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README.md

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+
+---
+language:
+- en
+---
+## What is this?
+A curated selection of manuals and documents from the US military and other departments. All data was manually scraped from publicly available sources.
+
+The PDF's and EPUB files were converted to markdown using the amazing [Marker github repository](https://github.com/VikParuchuri/marker) by Vik Paruchuri.
+
+### Sources:
+- [United States Army Central Army Repository](https://rdl.train.army.mil/)
+- [Marines Publications](https://www.marines.mil/News/Publications)
+- [Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program](https://irp.fas.org/doddir/index.html)

army.json

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markdown/army/ad2010_02.md

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+## Memorandum For See Distribution Subject: Army Directive 2010-02 (Guidance For Reporting Requirements And Redacting Investigation Reports Of Deaths And Fatalities)
+
+1. This directive implements Department of Defense (DoD) reporting requirements for death investigations established in Change 1 to DoD Instruction 1300.18 (Department of Defense Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures). It also provides guidance for the redaction of investigation reports of deaths and fatalities that are provided to surviving Families.
+
+2. Commanders will follow the enclosed reporting and redaction procedures conceming a unit- or agency-level investigation into the death or fatality of a Soldier or DoD civilian to ensure that surviving Families are apprised of and updated on any and all ongoing DoD investigations concerning the death or fatality.
+
+3. This directive is effective immediately. The guidance in this directive is applicable to all cases for which the deceased Soldier or DoD civilian is a reportable casualty as outlined in AR 600-8-1 (Army Casualty Program). The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1
+(DAPE-ZA) must approve supplementation of this guidance.
+
+4. These changes will be incorporated into the next revision of AR 600-8-1 .
+5. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 is the proponent for this policy.
+Encl DISTRIBUTION:
+Principal Officials of Headquarters, Departmen of the Army Commander U.S. Army Forces Command U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command U.S. Army Materiel Command U.S. Army Europe U.S. Army Central U.S. Army North U.S. Army South
+(CONT)
+
+## Subject: Army Directive 2010-02 (Guidance For Reporting Requirements And Redacting Investigation Reports Of Deaths And Fatalities)
+
+DISTRIBUTION: (CONT)
+U.S. Army Pacific U.S. Army Africa U.S. Army Special Operations Command Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command Eighth U.S. Army U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9~ Signal Command (Army) U.S. Army Medical Command U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command U.S. Army Corps of Engineers U.S. Army Military District of Washington U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command U.S. Army Reserve Command U.S. Army Installation Management Command Superintendent, United States Military Academy Director, U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center CF:
+Commander, U.S. Army Corrections Command Commander, U.S. Army Accessions Command Chief, General Officer Management Office
+
+## Reporting Requirements And Redacting Investigation Reports Of Deaths And Fatalities Reporting Requirements
+
+Army commanders who initiate or conduct investigations into the cause or circumstances surrounding the death of a Soldier or DoD civilian employee who became a fatality while accompanying military personnel in the field or as a result of military-related action-including AR 15-6 investigations, line of duty investigations, etc.-will immediately notify the Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Operations Center
+(CMAOC). Use the casualty reporting system for unit-level investigations and directly contact CMAOC at (703) 325-0395 or cocopns@conus.army.mil for agency-level investigations. Give CMAOC the:
+
+- Name of the unit, command, or agency conducting the investigation.
+- Type of investigation(s) being conducted.
+- Existence and releasability of reports that have been or will be issued as a result of
+the investigation(s).
+- Unit or command point of contact (POC) and contact information to provide the
+status of completion of the investigation report(s) at 30-day intervals until the report
+is complete.
+- Procedures for Family members to obtain a copy of the completed report(s), to the
+extent such reports may be provided consistent with Title 5, United States Code,
+sections 552 and 552a, and to obtain assistance in receiving a copy of the
+completed report(s), following the additional guidance for unit-level investigations
+(beginning on page 3 of this enclosure).
+- Procedures for Family members to obtain answers to their questions on the
+completed investigation report from a fully qualified representative, in accordance
+with the procedures outlined for unit-level investigations.
+Headquarters, Department of the Army-level proponent agencies will include these reporting requirements in the next revision of applicable regulations or other official publications pertaining to the initiation or conduct of an investigation into the cause or circumstances surrounding the death of a Soldier or 000 civilian employee who became a fatality while accompanying military personnel in the field or as a result of military-related action.
