[{"doc_id": "2021 INSC 289", "case_name": "ACHHAR SINGH v STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH", "year": "2021", "issue": "", "held": ": High Court rightly interfered with the perverse findings of the trial court and prevented miscarriage of justice by convicting the appellants \u2013 High Court went through the consistent evidence against some of the accused which were overlooked by the trial court amid the chaos in evidence, and on basis of the evidence, convicted one accused u/s. 302 IPC and other u/ss. 326 and 323 IPC \u2013 Trial court erred in overlooking the credible and consistent evidence while proceeding with a baseless premise that the exaggerated statements made by the eye-witnesses belie their version \u2013 Trial court due to many contradictions failed to identify and appreciate material admissible evidence against the accused \u2013 Thus, the finding of the trial court in ignorance of the relevant material on record was perverse and called for interference from the High Court \u2013 Penal Code, 1860 \u2013 ss. 302, 323, 326, 452 \u2013 Evidence \u2013 Eye witnesses. Criminal jurisprudence: Cardinal rule \u2013 Held: Every person is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty \u2013 It is obligatory on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused save where the presumption of innocence has been statutorily dispensed with \u2013 This presumption of innocence is doubled when a competent Court analyses the material evidence, examines witnesses and acquits the accused \u2013 When two reasonable and possible views arise, the one favourable to the accu"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 423", "case_name": "K.A. NAGAMANI v INDIAN AIRLINES & ORS.", "year": "2009", "issue": "", "held": ": Mere description of rules of Administrative practice as 'rules' does not make them statutory Rules - The agreement! settlement are complimentary to each other and have to be read together - Also it has-the effect of protanto amending the Recruitment and Promotion Rules - The Air Corporations E Act, 1953 - Indian Airlines Corporation Employees Service Regulations, 1955 - Constitution of India, Articles 14, 16. \" In this appeal against High Court's judgment, the issue that arose for consideration was whether the Recruitment & Promotion Rules in the Indian Airlines are F statutory in nature of mere administrative instructions. The appellant contended that promotion to the post of Deputy Manager (Maintenance/Systems) could not have been made based on the terms of the settlement G between Indian Airlines and its Officers' Association ,.., contrary to the Recruitment and Promotion Rules. .J Dismissing the appeal, the Court 89 H 90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R. A HELD: 1.1. The Recruitment and Promotion Rules were framed in e'xercise of the powers conferred under the Regulatiom;. There is no power vested in the Corporation to make any rules since Section 44 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 confers power to make rules only B in the Central Government and not in the Corporation. The Corporation is enititled to make only regulations which it did and published by way of Notific"}, {"doc_id": "1994 INSC 172", "case_name": "SARDAR SINGH v SMT. KRISHNA DEVI AND ANR.", "year": "1994", "issue": "", "held": "unregistered award is not per se inadmis- sible in evidence-Registration is compulsory if the award creates a title or c interest in immova.ble propertyfor the first time-lf it contains a mere dee/a- ration of a pre-existing right then registration is not compulsory. Private Arbitrator-Award pertaining to immovable property-Nature of-Held non-testamentary instrument under section 17(/)(b). D ~ Specific Relief Act, 1963 : Section 20-Suit for specific peifor- mance-Coult-l'ower to grant relief is discretionaiy-Conduct of parties may > disentitle them to relief Section !];-Specific peiformance of part of contracr-House-Co-par- E ceners and co-owner brothers in joint possession-Sale by one brothe,-Other brother not a party io the agreement-Purchaser not making. enquiries as to whether vendor-brother had exclusive title-Suit for specific peifor- mance-Grant of decree in respect of entire property held not justified-Held purchaser was entitled to enforce decree to the extent of half-share of vendor- t brother only. F The appellant's brother pnrchased a house from the Ministry of Rehabilitation for which a sale certificate was issued in bis name. The appellant raised a dispute claiming half share in the property which was referred to private arbitrators for adjudication. The arbitrators gave their G award holding that (i) though the sale deed was taken by the appellant's brother in hi"}, {"doc_id": "2021 INSC 71", "case_name": "RAMESH KYMAL v M/S SIEMENS GAMESA RENEWABLE POWER PVT. LTD.", "year": "2021", "issue": "", "held": ":Untenable, as it is contrary to the disclosure made by the appellant in the demand notice issued in pursuance of the provisions of s.8(1) and s.9 \u2013Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 \u2013 r.5. Words & Phrases: \u201cshall be filed\u201d in first proviso to s.10A\u2013Plea of the appellant is that the said expression indicates prospective nature of the provision so as to apply only to the applications filed after 05 June 2020, the date on which the provision was inserted\u2013 Held: Rejected\u2013 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 \u2013 s.10A. \u201cfrom such date\u201d in s.10A \u2013Intention of Legislature \u2013 Discussed \u2013 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 \u2013 s.10A. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 The attempt to set back the date of default to either 21 January 2020 or 23 March 2020 is plainly untenable for the reason that it is contrary to the disclosure made by the appellant in the demand notice which has been issued in pursuance of the provisions of Section 8(1) and Section 9 of the IBC.[Para 10][990-F-G] 1.2 The financial distress caused by the outbreak of Covid- 19 provides the backdrop to the insertion of Section 10A. The underlying rationale for the insertion of Section 10A has been explained in the recitals to the Ordinance. Section 10A is prefaced with a non-obstante provision which has the effect of overriding Sections 7, 9 and 10. The proviso to Section 10"}, {"doc_id": "1995 INSC 279", "case_name": "RADHAKISAN RATHI v ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR, DURG AND ORS.", "year": "1995", "issue": "", "held": ", Janapada Panchayats are entitled to impose theatre tax on such theatres and there will be no double taxation involved in such a case. The appellants, owners of cinema theatres, filed writ petitions before the High Court challenging the imposition of theatre tax by the concerned D Janapada Panchayats on the ground that they were already paying theatre tax under the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 or the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Their case was that once cinema taxes were imposed on cinema theatres by concerned local authori.ties, they could not be taxed by Janapada Panchayats by way of E theatre tax. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Aggri.eved, tho theatre owners filed the appeals by special leave It was contended for the appellants that the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962 was concerned with only rural areas and theatres situated in urban areas like Municipal Council or the Corporation limits F could not be covered by the tax net available under the Panchayats Act \"- Dismissing the appeals, this Court HELD : 1. A cinema theatre situated within the territorial limits of local municipality or a corporation can be taxed by the concerned G municipality In exercise of Its powers under the relevant Municipal Act. But If the same theatre is also situated within a block duly constituted under the Panchayats Act it would fall within the terr"}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 122", "case_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS. v BHAJAN SINGH AND ANR.", "year": "2001", "issue": "", "held": ", law relating to elections is creaJion of sta/ute, D which has to be strictly interpreted and effected-There is no unbridled power to notify or not to notify the election as it would be contrary to the concept of democracy, rule of law and mandate of the Act-Even if Respondent No. 1 incurred some disqualifications, he should have been intimated and there can \" be no justification for not doing so-Principal Secretary persistantly deprived E him from performing his functions as an elected representative for 3 years and \"\"'l this loss cannot be compensated under any law-Principal Secretary person- ally held liable to pay exemplary costs of Rs. 25,000. Section 16 and 24 (2) proviso (/)-Power of Stale Government to remove ftvm membership of council on grounds of misconduct-Held, there F are other disqualifications provided under the Act and other laws which can be relied on for taking action-Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994-- Section II. Words and Phrases-Meaning of \"flagrant abuse of power\" in the G context of Punjab Municipal Act, 1911-Sections 16(/)(e) and 20. _.., Appellants and in particular the Principal Secretary of the State Government did not allow Respondent No. 1 who was an elected repre- sentative to the Municipal Council to perform his functions in order to further the interest of the ruling party. Later on, he was also elected as H 149 150 SUPREME COURT REPO"}, {"doc_id": "2025 INSC 723", "case_name": "Raghunath Sharma & Ors. v State of Haryana & Anr.", "year": "2025", "issue": "Correctness and legality of the impugned judgment whereby the High Court restored FIR previously quashed, recalling the order of quashment. Headnotes\u2020 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 \u2013 ss.362, 482 \u2013 Power under \u2013 Scope \u2013 Criminal cases were quashed u/s.482 on the ground of compromise entered into between the parties \u2013 However, the complainant, filed an application for revival of the FIRs \u2013 High Court ordered revival of the FIRs \u2013 Impermissibility:", "held": ": 1.1 s.362 provides that a Court shall not, once it has signed the judgment or final order disposing of a case, alter or review the same, except to correct an error clerical or arithmetic \u2013 Bar u/s.362 is almost absolute \u2013 The only exceptions to the bar, which would then permit the invocation of inherent powers, would be if it is necessary to meet the ends of justice; or to remedy the abuse of the process of law \u2013 In such extraordinary circumstances, the Court should record reasons for exercising such power, justifying the invocation thereof. [Paras 8, 14] 1.2 Once a judgment has been passed, the powers u/s.482 do not permit its alteration or review \u2013 Such power is meant solely to secure the ends of justice and it cannot be taken to mean doing something that is expressly prohibited by statute \u2013 The role of the Court, after a judgment has been delivered, is circumscribed by the law itself \u2013 In the present facts, the only provision of law, that permits an alteration in the judgment, in its own terms, was not resorted to \u2013 What was done was a review of the * Author [2025] 5 S.C.R. \b 2129 Raghunath Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr. judgment quashing the proceedings which was not permissible. [Paras 10, 11] 1.3 Impugned judgment was passed by the High Court without any authority or basis \u2013 Once the criminal cases had been quashed, u/s.482 on the ground of compromise entered "}, {"doc_id": "1961 INSC 175", "case_name": "NAV RATTANMAL AND OTHERS v THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "year": "1962", "issue": "", "held": ", that statutes cif limitation are designed for the bene- ficent public purpose of preventing the taking away from one what he has been permitted to consider his own for a long time and on the faith of which he plans his future life. If the suit was by a private individual the suit would have fallen under art. 83 and would have been barred by it but different considerations arise in the case of the State and there is a distinction between claims by the Government and those -of private individuals. Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which fixes a period of 60 years for suits by the Government has a reasonable basis of classification between the Government and private individuals, and the exact period that should be allowed to the Government to file a suit would be a matter of legislative policy and as such its constitutional validity cannot be questioned under Art. 14 of the Constitution. Purushottam Govindji Halai v. Desai, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 887, Collector of Malabar v. Ebrahim, [1957] S.C.R. 970 and Mannalal v. Collector of ]halwar, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 962, applied. Crv1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 454of1957. Appeal from the judgment and order dated Decem- ber 16, 1954, of the Court of Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer in Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1952. \u00b7 ' r A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and I'. L. Vohra, for the appeJ!ants. G. C. Kasliwal, Advo"}, {"doc_id": "2021 INSC 21", "case_name": "TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD v ABDUL SALAM SARKAR (DEAD) AND OTHERS", "year": "2021", "issue": "", "held": ": Justified \u2013 On facts, claim for interest on solatium had not been rejected by the reference court \u2013 High Court had held that the issue as to whether interest on solatium would be granted would depend on the outcome of the proceedings pending before Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh case \u2013 Liberty was thus granted by the High Court to institute proceedings before the Sub Court after the matter was resolved in Gurpreet Singh case \u2013 Gurpreet Singh case mandates a test that interest on solatium would be payable if the reference court has either not referred to it or has not rejected it expressly or by necessary implication, and the claim can only be made in pending execution proceedings. \u2013 Hence, on facts, inter parties, respondents entitled to apply for grant of interest on solatium, though the earlier execution petition was closed since their claim had not been rejected at any antecedent stage and had been kept open \u2013 Reference court to verify the computations and to pass appropriate orders \u2013 In terms of the judgment in Gurpreet Singh case, interest on solatium payable w.e.f date of judgment in Sunder vs Union of India (19 September 2001). Disposing the appeal, the Court HELD:1.1. Gurpreet Singh case mandates a test that interest on solatium would be payable if the reference court has either not referred to it or has not rejected it expressly or by necessary implication. Moreover"}, {"doc_id": "2023 INSC 286", "case_name": "MAH. ADIWASI THAKUR JAMAT SWARAKSHAN SAMITI v THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.", "year": "2023", "issue": "", "held": ": Only when the Scrutiny Committee after holding an enquiry is not satisfied with the material produced by the applicant, the case can be referred to Vigilance Cell \u2013 While referring the case to Vigilance Cell, the Scrutiny Committee must record brief reasons for coming to the conclusion that it is not satisfied with the material produced by the applicant \u2013 Only after a case is referred to the Vigilance Cell for making enquiry, an occasion for the conduct of affinity test will arise \u2013 When an affinity test is conducted by the Vigilance Cell, the result of the test along with all other material on record having probative value will have to be taken into consideration by the Scrutiny Committee for deciding the caste validity claim \u2013 In short, affinity test is not a litmus test to decide a caste claim and is not an essential part in the process of the determination of correctness of a caste or tribe claim in every case. Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De- notified Tribes, (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward A B C D E F G H 1101 Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000 \u2013 Maharashtra Scheduled Tribes (Regulation of Issuance and verification of) Certificate Rules, 2003 \u2013 Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, De- notified Tribes, (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special"}, {"doc_id": "1989 INSC 248", "case_name": "SHAM SUNDAR & ORS. v STATE OF HARYANA", "year": "1989", "issue": "", "held": ", no vicarious liability in criminal law unless statute so specifies. D The short supply of levy rice to the State Government by licensed millers is a contravention of the Haryana Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1979 made under s. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The said contravention is punishable under s. 7 of the Act. Under s. 10(1) of the Act a person is deemed to be guilty of contravention of such r an order, if he was in charge of and was responsible to the company for E the conduct of its business. Under the proviso thereto, a person is, however, not liable to any punishment if he proves that the contraven- t.ion took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention. Under explanation (a) to the - section the term \"compauy\" includes a firm or other association of individuals. ~ F The appellants, partners of a firm running a rice mill, were con- v.icted for contravention of the provisions of the procurement order read with s. 7 of the Act, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and fine. The High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence. G In this appeal by special leave, it was contended for the appellants that there was no evidence adduced by the prosecution that they were in charge of the business of the firm when the offence was committed and ~ in the absence of any such evidence the conviction could not be s"}, {"doc_id": "2025 INSC 808", "case_name": "Greater Mohali Area Development Authority (GMADA) Through Its Estate Officer (H) v Anupam Garg Etc.", "year": "2025", "issue": "Matter pertains to correctness of the order passed by the National Commission imposing liability on the Development Authority to pay for interest paid by the respondents-buyers for loans secured for the flat, on account of delay in delivery of possession of flats. Headnotes\u2020 Consumer Protection Act, 1985 \u2013 Compensation \u2013 Liability of the Development Authority to pay interest on the loan taken by the buyers for delay in delivery of flats/plots \u2013 On facts, consumer complaint by the buyer for refund of money paid on account of delay in delivery of flat \u2013 Direction by the State Commission to the D", "held": ": Commission was to compute an amount as compensation, in which one of the factors would be that in order to secure a property in the scheme floated by the Development Authority, the buyers had taken out a loan and would be liable to pay interest thereon \u2013 However, this order does not permit the interest on the loan, in its entirety, to be saddled by the authority responsible for the housing scheme and the delay \u2013 Orders of the Commissions does not reveal any exceptional or strong reasons for the interest on the loan taken by the buyers to be paid by the Development Authority \u2013 Whether the buyers of the flat do so by utilizing their * Author [2025] 7 S.C.R. \b 381 Greater Mohali Area Development Authority (GMADA) Through Its Estate Officer (H) v. Anupam Garg Etc. savings, taking a loan for such purpose or securing the required finances by any other permissible means, is not a consideration that the developer of the project is required to keep in mind \u2013 The one who is buying a flat is a consumer, and the one who is building it is a service provider \u2013 That is the only relationship between the parties \u2013 If there is a deficiency or delay in service, the consumer is entitled to be compensated for the same \u2013 Repayment of the entire principal amount along with 8% interest thereon, as stipulated in the contract, alongside the clarification that there would be no other liability on the a"}, {"doc_id": "1962 INSC 166", "case_name": "S.S. GAREWAL v MESSRS. BHOWRA KANKANEE COLLERIES", "year": "1963", "issue": "", "held": ", that when an order to pay expenses is passed with- out quantifying the amount in a report by a Court of Inquiry, it necessarily carries with it the impJication that the person appointed Jo hold the enquiry would quantify the expenses later in materials heing placed before him as othenvise such an order would be rendered completely m,igatory. Where no time was fixed within \\vliich the report had to be made by the Court of enquiry it cannot be said that the period for which the Court of enquiry \\-Vas appointed necessarily came to an end with the submitting of the report and this Court of Inquiry became functua officio. ( )<.. Held, further, that when the report itself containea the order for. payment for ~\u00b7penses, the later' order is merely a /: quantification of the earlier order and would be on a par with what happens_.everyday i,n courts which pass decrees with costs. \u00b7when giving judgment, courts do not qllantify cost in th~ judgment. Therefore the order dated September 7, 1956, cannot be treated as a review or a'.ny va,:_iation of the otder. passed in th~ report of September 26, 1955, which th,l'judge had no powers\" to pass. ~ Held, also, that it was open to the Judge 'of the Court of f'\" inquiry to quantify the ex.pense\u2022 and that it '~as not necessary that at that stage the assessors 'should be a~sociated with 'him. \\Jnder 1. 24il) of the Act, the enquiry is \u2022held by a co"}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 453", "case_name": "SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND ANR. v M.K. RAFIQ SAHEB", "year": "2011", "issue": "", "held": ": It is not an absolute rule that when the acquired land is a large tract of land, sale instances relating to smaller pieces of land cannot be considered - There are certain circumstances when sale deeds of small pieces of E fand can be used to determine the value of acquired land which is comparatively large in area -The sale of land containing large tracks are generally veiy far and few - This limitation of sale transaction cannot operate to the disadvantage of the claimants - Thus, the Court should look F into sale instances of smaller pieces of /anq while applying reasonable element of deduction - In the present case, the land acquired was 34 guntas and the notification under section 4 of the Act was issued on 17. 7. 1994 - The Reference Court had relied upon the compensation awarded for G acquisition of land in the neighbouring villages, which had occurred 5 years pn\u00b7or to the present acquisition - However, the market value of the land acquired in the present case is much better reflected by exemplar Ex. P-5, which relates to sale of land just 2 kms. away from the acquired land and is H 1088 SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND ANR. v.1089 M.K. RAFIQ SAHEB just a little over a year before the issuance of the s. 4 A notification in the present case - Thus, the sale deed Ex. P- 5 was rightly relied upon by the High Court in determining \u00b7 compensation - However, High Court ma"}, {"doc_id": "1963 INSC 266", "case_name": "VIDYACHARAN SHUKLA v KHUBCHAND BAGHEL AND OTHERS", "year": "1964", "issue": "", "held": ": (per B. P. Sinha, C.J., K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JI.) (i) The exclusion of time provided for by s. 12 is permissible in computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal in the High Court. Per B. p. Sinha, C.J., K. Sobba Rao and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JI.) (ii) Though the right of appeal is conferred by s. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and it is by virtue thereof that the appeal was filed by respondent in the High Court, it is still an appeal \"under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, tO the High Court\". To attract Art. 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. it is not necessary for an appeal to be an \"appeal under the Code of Civil Pro- cedure\" that tho right to prefer the appeal should be conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is sufficient if the proccaure for the filing. of the appeal and the power of the Court for dealing With the ippeal, when filed, are &overned by the Code. Per Raghubar Dayal and Mudholkar JJ.-There is no warrant fer holding that an appeal which is not given by the Code of Civil Proce- dure is still an appeal under the Code merely because its procedural provisions govern its course. Where a right of appeal is given by some\u00b7 other law, the appeal must be regarded as one untler that law and not under the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no reason for constr.llng the words \"under "}, {"doc_id": "1997 INSC 591", "case_name": "TATA DAVY LTD. ETC. v STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.", "year": "1997", "issue": "", "held": ", Central Act does not impair or interfere with the rights of States to legislate in respect of sales tax under Entry 54 of List II. Words & Phrases : ':Any other Law\"-Meaning of-Section 22( 1) of Sick Industrial Com- panies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. F The appellant was declared a sick company under the Sick Com\u00b7 panies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (Central Act). On a reference under S.15 of the Act, an inquiry under s.16 was made and a scheme for In- dustrial and Financial Reconstruction was sanctioned by the Board. The appellant was in arrears of sales tax. Recovery of the arrears was sought G to be made by attachment of the appellant's property under Section 13-A of the Orissa Sales Tax Act (State Act). The appellant intervened in a writ petition in which the High Court was considering the question whether steps taken for recovery of sales tax und~:- s.13-A of the State Act were in the nature of proceedings by way of H execution, distress or the like contemplated by s.22(1) of the Central Act. 232 [ TATADAVYLTD.v. STATE 233 The High Court held that Section 22(1) of the Central Act would not A protect the properties of Industrial Companies from being proceeded against in exercise of the power under s.13-A of the State Act. An appeal made in the High Court to review its decision in the light of Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. & Ors. [1990] 1 SCR 966, was rejected. Hence the p"}, {"doc_id": "2025 INSC 422", "case_name": "The Secretary, All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society (AISSMS) and Ors. v The State of Maharashtra and Ors.", "year": "2025", "issue": "Whether the respondents who have admittedly completed three years of service in the pre-revised pay scale of Rs.12000-18300 (on 01.01.2006) are now entitled for pay band of Rs.37400- 67000 and AGP of Rs.9000; also, whether they are liable to be re-designated as Associate Professors. Headnotes\u2020 Service Law \u2013 Movement to a higher pay scale \u2013 When not entitled to \u2013 All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 \u2013 Vide notification dated 15.03.2000, Ph.D. was made a mandatory qualification for Lecturers/Assistant Professors for the first time \u2013 Respondents appointed after 15.03.2000, who were", "held": ": No \u2013 Respondents appointed after 15.03.2000, who were non-Ph.D. and had also failed to acquire the same within seven years of appointment as was required, cannot be given the benefit of 2010 notification inasmuch as they cannot be given a higher pay scale or re-designated as an Associate Professor \u2013 \u2018incumbent Assistant Professor\u2019 in the 2010 notification only includes such Assistant Professors working on the post who had a Ph.D. qualification at the time of their appointment or who though did not have a Ph.D. qualification at the time of their appointment but subsequently in terms of the notification dated 15.03.2000 r/w subsequent notification dated 28.11.2005 acquired Ph.D. within seven years of their appointment or those appointed prior * Author [2025] 5 S.C.R. \b 343 The Secretary, All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society (AISSMS) and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. to 15.03.2000; when Ph.D. was not an essential qualification, continued uninterruptedly. [Para 27] Judicial review \u2013 Of decisions of expert bodies in academic matters like qualification for admission of students; qualifications required by teachers for appointment; salary; promotion, entitlement to a higher pay scale etc. \u2013 Qualification for teachers in Engineering Institutes prescribed by All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) \u2013 Ph.D. made an essential qualification: Held: AICTE which is a"}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 726", "case_name": "CHOLAN ROADWAYS LTD. v G. THIRUGNANASAMBANDAM", "year": "2004", "issue": "", "held": ": Jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited and cannot be equated with section JO-Tribunal has to see whether prima facie case against delinquem employee is made out on the evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry- On facts, refusal of approval of dismissal order of driver by tribunal on the ground of non-examination of passengers when evidence adduced during D domestic enquiry showing negligence of driver-Single Judge and Division Bench of High Court upheld the order-On appeal held : Courts below failed to pose unto themselves correct questions-Tribunal did not apply the principle of res ipsa loquitur and took into consideration an irrelevant fact that the passengers of the bus were mandatorily required to pe examined-It also failed to apply standard of proof- 'preponderance of E probability' in relation to domestic enquiry-Hence, order of tribunal set aside and tribunal directed to grant approval to the dismissal ordet- Constitution of India, J950-Article 136. Maxims : Res ipsa loquitur-Principle of-Discussed. A bus met with an accident resulting in death of seven passengers. Branch Manager of the appellant-Roadways Company conducted 'on the spot inquiry and submitted a report to the effect that the respondent- driver of the bus drove the bus in a rash and negligent manner. There- after\u00b7, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the respondent and charges were framed. In"}, {"doc_id": "2017 INSC 301", "case_name": "IN RE: TO ISSUE CERTAIN GUIDELINES REGARDING  INADEQUACIES AND DEFICIENCIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS v .", "year": "2017", "issue": "", "held": ": To bring about uniform best practices to be followed by Criminal Courts across the country, general consensus to be arrived at on the need to amend relevant rules of Practice/Criminal Manuals - Suggestions also c invited on other areas of concern - Kerela Criminal Rules of Practice, 1982 - rr. 62, 132, 134 - Andhra Pradesh Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1990 - r. 66 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 164, 207, 228, 238, 244, 251, 354, 428 - Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.27, 145, 157 - Constitution of India -Art. 142 - Supreme Court - Directions/Guidelines. CRIMINAL"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 739", "case_name": "RUDRADHAR R. TRIVEDI v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH  THE SECRETARY AND ANR.", "year": "1996", "issue": "", "held": "transfer was not vitiated by any el1'or of law-Notification and declaration held not invalid-Land Acquired for pi1blic pwpose can be tran;fen\u00b7ed for other public seTVice. Tiie Industlial Development & Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Qi:,., AIR (1989) Born. 156; Union, of India v. Nand Kishore, AIR (1982) Delhi 462, held inapplicable. D Award-Delay in makin[jNotification under section 4(1) published on 11.7.1953-Dec/aration under section 6 published in 1955-56-Notice under E Section 9 issued on 15th May, 1963--0bjections filed by landowner-Personal heming given to land owners--Tiiereafter 40 awards passed in cases involving 1nassive acquisition-Delay in ]Jassing award in such circu111stances-Held does not vitiate the award. Constitution of India, 1950 : Anicle 226. Land acquisition-Writ--Oial/enge to notification and declaration-In- ordinate delay of 22 years-Refusal of relief by High Coult held justified. F"}, {"doc_id": "2024 INSC 608", "case_name": "Maheshkumar Chandulal Patel & Anr. v The State of Gujarat & Ors.", "year": "2024", "issue": "Applicability of the Rule of Stepping up of pay of a Government employee on the basis of the pay of his junior. Headnotes\u2020 Gujarat Civil Services (Pay) Rules, 2002 \u2013 Rule 21 \u2013 Stepping up of pay \u2013 Assistant Professors in Government Colleges in Gujarat \u2013 Applicability of:", "held": ": Rule of stepping up shall apply only if the anomaly is the direct result of the application of Rule 21 and only if the conditions specified therein are fulfilled \u2013 One of the condition stipulates that if even in the lower post, the junior Government employee draws a higher rate of pay than the senior, by way of fixation of the pay or by grant of advance increments, the same shall not be applicable to step up the pay of the senior Government employee \u2013 In the present case, the anomaly in pay is not a direct result of Rule 21 \u2013 Rather, the anomaly arose because of the fact that the Junior employees were granted the benefit of Senior Scale/Selection Grade Pay by taking into account the ad hoc services that they had rendered in the past \u2013 Hence, Rule 21 became inapplicable in the present case \u2013 Stepping up of pay in the present case would go against the principle of equity as the benefit cannot be given to those who were not even born in the cadre, for claiming benefits for the service that they have not actually rendered. [Paras 31, 32, 33]"}, {"doc_id": "2016 INSC 218", "case_name": "M/S. ELECTRO OPTICS (P) LTD. v STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "year": "2016", "issue": "", "held": ": Electronic survey instruments are covered by Entry 14, Part F of Schedule. Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 Part-B of the Schedule covers various kinds of goods such as agricultural products, vegetable oils, kerosene, aluminium domestic utensils, raw wool, hosiery goods, gold and silver articles, cycles, tractors, different electronic items, television sets, gramophones, all chargeable at the rate of3%. In this background, Entry 50 of Part-B is meant to accommodate only such left over electronic system, apparatus etc. which are not specified elsewhere in the Schedule and are therefore, chargeable at the rate of 3%. Clearly, if specified elsewhere and chargeable at a different rate, they cannot be included under Entry 50. This conclusion is further strengthened by a look at some of the entries in Part-F, just preceding Entry 14. Entries 10, 11, 12 and 13 cover goods chargeable at the rate of 16%, such as typewriters, teleprinters, tabulating, calculating machines and duplicating machines etc. In all these four entries there is a specific exclusion of electronic variety of these machines. On the other hand in relevant Entry no. 14 such exclusion of electronic variety of any of the machines and apparatus such as survey instruments is conspicuously missing. Clearly the intended effect is deliberate so as to include binoculars, monoculars, survey instruments etc. of a"}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 1277", "case_name": "MIS. KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v COMMR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM", "year": "2007", "issue": "", "held": ": In view of the agreement and provisions of law, liability to pay the tax was on the service recipient-Consequently liability to pay statutory D interest on the due tax was also on the service recipient-Finance Act, 1994-s. 75. Appellant entered into an agreement with a foreign company for obtaining consultancy services from them. Under the agreement, the E liability to pay the service tax on behalf of the foreign company was fixed on the appellant. Despite the agreement, appellant neglected to pay service tax on behalf of the foreign company. It raised a dispute that in view of the statutory obligations of service provider as contained in Finance Act, 1994, it was not liable to pay the same. High Court by its F impugned order held that in view of the provisions of the Act and the terms of the contract, appellant was liable and notthe foreign company. Hence the present appeal. Dismissing the appeal, the Court G HELD: 1. In terms of the proviso appended to sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of Service Tax Rules, it is provided that in case ofa person who was a non-resident or was from outside India and who did not have any office in India, the service tax due on the service rendered by him should be H 420 i KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. COMMR. OF 421 CENTRAL EXCISE, THIRUV ANANTHAPURAM \u00b7 paid by such person or on his behalf by another person authorized by A him who should submit to the"}, {"doc_id": "2020 INSC 70", "case_name": "CHANDRA MOHAN VARMA v STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.", "year": "2020", "issue": "", "held": ": The Notification enhancing the age of retirement is a special order within the meaning of Rule 26 \u2013 Notification dated 6 February 2015 not ultra vires Fundamental Rule 56 \u2013 \u2018Session ending benefit\u2019 granted to teachers \u2018after retirement\u2019 according to the G.O \u2013 Grant of deeming provision not automatic but conditional \u2013 The increase in the age of superannuation from 60 to 65 years was prospective and would apply to those medical teachers in Government Medical Colleges who had not attained the age of superannuation under the prevailing rules \u2013 It was clarified by the State that the said notification would not apply to teachers, such as appellant, who had already crossed the age of superannuation as it then stood prior to the notification dated 6 February 2015 \u2013 In the instant case, the appellant was continuing until the end of the session (30 June 2015) after retirement, in terms of the G.O. dated 19 November 2012 \u2013 The determination of the age of retirement is a matter of executive policy \u2013 The appellant attained the age of superannuation prior to the notification dated 6 February 2015 and was not entitled to the benefit of the enhancement of the age of retirement \u2013 Ram Vir Sharma v. State of UP distinguished \u2013 Regulation 21 of the Intermediate Education Act 1921 extended service after the attaining superannuation in view of a deeming provision \u2013 In contrast the 6 February 2015 "}, {"doc_id": "1992 INSC 150", "case_name": "MRS. PAYAL ASHOK KUMAR JINDAL v CAPT. ASHOK KUMAR JINDAL", "year": "1992", "issue": "", "held": "sufficient cause for non appearance-Ex E parte decree set aside-Case transfe\"ed to Family Court, Bombay. The parties to the appeal were married on January.24, 1988 at Noida near Delhi. They hardly lived as husband and wife at Pune for about seven months when on August 16, 1988 the husband\u00b7 Respondent filed a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of cruelty. He alleged that the wife had a habit of smoking and drinking and even once came drunk to the house and abused everybody. The wife vehemently denied the allegations and claimed that she was a homely, vegetarian, non-smoking, teetotaller and faithful house\u00b7 wife. F G During the pendency of the aforesaid divorce-proceeding before the Family Court, Pone, the wife filed a petition, on May 1, 1989, before this Court seeking transfer of the case from the Family Court, Pune to Delhi. This Court granted ad interim stay of the proceedings which remained operative till Septembef 11, 1989 when the Transfer Petition was dismissed H 81 82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R. A and the stay become vacated. Thereafter~ the husband appeared before.the Family Court on Sep- tember 15, 1989 whereas the wife remained absent. Notices were sent by registered post to the wife on her address at Noida and also at her Delhi address given in the proceedings before this Court. The notice"}, {"doc_id": "1997 INSC 817", "case_name": "SALES TAX OFFICER AND ANR. v M/S SHREE DURGA OIL MILLS AND ANR.", "year": "1997", "issue": "", "held": ", principles of promisso1y estoppel not applicabl~Withdrawal of notification under Section 6 of the Act done in E public interest on the basis of resources cnmch--Hence the Cowt will not inte1fere with any such actio11 taken by the Stat~Fwther held, the indust1y affected by the State action must be deemed to know that notificatio11 was liable to be amended or resci11ded at a11y time under Sectio11 6 of the Act-Sales Tax-Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, Section 6. F Public interest-May ovenide consideration of p1ivate loss or gai11. The industry department of the State Government issued an In- dustrial Policy Resolution (IPR) on 18.7.1979. Clause (8) of the IPR provided specific industries certified as such by the Government and small G scale industries to be exempt from purchases/sales tax for five years on construction material, raw material, machinery and packaging materials. The IPR further provided that Government orders would be issued laying down the mode of administering the concessions and incentives by the department concerned. The IPR was effective for the period 1979- 83. Sec- tion 6 of the Orissa Sales 'fax Act provides that the State may, by notilica\u00b7 H tion, exempt from tax the sale or purchase of any goods or class of goods 488 SALES TAX OFFICER v. DURGA OIL MILLS 489 and likewise withdraw any such exemption. State Governm.ent had issued a notification under Section 6"}, {"doc_id": "1994 INSC 34", "case_name": "BILLA JAGAN MOHAN REDDY AND ANR. v BILLA SANJEEVA REDDY AND ORS.", "year": "1994", "issue": "", "held": ": to be normally allowed in the interest of justice. Certain lands were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and the compensation was determined therefor. Appellants claimed 1/4 share in A B c the compensation determined and the respondents objected. Collector made a reference under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. Appellants were the first party and Respondents were the second party in the said D reference proceedings, which is pending. The title of the appellants to claim compensation was based on the entries in record of rights, revenue records to show pre-existing title. The said documents were sought to be produced by an application for condona- E tion of delay in the production of documents which were public documents and procuring certified copies of the same took time. The trial court dismissed the application. Revision application preferred before the High Court was also dismissed. Hence this appeal. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders of the Courts below, F this Court, HELD: 1.1. It is clear from a bare reading of Order XIII Rule 1 that the parties or their counsel shall be required to produce all the documen- tary evidence in their possession or power which they intend to rely on to establish their right along with pleadings or before settlement of the issues. G The Court is enjoined under Sub-Rule (2) to receive such documents provided they ar"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 841", "case_name": "BALDEV SINGH AND ORS. v STATE OF PUNJAB THROUGH COLLECTOR", "year": "1996", "issue": "", "held": ", none of the pe1wns connected with the sale deeds D relied on by the c/abnants exan1ined-Docu111ents see111 to be brought into existence to Inflate the n1arket value-All the doczunents are inadn1issible in evidence a11d cannot be looked imo-ludgment of High Cowt modijj\u00b7i11g award of Collector up!zeld-Judgnient in another case, 1vhich is not pa1t of the record nor lvas brought on record, cannot be relied upon."}, {"doc_id": "2010 INSC 790", "case_name": "NAHAR SINGH YADAV & ANR. v UNION OF INDIA & ORS.", "year": "2010", "issue": "", "held": ": On issuance of notification by State Government uls. 6 of DSPE Act, CBI assumes role of an investigating agency and also of prosecuting agency in the particular case and, thus, it is entitled to move an E application u/s. 406(2) - However, apprehension entertained F by CBI that the trial of the case at Ghaziabad may not be fair, resulting in miscarriage of justice is misplaced - Apprehension of bias could not be based on a bald a/legation that trial judge and some of the named accused had been close associates and some of the witnesses are judicial officers - Acceptance of such a/legation, without something more substantial undermines the credibility and the independence of the entire judiciary of a State - Also plea that the court of Special Judge, CBI, Ghaziabad is already heavily over-burdened cannot be accepted - Application of G CBI for transfer of trial from Ghaziabad to any other place is dismissed- Penal Code, 1860- ss. 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477A and 120-B - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - ss. 851 H 852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A 8, 9, 13(2) rlw s. 13 (1) (d) and 14 - Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 - s. 6 - Scam - Ghaziabad Provident Fund Scam - Transfer Petition - Judiciary. B s. 406(2) - Power of Supreme Court to transfer criminal trial - Exercise of - Factors to be kept in mind - Discussed. A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak and"}, {"doc_id": "1995 INSC 514", "case_name": "HANMANTA DAULAPPA NIMBAL SINCE DECEASED  BY HIS HEIRS AND LRS. v BABASAHEB DAJISAHEB LONDHE", "year": "1995", "issue": "", "held": ", possession by defendant as a trespasse1; not protected by the Act-Entries in revenue record -and payment of land revenue to govemment, without notice to landlord cannot establish lawful possession. The respondent-landlord filed a civil suit for injunction against the appellant in January 1969. The appellant raised a plea of oral tenancy for the year 1968-69. The Civil Court referred the issue of tenancy to the I Tehsildar of held that the land belonged to the respondent and the appel- lant could not prove oral tenancy. In appeal, the Special Deputy Collector, Appeals, held that oral tenancy was established and, even otherwise, the appellant was a deemed tenant under section 4 of Bombay Tenancy and 1 Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The Revenue Tribunal confirmed the find- ings of the appellate authority. The Respondent filed a writ petition before D E F the High Court, which held that oral tenancy had not been proved in as much as the entries in the revenue records for the year 1968-69 were made without notice to the landlord; and since the reference to the revenue authorities was only with regard to the contractual tenancy for the year 1968-69, they could not have gone into the question of deemed tenancy under section 4. The High Court remitted the matter to the civil court for decision according to the findings of the Tehsildar. Aggrieved, the appel- G lant filed the appeal by"}, {"doc_id": "1997 INSC 400", "case_name": "HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR v SHRI UDAYSINGH S/O. GANPATRAO NAIK NIMBALKAR AND ORS.", "year": "1997", "issue": "", "held": ", It cannot be said that the Dist1ict Judge was biased against the Officer-Evidence was available before the disciplilla1y Authority namely the High Cowt-1he misconduct alleged against the Officer stands proved-171e imposition of penalty of dismissal is well justified-Judicial Review. E B.C. Chatwvedi v. Union of India & 01~\u00b7., [1995] 6 SCC 749 and State of Tamil Nadu v. S. Subaramaniam, [1996] 7 SCC 509, relied on."}, {"doc_id": "1963 INSC 164", "case_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v JAGATSING CHARANSINGH AND ANR.", "year": "1964", "issue": "", "held": "; (1) Where a person is a public servant in the very office where the appointment is to be made and takes money in order to get the appointment made there is no further question of the charge or evidence indicating who was the other public servant with \u00b7whom the service would be rendered. It was enough if it was shown that money was paid to a public servant in a particular department by which an order would be made and if it was taken for doing an official act in that department. That part of s. 161 which was considered in Shivajilal's case is a distinct part where it would be necessary to show who was the other public servant who would be approached. The other part of s. 161 applies not only to receiving gratification by the man foe himself but also for any other person so long as he is in a position by virtue of his being a public servant to do or to for- bear from doing an official act. The High Court was not therefore right in applying the ratio in Shivajilal's case to the facts of thi\u2022 case. (2) Respondent no. 1 would not be a public servant under s. 21 of Penal Code as it stood at the time of the commission of the offence and before it was amended by Act 2 of 1958. Only when an officer or servant of a corporation is acting or purporting to act in persuance of any of the provisions of the Transport Corporation Act or of any other law that he can be said to be a public serv"}, {"doc_id": "2010 INSC 291", "case_name": "JT. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, SURAT v SAHELI LEASING & INDUSTRIES LTD.", "year": "2010", "issue": "", "held": ": Penalty is leviable, even if no tax was payable. Judgment: Cryptic judgment - Held: Brevity without clarity is likely to enter the realm of absurdity, which is impermissible - D Guidelines regarding writing of judgment - Reiterated . . Writing of judgment - Guidelines issued by Supreme Court regarding manner of writing judgments - Non- adherence of - Deprecated. The question for consideration in the present appeals was whether penalty can be levied u/s.271(1)(c) of Income tax Act, where assessed income is loss, despite E the fact that Explanation 4(a) was added to the Act and subsequently, further clause (a) was replaced by another F clause (a) which is clarificatory in nature. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. The Division Bench of High Court has decided the question Of law as projected before it in the appeal preferred u/s.260(A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in a most casual manner. The order is not only cryptic but does not even remotely deal with the arguments which were sought to be projected by the Revenue before it. It is true that brevity is an art but brevity without clarity is 747 1\\ G- H 748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R. A likely to enter into the realm of absurdity, which is impermissible. This is what has been reflected in the impugned order. This Court, time and again, reminded the courts performing judicial functions, the manner in which judgme"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 795", "case_name": "KURIACHAN CHACKO & ORS. v STATE OF KERALA", "year": "2008", "issue": "", "held": ": Making of quick money and enrolment of members into the Scheme, both ingredients for applicability of S.2( c) of 1978 Act . are present - Courts below found that there is ~n element or\u00b7. \u00b7F'\"\u2022\u00b7 cheating inasmuch as accused inducing common public by way of representation to part with money on the lure of doubling the amount - Prima facie, the Courts were satisfied that but for the representation and benefits sought to be given under the Scheme, the victims/public would not have acted on such rep- G resentation - Thus, a case of committing offence under s.415 !PC has been made out- Hence, the Courts below. were right in not interfering with the prosecution at the stage of the framing of charge - No reason found to interfere with the order. 609 H 610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R. A Accused-appellants are partners in a firm engaged in the business of sale of l'Otteries'and magazines. They floated a scheme Jor selling of lotteries and magazines . In terms of the scheme, the Investors by investing in the \u00b7.\u00b7 scheme, would be able to double .their. investment in a B \u00b7\u00b7 short period of time. The scheme appeared to be very at- tractive and became popular. Howev,er1 the Police reg is~ tered a \u00b7c\u00b7ase~\u00b7against the firm for committing an offence\u00b7 punishabl~ 4nder.s.420, IPC; for violation of the provision of the Pri~e, Chits and money Circulati<>ri .Scheme (Ban- c . t'ling) Act~ "}, {"doc_id": "2021 INSC 794", "case_name": "ELECTROSTEEL CASTINGS LIMITED v UV ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED & ORS.", "year": "2021", "issue": "", "held": ": Mere allegations of fraud without material particulars not sufficient to get over bar on civil suit u/s.34 \u2013 A pleading/using the word \u2018fraud\u2019/\u2018fraudulent\u2019 without any material particulars would not tantamount to pleading of \u2018fraud\u2019 \u2013 On facts, allegations of \u2018fraud\u2019 made without any particulars and clever draft prepared to bring the suit maintainable despite the bar u/s. 34, is not permissible and cannot be approved \u2013 It cannot be said that the assignment deed is \u2018fraudulent\u2019 \u2013 In any case, whether there shall be legally enforceable debt so far as the appellant is concerned even after the approved resolution plan against the corporate debtor, and/or the assignee can be said to be secured creditor, such questions required to be dealt with by the DRT in the proceedings initiated under SARFAESI Act \u2013 Assignee has already initiated the proceedings u/s.13 which can be challenged by the appellant \u2013 Thus, the High Court justified in rejecting plaint/dismissing the suit in view of bar u/s.34 of the Act. [2021] 7 S.C.R. 532 532 A B C D E F G H 533 Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 It is the case on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that the suit in which there are allegations of \u2018fraud\u2019 with respect to the assignment deed shall be maintainable and the bar under Section 34 of SARFAESI Act shall not be applicable. However, it is required to be noted that except the words used "}, {"doc_id": "1961 INSC 304", "case_name": "THE JIYAJEEHAO COTTON MILLS LTD. v STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "year": "1962", "issue": "", "held": ", that on a combined reading of the definition of 'consumer' in s. 2(a) and 'producer' in s. 2(d-l) of the C. P. & Berar Act, 10 of 1949, a producer, consuming the electrical energy generated by him is also a consumer as he consumes electrical energy supplied by himself, falls squarely within the Table under s. 3 of the Act prescribing rates of duty payable by \u00b7 a consumer and is thettfore liable to pay duty thereunder. \u00b7 Held, futher, that the present Act for levy of duty upon consumption of electric energy was enacted under Entry 45B of the List II of the Government of India Act, 1935, corresponding to Entry 53 of List II of the Constitution where as the levy of duty of excise on manufacture or pro- duction of goods hy Parliament is under Entry 84 of List I. The taxable event with respect to a duty of excise is 'manufacture' or 'production' ; and not 'consumption'; the levy upon consumption of electric energy cannot be regarded as duty of excise falling within Entry 84 of List I. Held, also, the language used in the Legislative Entries in the Constitution must be interpreted in a broad way so as to give the widest amplitude of power to the Legislature to legislate and not in a narrow and ptndantic sense. Crvn. APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 582 of 1960. Appeal from the judgment and order dated Febuary 5, 1959, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Gwalior Bench) at Indo"}, {"doc_id": "2003 INSC 294", "case_name": "SYNDICATE BANK v M/S. R.S.R. ENGINEERING WORKS AND ORS.", "year": "2003", "issue": "", "held": ": Jn the absence of an agreement between third party, new firm and retiring partners discharging retiring partners C from liabilities or notice thereof by the retiring partners, their liabilities to third party continue. Creditor adopting reconstituted firm/new firm as debtor-Rights against the old firm-Held. Such an act of adoption of new firm as debtor does not deprive the creditor enforcing his rights against the old firm particularly when D there existed no fresh agreement between him and the new firm-In the facts and circumstances of the case priori-assumption that creditor entered into an agreemenr to discharge retiring partner from liability does not follow. Words and Phrases: 'Priori-assumption'-Meaning and applicability of Plaintiff-appellant, a Bank had filed two suits against the respondent- firms for recovery of certain amount horrowed by the firm from the Bank E with interest The firm was dissolved and taken over by one of the partners. Trial Court decreed the suit against the firm and the owner of the 11ew firm. Appellant-Bank filed appeals praying for decree against all the F. partners of the old firm. The High Court affirmed the decree of the trial Court. Hence the present appeals. It was contended for the appellant-Bank that the loan was availed G of by all the partners after jointly executing the requisite documents for getting the loan amount; that dissolutio"}, {"doc_id": "2025 INSC 435", "case_name": "Maukam Singh & Others v State of Madhya Pradesh", "year": "2025", "issue": "Whether the order passed by the High Court upholding the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused u/s.302/34 and ss.323 and 324 rw s.34 IPC justified. Headnotes\u2020 Penal Code, 1860 \u2013 ss.302, 323, 324, 34 \u2013 Murder \u2013 Ocular evidence \u2013 Animosity between the accused and the victims regarding the ownership of the place of worship \u2013 Accused persons-appellants armed with deadly weapons came to the house of the victim-grandfather, questioned them resulting in a scuffle which lead to the death of the victim and injuries to grandchildren \u2013 Appellants convicted u/ss.302/34, 323 and 324 rw s.34 for ho", "held": ": Not called for \u2013 Merely because witnesses are related, they cannot be termed to be interested \u2013 Ocular witnesses were all grandchildren of the deceased which would not result in eschewing their testimony \u2013 All the ocular witnesses were injured which makes their testimony credible and believable \u2013 Also nothing suspicious to doubt the veracity of the ocular witnesses \u2013 Furthermore, the facts regarding the fight and the overt acts does not make it an offence covered u/s.304 Part II nor fall under any of the Exceptions to s.300 resulting in a finding of culpable homicide not amounting to murder \u2013 Medical evidence that the injury could be caused either manually by a hard and blunt object or by an accidental fall, does not detract from the finding u/s.302, especially considering the ocular testimony \u2013 Intention is clear from the deadly nature of * Author [2025] 4 S.C.R. \b 337 Maukam Singh & Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh the weapons carried by the accused, who were the aggressors, who trespassed into the house of the victims and wielded such weapons in a manner causing grievous injuries to the victims, one of whom died \u2013 Evidence. [Paras 5, 6, 13, 14]"}, {"doc_id": "2016 INSC 406", "case_name": "COMMISS\"IONER OF INCOME TAX. MUMBAI v AMITABH BACHCHAN", "year": "2016", "issue": "", "held": ": For exeri.:ise a/jurisdiction u/s. 263, order passed by the Authority should be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue - Thereafter, the said power is available su~ject to observance of the principles of natural justice - Power of revision u/s. 263 is not co11tinge11t 011 the gh>ing of a notice to show cause - Requirement u/s.263 is an opportunity of hearing to the assessee and failure of the same renders the revisional order legally ji-agile - Full opportunity to controvert the same and to explain the circumstances surrounding such facts, must be afforded to assessee by C.I. T. prior to the finalization of the decision - On facts, C.I. Ton scrutinizing the record, noted that the assessee did not produce the books of account and other relevant documents despite various opportunities - Authorized representative of the assessee appeared during the revisional proceeding and had full opportunity to contest - It was revealed that the original assessment order on several heads was erroneous and had the potential of causing loss of revenue to the State - Requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard was not breached - Order of the tribunal as regards the revisional order going beyond the show cause notice, cannot be accepted - Orders passed by the High Court not tenable - As regards the claim of additional expenses of 30% of the gross professional rec"}, {"doc_id": "2003 INSC 678", "case_name": "KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI AND ORS. v PILLIBHIT PANTNAGAR BEEJ LTD. AND ANR.", "year": "2003", "issue": "", "held": ", wheat and wheat seed are different-Hence, State is not competent to levy market fee since seeds of wheat is not a specified agricultural produre under the State Act-On harmonious reading of State Act and Central Act, respondents are not traders under the State Act- _ D Essential Commodities Act, 1955; Section 3-Seeds Control Order, , 1983-Food grains Movement Restriction (Exemption of Seeds) Orders, 1970. Respondents are engaged in business -of buyfog, processing and selling of certified wheat seeds. The appellant-Market Committee E issued notices to the respondents for levying market fees under section 17 (iii) (b) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (U.r. Act) on the ground that the respondents are dealing in wheat, a specified 'agricultural produce' under section 2(a) of the U.P. Act. The respondents replied to the notices of the appellants that they are F dealing with certified seeds of wheat and not wheat and hence are not liable to market fee under the U.P. Act. The appellants rejected\u00b7 the representations and passed an order demanding market fees under 'the U.P. Act. The respondents filed a Writ Petition before High Court for quashing the order of the appellants. The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of the appellants following the decision G in State of Rajasthan v. Rajasthan Agriculture Input Dealers Association, AIR (1996) SC 21"}, {"doc_id": "1995 INSC 260", "case_name": "SH. JAI KISHAN v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND ANR.", "year": "1995", "issue": "", "held": "there was no deemed confirmation after expiry of period of probation. D The appellant was appointed as a temporary constable on September 9, 1982. Under Rule 5(e) of the Central Services Temporary .<Service) Rules, 1966 he was required to be on probation for a period of two years which In no case was to extend beyond three years. On successful comple- tion of probation he was to be conftrmed In the service. Therefore, conftr- E matlon Into the service was a condltlon precedent to continue as a member of Delhi Police Service. The appellant continued In service upto September 14, 1988 and on that date an order was passed under Rule S(e) terminating his services. He unsuccessfully questioned the termination order befm:\"e the Central Administrative Tribunal. Against the decision of the Tribunal, an appeal was preferred to this Court. F The respondent's case was that appellant's retention in service was not considered desirable for the dlsclpllne or the police force because he was found to be a habitual absentee and Incorrigible type of police employee and this could have set a bad example to other employees. Insplte G of giving repeated opportunities to Improve, the appellant failed to Im- prove his performance and consequently his services were terminated. Dismissing the appeal, this Court HELD: Successful completion of probation Is a condition precedent H for conftrmatlon as envi"}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 747", "case_name": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN,  JOOHPUR THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL", "year": "2011", "issue": "", "held": ": Section 9 vests power in the State Government to appoint such persons as it thinks fit, having the prescribed qualifications to be Food Inspectors for the local areas assigned to them, as prescribed ulr. 8 of the Rules - On facts with regard to manufacture and o sale of synthetic milk, the Chief Medical Officer initiated action of taking samples of the products and sending it for testing - Thereafter, in a writ petition, the High Court issued a mandamus compefling the State Government to replace the Medical Officers by Sanitary Inspectors or other regular E recruits as Food Inspector which was not correct - State Government could appoint a medical officer in-charge of health administration of a local area as a Food Inspector - If the High Cowt found that the medical officers were not trained in food inspection and sampling work, it could also direct that F the medical officers be given the required training to function as Food Inspector- Thus, the direction by the High Court with regard to appointment of Food Inspectors against 34 posts which were lying vacant and appointment of Sanitary Inspectors as Food Inspectors in the meanwhile is set aside G - Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 - r. 8. In a suo motu writ petition entertained by the High Court with regard to manufacturing and sale of synthetic milk in certain Districts of the State, the Collectors of the Distri"}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 309", "case_name": "NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v HARJEET RICE MILLS", "year": "2005", "issue": "", "held": ", State Consumer Commission should have given an opportunity. to prove investigation report-s. 64-UM of Insurance Act cannot stand in the D way of Insurance Company in establishing that the claim was a fraud on the Company-High Court failed lo exercise appellate jurisdiction properly so as td satisfy itself that no fraud was involved and the claim was genuine cmd sustainable-Interference warranted-Case remitted to Sta,te Consumer Commission to decide afresh all the questions involved including the cause of fire-Insurance Act, I938-:-s.64-UM-Constitution of India-Article 136. E F Respondent-consumer filed a claim against the appellant-Insurance Company before the Stat~ Consumer Commission for the loss stated to h~ve been caused by an accidental fire in its godown. The Insurance Company resisted the claim, inter alia, on\u00b7 the grounds that the fire was not caused by short-circuit but was a deliberate act with a view to make the claim and it was a case of an attempted insurance fraud; and that, even otherwise, the loss was highly exaggerated. The State Commission allowed the claim. The appeal filed by the Insurance Company was dismissed by the Hig'h Court. In the present appeal filed by the Insurance Company, it was contended G that though the surveyor had reported that the fire was caused by a short-; circuit, but the said report was based on a police investigation; which, on a fu"}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 55", "case_name": "RAM PHAL KUNDU v KAMAL SHARMA", "year": "2004", "issue": "", "held": ", exlrinsic evidence given afler the last date of filing nomination cannot be considered-Objection not valid-Election Symbols D (Resen\u2022ation and Allotment) Order, 1968-Paras 13 and I 3A . . \"'( Representation of the People Act, 1951-Section 36(4)-Defect of a ' substantial character-Meaning of-Form B having signature of the person authorised by the party but not the seal-Held,\u00b7 not a defect of substantial character-Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968-Paras E 13 and /3A. In an election to the Legislative Assembly, the respondent filed his nomination paper as the candidate of the Congress Party. In support of his nomination, the respondent filed both Form A and Form B before the ,_> Returning Officer. In Form A, the General Secretary of the Congress Party F had authorised one \"BSH\" to intimate to the Returning Officer the name of the approved candidate of the Party. In Form B, \"BSH\" had communicated to the Returning Officer the name of the respondent as the approved candidate of the Congress Party. The respondent filed his nomination paper on the last date for filing nomination at 12.20 p.m. G 4 On the same day, at 2.50 p.m. one \"BS\" also filed nomination paper ,, claiming to be the authorised candidate of the Congress Party. \"BS\" also filed Form A and Form B along with his nomination. In Form B filed by \"BS\" it was stated that the earlier notice in Form B in "}, {"doc_id": "2000 INSC 517", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. v WING COMMANDER T. PARTHASARATHY", "year": "2000", "issue": "", "held": ": No statutory rules or provisions of any Act existed denying the right of seeking withdrawal of application for premature retirement-As the premature retirement was to take effect long after moving of application seeking withdrawal of premature retirement, there was no cessation of master and E servant relationship-Employee's furnishing a certificate declaring that he was aware of the policy of non-acceptance of cancellation/withdrawal of application seeking premature retirement cannot stand in the way. The respondent, a Wing Commander in the Indian Air Force submitted F an application dated 21-07-1985 praying for pre-mature retirement from service with effect from 31-08-1986 with 6 months leave preparatory to retirement said to be due to him with the admissible full non-effective benefits. The reasons for the pre-mature retirement were the continued illness of his wife and other family commitments and responsibilities. Four months Jater when the matter was under process before the concerned authorities, the G respondent moved an amendment to his earlier application stating that the actual date of his release could be decided taking into account the pensionary ' recommendations of the IVth Pay Commission Report which was expected to come in November, 1985. On 19-02-1986, the respondent on being able to surmount the health problems of his wife and having sorted out the family H"}, {"doc_id": "2003 INSC 567", "case_name": "TULSHIDAS KANOLKAR v THE STATE OF GOA", "year": "2003", "issue": "", "held": ", on facts, victim is totally unaware of dreadful consequences-Hence, there is C no delay in lodging FIR-Mentally challenged victim cannot legally give consent to sexual intercourse Legislature advised to prescribe higher minimum sentence for rape of mentally challenged victim. Appellant accused committed rape of a mentally challenged D victim\u00b7several times. The parents of the victim came to know of it on seeing the legs of the victim being swollen and signs of advanced stage of pregnancy. The victim pointed out accusing fingers at the appellant. The mother of the appellant offered a part of the amount necessary for termination of the pregnancy of the victim. There was no termination of pregnancy and the victim delivered a stillborn child. The father of E the victim lodged a complaint with the police. The appellant was charged for the offences punishable under section 376 and 506(2) IPC. The appellant contended before the trial court that there was a delay in lodging of first information report: that certain persons were not examined by the prosecution; and that since the appellant had sexual F intercourse with the victim on several occasions, there was a clear consent by the victim. The trial court held the appellant guilty under sections 376 and 506(2) IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for 10 years and one year along with a fine of Rs.10,000 and Rs. 2,000 respectively wit"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 347", "case_name": "STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS v SANJAY NAGAYACH AND OTHERS", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": When an authority invested with the power purports to act on its own but in substance the power is exercised by external guidance or pressure, it would amount D to non-exercise of power, statutorily vested - In the instant case, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that Joint Registrar was acting under extraneous influence and under dictation - Order of supersession is not only in clear violation of second proviso to s.53(1), but also allegations raised in E show cause notice are deficiencies mostly relating to systems and procedures and are of general nature and not grave enough to overthrow a democratically elected Board of Directors - Board of Directors was superseded illegally, and, therefore, in view of proviso to s. 49(7 A)(i), they need to be . F put back-if1'-office and' allowed to continue for the period they were put out of office - Ordered accordingly - Costs imposed on State Government and officer concerned - Legislation - Legislative intent. G H s.31 (1) second proviso - Expression 'previous consultation with the Reserve Bank' - Connotation of - Held: Previous consultation is a condition precedent before forming an opinion by Joint Registrar to supersede the Board of Directors or not - Mere serving a copy of show cause notice 738 STATE OF M.P. v. SANJAY NAGAYACH 739 on RBI with supporting documents is not what is A contemplated under second proviso to s. 53(1"}, {"doc_id": "1998 INSC 380", "case_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR. v HONBLE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT", "year": "1998", "issue": "", "held": ", (per Thomas, J.) D imprisonment is for reformative and rehabilitative purpose which is a public purpose. Constitution of India-Article 23-Labour by prisoners undergoing rigorous imprisonment-Payment for-Whether prisoners entitled to any wages-Wages-Quantum of-Deduction on account of expenditure on the E food and clothing of the prisoner-Whether permissible-Minimum Wages Act, I 948-Section 3. Indian Penal Code, 1860-Section 53-Kinds of punishments- Difference between. Penology-Punishment-Object of-Theories-Reformative and rehabilitative theories of punishment-Desirability of F Victimology-Theories of-Restorative and Reparative theories- Desirability of-Reparation-Meaning of-Held, victims of crime should not G be ignored-Rules/law must be framed for providing compensation to victims/ their family-Constitution of India-Article 300 A. The question of law which arose for determination in the present case was as to what. should be the wages paid to the prisoners who are required to do labour as a part of their punishment and whether any part of the wages H 31 32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A as payable to the prisoners but spent on their clothes and other amenities etc. can be deducted. B Article 23(1) of the Constitution of India prohibits any \"traffic in human being and begar and other similar forms of forced labour\". However, by virtue of Article 23(2), State is "}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 727", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY MINISTRY  OF DEFENCE v RABINDER SINGH", "year": "2011", "issue": "", "held": ": The two parts of s. 52 (f) are disjunctive, which can also be seen from the fact that there is a comma and the conjunction 'or' between the two parts of this sub-section, viz (i) does any other thing with intend to defraud and (ii) to cause B wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person - If the legislature wanted both these parts to be read together, it would have used the conjunction 'and'. The first respondent was deployed as the Commanding Officer of the 6 Armoured Regiment in the C Indian Army. The unit was authorized for one signal special vehicle. In case such a vehicle was not held by the unit it was authorized to modify one vehicle with ad- hoc special finances for which it was authorized to claim amount. D It is the case of the appellant that the respondent proceeded to order modification of some 65 vehicles in two lots, first 43 and thereafter 22 and he countersigned bills, and claimed and received an amount of Rs.77,692/ E - by preferring four different claims, though not a single vehicle came to be modified; that no such items necessary for modification were purchased, but fictitious documents and pre-receipted bills were procured; and that though, the counter-foils of the cheques showed the F names of some vendors, the amount was withdrawn by the respondent himself. This led to the conducting of the Court of Inquiry to collect evidence and to m"}, {"doc_id": "2000 INSC 31", "case_name": "RAMESHW ARI DEVI v STATE OF BIHAR", "year": "2000", "issue": "", "held": ", disbursement of pension cannot wait till civil court pronounces upon the respective rights of the parties-Second D marriage void but children legi.timate-No error in judgement of the Division Bench-Hindu Marriage Act, 1955-Sections 5( 1) and 16--Hindu Succession Ac~ 1956. Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964-Rule 21-Bihar Govem- E ment Servant's Conduct Rules, 1976-Rule 23-Restriction over second mar- riage-Proceedings before court of law-Held, State Government not debarred from conducting separate inquiry to ascertain beneficiaries-Detailed inquiry cannot be tenned sham. The Appellunt is the first mdow of the deceased employee having one F son. The second ltidow has four sons and claimed to have resided with the deceased as his wife for a long period. The State Government conducted an inquiry which proved the said cohabitation. Single Judge held that the appellant and her son alongmth children out of the second marriage, till they attain majority, were entitled to share the family pension and death G cum retirement b'l'lltuity. The appellant filed L.P .A. which was dismissed. Hence this appeal. The appellant contended before this Court that the State Govern- ment had no la\\,ful authority to condl!ct an inquiry; that such inquiry could be made if charges of misconduct were levelled during the lifetime H of the decease; 1:1nd that the second marriage has to be establis"}, {"doc_id": "2019 INSC 882", "case_name": "ZONAL MANAGER, BANK OF INDIA, ZONAL OFFICE, KOCHI & ORS. v AARYA K. BABU & ANR.", "year": "2019", "issue": "", "held": ": The question in regard to equivalence of educational qualifications is a technical question based on proper assessment and evaluation of the relevant academic standards and practical attainments of such qualifications and where the decision of the Government is based on the recommendation of an expert body which possesses the requisite knowledge, skill and expertise for adequately discharging such a function, the Court, uninformed of relevant data and unaided by the technical insights necessary for the purpose of determining equivalence, would not lightly disturb the decision of the Government. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. If the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Sohrab Khan v. Aligarh Muslim University & Ors. is kept in perspective it is clear that while examining the correctness of the action of the employer what would be sacrosanct will be the qualification criteria published in the Notification, since if any change made to the qualification criteria midstream is accepted by the Court so as to benefit only the petitioners before it, without making it open to all the qualified persons, it would amount to causing injustice to the others who possess such qualification but had not applied being honest to themselves as knowingly they did not possess the qualification sought for in the Notification though they otherwise held another degree. Therefore"}, {"doc_id": "2020 INSC 68", "case_name": "DR NALLAPAREDDY SRIDHAR REDDY v THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS", "year": "2020", "issue": "", "held": ": s. 216 provides to the Court exclusive and wide ranging power to change or alter any charge \u2013 Court can exercise the power to add charges at any stage before the judgment is pronounced \u2013 The test to be adopted by the Court is that the material brought on record needs to have direct nexus with the ingredients of the alleged offence \u2013 The Court must exercise such power judiciously and ensure that no prejudice is caused to the accused \u2013 In the facts of the present case, High Court rightly framed additional charges. Penal Code, 1860: ss. 406 and 420 \u2013 Prosecution u/s. 498A of IPC and ss. 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act \u2013 Application for framing additional charges u/s. 406 and 420 IPC \u2013 Denied by trial court \u2013 High Court directed framing of additional charges \u2013 Appeal to Supreme Court \u2013 Held: There exists sufficient material on record that shows a connection or link with the ingredients of offences u/ss. 406 and 420 \u2013 High Court has spelled out the reasons that have necessitated the addition of the charge, hence need no interference. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Section 216 of Cr.P.C. provides the court an exclusive and wide-ranging power to change or alter any charge. The use of the words \u201cat any time before judgment is pronounced\u201d in Sub-Section (1) empowers the court to exercise its powers of altering or adding charges even after the completion of evidence, argume"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 228", "case_name": "EZHIL AND ORS. v STATE OF TAMIL NADU", "year": "2002", "issue": "", "held": ", justified. Evidence Act, 1872 : Section 114-Illustration (a)-App/icability of. Presumption-Accused-Possession of stolen goods-Absence of D reasonable' explanation by accused-Presumption as to guilt of accused- Permissibility of The appellants were prosecuted under Section 364, 392 and 302 read with Sections 34 and 120-B IPC. The entire prosecution case was based on E circumstantial evidence; (i) An Inspector of Police, PW-4, intercepted a car on 11.3.1994 at about 5.00 a.m. in which the three accused were together; (ii) the car was entrusted to the accused persons. Particularly A-3 as its Driver and A-2 as its Cleane;\u00b7; (iii) the car when intercepted was found carrying the articles, which were proved to he that of the deceased as also those entrusted to him by others; (iv) that when PW-4 asked A-1 to show the passport, he F produced the same which really belonged to the deceased and from the suitcase of the deceased found in the dicky even the driving license of the deceased was retrieved; (v) that all the recoveries of the articles from the car were prior to the discovery of the body of the deceased in almost less than 24 hours; (vi) that the articles with blood stains, particularly the bed-sheet, lungi G and chappals recovered from the car were, as per Serologist Report, stained with human blood for which no reasonable explanation was offered (vii) that the accused did not "}, {"doc_id": "2012 INSC 546", "case_name": "M/S. LAXMI DYECHEM v STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.", "year": "2012", "issue": "", "held": ": Just as dishonour of a cheque on the ground that the account has been closed is a dishonour falling in the first contingency referred to in s. 138, so also dishonour on the ground that the \"signatures do not 0 match\" or that the \"image is not found'; which too implies that the specimen signatures do not match the signatures on the cheque, would constitute a dishonour within the meaning of s. 138 - So long as the change is brought about with a view to preventing the cheque being honoured the dishonour would become an offence uls. 138 subject to other conditions E prescribed being satisfied - Allegations of fraud and the like are matters that cannot be investigated by a court uls 482 Cr.P. C. and s/1all have to be left to be determined at the trial after the evidence is adduced by the parties - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482. F ss. 138 and 139 - Dishonour of cheque - Presumption in favour of holder - Held: Is rebuttable - Return of cheque by bank on ground of 'stop payment' although has been held to constitute an offence, s. 138 cannot be applied in isolation G ignoring s. 139 - The category of cases of 'stop payment' instructions where the account holder has sufficient funds in his account to discharge the debt, would be subject to rebuttal and the accused can show that the stop payment instructions were not issued because of insufficiency or paucity of funds, H 466 "}, {"doc_id": "1957 INSC 63", "case_name": "MOBARIK ALI AHMED v THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "year": "1958", "issue": "", "held": ": (I) that, on the facts, all the ingredients constituting the offence of' cheating under s. 420 of the Indian Penal Code having occurred in Bombay, the offence was committed there and that, though the appellant 'was not corporeally present in India at the time of the commission of the offence, his conviction under the Indian Penal Code was valid in view of the terms of s. 2 of the Code; (2) that, as the appellant was surrendered to the Indian authorities under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, and there was no provision in that Act preventing arrest in India for the purpose of a trial in respcet of a fresh offence, his conviction following upon his trial was valid. H. N. Rishbud v. The State of Delhi, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 1150, relied on. (3) that the conviction of the appellant of the offence of s. 420 was valid, though the charge was one under s. 420 read with s. 34. as the actual findings in the case could support a con- viction under s. 420 itself. Willie (William Slaney) v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1140, relied on. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 200of1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 20, 1954, of the Bombay High Co11rt in Criminal Appeal No. 1596 of 1953, arising out of the judgment and order dated September 23, 1953, of the Court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, 3rd Court, Esplanade, Bo"}, {"doc_id": "2003 INSC 505", "case_name": "VIJAY LAKSHMI v PUNJAB UNIVERSITY AND ORS.", "year": "2003", "issue": "", "held": ", classification between male and female permissible for certain posts in accordance with established propositions of law on the concept of equality-State empowered to take a policy decision and frame rules accordingly-Such reservation D also permissible under Article I 5(3)-Court not to sit in appeal against the policy decision of the State Government-Provisions not violative of Articles I 4 or I 6 as classification is reasonable having nexus with the object sought to be achieved, which is protection of young girl students. E Rules S, 8 and IO of the Punjab University Calender, Volume III provide a reservation that only women may be appointed as Principal of a women's college, teacher or hostel superintendent. A writ petition was filed challenging the said provisions. The High Court, by majority, held them to be violative of Articles IS and 16 of the Constitution. F Hence this appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Rules Sand 8 of Punjab University Calender Volume- 111 providing for appointment of lady principal in women's college or G a lady teacher therein are not violative of either Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution, because classification is reasonable and it has nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The State Government is also empowered to make ~uch special provisions under Article 15(3) of the Constitution, which is not restricted in any manne"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 497", "case_name": "KANHAIYALAL AND ORS. v ANUPKUMAR AND ORS.", "year": "2002", "issue": "", "held": ", memorandum of a second appeal filed u/s. JOO shall precisely state the D substantial question of law involved in the case as required under sub-section (3)-Where the High Court is satisfied that any substantial quest:on of law is involved, it shall.formulate that question under sub-section (4)-Second appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated as provided in sub-section (5)- Judgments of High Court set aside_;_Matters remitted to High Court for disposal in accordance with law and keeping in view the observations made herein. E /shwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, [20001 1 SCC 434 and Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 708, relied on. Judgment-Delay in pronouncement-In second appeals arguments heard by High Court in November 1990---Judgments pronounced on 7.5.1993- F Besides, no substantial question of law formulated by High Court-Second appeals allowed and concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts below reversed-Held, judgments of High Court cannot be sustained and, therefore, set aside-Matters remitted to High Court for decision afresh expeditiously-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-s. l OD-Administration of G Justice. H Bhagwandas Fatehchand Daswani and Ors. v. HPA International and Ors., (2000) 2 SCC 13, relied on."}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 1290", "case_name": "BRIJ LAL (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS. ETC. ETC. v STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. ETC. ETC.", "year": "2007", "issue": "", "held": ": High Court has failed to take note of the decision of this Court on the E similar issue in the case of Financial Commissioner, Haryana State & Ors. v. Smt. Kela Devi & Anr. -It has also not recorded any finding of fact as to whether tenants were entitled to any relief as they challenged the order of the Financial Commissioner after a long lapse of time- Since the basic issues have not been dealt by the High Court, the l matter is remitted to High Court to decide it afresh taking note of the F decision in the above said case. Words and Phrases: 'Any time '-Meaning of in the context of S.18(6) of the Haryana G Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972. On 26.7.1961, the Collector, Surplus Area assessed the surplus area of one 'P', since deceased. On appeal by two tenants against the order of the Collector, the Commissioner remanded the surplus area H 574 \u2022 r BRIJ LAL (DEAD) BYLRS. v. STATE OF HARYANA 575 case to the Collector to re-decide the issues. The Collector initiated A proceedings for deciding surplus area case of 'P'. While the proceedings were pending the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 came into force. The Prescribed Authority decided the surplus area cases of some other land owners under the 1972 Act and held thatthe totalland in respect of each of them was less than the permissible limit. Later, B the land owners filed an application for ejectment of their tenan"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 1002", "case_name": "ATTAR SINGH AND ANOTHER v UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER", "year": "2009", "issue": "", "held": ": Correct - It is not known on what basis settlement was arrived at in Lok Ada/at ' . - Absence of any detailed particulars showing similarity of land and/or advantages and dis-advantages pertaining thereto, settlement not rightly made basis for determining market value of land - High Court was required to determine fair market value of land on basis of the legal principles - It based its decision on its earlier common judgment delivered arising out of the same notification, which has attained finality. The question which arose for consideration in this . appeal was whether any agreement entered into by and between the holders of the lands and the Union of India in a Lok Adalat should have formed the basis for determination of the amount of compensation in respect of the lands which are said to be similarly situated. Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. Determination of the market value of the land acquired would depend upon a large number of factors including the nature and quality thereof. The norms which are required to be applied for determination of the market value of the agricultural land and 315 A B c D E F G H 316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 12 S.C.R. A homestead land are different. In given cases location of land and in particular, closeness thereof from any road or high-way would play an important role for determination of the market value wherefor belting s"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 43", "case_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND ORS. v SYED HUSSAIN", "year": "2006", "issue": "", "held": ", punishment of removal from service cannot be said to be wholly D disproportionate and violative of doctrine of proportionality. Administrative Law Public servant-Duty to act in aid of law and not to aid or abet accused fleeing from justice. Doctrine-Doctrine of proportionality-Applicability of E Respondent, a Police Constable, was dismissed from service for misconduct on the charges that he knowingly stood surety for a hardened criminal involved in 32 cases of snatching goods from other persons. His F application was dismissed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal but his writ petition was allowed by the High Court in part holding that the respondent had an unblemished record of28 years of service and directing the Tribunal to substitute the order by any other punishment except dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement. Aggriev\u00b7ed, the Department filed the G present appeal Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The respondent stood surety for a hardened criminal who had sos H 806 SUPREME C()l'Rl REPORTS [2006] I S.C.R. A been involved in several snatching cases and who jumped bail. Presumably because the respondent, a Constable, had stood as the surety, the accused was ! enlarged on bail by the court. In a situation of this nature, keeping in view the nature of duties that a protector of law is required to perform, the disciplinary authority cannot be said to have "}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 248", "case_name": "N.G. DASTANE v SHRIKANT S. SHIVDE AND ANR.", "year": "2001", "issue": "", "held": ", amounts to misconduct-Advocate is duty bound to see that witnesses present in the Court were examined-Any misdemeanour or misdeed or misbehaviour interfering with the administration D of justice, amounts to misconduct-Tactics of filibuster is also professional misconduct. Power and Duty of State Bar Council-Advocate-\"Professional or y other misconduct\"-Held, if Bar Council comes across any instance of misconduct which is genuine and not actuated with the sole purpose of E harassing the advocate, it is duty bound to forward the complaint to the Disciplinary Committee. .. Witness-Examination of-Counsel for accused avoiding cross examination and seeking repeated adjournments on flimsy grounds-Held, Court should not accede to such tactics. F Words and Phrases : \"Professional or other misconduct\"-Meaning of in the context of .... S.35(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961. G In a complaint filed by the appellant for the offence of theft of electricity, respondent-Advocates were engaged by the accused. After examination-in- chief, the case was posted for cross-examination of appellant hlstead of cross- examining the appellant, the respondents went on seeking adjournments on >-->\u00b7- one or tht other pretext and every time the Court yielded to their request. H On one of such occasion i\u00b7espondent No. 1 sought adjournment on the ground 442 + ...... N.G. DASTANE v. SHRIKANT S. SHIVDE 443 that he"}, {"doc_id": "1961 INSC 98", "case_name": "KAILASH CHANDRA v UNION OF INDIA", "year": "1962", "issue": "", "held": ", that the correct interpretation of Rule 2046(2)(a) is that a railway ministerial servant falling within this clause may be compulsorily retired on attaining the age of 55 but when the servant is between the age of 55 and 60 years the appropriate authority has the option to continue him in ser- vice, subject to the condition that the servant continues to be efficient but the authority is not bound to retain him even if he continues to be efficient. This rule does not give the servant a right to be retained in service beyond the age of 55 years even if he continues to be efficient. Jai Ram v. Union of India, A.LR. r954 S.C. 584, explained. Basant Kumar Pal v. The Chief Electrical Engineer, A.LR. r956 Cal. 93, Kishan Dayal v. General Manager, Northern Rail- way, A.LR. r954 Punj. 245 and Raghunath Narain Mathur v. Union of India, A.LR. r953 All. 352, approved. ' \u2022 t _. \u2022 \u2022 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 375 The formation by the Railway Board of two classes of 1961 ministerial servants, namely, one of those who retired after September 8, r948, and the other of those who had already /{ailash Chandra retired before that date was a reasonable class1ficahon and chd v. not offend Art. r4 of the Constitution. Uaion of India"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 1176", "case_name": "KARAN SINGH v STATE (DELHI ADMN.)", "year": "1996", "issue": "", "held": ", accused was found in conscious possession of unauthorised arms and ammunition within the notified area-Discrepancy in statement of witness with regard to description of specimen of the seal utilised in sealing the case property was typographical erro~onviction and sentence upheld. D S. 14( 1 )--Cognizance by Designated Court of an offence under the Act, z.9on receiving a 'complaint of facts'-Accused sent for trial u/ss. 25/54/59. Arms Act-Metropolitan Magistrate, finding that the matter was triable by the Designated Court, referred it to Sessions Judge who transferred the case to Designated Court-Designated Court took cognizance of the matter on 7.2.1991 and proceeded with the trial-Held, since the case was received by the Designated Court on assignment by order of Sessions Judge, the Desig- nated Court did not take cognizance upon police report-After receipt of the case file from the Sessions Judge the Designated Court pernsed the maten\u00b7a1 and prima f acie found a case u/s. 5 to have been made out-Cognizance was thus taken by the Designated Court on basis of complaint off acts which disclosed the commission of an offence u/s. 5. E F S. 20-A-Approval of Superintendent of Police for investigation into an offence under the Act and cognizance by the Court-Provisions whether G perspective in operation-Held, since the occurrence in the case took place much be/ ore the insertion of"}, {"doc_id": "2025 INSC 697", "case_name": "Power Grid Corporation of India Limited v Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company", "year": "2025", "issue": "(i) Whether the CERC, while exercising its functions u/s.79(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003, is circumscribed by statutory regulations enacted u/s.178 of the Act, 2003; (ii) Whether the CERC exercises regulatory or adjudicatory functions u/s.79 of the Act, 2003. In other words, what is the scope of the CERC\u2019s power to regulate inter-state transmission of electricity and determine tariff for the same under clauses (c) and (d) of s.79(1); (iii) Whether the grant of compensation by the CERC for the delay vide the orders dated 21.01.2020 and 27.01.2020 respectively, is a regulatory or adjudicatory", "held": ": A perusal of the provisions laying down the functions of the CERC indicates that the statutory authority is enjoined with the task of regulation as well as adjudication of several aspects of the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity \u2013 S.79 of the Act, 2003 enumerates the functions of the CERC which includes the dual functions of regulation and adjudication \u2013 S.178, on the other hand, empowers the CERC to enact regulations by notification thereby delegating to the body, the power of legislating statutory regulations under the Act, 2003 \u2013 The aforesaid two provisions * Author [2025] 5 S.C.R. \b 2063 Power Grid Corporation of India Limited v. Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company Limited & Ors. indicate that the CERC functions as both, decision-making and regulation-making authority u/ss.79 and 178 respectively \u2013 However, while the authority exercising both these functions is one and the same, it is a settled position of law that the functions by themselves are separate and distinct \u2013 The functions u/s.79 are administrative or adjudicatory whereas those u/s.178 are legislative \u2013 A regulation u/s.178 is of general application to the entirety of a particular subject matter as opposed to regulation on a case-to-case basis which may be done by the CERC u/s.79 \u2013 Therefore, making of a regulation u/s.178 has the effect of interfering with and overriding existing "}, {"doc_id": "2015 INSC 669", "case_name": "SONI KUMARI v DEEPAK KUMAR", "year": "2015", "issue": "", "held": ": In the instant case, Family Court had made necessary efforts for reconciliation between the parties but efforts failed -Appellant-wife taking plea that respondent-husband has to leave India for job purpose and it was not possible for him to D return back in a year or two and, therefore, she would suffer mental agony and would also not be able to remarry- It is a fit case where in order to do complete justice to the parties, it is necessary to invoke the power u!Art. 142 in an irreconcilable situation - Cooling off period of 6 months E waived and decree of divorce by mutual consent granted - Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - s. 13-8(1 ). Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The order passed by the Family Court F clearly showed that before passing the impugned order under Section 13-8(1) of the Act, the Family Court made necessary efforts for reconciliation between the parties but the efforts yielded no fruitful result. The Family Court, G before passing the order, carefully perused the\u00b7 entire materials on the record including the joint statement of the parties. It is also not disputed that the respondent- husband would be leaving India for his job purpose and 305 H 306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015)108.C.R. A once he goes out of the country, it would not be possible for him to return back in a year or two. In the event the respondent is not returned within the stipulated time for s"}, {"doc_id": "2010 INSC 785", "case_name": "COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI v M/S HARI CHAND SHRI GOPAL & OTHER", "year": "2010", "issue": "", "held": ": At the E supplier end, no registration ulr. 17 4 obtained nor records were kept - Failure on the part of applicants, at the recipient end, to give various declarations in the statutory forms so as to claim exemption - Non-compliance of conditions enumerated under various rules in Chapter X and non- fumishing of various statutory forms prescribed under Chapter F X - Thus, plea of 'intended use' and 'substantial compliance' not established - Order passed by the tribunal set aside - Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 - Notification No. 121194-CE dated 11. 8.1994 - Doctrine of 'substantial compliance' and 'intended use'. G Chapter X - Manufacture and clandestine removal of pump parts and gun metal casting - Exemption from payment of excise duty and penalty as per Notification No. 312001-CE and 612001-CE - Grant of, by tribunal even though procedure H 820 COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE v. HARi CHAND 821 SHRI GOPAL set out in Chapter X not followed, holding that procedure laid A down in Chapter X is meant to be followed only to establish the receipt of goods by recipient unit and their utilization - Sustainability of - Held: Not sustainable - Tribunal completely overlooked the object and purpose of the procedure laid down in Chapter X - Goods manufactured at B the supplier's end were excisable goods and if a party wanted remission of duty, he was to follow certain pre-requisites - Object w"}, {"doc_id": "1999 INSC 146", "case_name": "STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v RAJA MAHENDRA PAL", "year": "1999", "issue": "", "held": ", no statutory enforceable right existed in favour of erstwhile ruler; claims related to exercise of sovereign rights vested in State and could not be made by private citizen; mandamus could not have been issued. \u00b7 Administrative Law-Pricing Committee constituted for determining price payable to government for supplies made to forest corporation-- Whether quasi judicial body whose decision co.uld be enforc;ed through writ of mandamus-Held, Pr~cing Committee not a quasi judicial or statutory body; its decision could not be given effect to by the High Court-Constitution D of India, Article 226. E Practice and pmcedure-Constitution, of India, Articles 21 and 226- Writ petition by respondent er.stwhile ruler claiming price of forest produce on basis of equality with State-High Court recognising and enforcing respondent's right to livelihood under Article 21-Held, High Court wrongly assumed jurisdiction; right to livelihood could not b..: expanded to include F claims relating to contractual rights. A notification was issued on August 31, 1915 by the Lt. Governor of Punjab under Ss. 28, 29 (a) and 31 of the Indian Forests Act, 1878 whereby the management of the Kutlehar forests was assigned to erstwhile rulers G including MP, Respondent No.1. The rajas were to maintain proper account of the trees standing on the land. Trees identified by the Forest Department alone could be sold and "}, {"doc_id": "2019 INSC 735", "case_name": "SHIV DARSHAN SINGH v RAKESH TIWARI, DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARCHAEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA (ASI) & ORS.", "year": "2019", "issue": "", "held": ": On the date when the matter was considered and judgment was delivered, as per the spot panchnama dated 7.5.2003, the builders had completed the ground floor plus four upper floors including two levels of basement and only finishing work was yet to be completed \u2013 Supreme Court had passed no specific direction as to the status of structure or that the structure was to be pulled down or not \u2013 In the inspection held, after the contempt petition was filed, no vertical or horizontal expansion of the building was found as against what obtained in the year 2003 and only finishing work was completed \u2013 The permissions granted for renovation was also revoked even before filing of contempt petition \u2013 Therefore, it cannot be said that the authorities were in violation of the orders passed by Supreme Court \u2013 Hence the contempt petition is closed. Closing the Contempt Petition, the Court HELD: 1. On the date when the matter was considered and the Judgment was delivered by this Court, the structure as indicated in the Spot Panchnama dated 07.05.2003 was in existence. In the local inspection held on 07.05.2003 it was found that Respondents 4 and 5 had structurally completed the ground floor plus four upper floors including two levels of basement having height of 61 ft and 6 inches from the ground level to the terrace level of the 4th floor. However, the finishing work in the lower basement, u"}, {"doc_id": "2019 INSC 253", "case_name": "RAJU v THE STATE OF HARYANA", "year": "2019", "issue": "", "held": ": High Court decided the issue merely upon an assessment of the material on record without resorting to the procedure governing inquiries for determination of age as laid out in s.7A of the 2000 Act and r.12 of the 2007 Rules \u2013 High Court did not conduct inquiry stipulated as per s.7A & r.12 \u2013 In instant case, inquiry was conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) upon direction of the Supreme Court \u2013 As the inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) was thereafter affirmed, so that amounted to an inquiry conducted by the Supreme Court \u2013 Thus, findings of such inquiry would prevail over the view taken by the High Court \u2013 Accordingly, conviction and sentence of the appellant u/s.376 of IPC set aside. [2019] 4 S.C.R. 18 18 A B C D E F G H 19 Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The High Court evidently did not even frame its discussion in terms of whether the evidence brought on record was sufficient to conduct an inquiry under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 let alone order and conduct such an inquiry. On the contrary, it simply recorded that the evidence did not go to show that the Appellant was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offence, and proceeded to affirm the conviction of the Appellant on merits. [Para 15][26-E-F] 2. Therefore, it is evident that the onl"}, {"doc_id": "2010 INSC 238", "case_name": "DHARAMBIR v STATE (NCT OF DELHI) AND ANR.", "year": "2010", "issue": "", "held": ": Tenable - All persons below the age of 18 years on the date I of commission of offence, even prior to 1st April, 2001, would E be treated as juveniles even if the claim of juvenility is raised after they have attained the age of 18 years on or before the date of the commencement of the Act of 2000, and were undergoing sentences upon being convicted - However, since the maximum period of detention under the Act of 2000 was F for three years and appellant had already undergone an actual period of sentence of 2 years, 4 months and 4 days and is now c=iged about thirty five years, his case not forwarded to the Juvenile Justice Board concerned for passing sentence in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2000 - Conviction G of appellant sustained but quantum of sentence reduced to the period already uridergone - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 - rr. 12 and 98 - Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. 137 H 138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 5 S.C.R. A Appellant allegedly committed tt~e murder of a close relative and attempted to murder his brother. On the date of commission of the said off~nces i.e. on 25th August, 1991, appellant was aged 16 years, 9 months and 8 days. He was thus not a juvenile Wi.ithin the meaning of the B Juvenib Justice Act, 1986 when the offences were commit~ed. Appellant was convicted by the regular trial court u/s. 302 and 307 r/w s"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 721", "case_name": "SUBHASH MARUTI AVASARE v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "year": "2006", "issue": "", "held": ": By mere filing of a document, its contents are not proved-Certificate issued by an expert should be brought on record by examining him. E Appellant-Accused No. 3 has been alleged to have caused death of one person along with other co-accused. On the day of incident, the deceased had gone to a doctor with his wife (PW 2) for medical check up of their son. After sometime, PW-2 came back running to the house and informed mother of the deceased (PW I) that some persons had picked up quarrel with the deceased. F PW-I ran to the spot and found the accused persons assaulting the deceased. PW-2, her husband and son-in-law also came there. On being stabbed by accused-I, deceased fell down and he was taken to the hospital by PW-I and her husband. On the way to hospital the deceased had disclosed the names of accused I and 2, and the appellant as his assailants to PSO (PW 9). According to P.W .. I appellant had been nurturing grudge against the deceased as he G had refused to offer him beer. H Trial Court, relying on the testimony of PW-I, convicted the accused under Section 302 IPC. High Court, confirmed the conviction of accused I, 2 and the appellant, while acquitted Accused Nos. 4 and 5 of the offence under 514 SUBHASH MARUTI A VASARE 1\u00b7. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA 515 Section 302 and convicted them for offence under Section 323 IPC. A In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that P."}, {"doc_id": "2021 INSC 256", "case_name": "BOOTA SINGH & OTHERS v STATE OF HARYANA", "year": "2021", "issue": "", "held": ": Explanation to s. 43 shows that a private vehicle would not come within the expression \u201cpublic place\u201d \u2013 Words and Phrases \u2013 Expression \u201cpublic place\u201d. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 \u2013 s.42 \u2013 Requirements of \u2013 Substantial or adequate compliance vis-\u00e0-vis total non-compliance \u2013 Held: Total non-compliance of s.42 is A B C D E F G H 181 impermissible \u2013 The rigor of s.42 may get lessened in situations dealt with in Karnail Singh case but in no case, total non-compliance of s.42 can be accepted. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1. The evidence in the present case clearly shows that the vehicle was not a public conveyance but was a vehicle belonging to one the accused-appellants. The Registration Certificate of the vehicle, which has been placed on record also does not indicate it to be a Public Transport Vehicle. The explanation to Section 43 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 shows that a private vehicle would not come within the expression \u201cpublic place\u201d as explained in Section 43. The relevant provision would not be Section 43 but the case would come under Section 42. [Para 12][188-E-G] 1.2. It is an admitted position that there was total non- compliance of the requirement of Section 42. Total non- compliance of Section 42 is impermissible. The rigor of Section 42 may get lessened in situations dealt with in the conclusion dr"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 1229", "case_name": "M/S. M.M.T.C. LIMITED v COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAX & ORS.", "year": "2008", "issue": "", "held": ": In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court may not D only set aside/quash the impugned judgment/order/ proceeding but could also make such directions as the 'facts / and circumstances of the case warrants - High Court erred in holding that Letters Patent Appeal not maintainable - M.P. Uchacha Nyayalay (Khand Nyaypeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, E 2005 - S.2(1). Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution - Scope of - Discussed. The question which arose for determination in this )r- F appeal was as to whether the Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against the order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court in exercise of power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. G Allowing the appeal, the Court - HELD: 1.1. A bare reading of the order dated 22.8.2006 of this Court in the earlier round of litigation shows that the direction was to consider the Letters H 170 M.M.T.C. LIMITED v. COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL 171 TAX & ORS. )--- Patent Appeal (LPA) on merits and time was granted to A prefer the LPA within the stipulated time. The High Court was directed to dispose of the LPA on merits if it was otherwise free from defect. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in holding that this Court's earlier order only waived the limitation for filing a Letters Patent B Appeal. On that score alone the High Court's order is unsustainable. [Para 6] [1"}, {"doc_id": "2015 INSC 414", "case_name": "DEVI DAS RAMACHANDRA TULJAPURKAR v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA& ORS.", "year": "2015", "issue": "", "held": ": By F .. bringing in a historically respected personality to the arena of s.292 IPC, neither a new offence is created nor an ingredient is interpreted - The parameter for adjudging obscenity is 'contemporary community standards' test- However, the test becomes applicable with more vigour, in a greater degree, if G the name of Mahatma Gandhi is used as a symbol or allusion or surrealistic voice to put words or to show him doing such acts which are obscene. 853 H 854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 7 S.C.R. A CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950 Art. 19(1)(a) and 19(2) - Freedom of speech and expression and limitations thereon - Held: Freedom of speech and expression though has to be given a broad B canvas, but it has its inherent limitations, it is not absolute. Art. 19(1)(a) - Interpretation of - Held: When two interpretations (restrictive and liberal) of Art. 19(1)(a) are possible, liberal interpretation shouid be adopted - Art. c 19(1)(a) is intrinsically linked with preambular objectives which form a part of basic structure- Hence the Article should be interpreted in aid of the preambular objective. WORDS AND PHRASES: - D 'Poetic license'- Meaning of- Discussed. 'Obscenity' and 'vulgarity' - Meaning of, in the context of s.292 /PC- Discussed. E 'Poetry' - Meaning of. Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The prevalent test of obscenity in praesenti is the contemporary community s"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 409", "case_name": "JIJU KURUVILA & ORS. v KUNJUJAMMA MOHAN & ORS", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": If the claimant files petition claiming compensation in Indian Rupees(INR), 0 then date of filing of claim petition is the proper date for fixing the rate of exchange at which foreign currency amount has to be converled into currency of the country (INR) -- Deceased aged 45 years, multiplier of 14 applicable - At the time of death, there being four dependents, 114th of total income to be deducted towards personal expenses - Amount of E compensation payable to claimants will thus, be Rs.54,49,500/-, besides Rs.2,00,0001- as loss of love and affection to two children and Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of consorlium to the wife, with 12% interest. F s. 166 - Fatal accident - Comp~ds~t(on ~ Propfiety of \u00b7 Tribunal and High Court apportioning corJtributory negligence at 75:25 and 50:50 respectively and avfarding cqmpensation accordingly - Held: The eviden'ce;of eye~witness,:f!fe FIR and the charge-sheet against the driver of offending vehicle, G established that he caused the death due to negligent driving -- Therefore, Tribunal and High Court erred iri concluding that the accident occurred due to the negligence. d.n the part of the deceased as well. H 276 JIJU KURUVILA & ORS. v. KUNJUJAMMA MOHAN & 277 ORS. The father of appellant no. 1, while driving a car, met A with an accident as a bus coming from the opposite direction hit his car resulting in his death. At that time he was aged "}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 782", "case_name": "IDDAR AND ORS. v AABIDA AND ANR.", "year": "2007", "issue": "", "held": ": The provision is supplementary\u00b7 and discretionary-It is general provision which applies to all proceedings-The object thereof is to safeguard failure of justice on E account of mistake of either party in bringing valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity of statements of examined witnesses-The object is to bring on record evidence from the point of view of the accused, the prosecution and also the orderly society-Powers under it are very wide and hence the discretion is to be exercised judiciously. F The statement of a complainant before Trial Court was at variance with the statement recorded during investigation. Thereafter an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. requesting for recording the statement of the complainant afresh was filed. Trial Court rejected the application on the ground that it was a case where prosecution was trying to fill up lacunae of prosecution version. G Respondent No. 1 filed application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for setting aside order of trial court. High Court by order dated 20.2.2006 allowed the application. Thereafter appellants herein filed an application to recall the order dated 20.2.2006 as the same was decided without hearing them. They also filed an application to be impleaded. High Court rejected the application. Hence the H 518 -~ __,. IDDAR v. AABIDA 519 present appeal A J \"\"' Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: l. Section 311 Cr.P.C. is a supple"}, {"doc_id": "1961 INSC 87", "case_name": "SENAIRAM DOONGARMALL v COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,  ASSAM", "year": "1962", "issue": "", "held": ", that the amounts paid by the military authorities were received by the assessee not as compensation for the loss of profits of the business which it had been carrying on but for the injury to the business as a whole, because the entire structure of business was affected to such an extent that no business was carried on by the assessee during the two years in question. Accordingly, the compensation could not bear the character of profits of a business and was not liable to tax under s. IO of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Income-tax Commissioner v. Shaw Wallace & Co., (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 206, referred to and applied. Case law reviewed. 33 Mat'ch IJ. Senairatn 258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962]"}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 167", "case_name": "GVK INDS. LTD. & ANR. v THE INCOME TAX OFFICER & ANR.", "year": "2011", "issue": "", "held": ": Parliament has been constituted, and empowered to, and that its core role would be to enact laws to protect the interests, welfare and securif'/ of India - Therefore, even those extra-territorial aspects or causes, provided they have nexus with India, should be deemed to E be within the domain of legislative competence of Parliament except to the extent the Constitution itself specifies otherwise - Parliament may exercise its legislative powers with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes - events, things, phenomena (howsoever commonplace they may be), resources, actions or transactions, and the like - that occur, F arise or exist or may be expected to do so, naturally or on account of some human agency, in the social, political, economic, cultural, biological, environmental or physical spheres outside the territory of lnd.'a, and seek to control, modulate, mitigate or transform the effects of such extra- G territorial aspects or causes, or in appropriate cases, eliminate or engender such extra-territorial aspects or causes, only when such extra-territorial aspects or causes have, or are expected to have, some impact on, or effect in, or H 366 -- -- GVK INDS. LTD. & ANR. v. INCOME TAX OFFICER & 367 ANR. corsequences for: (a) the territory of India, or any part of India; A or (b) the interests of, welfare of, wellbeing of, or security of inhabitants of India, and Indian"}, {"doc_id": "2022 INSC 712", "case_name": "SADHNA CHAUDHARY v THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.", "year": "2022", "issue": "", "held": ": Considering the seriousness of the offences alleged, not a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail \u2013 Recoveries are yet to be made and the accused has not extended full cooperation in the investigation \u2013 Accused is not a common man, his adherence to law has to be more stringent than expected in general by a common man, which apparently, he failed to observe \u2013 High Court accepted the case as set up by the accused to be true and on that basis proceeded to grant anticipatory bail thus, committed an error \u2013 Order passed by the High Court set aside. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 : [1980] 3 SCR 383; Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Others (2011) 1 SCC 69 : [2010] 15 SCR 201; Sushila Aggarwal and Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another (2020) 5 SCC 1 : [2020] 2 SCR 1; State of U.P. v Deoman Upadhyaya AIR 1960 SC 1125 \u2013 referred to. Case Law Reference [1980] 3 SCR 383 followed Para 14.1 [2010] 15 SCR 201 referred to Para 14.2 [2022] 13 S.C.R. 239 239 A B C D E F G H 240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R. [2020] 2 SCR 1 referred to Para 14.3 AIR 1960 SC 1125 referred to Para 14.3"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 290", "case_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR. v KULDIP SINGH AND ANR.", "year": "2002", "issue": "", "held": ", as per the Government Circulars an employee has to complete 15 years of service to claim Selection Grade Pay-Government Circulars-Interpretation of Officers junior to respondents-Sub-Divisional Engineers were D granted higher \u00b7pay. Respondents filed writ petition praying for Writ of Mandamus directing the State Government to grant selection grade pay scale with effect from_ the date when officers juniors to them were granted higher pay. Appellants contended that the respondents could not be given the selection grade pay before they completed 15 years of service which is the eligibility condition for such benefit under the Government E Circulars. High Court allowed the petition. In appeal before this Court appellants contended that the judgment passed by the High Court is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside as it is contrary to the circulars prescribing the eligibility criteria for the purpose of grant of selection grade pay. F Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. As per the relevant Go_:ernment Circulars an employee in order to be eligible to get the selection grade pay has to complete 15 years of service and he is not to be given such scale of pay before he fulfils G the said eligibility criteria. It follows as a consequence that no employee can claim selection grade pay before completing 15 years of service on any ground including the ground that an employee ju"}, {"doc_id": "2022 INSC 483", "case_name": "OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD. v M/S DISCOVERY ENTERPRISES PVT. LTD. & ANR.", "year": "2022", "issue": "", "held": ": An arbitration agreement entered into by a company within a group of companies, can bind its non-signatory affiliates or sister concerns if the circumstances demonstrate a mutual intention of the parties to bind both the signatory and affiliated, non-signatory parties \u2013 A non-signatory may be bound by the arbitration agreement where: (i) there exists a group of companies; and (ii) parties have engaged in conduct or made statements indicating an intention to bind a non-signatory \u2013 In deciding whether a company within a group of companies which is not a signatory to arbitration agreement would nonetheless be bound by it, the law considers the following factors: (i) mutual intent of the parties; (ii) relationship of a non-signatory to a party which is a signatory to the agreement; (iii) commonality of the subject matter; (iv) composite nature of the transaction; and (v) performance of the contract. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 \u2013 s.37 \u2013 Decision of Arbitral Tribunal that it lacks jurisdiction \u2013 Challenge to \u2013 Held: If the arbitral tribunal accepts a plea that it lacks jurisdiction, the order of the tribunal is amenable to a challenge in appeal u/s.37(2)(a) \u2013 In exercise of the appellate jurisdiction, the court must have due deference to the grounds which weighed with the tribunal in holding that it lacks jurisdiction having regard to the object and spirit underlying the"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 362", "case_name": "HEM CHAND v STATE OF JHARKHAND", "year": "2008", "issue": "", "held": ": Proper - The Court at the stage of framing charge D exercises a limited jurisdiction - It would only have to see as to whether a prima facie case has been made out - At that stage, it woald not delve deep into the matter for purpose of appreciation of evidence - It would ordinarily not consider as to whether the accused would be able to establish his defence, E if any. Appellant, Executive Director (Vigilance) in a Government Company, faced trial for alleged commission of offence under s.13(2) r/w s.13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on charges of corruption. It was F .._, alleged that he was in possession of assets more than his known sources of income. Charge-sheet was filed. Appellant filed application for discharge and filed some documents in his defence. The Special Judge, CBI dismissed the application holding that documents relied G on by Appellant could not be looked into for passing order on his application. Revision application filed by appellant under s.397 CrPC was dismissed by the High Court. The question which arose for consideration in the 985 H 986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 4 S.C.R. A present appeal is as to whether the documents, whereupon the Appellant relied upon in support of his defence, can be looked into at the stage of framing of the charges .. The contention of the Appellant is that it was evident 8 that the CBI itself had seized the"}, {"doc_id": "2025 INSC 1139", "case_name": "Tarun Sharma v State of Haryana", "year": "2025", "issue": "Conviction of the appellant u/s.302, IPC based on the statement/ dying declaration (Exh. P-34) of the deceased, if ought to be set aside. Headnotes\u2020 Evidence \u2013 Dying declaration \u2013 When cannot be relied upon \u2013 Penal Code, 1860 \u2013 s.302 \u2013 FIR u/ss.323, 324, 506 r/w 34, IPC was registered on the basis of injured victim\u2019s statement (Exh.P 34) \u2013 Victim died, s.302 was added to the case \u2013 Appellant along with co-accused persons was arrested \u2013 Trial court acquitted the co-accused persons however, the appellant was convicted u/s.302 \u2013 Conviction affirmed by High Court \u2013 Interference with:", "held": ": 1.1 Prosecution could neither prove the faithful recording of the statement/dying declaration nor they could prove it to be an unimpeachable document \u2013 Such a doubtful piece of evidence cannot be made the foundation of conviction of the appellant. [Para 64] 1.2 There are material infirmities in the case of prosecution \u2013 It was categorically stated by PW-1 (brother of the deceased) and corroborated by the Doctors (PW-9 and PW-10) who treated the deceased, that the deceased remained unconscious almost fully from the time of the assault on until his death, and was never in a condition to speak \u2013 Hence the fitness certificate becomes doubtful. [Paras 63] 1.3 Prosecution failed to identify or examine the doctor who had issued the fitness certificate, which creates grave doubt about the * Author 1274\b [2025] 9 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports authenticity of the fitness certificate \u2013 Furthermore, non-examination of the said doctor, deprived the defence an opportunity to discredit the fitness certificate. [Paras 63] 1.4 No contemporaneous medical record relating to the treatment of the deceased at the hospital was produced nor proved during trial, leaving the Court without corroborative material to assess the fitness of the injured to make a statement. [Para 63] 1.5 The statement/dying declaration itself suffers from serious infirmities as it bears no time of recording, and the recordin"}, {"doc_id": "2016 INSC 166", "case_name": "ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ & OTHERS v TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY & ANOTHER", "year": "2016", "issue": "", "held": ": By preventing the legislator from participating in the proceedings of the House, though there is a curtailment of the petitioner-members' right of free speech in the Legislative Assembly to which they are entitled u!Art. 194 but the impugned order does not violate fundamental rights of petitioners guaranteed under!A'd. 19(/)(a). -\u00b7 Right to participate in the proceedings of the legis/ptive. bodies is D E not a fundamental right falling u/Art. 19(/)(g) - Member of the. F legislative assembly cannot be treated as pursuing an 'occupation' \u00b7 u!Art. 19(/)(g) - Further, the only material relied upon by the Privileges Committee to identify all the members and recommend action against them for breach of privilege was the video recording - It was the legal obligation of the Committee to ensure that a copy of the video recording was supplied to the members\u00b7- Failure to supply a copy of the video recording or affording an opportunity to the petitioners to view the video recording resulted in the violation of the principles of natural justice-denial of a reasonable opportunity to meet the case - Thus, the second resolution passed 611 G H 612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R. A by the State Legislative Assembly set aside - Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules - r.121(2) - Principles of natural justice. Arts. 105, 194, 19(l)(a) - Freedom of ~peech available to a member of the legislat"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 753", "case_name": "M.D., M/S. RAMAKRISHNA POULTRY P. LTD. v R. CHELLAPPAN & ORS.", "year": "2009", "issue": "", "held": ": Purchase of /,:ind and starting poultry business were effected when survey fOr route of transmission line was being undertaken - In view of stand of Power Grid Corporation that deviation in D transmissipn linfJ\u00a7 could not be practically achieved, Corporation would r[Jise the height of the lowest point of sag of transmission lines between two towers on either sides of the poultry shed from 46. 5 meters to 56 meters raising the E clearance to 40' between the lowest point of sag and the highest point of poultry shed - Company would be entitled to oompensation on account of erection of tower for carrying transmission lines over poultry farm in accordance with provisions of s. 10 (d) of the Act- Equity- Balance between F grievance of individual and public interest. The appellant company which was engaged in poultry farming, purchased land and constructed poultry sheds thereon, at about the same time when respondent No. 3, the Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd., started G .. ,- survey in the area for erecting transmission towers for carrying High Voltage electricity current transmission wires at various locations. The appellant company apprehending that High voltage transmission wires over 1055 H 1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R A the poultry sheds would adversely affect the performance and health of layer birds, filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking a real"}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 657", "case_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v RAMESH", "year": "2004", "issue": "", "held": ": The right of private defence is essentially a defensive right which. is available as and when the circumstances clearly justifY it-It is a right of defence, not retribution, expected to repel unlawful aggression and not as a retaliatory measure- E F G The findings of the High Court are vague, unclear and indefensible-Hence, conviction under S. 304 Part I set aside-Conviction under S. 302 upheld. Section JOO-Murder-Exceptions I and 2-Distinction between- Held: Exception I relates to grave and sudden provocation while the other relates to exercise of right of privat(! defence. According to the prosecution, the deceased and PW-I were returning after their examination and were passing in front of the house of the acquitted-accused when his two sons and wife started pelting stones on them. Thereafter, the respondent-accused fired a shot at the deceased who died on the spot. The trial court convicted the respondent-accused under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 holding that the firing was deliberate and rejected the respondent's plea of exercise of right of private defence. However, the High Court accepted the plea of self-defence and altered H the conviction to one under Section 304 Part I IPC. Hence the appeal. 152 ST A TE v. RAMESH 153 Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: I. The right of private defence is essentially a defensive right circumscribed by the governing statute i"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 72", "case_name": "R. SHAJI v STATE OF KERALA.", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": Justified - Evidence on record clearly established that appellant had adequate reason to harbour animosity towards o the victim 'P', as he may well have been unable to tolerate the intimacy that 'P' had developed with appellant's wife - PW testified that appellant had threatened that in the event that he was able to lay his hands on 'P', he would chop him up into pieces - The motive thus stood proved - Victim last seen E with appellant (A-1) and A-2 - Recovery of chopper at the behest of appellant - Injuries revealed by post-mortem report established that dismemberment of parts of the body was possible by using a weapon like chopper\u00b7 - Victim's skull recovered on basis of disclosure statement of appellant - F Use of vehicle in the crime also stood proved - Appellant clearly involved in conspiracy \u00b7to eliminate 'P' - Prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.161 and 164 - Statements uls.161 and u/s.164 - Difference - Held: G Statements uls.161 can be used only for the purpose of contradiction - Statements u/s. 164, however, can be used for both corroboration and contradiction - Evidence Act, 1872 - s.157. H 1172 R. SHAJI v. STATE OF KERALA 1173 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.164 - Object of- A Discussed. Criminal Law - Criminal conspiracy - Proof - Held: B Offence of criminal conspiracy can be proved, either by adducing ci"}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 113", "case_name": "STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v MAMATA MOHANTY", "year": "2011", "issue": "", "held": ": Questions raised in instant appeals had never been considered by courts earlier - A teacher who had been appointed without E possessing the requisite qualification at initial stage, cannot get the benefit of grant-in-aid scheme unless he/she acquires the additional qualification and, therefore, question of grant of UGC pay scale would not arise unless such teacher acquires the additional qualification for benefit of grant-in-aid F scheme - However, terminating the services of those who had been appointed illegally and/or withdrawing the benefit of grant-in-aid scheme would not be desirable as a long period has elapsed - But, UGC pay scale cannot be granted prior to the date of acquisition of higher qualification - Delay/ G /aches -Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 14, and 16 and 21 - Stare decisis - Rule of per incurium. H CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950 : Article 226 - Writ petition - Limitation for filing of - Held 704 STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. MAMATA MOHANTY 705 ' : Doctrine of limitation being based on public policy is A applicable to writ petitions which may be dismissed at initial stage on ground of delay and /aches - Relief granted in similar case cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay/ /aches - Limitation Act, 1963 - s.3 B Article 226 ..:. Writ petition - Held : Relief not founded on pleadings should not be granted - Relief - Pleadings. Article 14 -Held : Does"}, {"doc_id": "2023 INSC 209", "case_name": "THE SECRETARY MINISTRY OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS v DR. MAHINDRA BHASKAR LIMAYE & ORS.", "year": "2023", "issue": "", "held": ": rr.3(2)(b), 4(2)(c), 6(9) which are contrary to the decisions of Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. All Uttar Pradesh Consumer Protection Bar Association [2016] 8 SCR 851 and Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and Another [2020] 2 SCR 246 are unconstitutional, arbitrary and violative of Art.14 \u2013 rr.3(2)(b) & 4(2)(c) struck down to the extent providing minimum 20 years\u2019 and 15 years\u2019 experience for appointment as a Member in the State and District Commission, respectively \u2013 Central Government and the concerned State Governments to amend the 2020 Rules \u2013 Till amendments are made, directions issued for appointment of President and Members of the State Commission and District Commission \u2013 A person having bachelor\u2019s degree from a recognized University and who is a person of ability, integrity and standing and having special knowledge and professional experience of not less than 10 years in consumer affairs, law, public affairs etc., shall be treated as qualified for appointment of President and Members of the State and District Commission \u2013 Appointment shall be made on the basis of performance in written test consisting of two papers \u2013 Qualifying marks in each paper shall be 50% and there shall be a viva voce of 50 marks \u2013 Consumer Protection Act, 2019 \u2013 Consumer Protection Act,1986 \u2013 Consumer Protection(Appointment, Salary, Allowance and Conditions of Ser"}, {"doc_id": "2022 INSC 304", "case_name": "HIGH COURT OF DELHI v DEVINA SHARMA", "year": "2022", "issue": "", "held": ": In regard to the DJS examination 2022 \u2013 The High Court conducted the last examination for recruitment to the DJS in 2019 \u2013 No examination was held in 2020 for institutional reasons and in 2021 due to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic \u2013 Suggestions of the High Court were accepted that candidates who would have fulfilled the upper age limit of 32 years for years 2020 and 2021, would be eligible to participate in the examination for the ensuing year 2022 \u2013 Hence, the last date of receipt of applications forms were extended and new date of examination were announced \u2013 In regard to DHJS examination \u2013 Clause (1) of Art.233 stipulates that appointments of persons, posting and promotion of District Judges shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the State \u2013 The Constitution has prescribed the requirement to the effect that a person shall be eligible for appointment as a District Judge only if he has been an advocate or a pleader for at least seven years \u2013 What this means is that a person who has not fulfilled the seven year norm is not eligible \u2013 The Constitution does not preclude the exercise of the rule making power by the High Courts to regulate the conditions of service or appointment \u2013 The Constitution being silent in regard to the prescription of a minimum age, the High Courts in the exercise of their"}, {"doc_id": "2023 INSC 74", "case_name": "DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v DEWAN CHAND PRUTHI & ORS", "year": "2023", "issue": "", "held": ": Not sustainable \u2013 Impugned judgment contrary to law laid down by this Court in the Constitution Bench decision in the Indore Development Authority\u2019s case that once having obtained the stay against the dispossession and due to which the acquiring body/beneficiary could not have taken the possession, thereafter, it is not open for the landowner to contend that as the possession is not taken, he is entitled to the benefit of s. 24(2) \u2013 Thus, order passed by the High Court is quashed and set aside \u2013 Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors, (2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1 - followed. Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. Vs Harakchand Misrimal Solanki & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 183 : [2014] 1 SCR 783 - referred to. Case Law Reference [2014] 1 SCR 783 referred to Para 2.1 [2020] 3 SCR 1 followed Para 3"}, {"doc_id": "1961 INSC 112", "case_name": "K. S. NANJI AND COMPANY v JATASHANKAR DOSSA AND OTHERS", "year": "1962", "issue": "", "held": ", that the burden of proof had not been misplaced. Under art. 48 of the Indian Limitation Act, which prescribes a three years' limitation from the date of the knowledge, the initial onus is obviously on the plaintiff to prove that date since it\u00b7would be within his special knowledge. Moreover, under s. 3 of the Act, which makes its obligatory on the court to dismiss a suit barred by limitation, even though such a plea is not set up in defence, it is for the plaintiff to establish that the suit is not so barred. Lalchand Marwari v. Mahant Rampur Gir, (1925) I.L.R. 5 Pat. (P.C.) 312 and Rajah Sahib Perhalad Sein v. Maharajah Rajender Kishore Singh, (1869) 12 M.I.A. 292, referred to. Under the Indian Evidence Act there is an essential distinc- tion between burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading and as a matter of adducing evidence and under s. 101 of the '\u00b7 Vt I ; ) I l / l ' ' \u2022 I - 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 493 Act the burden in the former sense is always on the plaintiff and never shifts, but the burden in the latter sense may according to the evidence led by the parties and presumptions of law or fact raised in their favour. Sundarji Shivji v. Secretary of Stale for India, (r934) I.LR. r3 Pat. 752, disapproved. Kalyani Prasad Singh v. Borrea Coal Co. Ltd., A.LR. r946 Cal. r23, Bank of Bombay v. Fazulbhoy Ebrahim, (r922) 24 Born. L.R. 5r3 and Talyarkhan v. Gangadas"}, {"doc_id": "2025 INSC 144", "case_name": "Shripal & Anr. v Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad", "year": "2025", "issue": "Whether the services of the appellant-workmen (gardeners) were terminated without complying with Sections 6E and 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Appellants, if entitled to reinstatement with back wages as also regularization of their services. Headnotes\u2020 U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 \u2013 ss.6E, 6N \u2013 Non-compliance with:", "held": ": The pattern of direct oversight and wage disbursement negates the stand of the Respondent-Employer that the Appellant- Workmen were \u201ccontractor\u2019s personnel\u201d \u2013 Appellants were pressing for regularization and proper wages through pending conciliation proceedings, however, the Employer proceeded to discontinue their services, without issuing prior notice or granting retrenchment compensation \u2013 Discontinuation of the Appellants\u2019 services, effected without compliance with ss.6E and 6N was illegal \u2013 Appellants were performing the same tasks of planting, pruning, general upkeep as regular Gardeners \u2013 The principle of \u201cequal pay for equal work\u201d cannot be casually disregarded when workers continuously served for extended periods in roles resembling those of permanent employees \u2013 Long-standing assignments under the Employer\u2019s direct supervision belie any notion that these were mere short-term casual engagements \u2013 Employer\u2019s plea of lack of an employer- employee relationship is not supported by evidence \u2013 Furthermore, reliance on a general \u201cban on fresh recruitment\u201d cannot be used to deny labor protections to long serving workmen \u2013 Uma Devi cannot be used to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment \u2013 Impugned order of the High Court, to the extent it confines the * Author 1428\b [2025] 1 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports App"}, {"doc_id": "1963 INSC 152", "case_name": "GENERAL MANAGER, B. E. S. T.  