---
license: mit
tags:
  - security
  - proof-of-concept
  - openvino
---

# OpenVINO IR `shape_size()` overflow PoC — **UNTESTED, not build-verified**

This repository contains a **hand-crafted, NOT empirically verified** proof-of-concept IR model
pair for a responsibly-disclosed vulnerability in
[`openvinotoolkit/openvino`](https://github.com/openvinotoolkit/openvino) (tested at commit
`2772fc77d9b7c8927d622a32ec782700d156203f`), reported via huntr's Model File Vulnerability
program.

## Important caveat — read before using

**This exact file pair was never loaded against a real, compiled OpenVINO build.** The reporter's
own verification (see the full write-up submitted via huntr, and `attachments/` in this
disclosure) proves the underlying arithmetic bug — the `shape_size()` integer overflow — with a
standalone, compiled, and executed C++ program that copies the exact vulnerable logic from the
real source, but stops short of building the full OpenVINO project (a heavy CMake-based C++
build). This XML/bin pair is a best-effort construction based on the real IR v10 schema (modeled
directly on `openvino`'s own test fixture,
`src/core/tests/models/ir/add_abc_initializers.xml`/`.bin`), with only the vulnerable `Const`
layer's `shape` attribute changed to the exact overflow-triggering values already proven in the
arithmetic PoC. **It has not been confirmed to actually load without error via
`ov::Core::read_model()`** — there could be an additional consistency check elsewhere in the IR
loader (e.g. between the `<data shape="...">` attribute and the `<output><port><dim>` values, both
set to the same malicious value here, or something else entirely) that rejects it before reaching
the vulnerable code path, or a schema detail this reporter is unaware of.

## What these files are

- `malicious_shape_overflow.xml` — an IR v10 model with a single `Const` layer whose `data`
  element declares `shape="4611686018427387905,4"` and `size="16"` — the exact values proven to
  overflow `shape_size()` down to `4` in the reporter's arithmetic PoC, making the (broken)
  consistency check at `xml_deserialize_util.cpp:904` pass.
- `malicious_shape_overflow.bin` — 16 bytes (arbitrary content, matches the declared `size="16"`).

## How to (attempt to) reproduce

```cpp
#include <openvino/openvino.hpp>
int main() {
    ov::Core core;
    auto model = core.read_model("malicious_shape_overflow.xml", "malicious_shape_overflow.bin");
    // If loading succeeds, look for a downstream crash/OOB read when the model is used in any
    // operation that triggers OpenVINO's bound-propagation engine (evaluate_upper/evaluate_lower,
    // src/core/src/bound_evaluate.cpp) -- reached during graph construction/optimization, not
    // necessarily requiring actual inference. Running under AddressSanitizer is recommended to
    // catch the out-of-bounds read reliably.
}
```

If this specific file does not reproduce the issue as-is, the reporter's arithmetic PoC
(`attachments/poc_shape_size_overflow.cpp` in the main disclosure) demonstrates the exact overflow
condition and can be used to adjust the `shape`/`size` values or diagnose what additional
validation (if any) is blocking this particular construction.

## Scope note

This PoC is provided solely for the purpose of responsible vulnerability disclosure and
reproduction by the `openvino` maintainers / huntr triage team. It is not intended for any other
use.