+
+To ensure that the Family is kept fully informed while the investigation is underway, commanders will notify CMAOC (through the casualty reporting system for unit-level investigations and by direct contact for agency-level investigations) of any new factual information leamed through the investigation about the circumstances of death as soon as the information becomes known, even if the investigation is ongoing.
+
+E-mail monthly updates on the progress of the investigation(s) and the estimated completion date(s) to CMAOC at cocopns@conus.anmy.mil. For criminal investigations, U.S. Anmy Criminal Investigation Command (CID) will provide monthly updates to CMAOC. CID may withhold information to protect the due process concems of potential criminal defendants, the Privacy Act concems of other parties, the integrity of the investigation, and the viability of remaining investigation leads.
+
+CMAOC will pass the information updates to the Family's casualty assistance officer
+(CAO) who, in tum, will make sure the Family is kept apprised of all aspects of the investigation(s). The CAO and CID representatives providing information to the Family will coordinate their infonmation before giving any briefings. Additionally, the CAO will help the Family:
+
+- schedule a Fatal Incident Family Brief, when requested, for those categories of
+investigations that require a briefing offer; and
+- request a copy of the investigation report in accordance with the Freedom of
+Infonmation Act (FOIA) for those categories of fatality reports that are not required to
+be offered to the Family as an Qutbrief, or in those cases where the Family declines
+the offer for the Fatal Incident Family Brief.
+When the investigation is completed, commanders who have release authority
+(exclusive of commanders who command Headquarters, Department of the Anmy-Ievel investigative agencies) will e-mail a scanned copy of the unredacted investigation report to CMAOC so that CMAOC can compare the investigation results with the circumstances of the casualty previously reported to the Family. Send unclassified reports to cocopns@conus.army.mil and classified reports to tagcasu@hrc.anmy.smil.mil. In tum, CMAOC will provide all unredacted investigation reports of suspected suicides to the Anmy Suicide Prevention Office. That office will consolidate lessons leamed and disseminate them to the field, as well as to CID and the Office of the Anmed Forces Medical Examiner.
+
+All death investigation or fatality reports (other than those fatal military accident investigation findings that will be briefed in person to the Family by a colonel-level briefer under the provisions of AR 600-34 (Fatal Training/Operational Accident Presentations to the Next of Kin')) will be delivered in person to the appropriate requesting Family member through the CAO. Therefore, if the Family has requested a copy of the investigation report, release authorities must contact the investigation POC
+for CMAOC to coordinate hand delivery of the report through the CAO to the Family.
+
+The Family member requesting a report may waive the requirement for hand delivery.
+
+Once the CAO or CMAOC receives the redacted report of investigation, CMAOC will assume all statutory time requirements for delivering FOIA-requested investigation reports to the Family.
+
+For deployed units and commands, the release authority's letter of transmittal of the report(s) to the Family should include this wording:
+If you have questions about the enclosed report of investigation, please contact the Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Operations Center, Investigations Section by telephone at (703) 325-0395; bye-mail at cocopns@conus.army.mil; or by U.S. mail at CDR, U.S. Army Human Resources Command (AHRC-PDC-M), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332. That office will coordinate with this command to ensure that your questions are promptly answered.
+
+Provide CMAOC with the name and contact information of a knowledgeable field grade officer to serve as the unit or command POC to address any questions the Family may have about the investigation results or processes.
+
+For units and commands that are not deployed, the release authority's letter of transmittal of the report(s) to the Family should include the name and contact information of a knowledgeable field grade officer to serve as the unit or command POC
+who can address questions the Family may have about the investigation results or processes.
+
+For CID investigations, the release authority's letter of transmittal will identify a central POC who can locate and query the investigating agents who handled the incident.
+
+Release authorities will withhold any public release of the results of a death investigation to make sure the Family is informed of those results before public release.
+
+Units and agencies must coordinate with CMAOC to provide the investigation results to the Family before making any public release.
+
+## Unit-Level Redaction Requirements And Guidance For Death Investigation And Fatality Reports Provided To Surviving Family Members
+
+The redaction process is intended to protect the privacy of third parties who may be mentioned in the report and to safeguard information that pertains to national security or that would jeopardize unit operations and the safety of other individuals if made public.
+
+The release authority cannot withhold information merely because it may be emotionally difficult for the surviving Family members to see or hear.
+
+Potentially upsetting information should be segregated from the body of the report and made available in a separate sealed envelope that is clearly marked as potentially upsetting information. Examples of such content include suicide notes, accusations against Family members by the deceased individual or third parties, photographs or gruesome descriptions of the death scene, and any other content that the release authority deems to be potentially upsetting to the surviving Family members.