UNDERTAKING, BOMBAY v MRS. AGNES", "year": "1964", "issue": "", "held": "(per Subba Rao and Mudholkar JJ.), that under ~the :Rules, a bus driver is given the facility in his capacity as a driver to travel in any bus belonging to the undertaking, presumably, to enable him w keep up punctuality and to discharge his oner1Jus obJigations. It is given to him not as a grace, but is of right because efficiency of the service demands it. Therefore the right of a bus driver to travel in the bus in q~ger to discharlje his duties punctnally and efficiently was a \u2022 . ' I. \u2022 - \u2022 3 S.C,R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 931 condition of his service and there was an implied obligation on his part to travel in the said buses as a part of his duty. Though the doctrine of reasonable or notional extension of employment developed in the context of specific workshops, factories or harbours, equally applies to such a bus service the doctrine necessarily will have to be adapted to meet its peculiar requirements. While in a case of a factory, the premises of the employer which gives ingress or egress to the factory is a limited one, in the case of a city transport service, by analogy, the entire fleet of buses forming the service would be the \"premises\" . In the present case, therefore, the High Court was right in saying that the accident occurred to Nanu Raman during the course of his employment and, therefore, the respondent was entitled to compensation. Cremins v. Guest Keen & Ne"}, {"doc_id": "2025 INSC 481", "case_name": "The State of Tamil Nadu v The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.", "year": "2025", "issue": "a. What courses of action are available to the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution. b. Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered in accordance with the first proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first instance. c. Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time limit within which the Governor is required to act in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the C", "held": ": There are only three courses of action available to the Governor to choose from when a bill is presented to him for assent under Article 200 \u2013 The first proviso is not an independent fourth course of action but intrinsically attached to the option of withholding of assent \u2013 In other words, the first proviso is clarificatory and only elaborates the procedure to be followed in case the option of withholding of assent is invoked by the Governor \u2013 The use of the expression \u201cshall\u201d in the substantive part of Article 200 read with the expression \u201cas soon as possible\u201d used in the first proviso indicates that there is no pocket veto available to the Governor while he is exercising the powers under Article 200 \u2013 Inaction on part of the Governor to take a decision when a bill is presented to him under Article 200 is grossly violative of the constitutional scheme of expediency which permeates the provision \u2013 The Governor, in exercise of his powers under Article 200, also does not possess any absolute veto \u2013 He is mandated to take a decision from among the three options that are provided in the substantive part of the Article 200 \u2013 In case of withholding of assent, the Governor is bound to follow the procedure prescribed under the first proviso and assent to the bill if it is ultimately presented to him for assent after being repassed by the State legislature \u2013 The Governor may also rese"}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 501", "case_name": "S.E.B.I. v SAHARA INDIA REAL ESTATE CORPORATION LTD.", "year": "2014", "issue": "", "held": ": On facts, contemnors cannot be granted parole as prayed for- Nothing F to show that Shri Subrata Roy Sahara suffered from any serious medical condition - Alternative ground for parole, viz. facilitating negoiiations with prospective purchasers of property offered for sale by Saharas, also not justified - No legal impediment in permitting the sale of offshore properties G owned by Saharas for raising funds for compliance with the order of Court - Three offshore hotel properties owned by Saharas allowed to be transferred, sold or encumbered subject to conditions - Bail. Parole - Entitlement of H 1036 S.E.8.1. v. SAHARA IN DIA REAL ESTATE CORPN. LTD. 1037 Disposing of the applications, the Court A HELD:1. The anxiety on the part of the Saharas generally and the contemnors in particular to sell the offshore properties is understandable especially when such sale and transfer is not only going to help Saharas in liquidating the outstanding loan amount payable to 8 the Bank of China but leave sufficient surplus with the Sahai'as to not only deposit the balance of Rs.2,000/- crores approximately that needs to be immediately paid by them but also furnish a bank guarantee for a sum of Rs.5,000/- crores, as directed. There is therefore no legal C impediment in permitting the sale of the offshore properties owned by Saharas. [Para 11][1046-C-F] 2. There is nothing to show that Shri Subra"}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 619", "case_name": "RAGHUBIR SINGH v STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.", "year": "2011", "issue": "", "held": ": Each and every injury on an accused is not required to be explained and more particularly where all the 739 H 740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 10 S.C.R. A injuries caused to the accused are simple in nature - The facts of the case have to be assessed on the nature of probabilities - In the instant case, the injuries on the accused were not explained as the prosecution witness did not utter a single word as to how they had been suffered by them - In 8 this view of the matter, the defence can legitimately raise a suspicion that the genesis of the incident was shrouded in mystery - Undoubtedly, there were a large number of injured witnesses, some of them grievously hurt, to support the prosecution case, but in the instant case, this fact by itself C cannot preclude the accused from claiming that no case was made out against them. Appeal against acquittal: Acquittal by High Court - Scope of interference u/Article 136 - Held: If view taken by High Court was plausible or possible, it would not be proper D for the Supreme Court to interfere with an order of acquittal - Various circumstances when Supreme Court would interfere with the judgment of the High Court enumerated - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136. E The prosecution case was that the land on which incident took place was mortgaged to the appellant-PW- 1 several years prior to the date of incident. On the fateful day"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 461", "case_name": "MAHINDER KUMAR & ORS. v HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH  REGISTRAR GENERAL &ORS", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": Having regard to the power vested in the High Court u/ r. 7, as well as para 9 of the advertisetrJent (inviting D applications for filling up the posts), in particular para 9 (iv), the High Court was fully empowered to prescribe its own fa.ir procedure for purpose of evaluation of the marks of the candidates, in order to make the ultimate selection - No flaw found in the process adopted by the High Court - Para 9(iv) E of the advertisement, read along with r. 7, fully empowered the High Court to prescribe a procedure from the stage of evaluating the answer sheets of the candidates, initially by different District Judges and after noticing different standard. adopted by different District Judges in the matter of valuation j F of answer sheets of the candidates, for adopting the normalization process in order to streamline the whole selection in a fair manner - Also there was no conflict with the ~ Sheffy Commission recommendation, as approved by Supreme Court - The procedure followed by 1st respondent G High Court was also rational - No material on record in --r support of the plea that the minimum percentage requirement for final selection was increased at the final stage - Procedure adopted by the 1st respondent High Court well in order and not calling for interference - Madhya Pradesh Uchchtar H 884 l\\t'AHINDER KUMAR v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. THR. REG. 885 GEN. ,y Nyayik Seva ("}, {"doc_id": "2020 INSC 496", "case_name": "MOHD. ANWAR v THE STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI)", "year": "2020", "issue": "", "held": ": Testimonies of the witnesses were impeccable and corroborative of each other \u2013 The crime of robbery with hurt was established \u2013 The complainant had no motive to falsely implicate the appellant \u2013 The refusal to participate in the TIP proceedings undoubtedly establish the appellant\u2019s guilty conscience \u2013 Pleas of unsoundness of mind or mitigating circumstances like juvenility of age, ought to have been raised during the trial \u2013 No evidence in the form of a birth certificate, school record or medical test was brought forth nor any expert examination has been sought by the appellant to prove his age \u2013 Instead, the statement recorded u/s. 313 Cr. P.C. showed that the appellant was above 18 years of age \u2013 Further, the plea of mental disorder also remained unsubstantiated \u2013 The conduct of appellant like running away from the spot of crime and thereafter an attempt to escape [2020] 7 S.C.R. 150 150 A B C D E F G H 151 show elevated level of mental intellect \u2013 The answers recorded u/s. 313 Cr. P.C. were also not mechanical or laconic \u2013 Further, the appellant is now as per record untraceable \u2013 The plea of mental illness is a made-up story \u2013 Consequently, appellant\u2019s bail bonds are cancelled and the respondent-State directed to take appellant into custody to serve the remainder of his sentence. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The testimonies of the witnesses are indeed impeccab"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 734", "case_name": "S.V.L.MURTHY v STATE REP. BY CBI, HYDERABAD", "year": "2009", "issue": "", "held": ": Prosecution failed to prove conspiracy as also wrongful gains - Impugned judgment unsustainable and set aside - Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 138. Constitution of India, 1950: E Article 136 - Special Leave jurisdiction - Ordinarily concurrent finding of fact not interfered with - However, the ;urisdiction must be exercised whenever it is required to do so for securing the ends of justice and to avoid injustice. A charge sheet was filed under Sections 120-B, 420 ~ F IPC r/w Section 13(1)(q) of the Prevention of Corruption Act alleging inter alia that there was criminal conspiracy between the accused persons to cheat the State Bank of India. Special Judge for CBI cases found A-1 to A-6 guilty G for the offence under Section 120-B and 420 IPC, A-4 to A- 6 were found guilty for the offence under Section 13(2) r/ -+ 4 w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Accordingly, he convicted and sentenced the accused. H 784 S.V.L. MURTHY V STATE REP BY CBI, HYDERABAD 785 - ~ ' High Court dismissed the appeals of the accused, but A ' acquitted A-6. Hence the appeals. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the 8 accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time \u2022 of making promise or representation. Even in a case \u00b7~ where allegations are made in regard to failure o"}, {"doc_id": "2010 INSC 604", "case_name": "ASHOK PAL SINGH AND ORS. v U.P. JUDICIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION AND ORS.", "year": "2010", "issue": "", "held": ": Direct recruits to be given quota in the temporary posts also - Quota of direct recruits is '15%' and not 'upto 15%' - Though the quota of direct recruits is fixed, there is flexibility in fixing the vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment and vacancies to be filled by E promotion - High Court can make adjustments in fixing the number of officers to be appointed by promotion and direct recruitment as shown in Rule 8(2) and the provisos thereto ensuring that the number of direct recruits does not exceed 15% of the total strength of the service - Proviso to Rule 8(2) F to be read in the context of the quashing of Sub-Rules (3) and (4) of Rule 22 -Total vacancies to be filled up at a recruitment by applying sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 8 and its provisos - There is no question of unfilled vacancies being carried forward for the purpose of fixing the number of officers to be taken at the next recruitment. G The recruitment and appointment to the U.P. Higher Judicial Service were governed by the U.P. Higher Judicial Services Rules, 1975. In terms of the Rules, the 25 H 26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R. A vacancies were filled by i) direct recruitment from the Bar; and ii) by promotion from amongst a) Uttar Pradesh Nyayik Sewa and b) Uttar Pradesh Judicial Officers Service (Judicial Magistrates). 8 The issue of inter-se seniority between promotees and direct recruits "}, {"doc_id": "1958 INSC 109", "case_name": "NARAIN AND TWO OTHERS v THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "year": "1959", "issue": "", "held": ", that the trial was not vitiated by the failure of the prosecution to examine R as a witness. Section 167 did not help the appellants as it was not a case in which evidence could be said to have been rejected within the meaning of that section. Further, R was not a witness material to the prosecution ina11- much as he arrived on the scene after the assault was over and it was not necessary for the prosecution to examine him to ensure a fair trial. Where a material witness has been deliberately !>r unfairly kept back, a serious reflection is cast on the propriety bf the trial and the validity of the conviction resulting from it may be open to challenge. The test whether a witness is material .is whether he is essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based and not whether he would have given evidence in support of the defence. , Habeeb Mohammad v. The State of Hyderabad, [1954] S.C.R. 475; Stephen Seneviratne v. The King, A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 289. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Crimin1tol Appeal No. 186 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment a.ud order dated February 18, 1955, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 389 a.nd 406 of 1954, a.rising out of. the judgment a.nd order dated June 16, 1954, of the Court of the Additional Sessions J ud~e, l!'erozepur, in Sessions Case No. 5 of 1954 a.nd Tr~a.l No. 5 of 1954. Narain and tw"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 488", "case_name": "M/S RAPTI COMMISSION AGENCY v STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.", "year": "2006", "issue": "", "held": ", Section 8-E of the Act cannot be made D applicable to inter-State transactions--High Court was in error by reading down the provision without going intu the facts-Directions issued to Revenue to deal with the case in accordance with law. Appellant-agent purchases Mentha Oil from sellers/agriculturists and consigns them to its principal situated in another State. Respondent-State E Revenue detained one of the consignments and issued a notice to the appellant stating that the detention was made for not deducting tax from the payment made to the seller/agriculturists and depositing the same as required under section 8-E of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948. 0 The appellant replied to the notice stating it is not liable to deduct and deposit F tax under the Act as it merely purchases and consigns them for and on behalf of its principal situated outside the State. When the Revenue insisted on the deposit of the tax, the appellant, by a Writ Petition before High Court, challenged the constitutional validity of section 8-E of the Act contending that the sellers/agriculturists cannot be treated as a 'dealer' under the proviso to section 2(c) of the Act; and that, the State does not G have legislative competence to levy tax on inter-State transactions. The High Court dismissed the Writ petition holding that the language of a statutory provision can bee narrowed down to sustain its"}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 263", "case_name": "SHRI AMBICA MILLS CO., LTD. v SHRI S. B. BHATT AND ANOTHER", "year": "1961", "issue": "", "held": ", that both \u00b7the contentions must be negatived. The High Court has power under A rt. 226 of the Constitu- tion to issue a \u00b7writ of ce.-tiorari not only in cases of illegal exer- cise of jurisdiction but also to correct errors of law apparent on the face of the record, although not errors of fact even though so apparent. No unfailing test can, however, be laid down when an error of law is an error apparent on the lace of the record and the rule that it must be self-evident, requiting no elaborate examination of the record, is a satisfactory practical test in a large majority of cases. Rex v. NorlhumberlaKd Compensation Appeal Tribunal, (1952] l K.B. 338 and 'NageKdra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of HiUs Division aKd Appeals, Assam, [1958] S.C.R. 1340, referred to. 222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] 196\u2022 Viswanath Tukaram v. The General Manager, Central Railway, . -. . V. T., Bombay, (I9S7) S9 Born. L.R. 892, considered. Shri Amb~~ Mills A look at the two clauses is enough to show that the appel- Co., 1 \u2022 late Authority in construing them in the way it did committed \u2022\u00b7 an obvious and manifest error of law. It was clear that the two Shri s. B. Bhatt l l\" d d\" \u00b7 c auses app 1e to two 1stmct categories of persons and persons .;. dnoth\" falling under cl. S could not be governed by cl. 2 and were not expected to satisfy the test prescribed by it. Under s. IS of the Payment of Wages Act; 19"}, {"doc_id": "1998 INSC 138", "case_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BHUBANESHWAR AND ANR. v PARMESHWARI DEVI SULTANIA AND ORS.", "year": "1998", "issue": "", "held": ", not maintainable as the claim in the suit would effect the order passed under section 132(5) of the Income Tax Act-Claimant could have instead resorted \u2022 to the remedy provided under the Act by filing objection under section 132(11)-Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Section 9. D Words and Phrases : 'Any person '-Meaning and scope of-Income Tax Act, 1961 : Section 132(11). Income-Tax Officer conducted search and seizure under section 132 E of the Income Tax Act, 1961 at a residential and business premises of 'B'. Various assets including gold ornaments were seized in the raid. On interrogation 'B' gave a statement that the gold ornaments belonged to deceased 'M' first wife of his father, who had bequeathed them for her only )o._ daughter, Respondent No. 1 and other children of his father from his second F wife. The said gold ornaments were in the custody of his father and on his death it came into his custody. The Income Tax Officer disbelieving the version of 'B' passed an order under section 132(5) of the Act and directed that all the assets seized including gold ornaments be retained by the department. Respondent No. 1 filed a petition before the Income Tax Officer G for return of the ornaments, which was rejected. Therefore, she filed a partition suit claiming 5/14th of her share in the gold ornaments which were . '\u00b7--\"., seized. Revenue objected to the maintainability of the sui"}, {"doc_id": "1963 INSC 201", "case_name": "MOHAN SINGH v BHANW ARLAL & OTHERS.", "year": "1964", "issue": "", "held": ": (i) The election petition was not detective. There was no allegation of corrupt practice against Himmat Singh. It was merely alleged that the appellant had offered to assist or help Himmat Singh in obtaining employment with '\"Dalauda Sugar Factory or elsewhere\". The acceptance of offer which constitutes a motive or reward for withdrawing from the candidature must be acceptance of gratification. Gratification does not include offers and acceptances of mere promises, but requires an offer and acceptance relating to a thing of some value, though not necessa- rily estimable in terms of money. A mere offer to help in getting employment is not such offer of gratification within the meaning of s. 123(1)(8) as to constitute it a corrupt practice. On the allegations therefore, it was not necessary to implead Himmat Singh as a respondent to the petition. (ii) The onus of establishing a corrupt practice is undoubted- ly on the person who sets it up, and the onus is not discharged on proof of mere preponderance of probability, as in the trial of a civil suit; the corrupt practice must be established beyond reasonable doubt by evidence which is clear and unambiguous. (iii) Jn considering whether a publication amounts to a corrupt practice within the meaning of s. 123(4) the Tribunal would be entitled to take into account matters of common knowledge among the electorate and read the public"}, {"doc_id": "2024 INSC 516", "case_name": "Duni Chand v Vikram Singh and Others", "year": "2024", "issue": "Whether the High Court erred in extending the benefit of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to the defendants despite the lack of specific pleadings, and no evidence to show consent of interested persons. Headnotes\u2020 Transfer of Property Act, 1882 \u2013 Section 41 \u2013 Transfer by ostensible owner \u2013 Consent of persons interested in the immovable property required \u2013 No specific pleading or evidence showing the consent, whether express or implied, of the interested persons \u2013 Relief granted in favour of defendants by the High Court relying on Section 41 was unwarranted. Transfer of Propert", "held": ": Plaintiff had a registered Will dated 12.12.1988 (\u20181988 Will\u2019) bequeathing the suit land to him \u2013 Defendant No. 1 based on Will dated 16.05.1994 (\u20181994 Will\u2019) got his name mutated in the revenue records and subsequently transferred the land to other defendants \u2013 High Court confirmed the first Appellate Court\u2019s finding that the 1988 Will was a valid and genuine document, and the 1994 Will was invalid and shrouded in suspicion \u2013 However, it extended the benefit of Section 41, TP Act, to the purchasers of the property from defendant No. 1 \u2013 Appeal against reliance on Section 41, TP Act, allowed. Section 41, TP Act, requires the consent, express or implied, of persons interested in the immovable property \u2013 Plaintiff was * Author [2024] 7 S.C.R. \b 1203 Duni Chand v. Vikram Singh and Others an interested person as the 1988 Will was in his favour, but no pleadings or evidence showed that the defendants had obtained consent from him \u2013 Furthermore, the proviso to Section 41 requires transferees to take reasonable care and act in good faith, which also was not pleaded by defendants 2, 4, and 5 \u2013 Thus, the relief granted by the High Court under Section 41 was unwarranted, misplaced, and against the pleading and evidence on record. [Paras 12, 13]. Wills \u2013 If vendor has no rights under the invalid Will, purchasers could not acquire any better rights. Held: Once the High Court had determin"}, {"doc_id": "1999 INSC 52", "case_name": "NAZIM ALI AND ORS. v ANJUMAN ISLAMIA CHHATARPUR AND ORS.", "year": "1999", "issue": "", "held": ", yes. Code of Civil Procedure 1908, s. 11-Res Judicata-Agreement between Appellants and Respondent No. 1 regarding taking out of Tazia from suit land during MuhaTTam-Held earlier proceedings by High Court not to operate as estoppel against appellants as regards their title to suit land-High E Court decreeing subsequent suit by Respondent No. 1 for declaration that suit land is wakf property relying on agreement-Held, on principle of res judicata not open to High Court to re-examine point which stood decided against respondent No. 1. In 1960 the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants filed a suit F against respondent No. 1 for a declaration that they were the pwners of the suit land known as 'Badi Takia'. The Trial Court decreed the suit and held that Respondent No. 1 had committed trespass by keeping their Tazia on the suit land. While upholding this decree, the High Court held that the mosque on the suit land was alone wakf property, which this Court G affirmed. Thereafter Respondent No. 1 filed a suit in 1974 for a declaration that the suit land except for a plot measuring 6' x 6' situate in it was wakf property. The Trial Court dismissed the suit inter alia on the ground that; (i) the Mosque was wakf property by user and not other portions of the H property and the respondents were not the Mutwallis of the suit land and 516 NAZIMALI v. ANJUMAN ISLAMIACHHATARPUR[RAJENDRA"}, {"doc_id": "2022 INSC 1301", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v DILIP KUMAR MALLICK", "year": "2022", "issue": "", "held": ": Admittedly, at the time of filling up the verification roll, the criminal case was pending \u2013 Respondent cannot feign ignorance about the said case because he indeed surrendered before the Trial Court and was granted bail \u2013 He had indeed left the relevant columns in the verification roll blank; and thereby, had been wanting in forthrightness while filling up the verification roll for employment \u2013 That being the position, the findings whereby he is held guilty of misconduct of suppression/ concealment of material information, cannot be faulted at \u2013 In fact, such findings of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority were affirmed by the Single Judge as also by the Division Bench in the order impugned \u2013 Division Bench was not justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment \u2013 In the given set of facts and circumstances, where suppression of relevant information is not a matter of dispute, there cannot be any legal basis for the Court to interfere in the manner that the employer be directed to impose \u2018any lesser punishment\u2019, as directed by the Division Bench A B C D E F G H 1057 of the High Court \u2013 The submissions seeking to evoke sympathy and calling for leniency cannot lead to any relief in favour of the respondent. Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others (2016) 8 SCC 471 : [2016] 7 SCR 445 \u2013 relied on. Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Sandeep Kumar (2011)"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 482", "case_name": "COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, PUNE v M/S. CADBURY INDIA LTD.", "year": "2006", "issue": "", "held": ": Products in question captively consumed by the a~sessee in his factories-These are neither marketable nor A B c did the assessee sell them-Principles of Accountancy as recognized by the D Central Board of Excise and Customs could be followed for determining the cost of production-Direct Labour Cost/material cost/overhead expenses in producing the intermediate products could only be included in the cost of production of the final product-Revenue is not permitted to rake view to the contrary-Hence, factory expenses incurred on these products could not be included in the cost for the purpose of valuation. E The question, which arose for determination before this Court in these appeals was as to whether the expenditure incurred in manufacturing of certain products of milk which are captively consumed in the factories of the assessee in the manufacture of chocolate, the final product, and no F part of which are sold by the respondent, could be included in the cost of production in terms of Rule 6(b)(ii) of the Central Excise (Valuation) Rules for the purpose of valuation. Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. According to settled principles of accountancy only the G elements that have actually gone into the manufacture/production of the intermediates i.e. sum total of the direct labor cost, direct material cost, direct cost of manufacture and the factory overheads of the fa"}, {"doc_id": "2020 INSC 281", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v M. V. MOHANAN NAIR", "year": "2020", "issue": "", "held": ": Law declared by the Supreme Court is a principle laid down by the court and it is this principle which has the effect of a precedent \u2013 A principle is a proposition delivered after examination of the matter on merits \u2013 Service Law. Service Law \u2013 Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) Scheme \u2013 Object and salient features of \u2013 Discussed. Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 In order to bring systematic changes in the existing scheme of ACP so that all employees irrespective of existing hierarchical structure in their organisations/cadre get the same benefit, MACP was recommended by the Sixth Central Pay Commission. Both ACP and MACP Schemes are in the nature of incentive schemes devised with the object of ensuring that the employees who are unable to avail of adequate promotional opportunities, get some relief from stagnation in the form of financial benefits. Under the MACP Scheme, financial upgradations are granted at three regular intervals on completion of 10-20-30 years of service without promotion. Hence, it is also intended to ensure that the employees are adequately incentivised to work efficiently despite not getting promotion for want of promotional avenue. The change in policy brought about by supersession of the ACP Scheme with the MACP Scheme is after well-deliberated and well-documented recommendations of the Sixth Central Pay Commission. Considering t"}, {"doc_id": "2019 INSC 287", "case_name": "DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v VIRENDER LAL BAHRI & ORS.", "year": "2019", "issue": "", "held": ": The proviso governs s. 24(1)(b) and not s. 24 (2) \u2013 However the question is referred to larger Bench. Referring the matter to larger Bench, the Court HELD: 1. Section 24(1) and (2) Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 deal with different subjects. Section 24(1) deals with compensation whereas Section 24(2) deals with lapsing of the acquisition itself. There are many cogent reasons as to why the proviso in Section 24 is really a proviso to Section 24(1)(b) and not to Section 24(2). [Para 9][480-C, D] 2.1 Firstly, the scheme of Section 24(1) is to provide enhanced compensation under the 2013 Act even in cases where a Section 4 notification has been made under a repealed statute, namely, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but where no award has been pronounced on 01.01.2014, when the 2013 Act comes into force. This is clear from a reading of Section 24(1)(a). Section 24(1)(b) then goes on to state that where an award has been made under the repealed Act prior to 01.01.2014, then compensation and all other provisions of the repealed Act will continue to apply to such award. To this, an exception has been carved out by the proviso, which states that even in such cases where compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then all beneficiaries speci"}, {"doc_id": "2017 INSC 1036", "case_name": "COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & SERVICE TAX,  BANGALORE v MIS KARNATAKA SOAPS & DETERGENTS LTD.", "year": "2017", "issue": "", "held": ": Respondent manufactures perfumery compound in its F Bangalore unit and then tramports it to Mysore where it is finally applied to raw agarbathis to complete the manufacturing process of agarbathi - In this process of manufacturing, the perfumery compound is capable of being sold in the open market - Appellant fwd even sold some part of the compound to Mis. 'THC' - Evidently, clarification given by the circular is applicable to the product which G comes into existence, at intermediate stage in the form of pastel dough in a continuous process of manufacture and not to the manufacture of odoriferous perfume, which is in liquid form and has got shelf life and capable of being stored/transported/sold - Circular cannot be equated with that of an exemption notification but is required to be read within the limited scope of its context in H 148 CCE & SERVICE TAX, BANGALORE v. M/S KARNATAKA 149 SOAPS & DETERGENTS LTD. which it was issued - Circular clarifying certain doubts cannot give A effect of an exemption notification - Therefore, it cannot be said that agarbathi compound manufactured by the respondent is covered under the aforesaid circular - Central Excise Act, 1944. Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 - Chapter Sub-Heading 3302. 90 of First Schedule - Whether actual marketing of the B pe1fumery compound manufactured by the respondent is necessary for the levy of excise duty - Held"}, {"doc_id": "2020 INSC 122", "case_name": "UTTAR BHARTIYA RAJAK SAMAJ PANCHAYAT BANGANGA RAJAK SAMAJ CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY (PROPOSED) & ANR. v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH SECRETARY & ORS.", "year": "2020", "issue": "", "held": ": LOI was valid for a period of three months only and the same was not kept alive by the appellants, the premium is to be paid as per Government Resolution dated 16.4.2008 \u2013 Demand is in confirmity with law. Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: The Letter of Intent was valid for a period of three months only. If, for any reason, delay occurred in obtaining clearance from the Coastal Zone Management Authority, nothing prevented the appellants to make appropriate representation so as to keep the Letter of Intent alive. When the validity of Letter of Intent itself is for three months and if the same is not kept alive, the premium is to be paid as per the Government Resolution dated 16.4.2008. By virtue of the aforesaid notification developer/ co-operative society is required to pay premium @ 25% in terms of the Ready Reckoner, in respect of Slum Rehabilitation Schemes [2020] 2 S.C.R. 576 576 A B C D E F G H 577 proposed to be undertaken on the lands owned by the Government, Semi-Government Undertakings and local bodies. In that view of the matter the demand made by the respondents is in conformity with the law and there is no illegality in the impugned orders passed by the High Court. [Paras 11 & 12][580- C-E]"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 179", "case_name": "S. BALDEV SINGH MANN v S. GURCHARAN SINGH, MLA AND ORS.", "year": "1996", "issue": "", "held": ", No. Representation of the People Conduct of Election Rules, 1961-Rule 9rlnspection of marked copies of electoral rolls and packets of counterfoils of used ballot papers-Prayer f 01~Allegation of booth capturing not estab- D lished-Non-compliance of P & H High Court Rules-Application for inspec- tion liable to be dismissed. The appellant challenged the election of the returned candidate, respondent No. 1 to the Punjab Legislative Assembly, by presenting an election petition under Part VI of the Representation of People Act, 1951, for declaring his election as void and to declare that the appellant was the duly elected candidate in place of the first respondent. The appellant questioned the election of the respondent on the allegations that he had indulged in the commission of the corrupt practice of booth capturing by himself and through his agents within the meaning of Section 123(B) r/ws 135-A of the Act and that the respondent No. 1 had spent over Rs. 2,00,000 on his election in violation of the ceiling limit on expenses provided u/s 77 of the Act r/w rule 90 and the return of expenses filed by the first respondent was totally false. The High Court dismissed the election peti- E F tion while holding that the allegations of the corrupt practice levelled G against the returned candidate were not only vague but indefinite and that the appellant had failed to substantiate the s"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 298", "case_name": "STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR. v HARYANA CIVIL SECRETARIAT PERSONAL STAFF ASSOCIATION", "year": "2002", "issue": "", "held": ", Fixation ojpay and determination of parity in duties and responsibilities D is a ,matter for the executive to discharge taking into consideration financial posiiion, policies of State Government in giving priority to different categories , of posts etc.-Courtshould interfere only when they are satisfied that decision of the Government is patently irrational, unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees. E F Respondent-Association filed a writ petition praying for grant of revised pay scale to Personal Assistants at par with the pay scale given to Personal Assistants working in the Central Secretariat Service, consequent to \u00b7the acceptance of recommendations of the Fourth Central Pay Commission by the State Government. High Court placed reliance on the principle of equal pay for equal work and found the fixation of pay of Personal Assistants improper and allowed the writ petitions. In appeal to this Court, State Government contended that the High Court had ignored settled principle of law for determination of the claim relating to parity of pay and fixation of revised scale of pay to the Personal G Assistants working in the State Secretariat. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. While making copious reference to the principle of equal pay for equal work and equality in the matter of pay, the High Court overlooked the position that the parity sought by the petitioner i"}, {"doc_id": "1957 INSC 115", "case_name": "THE CENTRAL INDIA SPINNING AND WEAVING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY  LIMITED, THE EMPRESS MILLS, NAGPUR v THE MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, WARDHA", "year": "1958", "issue": "", "held": ", that the goods which were in transit and were merely carried pcross the limits of the municipality were not liatle to terminal tax. Terminal tax on goods imported into or exported from the limit~ of a municipality was payable on goods on their journey ending within 1hc municipal limits or commencjng therefrom and not where the goods were merely \u2022 S.C.R SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1103 in transi.t and that their terminus elsewhere. Terminal tax levj, 196'1 able under s. 66(!)(0) must have reference to some activity within the municipal area i.e .. the entry for the. purpose of re- The Central Iniia Spinning and maining within that area or the commencement of the jounrey Weaaingand from that area. Manufacturing . . ,, l \"b . . Company, LimKetl, The words \"imported mto do not mere Y mean rmgmg Tiie Empress Mills into\" but comprise something more i.e., incorporating and mix- Nagpur ' ing up of the goods with the mass of the property in the local v. area. Similarly, the words \"exported from\" do not merely in- The Municipal dicate \"taking out\" but have reference to the taking out of Oommi~ Wartlha goods which had become part and parcel of the mass of the property of the local area and will not apply to goods in transit i.e. brought into the area for the purpose of being transported out of it."}, {"doc_id": "1995 INSC 357", "case_name": "KIRLOSKAR OIL ENGINES LTD v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.", "year": "1995", "issue": "", "held": "not proper-Matter remitted to High Court for redetennination. D The appellant-Company was manufacturing bushes and washers which were exclusively used in motor vehicles. It cleared these goods under notification No. 99 of 1971 without payment of excise duty from 1971 onwards. The said notification provided that motor vehicles parts and E accessories falling under Item No. 34-A of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 were exempted from payment of excise duty except the items mentioned in the said notification. However, in a meeting held in 1978 between the Central Excise and Tariff Board and representatives of the Trade it was decided that washers and bushes F manufactured by the appellant were bimetal bearings and tha! they could be classified as 'thin walled bearing' if they satisfied the specifications as provided in Indian Standard 4774-1968. Accordingly, a trade notice was issued and acting on it the Superintendent of Central Excise issued a letter demanding Rs. 1,79,504,21 from the appellant stating that the goods cleared by the appellant were thin walled bearing liable to excise duty. The G appellant contested the demand on the ground that 'wrapped bushes' and 'thrust washers' manufactured by it were articles different from 'thin walled bearing' and therefore not excisable from the date of exemption notification. Rejecting the contention the Assist"}, {"doc_id": "2020 INSC 256", "case_name": "ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER REVENUE AND v AKHALAQ HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER", "year": "2020", "issue": "", "held": ": s.161 pertains to exchange of land, as per which a bhumidhar may exchange land with another bhumidhar or with any Gaon Sabha or local authority, with the prior permission of an Assistant Collector \u2013 Insofar as the land belonging to a member of Scheduled Tribe, exchange is not permissible \u2013 Under s.157-B, no bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, shall have the right to transfer by way of \u201csale, gift, mortgage or lease or otherwise any land to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe\u201d \u2013 Language used in s.157-B \u201cor otherwise\u201d emphasizes that the land belonging to a Scheduled Tribe cannot be transferred in any manner whatsoever \u2013 Further, in the instant case admittedly, even no prior permission was sought from the Assistant Collector \u2013 Also, respondents did not explain as to why a member of Scheduled Tribe wanted to exchange his large extent of land i.e.12 Nali (2400 sq. mtrs.) with a much smaller piece of land i.e. 4\u00bd Muthi (56.25 sq. mtrs.) \u2013 This raises doubt about the genuineness of exchange deed strengthened by the fact that respondents\u2019 names were mutated in the land exchanged while that of the member of Scheduled Tribe was not \u2013 Since the exchange deed violated s.157-B, the transfer is void u/s.166 \u2013 No justification to consider respondents\u2019 request on the basis they are running Hotel on the land \u2013 No ground for [2020] 2 S.C.R. 1001 1001 A B C D E F G H 10"}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 352", "case_name": "L.L. SUDHAKAR REDDY AND ORS. v STATE OF A.P. AND ORS.", "year": "2001", "issue": "", "held": ", High Court having made observation that writ petitioners could have availed remedy of review u/s. 17- A, ought not to have expressed any opinion on merits-As regards remedy of D suit, in view of s.8(2), rlws. I 5, in respect of land alleged to be grabbed suit for declaration of title by writ petitioners would not be maintainable-Order \u00b7of High Court set aside-High Court would decide writ petition afresh. S.8(2) rlw.s. I 5-land alleged to be grabbed-Title suit in respect of- He/d not maintainabie. Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226-Writ petition against order of Special Court under A.P. land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982-High Court observing that remedy E of review uls. 17-A was available and also dismissing writ petition on merit justifying order ofSpecial Court-Held, High Court should not have expressed F any opinion on merits-Andhra Pradesh land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982."}, {"doc_id": "2010 INSC 20", "case_name": "TAMEESHWAR VAISHNAV v RAMVISHAL GUPTA", "year": "2010", "issue": "", "held": ": Not entitled - Cause of action for a complaint uls 138 arises only once, with the issuance of notice after dishonour o of cheque and receipt thereof. The question for consideration in the present appeals was, whether after the notice u/s 138(b) of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is received by the drawer of the cheque, the payee/holder of the cheque E having failed to take action on the basis of the notice within the period prescribed u/s 138, is entitled to send a fresh notice in respect of the same cheque and file complaint u/s 138. F Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. A cheque may be presented several times within the period of its validity, but the cause of action for a complaint under Section 138 of the Act arises but G once, with the issuance of notice after dishonour of the cheque and the receipt thereof by the drawer. [Para 15] [209-F-H] Prem Chand Vijay Kumar vs. Yashpal Singh and Anr. (2005) 4 sec 417, relied on. H 204 TAMEESHWAR VAISHNAV v. RAMVISHAL GUPTA 205 S.L Constructions vs. Alapati Srinivasa Rao (2009) 1 A sec 500, distinguished. 1.2. In the facts of the instant case, the complaints were filed beyond the period of limitation and the Magistrate erred in taking cognizance on the. complaints 8 filed on the basis of the second notices. (Para 17] (210- E-F] Case Law Reference: (2005) 4 sec 417 Relied on Para 15 c (2009) 1 SCC 500 Distinguished Para 15 C"}, {"doc_id": "2021 INSC 250", "case_name": "GHANASHYAM MISHRA AND SONS PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH THE AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY v EDELWEISS ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED THROUGH THE DIRECTOR & ORS.", "year": "2021", "issue": "", "held": ": Once a resolution plan is duly approved by the Adjudicating Authority under sub-section (1) of s. 31, the claims as provided in the resolution plan shall stand frozen and would be binding on the Corporate Debtor and its employees, members, creditors, including the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority, guarantors and other stakeholders \u2013 On the date of approval of resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority, all such claims, which are not a part of resolution plan, shall stand extinguished and no person would be entitled to initiate or continue any proceedings in respect to a claim, which is not part of the resolution plan \u2013 Dominant purposes of the I&B Code is, revival of the Corporate Debtor and to make it a running concern \u2013 Legislative intent behind this is, to freeze all the claims so that the resolution applicant starts on a clean slate and is not flung with any surprise claims \u2013 Insolvency and Bankruptcy board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 \u2013 rr. 13 and 14. s. 31 \u2013 Amendment to s. 31 by s. 7 of Act 26 of 2019 \u2013 Nature of, clarificatory/declaratory or substantive in nature \u2013 Held: 2019 Amendment to s. 31 of the Code is clarificatory and declaratory in nature and thus, would be effective from the date on which I&B Code came into effect. s. 31 \u2013 Approval of resolution plan by the Adjudicating Au"}, {"doc_id": "1963 INSC 217", "case_name": "MANGILAL v SUGANCHAND RATHI", "year": "1964", "issue": "", "held": ": (i) Though the notice dated April 11, 1959 could be c.onstrued to be composite notice under s. 4(a) of the accommoda- tion Act and s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act it was ineffective 1963 October 24 1963 Mangilal v. Suganchand Rat hi 240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] uuder s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act because it was not a notice of 15 clear days. In the present case, the defendant had only 14 clear days' notice. Subadini v. Durga Charan Lal, I.L.R. 28 Cal. 118 and Gobind Chandra Saha v. Dwarka NathPatita, A.I.R.1915 Cal. 313, approved. Harihar Banerji v. Ramsashi Roy, L.R. 45 I.A. 222, dis- tinguished. (ii) The suit was actually based upon the notice dated July 9, 1959 which gave more than 15 days' clear notice to tho defendant to vacate the premises. This notice was a valid notice under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. (iii) The contention that a suit under cl. (a) of s. 4 of the Act is not maintainable unless a tenant is in arrears on the date of the \u2022 suit, cannot be sustained. If this contention had to be accepted it would be virtually re-writing the section by saying \"that the tenant was in arrears of rent at the date of suit\" in place of that the \"tenant has failed to make payment etc.\" It is certainly not open to a court to usurp the functions of a legislature. Nor again, is there scope for placing an unnatural interpretation on the language used "}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 212", "case_name": "ALPESH NAVINCHANDRA SHAH v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.", "year": "2007", "issue": "", "held": ", on law, the order of the Settlement Commission granting immunity from prosecution under the Customs Act have no bearing D on the Detention Order passed by the State under the Prevention Act- However, on facts, since the Detention order of one of the detenus was \u2022. revoked by the State since there was no sufficient cause for his detention, the Detention order of the petitioner-detenu, who is similarly placed, is i1uashed. Petitioner and his brother were arrested by Intelligence Officers for E mis-declaration of import consignments and evading customs duty thereby. Respondent - authorities issued two detention orders under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA Act) and issued a show cause notice to both of them. Pursuant to the show cause notice, the petitioner and his brother made an F J ~ application under section 1278 of the Customs Act, 1962 for settlement before Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission allowed the application on payment of customs duty under section 127H of the Customs Act and granted immunity to the applicants from payment of any penalty and prosecution under the Customs Act and the Penal Code, 1860. The Detaining authority proceeded to detain the petitioner in view of the Detention Order G ' l. issued earlier under COFEPOSA Act. Hence, the Writ Petition under Article 32 of "}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 14", "case_name": "E.S. RAJARAM AND ORS. v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.", "year": "2001", "issue": "", "held": ", such order can be passed to ensure co111plete justice--Constilution of lndia-Arlicle 142. D Railway Board by a memorandum dated 15-5-1987 brought some change in the recruitment of Traffic Apprentices. One of the chances is that from 15-5-1987, the recruitment of the Apprentices would be made in the pay scale \" ... of Rs. 1600-2660. The old pay scale for the existing Apprer.tices was Rs . 