Judge. In appeal to this Court, it was contended by the appellant that since Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to special law~ like the 1996 Act and since the 1996 Act itself did not expressly exclude applicability of the Limitation Act and as there was sufficient cause, for the delay in filing the application under Section 34, should have been condoned. Respondent contended that the language of Section 34 plainly read, expressly excluded the o"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 433", "case_name": "GANGADHAR BEHERA AND ORS. v STATE OF ORISSA", "year": "2002", "cite_indeg": 32, "issue": "", "held": ". a member of the assembly if understood the object and unlawful acts \u00b7likely to C be committed by it, then such member would be held liable as member of unlawful assembly-Proof of overt act is not necessary. Common object and commcn il'lention-Distinction between-Discussed Evidence Act, 1872: Testimony of interested witnesses-reliance thereupon-Held, relationship does not affect credibility of the witnesses-Cou: 'to adopt a careful approach in such cases and analyze evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible. Maxim: 'Falsus in uno-falsus in om1Jibus'-Meaning and applicability of D E According to prosecution, on the fateful day, there was a quarrel between the deceased and DWI in connection with construction of a shed F in a market. The deceased and PWs. were chased by the accused persons. Two of the accused (Appellant Nos. 7 & 10) dragged the deceased and others and assaulted them. When police came on the spot, these accused persons fled away. PWS, one of the eyewitnesses, lodged an FIR. Trial Court conducted trial of 21 accused persons and convicted 15 of them under Section 302 read with Section 149 and Section 148 as well as Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced them accordingly. However, it acquitted remaining accused persons. Convicted accused unsuccessfully filed an appeal before High Court. On appeal, this Court 183 G H 184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS"}, {"doc_id": "2012 INSC 379", "case_name": "BHARAT ALUMINIUM CO. v KAISER ALUMINIUM TECHNICAL SERVICE, INC.", "year": "2012", "cite_indeg": 31, "issue": "", "held": ": The Act has accepted the territoriality principle which has been adopted in the UNCITRAL Model Law - s.2(2) makes declaration that Part I of the Act shall apply to all arbitrations which take place within India - Part I of the Act would have no E application to International Commercial Arbitration held outside India - Therefore, such awards would only be subject to jurisdiction of the Indian courts when the same are sought to be enforced in India in accordance with the provisions contained in Part II of the Act - No overlapping or intermingling of the provisions contained in Part I with the F provisions contained in Part II of the Act - S. 2(2) not in conflict with any of the provisions either in Part I or in Part II of the Act - In a foreign seated international commercial arbitration, no application for interim relief would be maintainable u/s.9 or any other provision, as applicability of Part I of Act is limited to all G arbitrations which take place in India - Similarly, no suit for interim injunction simplicitor would be maintainable in India, on the basis of an international commercial arbitration with a 327 H 328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 12 S.C.R. A seat outside India - Part I of the Act applicable only to all the arbitrations which take place within the territory of India - Law declared to apply prospectively, to all the arbitration agreements executed hereafter. "}, {"doc_id": "1999 INSC 235", "case_name": "STATE THROUGH SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, CBI/SIT ETC. v NALINI AND ORS. ETC. ETC.", "year": "1999", "cite_indeg": 31, "issue": "", "held": ", per majority: four out of seven accused sentenced to death-Three accused sentenced to life imprisonment. F CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973: S.300-Scope of-Second trial on the ground that some more allegcttions were not made in the first trial-Not to be allowed-Double jeoparayc...- Constitution of India, Art, 20(2). Ss.215 & 465-Charges-Defects in charge-sheet alleged-Powers of G Reference Court. S.313-Improper examination of accused-Examination by Reference Court to correct the error-Scope of LEGAL MAXIMS H (1) Actus non facit reum mens nisi sit rea-App/icability of ' ([ ( ) l_ / \\ I \\ ; I \\ ) i \\ I \\ - I \\ ( > '; \\ ! \\ i < I ( I \\ ( l STATE THROUGH CBI v. NALINI 3 (2) Justicia non novit patrem nee matrem-Applicability of A (3) \"Nemo debet is vexari pro eadem causa\"-Meaning and applicability of WORDS & PHRASES \"Substantive Evidence\", \"Shall presume\"-Meaning of On May 21, 1991 in Sriperambadur in Tamil Nadu at 10.20 p.m. a human bomb exploded which resulted in the death of former Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi as also 18 others and leaving 43 persons seriously B ~~ c According to the prosecution, this was th~ handi work of LTTE because of its hatred towards Raj iv Gandhi since LTTE believed that it was forced to be a signatory to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord signed on July 22, 1987. In accordance with the said accord, Government of India took upon itself certain role of maint"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 612", "case_name": "RAMESH BABULAL DOSHI v THE STATE OF GUJARAT", "year": "1996", "cite_indeg": 31, "issue": "", "held": ", reasons given by trial court's were cogent and convinc- ing and the High Court's approach in reappraising evidence was patently wrong. A B c Criminal trial-Circumstantial evidence-After initial search of premises of accused two days after event only a pair of blood stained trousers recovered-Keys of house left with brother~ in-law of accuseti-Second search D after five days leading to recovery of articles containing stains matching victim's blood group-Appellant not having access to flat-Held, the entire story of search and recovery of the. articles was a myth. Criminal triaf-Circumstantial evidence-Theory of last seen-Held, on E facts, even if proved did not by itself lead to the only conclusion that the appellant was guilty. \u00b7 In seeking to prove the .charge that it was the appellant who had 111urdered the deceased, who carried on business in diamonds, at his house in Surat on September 2, 1980, the prosecution relied upon, inter alia, the F following circumstances : that the appellant, who also dealt in diamonds, and the deceased were seen moving on a scooter between 12 noon and 1.30 p.m. on the fateful day; that the following morning the appellant was seen going out with others with a trunk in which the dead body of the deceased was subsequently recovered and that some of the articles that were seized G from the appellant's house on the morning of September 9 were found t"}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 58", "case_name": "PRATAP SINGH v STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ANR.", "year": "2005", "cite_indeg": 31, "issue": "", "held": ": The reckoning date for determining the age of the Juvenile offender is the date of offence and not the date when he is produced before the Authority/Court. D 2000 Act-Applicability of-To the cases initiated under 1986 Act, pending on the date of enforcement of 2000 Act-Held: The Act of 2000 would be applicable to such cases only when the accused had not attained 18 years of age on the date of its enforcement-Model Rules framed by Central Government-Rule 62-United National Standard Minimum Rules for E Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985. The questions for determination in the present appeal before the Constitution Bench were : 1. What would be the reckoning date in determining the age of p juvenile offender, viz., date when produced in a Court, as had.been held by this Court in Amit Das v. State of Bihar, (2000) 5 SCC 488 or the date on which the offence was committed as had been held in Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, (1982( 2 SCC 202? 2. Whether Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, G 2000 would be applicable to the case, proceeding whereof was initiated under Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and was pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2000? Disposing of the appeal, the Court 1019 H A B 1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) I S.C.R. HELD : Per Sema, J. (for himself N Santosh Hegde, S.N Variava and B. P. Singh, JJ.) : 1.1. The reckoning date for"}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 334", "case_name": "JACOB MATHEW v STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.", "year": "2005", "cite_indeg": 31, "issue": "", "held": ", to C prosecute a medical professional for criminal negligence it must be shown that the accused doctor did something or failed to do something which in the given/acts and circumstances no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to .do-Hazard taken by the accused doctor should be of such a narure that the resultant i'?iury was most likely D imn1inent-Onfacts, held, doctor can not be p1oceeded against under S. 304- A as it is a case of non-availability of oxygen cylinder-Rationale for special treatment of doctors discussed in detail and guidelines laid down to protect interest of doctors, and to save the1n from unwarranted and malicious proceedings. Sections 304-A, 88, 92, 93-Mens rea in criminal negligence-Held, for negligence to amounl to a crinzinal offence, the element o/mens rea must be shown to exist-Recklessness, i. e. disregard/or the possible consequences, constitutes the mens rea in criminal negligence. Section 304-A-Negligence-As a tort and criminal negligence-Nature of Negligence required-Held, to fasten liability in criminal law, degree of negligence has to be higher than negligence enough to fasten liability for damages in civil law-For criminal libility, the negligence has to be gross or of a very high degree-Expression \"rash and negligent act\" to be reads 9ualified by \"grossly\". 304-A-liabi/ity under-When attracted-Held"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 39", "case_name": "LEHNA v STATE OF HARYANA", "year": "2002", "cite_indeg": 31, "issue": "", "held": ", reliable--Conviction upheld in view thereof Section 458-Conviction under-Held since no finding recorded by the courts below as to existence of ingredients of the offence, conviction set aside. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Sections 354(3), 360 and 361- Punishment for murder-Determinative factors-Personality of the offender as revealed by his character, antecedents and other circumstances and tractability of the offender to reform--Criminal Procedure Code, 1898-Section 367(5)-Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955. Criminal Trial Related witnesses-Reliability of-Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. E F Injuries on accused-Effect of on prosecution case-Held, per se does G not affect prosecution version-But when the injuries are not explained and are of series nature, they assume importance. Sentencing : 'Just desert '-Principle of-Discussed-Proportionality of punishment H 377 378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] I S.C.R. A to crime-Excessive punishment is punishment without guilt. The appellant-accused was charged for the offences under Sections 302, 458 and 324 IPC. The prosecution case was that due to dispute between the accused and the other members of his family over ancestral land, he killed his mother, brother and sister-in-law and caused injuries B to his father (PW6) and his nephew (PW7). During trial, the evidence was that 2-3 days before"}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 15", "case_name": "STATE 0]' BOMBAY & OTHERS v THE HOSPITAL MAZDOOR SABHA & OTHER", "year": "1960", "cite_indeg": 31, "issue": "", "held": ", that the decision of the Division Bench was right and must be affirmed. The mandatory language of s. \u00b7 25F(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, plain and unambiguous in effect, leaves no manner of doubt that the payment of compensation as required by it is a condition precedent to retrenchment and that s. 251 of the Act is intended to provide for the recovery of other monies that became due to the employees under Ch. V of the Act. The object and the scope of the Act, as apparent from its various provisions, made it amply clear that the Legislature in defining the the word 'industry' in s. 2(j) of the Act was deliberately using term of wide import in its first clause and referring to several other industries in the second in an inclusive way obviously denoting extention.- In construing the definition, therefore, it is inappropriate to apply the maxim noscitur a sociis so as to restrict its meaning. The maxim is a rule of construction and can apply only where the intention of the Legislature in associating terms of wider import with those or narrower import or the meaning of the wider terms used is in doubt. The corporation of Glasgow v. Glasgow Tramway and Omnibus Co. Ltd., 1898 A. C. 631, referred to. Nor can undue importance be attached to the conventional meaning attributed to trade or business in construing the wide words of the definition since it has lost some of its"}, {"doc_id": "1963 INSC 173", "case_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v SINGHARA SINGH AND OTHERS", "year": "1964", "cite_indeg": 30, "issue": "", "held": ", the confession had not been recorded under s. 164 of the (~ode and the record could not be put in evidence under ss. 74 and 80 of the Evidence Act to prove confes:iiion. Oral evidence of the Magistrate to prove the confession \\Vas not a<l1nissible. If a statute has conferred a power to do an act and ha<l laid <lo\\Vn thr\" method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than thJt lvhich has been prescribed. Taytur v. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch. D. 47.6 and Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, L.R. 63 LA. 372. A ?vfagistrate recording a confession under s. 164 of the Code is bound to follow the procedure laid <lo'\\Vn in it. Section 533 of the (~ode does not shovv that the procedure prescribed by s. 164 of the Code was not mandatory. The object of s. 164 of the Code \\Vas not to give the prosecution the advantage of ss. 74 and 80 ot the \"EviJence Act so that the only result of the disregard of these pro,\u00b7isions \\Vas to deprive the prosecution of that advantage. Nazir Ahmed's case was rightly decided. Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, L.R. 63 I.A. 372 Rao Shiv Bah\u2022dur Singh ,-. State of Findhya Pradesh, [1954 J S.C.R. 1908 and Dap Chand \\'. State of Rajasthan, [1962/ 1 S.C.R. 662. 'The principle of Nar::ir Ahmed's case which dealt '\\Vith the re~ cording of a confession by a Magistrate of the first class without c;om!Jlying \\Vith the pro"}, {"doc_id": "1964 INSC 17", "case_name": "R. CIDTRALEKHA & ANR. v STATE OF MYSORE & ORS.", "year": "1964", "cite_indeg": 30, "issue": "", "held": ": (Per B. P. Sinha, C.J., Subba Rao, P.aghubar Dayal and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.) (i) Ibe provisions of Art. 166 of the Con- stitution are only directory and not mandatory and, if they are not com- plied with, it can be established as a question of fact tbat the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government or the Governor. In the present case the impugned order !bough it does not conform to tbe provisions of Art. 166 ex facie says that an order to the effect mentioned therein was issued by the GovcrnmCnt and it is not denied by the appel- lants tbat the order was made by the Government and neither it iJ denied that it was communicated to the selection committeee. Therefore it iJ valid. 134-159 S.C.-24 370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1964 Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay [1952] S.C.R. . 612, State of Bombay, v. Purushottam log Naik;-[1952] S.C.R. 74, Ghaio R. Chitralekha Mall & sons v. State of Delhi, (1959] S.C.A. 1424 and Bachillar Singh v. State ;; Mysor. Stat\u2022 of Punjab, (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713, referred to. (ii) If the impact of the State law providing for standards of educa- tion on entry 66 of List I is so heavy and devastating as to wipe out or appreciably abridge the Central field it may be ;truck down. But that i1 a question of fact to be ascertained in each case. . If a State Jaw Prescribes higher percen!!J.ge _ _of. mark-s\u00b7\u00b7fot -extra-curric"}, {"doc_id": "2012 INSC 187", "case_name": "ANEETA HADA v M/S. GODFATHER TRAVELS & TOURS PVT. LTD.", "year": "2012", "cite_indeg": 30, "issue": "", "held": ": An authorised signatory of a company cannot be held liable for prosecution C uls.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or uls.67 rlw s.85 of Information Technology Act, 2000 without the company being arraigned as an accused - Information Technology Act, 2000 - ss.67, 85 - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - ss.138, 141. D Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - s.141 - Statutory intendment of - Held: s. 147 stipulates that if a person who commits offence uls. 138 of the Act is a company, the company as well as every person in-charge of and E responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company at the time of commission of offence is deemed to F be guilty of the offence - The criminal liability on account of dishonour of cheque primarily falls on the drawee company and is extended to the officers of the company and as there is a specific provision extending the liability to the officers, the conditions incorporated in s.141 are to be satisfied - The power of punishment is vested in the legislature and that is absolute in s. 141 of the Act which clearly speaks of commission of offence by the company - Applying the doctrine of strict construction, commission of offence by the company G is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others - Thus, the words \"as well as the company\" appearing in the Section make it clear that when the comp"}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 433", "case_name": "HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v DARIUS SHAPUR CHENAI AND ORS.", "year": "2005", "cite_indeg": 30, "issue": "", "held": ", if court in order to satisfY itself about existence of any grounds for judicial review, calls for records, same must be produced by the government along with counter affidavit-Failure to file the counter affidavit may be treated as Government's admission to the allegations made against it-Action required to be taken by the government is distinct and different from that of collector and collector is incompetent to affirm an affidavit B on behalf of government. The appellant Corporation was a tenant in the premises in question. On expiry of the lease period, an eviction petition was filed by the Respondent-owner against the appellant. The suit was decreed and an C appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed. The appellant thereafter sent a requisition to the Special Deputy Collector for acquisition of the land for the purpose of continuing the business. Notification for acquisition was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Respondent filed a detailed objection contending that there existed no public purpose for acquisition of his land. After giving an opportunity of hearing to D respondent, collector conducted an enquiry and submitted his report to the Government. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued. Respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court contending inter a/ia that there had been a total non-application of mind on the part of the Sta"}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 379", "case_name": "NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN v STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.", "year": "2011", "cite_indeg": 30, "issue": "", "held": ": A party has to plead its case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate B c the averrnents made in the petition and in case the pleadings D are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas - It cannot be said that the rules of procedural law do not apply in PIL - In the instant case, there were no pleadings before the High Court on the basis of which the writ petition could be entertained/decided - Thus, it was liable to E be rejected at the threshold for the reason that the writ petition suffered for want of proper pleadings and material to substantiate the avermentslallegations contained therein - Besides, there was no explanation as to under what circumstances the High Court had been approached at such F belated stage - In fact for redressal of any grievance regarding implementation of the Rehabilitation & Resettlement Policy, the oustees ought to have approached the Grievance Redressal Authority - High Court ought not to have examined any issue other than relating to rehabilitation i.e. implementation of the R & R Policy - Constitution of India, G 1950- Article 226 - Writ petition - Delay I Laches - Remedy - Alternate remedy - Public Interest Litigation. 443 H 444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R. A CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950: Articles 21 and 14 - Hydro Electric Projects - Omkareshwar Dam in the basin of river Narmada - Land acqu"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 1234", "case_name": "OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR v DAYANAND AND OTHERS", "year": "2008", "cite_indeg": 30, "issue": "", "held": ": Is sine qua non for E ef+ective and efficient functioning \u00b7of judicial system as also for sustaining the system - Benches of High Courts and Supreme Court ignoring decisions area-ordinate Benches or larger Benches and High Courts bypassing law laid down by Supreme Court illustrate non-adherence to rule of judicial F discipline - Disrespect to constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation - Predictability and certainty is the hallmark of judicial jurisprudence - Stare decisis. G ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ..judicial Review - Policy decision by Government to -\u00b7 create/abolish posts or cadres - HELD: Power of judicial 1. State of Kamataka v. Uma Devi, [2006] 3 SCR. H 2. UP. SEB. v. Pooran Chand Pandey, [2007] 10 SCR 920. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR v. DAYANAND AND ORS. 333 _,-1 review can be exercised in such matters only if it is shown that A the action of the employer is contrary to any constitutional or statutory provisions or is patently arbitrary or vitiated by ma/a fides - In the instant case, directions given by High Courts for creation of supernumerary posts to facilitate absorption of company paid staff are unsustainable and are set aside. B Legitimate Expectation - Held: At the root of legitimate expectation is the constitutional principle of rule of law, which ' ~ requires regularity, predictab"}, {"doc_id": "1957 INSC 79", "case_name": "KHUSHAL RAO v THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "year": "1958", "cite_indeg": 30, "issue": "", "held": ", that the certificate granted by the High Court wa:s incompetent and as the case disclosed on grounds on which this Court could possibly grant special leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution, the appeal must be dismissed. CRIMINAL - APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 184 of 1956. Appeal from the judgment_ and order dated October 15, 1956, of the former Nagpur High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 205 of 1956 and Criminal Reference No. 15of1956, arising out of the judgment and order dated July 10, 1956 of the First Additional District Judge, Nagpur in Sessions Trial No. 34 of 1956. M2SC/61-7 1957 Kltruhal Rao v. State of Bomba; 1957 Khwhal Rao v. State of /Wmbay Sinha J. 554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958} J. N. Banerjee and P. C. Agarwala, for the appellant. Jindra Lal and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent. 1957. September 25. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.-This appeal on a certificate of fitness under Art. 134 (l)(c), granted by the High Court at Nagpur (as it then was), is directed against the con- current judgment and orders of the courts below, so far as the appellant Khushal is concerned, convicting and sentencing him to death under s. 302, Indian Penal Code, for the pre-meditated murder of Baboolal on the night of February 12, 1956, in one of the quarters of the city of Nagpur. It appears that there are two rival factions in wha"}, {"doc_id": "1991 INSC 225", "case_name": "DELHI JUDICIAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION TIS HAZARI COURT, DELHI ETC. ETC. v STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. ETC. ETC.", "year": "1991", "cite_indeg": 30, "issue": "", "held": "Court has inherent power and jurisdiction to take action for contempt of subordinate or inferior courts aliJo---Power to be exercised sparingly~Only when contempt is 'likely to have repercussions throughout the country. Contempt of Court-High Courts as Courts of Record have inherent power and jurisdiction to take action for contempt of subordi- nate or inferior courts-Supreme Court having judicial superintendence over all courts in the country has same jurisdictic-n. Contempt of Court-Civil and criminal contempt-Criminal contempt_;,__Wide enough to include any act which would tend to interfere with administration of justice or which would lower the dignity and authority of court. Chief Judicial Magistrate-Assaulted, arrested on flimsy grounds, handcuffed, tied with rope, photographs taken and published by Police .Officers-Held constituted clear case of criminal contempt-Con- \u00b7 temners-punishment-Quantum of punishment determined according to qegree and extent of part played by each contemner-Guidelines laid down by Supreme Court in case of arrest and detention of a Judicial Officer-To be followed by State Governments as well as High Courts-Judicial Officer not to visit Police Station-Except in connec- tion with official and judicial duties and with prior intimation to District and Sessions Judge. Contempt proceedings in Supreme Court-Dispute regarding facts-High Court Judge appo"}, {"doc_id": "1994 INSC 371", "case_name": "SANJAY DUTT v THE STATE THROUGH C.B.I. BOMBAY", "year": "1994", "cite_indeg": 30, "issue": "", "held": "possession means conscious possession and not mere cus- todj-Second ingredient-Possession should be unauthorised i.e. without the authority of law-Third ingredient-Possession of unauthorised arms and . ammunition should be in a notified area-Essence of third ingredient is that D a presumption arises that the weapons were meant for use in terrorist or disruptive act-Held such a presumption is reason\u00a2le and in consonance with the scheme of the Statute but is rebuttable-The extent of burden of proof on the accused to rebut presumption is lighter burden of proving the great probability--// the accused proves non-existing off acts necessary to prove the third ingredient he cannot be prosecuted under section 5 but has to be dealt E with under Section 12-But where prosecution proves the essential ingredients it has to do nothing more and convictions under Section 5 would follow. Expression 'arms and ammunition'-Held these words are not to be read conjuctively. F Section 2( l)(f)-State Government-Power t<;> declare 'notified area'---Manner of exercise of powe,-/leld, must have relation to curb terrorist and disruptive activities. Section 20(4) (bb) and Proviso-Offence punishable under TADA- G Failure to complete Investigation within the specified period-Right of ac- cused to be released on bai1-Held that right accruing to the accused in such a situation is enforceable only prior to the"}, {"doc_id": "2015 INSC 886", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA v V. SRIHARAN @ MURUGAN & ORS.", "year": "2015", "cite_indeg": 30, "issue": "", "held": "(per majority): Imprisonment for life in terms of s.53 r/w s.45 of /PC only means imprisonment for rest of life of the convict - The right to claim remission, commutation, reprieve etc. as provided under Art. 72 or F Art. 161 of the Constitution will always be available being Constitutional Remedies untouchable by the Court - The ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda case that a special category of sentence; instead of death can be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life or for a term G exceeding 14 years and put that category beyond application of remission is well-founded - Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 72 and 161 - Sentence I Sentencing- Remission. 613 H 614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R. A Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-ss.432 and 433- Whether the \"Appropriate Government\" is permitted to exercise the power of remission u/ss.4321433 CrPC after parallel power has been exercised by the President under Art. 72 or the Governor under Art.161 or by this Court in its B Constitutional power under Art.32- Held (per majority): The exercise of power u/ss.432 and 433 of CrPC will be available to the Appropriate Government even if such consideration was made earlier and exercised u!Art. 72 by the President or u/Art. 161 by the Governor-As far as the application of Art.32 c of the Constitution by Supreme Court is concerned, the powers u/ss.432 and 433 are to"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 691", "case_name": "TRIMUKH MAROTI KIRKAN v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "year": "2006", "cite_indeg": 29, "issue": "", "held": ", Initial burden is on the prosecution-On facts, deceased was often beaten up by her husband on account of non-fi1lfillment of monetary demand by her father-Injuries found on her dead body and her bangles were missing-Accused did not offer any explanation regarding such injuries-Recovery of broken bangles based on D disclosure statement by accused-As there was no eye witness of the occurrence, case of prosecution rested on circumstantial evidence-Circumstances unerringly point to the guilt of the accused-Accused rightly convicted u!s. 302-Evidence Act, 1872-Section 106. Prosecution's case was that deceased was married to appellant nearly E 7 years before the incident which took place in village Kikki. The deceased was being ill treated by her husband and his parents. She was often beaten up and not provided food. At the time of Panchami, when she had stayed at parental house, she disclosed that on account of non-fulfilment of demand of Rs.25,000 by her father, appellant and her in laws harassed her. After Panchami, deceased's father took her to her matrimonial house F and requested appellant and his parents not to ill treat her and told them that he was not in a position to fulfil their demand due to his weak financial condition. On the fateful day, he received information from a person of village G Kikki that his daughter had died due to snake bite. On reaching there, they saw"}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 323", "case_name": "SHYAM SUNDER AND ANR. v RAM KUMAR AND ANR.", "year": "2001", "cite_indeg": 29, "issue": "", "held": ", right of pre-emption after decree of the suit is a vested right of the pre-emptor-Appellate Court cannot consider subsequent amendment in the Act during the pendency of appeal and take away the vested right accrued on passing of the decree by Trial Court-The D amended section is not retrospective in operation either expressly or impliedly- The amending Act is not a declaratory Act-Hence, it has no retrospective operation. Interpretation of Statutes: Beneficial legislation-Rule of benevolent construction-Applicability of-Held, the amending Act is a beneficial legislation-Rule of benevolent construction is not applicable while construing the amended Section of the Act-Cannot be construed that a beneficial legislation is always retrospective E in operation even though it is not stated in the 1egislation either expressly or F impliedly. ' Appellants purchased suit lands from vendors through a sale deed. Respondents tiled a suit before Trial Court claiming preferential right to pre- empt the sale on the ground that they were co-sharers of the suit lands. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court in favour of the respondents. The G respondents deposited required purchase money under Order 20 Rule 14 CPC. The appellants were not successful both before the Appellate Court and. High Court. Hence they approached this Court. During pendency of the appeal. Section IS(l)(b) of the Punjab Pr"}, {"doc_id": "1995 INSC 100", "case_name": "MADAN LAL AND ORS. v STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND ORS.", "year": "1995", "cite_indeg": 29, "issue": "", "held": ", Ncr--Scope of interference--Extent of. Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Judicial) Recruitment Rules of 1967-Rule lO(l)(b}-Selection process-Viva voce examination-Split up of marks on various sub-heads noi necessa~Tape recording of questions and answers given at oral interview-Not provided-Effect of. D Rule 9-Appointment-Post of Munsi!f-Words 'actual practice!