+
+Before providing the investigation report(s) to the Family, make sure the report(s) is redacted in accordance with FOIA provisions by individuals with appropriate expertise in FOIA redaction requirements. Refer those sections of an investigation report that were generated by other agencies to those agencies for a release determination. For example, CID reports should be referred to the CID FOIA officer, and medical reports should be referred to the U.S. Army Medical Command FOIA officer.

markdown/army/pam525-92.md

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+This page intentionally left blank
+
+## Foreword
+
+ The United States Army faces multiple, complex challenges in the Operational Environment (OE).  The Army will confront strategic competitors in an increasingly contested battlefield across every domain. The emergence of hypersonic weapons, application of artificial intelligence, machine learning, nanotechnology, and robotics are but a few of the disruptive technologies with which we must contend.  Coupled with these new technologies will be new approaches to warfare that continue to seek means to degrade our strengths and exploit our weaknesses.  Evolving geopolitics, impactful demographic shifts, competition for resources, and challenges to classic structures, order, and institutions coupled with hyper-connectivity - the Internet of Things - will add additional layers of complexity. Strategic competitors like Russia and China are heavily investing in and incorporating emerging technologies in order to exploit assessed overmatch opportunities in areas such as anti-access and area denial, cyber, combat robotics, and direct/indirect fire.  They are challenging U.S. superiority across all domains - space, cyber, air, sea, and land.  One of the challenges associated with the changing character of warfare comes not just from the emergence of disruptive technologies and our adversaries' embrace of them, but also from the ways in which they adopt hybrid strategies that challenge traditional symmetric advantages and conventional ways of war. This assessment does not seek to predict the future, but rather describe the evolving OE.  It is crucial to understand what the OE looks and feels like to Warfighters in order to shape our application of combat power and how we train our formations to meet these challenges.  This deep look at the future allows us to examine our assumptions about warfare, force structuring, and capabilities requirements. This assessment is vitally important to every member of the Army team - from the brand new Soldier, to general officers, to career Army Civilians.  Shared understanding of the environment is essential to preparing our people, setting the context for readiness, informing our modernization efforts, and guiding us in reforming our processes to meet new challenges. Victory Starts Here!
+
+
+     THEODORE D. MARTIN Deputy Commanding General/ Chief of Staff
+
+
+This page intentionally left blank
+
+Headquarters, United States Army
+Training and Doctrine Command
+Fort Eustis, Virginia  23604-5700
+
+7 October 2019
+
+
+# Military Operations
+
+
+
+# The Operational Environment And The Changing Character Of Warfare
+
+
+
+THEODORE D. MARTIN Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Deputy Commanding General/ Chief of Staff WILLIAM T. LASHER Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6 History.  This is a new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) pamphlet. Summary.  This pamphlet provides the Operational Environment that Army forces will encounter as described by the TRADOC G-2 and United States Army Futures Command (AFC).
+
+It presents a continuum divided into two distinct timeframes, The Era of Accelerated Human Progress (2017-2035) and the Era of Contested Equality (2035-2050), which depict different doctrinal and technological challenges that the U.S. Army will face in the near to mid future. Applicability.  This pamphlet applies to all Department of the Army activities that develop doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities. Proponent and exception authority.  The proponent of this document is the Deputy Chief of Staff, TRADOC G-2, 950 Jefferson Avenue, Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5763. Suggested improvements.  Submit changes for improving this publication on Department of the Army Form 2028 to TRADOC G-2, 950 Jefferson Avenue, Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604-5763. Availability.  This pamphlet is available in electronic media only on the TRADOC
+Administrative Publications website (https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/). Summary of Change TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92
+The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare This new pamphlet, dated 7 October 2019- o  Describes the Operational Environment the Army will face through 2050 in collaboration with Army Futures Command (throughout).
+
+
+
+This page intentionally left blank
+
+Chapter 1 Introduction 1-1.  Purpose U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare, describes the conditions Army forces will face and establishes two distinct timeframes characterizing near-term advantages adversaries may have as well as breakthroughs in technology and convergences in capabilities in the far term that will change the character of warfare.  The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare describes both timeframes in detail accounting for all aspects across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) spheres to allow Army forces to train to an accurate and realistic Operational Environment (OE). 1-2.  Scope This pamphlet is the culmination of five-years of effort involving all elements of the U.S.