1400-2300. The pre-1987 Apprentices across the country challenged the E memorandum in various Central Administrative Tribunals and claimed higher pay scale on the basis of the memorandum. There had been connicting views of the Tribunals which came to be decided by this Court in Union of India & Ors. v. M. Bhaskar & Ors .. 1199614 SCC 416, upholding the validity of the memorandum. The Court further gave two directions - (1) that the Union of 'li. India Should not recover the excess amount paid to the Apprentices which F were paid on the basis of the judgments of the Tribunals and (2) that the order shall apply to the Apprentices who were before this Court and to those Apprentices in whose favour judgment had been delivered by any Tribunal and which had become final either because no appeal was carried to this Court or if carried the same was dismissed. Appellants are those Apprentices who G -~ are affected by the second direction. In pursuance to the directions of the Court, the departmental a"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 129", "case_name": "KARAN SINGH AND ORS. ETC. v BHAGWAN SINGH (DEAD) BY L.R. AND ORS. ETC.", "year": "1996", "issue": "", "held": "claimant having sold lands to strangers could not validly lay the suit for pre-emption---Cowt would take notice of amendment in law dwing pendency of appeal and would apply relevant provision of law prevai/- D ing on date of jud1?7nenl--{}nder the amended law only a tenant whose vendor sold land to a third pa1ty can avail the right of pre-emption. Evidence Act, 1872 : E S.115--Estoppel-Held, is applicable to cases of pre-emption-- Claimant having sold the land to strangers cannot lay suit for pre-emption against purchaser of the fwther sale. The respondent, an agriculturist in the State of Haryana, sold some agricultural lands from undivided joint family properties, but in specie, F to strangers who were residents qf a different village. The vendees further sold some of the lands purchased from the respondent to the appellant in 1982. The respondent filed a suit for pre-emption under the Punjab Pre- emption Act, 1913 on the ground that being a co-owner he was entitled to pre-emption of the land purchased by the appellant. The trial court G dismissed the suit, but the appellate court decreed the suit and the High Court, in second appeal, upheld the decree. In appeal before this Court, it was contended for the appellant that the respondent himself having sold the land to strangers from whom the appellant purchased, could not exercise the right of pre-emption under H s.15 of the A"}, {"doc_id": "1995 INSC 458", "case_name": "SHARADCHANDRA GANESH MULEY v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.", "year": "1995", "issue": "", "held": ", award is con- clusively made on the date Land Acquisition Officer signed and sealed it, and not when claimant received copy thereof Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : Section 11; Explanation IV-Constructive resjudicata-Doctrine of 'might and ougltt'-Landowner's Writ challenging notification u/s. 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act pendin~Amendment Act 68 of 1984 coming into force meanwhile-Held, defence of bar u/s. 11-A being available to land owner but not availed of, doctrine of constructive res judicata applies in subsequent writ petition. E The Land-owner-claimant, after unsuccessfully challenging before the High Court initially the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and later the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer after the decision of the High Court in the earlier writ petition, F tiled the appeals by special leave against both the judgments of the High Court. Tht! appellant contended that the award made by the Land Acquisi- tion Officer, was without jurisdiction as the same was not made within two years from the date of decision of the High Court in the earlier writ G petition. Dismissing the appeals, this Court HELD: 1.1. The award was clearly made within two years from the judgment of the High Court. The High Court gave its judgment on H 693 694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A 31.3.1992 whereas the Land Acquisition Officer m"}, {"doc_id": "1957 INSC 14", "case_name": "K. N. MEHRA v THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "year": "1957", "issue": "", "held": ", that as the flight was unauthorised there could be no consent. and as it was unlawful at \u00b7the outset. in the circumstances of the case, and the appeilant obtained a temporary use of the aircraft for his ()\\Vil purposes and deprived the c;m\u00b7ernment of its use, there was a dishonest intention, and consequently the flight constituted a theft of the aircraft. A temporary retention of property by a person wrongfully gaining thereby. or a temporary keeping out of property from the person legally entitled thereto, ;1uy amount to theft under s. 378 of the Indian Penal Code, and in this respect the offence differs from \"larceny\" in English Law which contemplates \u00b7permanent gain or less. Queen-Empress v. Nagappa, ( 1890) l.L.R. 15 Rom. 344 and Queen-Empress v. Sri Ch1mi Clmngu ( 189~) l.L.R. 22 Cal. 1017, \u00b7 referred to. 1957 Fehrua;y I I. 1957 K.N. Mthra v. Tht Statt of Rajasthan 624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] CRnnNAT. APPELLATJ: !L'Rrsn1cnoN : Criminal Appeal No. 51 nf J955. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and orJcr c!ared October 22, 1953, of the Rajasthan High Court at jodhpur in Criminal Revision No. 88 of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order dated May 18, 1953, of the Court of Sessions jurlge at Jodhpur in Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 1953. Jai Gopiil Sethi and W. S. Nantla, for the appellani. R. Ganpat!ty Iyer, Porns A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent. ~"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 19", "case_name": "AMAR NATH CHOWDHURY v BRAITHWAITE AND CO. LTD. AND ORS.", "year": "2002", "issue": "", "held": ", order of Appellate Authority vitiated on account of bias-Dual function permissible only when permitted by an act of legislation or statutory provision-Administrative Law-Bias. D Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against appellant by the respondent-Company. Disciplinary Authority, who was the Chairman-cum- y --1 . Managing Director of the company, accepted the report oflnquiry Committee .\u2022 / and removed the appellant from service. Appellant preferred appeal against the said order under regulations framed by the company before the Board of Directors which was dismissed by a non-speaking order. The Chairman-cum- E Managing Director presided over and participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board. Appellant filed writ petition challenging the said order which was allowed by Single Judge. In appeal, Division Bench reversed the order of Single Judge. Hence, this appeal. Appellant contended that order of Appellate Authority was vitiated on F account of legal bias by the participation of Disciplinary Authority in the deliberations of meeting of the Board which decided his appeal. Respondent relied upon doctrine of necessity and contended that rule against bias is not available as Chairman-cum-Managing Director was G required to participate in the meeting of the Board under the Regulations framed by the Company. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : I. Where an au"}, {"doc_id": "1962 INSC 277", "case_name": "HAZARl LAL v STATE OF BIHAR", "year": "1963", "issue": "", "held": ", that the appellant was properly convicted under s. 353 Penal Code. The snatching of the books amounted to use of force; the snatching necessarily caused a jerk to the hands of the officer which caused motion to his hands wit bin the meaning ofs. 349 of the Penal Code. The Officer was entitled under the Bihar Si'les Tax Act, and the Rules to pay a surprise visit to the shop of the appellant without giving him any notice and the appellant was bound to show him his account books. The officer was lawfully in possession of the account books and the appellant had no justification to snatch them away. The officer was naturally annoyed at this and accordingly the act of the appellant amounted to use of criminal force. A seizure of the books under s. 17 of the Sales\u00b7 Tax ,\\ct would be valid only if the reasons for the seizure were recorded by the officer. But the present case was not one of seizure. Merely holding books found lying in a shop for perusing the\"' does not amount to their seizure. Prahlad Ram '\"Staff, (Patna Hi\"h Court, unreported). distiniruished. 1962 1961 Haz\u2022ri Lol v. Slall of Bihar Mud/,.lkar, J. 420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963JSUPP. The act of the appellant amounted to an ofl'ence under s. 26 (I) (h) of the Sales Tax Act also and for his prosecution under that section sanction of the Commissioner would have been necessary. His act was an offence both under that sect"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 619", "case_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN v YUSUF", "year": "2009", "issue": "", "held": ": No case made out for interference - The finding of High Court that dying declaration was not truthful and there was attempt to falsely implicate the accused D was borne out by various statement in the dying declaration which were proved beyond doubt to be false - Order of High Court cannot be faulted - Moreover, in case of acquittal, there is doub(e presumption in favour of accused - If two reasonable conclusions were possible on the basis of E evidence, appellate court should not disturbed the findings of acquittal recorded by court below - Evidence - Dying declaration - Appeal against acquittal. r The trial Court relied upon the dying declaration and F held the appellant guilty of offence punishable under s.302 IPC. On appeal, High Court found that the dying declaration was not reliable and directed acquittal. Hence the appeal. Dismissing the appeal, the Court G ~ HELD: 1.1. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene that the grave position in which he H 1138 STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. YUSUF 1139 \"( is placed, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of A \" his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded, it will result in the miscarriage of justice b"}, {"doc_id": "1951 INSC 53", "case_name": "RAM KUMAR DAS v JAGADISH CHANDRA DEB DHABAL DEB AND ANOTHER", "year": "1952", "issue": "", "held": "(i) that from the facts a tenancy could be presumed to have come into existence from 1924 ; (ii) as the purpose of the tenancy was for building structures on the land, under sec. 106 ()f the Transfer of Property Act the tenancy must be presumed to be one from month to month in the absence of a contract to the contrary ; (iii) a contract that the tenancy was for one year certain could not be inferred in the present case from the fact that an a'nnual rent was paid in 1925 and 1926, inasmuch as the kabuliyat, though inoperative in law, showed that the parties never intended to create a lease for one year; {iv) on the facts of the case it was quite proper to hold that the tenancy was one from month to month since its inception in 1924 and the suit was not time~barred. Debendra Nath v. Shyama Prasanna (11 C.W.N. 1124) and Sheikh Akloo v. Emaman (I.L.R. 44 Cal. 403) approved. Aziz Ahmad v. Alauddin Ahmad (A.LR. 1933 Pat. 485), Md. Moosa v. faganand (20 LC. 715) and Matilal v. Darieeling Muni\u00b7 cipality (17 C.L.J. 167) rderred to."}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 136", "case_name": "RAJ KUMAR v STATE OF M.P.", "year": "2014", "issue": "", "held": ": Courts below rightly drew adverse inference against appellant - He did not take any defence or furnish any explanation as to any of the incriminating material placed by the trial court - He also did not deny his presence in the house on that night E - When the children were left in the custody of the appellant, he was bound to explain as to under what circumstances girl died - Incident witnessed by brother of the deceased - Also, no case of false implication was made out - In view of the concurrent findings of fact recorded by courts below, F particularly in respect of the DNA report to the extent that the semen of appellant was found in the vagina swab of the deceased and that she died of asphyxia caused by strangulation, the findings of fact recorded by the courts below affirmed - Order of conviction not interfered with. G WITNESS: Child witness - Evidentiary value of - Held: Every witness is competent to depose unless the court considers that he is prevented from understanding the question put to him, or from giving rational answers by reason of tender age or extreme old age or disease or because of H 212 RAJKUMAR v. STATE OF M.P. 213 his mental or physical condition - The evidence\u00b7 of a child A witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him - In the instant case, the eye-witness,"}, {"doc_id": "2021 INSC 676", "case_name": "CAPARO ENGINEERING INDIA LTD. v UMMED SINGH LODHI AND ANR.", "year": "2021", "issue": "", "held": ": The order transferring the respective workmen from Dewas to Chopanki at about 900 Kms. away was in violation of s.9A read with Fourth Schedule of the ID Act and was arbitrary, mala fide and victimization \u2013 By such transfer, their status as \u201cworkman\u201d would change to that of \u201csupervisor\u201d \u2013 Thus, by such a change after their transfer to Chopanki and after they work as supervisor they would be deprived of the beneficial provisions of the ID Act and, therefore, the nature of service conditions/service would be changed \u2013 Even from the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court as well as the impugned judgment and order passed by the Single Judge, it can be seen that the appellant/employer has failed to justify the transfer from Dewas to Chopanki, which is at a distance of 900 Kms. and that too at the fag end of their service career \u2013 Every aspect was dealt with and considered in detail by the Labour Court as well as by the Single Judge of the High Court. A B C D E F G H 781 Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 There are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court as well as Single Judge of the High Court that the order transferring the respective workmen from Dewas to Chopanki was arbitrary, mala fide, amounted to victimization, unfair labour practice and in violation of Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act. On appreciation of evidence, more particularly"}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 830", "case_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN v SHERA RAM @ VISHNU DUTTA", "year": "2011", "issue": "", "held": ": Oral and documentary evidence clearly O showed that respondent was suffering from epileptic attacks just prior to the incident - Immediately prior to the occurrence, he had behaved violently and had caused injuries to his own family members - After committing the crime, he was arrested by the Police and even thereafter, he was treated for insanity, while in jail - There was evidence to show continuous mental sickness of the respondent - High Court on the basis of documentary and oral evidence had a taken a view which was E a possible view and could not be termed as peNerse or being supported by no evidence - The finding of High Court, being F in consonance with the well settled principles of criminal jurisprudence, did not call for any interference, particularly when the appellant-State did not bring to the fore any evidence- documentary or otherwise, to persuade the Supreme Court to take a contrary view. G Appeal - Appeal against acquittal - Distinction between appeal against acquittal and appeal against conviction - Limitation upon the powers of the appellate court to interfere 485 H 486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A with the judgment of acquittal and reverse the same - Discussed. Criminal Trial - Exemption from criminal liability - Accused taking plea o( insanity - Held: A person alleged to B be suffering from any mental disorder cannot be exempted from "}, {"doc_id": "1995 INSC 610", "case_name": "AIR INDIA AND ORS. ETC. v B.R. AGE AND ORS ETC.", "year": "1995", "issue": "", "held": "covered under section 34( 1 )-Held such directions pe11ain to exercise and pe1fonna11ce of fu11ctio11s by the Co1poration-Fu11ctio11s of Cmporation held not confi11ed to those specified in section 7-Expressio11 /H1we1:<' a11d 'f1111ctio11s' held illler- changeable. D In exercise of the power conferred by Section 34(1) of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 the Central Government issued directions to the appellant-Air Corporation to provide reservations for Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes in the services under the Corporation. The respon- dents challenged the vires of these directi<ms before the High Court of E Bombay which held that the power under Section 34(1) was confined to giving directions only with respect to \"the exercise and performance by the Corporation of its functions\" and that the expression \"functions\" in the said provisions should be understood in the light of Section 7 of the Act which sets out the functions of the Corporation; since regulating the F conditions of' service of its employees was not a matter specified in Section 7, the impugned directions were not within the ambit of Section 34(1) and thus beyond the authority of the Central Government. Air India as well as its employees belonging to Scheduled Castes preferred appeals before this Court. G Writ petitions were also filed under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the directions issued by the"}, {"doc_id": "1995 INSC 230", "case_name": "M/S COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS", "year": "1995", "issue": "", "held": "valid. The appellant imported 125 cartons of toners and filed a bill of entry for their clearance declaring their value on the basis of invoice-cum-value and country of origin certificate Issued by the trading company. It did not D file the price list of goods imported as asked by the Department, stating that the trading company was not willing to reveal the source of supply. Constquently, the Customs Department obtained the price list from ' manufacturer and relying upon the same determined the value of goods under Rule 3(b) of Customs Valuation Rules holding that It was a case in which rule 3(a) could not be applied. On appeal the Tribunal upheld the E valuation made under Rule 3(b). Hence this appeal by the importer. Dismissing the appeal, this Court HELD: The determination under rule 3(b) of the Customs Valuation Rules could be undertaken if the valuation could not be determined under F clause(a). The authorities found that In the nature of goods Imported by the appellant the valuation of It could not be determined under rule 3(a). Therefore, rule 3(b) was rightly Invoked. The determination having been done .on comparable goods offered for sale .in competitive conditions In countries outside India the order does not suffer from a1_1y error of law. G [71-B)"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 1030", "case_name": "RANJIT SINGH v STATE OF HARYANA", "year": "2008", "issue": "", "held": ": s. 20 deals with cases related to period when 1986 Act was in force - It provides that proceadings shall continue as if Act of 2000 is not in existence - Even if the definition of 'iuvenile' has undergone change by D fixing age to be 18 years, proceedings shall continue on the footing that accused was juvenile under 1986 Act - Thus, accused is not legally permissible to take the applicable age to be 18 years - Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. In year 1993, the appellant-accused was tried for the E commission of offences punishable under IPC. The trial court convicted and sentenced the appellant u/s 302 and 452 IPC. The appellant contended before the courts below that he was a juvenile in terms of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, thus, should F be tried under the 2000 Act and in any event, Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was applicable. However, the courts below did not record any definite conclusion. Hence the present appeal. Appellant contended that though material was G placed before the courts below to show that the accused appellant was a juvenile, but it did not substantially deal with that aspect. Respondent-State contended that even according H 332 RANJIT SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA 333 \"' .. to the case of the accused-appellant, he was about 17 A years of age at the time of occurrence and, thus, 1986 Act had no application to him; that for bringin"}, {"doc_id": "1993 INSC 194", "case_name": "KIKAR SINGH v STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "year": "1993", "issue": "", "held": ", accused took undue advantage and acted cruelly-Exception 4 not applicable-Offence is one of murder-Conviction and sentence under s. 302 awarded by trial court maintained. The accused-appellant was prosecuted for the offence of murder. D The prosecution case was that during an altercation between the E F G H accused and his neighbour the former inflicted a blow with a Kassi (spade) on the head of the latter who fell down; and thereafter the accused inflicted two more injuries on the victim; out of the three injuries the third one afflicted on the neck of the deceased was, according to the post-mortem report, sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The trial court convicted the accused for the offence of murder and sentenced him to imprisonment for life under s. 302 I.P.C. The High Court confirmed the conviction and the sentence. In\u00b7appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the accused that the case fell under Exception 4 to s. 300 IPC inasmuch as the accused committed the offence on the spur of moment and inflicted the injuries during the quarrel in the heat of passion without any premeditation and he had no intention to cause particular injuries. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The offence committed by the accused is one of murder and the trial court rightly convicted and sentenced him to imprisonment for life under s. 302 IPC. (703-D"}, {"doc_id": "1951 INSC 46", "case_name": "COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY v MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS", "year": "1952", "issue": "", "held": "per KANIA C. J., DAs, CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR and BosE JJ. (PATANJALI SAsTRr J. dissenting)-that the Government was, not under the circumstances of the case\\ entitled to assess land revenue on the land in question. Per KANIA C. J.; DAs and BosE JJ.-Though there was no effectual grant by the Government passing title in the land to the Corporation by reason of non-compliance with the statutory formalities, yet, inasmucli as the Corporation had never-the-less taken possession of the land in terms of the Government resolu- tion and continued in such possession open!~, uninterruptedly and as of right for over 70 years, the Corporation had acquired the (1) (1866) L.R. I H.L. 129. 1951 October 5. 1951 Collector of Bombay v. 44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19521 limited title it had been prescribing for during the period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free of rent, but only for the purposes of a market and for no other purposes. The right acquired included as part of it an immunity from pay- Municipal Cor- poration of the City of Bombay ment of rent which constituted a right in limitation of the Government's r.ight to assess in excess of the specific limit esta- blished and preserved by the Government Resolution within the meaning of s. 8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act (II of 1876) there being for the purposes of \u00b7this case no distinction bet- and Others. weea re"}, {"doc_id": "1957 INSC 57", "case_name": "THE UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD.,  CALCUTTA v THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,  WEST BENGAL", "year": "1958", "issue": "", "held": ", that the scheme of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, is that the various heads of income, profits and gains enumerated in s. 6 are mutually exclusive, each head being specific to cover the item arising from a particular source and, consequently, \"interest on securities\" which is specifically made chargeable to tax under s. 8 as a distinct head, falls under that section and cannot be brought under, s. 10, whether the securities are held as trading assets or capital asset. M2SC\u00b761-6 1957 May23 80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958J 1957 Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chunni/a/ B. Mehto, (1938) 6 The United I.T.R. 521, Salisbury House Estate Ltd. v. Fry, (1930) 15 T.C. 266, Commercial Bank Con1mercial Properties Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bengal Ltd., Calcutta (1928) 3 l.T.C. and H.C. Kothari v. Commissioner of Income v. Tax, Madras, (1951) 20 I.T.R. 579, relied on. The Co1n1ni.ssioner of Income-tax, The question whether the holding of securities by the West Bengal appellant formed part of the same business within s. 24(2), could not be decided in the absonce of a finding that the securities in question were a part of the trading assets held by the appellant in the course of its business as a banker, and the case, was remit\u00b7 ted to the High Court fo\u00b7r a fresh decision on the reference after getting from the Tribunal a fuller statement of facts. Kapur J."}, {"doc_id": "1963 INSC 66", "case_name": "PHILIP JOHN PLASKET THOMAS v COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CALCUTT A", "year": "1964", "issue": "", "held": "that the provisions of s. 16 (3) (a) (iii) did not apply to the present case. From whatever point of view the transfer of the shares be con!lidered, whether as a consideration for a promise to marry or a gift subject to the subsequent condi\u00b7 tion of marriage, the transfer took effect immediately and was not postponed to the date of marriage. On the date of transfer, the appellant and Mrs. Knight were not husband and wife and hence there was no transfer, directly and indirectly, by the husband to his wife. All income of the wife from all assets is not includible in the income of her husband. The income from only those assests of the wife can be included in that of her husband which were transferred to her by her husband after they became husband and wife. The statute must be construecl in a manner which carries out the intention of the legislature. The intentlon of the legislature must be primarily gathered from the words of the statute itself. If the words are unambiguous or plain, they will indicate the intention with which the statute was passed and the object to be obtained by it. There is nothing ins. 16 (3) which indicates that the words \u2022wife' or 'husband' must not be taken in their primary sense which is clearly indicative of a marital relationship. The words \u2022wife and husband' should be given their true natural meaning. They do not include prospective husband and prospe"}, {"doc_id": "1999 INSC 310", "case_name": "UMAR ABDUL SAKOOR SORA THIA v INTELLIGENCE OFFICER NARCOTIC CONTROL BUREAU", "year": "1999", "issue": "", "held": ": Under such circumstances, trial court and High Court rightly refused to discharge accused-Criminal Procedure Code, E 1973, S.227. Evidence Act, 1872: Section 9-Accused-Jdentification-Mode-ldentification by photograph-Admissibility-Witness identified the photograph of accused as F the person whom he saw at the relevant time-Accused was not a proclaimed offender and court did not consider the eventuality in which accused was to be so proclaimed-Held: Identification by photograph admissible in evidence. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Sections 228 and 240-Framing of charge-Scope-Held: Court not expected to go deep into the probative value of materials on record-If on basis of materials on record court comes to conclusion that accused would have committed the offence, court obliged to frame charge and proceed to trial. 113 G H 114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. I S.C.R. , A The appellant was charged under Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and his application for discharge under Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was dismissed by the trial court and the High Court. Hence this appeal. According to the prosecution, the police intercepted a truck carrying B tablets of \"Mandrax\" which was a high potency narcotic substance. The said stock was despatched from a port in India to a company abroad. The appellant was one of the key perso"}, {"doc_id": "2021 INSC 284", "case_name": "DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v THE CHIEF MINISTER & ORS.", "year": "2021", "issue": "", "held": ", No \u2013 Held [per Ashok Bhushan, J. (for himself and S. Abdul Nazeer, J.)] with Ravindra Bhat, J., L. Nageswara Rao, J. and Hemant Gupta, J. concurring : The greatest common measure of agreement in six separate judgments delivered in Indra Sawhney is: (i) Reservation under Article 16(4) should not exceed 50%. (ii) For exceeding reservation beyond 50%, extra-ordinary circumstances as indicated in paragraph 810 of Justice Jeevan Reddy should exist for which extreme caution is to be exercised \u2013 The 50% rule affirmed in Indra Sawhney is to fulfill the objective of equality as engrafted in Article 14 of which Articles 15 and 16 are facets \u2013 50% is reasonable and it is to attain the object of equality \u2013 To change the 50% limit is to have a society which is not founded on equality but based on caste rule \u2013 The cap on percentage of reservation as laid down in Indra Sawhney is with the object of striking a balance between the rights under Article 15(1) and 15(4) as well as Articles 16(1) and 16(4) \u2013 The cap on percentage is to A B C D E F G H 716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 15 S.C.R. achieve principle of equality and with the object to strike a balance which cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable \u2013 The Constitution (Eighty-first Amendment) Act, 2000 by which sub- clause (4B) was inserted in Art.16 makes it clear that ceiling of 50% \u201chas now received constitutional recognition\u201d \u2013"}, {"doc_id": "2017 INSC 426", "case_name": "SURAZ INDIA TRUST v UNION OF INDIA", "year": "2017", "issue": "", "held": ": The waste of judicial time is a matter of serious concern - The course of action adopted by the petitioner was not in consonance with law - Filing of contempt petitions on issues which lacked justification, highlighted the petitioners misadventures - All such E misadventures have to be dealt with sternly, so as to prevent abuse of judicial time - Therefore, petitioner directly or through any individual refrained absolutely, from filing any cause in public interest, before any Court of this country - To discourage . indiscretion of instant nature, cost of Rs.25 lakhs imposed on the petitioner - Public Interest Litigation. F Disposing of the writ petition, the Court HELD: 1. The narration recorded hereinabove, leaves no room for any doubt, that the petitioner's (Suraz India Trust) . actions, in repeatedly invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, were clearly uncalled for. In 64 of the cases, when Suraz India Trust G approached this Court, it did not find ariy success whatsoever, and not a single direction, ever came to be issued by this Court, out of its repeated endeavours. No one, who does not understand the nicety of legal issues, as has been demonstrated by the actions of Suraz India Trust, can be permitted to endlessly waste Court, H 1 . . . 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 8 S.C.R. A time. The different contempt petitions filed by Suraz India Trust, against a Chief Justice "}, {"doc_id": "2018 INSC 1161", "case_name": "K. LAKSHMINARAYANAN v UNION OF INDIA & ANR.", "year": "2018", "issue": "", "held": ": For nomination by Central Government, concurrence of Council of Ministers/Chief Minister of Government of Union Territory of Puducherry not required \u2013 There is no established practice or convention that names for nominations to members of the Legislative Assembly has to emanate from Chief Minister and can be made by Central Government only after concurrence by Chief Minister \u2013 In exercising the power u/s. 3(3) no particular statutory procedure having been prescribed except the exercise of power as per Allocation of Business Rules and Transaction of Business Rules, 1961 \u2013 Nominations made cannot be held to be vitiated on the submission that a particular procedure which was followed in some earlier cases was not followed. s.3(3) \u2013 Nomination of members of the Legislative Assembly of Union territory by Central Government \u2013 Expression \u201cCentral Government\u201d in s.3(3) \u2013 Whether the expression \u201cCentral Government\u201d means an Administrator, who has to exercise the power of nomination that too on the aid and advise of the Council of [2018] 14 S.C.R. 689 689 A B C D E F G H 690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 14 S.C.R. Ministers of the Union Territory of Puducherry \u2013 Held: Definition of Central Government, as occurring in s.3(3) has to be read as to mean the President and not the administrator \u2013 Definition of Central Government means the President is not controlled by the second expression \u201c"}, {"doc_id": "1962 INSC 226", "case_name": "ABINASH CHANDRA BOSE v BIMAL CHANDRA BOSE", "year": "1963", "issue": "", "held": ", that the order of the High Court were entirely erroneous and must be set aside. There was no ground for directing a retrial and the appellant could not be put to a second trial for the same offence 'simply because of the failure of the complainant to adduce all the evidence that should, and could, have been adduced. The fact that the appellant was a lawyer could make no difference and the same rules of crimi- nal jurisprudence that applied to all must apply to him. Further, the High Court was not exercising disciplinary juris- diction and no relationship of lawyer and client was involved in, the,crimioal case. CRIMIN.AL APPELLATE JurusDIOTION: Criminal App~al No. 119 of 1961. Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 21, 1960, . of the Calcutta High Court in Cr. A. No. 423 of 1958. P: .K. Ohakravarty, for the appellant. S. 0. Mazumdar, for respondent No. 1. D. N. Mukherjee, P. K. Mukherjee for P . .K. Bose, for the respondent No. 2. 1962. Augnst 3. \u2022 The Judgment of the Court w~a,dEjlivered by SINHA, C.J.-This appeal, on a certificate of fit- ness .granted 1by the High Court under Art. 134(1) ( 0 ) 190ll Abina:rh C~an//ra Bose y, Blmal Ch'andra Bou \u00b7 8inAa C.J. 196S Abint.:tsh Clra..ndra ' /!ose \u00b7 v. {l\u2022ma~ <~:haiidr3_ ~1 Sinha C \u2022. 1 \u2022 . ; 566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] of the Constitution, is directed against the order of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Cour"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 1049", "case_name": "JAHAR SINGH v UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "year": "1996", "issue": "", "held": ", C01icellation of the candidature illegal-Other siinilarly :situated persons allowed to appear-Contrary and conflicting stands in op- posing the appeal only to fore stall the claim of the appellant-Appellant e11titled to all the consequential be11efits upon his having been declared D successful. The appellant, an employee of the Savings Bank Control Organisa\u00b7 tion (SBCO), Uttar Pradesh Circle, under the Ministry of Communica\u00b7 tions, appeared in the examination held for appointment of Accountants in the Post Office and Railway Mail Service and qualified. lnspite of his being (fUalified, he did not get any appointment as an Accountant but on the other hand he was intimated by Assistant Director General, New Delhi vide letter dated July 23rd, 1993 addressed to ADDS (Rectt.) U.P. Circle E F that as the appellant was working as Lower Division Clerk (LDC) in the SBCO, he was not eligible to appear in the aforesaid examination and his candidature be immediately cancelled. The representation of the appellant against the cancellation of his candidature having been rejected by the Director General of Post, New Delhi, the appellant approached the Central Administrative Tribunal. Before the Tribunal the respondent contested the claim of the appellant on the ground mentioned in letter dated 23rd July, G 1993 and also on the ground that there was a separation of cadre of Assistants of SBCO "}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 233", "case_name": "JESTAMANI GULABRAI DHOLKIA AND OTHERS v THE SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMP ANY, BOMBAY AND OTHERS", "year": "1961", "issue": "", "held": ", that in law they were the employees of the Air Ser- vices of India from the appointed day, notwithstanding the existence of certain special features of their employment, and as such governed by s. 20(1) of the Act and since they did not exercise the option given to them under the proviso, they became employees of the Corporation established under the Act and ceased to have any rights against the original. employers. Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd., [1940] A.C. 1014, considered. CIVII. APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 395 of 1959. Appeal by special leave from the A ward dated November 25, 1957 of the Industrial Tribunal, Bom- bay, in Reference (I. T.) No. 24 of 1956. N. G. Chatterjee, D. H. Buch and K. L. Hathi, for the appellants. M. G. Setalvaa, Attorney-General for India, J. B. Dadachanji and S. N. Andley, for the respondent Nos. 1and2. M. G. Setalvaa, Attorney-General for India, Dewan Ghaman Lal Pandhi and I. N. Shroff, for the respon- dent No. 3. 1960. November 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave in an industrial matter. It appears that the appellants were originally in the service of the Scindia. Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (hereinafter called the Scindias). Their services were transferred by way of loan to the Air Services of India. Limited (hereinafter referred to as the ASI). The ASI wa.s f"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 734", "case_name": "SHANAKR DEB ACHARYAND ORS. v BISWANATH CHAKRABORTY AND ORS.", "year": "2006", "issue": "", "held": ": Requirement of passing of the departmental examination 'is essential before confirmation by a declaration by the appointing authority in that behalf-The sole basis of judging merit, therefore, is the passing of departmental examination-In the policy of merit- cum-seniority great emphasis is on merit and the ability and seniority plays a less significant role-Seniority has to be given weightage only when merit F and ability are approximately equal-High Court judgment set aside-West Bengal Services (Training and Examination) Rules, 1953 (as amended)-The West Bengal Services (Revision of Pay and Allowances) Rules, 1970. The appellants and the respondents were recruited through the State Public Service Commission on temporary basis. The respondents were G appointed earlier to the appointment of the appellants and joined duty earlier than the appellants' date of joining. The appellants passed the departmental examination prior to the private respondents. The appellants also completed the period of probation and were confirmed at an earlier point of time than 651 H 652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R. A the respondents. The scheme of the West Bengal Services (Training and Examination) Rules, 1953 (as amended), the West Bengal Services (Revision of Pay and Allowances) Rules, 1970 and the West Bengal Services (Appointment, Probation and Confirmation) Rules, 1979 provided f"}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 1049", "case_name": "STATE OF DELHI v JITTI", "year": "2007", "issue": "", "held": ": No final opinion expressed on the question-On facts and in interest ofjustice, accused acquitted as he had already undergone sentence of F almost 10 years. Respondent was found in possession of 45 kgs of poppy straw powder. Trial Court convicted him under s.18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and sentenced him to suffer G minimum punishment of RI for 10 years. Respondent filed appeal before High Court. Meanw~ile Section 41 of the Act was amended. Relying on the amended Section 41, 133 H 134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R. A Respondent challenged the quantum of sentence imposed. He ~ contended that minimum punishment of RI was for 10 years only in respect of recovery of 'commercial quantity' but the quantity recovered from Respondent being less than 50 Kgs was not 'commercial quantity'. High Court ordered r:elease of Respondent B by restricting his sentence to the period already undergone. Aggrieved State approached this Court which granted interim stay of the operation of th~ judgment. Respondent was again ;- arrested. This Court, however, ordered Respondent to be released on bail on his furnishing self bond of Rupees One lakh with two C sureties. Respondent could not furnish surety and therefore was not released. He is in the jail for the last about 10 years. It was submitted by the State that the High Court was no~ right in applying Section"}, {"doc_id": "1990 INSC 4", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v K.T. SHASTRI", "year": "1990", "issue": "", "held": "discriminatory. Respondent was recruited as a Senior Scientific Officer in the Defence Science Service whic:h was subsequently trifurcated and reconstituted. D The Government of India enhanced the superannuation age of Scien.tific and Technical personnel of one of the newly constituted units upto 60 years by an order dated 24.12.1985. The respondent who was working in one of the other units of the reconstituted service, filed an a11plication in the Central Administrative E Tribunal seeking a direction libat be was entitled to the benefit of enhanced age of superannuation upto 60 years as made applicable to the other unit which allowed the application. Hence this appeal by the Union of India. F Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. In view of Rullo 12 of the Defence Aeronautical Quality Assurance Service Rules, 1979 the benefit of enhanced age of superan- nuation given to the members of one unit was also available to the members of the other unit sim:e the said condition of service was not expressly provided for in the Service Rules. At the time of reconstitution G of the service no option was 1iiven to the employees working in the different units to opt for one m\u00b7 the other of the units. Those who were already working in either of the three units were deemed to belong to \u00b7 the respective newly constituted service. Therefore their service condi- tions will have to. run par"}, {"doc_id": "2015 INSC 1043", "case_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. v BRIJLAL SADASUKH MODANI", "year": "2015", "issue": "", "held": ": Any grant or any aid at the time of establishment of the society or in any construction or in any structural concept or any aspect would be aid - High Court was swayed by the concept of Article 12 of the Constitution, the provisions contained in 1949 Act to hold F that multi-state society is not controlled or aided by the Government- In the facts of the case, it is left to be dealt with in the course of trial whether the society concerned was ever been granted any kind of aid or not - Impugned order set aside and issue whether the respondent is a public servant G or not to be gone into during the trial - Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 12 - Banking Regulations Act, 1949 - Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002. S.S. Rana v. Registrar, Coop. Societies & Anr. H (2006) 11 sec 634: 2006 (1) Suppl. SCR 311; 1158 STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. BRIJLAL SADASUKH MO DANI Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 722: 1981 (2) SCR 79; Zoroastrain Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Coop. Societies (Urban) & Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 632: 2005 (3) SCR 592; State of Maharashtra v. Laljit.Rajshi Shah AIR 2000 SC 937: 2000 (1) SCR 1239; Ramesh Balkrishna Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra (1985) 3 SCC 606: 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 345; Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 sec 733: 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 121; Govt. of A.P. v. P. Venku Reddy (2002) 7 SCC 631: 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 5"}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 299", "case_name": "STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. v JANTHAKAL ENTERPRISES AND ANR.", "year": "2011", "issue": "", "held": ": The courts C should share 'the legislative concern to conserve the forests and the mineral wealth of the country - Courts should be vigilant in issuing final or interim orders in forest/mining/ Environment matters so that unscrupulous operators do not abuse the process of courts to indulge in 1arge scale D violations or rob the country of its mineral wealth or secure orders by misrepresentation to circumvent the procedural safeguards under the relevant statutes - Central Government and the State Government are huge and complex organizatioris and many a time require considerable time to E secure information and provide them to court, in matters requiring enquiry, investigation or probe - Where writ petitions involving disputed questions of fact in regard to forest/mining/ environment matters, come up for consideration, courts should give sufficient time and latitude to the concerned F ministries/departments to file their objections/counters after thoroughly verifying the facts - ff there is undue hurry, the concerned ministries/departments will not be able to make proper or thorough verifications and place the correct facts - A wrong decision in such matters may lead to disastrous G results - in regard to public interest - financially and ecologically - Therefore, writ petitions involving mineral wealth, forest conservation or environmental protection should not be disposed of"}, {"doc_id": "1991 INSC 248", "case_name": "JASWANT SINGH MATHURA SINGH AND ANR. v AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND ORS ..", "year": "1991", "issue": "", "held": "a person interested and entitled to notice under sub-rule (3) and opportunity under sub-role (4)-Purpose of Rule 21(3) and (4)-Explained. D Principle of 'Waiver' explained. Administrative Law - Natural justice. 