-Cer- tificate issued by the concerned District Judg~J & K Public Service Com- mission not empowered in going behind the certificate. Rule 41-Appointments-Merit list and waiting list-Held, such list will E have a !if e of one year from date of publication or till it is exhausted, whichever is earlier. An advertisement notice issued by the Jammu & Kashmir Public Service Commission in 1993, invited applications for filling up posts of Munsiff in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission conducted p the written examination and thereafter 79 candidates mentioned in the notification were declared to have qualified for viva voce test. That in- cluded the petitioners and the respondents. A viva voce test was conducted by four Members of the Commission and an Expert. The petitioners challenged the process of selection, while challenging the selection of the successful respondents. Petitioners alleged that viva voce test was so G manipulated that only preferred candidates were permitted to get into the select list, and theref"}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 163", "case_name": "ATIABARI TEA CO., LTD. v THE STATE OF ASSAM AND OTHERS. (AND CONNECTED PETITION AND APPEALS)", "year": "1961", "cite_indeg": 29, "issue": "", "held": ", (per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Das Gupta, JJ.) that the Act violated Art. 301 and since it did not comply with the provisions of Art. 304(b) it was ultra vires and void. The freedom of trade, con1metce and intercourse guaranteed by Art. J.Ol was wider than that contained in s. 297 of the Govern- ment of India Act, 1935, and it included freedom from tax laws also. Article 3or provides that the flow of trade shall run smooth and unhampered by any restriction either at the bounda- ries of the States or at any other points inside the States them- selves; and if any Act imposes any direct restrictions on the movetnent of goods it attracts the provisions of Art. 301, and its validity can be sustained only if it satisfied the requirements of Art. 302 or Art. 304. The operation of Art. 301 cannot be restricted to legislation under the Entries dealing with trade and commerce. The Assam Act directly affected the freedom contemplated by Art. 3or. Ramjilal v. Income-tax Officer, Mohindargarh, [1951] S.C.R. 127, M. P. V. Sundararamier G Co. v. The State of Andhra Pra- desh, [r958] S.C.R. 1422, James v. Commonwealth of Aitstralia, (1936) A.C. 578, The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (Indio) Ltd., [1953] S C.R. 1069, Saghir Ahmed v. The State of U.P., September 26. 1960 At1abari Tea Co., Ltd. v. The Stal~ of \u00b7 A ssan1 6- Others 810 SCPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1961] [1955] r S.C.R. 707, J"}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 241", "case_name": "STATE OF GOA v SANJAY THAKRAN AND ANR.", "year": "2007", "cite_indeg": 29, "issue": "", "held": ", court in appeal can set aside the order of acquittal only when the decision is perverse-On examination of evidence, there was a considerable time gap between the persons last seen together and the proximate time of crime-Prosecution failed to prove that the articles D recovered were that of the deceased-Hence, acquittal of accused upheld in the absence of any other corroborative evidence to complete the chain of circumstances. Respondents-couple were charged for offences under sections 120-8, 364, 302 and 392 read with section 34 IPC for murdering and robbing the E deceased couple on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The trial court and the High Court acquitted the respondents of the charges on the ground that th~ proseuction failed to prove involvement of the respondents in the commission of the crime. In appeal to this Court, the appellant-State contended that certain F articles, including some gold jewels belonging to the deceased were seized from the respondents; that certain witnesses had deposed that the deceased werl!-last seen with the respondents; and that the respondents have not explained as to in what circumstance!!, the victims suffered the death, in their statements under section 313 Cr.P.C. G The respondents contended that this Court, in an appeal.arising out of special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia, cannnot, on reappraisal of"}, {"doc_id": "2019 INSC 647", "case_name": "SSANGYONG CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD. v NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA (NHAI)", "year": "2019", "cite_indeg": 29, "issue": "", "held": ": Government guidelines that were referred to and relied upon by the majority award to arrive at the linking factor were never in evidence before the Tribunal \u2013 Tribunal relied upon the said guidelines by itself [2019] 7 S.C.R. 522 522 A B C D E F G H 523 stating that they are to be found on a certain website \u2013 This being the case, the appellant would be directly affected, not being allowed to comment on the applicability or interpretation of those guidelines \u2013 Thus, majority award set aside u/s.34(2)(a)(iii) \u2013 Further, in order to apply a linking factor, a Circular, unilaterally issued by one party, cannot possibly bind the other party to the agreement without that other party\u2019s consent \u2013 Indeed, the Circular expressly stipulated that it cannot apply unless the contractors furnish an undertaking/ affidavit that the price adjustment under the Circular is acceptable to them \u2013 Appellant gave such undertaking only conditionally and without prejudice to its argument that the Circular does not and cannot apply \u2013 Majority award created a new contract for the parties by applying the said unilateral Circular and by substituting a workable formula under the agreement by another formula de hors the agreement \u2013 Thus, a fundamental principle of justice was breached \u2013 Such a course of conduct would be contrary to fundamental principles of justice as followed in this country and shocks the c"}, {"doc_id": "2015 INSC 163", "case_name": "K.P. MANU v CHAIRMAN, SCRUTINY COMMITTEE FOR  VERIFICATION OF COMMUNITY CERTIFICATE", "year": "2015", "cite_indeg": 28, "issue": "", "held": ": Not sustainable - For grant of scheduled caste status, person must belong to the caste recognised by the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, there should be reconversion to the original religion to which the forefathers belonged; and should be accepted by the F community -Appellant after reconversion had come within the fold of the community, and thereby became a member of the Scheduled Caste - Had the community expelled him, the matter would have been different - Acceptance is in continuum - Appellant's marriage to a Christian lady G and non-production of any evidence for leading the life of a Hindu would not make any difference - Appel/an( to be 243 H 244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 3 S.C.R. A \u00b7reinstated in service forthwith with all the benefits relating to seniority and his caste and also be paid back wages upto 75 per cent - Social status certificate. B Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 Three things that need to be established by a person who claims to be a beneficiary of the caste certificate are (i) there must be absolutely clear cut proof that he belongs to the caste that has been c . recognised by the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950; (ii) there has been reconversion to the original religion to which the parents and earlier generations had belonged; and (iii) there has to be evidence establishing the acceptance by the D community. Each as"}, {"doc_id": "2000 INSC 405", "case_name": "DELHI ADMINISTRATION v GURDIP SINGH UBAN AND ORS. ETC.", "year": "2000", "cite_indeg": 28, "issue": "", "held": ", those claimants who have not.filed objections cannot be permitted to contend that Section 5A inquiry is vitiated so far as they are concerned-Applicant not having filed objections on grounds personally applicable to him or his land seeking exclusion.from acquisition, the objections in that behalf must be deemed to have been waived-However, DDA having represented to the applicant that acquisition proceedings had been quashed and applicant having constructed a building on that representation, estoppel prima facie arising in favour of the applicant-Applicant's case directed to be considered sympathetically for release of his land-Indian Sol- diers (Litigation) Act, 1925-Section JO-Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Section 115. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose-Satisfaction of Government-Requirement of-Held, no reasons or other.facts need be men- tioned in Section 6 declaration on its face-If satisfaction is challenged, it would be sufficient if such satisfaction is proved by producing the record on the basis of which the declaration was issued-While referring to its satisfaction, the Government need not refer to every piece of particular land-It is sufficient if the authority which conducts-Section 5A inquiry has considered the objec- .. tions raised in relation to any particular land. Supreme Court Rules, 1966-0rder XL, Rules I and 35-Review appli- cations-Restrain"}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 256", "case_name": "SANWAT SINGH & OTHERS v STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "year": "1961", "cite_indeg": 28, "issue": "", "held": ", that the words \"substantial and compelling reasons\" for setting aside an order of acquittal used by this Court in its decisions were intended to convey the idea that t'.l.n appellate court shall not only bear in mind the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Shea Swarufs case but must also give its clear reasons for coming to the conclusion thal the order of acquittal was wrong. The following results emanate from a discussion 0! the case law on appeals against acquittal:- (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (z) the principles 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 121 laid down in Sheo Swarup's case afford a correct guide for the 1960 appellate court's approach to a case disposing of such an appeal; (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, Sanwal Singh such as (I) \"substantial and compelling reasons\", (II) \"good and & Olhers sufficiently cogent reasons\", and (III) \"strong reasons\", are not v. intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate Court State of Rajaslha1 in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to some to its own conclusion, but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the ques- tions of fact and the reasons given by the Court below in support of its order of acquittal in arriving at a conclusion on"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 75", "case_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB v GURMIT SINGH ANR ORS.", "year": "1996", "cite_indeg": 28, "issue": "", "held": "- Prosecutrix reliable and truthful witness-corroboration by medical evidence and chemical examination report though no such corroboration is necessary to rely upon the testimony of the prosecutrix. Criminal Procedure Code 1973--Section 154-Delay in.filing FIR-Time spent to secure justice through village panchayats and consultations between D the.family members-Held, generally