+
+Army's TRADOC G-2 and supports the collaborative Army transition to an OE developed by TRADOC and United States Army Futures Command (AFC).  Critical inputs, thoughts, and lessons about the future resulted from the Army Mad Scientist Initiative, which brings together cutting-edge leaders and thinkers from the technology industry, research laboratories, academia, and across the military and Government to explore the impact of disruptive technologies, including robotics, autonomy, artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, megacities, biology, neurology, and material sciences.  This was further augmented by AFC's Futures and Concept Center and its Campaign of Learning, which included the "How the Army Fights", Future Force Design, and Deep Future Wargame events.  Work across the TRADOC G-2 OE Enterprise, particularly our monitoring and assessment of twelve key trends and technological game changers added further to the body of knowledge for this pamphlet. Chapter 2 The Operational Environment (OE) and the Changing Character of Warfare 2-1.  Forecasting the future:  Toward a changing character of warfare The U.S. military, and therefore, the U.S. Army, finds itself at a historical inflection point, where disparate, yet related elements of the OE are converging, creating a situation where fast-moving trends across the DIME-spheres are rapidly transforming the nature of all aspects of society and human life - including the character of warfare.  These trends include significant advances in science and technology, where new discoveries and innovations are occurring at a breakneck pace; a dizzying pace of human interaction and a world: a.  That is connected through social media and the "Internet of Things" and all aspects of human engagement where cognition, ideas, and perceptions, are almost instantaneously available; b.  Where economic disparities are growing between and within nations and regions; where changing demographicslike aging populations and youth bulgesand populations moving to
+
+## Global Trends And Challenges To Structure, Order, And Institutions (2017-2050)
+
+-
+Evolving geopolitics
+-
+Resurgent nationalism
+-
+Changing demographics
+-
+Unease with globalization
+-
+Competition for resources
+-
+Rapid development of technology
+-
+Disparities in economic resources and social influence
+-
+Perceived relative deprivations
+
+##
+
+urban areas and mega cities capable of providing all of the benefits of the technological and information-enabled advances; c.  With competition for natural resources, especially water, becoming more common; d.  And where geopolitical challenges to the post-Cold War U.S.-led global system in which strategic competitors, regional hegemons, ideologically-driven non-state actors, and even super empowered-individuals are competing with the U.S. for leadership and influence in an evershrinking world. These trends must be considered in the military sphere, matched with advances in our adversaries' capabilities and operational concepts, and superimposed over a U.S. military that has been engaged in a non-stop state of all-consuming counter-insurgency warfare for the last
+15-plus years.  The result is a U.S. military, and an Army in particular, that may find itself with the very real potential of being out-gunned, outranged, out-protected, outdated, out of position, and out of balance against our adversaries.  These potential foes have had time to refine their approaches to warfare, develop and integrate new capabilities, and in some cases expedite growing changes in the character of warfare. 2-2.  Critical drivers An assessment of the OE's trajectory through 2050 reveals two critical drivers - one dealing with rapid societal change spurred by breakneck advances in science and technology and the other with the art of warfare under these conditions, which will blur the differences in the art of war with the science of war.  These drivers work along a continuum beginning in the present in a nascent form, and rapidly gaining momentum through a culmination point around 2050.  First, the trends referenced above will create an OE marked by instability, which will manifest itself in evolving geopolitics, resurgent nationalism, changing demographics, and unease with the results of globalization creating tension, competition for resources, and challenges to structures, order, and institutions.  Instability also will result from the rapid development of technology and the resulting increase in the speed of human interaction, as well as an increasing churn in economic and social spheres.  A global populace that is increasingly attuned and sensitive to disparities in economic resources and the diffusion of social influence will lead to further challenges to the status quo and lead to system rattling events like the Arab Spring, the Color Revolutions in Eastern Europe, the Greek monetary crisis, the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union, and the mass migrations to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa, many of which will come with little warning.  Also, the world order will evolve with rising nations challenging the post-Cold War dominance of the U.S.-led Western system.  New territorial conflicts will arise in places like the South China Sea, compelling us to seek new partnerships and alliances, while climate change and geopolitical competition will open up whole new theaters of operation, such as in the Arctic.