'f E Deprivation of property - lniposition of liability - Prior notice and opportunity should be provided to affected person - Rules 21(3) and (4) of the Bombay Town Planning Rules, 1955 subserve the principle of Natural Justice and the basic concept of fair and just procedure. F 'Shall' - Connotation of - Whether mctndatory or directory - Mean- ~ ing shall be ascertained in the light of legislative intent, the context in which it is couched, the consequences it prod~ces and the purpose it seeks to serve. The appellant was in possession of a plot as a tenanL Pursuant to a Town Planning Scheme framed by the respondent-Corporation under the G Bombay Town Planning Act, 1955 the said plot was re\u00b7 constituted I.e. the plot was altered by the making of the Town Planning Scheme. The respondent was injuriously affected by the said scheme because it has the effect of terminating his possession and adversely affected his business in y the demised premises. However, before finalising the scheme the\u00b7 Town Planning Officer neither issued special notice to the respondent as H required under sub-rule (3) nor provided him an opportunity as provided 226 J .f' ,,,~: \"\" JASWANT SINGH v. MU"}, {"doc_id": "2024 INSC 482", "case_name": "Vishwanatha v The State of Karnataka by the Secretary, Home Department", "year": "2024", "issue": "High Court reversing the order of acquittal found the appellant along with co-accused (now deceased) guilty of offences under Sections 302 and 450 read with Section 34 of Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced them. In view of doubt as regards the identity of the appellant, whether it was the accused persons who were responsible for the death of PW-1 and PW-3\u2019s mother. Headnotes\u2020 Evidence \u2013 Test Identification Parade (TIP) \u2013 Absence of \u2013 When fatal \u2013 As per the prosecution, the appellant and the co-accused (now deceased) broke into the house of PW-1 and PW-3 to commit robbery when they were not at hom", "held": ": As per the eyewitnesses, PW-1 and PW-2 they saw the two accused strangulating PW-1\u2019s mother by pulling both ends of the rope \u2013 However, their evidence does not corroborate with the post mortem report \u2013 The report does suggest that the deceased was indeed strangulated to death but, it could not be in the manner as seen by PW-1 and PW-2 as the ligature mark extended only from one angle of the mandible to the other and no such mark was seen at the back of the neck \u2013 Absence of any reasonable explanation as to how PW-1 reached her house in a * Author [2024] 7 S.C.R. \b 51 Vishwanatha v. The State of Karnataka by the Secretary, Home Department short span of time of 21/2 hours, after leaving home at 10:00 AM, creates doubt on the prosecution story \u2013 Furthermore, appellant was not known to any of the witnesses and more pertinently, the two eyewitnesses \u2013 Co-accused was related to the complainant and was thus, known to the eyewitnesses \u2013 Hence, there was no requirement of TIP as regards him \u2013 But, the appellant was a total stranger to PW-1 and PW-2 \u2013 His name \u2018Vishwanatha\u2019 came to their knowledge, only after co-accused called him by name exhorting him to run \u2013 The identification of an accused in court is acceptable without a prior TIP and absence of TIP may not be fatal for the prosecution \u2013 It would depend on facts of each case \u2013 In a case where the identity of the accused is not kno"}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 543", "case_name": "SOHAN SINGH SODHI v PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, PATIALA", "year": "2007", "issue": "", "held": ": Parity in the pay D cannot be claimed when the educational qualification is different- Jurisdiction of the respondent-Board to lay down different scale of pay on the basis of educational qualification per se is not discrimination-Article 14 of the Constitution has no application in such a case-First Appellate Court rightly dismissed the claims of the incumbent and denied benefit to him by following the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court E over-ruling the decision of a Division Bench where junior to the incumbent was given such benefit-Constitution of India, 1950-Article 14-State Electricity Act, I 948-ss. 12 and I 5. Appellant was appointed as a lineman and promoted to the post of Junior F Engineer though he was not holding a diploma in Engineering. One Ravinder Kumar who was also a non-diploma holder filed a suit questioning the purported discrimination in promotion of Lineman to Line Superintendent between diploma holder linemen vis-a-vis non diploma holder linemen. In that case, ultimately the matter came up before this Court wherein this Court observed that it has rightly been held by the High Court that the promotion of G defendants who were junior to the plaintiff from Line Man to the Line Superintendent is wholly bad and discriminatory and directed that the petitioner be deemed to have been promoted to the post of Line Superintendent from the date "}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 208", "case_name": "COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, JAIPUR v M/S. HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD.", "year": "2004", "issue": "", "held": ", anodes after conversion become a new product known in the market with a distinct name, character and use and marketable as such-Hence liable to excise duty---On facts, the extended period of limitation is rightly invoked by the Revenue. D Respondent-assessees are engaged in the manufacture of zinc, lead and products thereof. Zinc is manufactured by a process of\"electrolysis. For electrolysis, the respondents manufacture cathodes and anodes. The cathodes are manufactured by welding Aluminium Header of a specific size with an Aluminium Sheet of a specific size and thereafter welding E Copper Tips on the Header for better conductivity. Aluminium Hooks are then welded on the Header for facilitating the lifting of Cathodes as and when desired. Anodes are manufactured by melting lead ingots containing specific quantity of silver and casting it in the required size. A header is then welded with the cast rolled plate. Respondent-assessees filed a F Classification list showing anodes and cathodes having headers .in respect of one of the units. In respect of another unit, they had filed a Classification list merely showing anodes and cathodes without headers on them. Revenue issued show-cause-notices to Respondent-assessees for levy of Central Excise duty and penalty for manufacture of cathodes and G anodes. Tribunal allowed the appeal of the respondent-assessees on the ground that the"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 283", "case_name": "BANK OF BARODA v RAJENDER PAL SONI", "year": "1996", "issue": "", "held": ": In view of the specific provision in the Amalgamation Scheme in paras 3 and JO of the notification mrears of salary is liability to be discharged by the transferor-Bank and not of transferee- Bank-Hence the suits are clearly not D maintainable-Banking Companies Regulation Act, 1949--S.45. Chainnan, Canara Bank, Bangalore v. M.S. Jasra & Ors., AIR (1992) SC 1100 and U.P. Electricity Board, Lucknow through it Chainnan and Anr. v. Radhey Mohan Venna, Supp.2 SCC 356, referred to."}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 377", "case_name": "VANCHALABAI RAGHUNATH ITHAPE (D) BY LR v SHANKARRAO BABURAO BHILARE (D) BY LRS. AND  OTHERS", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": For purpose of bringing a transaction within meaning of o 'mortgage by conditional sale', the first condition is that the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property on the condition that on such payment being made, the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller - Although there is a presumption that transaction is a mortgage by conditional E sale in cases where the whole transaction is in one document, but merely because of a term incorporated in the same document it cannot always be accepted that the transaction agreed between the parties was a mortgage transaction - In the instant case, the trial court committed grave error in F construing the document as a mortgage and in holding that plaintiff-appellant was entitled to decree of redemption - The alleged sale document was executed in the year 1967 subject to stipulation/condition that on receiving the sale amount of Rs. 3, 0001- within five years the land was to be returned to the G plaintiff-vendor - A/so after transfer of the land, the defendant- respondent came in possession and used & enjoyed the property as an absolute owner - It was only after 11 years that the plaintiff-appellant filed suit alleging that the property was mortgaged in favour of defendant/respondent with a condition H 1028 VANCHALABAIRAGHUNATHITHAPE(D)BYLR.v.SHANKARRAO 1029 BABUR.A.O BHILARE (0) BY LRS. to reconvey the land - Evidently, th"}, {"doc_id": "1962 INSC 269", "case_name": "M/s . MANGALORE GANESH BEDI WORKS v THE STATE OF MYSORE & ANOTHER", "year": "1963", "issue": "", "held": ", that by substitution of new coinage, no enhance- ment of tax was enacted but was mere Iv a sbustitution of one coinage by another of equivalent value Und even assuming that it was a taxing measure, its validity could not be challenged on the ground that it offends Arts. 197 to 199 and the procedure laid down in Art. 202 of the Comtitution, because of Art. 212 which prohibits the validity of any proceedings in a Je~islature from being called in question for irregularity of procedure and formalities of .'\\rt. 255 a re only matters of procedure. Held, further, that if the Indian Coinage Act had not the effect of changing 3 pies into .02 Nps in the rate of tax leviable under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, the Mysore Existing Laws (Constrnction of References to Values) Act, 1957, had made a provision for charging the tax in terms of naya paisas instead of pies, therefore, the levy of tax in terms of naya paisas was not unconstitutional, nor \\Vas it a taxing measure, but dealt mere I~. with the canversion of the old coinage into new coinage. CIVJL.APPELLATE JuRISDICTTON : Civil Appeal No. 194 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the order dated July 15, 1960, of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 719 of 19fi0. N. C. Chatterjee and S. S. Shukln, for the appellant. N. S. Bindra. and P. D. .Menon, for the respond en ts. 1962. September 25. The Judgment of the Court was delivered b"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 709", "case_name": "CENTRE FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION v UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ,", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": Art. 21 of c the Constitution of India guarantees the right to live with dignity - Any food article which is hazardous or injurious to public health is a potential danger to fundamental right to life guaranteed under Art.21 - Children and infants are uniquely susceptible to the effects of pesticides because of their 0 physiological immaturity and greater exposure to soft drinks, fruit based or otherwise - A paramount duty is cast on the State and its authorities to achieve an appropriate level of protection to human life and health which is a fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens under Art. 21 read with Art. 39(e) E and (f) and Art. 47 of the Constitution - Therefore, provisions of FSS Act and PFA Act and the rules and regulations framed thereunder have to be interpreted and applied in the light of the Constitutional principles, and endeavour has to be made to achieve an appropriate level of protection of human life and health - Considerable responsibility is cast on the Authorities F as well as the other officers functioning under the Acts to achieve the desired results - Constitution of India, 1950 - Ars. 21, 39(e)(f) and 47 -- Food Supply and Standards Act, 2006 - Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. PUBLIC INTEREST LIT/GA TION: Writ petition before Supreme Court - For constituting a Committee of Experts to evaluate harmful effects of soft drinks 1103 G H 1104"}, {"doc_id": "2024 INSC 564", "case_name": "Delhi Transport Corporation v Ashok Kumar Sharma", "year": "2024", "issue": "High Court, if justified in upholding the order passed by the tribunal setting aside the dismissal of the charged officer. Headnotes\u2020 Administrative law \u2013 Disciplinary proceedings \u2013 Mandatory compliances by the disciplinary authority \u2013 On facts, memorandum of charge issued to the officer \u2013 Disciplinary enquiry held and seven out of the eight charges proved against the charged officer \u2013 Issuance of notice to the charged officer \u2013 Thereafter, the charged officer dismissed from service \u2013 Challenge to \u2013 Tribunal set aside the dismissal order \u2013 Said order upheld by the High Court \u2013 Correctness:", "held": ": Disciplinary Authority must indicate an independent application of mind to the findings in the enquiry report followed by opportunity of hearing to the charged officer and only thereafter, the order imposing a major penalty like dismissal from service can be passed against the charged officer \u2013 On facts, action of the Corporation in dismissing the charged officer from service suffered from fatal lacuna of having been arrived at with sheer non- application of mind in addition to being non-speaking \u2013 Neither of the two mandatory compliances carried out \u2013 Other than giving a blind approval to the show cause notice and the agenda item albeit referring to the reply of the charged officer, the Board\u2019s Resolution did not reflect any independent or objective application of mind by the members of the Board to the enquiry report either individually or collectively \u2013 Enquiry report sufferred from a fatal lacuna which goes to the root of the matter thereby vitiating the proceedings \u2013 No witness was examined on behalf of the prosecution during the course of departmental enquiry \u2013 Enquiry report nowhere records that any document was admitted by the charged officer \u2013 Since no evidence was led on behalf of the department in the enquiry 1176\b [2024] 7 S.C.R. Digital Supreme Court Reports proceedings, the enquiry report was based on no evidence whatsoever \u2013 Thus, no error by the tribunal in al"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 129", "case_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": 0 Maharashtra can utilize waters not exceeding 60 TMC for new projects, including any additional use over and above the sanctioRed or cleared utilization, as the case may be - The essence of Clause II (i) of the agreement is to put a cap on the right of Maharashtra to utilize waters of Godavari river E below the three dams mentioned therein up to Pochampad dam site to the extent of 60 TMC for new projects and in no case exceeding that limit - There is no demarcation made that the utilization of waters not exceeding 60 TMC for new projects by Maharashtra shall be from the flowing water - State of Andhra Pradesh is not entitled to the reliefs as prayed F for in the suit - However, a three member supervisory committee as detailed in the judgment is constituted - The committee shall surprise the operation of Babhali barrage and Balegaon barrage in terms of the judgment. Art. 131 - suit for injunction filed by one State against other State - Guiding factors to grant injunction - Explained - Evidence - Burden of proof. 153 G H 154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 2 S.C.R. A Words and Phrases: Expressions, 'dam', 'up to dam site', 'from the waters in the area of Gadavari basin' and 'from the waters of Godavari basin' - Connotation of. B The State of Andhra Pradesh filed the instant suit against State of Maharashtra, defendant no. 1 mainly. Union of India was impleaded as defendant no. 2"}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 9", "case_name": "DR. VIJAY LAXMI SADHO v JAGDISH", "year": "2001", "issue": "", "held": ": Defect A B c in affidavit is a curable one-Hence, petition not liable to be dismissed in limine-Any consequences arising from such 'defective' affidavit have to be D judged at the trial of the election petition-But S.86(/) not attracted to such a case. Madhya Pradesh High Court rules: Rule 2(b). Election petition-Drawn-up in Hindi language-Maintainability of- E Rules stipulated every election petition to be drawn-up in English language- State Government, by a notification issued by the Governor with the previous consent of the President, authorised Hindi for use in all proceedings of High Court-High Court held that the election petition was maintainable- Correctness of-Held. Rules relating to trial of election petitions are only F procedural in nature and not 'substantive law '-Art. 348(2) permits use of Hindi in High Court-R.2(b) cannot render Art. 348(2) meaningless-Hence, election petition can be filed in Hindi language and it cannot be dismissed at the threshold under S.86-Constitllfion of India, 1950, Arts. 225, 229 and 348-Practice and Procedure. The respondent (defeated candidate) filed an election petition before the t High Court challenging the election of the appellant (returned candidate) on grounds of corrupt practice. The election petition had been drawn-up in Hindi Language. The affidavit filed in support of the election petition was also drawn-up in Hindi langu"}, {"doc_id": "2024 INSC 990", "case_name": "Rajendra Kumar Barjatya and Another v U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Ors.", "year": "2024", "issue": "Respondent Nos.5 (original allottee of the plot) and 6 (Respondent No.5\u2019s power of attorney) without any approval from the competent authority, unauthorizedly constructed commercial shops on the subject property which was residential in nature and sold them to the appellants; Impugned order passed by High Court ordering demolition and directing criminal as well as departmental action against the erring officials. Headnotes\u2020 Illegal/Unauthorized constructions \u2013 U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 \u2013 s.83 \u2013 High Court allowed the writ petition filed by Respondent No.1-authority and dire", "held": ": Order passed by the High Court is well-reasoned \u2013 From 1990 onwards, though the Respondent No.1 periodically issued notices for removal of unauthorized constructions, however, it did not lead to actual removal/demolition \u2013 Despite sufficient opportunities being granted to Respondent Nos.5 and 6 they continued the illegality and thus, cannot plead estoppel \u2013 Further, the fact that the notices issued by the authorities between 1990 to 2013 did not culminate into demolition also speaks volumes about the lackadaisical attitude of the authorities which smacks of collusion with the violators \u2013 Thus, the fact that the building has stood for over 24 years will not give the appellants any right in law alleging delay and latches \u2013 There was no violation of the principles of natural justice \u2013 Respondent No.1 after sending notices to the * Author [2024] 12 S.C.R. \b 1321 Rajendra Kumar Barjatya and Another v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Ors. original allottee i.e., Respondent No.5 took steps to remove the unauthorized construction made on the subject property \u2013 Thus, the action impugned is not de novo action, but only continuation of the earlier line of events \u2013 A situation was created, where the Authority itself was forced to approach the High Court for a writ of mandamus to the district police to provide help in demolition of the unauthorized constructions \u2013 Order of the High Court "}, {"doc_id": "1958 INSC 117", "case_name": "HUKUM CHAND MALHOTRA v UNION OF INDIA", "year": "1959", "issue": "", "held": ", that the pith and substance of the impugned Act was the control of the use of amplifiers in the interests of health and also tranquillity and thus the Act was substantially within the powers conferred by Entry No. 6 and conceivably Entry No. l of the State List, and did not fall within Entry No. 31 of the Union List, even though the amplifier, the use of which is re- gulated and controlled, is an apparatus for broadcasting or com- munication. Accordingly, the Act was intra vires the State Legislature."}, {"doc_id": "1999 INSC 210", "case_name": "M/S NIRULAS CORNER HOUSE PVT. LTD. v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY", "year": "1999", "issue": "", "held": ", these machines were C independent and not accessories as claimed by the appel/ant-,-Hence, rightly classified under Heading 84.19 and 84.30(1) and not under Heading 84.15 and liable to CVD under Excise Tariff Item 29-A(J)-Further, continuous ice cream freezer rightly classified under Heading 84. 15-Excise-Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, Items 29-A(J) and 68. D Appellant had imported under one single order in its single consignment of plant and machinery namely, \"continuous ice cream freezer and alleged accessories such as Electronic Doser, Can Filler, Fruit Feeder and Ripple Machine\". According to the appellant, the main function of the machines imported was to make ice cream. The ice freezer was said to be refrigerating equipment classified as such under heading 84.15(1) of the Customs Tariff Act. None of the aforesaid so-called accessories could function independently. Being refrigerating machinery the imported machines were claimed to be E not dutiable and that no countervailing duty under Tariff No. 68 of the Central Excise Tariff was attracted, the appellant filed refund claim before F the Customs Department. The Assistant Collector rejected the claim of the appellant. The appeal preferred before the Collector (Appeals) and Appellate Tribunal were also rejected. Hence this appeal. It was contended by the appellant that the said articles were not independent machines "}, {"doc_id": "2000 INSC 493", "case_name": "M/S. KONKAN RAILWAY CORPORATION LTD.  AND ANR. ETC. ETC. v M/S. RANI CONSTRUCTION PVT. LTD. ETC.", "year": "2000", "issue": "", "held": ", the question is one arising almost constantly in a large number of cases in various High Courts-Held it is desirable that this court re-examines the matter-Direction that papers be placed before the Hon'ble D Chief Justice of India for passing appropriate orders-Law on this point in other countries discussed-Principle of 'Kompetenz-Kompetenz'. Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. v. Mis. Mehul Construction Co., (2000) 6 SCALE 71; Sunderam Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd., (1999) 2 SCC 479; Ador Samia Pvt. Ltd. v. Peekay Holdings Ltd. & Ors., [19991 8 E SCC 572; Inda-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, AIR (1964) SC I 140: (1964) 6 SCR 594; Wellington Associates Ltd. v. Mr. Kirit Mehta, JT (2000) 4 SC 135; Nimet Resources Inc. & Anr. v. Essar Steels Ltd., ZT (2000) Suppl. 1 SC 95 and Mis. Datar Switchgears Ltd. v. Tata Finance Etd. & Anr., (Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 13812 of 2000 decided by Supreme Court on 18.10.2000), referred to. F Caprodag v. Dame Bohin, (1995 Rev. Arb. 617); Comptek Telecom Inc. v. !VD Corpn. (I 995) (US Dist. Lexis I 1876); SMG Swedish Machine Group v. Swedish Machine Group Inc., (1991) (US Dist. Lexis 780); Azov Shipping Co. v. Baltic Shipping Co., (1999) I LL LR 68 and Hi-fert Pty. Ltd. v. G Kiukiang Maritime Carriers, Vol. XXIII-1998, Year Book of Commercial Arbitration of ICCA p. 606 at p. 612, referred to. 'Law and Practice of I"}, {"doc_id": "1998 INSC 451", "case_name": "M.S. ZAHED v K. RAGHAVAN", "year": "1998", "issue": "", "held": ", requirement of C landlord has to be both bona fide and reasonable-Landlord had sufficient accommodation in his possession for requirement of his family members-His requirement not being reasonable, he was not entitled to an order of ejectment in his favour-However, as tenant agreed to vacate premises after expiry of 4 years-Ordered accordingly in exercise of power under Article I 42 of the D Constitution of India-Constitution of India-Article 142. S.50--Revision-Power of High Court-Held, High Court entitled to re-appreciate evidence in order to examine legality as also correctness of judgment of trial court. The appellant-landlord filed a suit under Section 21(1) (h) of the E Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 for possession of the premises in occupation of the respondent tenant on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. The case of the landlord was that he purchased a double storeyed house in which in a portion of ground floor the respondent tenant was staying; and that he required the accommodation occupied by the tenant F for comfortable stay of his family members including his parents. The tenant resisted the suit contending that the landlord was in possession of substantial portion of the ground floor and the whole first floor, which was quite sufficient to meet the needs of his family members. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the accommodation ava"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 246", "case_name": "KENDRIYA VIDYALAYA SANGATHAN AND ORS. v AJAY KUMAR DAS AND ORS.", "year": "2002", "issue": "", "held": ", such order B c not valid-Such orders being a nullity, observance of principles of natural justice would not arise-Principles of natural justice-Administrative Law. D Appellants issued advertisement for the posts of LDCs. Assistant Commissioner, whose services had been terminated a couple of days before, issued appointment orders since he was continuing in service on the basis of the interim order of the High Court. Assistant Commissioner then challenged the order of his termination. High Court dismissed the petition E and also held that the appointment order issued by him were null and void. Inquiry Report regarding recruitment made by the Assistant Commissioner also indicated several irregularities. Thereafter, on the basis of vacation of the interim order, the appointing authority passed an order terminating the services of the respondents. Respondents challenged the or_der and the tribunal set aside the order on the ground that the respondents were not parties to the writ proceedings and identical order had been issued in the case of persons who had been selected, without observing the principles of natural justice. Aggrieved appellant filed writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present appeals. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: Respondents were appointed by the Assistant Commissioner when his services had been terminated and his continuation i"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 1201", "case_name": "LOKESH SINGH v STATE OF U.P. & ANR.", "year": "2008", "issue": "", "held": ": Not proper c - It is duty of Court to indicate reasons for granting bail. Prosecution case was that the deceased was shot dead by some unknown persons. During investigation, it was found that respondent no.2 and another person 'SBS' had entered into criminal conspiracy to commit murder D of deceased and the said 'SBS' arranged two shooters ).._ who caused death of the deceased. In order to show com- -.! plicity of respondent no.2, reference was made to the statement of one 'MK' who claimed to have overheard the conversation of respondent no.2 and 'SBS' before the E incident relating to the plan of the murder of the deceased. Prayer for bail was rejected by Sessions Judge. High Court noted that the son of the deceased and 'MK' did not disclose the involvement of respondent no.2 at the first instance and it was only in their statement recorded }- F under s.161 Cr.P.C. which was recorded after 2- 1/2 months ~ from date of incident that they disclosed his involvement in the offence and that the evidence collected by investi- gating officer put dent in prosecution case and therefore respondent no.2 was entitled to be enlarged on bail. G In the instant appeal, it was contended for the appel- !ant-complainant that the High Court had practically writ- t- ten a judgment of acquittal by not only referring to the incriminating materials but also in concluding about their H 980 LOKESH SI"}, {"doc_id": "2022 INSC 238", "case_name": "NKGSB COOPERATIVE BANK LIMITED v SUBIR CHAKRAVARTY & ORS.", "year": "2022", "issue": "", "held": ": Purpose of the 2002 Act is to empower the financial institutions to manage the non performing assets by adopting measures for recovery or reconstruction \u2013 s.13(4) states that when a default is committed by the borrower in discharging his liability in full, the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the measures \u2013 One of the measures is to take possession of the secured assets of the borrower \u2013 If secured creditor intends to take possession of secured assets, the application u/s.14 must be moved to CMM/DM in writing \u2013 s.14(1A) added by amendment provides that CMM/DM may authorize any officer subordinate to him for the aforesaid purpose \u2013 The statutory obligation enjoined upon the CMM/DM is to immediately move into action after receipt of a written application under s.14(1) of the 2002 Act \u2013 There is de jure functional subordinate relationship between the CMM/DM and the advocate being an officer of the Court \u2013 There is no rule as such framed by the central government which expressly or impliedly prohibits CMM/ DM to engage an advocate commissioner for taking possession \u2013 Hence, by applying \u2018functional subordination\u2019 test, CMM/DM may appoint advocate as a subordinate officer for the purpose of s. 14(1A) of the 2002 Act. A B C D E F G H 1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R. Allowing the Appeals filed by secured creditors and delinking the SLP (Civil) No.12011 o"}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 616", "case_name": "KURMANCHAL INSTITUTE OF DEGREE & DIPLOMA AND ORS. v CHANCELLOR, M.J.P. ROHILKHAND UNIVERSITY AND ORS.", "year": "2007", "issue": "", "held": ": In terms of provision uls. 5 of the .I Act, territorial jurisdiction of the University is confined only to seven districts, Nainital district is not amongst them-Hence, it is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the University-Since Nainital district is not situate in the State of UP., provisions of the Act not applicable. D Appellant no. 1, Kurmanchal Institute of Degree and Diploma, is a study centre at Nainital, Uttranchal. It is recognized by Mahatma Jyotiba Phule Rohilkhand University and constituted in the year 1975 by issuance of a Notification under Section 4(1-A) of the Uttar Pradesh Jtate Universities Act, 1973. Academic Council of the University granted permission to start E 'distance education'. The State Government granted approval to run the diploma and certificate courses of the University through distance education mode. Since the degree course was not included in the letter issued by the State Government the Registrar of the University requested the State Government to grant permission for starting distance programme under F I distance education mode. The Chancellor disapproved the proposal for starting i a new course in distance education. A writ petition was filed questioning the '- legality of the said order by the appellants. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissed the said writ petition. Hence, the present appeals. Appellants-Institute a"}, {"doc_id": "2011 INSC 712", "case_name": "M/S L.N. GADODIA & SONS & ANR. v REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER", "year": "2011", "issue": "", "held": ": The Provident Fund Commissioner was justified in drawing the inference of E integrity of finance, management and workforce in the two concerns and taking a view that the said companies had to be clubbed together for the purposes of their coverage under the Act - The authority concerned will proceed for determination and recovery of the provident fund dues from the said companies - Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, F \u00b7 1954 -ss. 2(5) and 2(9). \u00b7 DELHI SHOPS AND ESTABLISHMENTS ACT, 1954: s. 2(9) read with s. 2(5) - 'Establishment' and G 'commercial establishment' - Held: In the instant case, the two companies carrying on trade or business for private gain fall within the definition of 'commercial establishment' and consequently, under the definition of 'establishment' as defined in sub-ss. (5) and (9) of s. 2 respectively- Employees H 508 L.N. GADODIA & SONS v. REGIONAL PROVIDENT 509 FUND COMMISSIONER Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 - s. A 7-A. EVIDENCE ACT, 1872: s. 106 - Burden of proof - HELD: When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of 8 proving that fact lies on him - This rule expects such a party to produce fhe best evidence before the authority concerned, failing which the authority cannot be faulted (or drawing the necessary inference. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: Purposive construction - Provident Funds Act - HE"}, {"doc_id": "2025 INSC 731", "case_name": "Gopal Dikshit v United India Insurance Company Ltd.", "year": "2025", "issue": "Matter pertains to the correctness of the order passed by the National Commission dismissing complaint filed by appellant; and whether the cause of loss to the premises is due to the seepage water or the heavy rains in Delhi. Headnotes\u2020 Consumer Protection Act, 1986 \u2013 s.23 \u2013 House holder insurance policy \u2013 Second survey report \u2013 Reliability \u2013 Premises of the appellant insured with respondent-insurance company \u2013 Due to heavy downpour in Delhi, his premises severely flooded, resulted in extensive damage to the basement and the belongings lying there \u2013 First survey carried out, which stated that ", "held": ": In view of the concurrent findings in the certificates and first survey report, the damage to the insured premises was not caused by any inherent structural defect or seepage, but was instead a direct consequence of unprecedented and heavy rainfall experienced during the relevant period, which led to flooding of water into the basement \u2013 First survey, conducted promptly, had already comprehensively assessed the cause and extent of the * Author [2025] 7 S.C.R. \b 15 Gopal Dikshit v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. damage \u2013 Nothing on record to suggest that first survey was deficient or incomplete in any manner \u2013 Despite conducting a survey before, respondent proceeded to commission a second survey without furnishing any reasonable, cogent, or valid grounds justifying the necessity for a reassessment \u2013 Second survey report deviated from the reasons of the first survey report and curiously recorded that the damage to the premises was caused by seepage, rather than by flooding due to heavy downpour \u2013 Second survey report failed to counter or address the detailed and comprehensive observations made in the first survey report nor did it offer any explanation or new material facts that would warrant a reversal of the initial conclusion \u2013 This abrupt departure from the earlier findings, without explanation or justification, raises serious concerns about the reliability and objecti"}, {"doc_id": "2022 INSC 136", "case_name": "SOUTHERN POWER DISTRIBUTION POWER COMPANY LIMITED OF ANDHRA PRADESH (APSPDCL) & ANR. v M/S HINDUJA NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION LIMITED & ANR", "year": "2022", "issue": "", "held": ": APTEL rightly held that, on account of the assurance given by the State of Andhra Pradesh/APDISCOMS, HNPCL had altered its position and as such, it was not permissible for the appellants-DISCOMS to withdraw O.P. No.19 of 2016 \u2013 Conduct of appellants-DISCOMS would disentitle them to withdraw the application \u2013 Argument, that on account of increase of the capital cost of the project, the appellants\u2013DISCOMS would be required to purchase power at much higher rate, also does not hold water since the State Electricity Regulatory Commission would only approve the cost as it would feel appropriate, as guided by the provisions u/ s.61 of the Act of 2003 and the Regulations; and merely because, the cost of the project is estimated by HNPCL at a particular amount, the State Commission is not bound to accept the same \u2013 Further, perusal of s.64 of the Act of 2003 would reveal that even a A B C D E F G H 199 Generating Company is entitled to make an application for determination of tariff u/s.62 of the Act of 2003 \u2013 As such, the State Commission was wholly unjustified in dismissing O.P. No.21 of 2015 filed by HNPCL \u2013 For reasons unknown, appellants-DISCOMS took a decision to resile from their earlier stand, due to which, not only the huge investment made by HNPCL would go in waste, but also valuable resources of the public including thousands of acres of land would go in waste \u2013 Appellants-"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 1477", "case_name": "C.R. JAYARAMAN & ORS. v M. PALANIAPPAN & ORS.", "year": "2008", "issue": "", "held": ": Not called for - Courts below on entire consideration of the materials on record held that the temples are public in nature - There was participation of members of public in darshan in the temple and in daily acts I E of worship or in celebrations of festive occasions - Appellants failed to prove successfully that temples were private in nature. It is the appellant's case that in the year 1890, their ancestor EL constructed three temples out of his own f'lnds. Throughout, the said ~emples were treated as their F private temples and were virtually in their management. The members of the public never had any right to offer wo.rship in the temples and the deities were never dedicated to the public. In 1965, appellant's mother . received a letter from three persons, appointed as non- hereditary trustees of the said temples by Hindu G Religious and Charitable Endowments Board to hand over the property and records of the temples. The mother filed writ petition for quashing the order of appointment of non-hereditary trustees of the said temples. High Court directed the mother to file appropriate application before ) H 1140 \"' / C.R. JAYARAMAN & ORS. v. M. PALANIAPPAN & ORS. 1141 the Board for declaration of said temples as private A temples of the appellant's family. Mother filed an, . application which was dismissed. Aggrieved, appellant filed a suit. Trial court held that the said"}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 195", "case_name": "KESHARBAI @ PUSHPABAI EKNATHRAO NALAWADE (D) BY LRS. & ANR. v TARABAI PRABHAKARRAO NALAWADE & ORS.", "year": "2014", "issue": "", "held": ": Once a partition in the sense. of division of right, title or status A B c is proved or admitted, presumption is that all joint property\u00b7 was partitioned or divided -- In the instant case, High Court has affirmed the findings of the trial court that in 1985, there 0 was a complete partition and the parties had acted on the same -- Therefore, the presumption would be that there was complete partition of all the properties -- Burden of proof that certain property was excluded from the partition would be on the party that alleges the same to be joint property - High E Court committed an error in placing the burden of proof on the appellants, who were defendants in the suit, to prove that the property at SI. No. V was a self-acquired property of their predecessor-in-interest - Findings recorded by High Court on \u2022 Issue No. Ill is set aside - Consequently, suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents shall stand dismissed - Evidence - F Burden of proof. HINDU LAW\u00b7 HUF - Partition - Presumption -- Explained. G A suit for partition between the parties was dismissed by the trial court holding that a family arrangement had taken place in the year 1985, and every one took possession in their respective shares and was enjoying 765 H 766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 3 S.C.R. A the same. However, in appeal the High Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to partition of property at SI. N"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 710", "case_name": "MARY v STATE OF KERALA AND ORS,", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": In terms of sub-r. (15) of r. 5, security money deposited by auction 0 purchaser is liable to be forfeited. CONTRACT ACT, 1872: s. 56 - Contract to do act, afterwards becoming impossible - Doctrine of frustration - Statutory contract - E Auction purchaser finding impossible to run abkari shops due to resistance by local residents, the area being a holy place - State also found it impossible to re-sell or re-dispose of arrack shops -- Held: Doctrine of frustration excludes ordinarily further performance where the contract is silent as F to the position of the parties in the event of performance becoming literally impossible -- However, in a statutory contract in which party takes absolute responsibility, it cannot escape liability whatever may be the reason -- In such a situation, events will not discharge the party from the G consequence of non-performance of contractual obligation - - Further, in a case in which consequence of non-performance of contract is provided in statutory contract itself, parties shall be bound by that and cannot take shelter behind s. 56 - In the instant case, by reason of sub-r. (15) of r. 5 of 197 4 Rules, H 1126 MARY v. STATE OF KERALA 1127 State was entitled to forfeit the security money -- In the face A of specific consequences having been provided, appellant shall be bound by it and could not take benefit of s.56 - Kera/a Abkari Shops (Disposal"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 164", "case_name": "S. RENUKA AND ORS. v STATE OF A.P. AND ANR.", "year": "2002", "issue": "", "held": ", petitioners have no right to clain1 an appointment, as r the selection was de-hors the Special Rules and reservation polic~They cannot be appointed even on ex-cadre post, as the san1e would an1ount to creating ex-cadre post by Court and would be against Rules. After establishment of Family Courts and Mahila Courts, High Court E desired to post women Judges in such Courts. In view of in-sufficient number of women Judges IO additional posts were sanctioned by the State. Advertisement was issued for appointment to the posts of District Judges, Grade IL Out of the IO posts, 5 were for open competition, 2 for SC, one for ST, one for Backward Class category A and one for Backward Class, category F B. But after selection process, High Court approved 9 names for the panel consisting of 7 from the open competition and one each from SC and Backward Class A category B. The names of9 candidates were sent to State Government for appointment, informing that the appointments of the candidates shall be provisional as family court judges and they would be later recruited to Higher Judicial Service as District Judges, Grade II on the G \u2022 availability of vacancies reserved for women. State Government then ~ requested High Court to express its views on certain aspects with regard to the selection. Full Bench of the High Court opined that it was not in favour of 697 H 698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 595", "case_name": "ROHILKHAND MEDICAL COLLEGE & HOSPITAL,  BAREILLY v MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA & ANOTHER", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": CBI, in its charge-sheet, pointed out E serious infirmities in the report submitted by the inspection team constituted by the Union Ministry- CBI investigation has revealed that fraud was practiced by the Central team as well as the college to get the sanction for the 3rd batch of MBBS students for the academic year 2008-09 - That was sufficient F for the MCI to take action, and revoke the Jetter of permission granted for academic year 2013-14 - The decision of MCI is in accordance with Regulations 8(3)(1)(d) - Minimum Standard Requirements for the Medical College for 100 Admissions Annually Regulations, 1999. G H Indian Medical Council Act, 1956: ss. 10A and 19A - s. 10A, mandates that when a new medical college is to be established or the number of seats 692 ROHILKHAND MED. COLLEGE & HOSP., BAREILLY v. 693 MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA to be increased, the permission of Central Government is a A pre-requisite - s. 19A obliges MCI to prescribe minimum required standards for medical education and the recommendations made by MCI to Central Government carry considerable weight - In the instant case, MCI constantly on all the occasions, recommended to Central Government not B to renew permission for admission of the third batch for the academic year 2008-09, but in spite of the same, a Central Team was appointed, a favourable report was got and permission was accorded by Central Gove"}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 698", "case_name": "THAYARAMMAL (DEAD) BY LR. v KANAKAMMAL AND ORS.", "year": "2004", "issue": "", "held": ", such a dedication made by D a Hindu for religious or charitable purposes in strict sense is neither a gift nor a trust-Such a property is itself raised to the categ01y of juristic person. Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959: Ss. 6(5) and .(17)-Charitable and religious endowments -Owner dedicating his property for being used by public as Dharmachatram (Choultly)-No administrator or manager appointed-Held, High Court E rightly opined that the suit property which was a dedication for charitable purposes on neither be claimed by plaintiff as a trustee nor by defendant as owner-However, order of High Court modified to the effect that the suit property being a 'charitable endowment' would be taken in control for administration, management and maintenance by State Government and F the Commissioner invoking powers under the Act-Administrator Generals Act, 1963-0.fficial Trustees Act, 1913-S. JO. Evidence Act, 1872 : Property dedicated for public use-Document of dedication being a G stone inscription-Evidentiary value of Suit properties were dedicated for being used by the public as 'Dharmachatram', where travelers and pilgrims could take shelter and be provided with refreshment. The document of dedication was a stone H inscription of the year 1805 on the front wall of the property. The 734 THAYARAMMAL v.KANAKAMMAL 735 plaintiffs, who claimed themselves in o"}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 480", "case_name": "BRITANNIA INDUSTRIES LTD. v COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL, KOLKATA  AND ANR.", "year": "2005", "issue": "", "held": ", does not extend to expenditure incurred in respect of guest houses. The appellant sought for benefit of exemption of expenditure incurred in respect of guest houses which was not allowed by the authorities. The claim was rejected by High Court based on other D judgments by same High Court. On appeal, appellant contended that Sections 30 to 32 deal with specific types of expenditure which are allowable in terms of the said provisions, whereas Section 37 deals with all other expenditure, not being expenditure described in Sections 30 to 36 of the Act, subject to the conditions; that Section 37 contains general provisions allowing deductions in respect of expenditure not included E within Sections 30 to 36 of the Act; that since expenditure incurred by the assessee towards payment of rent, rates, taxes, repairs and insurance of premises, buildings and furniture used for the purposes of the business or profession has been provided for specifically under sections 30, 31 and 32 of the Act, by virtue of the non-obstante clause used in Sub-section (1) p of Section 37 such expenses could not again be referable to Section 37 and the different provisions thereof; that in other words, since the aforesaid expenses had been specifically allowed to be deducted the said benefit could not be taken away by the word \"including\" in the expression \"residential accommodation including any accommod"}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 157", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA v KARAM CHAND THAPAR AND BRS. (COAL SALES) LTD. AND ORS.", "year": "2004", "issue": "", "held": ": It is not permissible for Central Government to set-off outstanding royalty against D stowing assistance-Coal Mines (Conservation and Safety) Rules, 1954, R.49. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order 8 Rule 6. I Set-off-Claim for-Writ petition to enforce the same-Applicability of 0. 8 R. 6-Held: Though there is no specific provision of law or settled rule of E procedure governing writ jurisdiction yet the principles underlying 0. 8 R. 6 are applicable to writ proceedings-Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 226. Equitab_le and legal set-off-Conditions. to be fulfilled-Held: Mutual debts and credits to be available for extinction by way of equitable set-off must have arisen out of the same transaction-Equittable set off not available F as a matter of right and the discretion to allow or disallow lies with the Court. The predecessor of respondent No. 1 (Coal company) was liable to pay royalty to the Central Government on account of sand extracted by it for the purpose of stowing operations in the coalfields. The Central Government was liable to pay a certain amount to the Coal company as G stowing assistance under Section 9 of the Coal Mines (Conservation and Development) Act, 1974. There were certain arrears of the amount of royalty payable by the Coal company to the Central Government and the Central Government sought to enforce recovery of the amount of royalty 997 H 998 SUPREME "}, {"doc_id": "1997 INSC 566", "case_name": "GTC INDUSTRIES LTD. v COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI", "year": "1997", "issue": "", "held": ", appeal filed by the Revenue before the Tribunal is beyond time-Cannot be entertained-Each show cause notice must be D limited to the case made out therein-No jurisdiction for Tribunal to direct that third show cause notice be looked into for the purpose of adjudication of 1st and 2nd show cause notices-Direction of tribunal-Beyond its ad- judicatory.function. The appellant-assessee, a cigarette manufacturing Company, was E issued two show cause notices demanding excise duty. Subsequently a third show cause notice was issued to the assessee. A petition challenging the show cause notices was filed before the High Court. The High Court 011 20th June 1984 while permitting the Revenue to proceed with adjudication of the first show cause notice directed not to communicate the order passed in the adjudication proceedings to the parties. By subsequent order F dt. 18th June 1991 High Court gave directions for opening the sealed cover and for showing the orders to the parties. A direction for filing appeal against the adjudication order was passed by the High Court on 21st July 1994. The appeal filed by the assessee against the adjudication order on the ground that the Board's order had been passed beyond the period stipulated in Section 35E of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 was G dismissed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal. Aggrieved by the order of "}, {"doc_id": "2003 INSC 43", "case_name": "ROURKELA SHRAMIK SANGH v STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. AND ANR.", "year": "2003", "issue": "", "held": ", Jn spite of clear and unambiguous directions by the Supreme Court, workmen did not go to appropriate authority for resolving the dispute but preferred the writ petition before the High Court-Hence, High Court rightly dismissed the writ petition-Constitution of India; Articles 32 and 226. Some workmen filed a writ petition for regularisation of their ~ F services on the ground that they had been doing similar jobs as has been ~ done by regular employees of the Plant. Supreme Court allowed the writ petition and issued certain directions for absorption of workmen subject to fulfilment of eligibility conditions and also directed that in case of any dispute as to identification of such workmen the same may be referred G to the Chief Labour Commissioner. Workmen filed interlocutory applications for further orde~ and clarification. Disposing of I.As., the Court directed workmen to approach any other appropriate authority ~ prescribed under law. In the meanwhile, cases of ineligible workmen were referred to H 704 ROURKELA SHRAMIK SANGH' STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. [S.B. SINHA,!.] 