a complaint is lodged in a sexual offence after a cool thought since the incidence concerns the reputation ~f the victim and honour of her .family-Therefore delay is justified. E Criminal Procedure Code 1973--Sections 327 (2) and (3)--Sexual o.ffences--/n camera trial should be the rule and open court trial an exception. According to the prosecution, the Prosecutrix aged around 15 years, was going to her uncle's home after giving her matriculation examination and was abducted by the respondents. They took her to a tubewell kotha and made her drink liquor ignoring her protest, telling her that it was only F fruit juice. Thereafter all the three respondents had sexual intercourse with her without her consent and against her will. Next day, in the mo ruing the prosecutrix was dropped by the respondents at the same place from where she was abducted. The prosecutrix after giving her examination on that day returned to her house and told P. W. 7 (Mother) her traumatic G experience. P.W. 6 (Father) learnt about "}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 190", "case_name": "RANJITSING BRAHMAJEETSING SHARMA v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.", "year": "2005", "cite_indeg": 28, "issue": "", "held": ", provisions of the Act must receive a strict construction so as to pass the test ofreasonableness-s. 21(4) must be construed reasonably so that the court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and D conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial- Prima faie s.3(2) is not attracted-Order granting interim bail to continue- Penal Code-ss. 107 and JOB-Constitution of India-Article 21. Evidence-Brain mapping test report-Admissibility of Words and Phrases : Expressions, 'abet', and 'conspiracy '-Meaning of in the context of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, I 999 : E A case of printing counterfeit stamps and forgery in various States p including the State of Maharashtra was unearthed and fake stamp papers worth lacs of rupees were recovered during appellant's tenure as Commissioner of Police, Pune. One 'T' was arrested and a case initially under various sections of Penal Code was registered. Later, s.3 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 was invoked. During investigation, the appellant was arrested on the alleged ground of rendition G of help and support to organized crime syndicate by acts of omission and commission, i.e. rendering help or support to a police officer through another police officer, both of whom were co-accused in the case. His bail application was rejected by the Special Judg"}, {"doc_id": "1959 INSC 2", "case_name": "DEEP CHAND v THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH  AND OTHERS", "year": "1959", "cite_indeg": 28, "issue": "", "held": ", (per curiam), that the Uttar Pradesh Transport The State 0! Uttar Service (Development) Act, 1955, did not, on the passing of the Pradesh & Othtrs Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (mo of 1956), become wholly void under Art. 254(1) of the Constitution but continued to be a valid and subsisting law supporting the scheme already framed under the U.P. Act. Even assuming that the Amending Act had the effect, under Art. 254(2), of repealing the State Act, such repeal could not nullify the scheme already framed under that Act, for the provisions of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act would operate to save it. Nor could it be said, having regard to the provisions of the impugned Act and particularly s. u(5) thereof, that it offended Art. 31 of the Constitution as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, by failing to provide for the payment of adequate compensation. Per Das, C.J., and Sinha, ].-There was no reason why the doctrine of eclipse as explained in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 589, could not also apply to a post-Constitution .law that infringed a fundamental right conferred on citizens alone. Such a law, though shadowed and rendered ineffective by the fundamental right so far as the citizens were concerned, would remain effective so far as non- citizens were concerned. The moment the shadow was removed by a cons"}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 841", "case_name": "NEERU YADAV v STATE OF U.P AND ANOTHER", "year": "2014", "cite_indeg": 28, "issue": "", "held": ": The accused was a history-sheeter and number of cases have been lodged against him - In the present case allegations against him were different from the co-accused - Therefore, grant of bail by the High Court on the ground of parity without scrutinizing every aspect of the D 'case, was not justified - The order, granting bail is set aside -8~ . Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The liberty is a priceless treasure for a E human being. It is founded on the bed rock of constitutional 'right and accentuated further on human rights principle. It is basically a natural right. It cannot be allowed to be paralysed and immobilized. Deprivation of liberty of a person has enormous. impact on his mind as F well as body. But, the liberty of an individual is not absolute. The society by its collective wisdom through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an individual when an individual becomes ' a danger to the collective and to the societal order. G Therefore, when an individual behaves in a disharmonious manner ushering in disorderly things which the society disapproves, the legal consequences are bound to follow. At that stage, the Court cannot 453 H 454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R. A abandon its sacrosanct obligation and pass an order at its own whim or caprice. It has to be guided by the established parameters of law. [Para 16] [463-C-H; 464"}, {"doc_id": "2019 INSC 889", "case_name": "PIONEER URBAN LAND AND INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED & ANR. v UNION OF INDIA & ORS.", "year": "2019", "cite_indeg": 28, "issue": "", "held": ": Constitutionality of the Amendment Act is upheld \u2013 Amendment to the Code does not infringe Arts. 14, 19(1)(g) r/w Art. 19(6), or 300-A \u2013 Constitution of India \u2013 Arts. 14, 19(1)(g) r/w Art. 19(6), 300-A \u2013 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018. s.7 \u2013 Amendment to the Code whereby home buyers categorized as financial creditors under the Code \u2013 Reasons for amendment \u2013 Held: Insolvency Law Committee found that delay in completion of flats/apartments has become a common phenomenon, and amounts raised from homebuyers contributes significantly to financing of the construction of such flats/apartments \u2013 Thus, it was important, to clarify that homebuyers are treated as financial creditors so that they can trigger the Code u/s. 7 and have their rightful place in the Committee of Creditors when it comes to making important decisions as to execution of the real estate project in which homebuyers are ultimately to be housed \u2013 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code vis-\u00e0-vis Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act (RERA) \u2013 Held: Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act is to be read harmoniously with the Code, as amended by the Amendment Act \u2013 In case of conflict, [2019] 10 S.C.R. 381 381 A B C D E F G H 382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 10 S.C.R. the Code will prevail over RERA \u2013 It cannot be said that RERA "}, {"doc_id": "1962 INSC 279", "case_name": "M.R. BALAJI AND OTHERS v STATE OF MYSORE", "year": "1963", "cite_indeg": 28, "issue": "", "held": ", that the impugned order was a fraud on the consti- tutional power conferred on the State by Art. 15 (4) and the 'ame be quashed. The impugned order categorises the backward classes on the sole basis of caste which is not permitted by Art. 15 (4). The reservation of 68% seats is inconsistent with the concept of the special provision authorised by Art. 15 (4). However, this Court would not attempt to Jay down definitely and in an inflexible manner as to what should be the proper percentage for reservation. Reservation should and must be adopted to advance the prospects of weaker sections of society, but while doing so, care should be taken not to exclude admission to higher educational centres of deserving and qualified candidates of other com\u00b7 munities. Reservations under Arts. 15 (4) and 16 f4) ltt\"St be within reasonable limits. The interests of weaker ~Hoos of society, which are a first caarge on the States and the dentrc, have to be adjusted with the interests of thr. community as a whole. Speaking generally and in a broad way, 11 special provislon should be less than 50%. The actual percentage must depend upon the relevant prevailing circumstances in each case. The object of Art. 15 (4) ls to advance the intereits of the society as a whole by looking after the interests of tHc weaker clements in 1ociety. If a provision under Art. 15 ( 4) ignores the intereotl of society, "}, {"doc_id": "2019 INSC 1256", "case_name": "COMMITTEE OF CREDITORS OF ESSAR STEEL INDIA LIMITED THROUGH AUTHORISED SIGNATORY v SATISH KUMAR GUPTA & ORS.", "year": "2019", "cite_indeg": 28, "issue": "", "held": ": Role of resolution professional is not adjudicatory but administrative - Resolution professional manages the affairs of the corporate debtor as a going concern from the stage of admission of an application u/ss. 7, 9 or 10 - He appoints and convenes meetings of the Committee of Creditors \u2013 He collects, collates and finally admit claims of all creditors, which must then be examined for payment, by the resolution applicant and be finally negotiated and decided by the Committee of Creditors. Prospective resolution applicant - Role of \u2013 Explained. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 \u2013 Committee of creditors - Role of, in the corporate resolution process \u2013 Held: Committee of Creditors decides on whether or not to rehabilitate the corporate debtor by means of acceptance of a particular resolution plan \u2013 Committee of Creditors may approve a resolution plan by a vote of not less than 66% of the voting share of the financial creditors, after considering its feasibility and viability, and various other requirements as may be prescribed by the Regulations - Ultimately it is the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors which operates to approve the best resolution plan, which is finally accepted after negotiation of its terms by such Committee with prospective resolution applicants \u2013 Furthermore, the Committee of Creditors does not act in any fiduciary capacity to any group of cr"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 138", "case_name": "BHATIA INTERNATIONAL v BULK TRADING S.A. AND ANR.", "year": "2002", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ", may not be ousted unless explicitly expressed by the statutory provisions or by inferential conclusion. A B c Provisions of Part-I-Applicability to arbitration proceedings and D International Commercial Arbitration in India. Deviation from provisions-Extent of-Parties can deviate from the provisions to the extent permitted as per Part-I of the Act-For International Commercial Arbitration parties by an agreement may exclude all or any E provisions of the Act. Application for interim measure-Maintainability of-Such Application can be submitted to Courts in India irrespective of place of arbitration but before expiry of time of execution of the Award. Interim Award-Interim Order-Distinction between-Though Arbitral Tribunal could pass an interim award under Part-II of the Act, yet an interim order passed by it would not be enforceable in India. F Legislative lntent--Provisions of Part-! is compulsorily applicable to arbitration including an International Commercial Arbitration in India-Parties G by an agreement can declare that Part-1 or any of its provisions will not apply to arbitration-UNC!TRAL Model Laws Article I (2). Interpretation of Statutes: Statutory provisions-Possibility of more than one interpretation-Court H 411 412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] 2 S.C.R. A to choose that interpretation which repre~ents the true intention of the ,,4.... legislature-In the unforeseen s"}, {"doc_id": "1999 INSC 407", "case_name": "AJIT SINGH AND ORS. v THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.", "year": "1999", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ", roster point promotees cannot count their seniority over general candidate from the date of their continuous officiation D in the promotional posts-Senior general candidates at lower level reaching the promotional level later will have to be treated as senior to reserved category candidates-Seniority of reserved category candidates promoted to higher level ignoring the general category candidates has to be refixed- However, if the reserved category candidates are otherwise eligible and posts E are available for promotion, cannot be denied right to be considered for promotion merely because senior general candidates at initial level have not reached the promotional level-Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 14, 16(1), 16(4) and l 6(4A)-Punjab Secretariat Class Ill Service Rules, 1956. Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 16(1), 16(4) and l 6(4A)-Reservation in promotion-Right to F \u00b7 be considered-Whether \"Fundamental\" or \"Statutory\"-Held, Articles 16(4) and 16(4A) do not confer any fundamental right and are only enabling provisions-They confer only a discretion but do not confer any duty or G obligation. Articles 16(4) and 16(4A) and 16(1) r!w 14-Reservation in promotion-Roster point promotees vis-a-vis-general candidates-Balancing of fundamental rights and rights of reserved candidate-Held, a reasonable H 521 522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 4 s.c:R .. A balance has to"}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 590", "case_name": "MOHD. ARIF @ASHFAQ v HE REGISTRAR, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA & ORS.", "year": "2014", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ": Per majority: Limited oral hearing at review stage in death sentence cases is mandated by Art. 21 of the Constitutio_n, hence permissible - Per Minority: Not permissible - There is no obligation u!Art. 21 to grant oral hearing - The rule of D audi alteram partem does not take within its sweep right to make oral submission - Constitution of India, 1950- Arts. 21 and 137. Disposing of the writ petitions, the Court HELD: MAJORITY OPINION: Per R.F. Nariman, J. (for himself and Lodha. Khehar and Sikri. JJ.l : E F 1 . .Crime and punishment are two sides of the same coin. Punishment must fit the crime. The notion of 'Just deserts' or a sentence proportionate to the offender's culpability was the principle which, by passage of time, G became applicable to criminal jurisprudence. There are no statutory guidelines to regulate punishment. Therefore, in practice, there is much variance in the matter of sentencing. The Judges exercise wide discretion 1009 H . 1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 11 S.C.R. I A within the statutory limits and the scope for deciding the .amount of punishment is left to the judiciary to reach decision after hearing the parties. [Para 30] [1031-C\u00b7G] 2.1. The fundamental right to life and the irreversibility 8 of a death sentence mandate that oral hearing be given at the review stage in death sentence cases, as a just, fair and reasonable procedure under Article 2"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 693", "case_name": "HARI RAM v STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.", "year": "2009", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ": In view of conjoint reading of ss. 2(k}, c 2(1), 7 A, 20 and 49 rlw rr. 12 and 98 of Juvenile Justice Rules, the provision Of the Act are applicable to such juvenile - The Act is applicable even in finally disposed of cases - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 - rr. 12 and 98. D .,., Nature and object of the Act - Discussed - Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 15(3), 39(e) and (f), 45 and 47 - c Convention on the Rights of the Child and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985. E Criminal Law - Claim of juvenility - If two views possible - Court to lean in favour of holding the offender to be a juvenile ~~ in borderline cases. Appellant-accused was arrested for commission of F offences ulss. 148, 302, 149, 3251149 and 323/149 l.P.C. The Trial Court determined the age of the appellant- accused to be below 16 years on the date of the commission of the offences and thus declaring him to be ' a juvenile directed the case to Juvenile Justice Board for G .. /\u2022~ the trial of his case. Cross appeals were filed by the appellant-accused as well as the State. The appeal of the accused challenging the framing of charges was dismissed by High Court. Appeal of the State was allowed 623 H 624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R. A by High Court holding that he was not a juvenile because .;. according to his d"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 179", "case_name": "YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON v THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THROUGH CBI,  BOMBAY", "year": "2013", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ": The confessional statements of accused and co-accused as a/so the evidence of approver and other prosecution witnesses, the recoveries made and other evidences, establish the guilt of all accused- appellants - Their conviction affirmed - The sentence of dea.th E to first accused-appellant affirmed - Sentence of remaining ten, accused-appellants commuted to rigorous imprisonment for life - Life imprisonment means the whole natural life - Therefore, subject to ss. 432 and 433 of the Code and clemency powers of President and Governor under Arts. 72 F and 161 of the Constitution, the ten accused-appellants shall be imprisoned for life until their death - The executive should take due consideration of judicial reasoning before exercising the remission power - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 120-B, 302, 307, 324, 427, 435, 436, 201 and 212 - Arms Act, 1959 - ss. G 3, 7, 25 (1-A), (1-BO - Explosives Act, 1884 - ss. 9-B (1 )(a) (b), and (c)-Explosive Substances Act, 1908 - ss. 3, 4(a), 5 and 6 - Prevention of Damage to Public Property, Act, 1984 - s. 4 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 432 and 433 1 H 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 15 S.C.R. A - Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 72 and 161. PENAL CODE, 1860. s. 120-8 - Criminal conspiracy - Explained - Held. To bring home the charge of conspiracy within the ambit of s. B 120-8, it is necessary to establish that there was an agreement"}, {"doc_id": "1954 INSC 5", "case_name": "JAGANNATH v JASWANT SINGH AND OTHERS", "year": "1954", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ", (i) that non-con1pliance with the provisions of s. 82 of the Representation of the People Ac_t, 1951 (XLIII of 1951), and the omission of a proper party from the list of respondents is not fatal and the tribunal is entitled to deal \\Vith the tnatter in accordance with the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure which have been ma<le expressly applicable; . (ii) that it is one of the rules of construction that a provi- sion similar to the one in s. 82 is not mandatory unless non- compliance \\Vith it is made penal. Order XXXIV, r. l, of the Code of Civil Procedure, referred to. General principles governing the decision of election peti- tions discussed. C1v1L APPELLATE JuRISDICTJON : Civil Appeal No. 100 of 1953. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order, dated the 27th November, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature, Punjab, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Civil Writ No. 65-D of 1952 arising out of the , S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 893 Judgment and Order, <lated the 11th November, 1952, of the Election Tribunal at Delhi in. Election Petition No. 10 of 1952. N. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha, with him) for the appellant. S. P. Sinha (R .. Patnaik, with him) for the respondent. 1954. January 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MAHAJAN C. J .-This is an appeal by special leave against the decision of the Delhi Election Tribunal, dated the 11th November, 1952, in Election"}, {"doc_id": "2010 INSC 146", "case_name": "PTC INDIA LTD. v CENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION  THROUGH SECRETARY", "year": "2010", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ": A regulation u/s. 178 is made under the authority of delegated E legislation and its validity can be tested only in judicial review and not by way of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal uls. 111 - Section 121 does not confer power of judicial review of the validity of the Regulations made u/s. 178, on the Appellate Tribunal - Applying the principle of \"generality versus F enumeration'; CERC empowered to cap the trading margin under the authority of delegated legislation u/s. 178 - Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Fixation of Trading Margin) Regulations, 2006. Administrative law: Rules and Regulations vis-a-vis Law enacted by legislative - Nature of - Similarity between. 609 G H 610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 3 S.C.R. A Quasi judicial orders and judicial decisions - Similarity B between. Order and 'Regulation' - Distinction between. Legislation: Substitution of a statutory provision - Effect of - Held: Substitution of a provision is a combination of repeal and fresh enactment. c Appellants challenged thP. vires of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Fixation of Trading Margin) Regulations, 2006 as null and void before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity and had prayed for quashing of the said Regulations. The Tribunal dismissed 0 the appeals holding that its jurisdiction was restricted by the limits imposed by the parent Statute, i.e., the Electricit"}, {"doc_id": "1952 INSC 28", "case_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR v MAHARAJADHIRAJA SIR KAMESHWAR SINGH OF DARBHANGA  AND OTHERS", "year": "1952", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": "per Curiah (MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRA\u00b7 SEKHARA AtYAR JJ.)