+
+## Expanding Doctrine And Capabilities
+
+Our adversaries already are working to develop new methods and new means to challenge the United States.  These efforts will only continue and attenuate through 2050. We can expect to encounter:
+
+
+-
+Multi-domain threats
+-
+Operations in complex terrain, including dense urban
+areas and even megacities
+-
+Hybrid Strategies / "Gray Zone" Operations
+-
+Weapons of Mass Destruction
+-
+Sophisticated anti-access/area denial complexes
+-
+New weapons, taking advantage of advances in technology (robotics, autonomy, AI, cyber, space, hypersonics etc.)
+-
+Information as a decisive weapon
+2-3.  Modernizing adversaries The second driver deals with the combination of this instability with adaptive, thinking adversaries who are modernizing, and will continue to modernize their capabilities and adjust them to this changing OE.  Throughout this continuum, these adversaries will present an array of threats that will be lethal and will be presented across multiple domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyber.)  Our adversaries will operate in and among populations and in complex terrain, and endeavor to negate many of our own traditional technological advantages and force us to operate with degraded capabilities and take advantage of the infrastructure and other resources cities offer.  They will adopt hybrid strategies that take advantage of a range of capabilities that deny us a conventional force-on-force fight unless the situation is advantageous to the adversary.  They will use proxy forces that provide plausible deniability, yet directly allow them to not only shape the battlespace, but even achieve their objectives without risking a wider conflict.  Similarly, they also may choose to work with, sponsor, or support terrorist or criminal entities to achieve a similar end.  Irregular operations, often in concert with proxies, terrorist, or criminal activities, operating within a "Gray Zone" short of war, will challenge our ability to come to grips with the enemy and perhaps present an unfavorable costbenefit equation to our political leaders.  Our adversaries will rely on strategic capabilities, such as weapons of mass destruction, information operations, and direct cyber-attacks designed to give us pause in responding to their actions and provide them the strategic space they need to operate.  Space is becoming an increasingly congested, commercialized, democratized, and contested domain.  State and non-state actors compete to enhance their ability to operate while working to deny what was once an area of superiority.  Finally, they will develop conventional force structures capable of providing anti-access and area denial capabilities designed to keep us from entering forces into a battle space, or at a minimum, provide an operational barrier that we will have to spend time and resources to breach. 2-4.  The continuum With these drivers in mind, our analysis of the OE and its implications on the future of warfare through 2050 allows us to envision a continuum divided into two distinct timeframes.  Warfare in each of these timeframes must contend with the same timeless competitions with which commanders have engaged for generations, but the way these competitions play out reveals two distinct waypoints, or eras in which we move toward a changed character of warfare.
+
+## Flashpoints And Fault Lines
+
+Crises and conflicts will be in familiar areas, although some could appear in unfamiliar locales:
+
+-
+Baltics / Eastern Europe
+-
+Other Russian Near-Abroad
+-
+Arctic (Russia, China, U.S., Canada, and Europe)
+-
+Balkans
+-
+Syria/Iraq/Turkey/Iran/Kurds
+-
+Greater Middle East / North Africa
+-
+Israel-Palestinians
+-
+Israel-Iran-Hizballah
+-
+Sunni / Shia Rivalry
+-
+South China Sea
+-
+Southeast Asia (China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma)
+-
+India-Pakistan
+-
+China-India
+-
+China-Taiwan
+-
+Korean Peninsula
+-
+Sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria, West Africa, Humanitarian)
+-
+Horn of Africa
+-
+Mexico
+-
+Venezuela-Colombia
+2-5.  Accelerated human progress The first is the Era of Accelerated Human Progress, which can roughly be considered from the present through 2035, and relates to a period where our adversaries can take advantage of new technologies, new doctrine, and revised strategic concepts to effectively challenge U.S. military forces across multiple domains.  Our adversaries in some cases will have superior, or near equal capabilities bolstered by advantages in time, space, and perception, and when employed effectively - often in a hybrid and multi-domain fashion - they can prevail over a U.S.-led force.  The Era of Accelerated Human Progress represents an evolutionary movement rooted in the present, but clearly advancing to a new state of affairs. 2-6.  Contested equality The second is the Era of Contested Equality, running roughly from 2035 through 2050.  This period is marked by significant breakthroughs in technology and convergences in terms of capabilities, which lead to significant changes in the character of warfare. During this period, traditional aspects of warfare undergo dramatic, almost revolutionary changes which at the end of this timeframe may even challenge the very nature of warfare itself.  In this era, no one actor is likely to have any long-term strategic or technological advantage, with aggregate power between the U.S. and its strategic competitors being equivalent, but not necessarily symmetric.  Prevailing in this period will depend on an ability to synchronize multi-domain capabilities against an artificial intelligence-enhanced adversary with an overarching capability to visualize and understand the battlespace at even greater ranges and velocities.  Equally important will be controlling information and the narrative surrounding the conflict.  Adversaries will adopt sophisticated information operations and narrative strategies to change the context of the conflict and thus defeat U.S. political will. 2-7.  OE future trends Recent decades have witnessed far-reaching changes in how people live, create, think, and prosper.  Our understanding of these changes is a prerequisite to further understand how the strategic security environment and the character of warfare itself transformed the present into the Era of Transition, and then into a culmination point  -- somewhere around 2035 - where the combination of technology, speed of human interaction, and the convergence in the realms of nanotechnology, quantum computing, biology and synthetic biology, neurological advancements, and the omnipresence of information moves us into the Era of Contested Equality.