705 the Chief Labour Commissioner who found some more workmen eligible A for absorption. In review, the Chief Labour Commissioner ordered absorption of some l)lore workmen. Workmen Union also filed a writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court. Thereafter, writ appeal was also dismissed. Hence the "}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 1468", "case_name": "MOHAN BIR SINGH CHAWLA v PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH AND ANR.", "year": "1996", "issue": "", "held": ": Weightage of 10% was on higher side-It should not exceed So/er-Since admission D pertained to 1993-94 not possible to give any relief-But it must be taken into consideration for future admissions. The rule governing admission to LL.B. course among other courses prescribed by the respondent-University provided that while admission shall be made on the basis of merit, ten percent of the marks obtained in the E qualifying examination shall be added in the case of candidates who had passed the qualifying examination from the respondent-University. The impugned rule read: \"(vi) Admission shall be made on merit which shall be determined after giving weightage as under: (a) 10% marks obtained in the aggregate marks of the qualifying F examination passed from Panjab University.\" The appellant filed writ petition before the High Court challenging the validity of the aforesaid rule on the ground that the said rule violated the eqnality clause enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The G High Court dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved the appellant \u00b7- preferred the present appeal. The question before this Court was whether weightage of ten percent marks given to students of the same university in the matter of admission to different courses in its constituent or affiliated colleges was permissible H 949 950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R. A where the ad"}, {"doc_id": "2001 INSC 524", "case_name": "MANGILAL v STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANR.", "year": "2001", "issue": "", "held": ": The vietim s deposition is direct evidence which was supported by presence of insecticide poison in the blood sample of the victim-Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no oral, direct, documen- tary or circumstantial evidence-Acquittal set aside-Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 307, 323, 324 and 498-A. Respondent No. 2 was tried for offences under Sections 307, 323, 324 and 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860 \u2022 But the trial court acquitted respond\u00b7 ent No. 2 on the ground that there was no oral, documentary or circum- stantial evidence to show that respondent No. 2 had administered poison to his wife. The Criminal Revision Petition r.Jed by the appellant against the order of acquittal was dismissed by the High Court. Hence this appeal. According to the prosecution, the appellant's daughter was married to respondent No. 2. The appellant had rd~ a First Information lleport stating that his daughter had been beaten and administered a glass of pesticide by respondent No. 2. Chemical examination disclosed that an insectkide poison namely, organo-phosphorous, which was dangerous to life was found present in the gastric lavage and blood sample of the appellant's daughter. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1. The appellant's daughter deposed in clear terms that her husband i.e. the 2nd respondent had held her nose and poured poison into H her mouth, forcing her to take two or three sips o"}, {"doc_id": "2012 INSC 202", "case_name": "RASHMI REKHA THATOI & ANR. v STATE OF ORISSA & ORS.", "year": "2012", "issue": "", "held": ": The o Court of Session or the High Court cannot pass an order that on surrendering of the accused before the Magistrate he shall be reloased on bail on such terms and conditions as the Magistrate may deem fit and proper - When the High Court in categorical terms expressed the view that it was not inclined E to grant anticipatory bail to the accused, it could not have issued such direction which would tantamount to conferment of benefit by which the accused would be in a position to avoid arrest - Court cannot issue a blanket order restraining arrest and it can only issue an interim order and the interim order F must also conform to the requirement of the section and suitable conditions should be imposed - Direction to admit the accused persons to bail on their surrendering has no sanction in law and, in fact, creates a dent in the sacrosanctity of law - By passing such kind of orders, the interest of the G collective at large and that of the individual victim is jeopardised - That apart, it curtails the power of the regular court dealing with the bail applications - A court of law has to act within the statutory command and not deviate from it - It is a well settled proposition of law what cannot be done H 674 RASHMI REKHA THATOI & ANR. v. STATE OF 675 ORISSA & ORS. directly, cannot be done indirectly - The statutory exercise of A power stands on a different footing than exer"}, {"doc_id": "1964 INSC 118", "case_name": "STATE. BY NILRATAN SIRCAR, ENFORCEMENT v LAf91HMI NARAIN RAM NIWAS", "year": "1964", "issue": "", "held": "': (i) The Magistrate has no jurisdiction over the arti- cles seized in execution of the search warrant issued under s. 19(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and that he cannot permit the retention of such documents by the Director of\u00b7 Enforcement after the expiry of the period he is entitiE<l to keep them in accordance with the provisions of s. 19-A 0\u00a3 the Act. The Enforcement Officer has a right under s. 19-A to retain the articles seized for a period not exceeding four months and it is not necessary for him to obtain permission from the Magistrate for retaining the seized documents within the stlF- tutory period. Therefore, the Magistrate issuing the \u00b7search warrant has nothing to do with the retention or disJ>osal of the documents seized in execution of the search warrant either during the statutory period of four months or after the expiry of that period. \u00b7 Mohammad Serajuddin v. R. C. Mishm, (1962] 1 Supp. S.C.R. 545, distinguished. (ii) In view of the specific provision for the issue of a search warrant under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, the provisions of ss. 96, 98 and Form No. 8 of Schedule V of the Code would not be applicable to the search warrants issued under sub-s. (3) of s. 19. The provisions of ss. 101, 102, 103 of the Code will apply to searches under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act as there is no specific provision in the A"}, {"doc_id": "1994 INSC 343", "case_name": "DR. ARUNDHATI AJIT PARGAONKAR v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.", "year": "1994", "issue": "", "held": ": the candidate appointed temporarily though working continuously for a number of years not entitled to be regularised. D The appellant, a Bachelor in Dental Surgery was selected by the Divisional Selection Board and was appointed as Lecturer in Dentistry on a purely temporary basis in 1978. In 1980 and 1985 the appellant was selected by the public Service Commission for the post of Lecturer of Dental Mechanics and Periodontia respectively, but she did not join. In E 1987 her name was sponsored for po:1t graduation on deputation. But the Government did not agree to it sin\u2022ce the qualiflcation for the post of Lecturer in dentistry bad changed in the meantime In 1986. In March, 1988 the post held by the appellant was advertised through Public Service Commission. The appellant filed a Writ Petition F before the High Court claiming that since she bad rendered nine year continuous service she stood regularis<d as per the Government resolution dated 19.9.1975. The petition was transferred to the Tribunal which passed an interim order In favour of the ap1.ellant but the selection to the post was not stayed. Resp\"ondent No. 3 was selected but he could not joined in G view of the said Interim order. He file1l a petition before the Tribunal. Both the petitions were decided! by the Tribunal. The appellant's claim was rejected as her appointmeiot was not in accordance with the recruitment "}, {"doc_id": "2012 INSC 121", "case_name": "MANO DUTT & ANR. v STATE OF U.P.", "year": "2012", "issue": "", "held": ": In the instant case, six accused were charge-sheeted uls.302 rlw ss.149 and 323 - However, two of the accused were acquitted by trial court and H 686 MANO DUTT & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. 687 remaining were convicted of an offence u/ss.302134 and 3231 A 34 - High Court acquitted all the accused of offence u/ss. 3021 34 - One of the accused died during the pendency of that appeal - Because the alleged number of accused having become less than five, nature of the offences were changed from offence uls.149 to s.34 - In the circumstances of the B case, the possibility of presence of all other persons in the appellants' party cannot be excluded - Even where there are less than five persons who are accused, but the facts and the evidence of the case is convincing as in the instant case, where the accused had returned to the place of occurrence c with complete preparedness and after giving lalkar had attacked the deceased there, they have to be held liable for commission of the crime - It cannot be ignored that the extent of participation, even in a case of common intention covered u/s. 34 would not depend on the extent of overt act - If all the 0 accused have committed the offence with common intention and inflicted injuries upon the deceased in a pre-planned manner, the provisions of s.34 would be applicable to all. Evidence: Right of self defence - Held: It is a settled canon of evid"}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 238", "case_name": "M/s. RAMNARAIN SONS (Pr.) LTD. v COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY", "year": "1961", "issue": "", "held": ", that the High Court had taken the correct view of the matter and the appeal must fail. The question whether a transaction is or is not an adven- ture of the nature of trade has to be decided in the light of the intention of the assessee judged by the legal requirements asso- ciated with the concept o'f trade or business. Since the shares in question were purchased by the appel- lants with the intention of acquiring the managing agency and not in the course of their business as dealers in shares with the intention of trading in those shares and what was acquired by such purchase was a capital. asset in the shape of a managing agency, it could not be said merely because the managing agency could be utilised for earning profits. that those shares were stock-in-trade of their share business. G. Venkataswami Naidu and Co. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 464 and The Oriental Invest- ment Co., Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 49, referred to. ' CIVIL APPELL.A.TE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 698of1957. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 2, 1956, of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 1 of 1956. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, B. A. Pallcliiwala and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. Hardyal Hardy and D. Gupta, for the respondent. 1960. December 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 923", "case_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB REP. THROUGH SECRETARY v RAJ KUMAR AND ORS.", "year": "2008", "issue": "", "held": ": c Situation in which a person is on his death-bed being exceed- ingly solemn, severe and grave is the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement - Moreover, its exclusion will result in miscarriage of justice - But the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court as to its correctness -Once the Court is satisfied that it was true o\u00b7 and voluntary, conviction could solely be based on it without any further corroboration - In the instant case,. prosecution has successfully established accusation on the basis of dy- ing declaration against accused No. 2 - However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, punishment under Section 304 E Pt. II and custodial sentence of 6 years would sub-seNe the ends of justice - Sentencing - Penal Code, 1860 - Murder/ Culpable homicide - Ss. 302 and 304 Pt. II - Dying declara- tion - Evidentiary value. According to the prosecution, relationship between F > accused No.1, husband and the deceased wife was strained on account of more and more demand of dowry being made by the accused and his parents. On March 12, 1996, mother in law of the deceased allegedly sprinkled kerosene oil on her and set her on fire. On hearing hercry, G her brother-in-law and his wife took her to a hospital and .-l her statement was recorded by PW9, a doctor, on the ba- sis of which an FIR was registered on the next day. He"}, {"doc_id": "2005 INSC 537", "case_name": "FORUM, PREVENTION OF ENVN. AND SOUND POLLUTION v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.", "year": "2005", "issue": "", "held": ": Constitutional-Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 14 and 21. In terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rule 2000, the Central Government imposed restriction on the D use of loud speakers/public address system at night (between 10.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m.). By 2002 Amendment, sub-rule (3) was inserted in Rule 5 which granted permission to the State Government to relax the applicability of sub-rule (2) and grant exemption therefrom between 10.00 P.M. and 12 mid-night for maximum of 15 days during a calender year. E Appellant-Forum unsuccessfully filed writ petition before High Court F challenging the constitutional validity of sub-rule (3). Hence the present appeal. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: Looking at the diversity of cultures and religions in India, a limited power of exemption from the operation of the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rule, 2000 granted by the Central Government in exercise of its statutory power cannot be held to be unreasonable. The power to grant exemption is conferred on the State Government. It cannot G be further delegated. The power shall be exercised by reference to the State as a unit and not by reference to districts, so as to specify different dates for different districts. It can be reasonably expected that the State Government would exercise the power with due care and caution and in public"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 241", "case_name": "KAHANDU DAULAT DANGDE v JAY WANTRAO YADAVRAO KHARADE AND ORS.", "year": "1996", "issue": "", "held": ", land being in tenancy on 1.4.1957, tenant entitled to purchase it-By virtue of the proviso to s.32F( 1)( a) provisions of the section not applicable to widow-Concept of notional severance cannot be read in provisions of the section. D Hindu Law: Doctline of relation back-Joint family prope1tyWidow member as such of joint family since plior to l.4.1957-Pa1tition taking place in E 1961-Proceedings under S.32F (l)(a) of Bombay Tenancy and A151icultural Lands Act, 1948 by tenant--Held, concept of notional severance cannot be read in provisions of section. In a suit for partition filed by one of the members of the joint family of which 'A', a widow was also a member, a compromise decree was passed F in 1961 as a result of which the land in dispute came in the share of 'A'. 'A'. had applied, for an exemption certificate under s.88C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The proceedings were contested by the appellant, the tenant of the land in dispute. After the death of 'A' in 1969, the proceedings were continued by her heirs and were disposed of on 1.12.1981. Thereafter, the appellant initiated proceedings under s32 G F(l) (a) of the Act. The respondents resisted the claim on the ground that 'A' being a widow since prior to 1.4.1957, the appellant, having not given notice under s32 F(l)(a) within the statutory period, was not entitled to purchase the land. The Re"}, {"doc_id": "1961 INSC 56", "case_name": "SMT. PADMINI KUNWAR JU SAHIBA v STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH. (now Madhya Pradesh)", "year": "1961", "issue": "", "held": ", that the appellant was not a Jagirdar and her right under the Lambardari lease could not be resumed under the Abolition Act. In the context in which the word \"Ijaredar\" was used ins. 2(1)lc) it meant a person holding an Ijara which was a lease or farm of land revenue or other proprietary right as distinguished from other kinds of leases. The Lambardari lease granted ~the appellant was not a mere farm of land revenue but it conferred~ghts in the land itself. It was not a mere Ijara, the appellant was not a mere \"Ijaredar\" and was not covered by the definition of Jagifdar in s. 2(1)(c). Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1955] 2 S.C.R. 303, applied. ClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 250of1956. Appeal from the judgment and order dated Janu- ary 17, 1955, of the former Judicial Commissioner's Court, Vindhya Pradesh, in Misc. Civil Writ Applica- tion No. 105 of 1954. G. 8. Pathak and G. 0. Mathur for the appellant. B. Ganapathy Iyer and B. H. Dhebar for the respond- ent. 1961. February 21. The Judgment of the Court WM delivered by 116 1961 908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19.61] x96x W ANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate . . granted by the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya. Smt.Pcdm1n1 p d h Th b. ff fi Ku wa Ju Sahiba ra es . e rte acts necessary or present pur- . \" ~- poses are these: The appellant filed a petition under State of Art. 226 of the. Constitu"}, {"doc_id": "1961 INSC 29", "case_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,  BOMBAY v DHARAMDAS HARGOVINDAS.", "year": "1961", "issue": "", "held": ", th\u2022t the assessee was liable to tax on this amount. Per Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, JJ.-Where a person, resident in the taxable territories, has already received, outside the taxable territories, any income etc. accruing or arising to him outside the taxable territories before the previous year brings that income into or receives that income in the taxable territories he would be chargeable to income-tax thereon. Though for the purposes of cl. (a) of s. 4 the receipt must be the first receipt of income in the taxable territories, for the purposes of cl. (b)(iii) the receiving in the taxable territories need not be the first receipt. Keshav Mills ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1953] S.C.R 9 50, referred to. Per Sarkar, J.-The income could not be said to have been \"received\" in the taxable territory within the meaning of cl. (b)(iii) as income could be received only once. But it is clear that the assessee \"brought into\" Bombay that income. It was immaterial in what shape he received the income in Bhavnagar and in what shape he brought it in Bombay. Keshav Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1953] S.C.R. 950, Board of Revenue v. Ripon Press (1923) I.L.R. 46 Mad. 706 and _Sundar Das v. Collector of Gujrat (1922) l.L.R. 3 Lah. 349, applied. Gresham Life Assurance Society ltd. v. Bishop [1902] A.C. 2 87 and Tennant v. Smith [18<)2] A.C. 150, referred to. CIVIL APP]jJLLAT"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 658", "case_name": "ASHOK MAHAJAN v STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.", "year": "2006", "issue": "", "held": ": High Court is C directed to re-consider the matter in the light of the observations made by Supreme Court in the case of Pa wan Kumar Jain v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of U.P. Limited on similar issu.e-Directions issued- Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition Act, 1950-Section 279(/)(b). A Company had taken term loan from the Pradeshiya Industrial and D Investment Corporation ofUttar Pradesh by mortg;iging immovable properties. Initially, the borrower/company had coinmenced its business as a private limited company but subsequently it was converted to a Public Limited Company. Appellant was serving as a Director in th.e said company. On 7. 7.1998 a recovery certificate was issued by the Corporation to one of the E guarantors of the company for recovery of the loan. Later, recovery certificates were also issued against other guarantors including the appellant. Auction proceedings were fixed on 25.5.03 in terms of Seetion 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues Act) 1972. Appellant filed a writ petition on the ground that the recovery could not have been made from him in terms of provisions of the Act. The High Court rejected the stand and held that the F authority concerned was entitled to recover the amount in question as arrears of land revenue in terms of the provisions under Section 279(1)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition Act, 19"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 819", "case_name": "INDIAN AIRLINES LID. v PRABHA D. KANAN", "year": "2006", "issue": "", "held": ", regulation setting out circumstances under which the services of an employee can be terminated by D way of discharge without holding enquiry-Regulation does not confer arbitrary power hut contains inbuilt safeguards-Regulation provides for simpliciter discharge-Termination is not on the grounaof misconduct but lack of confidence having regard to the specific contingencies specified in the regulation-Requirements to comply with principles of natural justice E held not practicable-Regulation is not arbitrary or discriminatory and is intra vires-However, in the facts, held, regulation not applicable to emmp/oyee appointed prior to amended regulation coming into force-. Employee holding post of trust and confidence and doubt on the integrity of person shaking confidence of employer-Jn the facts, termination not set F aside but employer directed to pay to employee eight years' salary towards both back wages as well as for loss of employment in future to subserve the ends of justice-Constitution of India, 1950-Artic/es 14, 21 and Article 311 (2) proviso (b)-Air Corporation Act, 1953-Sections 44 and 45. Respondent joined service of the appellant - Corporation as an Air G Hostess and was later on promoted as Deputy Manager in Inflight Service Department On 18.6.2002, the respondent was put on duty in Flight operating on sector Mumbai - Hyderabad - Bangalore - Sharjah. However, the co"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 755", "case_name": "VALLABHANENI VENKATESHWARA RAO v STATE OF A.P.", "year": "2009", "issue": "", "held": ": In view of the contradictions in the facts mentioned in the dying declarations and testimonies of the doctor and the other D prosecution witness, the dying declarations can not be believed - In the circumstances, it would not be safe to convict the accused - Their conviction is set aside - Dying declaration. \u00b7I The appellants and four others were prosecuted for commission of offences punishable u/s 302/149 and 148 E IPC. The prosecution case was that there was enmity between the accused group and the complainant party. On the specified date the accused assaulted the brother of PW3 as a result of which the victim died the same day in the hospital. The trial court relying upon the prosecu- F tion evidence and two dying declarations (Ext. P-12 and Ext. P-14) convicted all the seven accused of the offences charged. On appeal, the High Court affirmed the conviction of A-1 to A-3 and acquitted A-4 to A-7. In the appeals filed by A-1 to A-3, it was contended G for the appellants that the reasons given by the High Court for rejecting the second dying declaration (Ext.P-14), were equally applicable to the first dying declaration (Ext.P-12) and, therefore, the appellants were also entitled to acquittal. H 1210 VALLABHANENI VENKATESHWARA RAO V. 1211 STATE OF A.P. Allowing the appeals, the Court A \\ HELD : 1.1 As regards the alleged dying declaration (Ext.12), the A.S.l.(PW-8) stated tha"}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 687", "case_name": "STATE OF HARYANA v SURESH", "year": "2007", "issue": "", "held": ": A bag, brief case or any such container etc. can, under no circumstances be C treated as body of a human being-Therefore, these article cannot be included within the ambit of the person occurring in s. 50-Interpretation of Statutes. Interpretation of Statutes : Literal interpretation-Onus of showing that the words do not mean D what they scy lies heavily on the party who alleges it-Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985-ss. 50 rlw s. 18. Words and Phrases: 'Person' and occurring in s.50 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic E Substances Act, 1985---Connotation of Respondent was convicted by the trial court of an offence punishable u/s. 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, on the case of the prosecution that a plastic bag containing opium was recovered from his attache' case which was searched by the patrolling party. On appeal by the accused, the High Court directed his acquittal on the ground that there was non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of s.50 of the Act. F In the instant appeal filed by the State, it was contended for the appellant that the High Court failed to take note of the decisions of the Supreme Court G to the effect that s. 50 of the Act relates only to a personal search and not of bags or containers carried by the accused. On the question: what is the meaning of the words \"search any person\" 961 H 962 SUPREME "}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 574", "case_name": "RUPADHAR PUJARI v GANGADHAR BHATRA", "year": "2004", "issue": "", "held": ": Procedural laws cannot be interpreted with too much F rigidity-They are to be liberally construed to make them workable and advance ends ofjustice-Further, technical objections which defeat and deny substantial effective justice cannot be approved, except where the mandate of the law inevitably necessitates it. Gram Panchayat election for the office of Sarpanch was held. G Respondent was declared elected. Appellant, the only defeated candidate, challenged the election of the respondent-returned candidate seeking declaration to the effect that the election of respondent is invalid and declare appellant as the only duly nominated candidate. The Munsif set aside the election of the respondent on account of disqualification and H 86 RUPADHAR PU.TARI v. GANGADHAR BHA TRA 87 declared appellant being single candidate as duly elected to the post. The A High Court upheld the setting aside of the respondent's election, however, directed the authorities to hold re-election since in the relief clause appellant had not sought any relief to declare him elected. Hence the present appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD. 1.1. Procedural laws relating to Panchayat elections and election petitions cannot be allowed to be interpreted with too much of rigidity and by indulging in hair-splitting. Laws of procedure are meant B to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing substan"}, {"doc_id": "2024 INSC 870", "case_name": "Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. v Om Parkash", "year": "2024", "issue": "Whether the High Court erred in granting relief to the employee by setting aside his termination for abandonment of service despite the employee's failure to disclose his subsequent employment and the procedural compliance by the employer under Regulation 39(4)(iii) of the LIC Staff Regulations, 1960. Headnotes\u2020 Regulation 39(4)(iii), LIC Staff Regulations, 1960 \u2013 Abandonment of Service \u2013 The regulation deems an employee to have abandoned service if absent for 90 consecutive days without intimation \u2013 Employee absented himself without informing the employer, and notices were issued to his recor", "held": "that the employer\u2019s actions complied with the regulation, and the employee\u2019s non-response justified the abandonment finding \u2013 The High Court\u2019s doubt on notice service was misplaced. [Paras 9, 11] Held: The High Court erred in granting relief to the employee by allowing the Writ Petition and setting aside the termination order, as it overlooked that \"it was a case of the employee abandoning his services without informing his employer about his whereabouts\" \u2013 Treating the employee to have abandoned his service and taking appropriate action against him, in terms of the LIC Staff Regulation, cannot be faulted, given his absence since 25.09.1995, unanswered notices, and subsequent employment with the Food Corporation of India on 14.04.1997 \u2013 The employee\u2019s suppression of this employment in his Writ Petition filed on 05.01.1998 disentitled him to equitable relief from the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution \u2013 Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and quashed [Paras 8-13]."}, {"doc_id": "1962 INSC 295", "case_name": "THE GURU ESTATE THROUGH  DWARKADAS GURU AND OTHERS v THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX BIHAR AND ORISSA", "year": "1963", "issue": "", "held": ", tha.t the amounts received by the assessees under tke Annadan PatrM were not exempt from tax under ss, 4 (3) (i) and (ii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, since, on the find- ings of the Tribunal, they were not applicable exclusively to purposes religious or charitable. H\u2022ld, further, that the High Court erred in ignoring the finding ;or the Appellate Tribunal that there was no trust and in coming to a conclusion, on the assumption that a trust was intended to be created by the pilgrims, that the trust was a private tru\u2022t. Under the scheme of the Indian Income-tax Act the function of determining facts rests with the Tribunal and on the facts found the High uourt has to advise the Tribunal as to the Ja.w applicable. In the present case, the High Court attempted to exercise not the advisory jurisdiction in respect of the decision of the Tribunal which alone is conferred by s. 66 (2) of the Act, but jurisdiction which in substance was appellate. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 248 to 253 of 1962. Appeals from the judgments dated April 1, 1958, of the Orissa High Court in Special Jurisdiction Cases Nos. 6 of 1953 and 42 to 45 of 1954 and 7 of 1956. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. S. Mahanty and B. P .. Makeshwari, for the appeilants in all the appeals. N. D. Karkhanies and R. N. Saohthey, for the respondent in all the appeals. 1962. October 19. The Judgment of th"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 895", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA v DEVENDRA KUMAR PANT & ORS.", "year": "2009", "issue": "", "held": ": The medical standard having been fixed in the interest of public s.afety, D interest of employee concerned, co-employees and administration, protection uls 47 (2) not available - Service Law - Promotion. \u00b7 As per Office Order No. 4/1990 dated 19.7.1990, the E medical standards were rationalized, whereby for the posts of junior Research Assistant and Senior Research Assistant, medical standard was upgraded from 82 to 81 category. However, medical category for the post-of Chief Research Assistant wa!; retained as B-1 category. F Respondent-employee was promoted to the post of Chief Research Assistant with the condition that the promotion would be effective with effect from the date of submission of fitness certificate in B-1 medical category. G By subsequent Memos/Orders, he was asked to present \" himself before concerned medical officers for examination. 1 H 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R. A Respondent-employee filed a petition before Administrative Tribunal which was dismissed. He fil~d writ petition taking a new plea that 81 category required colour perception, and that lack of colour perception being a disability, he was protected by s. 47(2) of Persons B With Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. High Court allowed the writ, accepting the plea of disability. Hence the present appeal. c Allowing the appeal, the C"}, {"doc_id": "1961 INSC 58", "case_name": "PRATAP CHAND v RAM NARAYAN AND ANOTHER.", "year": "1961", "issue": "", "held": ", that as the mortgage deed stood it was a mortgage of all the proprittary rights in the mortgagor's share in the property including the proprietary right in the sir pertaining to that share. As the mortgage was without possession the mortgagor was not losing possession of his sir and it was\u00b7 not necessary for him to make an application under s. 50 of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act relating to the reservation of a right of occupancy. Sections 49 and 50 come into play when the propriet.or making a transfer loses his right to occupy any portion of his sir land temporarily or permanently. Although in the plaint of the suit based on the mortga~e no mention was made of sir, the entire proprietary right m sir, kliudkashat etc. relating tn the mortgagor's share would be sold on a decree passed in the suit. The words \" all rights pertaining to the share \" appearing in the sale certificate following the execution of the decree in the mortgage suit passed in favour of the respondents would include the mortgagor's proprietary rights in the sfr land and the respond- ents by their sale certificate would get a right in the sir land also. Ftb1uary aa. Pratap Chand v. Ram Narayan 914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] As the appellant had purchased the entire share of Ram. chandar who was later ejected from his ex-proprietary tenancy which came into the possession of the appellant as lambardar hi"}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 266", "case_name": "THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER, ALWAYE v THE ASOK TEXTILES LTD., ALWAYE", "year": "1961", "issue": "", "held": ", that the language and scope of s. 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act. r922, could not be equated with that of 0. 47, r. r of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Income-tax Officer could under s. 35 of the Act examine the record and if he disco- vered that a mistake had been made, could rectify the error both of law and fact. The restrictive operation of the powers of\u00b7 review under 0. 4 7, r. r of the Code of .Civil Procedure was not applicable in the case of s. 35 of the Income-tax Act. Held, further, that the s. r8A(8) was a mandatory one and the Income-tax Officer was required to calculate the interest in the manner provided under the provisions of that sub.section and had to add it to the assessment. Maharana Mills (P.) Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, (1959] 36 I.T.R. 350 and M. K. V enkatachalam v. Bombay Dyeing c5- Manu- facturing Co. Ltd., [1958] 34 I.T.R. r43, discussed. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Elphinstone Spi1ming c5- IV cav- ing Mills Co. Ltd. [1960] 40 I.T.R. r4>, Commi>sioner of Income- tax, Bombay City v. ]algaon Electric Supply Co. Ltd., [1960] 40 l.T.R. 184 and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City v. Khatau Makanji Spng. c5- Weavg Co. Ltd., [1960] 40 l.T.R. r89, not applicable."}, {"doc_id": "2018 INSC 718", "case_name": "RAJDEEP GHOSH v STATE OF ASSAM & ORS.", "year": "2018", "issue": "", "held": ": The preference to the State residents cannot be said to be unintelligible criteria suffering from vice of arbitrariness in any manner whatsoever \u2013 r.3(1)(c) framed by the Government of Assam is based on an intelligible differentia and cannot be said to be discriminatory and in violation of Art.14 \u2013 It is permissible to lay down the essential educational requirements, residential/domicile in a particular State in respect of basic courses of MBBS/BDS/Ayurvedic \u2013 Thus, r.3(1)(c) of the Rules is in consonance with the spirit of Art.14 of the Constitution \u2013 Constitution of India \u2013 Art.14 \u2013 Education \u2013 Admissions. Dismissing the Petitions, the Court HELD: 1. This Court has held in various decisions, that it is permissible to lay down the essential educational requirements, residential/domicile in a particular State in respect of basic courses of MBBS/BDS/Ayurvedic. The object sought to be achieved is that the incumbent must serve the State concerned and for the emancipation of the educational standards of the people who are residing in a particular State, such reservation has been upheld by this Court for the inhabitants of the State and prescription of [2018] 11 S.C.R. 329 329 A B C D E F G H 330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 11 S.C.R. the condition of obtaining an education in a State. The only distinction has been made with respect to postgraduate and post- doctoral super special"}, {"doc_id": "2024 INSC 484", "case_name": "The Excise Commissioner Karnataka & Anr. v Mysore Sales International Ltd. & Ors.", "year": "2024", "issue": "Whether provisions of Section 206C of the Income Tax Act is applicable in respect of the appellant and whether the liquor vendors (contractors) who bought the vending rights from the appellant on auction, can be termed as \u201cbuyer\u201d within the meaning of Explanation(a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act or excluded from the said definition of \u201cbuyer\u201d as per clause (iii) of Explanation (a) to Section 206C of the said Act. Relatable to the above core issue is the question as to, whether, the High Court was justified in rejecting the challenge to the said orders made by the appellant. Headnotes\u2020 ", "held": ": Explanation(a)(iii) to section 206C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 visualizes two conditions for a person to be excluded from the meaning of \u201cbuyer\u201d as per the definition in Explanation(a) \u2013 The first condition is that the goods are not obtained by him by way of auction \u2013 The second condition is that the sale price of such goods to be sold by the buyer is fixed under a state enactment \u2013 These two * Author 288\b [2024] 7 S.C.R. Digital Supreme Court Reports conditions are joined by the word \u2018and\u2019 \u2013 The word \u2018and\u2019 is conjunctive to mean that both the conditions must be fulfilled; it is not either of the two \u2013 Therefore, to be excluded from the ambit of the definition of \u201cbuyer\u201d as per Explanation(a)(iii), both the conditions must be satisfied \u2013 In the instant case, Mysore Sales is the licensee for the manufacture and bottling of arrack for specified area(s) \u2013 By a process of auction or tender or auction-cum-tender etc., excise contractors are shortlisted who are thereafter granted permits to vend arrack by retail in their respective area(s) \u2013 These retail vendors i.e. excise contractors have to procure the arrack from the warehouse or depot maintained by Mysore Sales on payment of the issue price fixed by the Excise Commissioner \u2013 The arrack is procured in sealed bottles or in sealed polythene sachets \u2013 So, there are two transactions, each distinct \u2013 The first transaction is shortl"}, {"doc_id": "1953 INSC 57", "case_name": "HABEEB MOHAMMAD v THE SlATE OF HYDERABAD.", "year": "1954", "issue": "", "held": ", that the failure to examine him not only led to \u00b7an adverse inference against the prosecution case but also cast .serious r~flection on the fairness of the trial. Adel Mohammad v. Attorney-General of Palestine (A.LR. 1945 P. C. 42) distiguished. Stephen Senivaratne v. The King (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 289) relied on. Ram Ranjan Roy v. Emperor (I.L.R. 42 Cal. 422) referred to. Police diaries of a case under inquiry or trial can be made use _.of by a criminal court only for aiding it in such inquiry or trial. The court would be acting improperly if it uses them in its judg- ment or seeks confirmation of its opinion on the question of appre- ciation of evidence from statements contained in those diaries. Though th~ Supreme Court would not interfere under article 136 of the Constitution if there were mere mistakes on the part of . the court below of a technical character which had not occasioned ~ny failure of justice or the question was purely one of the court taking a different view of the evidence given in the case, it would interfere if in substance there has not been a fair and proper trial Where rr:ater1al eye witnesses were not examined, to disprove the prosecution case as to the motive of the accused, the court, without calling for the police diaries during\u00b7 the trial, stated in the 1953 Oct. 5. 1953 Habeeb Mohammad v. The State of Hyderabad. 476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1954] jud"}, {"doc_id": "2022 INSC 229", "case_name": "MUKESH KUMAR & ANR v THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.", "year": "2022", "issue": "", "held": ": Is not sustainable \u2013 Denial to grant compassionate appointment only on the ground of descent under Art.16(2) amounts to discrimination. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: While compassionate appointment is an exception to the constitutional guarantee under Article 16, a policy for compassionate appointment must be consistent with the mandate of Articles 14 and 16. That is to say, a policy for compassionate appointment, which has the force of law, must not discriminate on any of the grounds mentioned in Article 16(2), including that of descent. In this regard, \u2018descent\u2019 must be understood to encompass the familial origins of a person. Familial origins include the validity of the marriage of the parents of a claimant of compassionate appointment and the claimant\u2019s legitimacy as their child. The policy cannot discriminate against a person only on the ground of descent by classifying children of the deceased employee as legitimate and illegitimate and recognizing only the right of legitimate descendant. Apart from the fact that strict scrutiny would reveal that the classification is suspect, as demonstrated by this Court in V.R. Tripathi, it will instantly fall foul of the constitutional prohibition of discrimination on the ground of descent. Such a policy is violative of Article 16(2). As appellant No.1, cannot be denied consideration under the scheme of compassionate appointm"}, {"doc_id": "1960 INSC 130", "case_name": "M/S. UNIVERSAL IMPORTS AGENCY AND OTHERS v THE CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AND OTHERS. (AND CONNECTED PETITIONS)", "year": "1961", "issue": "", "held": ", (Per Sinha, C.].. Imam and Subba Rao, JJ. Sarkar and Shah, JJ .. dissenting): (1) that on its proper interpretation, the express10n \" things done \" m para. 6 o( the French Establish- ments' (Application of Laws) Order, 1954\u00b7 was comprehensive enough to take in not only things done.but also the effects or the legal consequences flowing therefrom: [he Que\"n v. justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, (1876) l Q.ll.D. 220 and Heston and /slewortil Urbat> District Co1mcil v. Grout, [1897) 2 Ch. 306, relied on. (2) that the bringing of the goods into India and the rele- vant contracts entered into by the petitioners with the foreign dealers formed parts o( a same transaction, and therefore, the imports _were the effect or the legal consequence of the \" things done\", \u00b7i.e., tho contracts entered into by the petitioner; .. .. II 'j 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 307 State of Travancore-Cochin v. The Bombay Co. Ltd., [1952] S.C.R. u12 and State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory, [1954] S.C.R. 53, relied on. (3) that para. 6 of the order saved the transactions entered into by the petitioners and that, therefore, the Collector of Cus- toms had no right to confiscate their goods on the groun<\\ that they were imported without a licence. Per Sarkar, J.-(r) The mere making of the contracts and the opening of the letters of credit without the bringing of the goods "}, {"doc_id": "2016 INSC 620", "case_name": "BRAJENDRA SINGH YAMBEM v UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.", "year": "2016", "issue": "", "held": ": As per r.9(2)(b){ii) the disciplinary proceedings are burred by limitation and hence are liable to be quashed - Howeve1; having regard to the seriousness of the allegations made ugainst the delinquent, in exercin of power u!Art. 142, the Disciplinary Authority is directed to continue the disciplinary proceedings - Constitution of India - Art.142. Partly allowing the appeals, the Court A B c D E F HELD: 1. A perusal of r. 9(2) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 makes it clear that ifthe disciplinary proceedings are not instituted against the Government servant by the disciplinary authority while he was in service, then the prior sanction of the President G of India is required to institute such proceedings against such a person. It is also clear that such sanction shall not be in respect of an event which took place more than four years before the institution of such disciplinary proceedings. [Para 33) [351-H; 352-A-B) 333 H 334 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R. 2. It is an undisputed fact that the appellant retired from service on 31.08.2006. The Single Judge of the High Court by way of judgment and order dated 18.05.2006 in Writ Petition No. 720 of 2002 quashed the disciplinary proceedings in the case pertaining to the missing arms and ammunitions. However, liberty was granted to the Disciplinary Authority/Enquiry Officer to conduct the disciplinary enquiry afr"}, {"doc_id": "2022 INSC 499", "case_name": "PAWAN KUMAR v UNION OF INDIA & ANR.", "year": "2022", "issue": "", "held": ": Mere suppression of material/false information regardless of the fact whether there is a conviction or acquittal has been recorded in a given case does not mean that the employer can arbitrarily discharge/terminate the employee from service \u2013 Candidate who intends to participate in the selection process is always required to furnish correct information relating to his character and antecedents in the verification/attestation form before and after induction into service \u2013 Person who has suppressed the material information or has made false declaration indeed has no unfettered right of seeking appointment or continuity in service, however, the competent authority has to exercise the power judiciously \u2013 Yardstick/standard which has to be applied with regard to adjudging suitability of the incumbent always depends upon the nature of post, nature of duties, effect of suppression over suitability \u2013On facts, no FIR was registered on the date of filling the application form \u2013 False criminal case of trivial nature was registered later under misconception and the recruit was later acquitted \u2013 At the time of filling up the attestation form, the recruit was required to disclose whether he was ever arrested or prosecuted to which he mentioned \u2018No\u2019 \u2013 It is true that a candidate is required to furnish correct information before and after induction into service \u2013 However, the competent autho"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 392", "case_name": "M.D. SONALIKA INTERNATIONAL TRACTOR LTD. v DINESH SHARMA & ORS.", "year": "2009", "issue": "", "held": ": Complaint is not maintainable against the manufacturer as complaint does not show any a/legation against him. Respondent No.1, who purchased a tractor manufactured by appellant-Company from respondent D No.3 (dealer), filed a complaint u/ss. 1208, 420 and 468 IPC. It was alleged that the dealer falsely represented the capacity of the engine of the tractor and cheated him. The Magistrate dismissed the complaint. Sessions Judge, in revision directed the Magistrate to register the complaint. E High Court rejected the revision challenging the order of Sessions Judge. Hence the present appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : A bare reading of the complaint shows that F there was no allegation so far as the appellant is concerned. In any event, in the evidence recorded, no specific role was attributed to the appellant. That being so, the complaint proceedings cannot be maintained qua G the appellant and are set aside. [Paras 8 and 9] [1035-F-G] State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335 - relied on. 1031 H 1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R. A Case Law Reference I~ 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335 Relied on. Para 7 CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 539 of 2009 B From the Judgement and Order dated 24.05.2007 of the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur, Bench at Gawalior in Crl. Revision No. 257 of 2007. ..... ' D. Mehta, Vipin Gogia, Jaspreet Gogia"}, {"doc_id": "1958 INSC 98", "case_name": "H. VENKATACHALA IYENGAR v B. N. THIMMAJAMMA & OTHERS", "year": "1959", "issue": "", "held": ", that the High Court was right in setting aside the B. N. Thimma- finding of the trial court that the will had been duly and validly jamma executed. and Others Held further, that the trial court was in error in holding that the proof of signature in the instant case could raise a presumption as to the testator's knowledge of the contents of the will. Surcndra Nath Chattcrji v. ]almavi Charan M11khcrji, (1928) l.L.R. 56 Cal. 390, explained and approved."