File size: 7,063 Bytes
5f00812
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
"""Sandboxed Python executor for the agent.

LLM-generated code is untrusted. Two backends:

- ``process`` (default, always works): subprocess with env scrubbed to an
  allowlist, cwd pinned to a per-call scratch tempdir, wall-clock timeout,
  output bounded, resource limits via rlimit on Unix.
- ``docker``: container with bridge network, read-only rootfs + tmpfs /sandbox,
  ``--cap-drop=ALL``, ``--security-opt=no-new-privileges``, memory and pid
  caps. Metadata-IP block lives in the image's ``sitecustomize.py``.

Selection: ``LILITH_SANDBOX`` env var — ``auto`` (default), ``process``,
``docker``. ``auto`` uses docker when available, falls back to process.

The process backend does not prevent the subprocess from reading the host
filesystem or making outbound network calls. Env scrubbing defeats the most
common exfil path (API keys in env). For hard filesystem/network isolation
run with ``LILITH_SANDBOX=docker`` and a built ``lilith-pysandbox`` image.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import textwrap

from lilith_agent.runtime_env import SAFE_THREAD_ENV

_OUTPUT_CAP_CHARS = 200_000
_DOCKER_IMAGE_DEFAULT = "lilith-pysandbox:latest"
_DOCKER_STARTUP_HEADROOM_S = 5
BLAS_THREAD_ENV_DEFAULTS = SAFE_THREAD_ENV

# Env vars that are safe (or necessary) to forward. Everything else is dropped.
_ENV_ALLOWLIST = frozenset({
    "PATH",
    "HOME",
    "TMPDIR",
    "LANG",
    "LC_ALL",
    "LC_CTYPE",
    "TERM",
    "USER",
    "LOGNAME",
    "SHELL",
    "PYTHONPATH",
    "PYTHONHOME",
    "PYTHONIOENCODING",
    "OPENBLAS_NUM_THREADS",
    "OMP_NUM_THREADS",
    "MKL_NUM_THREADS",
    "NUMEXPR_NUM_THREADS",
    "VECLIB_MAXIMUM_THREADS",
    "TOKENIZERS_PARALLELISM",
    # Proxy config is routinely needed for scraping; not a secret.
    "HTTP_PROXY",
    "HTTPS_PROXY",
    "NO_PROXY",
    "http_proxy",
    "https_proxy",
    "no_proxy",
})


# Runner is injected into the subprocess via `python -c`. Reads user code from
# stdin so nothing sensitive lands in argv (visible via `ps`).
_RUNNER_SCRIPT = textwrap.dedent(
    """
    import ast, sys, io, contextlib, traceback

    try:
        import resource
        # CPU 60s, address space 1GiB, single-file write 128MiB.
        resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_CPU, (60, 60))
        resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (1024 * 1024 * 1024, 1024 * 1024 * 1024))
        resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_FSIZE, (128 * 1024 * 1024, 128 * 1024 * 1024))
    except Exception:
        pass  # non-Unix / sandbox already capping us — fine.

    code = sys.stdin.read()
    buf = io.StringIO()
    ns: dict = {}
    try:
        tree = ast.parse(code, mode='exec')
        last_expr = None
        if tree.body and isinstance(tree.body[-1], ast.Expr):
            last_expr = ast.Expression(body=tree.body[-1].value)
            tree.body = tree.body[:-1]
        with contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf), contextlib.redirect_stderr(buf):
            exec(compile(tree, '<agent>', 'exec'), ns)
            if last_expr is not None:
                val = eval(compile(last_expr, '<agent>', 'eval'), ns)
                if val is not None:
                    print(repr(val), file=buf)
        sys.stdout.write(buf.getvalue())
    except Exception:
        numbered = '\\n'.join(f'{i+1:3d}: {line}' for i, line in enumerate(code.splitlines()))
        sys.stdout.write(
            buf.getvalue()
            + '\\nERROR in agent-generated code:\\n\\n'
            + numbered
            + '\\n\\n'
            + traceback.format_exc()
        )
    """
).strip()


def _scrubbed_env() -> dict[str, str]:
    """Return a fresh env dict containing only allowlisted keys from os.environ."""
    env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k in _ENV_ALLOWLIST}
    env.update(BLAS_THREAD_ENV_DEFAULTS)
    return env


def _truncate_output(text: str) -> str:
    if len(text) <= _OUTPUT_CAP_CHARS:
        return text
    dropped = len(text) - _OUTPUT_CAP_CHARS
    return text[:_OUTPUT_CAP_CHARS] + f"\n...[output truncated: +{dropped} chars]"


def _run_process_sandbox(code: str, timeout: int) -> str:
    """Run ``code`` in a subprocess with scrubbed env + scratch cwd + rlimits."""
    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="lilith-pysbx-") as scratch:
        try:
            proc = subprocess.run(
                [sys.executable, "-I", "-c", _RUNNER_SCRIPT],
                input=code,
                capture_output=True,
                text=True,
                timeout=timeout,
                env=_scrubbed_env(),
                cwd=scratch,
            )
        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
            return f"ERROR: execution timed out after {timeout}s"
        out = proc.stdout or ""
        if proc.stderr and not out:
            out = proc.stderr
        return _truncate_output(out)


def _docker_available() -> bool:
    return shutil.which("docker") is not None


def _run_docker_sandbox(
    code: str,
    timeout: int,
    image: str = _DOCKER_IMAGE_DEFAULT,
) -> str:
    """Run ``code`` inside a hardened container. Image must already be built."""
    argv = [
        "docker",
        "run",
        "--rm",
        "-i",
        "--network=bridge",
        "--read-only",
        "--tmpfs",
        # mode=1777 so the non-root container user can write to the tmpfs;
        # without it the default owner is root:root 755 and writes fail EACCES.
        "/sandbox:rw,size=128m,mode=1777,noexec,nosuid,nodev",
        "--cap-drop=ALL",
        "--security-opt=no-new-privileges",
        "--memory=512m",
        "--memory-swap=512m",
        "--cpus=1.0",
        "--pids-limit=128",
        "-w",
        "/sandbox",
        image,
    ]

    try:
        proc = subprocess.run(
            argv,
            input=code,
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
            timeout=timeout + _DOCKER_STARTUP_HEADROOM_S,
        )
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
        return f"ERROR: execution timed out after {timeout}s (docker backend)"
    except FileNotFoundError:
        return "ERROR: docker binary not found on PATH"

    out = proc.stdout or ""
    if proc.returncode != 0 and not out:
        out = (proc.stderr or "").strip() or f"docker exited with code {proc.returncode}"
    return _truncate_output(out)


def _select_backend() -> str:
    raw = (os.getenv("LILITH_SANDBOX") or "auto").strip().lower()
    if raw not in {"auto", "process", "docker"}:
        raw = "auto"
    if raw == "auto":
        return "docker" if _docker_available() else "process"
    return raw


def run_python(code: str, timeout: int = 60) -> str:
    backend = _select_backend()
    if backend == "docker":
        if not _docker_available():
            return (
                "ERROR: LILITH_SANDBOX=docker was requested but `docker` is not on PATH. "
                "Install Docker or switch to LILITH_SANDBOX=process."
            )
        return _run_docker_sandbox(code, timeout=timeout)
    return _run_process_sandbox(code, timeout=timeout)