+
+## Convergence
+
+The impact of the development of so many new and potential revolutionary technologies is made all the more disruptive by the convergence phenomenon.  Virtually every new technology is connected and intersecting with other new technologies and advances.  The example of the contemporary "smart phone", which connects advances in cellular telephones with a camera, gaming, miniaturized computing, and the Internet has completely transformed, and in many ways disrupted, contemporary life.   Future convergences between various technological advances are likely to be equally disruptive and equally unpredictable, but the areas in which we foresee the most likely convergences are:
+
+-
+Biology and bio-engineering, to include optimizing human performance
+-
+Neurologic enhancement
+-
+Nanotechnology
+-
+Advanced material sciences
+-
+Quantum computing
+-
+Artificial intelligence
+-
+Robotics
+-
+Additive manufacturing
+ a.  Live.  Humanity will become richer, older, more urban, and better educated, but the uneven distribution of this progress will accelerate tension and conflict.  Shifting demographics, such as youth bulges in Africa and aging populations of traditional allies and competitors, will threaten economic and political stability.  The convergence of more information and more people with fewer state resources will constrain governments' efforts to address rampant poverty, violence, and pollution, and create a breeding ground for dissatisfaction among increasingly aware, yet still disempowered populations.0F1  These factors will be attenuated by a changing climate, which likely will become a direct security threat.  Risks to U.S. security include extreme weather impacting installations, increased resource scarcity and food insecurity, climate migration increasing the number of refugees and internally displaced peoples, and the Arctic as a new sphere of competition.  The addition of over seven billion people over the last century has altered geography itself, and cities now sprawl over large areas of the globe and contain almost two-thirds of the world's population.1F2  These numbers will only increase.  Some megacities will become more important politically and economically than the nation-state in which they reside.2F3
+Life will become both easier and more complex, with those able to take advantage of the leading edge of technological advancement increasingly exploiting those who cannot.  New social stresses and fractures will lead to strife and population migrations, which in turn create further challenges for urbanized areas.  Furthermore, the move of large numbers of people to large urban areas and megacities will strain resources, as these areas will become increasingly reliant on rural areas for food, water, and even additional power.  From a military perspective, cities represent challenges, opportunities, and unique vulnerabilities. b.  Create.  Although more human beings stress available resources, population growth has also compounded the rate of innovation and technology development.  Human creativity is now clearly the most transformative force in the world, both enhancing human life, but also upending it, and - at times - precipitating catastrophic, disruptive events.  Information technology will continue to improve exponentially, and most of the developed world already is instrumented in some way.  Nearly every person on Earth has access to a connected, mobile device.  Advanced material capabilities have, and will continue to extend the trend of reduced size, weight, and power requirements, as nanomaterials, metamaterials, and bespoke structures allow multifunctional assemblies, vastly improving overall systems integration, reliability, and performance.  Advanced materials also foster increases in battery power and performance, allowing large amounts of power to be stored across a distributed grid, and miniaturized storage powers mobile robotics and vehicles of all types.  Advanced robotic vehicles could serve as mobile power generation plants and charging stations, while highly dexterous ground robots with legs and limbs could negotiate complex terrain allowing humans access to places otherwise denied. c.  Think.  Artificial intelligence (AI) may be the most disruptive technology of our time:
+much of today's "thought" is artificial, vice human.  Breakthroughs in AI and deep learning enable reasoning intelligent systems that, though not sentient, administer and optimize a great many aspects of modern life.  Advanced physio-mechanical interfaces enable human-machine integration to include optimized searching of massive indexes of data, direct access to large-scale computing power, and life-like experiences through virtual reality.3F4  The revolutionary impact of