}, {"doc_id": "1994 INSC 537", "case_name": "SMT. SITA DEVI (DEAD) BY LRS. v STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.", "year": "1994", "issue": "", "held": ", Yes-Market Committee is empowered to levy and collect market fee when cattle is bought or sold in notified market or notified market area. The appellants challenged by filing a writ petition before the High Court the power of Market Committee to levy market fee on buffaloes, bullocks and cows bought or sold in Hat. The High Court held that by operation of Section 2(l)(a) r/w Item 3 in Classification 8 of the Schedule under the head 'Animal Husbandry Products' cattle was an a'gricultural produce for the purpose of levy of the market fee under section 27 of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960. This appeal by special leave had been filed against the judgment of the High Court. It was contended by the appellants that cattle being not an agricultural produce, the levy and collection of the market fee on the cattle bought or sold in the notified market was without jurisdiction. Dismissing the appeal, this Court HELD : 1.1. In Classification 8 of the Schedule, to the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act, Item 3 identifies cattle to be an agricultural produce. The definition is an inclusive definition and is of wide import. The legislature itself has specified diverse items in the schedule which is part of the Act which are amenable to levy and 1 collection of the market fee when the specified item is bought or sold in the notified market yard or sub-market yard or yard"}, {"doc_id": "2002 INSC 420", "case_name": "JAIPAL v STATE OF HARYANA", "year": "2002", "issue": "", "held": ", there were fatal omissions by the police in not protecting !he place of incident as well as samples of vomit, thereby depriving valuable and clinching evidence-Merely because of foul smell from !he mouth of the deceased, a case of poisoning could not be concluded-In the facts and circumslances of the case, ii is not safe to draw an inference !hat accused had administered poison lo the deceased wife. D Molive-Circumstances-Proof of-Discussed Accused-appellant and the deceased-wife could not pull on well and there arose differences leading to strained relationship between them. Wife initiated proceedings for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and E husband unsuccessfully filed a suit for dissolution of marriage. Though husband preferred an appeal, he compromised with his wife with the intervention of elders. Accordingly, wife was required to join him. Since she did not do so, husband persuaded his brother-in-law to send her back. On the fateful day, sister-in-law (PW3) of accused-husband brought his wife and in privacy they had conversation for about half an hour while F PW3 was sitting outside. When PW3 heard the voice of the deceased complaining of uneasiness, she rushed inside the room. Husband gave a tablet to the wife to cure her. Subsequently, wife started vomiting further. PW3 took her to a private hospital. Accused-appellant also reached there. She was shifted to Gov"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 229", "case_name": "SUNIL KUNDU AND ANR. v STATE OF JHARKHAND", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": In view of serious C lapses in the case, prosecution case not proved beyond reasonable doubt - Hence, the accused are liable to be acquitted. Criminal Jurisprudence - Prosecution must stand or fall 0 on its own - If it has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, it cannot draw support from weakness of the defence case. Investigation - Defective investigation - Effect of - Held: Lapses and i\"egularities in investigation, if they do not go to E ..,)he root of the matter, if they do not dislodge the substratum ' of prosecution case, they can be ignored - In the present case, lapses, being serious, cannot be ignored. Witness - Interested witness - Evidentiary value - Held: F Evidence of interested witness, if consistent, can be relied upon and not to be mechanically over-looked - In the present case, the interested witnesses, not being truthful, their presence itself being doubtful, cannot be relied upon. Criminal Trial - Direct evidence and medical evidence G - Inconsistency between \"\"'.\" Effect of- Held: Where eye-witness is cogent, medical evidence recedes in background - But when eye-witness account is totally inconsistent with medical evidence, there is reason to believe that improvements are H 924 . SUNIL KUNDU AND ANR. v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 925 made in the Court to bring the prosecution case in conformity A with the post-mortem report - In the present case, eye-witnes"}, {"doc_id": "2007 INSC 152", "case_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. v KAUSHALAYA DEVI", "year": "2007", "issue": "", "held": ": When claim is not allowed on the basis of jail certificate but on basis A B of oral statement of some other detenue, pension is to be granted from the C date of order for granting pension and not from the date of application. The question which arose for consideration in this appeal was whether the Freedom Fighters' Pension should be granted to the respondent from the date of the application or from the date of the order granting the pension. v Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: On the perusal of the record it is found that the claim was allowed on the basis of secondary nature of evidence. The claim was not allowed on D the basis of jail certificate produced by the claimant but on the basis of oral statement of some other detenue. Hence, the pension should be granted from E the date of the order for granting pension and not from the date of the application. [Para 5) (7 46-E] Mukand Lal Bhandari v. Union of India & Ors., AIR (1993) SC 2127, distinguished. Government of India v. K. V. Swaminathan, (1997) 10 SCC 190, relied on."}, {"doc_id": "1999 INSC 219", "case_name": "PUNJAB COMMUNICATIONS LTD. v UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.", "year": "1999", "issue": "", "held": ", changed policy decision was neither irrational or perverse on the basis of the underlining Principles and hence Govt. was not bound by its earlier policy decision-Such policy can be changed by the Decision-makers in overriding public interest-However, change in policy defeating the E substantive legitimate expectation 111us1 satisfy the test of reasonableness and the Court can interfere if the change of policy is irrational or perverse- W ednes bury principle-Government contracts-Fraud-Legitimate expectation. Administrative action-Allegation of fraud-Official decision should F not be infected with motives such as fraud or dishonesty, malice or personal self-interest-There can be any cause of action on the basis of an attempt at fraud, which did not materialise. Practice and Procedures-SLP-lnfructuous issues-Subsequent G issues-Regard for-Issues live before the High Court become non-issue due to subsequent events during the pendency of the appeal-Must be taken into consideration-Constitution of India, Article 136. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) agreed to grant a soft loan to respondent No. 1 for funding a project meant to provide digital wireless H 1033 \u00b71034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ' [1999] 2 S.C.R. A telecom facility to 36,000 identified villages in Eastern U.P. Accordingly, Department of Telecommunication (DOT) floated a tender inviting offers from foreign and Indian compan"}, {"doc_id": "2016 INSC 337", "case_name": "STATE OF M.P. & ANR. v RAJVEER SINGH & ORS.", "year": "2016", "issue": "", "held": ": It is apparent from the order that the High Court did not consider the facts and circumstances of the case and that there was serious counter a/legation made against the complainant by accused respondent - It was alleged in the petition filed uls.482 Cr.P.C. that he was harbouring the dacoits and gun-shots were fired by dacoits and injury suffered by complainant was caused by gun shot fired by dacoits - It is apparent that the complainant of the present case was not made an accused in the offence registered by the police in the year 2007 against certain dacoits and as they absconded, the trial was closed - The prayer was made before the High Court by respondent no. I to reopen the trial and to try respondents 5 to 7 in the Sessions trial on the basis of offence registered in the year 2007 - Considering allegations and counter-allegations, it was not such a case which could have been compromised by the complainant and the accused 1047 A B c D E F G H 1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R. A and FIR could not have been quashed in such a serious case as that was against public policy and administration of criminal justice system - The FIR disclosed commission of cognizable offence u/ s.30713./ !PC - Considering the nature of allegation, further investigation is necessary - Appeal allowed and investigation be B c made in accordance with law. Shiji@ Pappu & Ors. vs. Radhika & "}, {"doc_id": "2024 INSC 105", "case_name": "Axis Bank Limited v Naren Seth & Anr.", "year": "2024", "issue": "Application was filed by the applicant-appellant seeking clarification of the judgment reported in [2023] 14 SCR 581. Headnotes Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 \u2013 Limitation Act, 1963 \u2013 Judgment reported in [2023] 14 SCR 581, corrected to an extent \u2013 Word \u201cunsecured creditor\u201d referred in para 20 of the judgment to be read as \u201csecured creditor\u201d.", "held": ""}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 951", "case_name": "MONICA v SATISH SHARMA & ANR.", "year": "2009", "issue": "", "held": ": Not maintainable - Respondent no. 1 and other witnesses not involved in the E criminal case - Act of commission of forgery took place at Jaipur - Most of witnesses are from Jaipur only - Also petitioner need not attend the proceedings pending before Sessions Judge, Jaipur or High Court of Rajasthan in person ~ - More so investigation not completed - Thus, no ground to F transfer the matters. Abdul Nazar Madani v. State of Tamil Nadu (2000) 6 sec 204, referred to. ' Case Law Reference: G (2000) 6 sec 204 Referred to. Para-16 .. ~ CRIMINAL"}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 1043", "case_name": "MAHESH JOGI v THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "year": "2014", "issue": "", "held": ": Benefit would only enure to the extent of the sentence o imposed on the appellant - Therefore, even while upholding the cgnviction it is held that the appellant was a juvenile, as regards imposition of sentence on the appellant, the Juvenile Justice Board directed to pass appropriate orders u/s. 15 of the Act. E Ajay Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 15 SCC 83; Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2013) 11 SCC 193 - relied on. Hariram v. State State of Rajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 193; F Abuzar Hussain @ Guizar Hossain v. State of West Bengal 2012 (9) SCR 244:(2012) 10 SCC 489,; Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra 2013(13) SCC 1; Hakkim v. State represented through Deputy Superintendent of Police JT (2014) 9 SC 243 - referred to. G Case Law Reference: (2009) 13 sec 193 Referred to Para 5 293 H A B c D E 294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. 2012 (9) SCR 244 Referred to Para 6 2013(13) sec 1 Referred to Para 6 JT (2014) 9 SC 243 Referred to Para 6 (2013) 11 sec 193 Relied on Para 7 (2010) 1s sec 83 Relied on Para 8, 10"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 783", "case_name": "JAGMODHAN MEHATABSING GUJARAL AND ORS. v STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "year": "2006", "issue": "", "held": ", on Facts, conviction not to be interfered, fine enhanced. Appellants are accused of committing large scale theft of electricity. A team of officials led by the then Dy. Executive Engineer and in-charge of flying squad of the State Electricity Board went to appellant's industrial D premises for the purpose of inspection and checking. Large scale tampering with the meters so that actual consumption could not be recorded, was detected. The daily consumption of power to be recorded by the consumer in prescribed G-7 form was found to have been written only once every month. Abnormal difference was found between the entries noted by the consumer in G-7 form and the reading recorded by E the officers of M.S.E.B. The appellants did not pay any amount more than the minimum charges to the Doard, whereas the actual consumption of the electricity was assessed by the complaints as an Expert in the field to be much higher. After proper investigation of the entire case, the charges agai11st the appellant were framed under Sections 39 and 44 of the F Electricity Act, 1910 to which the appellants pleaded no! guilty. The appellants were found guilty and convicted by the trial cou~t for offences under Sections 39 and 44 of the Act and were also directed to pay a fine. These appellants were directed to suffer three months rigorous imprisonment. Appellant number 1 and 3 were also directed to pay "}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 1008", "case_name": "M/S. A.P. STEEL RE-ROLLING MILL LTD. v STATE OF KERALA AND ORS.", "year": "2006", "issue": "", "held": ", Correct as appellant-unit had failed to comply with terms/conditions of scheme and in obtaining sanction for electrical connection within a \u00b7reasonable time- Doctrine of promissory estoppel not applicable. Delay/latches in filing writ petition-Relief sought by placing reliance D on a Judgment passed in another case-Held, appellant approached the Court after a long delay, hence not entitled to obtain discretionary relief-Benefit of judgment not exten~ed automatically-While granting relief in a writ petition, High Court required to consider fact situation in each case including conduct .. of petitioner-Court to consider as to whether the writ petitioner chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after decision of this Court. E Interpretation of statutes-Exemption Notification-Held, generally, to he construed strictly, but once it is found that the entrepreneur fulfils the conditions laid down therein, liberal construction would be made. Doctrine of promissory estoppel-Beneficent scheme made by the State- F Applicability of the doctrine-Held, applicable if entrepreneur had altered his position pursuant to or in furtherance of a promise made by the State to grant benefit. Pursuant to the Industrial Policy adopted in 1992, the State of Kerala G issued a Notification dated 6.2.1992 granting exemption from payment of enhanced power tariff to the new industrial units, which start "}, {"doc_id": "1997 INSC 621", "case_name": "SURINDER SINGH AND ORS. ETC. v STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR. ETC.", "year": "1997", "issue": "", "held": ", normally not pemiissible but a policy decision can be taken to make excess appointments in rare, and exceptional cir- cumstances and in emergent situation-However reasonableness of the policy decision is subject to judicial review-Administrative law-Judicial review. Wait listed candidates-Have no vested right to be appointed except D when a selected candidate does not join and the waiting list is still operative. E F Recmitment process-Waiting List-Scope and intent of-Explained. Practice and Procedure : Time barred SLP--Refusal to condone delay though leave to appeal grante~Whi/e considering batch of SLPs, leave granted in all cases but delay not condoned in two cases which were delayed by 673 and 756 days as there was no sufficient cause to condone delay-Rather the petitioners acted as opportunists in approaching Supreme Court-Constitution of India-Article 136. The State Government advertised 2461 vacancies of teachers on 19.8.1992. Between 19.8.1992 to 22.6.1994, when process of selection was over and postings were made, 7737 posts of various categories of teachers became vacant. State Government filled up these posts out of the can- G didates who had applied against the post advertised on 19.8.1992. This action of the State Government was challenged in a batch of writ petitions filed before the High Court. The High Court quashed the appointments of 7737 candidates and uphe"}, {"doc_id": "2009 INSC 1048", "case_name": "AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA v RAJEEV RATAN PANDEY & ORS.", "year": "2009", "issue": "", "held": ": In matters of transfer of government employees scope of judicial review is ~ . limited and courts would not interfere with a transfer order D ~ j._ lightly ~ The burden of proving ma/a fide is on the party w~o alleges it - In the instant case, prima facie, the a/legation of ma/a fide is an after thought - Besides, except a bald statement, there is no convincing and cogent material on record in proof of the allegation - High Court erred in staying E the order of transfer - Order of High Court set aside - Constitution of India, 1950 ..:.. Articles 136 and 226 - Judicial review - Interim order - Interference with . \u2022 \u2022 Respondent no.1 filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the order of his transfer from Lucknow F to Calicut as violative of the transfer policy, and prayed for interim stay of the order of transfer. Initially, no stay was granted. Subsequently, the respondent filed a supplementary affidavit stating that the transfer order was actuated with mala tides. Thereupon the High Court G passed an interim order staying operation of the order of ~ transfer. Aggrieved, the Department filed the appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court 343 H - 344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A HELD: 1.1. In a matter of transfer of a government B employee, scope of judicial review is limited and High I Court would not interfere with an order of transfer lightly. "}, {"doc_id": "1953 INSC 18", "case_name": "NAMDEO LOKMAN LODHI v NARMADABAI AND OTHERS", "year": "1953", "issue": "", "held": ", that the suit was maintainable, Umar Pulavar v. Dawood Rowther (A.LR. 194 7 :VIa<l. 68), Bralvmayya v. Sundaramma (A.LR. 48 }fad. 275), Tatya Savla S11drik v. Yeshwanta Kondiba Mulay (52 Born. hR. 909) disappro- ved. Toleman v. Portbury (L.R. 6 Q.13. 245), Prakash Chandra Das v. Rajendra Nath Basu (I.L.R. 58 Cal. 1359), Rama Ai11angar v. Gumswami Chetty (35 l'vl.L.J. 129), Venkatachari v. Ranga\u00b7 swami Aiyar(36 llf.L.J. 532) and Krishna Shetti v. Gilbert Pinto (I.L.R. 42 !Yfad. 654) relied on. Venkatarama Aiyar v. Ponnu- swamy Padayachi IA.LR. 1935 Mad; 918), Aditya Prasad v. Ram Ratanlal (57L-A. 173), Muhammad Raza v. Abbas Bandi Bi/Ji. (59 I.A. 236), Roberts v. Davey (110 E.R. 606) distinguished. Crvn. A1'PELLA'l'E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 154 of 1952. Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 23rd June, 1949, of the High 13! I 1953 Bud Wit Satyanarayana and Others v. Konduru Venkatapayya and Other\u00ab~. 1953 Feb. 27. I 1010 SUPREME COUR,T REPORTS [l!l53] J%3 Court of Judicature at Bombay ,(Chagla C. J. Namd;a- Lokmanand Gajendragadkar J.) in Second Appeal No. 557 of Lodhi 1945 against the Judgment and Decree dated the v. 19th March, 1945, of the Court of Small Causes, Nmmadabai Poona, in Civil Appen,l No. 175 of 1943, arising @d Otltera. from the Decree dated the 31st March, 1943, of the Mahajan J. Court of the Extra ,Joint Sub-Judge of Poona in Suit No. 858 of 1941."}, {"doc_id": "2000 INSC 239", "case_name": "STATE OF KARNATAKA v STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS", "year": "2000", "issue": "", "held": ", Scheme 'B' was not a decision of the 'Tribunal and was not capable of being implemented by a mandatory injunction from the Supreme Court. Andhra Pradesh filing suit claiming that project-wise allocation had to be read into the mass allocation of dependable flow made by Tn'hunal and for A B c D E F G a declaration that Kamataka's construction of the Almatti Dam to a height of H 301 302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R. A 524.256 meters constituted an infraction of Tribunal's decision-Andhra Pradesh, inter alia, praying for injunction restraining Kamataka from coriStructing Almatti Dam up to a height of 524.256 meters-Held, the Tribu:- nal' s decision only made mass allocation and not pmject-wise allocatiOn; further held, as long as total user of water by Kamataka did not exceed mass B c D E allocation, Tribunal's decision was not violated and no mandatory injunction could be granted; there was no bar to raising of the height of Almatti Dam up to 519.6 meters subject to clearances by appmpriat~ authority of Central Government. Constitution of India, A1ticles 131, 262(2) r/w Inter-State Water Disputes Act 1956, Ss. 2(c) and 11-Maintainability of Suit-Kamatakafiling suit for decree that Scheme 'B' which did not form part of Final Order of the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal should be notified and given effect to-Defendants Andhra Pradesh and Union of India contending that thi"}, {"doc_id": "2003 INSC 429", "case_name": "MUNNA v STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI)", "year": "2003", "issue": "", "held": ": In such cases prosecution proceeds in a normal c manner like other cases and relies upon the testimony of witnesses recorded in the Court during course of trial-On facts, accused refusing to participate in TIP, .identification of accused in Court for first time, accused not named in FIR or statement in Court under Section 161 Cr.P.C.-Further no reason to falsely implicate accused-Identity of accused also established-Hence, case established against the accused and he was rightly convicted by trial Court- D Penal Code, 1860-Sections 392 and 1208-Evidence Act,1872-Sections 9 and 3-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 161. According to the prosecution, four persons committed robbery in a house where a lady was alone. It is alleged that the robbers broke open the lock of the almirah and removed currency notes and other articles. E Appellant-accused removed gold bangles from the hands of the lady. Her husband entered the house by breaking open the door on hearing her shouts. Seeing him the appellant-accused jumped out on the road from the balcony of the house with currency notes. Other two accused all>o jumped but the husband caught one of them who was later taken into F custody. Hearing the commotion, Head Constable on patrol duty also arrived and saw robbers jumping from the balcony and running away. FIR was lodged. On the basis of the disclosure statement made by accused in "}, {"doc_id": "1964 INSC 128", "case_name": "NAROTTAMDAS v STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "year": "1964", "issue": "", "held": ": (i) The contention that the Act was not independent legislation cannot be accepted. Section 2 of the Act merely says that the expressions used in this Act shall have the same meaning for the purpose of this Act as defined in the Minimum Wages Act of 1948. The definition of expressions used in an Act with reference to another Act is a well known device in legislative practice generally adopted for the sake of brevity. The definition would remain effective even after the other Act with reference to which the definition was given ceases to exist. This fact of defining expressions in an Act with reference to some other Act cannot therefore have the etr..,ct of making this Act dependent on such other Act. 7 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 821 It is clear from s. 3 of the impugned Act that the legislature was fixing for itself the minimum rates of wages in certain scheduled employments. The fact that the rates mentioned in the Table appended to the Act happened to t e the same as the rates fixed elsewhere cannot reasonably justify a conclusion that the validation of the old rates was being affected. In- dependent legislation does not cease to be so, merely because its effect is the same as it would have been if a validating Act had been passed. (ii) The retrospective operation of legislation is a relevant circumstance jn deciding its reasonableness. It is, however, not necessarily a d"}, {"doc_id": "2016 INSC 959", "case_name": "TIN PLATE DEALERS ASSOCIATION PVT. LTD. & ORS. v SATISH CHANDRA SANWALKA & ORS.", "year": "2016", "issue": "", "held": ": Share certificates discloses that the allotment was fresh and i11depe11dent - Certificates do not contain any stipulation or condition that the same are being held either on account of a third person or as beneficiary on behalf of a11y third person - Shares were held by the respondents in their own right without any connection with the fm:feited shares held by the appellants - Also, compliance of call notice in terms of s.53 was not proved by the appella11ts and its cm?fimnity ll'ilh clauses <~f Articles of Association of the company - Therefore. company petition maintainable. ss.397, 398 - Oppression and mismanage111enl - Respondenl- Sanwalka group filed company petition alleging oppression by the appellants-Gupta group and questioning the act of removal of lll'o members of respondent-Saml'C/lka group jiY1111 the Board of Directors and induction of two others of appellant-Gupta group in their place - Held: Satisfaction that oppression has been committed has to be reached in the facts of each case - Facts of the present case demonstrate a series of unacceptable decisions and actions 011 the part of the appellants-Gupta group. s.205(3) - Issue of bonus shares - Held: Proviso of s.205(3) permits issue of bonus shares out of revaluation reserves of a 145 c D E F G H 146 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R. company - Also, Articles of Association of the company t"}, {"doc_id": "2022 INSC 1220", "case_name": "THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER & ANR. v ISMAIL BHAI AND OTHERS", "year": "2022", "issue": "", "held": ": Acquired land of the village is a prominent area within the vicinity of the city of Hyderabad \u2013 It was acquired 40 years back in the year 1981 and the compensation was decided by LAO after litigating in courts only @ Rs. 6 per sq. yards \u2013 Land acquired is now in the heart of city of Hyderabad where the cost of the land has increased more than 100 times \u2013 Value of the said land cannot be computed at the rate less than Rs. 250/- per sq. yard which is supported by the evidence brought on record by the land owners \u2013 Therefore, High Court committed error in computing the compensation @ Rs.100 per sq. Yard \u2013 Further, development of the city has already taken place \u2013 Land owners, whose land has been utilized 40 years back, now cannot be compelled to pay the development charge for the development which has already taken place, only for a parcel of land to which they have not given compensation up to decades \u2013 Impugned judgment passed by High Court set aside \u2013 Order of Reference Court restored. Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 After having heard learned senior counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material brought on record, it is apparent that the acquisition of land was made in the year 1981. Indisputably, the land acquired is situated in a highly developed area of the twin cities having amenities of water, electricity, drainage, telephone, transport etc. The on"}, {"doc_id": "2004 INSC 272", "case_name": "RAM BALI v STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "year": "2004", "issue": "", "held": ": The time taken to digest food varies from individual to individual, the quantum of food taken etc.-Empty stomach not a relevant factor to throw doubt about the correctness of the time of incident-Only when ocular evidence was wholly inconsistent with medical evidence, th,e Court must consider the effect thereof D Defective investigation-Effect of-Held: In the case of defective investigation Court must be circumspect in evaluating the evidence-When direct evidence corroborated by medical evidence fully established prosecutidn version, accused could not be acquitted merely on account of defective investigation. According to the prosecution, there was enmity between the family members of the complainant and the appellant-accused due to litigations and for that reason the appellant-accused had assassinated the deceased. The trial Court convicted the appellant-accused and the High Cous:t E affirmed the conviction. Hence the appeal. F On behalf of the appellant-accused, it was contended that the medical evidence was clearly at variance with the ocular evidence; that the deceased had taken lunch at 2 PM but the postmortem showed the stomach of the deceased was empty_ which proved that the incident took place G around 9 PM and not around 6 PM as alleged; that the investigation was defective inasmuch as the gun was not sent for forensic test; and that thF judgment was delivered long a"}, {"doc_id": "2023 INSC 749", "case_name": "SURESH THIPMPPA SHETTY v THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "year": "2023", "issue": "", "held": ": There is su\ufb03 cient material on record giving rise to reasonable doubt as to the involvement of the appellants in the crime \u2013 Appellants were able to poke holes in the testimonies of PW1, PW2 and PW7 \u2013 This conclusion is only forti\ufb01 ed as co-accused A1 and A7 were acquitted and thus, the conspiracy angle dehors the said main conspirators, who are the masterminds as per the prosecution, cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt \u2013 Undisputedly, the four persons in the car on the fateful date were (1) the deceased; (2) PW1; (3) assailant/shooter, who is absconding, and (4) A3 \u2013 Admittedly, the appellants were not present at the spot where the crime was committed i.e., in the car nor any direct/speci\ufb01 c role in commission of the o\ufb00 ence being attributed to them and thus, their convictions cannot be upheld \u2013 Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra reported as [1971] 1 SCR 119 relied on by the High Court does not, in any manner, militate against this Court overturning a conviction when reasonable doubt emanates \u2013 Appeals allowed. [Paras 13 and 17] Administration of Criminal Justice \u2013 Reasonable doubt as to the version put forth by the prosecution: 1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R. Held: When this Court is confronted with a situation where it has to ponder whether to lean with the Prosecution or the Defence, in the face of reasonable doubt a"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 507", "case_name": "REKHA JAIN & ANR. v NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": High Court wrongly interfered with the D quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal - Moreover, the insurance company had no right to challenge the quantum of compensation in absence of permission from the Tribunal - Hence, judgment of Tribunal is restored. A renowned doctor lost her life in a motor accident. E The appellants (her daughter and husband respectively) filed petition claiming compensation. Claims Tribunal granted compensation at Rs.10,62,0001- with interest @ 6% P.A. taking her income as Rs. 12,000/- p.m. by deducting 1/3rd out of the monthly salary towards her F personal expenses and using multiplier of 11. The claimants went in appeal seeking enhancement of compensation amount, while insurer also filed appeal. High Court reduced the compensation amount to G Rs.8,00,0001-. Hence the present appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The Tribunal and the High Court have erred in not awarding just and reasonable compensation in H 750 REKHA JAIN & ANR. v. NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. 751 LTD. favour of the appellants keeping in view the principles A laid down by this Court in various judgments in the matters of motor accidents claims keeping in view the object of coropensation which will be the source of the maintenance for them particularly, in respect of the claimant, appellant no.1. The High Court instead of B enhancing the compensation, though the case is m"}, {"doc_id": "1998 INSC 184", "case_name": "POSTGRADUATE INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL EDUCATION AND  RESEARCH, CHANDIGARH v FACULTY ASSOCIATION AND ORS.", "year": "1998", "issue": "", "held": ": There cannot be any reservation in a single post cadre either directly or by device of rotation of roster-Contrary decision in some previous cases, overruled-Plurality of posts essential for reservation. Constitution of India, 1950 : B c D Articles 16(4) and 16(4A)-Reservation-Backward Classes-Special provisions for-Held: There must be a balance in the matter of appointments between reserved and general classes-In making reservations for bakward classes, the State cannot ignore the fundamental rights of the general candidates-Therefore, special provision under Art. 16(4) must strike a E balance between several relevant considerations and proceed objectively-- Hence, reservations cannot exceed 50%- Articles 16(1), (2) & (4)-Scope of -Held: Art. 16(4) is not an exception to Arts. 16(1) and 16(2) but an instance of classification permitted by Art. 16(1)-Equality of opportunity under Art. 16(1) is to be reconciled with concessions in favour of backwara\u00b7 classes under Art. 16(4) in such a manner that the latter while serving the F cause of backward classes, do not unreasonably encroach upon the field of equality. Article 13 7-Supreme Court judgment-Review of-Decision rendered on incorrect appreciation of law-Review allowed by a larger Bench- Supreme Court Rules, 1966-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, 0.47 R.1- G Practice and Procedure. The appellants have filed the present review pet"}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 488", "case_name": "C.K. DASEGOWDA & ORS. v STATE OF KARNATAKA", "year": "2014", "issue": "", "held": ": High Court erred in reversing the order of trial court - o Legal principles laid down by Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Kamataka applied - High Court erred in setting aside the order of acquittal of appellants in absence of any legal and factual evidence on record to prove\u00b7 the findings and reasons recorded in the judgment of the trial E court as perverse - Order of acquittal by the trial court reinforced - Appeal against acquittal. ' The accused-appellants allegedly attacked PW1 and PW3 with deadly weapons and caused them injuries. They were charge-sheeted for committing offences under F Sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 324, 326, 307 read with Section 114 IPC. The trial court gave benefit of doubt to the appellants and ordered their acquittal. Aggrieved, the State filed appeal before the High Court which set aside the order of acquittal as passed by the trial court; and G held that from the nature and manner of assault, it could be said that the appellants were guilty under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC for causing injuries to PW-1 and PW-3 and accordingly convicted them. 295 H 296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 8 S.C.R. A In the instant appeal, the question which arose for consideration before this Court was whether the High Court erred in reversing the order of the trial court. The appellants contended that the High Court erred 8 in reversing the orde"}, {"doc_id": "2014 INSC 160", "case_name": "PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, UTTARANCHAL v JAGDISH CHANDRA SINGH BORA & ANR. ETC.", "year": "2014", "issue": "", "held": ": All the candidates including the respondents participated in the selection process under 2001 F Rules being fully aware that no preference was given to the trained apprentices - Therefore, it cannot be said that any vested right had accrued to the trained apprentices, under the 2001 Rules - The Rules of 2003 came into force on 31. 7. 2003 and no retrospective effect was given to it - The 2003 Rules could not have the effect of amending the 2001 Rules G which had already ceased to exist in terms of Rule 6 thereof w.e.f. 11.11.2001 - It was wholly impermissible to alter the selection criteria which was advertised in 2001 - As no preference was given to the trained apprentices in 2001 H 1026 PUBLIC SERVICE COMM., UTTARANCHAL v. JAGDISH 1027 CHANDRA SINGH BORA ETC. Rules, many eligible candidates in that category may not A have applied - Therefore, giving such preference would be clear infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Service law - Selection. CIRCULAR/GOVERNMENT"}, {"doc_id": "2013 INSC 565", "case_name": "COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, JALANDHAR v M/S. KAY KAY INDUSTRIES", "year": "2013", "issue": "", "held": ": In the 0 instant case,. a declaration was given by manufacturer of inputs indicating that excise duty had been paid on the said inputs under the Act - Further, the said inputs were directly received from manufacturer and not purchased from the market - When the prescribed procedure has been duly E followed by assessee-manufacturer of final products, it cannot be said that the assessee has not taken reasonable care as prescribed in the notification - Orders of adjudicating authority and appellate authority rightly quashed by Tribunal and High Court - Notification No. 58197-CE (NT) dated 1.9.1997 - F Clause (6) - Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - s. 3- Central Excise Act, 1944. s.57-A(6), Proviso - Credit of duty of excise or additional duty- Held: The proviso postulates and requires \"reasonable care\u00bb and not verification from the department whether the duty G stands paid by the manufacturer-seller. The respondent-company (in Civil Appeal No. 7031 of 2009) availed deemed MODVAT credit of Rs.77,546/- 623 H 624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R. A during the quarter of March, 2000 on the strength of invoices issued by the manufacturer supplier of inputs. During MODVAT verification it was found that the supplier of inputs had not discharged full duty liability for the period covered by the invoices. The deemed MODVAT B benefit availed was disallowed. Recovery of the said sum along wit"}, {"doc_id": "1999 INSC 373", "case_name": "LACHMAN DAS ARORA v GANESHI LAL AND ORS", "year": "1999", "issue": "", "held": ": If election petition is not filed within the prescribed period it will result in dismissal-Benefit of S.10 of the General Clauses Act not D available to save period of limitation as election petition was filed on the reopening clay of summer vacations during which the period of limitation had expired. General Clauses Act, 1897: E Section 10-EJection petition-Applicability of-Held Applicable to F election petitions also and, therefore, if court is closed, petition can be filed on the next day on which the court re-opens-However, applicability of S.10 would depend upon the facts of each case. Limitation. Act, 1963: Section 5-Period of limitation-Extension of-Equity-Held: Law of limitation has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes- Court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds particularly in the matter of filing of election petition. G The respondent was declared elected to the State Legislative Assembly. The appellant, defeated candidate, filed a petition challenging the election of the respondent in the High Court on the reopening day after summer vacations. The respondent raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the election petition was not filed within the period of 45 days prescribed by H Section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and, therefore, 174 --- LACHMAN DAS ARORA v. GANES HI LAL 175 the elec"}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 820", "case_name": "COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, SURAT v M/S. ZANDU PHARMACEUTICAL WORKS LTD.", "year": "2006", "issue": "", "held": ": classified as perfumed hair oil under SH: 3305. I 0. A B Respondent-assessee had been manufacturing hair oil under the brand C name of'Alma Iio' and classifying it under CETA: SH: 3003.39 as Ayurvedic Medicament. The Department sought its classification under SH: 3305.99. Before the assessing authority, assessee disclosed the ingredients and manufacturing process of the p1oduct. Assessing Authority classified the product under H: 3305.99 as cosmetic product. Aggrieved assessee filed D appeal, which was dismissed. On further appeal, Tribunal classified the product under SH: 3305.10 as perfumed hair oil. Aggrieved by the order, Department filed the present appeal. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: No appeal has been filed by assessee against the order of the E Tribunal refusing to classify the product of assessee as an Ayurvedic Medicament. Therefore, only contention is whether the product of assessee is a 'perfumed hair oil'. Indisputably, perfume is added. Addition of perfume is a part of manufacturing process. It is one of the ingredients of the product. Therefore without going into the question as to whether the product of assessee F has any therapeutic value or not, the judgment of the Tribunal is upheld. 11063-D-F) Commissioner of Central Excise, Calcutta v. Sharma Chemical Works, 12003) 5 SCC 60; Alpine Industries v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi, (2003) 15"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 625", "case_name": "THE ASSTT. COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE v BATA INDIA LTD.", "year": "1996", "issue": "", "held": ", no; unless it is shown by the manufacturer that the price of the goods includes an amount of excise duty, no exclusion of the duty element from price for deter- mination of value under s. 4( 4)( d)(ii) arises. D Under a notification issued under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 ('Rules'), footwear the value of which was up to Rs. 60 per pair was wholly exempt from excise duty. The respondent-assessee BSL contended that foot- )Vear manufactured by it, the wholesale prices of\\ID.lch after discoUnt etc. were Rs. 62, Rs. 64 Rs. 66, per pair, would also be fully exempt because the value in these cases, after deduction of 10% excise duty, would be Rs. 60 or less per pair. E It was further contended that the explanation to s. 4(4)(d)(ii) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 under which the excise duty payahle was the 'effec- tive duty' payable after accounting for the exemptions available, would apply only where there was a variation in the rate of duty. F G Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD: 1.1. The contention of the assessee that once the excise duty was taken out from the wholesale price of shoes under the disputed category, the assessable value would be less than Rs. 60 and that the benefit of the exemption notification could therefore not be denied, could not be upheld. [427-E] 1.2. Unless it was shown by the manufacturer that the price of the goods included"}, {"doc_id": "1996 INSC 1115", "case_name": "K. SANKARAN NAIR (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v DEVAKI AMME MALATHY AMMA AND ORS.", "year": "1996", "issue": "", "held": "b01red by ~es judicata. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Section 11. Res judicat~Tenancy proceedings--Oecision rendered by competent Courts regarding tenancy statu~Judgments acquiring final-Amendment of Act-Confennent of status of deemed tenant-Fresh claim for deemed tenan- cy based on amended Act held baJTed by res judicata. Legislature-Power to ovemle judicial decision-Essential condition for-Unless legislature renwves the substratum off oundation of the judgment, it would remain operative and binding. D E The respondents (plaintiffs) filed a suit claiming their 5/6th share F in- the plaint schedule properties as well as for past and future mesne . profits. The appellant (defendant No. 2) contested the suit contending that he was a tenant. His case was that by a registered deed dated 10th January, 1969 the suit property was leased out to him by his mother-in-law. The tenancy. Tribunal held that he was not a tenant and the lease deed in his G \u2022 favour was hit by section 74 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 which totally barred creation of leases after 1.4.1964. The Tribunal's decision was confirmed by the High Court on 31st March 1978. As the Special Leave Petition filed by appellant was \u00b7also dismissed by this Court on 28th August, 1978 the question of alleged tenancy of the appellant got concluded against the appellant. H 839 840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R. "}, {"doc_id": "2006 INSC 654", "case_name": "UTTRARANCHAL FOREST RANGERS' ASSON. v STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.", "year": "2006", "issue": "", "held": ": Promotion in excess of quota makes an employee an ad hoc employee and seniority cannot be given to such employees on the basis of ad hoc promotion-Seniority can be given only from 'the date of substantive . appointment '--Seniority has to be decided on the basis of Rules in force on the date of appointment-Moreover, no retrospective promotion or seniority G can be granted from a date when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre particularly when this would adversely affect the direct recruits who have been appointed validly in the mean time-High Court judgment set aside-State Government directed to revise seniority list. 609 H 610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. A In the State forest department, during the period 1969-1979, there was no direct appointment to the post of Forest Rangers. The State Government kept promoting Deputy Forest Rangers on ad hoc basis to the post of Forest Rangers, if any vacancy arose. However, as on 30.11.1989, there were not enough vacancies in the promotee quota to accommodate all the regularized B Forest Rangers. By the year 1991, all the 124 regularized Forest Rangers were accommodated. In 1991, there was only one vacancy in the promotee quota. However, the State sent a requisition to the Public Service Commission to recommend 410 persons for promotion to the post of Deputy Forest Rangers. The appellants were substantively ap"}, {"doc_id": "2008 INSC 1500", "case_name": "HARENDRA NATH CHAKRABORTY v STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "year": "2008", "issue": "", "held": ": As the appeal of the accused was admitted by High Court only on the question of sentence, neither High Court nor Supreme Court was required to go into merits of the matter - However, on merits also, no failure of justice has occasioned 0 nor was the trial in any way unfair - High Court, having taken into consideration entire facts and circumstances, reduced the sentence of iinprisonment from six months to three months which was tht.9 minimum sentence provided under the provision - No case made out to invoke the proviso to s.7(1)(a)(ii) particularly in view of the fact that accused was E found to have via.fated provisions of both the 1968 Order as also the 1977 Order - Sentencing - West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968 - West Bengal Declaration of Stocks and Prices of Essential Commodities Order, 1971. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973: s. 313 - Examination of accused - Conviction under Essential Commodities Act - Plea that prosecution case was 1 not specifically put to accused u/s 313 - Held: Entire Prosecution case was based on documentary evidence as G also material objects which had been seized - All material evidence on record was brought to notice of accused - It was for him to explain the same - He did not adduce any evidence in defence - No failure of justice has occasioned nor was the trial in any way unfair - Conviction upheld - 1439 H 1440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2"}]