-Thc Bihar Land Reforms Act, XXX of 1950, is not unconstitutional or void except with regard to the provisions in s. 4(b) and s. 23(f) thereof. The provisions of s. 4(b) and s. 23(f) are unconstitutional. Per PATANJALI SASTRI C. J. and DAs J~The whole of the Bihar Land Reforms Act of 1950, including the provisions contained in s. 4(b) and s. 23(f) is constitutional and valid. Per PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, D1i.s and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.-(i) The Bihar Land Reforms Act, XXX of 1950, is not a law in respect of a matter mention- ed in entry 18 of List II, viz., \"lands and land tenures\", but a law in respect of \"acquisition of property\", a matter covered by entry 36 of List II. (ii) The obligation to pay compensation for property acquired by the State is not an obligation imposed by entry 36 of List II read by itself or in conjunction with entry 42 of List III or by the spirit of the Constitution. Consequently, an objection to the validity of a statute in resixct of acquisition of property on the ground that it does not provide for payment of compen- sation is an objection on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of. art. 31(2) and the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such an objection in respect of a statute mentioned in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution is barred by art. 31(4), ar"}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 463", "case_name": "ARNESH KUMAR v STATE OF BIHAR & ANR.", "year": "2014", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ": Section 41 makes it evident that a person accused of offence punishable with imprisonment for 0 a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years with or without fine, cannot be arrested by the police officer only on its satisfaction that such person had committed the offence - Before arrest police officer to record his satisfaction with regard to factors enumerated in E clauses (a) to (e) of s.41(1) - Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and casts scars forever - The need for caution in exercising the drastic power of arrest has been emphasized time and again by courts but has not yielded desired result - The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with rest is despicable - It has become a handy tool to police F officers who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive - No arrest should be made only because the offence is non- bailable and cognizable and therefore, lawful for police officers to do so - No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against G a person - Directions given in order to ensure that police officers do not arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorise detention casually and mechanically - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 498-A - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - s.4. H 128 ARNESH KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR 129 s. 41-A - Notice of appearance before police officer - A He"}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 585", "case_name": "ZILE SINGH v STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.", "year": "2004", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ": Second Amendment D alters the text of First Amendment from the date of commencement of First Amendment-5.4. 1994-It is declaratory in nature and though not expressly retrospective, would operate retrospectively Interpretation of Statutes: Principles of construction-Retrospective operation-General rule-Held: It is cardinal principle that every statute is E prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made retrospective-However, rule is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burden or to impair existing obligations-Furthermore, presumption against retrospectivity is not applicable to explanatory and declaratory statutes. F Statute Law: Legislative Drafting-Substitution of one text for the other pre-existing text-Held: Results in repeal of earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision. Section 13A(l)(c) inserted by Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, G 1994 (Act No. 3 of 1994) in the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 imposed disqualification for holding office of member of Municipality on having more than two living children with effect from 5.4.1994. However, under the proviso person having more than two children on or after expiry of one year from 5.4.1994 were not be disqualified. In view of the absurdity, H Haryana Municipal (Second Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No. 15of1994) 272 .: . - ZILE SING"}, {"doc_id": "1999 INSC 299", "case_name": "COMMON CAUSE, A REGISTERED SOCIETY v UNION OF INDIA & ORS.", "year": "1999", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": "not valid-Direction to CB.I to investigate offence of criminal breach of trust or any other offence-Held not legal. Constitution of India, 1950 : Articles 226 and 32-Public Law-Private Law-Remedies-Violation of fundamental rights-Remedy available in public law-Also available in cases of torts. D Judicial Review-Minister-Allotment of petrol pumps out of E discretionary quota-Question of abuse C?f discretion-Matter not considered in the House-Held judicial review of such a question was permissible. Supreme Court-Power to rectify its own mistake . Article 21-Right to life-Right to enjoy life without fetters-No general F direction can be issued to CB.I or to police whether a man has committed any offence or is living as a law abiding citizen. Article 75(3)--Cabinet-\"Col/ective Responsibi/ity\"-Meaning of Article 77(3)-Government of Indi~onduct of business-A/location O of business to Ministers-Object is smooth and better administration-A Minister does not become a trustee. Articles 77(1)(2) and 360-President-Judicial immunity of-Immunity available to President cannot be extended to the orders passed in the name of the President under Article 77(1) or 77(2). 1279 H 1280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R. A Articles 142-Directions passed by Supreme Court-Held cannot ignore substantive provisions of law much less the constitutional rights available to a person. Article 300-Act of Sta"}, {"doc_id": "1955 INSC 15", "case_name": "THE  SANGRAM SINGH v ELECTION TRIBUNAL, KOTAH, BHUREY LAL BAYA", "year": "1955", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ", (I) J,Tnder section 90(2) of the Representation of the People Act the procedure for the trial of election petition is to b~, as near as may be, the same as in the trial of suits under the Civil Procedure Code; (2) under the Civil Procedure Code there is no such thing as an \"ex parte order for non-appearance\" which precludes further ap- pearance at an adjourned hearing until the Order is set aside. If a party. appears at an adjourned hearing the court has a discretion (which must be exercised judicially) either to allow him to appear on such terms as it thinks fit, or to disallow further appearance; but (3) if he is allowed to appear then, unless good cause is shown under Order 9, rule 7 for the earlier non-appearance the proceedings must continue from the stage at which the later appearance 1s entered and the party so appearing cantlot be relegated to the posi- tion he would have occupied if he had appeared at the earlier hear- ing or hearings; also, ( 4) in exercising its discretion the court must see that justice is done to all concerned, including the witnesses. Rule 6(1) (a) of Order 9 of the Civil Procedure Code is con- fined to the first hearing of the suit and does not apply, per se to subsequent hearings. 0.9, r.7 gives a pany a right to he relegated to .the position \u00b7he would have occupied if he had appeared at the earlier hearing or hearings if he shows good cause. "}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 326", "case_name": "MCDERMOTT INTERNTIONAL INC. v BURN STANDARD CO. LTD. AND ORS.", "year": "2006", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ": It is same as of interim award envisaged in the Act, even though expression \"partial award\" is not used therein-If it answered definition of award under Section 2(c), for all intent and purport, it would be a final award-It is not akin to a preliminary decree-It is final in all respects with regard to disputes referred to arbitrator which are subject matter of such award-By such an award no prejudice is caused as both partial and final awards are subject matter of challenge under Section 34-Additional award is not vitiated in law, especially keeping in view powers of arbitral tribunal under Section 33. Section 16-Plea that a claim was arbitrary or beyond its authority-- Held: It has to be raised before arbitrator. Contract-Construction of-Held: It is within jurisdiction of arbitrators even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law-In this regard conduct of parties and correspondences exchanged by them are relevant factors. Denial of claim-Held-Jn every case claim is not required to be followed_ by denial-If a matter is referred to any arbitrator within a reasonable time, the party invoking the arbitration clause may proceed on the basis that the other party to the contract has denied or disputed his claim or is not otherwise interested in referring the dispute to the arbitrator. Parties to arbitration-:-Reduction of claim of party to contract by one who was not p"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 237", "case_name": "INDIAN COUNCIL FOR ENVIRO-LEGAL ACTION v UNION OF INDIA", "year": "1996", "cite_indeg": 27, "issue": "", "held": ": Petition maintainable even if private chemical industries were not amenable to writ jurisdiction-The Cowt had power and duty to intervene and protect right to life of citizens-Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981-AIR (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981-Hazardous D Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989. Constitution of India, 1950 : Article 32. Petition complaining of pollution by private chemical industries-Court can direct Central Govemment to recover costs of remedial measures from offending industries-Question of awarding damages against these industries left open. Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986: Sections 3 & 4. Environmental Pollution-Remedial measures-Costs for carrying out-Central Govemment could levy on pollute~Such power was implicit in Sections 3 & 4. \u00b7Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986: Sections 3 & 5. E F I G Envirimmental Pollution-Remedial measures-Pollute~Liability of-To defray costs-{Jniversally accepted as sound principle-central Govemment empowered to give directions and take measures for giving effect to this principle. Environmental Pollution-chemical industries-Main culprits-Their H 503 504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R. A establishment and functioning must be scmtinized rigorously. Torts: Environmental pollutiort--Negligence-P1inciples of \"strict liability'' and \"Polluter pays\"-Applicability of-Hazardous "}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 203", "case_name": "P. RAMA CHANDRA RAO v STATE OF KARNATAKA", "year": "2002", "cite_indeg": 26, "issue": "", "held": ", such bar contrary to law laid down by larger Bench in Antulay's case-Limitation bars not good law, since the same would amount to impermissible legislation and contrary to law of precedent-To effectuate the right to speedy trial, powers under Sections 309, 311, 258 and 482 of D Code of Criminal Procedure and Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution could\u00b7 be exercised-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Sections 309, 311, 258 and 482. Doctrines: E Doctrine of precedent-Pronouncements by smaller Benches contrary F to law laid down by larger Bench-Smaller Bench is bound by view expressed by larger Bench. Judicial Review: Held, is restricted to declaring and interpreting law and removing obvious 1.:icunae and filling the gaps-Not to entrench upon the field of legislation which is meant for legislature-Constitution of India, ...J950-Articles 32, 21, 141, 142-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Chapter XXXVl G In Common Cause v. Union of India, [1996) 4 SCC 33, (Common Cause ~ I); Common Cause v. Union of India, [1996) 6 SCC 775 (Common Cause 11); Rajdev Sharma v. State of Bihar, [1998) 7 SCC (Raj Dev Sharma I); Raj Dev Sharma II v. State of Bihar, [1999) 7 SCC 604 (Raj Dev Sharma II), the Court had issued direction fixing outer time limits for conclusion of certain nature of criminal proceedings. H 60 )__ r. - -- P. RAMA CHANDRA RAO v. STA TE OF KARNAT AKA 61 In the instant appeals, accuse"}, {"doc_id": "1994 INSC 348", "case_name": "KUMARI MADHURI PATIL AND ANR. v ADDL. COMMlSSIONER, TRIBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ORS.", "year": "1994", "cite_indeg": 26, "issue": "", "held": "conclusive in nature. , F Social Status Certificate--Findings of Verification Committee-Court's interference with-Held not pennissible unless vitiated by elTor of law or non-application of mind. S applied to tl!_e Tehsildar, Andheri for issuance of a caste certificate as 'Mabadeo Koli' Scheduled Tribe. Sub- Divisional Officer, Bombay G Sub-Urb;m District refused to issue the certificate informing her that she #as-llot a Scheduled Tribe. She filed an appeal before the Addi. Commis~ sicmer, Konkan Division, Bombay. Since she had applied for M.B.B.S. admissi9n and the time for the same was running out, she filed a writ petition in the High Court for direction to the Addi. Commissioner to H dispose of her appeal and for a further direction to the Medical College J.. 50 \u00b7 K.M. PATIL v. ADDL COMMR. 51 to admit her if found fit. Before the Additional Commissioner and also in A the High Court, she relied on a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Subhash Ganpatrao Kabade v. State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition No. 438 of 1985) wherein 'Koll' was held to be 'Mahadeo Koll' i.e. Scheduled 1iibe \u2022 . -_; The High Court directed the Addi. Commissioner to dispose of the appeal who in tum directed the Tehsildar to issue a certificate which was accord\u00b7 B ingly issued to her. In the meanwhile, she had by orders of the High Court got admitted into the college and pursued her studies. Thereafter, sh"}, {"doc_id": "1962 INSC 289", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA v DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS", "year": "1963", "cite_indeg": 26, "issue": "", "held": ", that excise duty being leviable on the manufacture of goods and not on their sale, the petitioners would no doubt be liable if they produced 'refined oil', as known in the market, at an intermediate stage. But it was clear that there could be no 'refined oil' as known in the market without dcodorisatio,n according to the specification of the Indian Standards Institute and the affidavits of the experts. Since, however, the process 1 $.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 587 of deodorisation was admittedly applied in the respondents' factories only after hydrogenation was complete, they could not be said to produce 'refined oil' at any stage. Nor could the respondents be held to manufacture some kind of 'non-essential vegetable oil'. 'Processing' cannot be equated to 'manufacture' which nieans bringing into existence a new substance. The Legislature by definin~ the word 'manufacture' in s, 2(f) of the Act did not intend to make the mere processing of goods liable to duty. The words \"all sorts\" in item 23 are intended only to make it clear that vegetable non- essential oi!s. whether raw or refined, from whatever raw material produced, will be liable to excise duty."}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 301", "case_name": "BOOZ-ALLEN & HAMILTON INC. v SBI HOME FINANCE LTD. & ORS.", "year": "2011", "cite_indeg": 26, "issue": "", "held": ": Even if there is an arbitration agreement o between the parties, and even if the dispute is covered by the arbitration agreement, the court where the civil suit is pending, will refuse an application uls. 8, to refer the parties to arbitration, if the subject matter of the suit is capable of adjudication only by a public forum or the relief claimed can E only be granted by a special court or Tribunal. s. 8 - First statement on substance of dispute - Defendant filed detailed affidavit opposing interim injunction application filed by plaintiff in a pending suit - Later the defendant filed application u/s. 8 praying that the parties to the F suit be referred to arbitration - Whether the counter affidavit filed by the defendant, in regard to the notice of motion for temporary injunction, amounted to submission of first statement on the substance of the dispute, and therefore the defendant lost the right to seek reference to arbitration - Held: G Not only filing of the written statement in a suit, but filing of any statement, application, affidavit filed by a defendant prior to the filing of the written statement will be construed as 'submission of a statement on the substance of the dispute', if by filing such statement/application/affidavit, the defendant H 310 BOOZ-ALLEN & HAMILTON INC. v. SBI HOME 311 FINANCE LTD. & ORS. shows his intention to submit himself to the jurisdictio"}, {"doc_id": "1961 INSC 196", "case_name": "THE GENERAL MANAGER, SOUTHERN RAILWAY v RANGACHARI", "year": "1962", "cite_indeg": 26, "issue": "", "held": ", (per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, and Das Gupta, JJ.), that the impugned circulars were well within the ambit of Art. 16(4) of the Constitution and the appeal must succeed. Articles 16(1) and 16(2) of the Constitution are intended to give effect to Art. 14 and Art. 15(1) of the Constitution and these Articles form parts of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. Article 16(1) should, therefore, be construed in a broad and general, and not pedan- tic and technical way. So construed, \"matters relating to em- ployment\" cannot mean merely matters prior to the act of appointment nor can 'appointment to any office' mean merely the initial appointment but must include all matters relating to employment, whether prior or subsequent to the employment, that are either incidental to such employment or form part of its terms and conditions and also include promotion to a selec~ lion post. Although Art. 16(4), which in substance is an exception to Arts. 16(1) and 16(2) and should, therefore, be strictly con- strued, the court cannot in construing it overlook the extreme solicitude shown by the Constitution for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. The scope of Art. 16(4), though not as extensive as that of Art. 16(1) and (2),-and some of the matters relatinr; to employ- ment such as salary, increment, gratuity, pension and the"}, {"doc_id": "1997 INSC 622", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v G. GANAYUTHAM (DEAD) BY LRS.", "year": "1997", "cite_indeg": 26, "issue": "", "held": ", 'reasonableness' and 'rationality' C are grounds for judicial review-Doctrine of 'proportionality'--Held, can also \u00b7 be invoked where the court is examining whether the restrictions on fun- damental freedoms imposed by a statute are within the constitutional limits-Question however left open whether the doctrine of proportionality could be applied to administrative or executive actions affecting fundamental freedoms and if it applies, whether the court would perf onn the 'primary' or D secondary role-Tests for detennining 'reasonableness', 'rationality' and 'proportionality' indicated. Doctrines: Doctrine of Proportionality- Nature and scope of-Position in India E and England discussed. \\ Judicial review-Scope of-'Margin of appreciation' and administrative authority-Discussed. Service Law : Departmental enquiry-Punishment-Judicial review-Scope of- Retiral benefits---Gratuity-Withholding of pursuant to a departmental in- quiry-Held, valid under Rule 9(1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules. Words and Phrases : 'Reasonableness', 'rationality' and 'proportionality'-Meaning of-ln the context of judicial review of administrative action. The respondent, an Excise Superintendent, was served with a memo F G of eight charges and inquiry was conducted. Out of eight, six charges were H 549 550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A proved and one charge was partly proved. Thereafter, unde"}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 294", "case_name": "T.T. ANTONY v STATE OF KERALA AND ORS.", "year": "2001", "cite_indeg": 26, "issue": "", "held": ", there can be no second FIR in respect of the same cognizable offence-Only information first entered in the Station House Diary can be regarded as FIR under Section 154-All subsequent information regarding the case, will fall under Section 162. Power of Police officer to investigate a case-Scope of-Held, Police Officer not merely to investigate a congnizable offence reported in FIR but all other connected offences committed in the course of same transaction. Constitution of India, J 950-Articles 226, 227 and J 36-Statuto1y power of police officer to investigate a congnizable offence-lnteiference by Courts-Permissibility of-Filing of second FIR and fresh investigation in respect of the same cognizable offence-Validity of-Held, power of investigation can be inteifered with. if the police officer transgresses his statut01y power-Registration of second FIR and fi\u00b7esh investigation pursuant thereto is beyond the purview of sections 154 and 156 and amounts to abuse of process of statut01y power of investigation-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Sections 482, 154, 156. Commission of lnqui1y Act, 1952-Section 3(1)-Report of Commission of biqui1y-Nature of-Held, not binding on government or courts-However, investigating agency can adva.ntageously make use of such report. Words and Phrases F.l.R.\u00b7-Meaning of in the context of Section 154 of Criminal Procedure Code. 1973. During the Visit of"}]