+"trans-humanism" challenges the very definition of "human" - with profound ethical dilemmas that remain unresolved.4F5  Big data techniques interrogate massive databases to discover hidden patterns and correlations that form the basis of modern advertising - and are continually leveraged for intelligence and security purposes by nation states and non-state entities alike. However, certain operational environments are data-scarce.  Missing inputs caused by data gaps inhibit a narrow AI's ability to provide the envisioned benefits in assessing the OE, limiting military application.  Quantum computing, first applied to encryption functions, is now a key computing enabler, especially for artificial intelligence.5F6  A mature Internet of Things connects and integrates the devices of the information realm with formerly inert objects - structures, motors, or appliances - of the physical realm.  AI will become critical in processing and sustaining a clear common operating picture in this data-rich environment.  Neuroscience has enhanced our understanding of brain function, including neural plasticity, and has enabled advanced techniques for human-machine interfacing.  A better understanding of the machinery of the mind has found commercial application in the acceleration of speed and retention in learning.  In the most connected and wealthy parts of the world, cell phones and computers will all but disappear as physical, hand held devices.  Select individuals will directly connect to cyberspace through neural implants or augmented reality systems painted directly on a retina.  If we have not yet reached the "singularity", where AI and machines are capable of outperforming the human mind, we will nonetheless have reached a point where AI, machines, and manmachine teaming open new possibilities in this realm. d.  Prosper.  Although AI and its associated technologies will shatter many industries and livelihoods, a wide range of advances continue to create new sources of wealth and economic development - while also significantly impacting the strategic security environment.6F7  Robotics and autonomous systems will underpin the smooth functioning of advanced societies.  Additive manufacturing, computer-aided design, and millions of industrial robots will dislocate significant portions of the global supply chain.  Virtually anyone in the world with access to a computer system and three-dimensional printer will be able to "print" anything from drones to weapons.
+Encrypted blockchains will be massively disruptive to commerce functions.7F8  Together with robotics, autonomy, and AI they comprise a perfect storm for "blue collar" and "white collars" alike, causing vast economic displacement as formerly high-quality information technology and management jobs follow the previous path of agricultural and manufacturing labor.  Militaries, paramilitaries, mercenary groups, criminal elements, and even extremists groups all will be able to take advantage of this potential pool of manpower.  Biotechnology will see major advances, with many chemical and materials industry being replaced or augmented by a "bio-based economy" in which precision genetic engineering allows for bulk chemical production. Individualized genetics enable precise performance enhancements for cognition, health, longevity, and fitness.  The low cost and low expertise entry points into genome editing, bioweapon production, and human enhancements will enable explorations by state, non-state, criminal, and terrorist organizations.  Competitors may not adopt the same legal regulations or ethics for enhancement as the U.S. causing asymmetry between the U.S. and those choosing to operate below our defined legal and ethical thresholds. Chapter 3 The Era of Accelerated Human Progress (2017-2035) 3-1.  A convergence of thought and technology erodes U.S. post-Cold War advantages Advances in these various arenas already have begun to shape how our potential adversaries think about and plan for war against the United States.  Having witnessed U.S. military operations from Operation DESERT STORM through recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our main potential adversaries - the so-called "2+3" of Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and radical ideologues, such as ISIS - came to the realization that U.S. military superiority in terms of superbly trained personnel operating highly capable equipment able to operate effectively and in a synchronized fashion across all domains of conflict could be mitigated by factors of time, space, distance, and perception.
+
+
+## The "2+3" Threat
+
+
+
+-
+Russia can be considered our "pacing threat," and will be our most capable potential foe for
+at least the first half of the Era of Accelerated Human Progress.  It will remain a key strategic competitor through the Era of Contested Equality.
+-
+China is rapidly modernizing its armed forces and investing heavily in readiness and
+technological research.  Its rapid development means that it likely will surpass Russia as our pacing threat sometime around 2030.
+-
+North Korea lacks the capabilities of Russia or China, and its large but outdated military, its credible ballistic missile force, expanding cyber capabilities, and nuclear capabilities make it a significant regional threat for at least the first half of the Era of Accelerated Human Progress.
+-
+Iran for the first part of the Era of Accelerated Human Progress represents a non-nuclear
+regional hegemon, but is likely to develop nuclear weapons sometime prior to 2035.  Its geography and mastery of hybrid conflict involving proxies, coupled with ambitious military reforms means it is likely that Iran remains a key concern to 2035.
+-
+Radical Ideologues and Transnational Criminal Organizations like ISIS, al-Qa'ida,
+Lebanese Hizballah, or Latin American drug cartels and other groups which will sprout up in reaction to the unfolding OE will remain difficult and capable threats through 2035, and
+probably beyond.  Although individual groups will rise and fall, radical ideologues and transnational criminal organizations will be able to match terrorism and insurgency with increasing access to commercially available technologies and connections to nation states and criminal elements to remain viable.
+
+While the U.S. military may not necessarily have to fight Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran, it is likely that U.S. forces through 2050 will encounter their advanced equipment, concepts, doctrine, and tactics in flashpoints or trouble spots around the globe.
+
+
+
+## Figure 3-1.  The "2+3" Threat
+
+ Key adversaries are now thinking in terms of hybrid strategies, which allow them to operate at times and places of their choosing, often at a level below the threshold of warfare using proxies, private contractors, or criminal elements often directly targeting the will of a national population or the decision-making apparatus of a nation-state or a transnational organization/alliance, like NATO or the European Union.  Early signs of this trend were seen in the hybrid strategies adopted by Iran, and then later still with Russian activities in the Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria, and now covered by the term Russian New Generation warfare.  While many of these ideas are not new, the fundamental difference beginning around 2017 is the ability of the 2+3 actors to match traditional operations, hybrid strategies and asymmetric warfare tactics with new technologies and capabilities that prevent, stall, or complicate the U.S. ability to bring forces to bear before our adversaries can achieve their political objectives.  Russia and China have led the way in this regard, focusing on the development of sophisticated anti-access/area denial capabilities, longrange fires, electronic warfare and deception capabilities, space-based sensors and anti-space weapons, advanced forms of information operations, weapons of mass destruction, and cyber capabilities, while North Korea and Iran have focused on narrower, less-comprehensive, and less technically sophisticated variants of these capabilities.
+
+## Potential Game Changers To 2035
+
+
+Evolutionary technologies that, if matured and fielded, can provide a decisive edge over an adversary unable to match the capability or equal the capacity:
+
+
+-
+Multi-Domain Swarms - Massed, coordinated, fast, and collaborative. Overwhelm target systems, disaggregate, and work in homogenous or heterogeneous teams.
+-
+Advanced ATGM & MANPADS - Proliferate more rapidly than Active Protection systems
+develop, putting armored vehicles and helicopters at risk.
+-
+Robotics - 40+ countries develop military robots with some level of autonomy.
+-
+Space - 70+ nations operating in space. Increasingly congested and difficult to monitor.
+PNT at risk.
+-
+Chemical Weapons - Non-traditional agents developed to defeat detection and protection
+capabilities.
+-
+Camouflage, Cover, Concealment, Denial, & Deception (C3D2) - Creates uncertainty and
+challenges multi-discipline intelligence.
+-
+Cannon/Rocket Artillery - Long range artillery, hardened GPS munitions defeat jamming.
+Point air defense systems defend against PGM.
+-
+Missiles - Developed for greater range and improved accuracy using inertial guidance.
+Hypersonics - high speed (Mach 5 or higher) and highly maneuverable.
+-
+Computing/Cyber - Human-Computer interaction is transformed. Processing power
+increases exponentially. Big Data and Quantum Computing.
+
+
+## Figure 3-2.  Potential Game Changers To 2035
+
+ Even our radical ideologue adversaries, such as ISIS, al-Qa'ida, or Lebanese Hizballah, as well as criminal organizations and drug cartels are able to employ complex combinations of terrorism and unconventional operations mixed with traditional military capabilities and commercial offthe-shelf technologies to challenge U.S. dominance.  The convergence of these new capabilities with hybrid strategies has fractured the U.S. concept of joint, phased, multi-domain operations by allowing our adversaries the opportunity to quickly mass force and capabilities, protected by their anti-access/area denial, long-range fires, and even weapons of mass destruction to achieve their objectives in a phase short of actual conflict, to negate, or at least mitigate, the advantages in maneuver and precision that the U.S. joint force has grown accustomed.  In effect, our adversaries are beginning to understand that they can use these capabilities and strategies to deny U.S. forces the ability to operate seamlessly across domains, while at the same time delivering effects - particularly in the cyber, space, and information realms - which afford them the opportunity to win and achieve objectives before even engaging U.S. forces in combat, and creating a political dilemma for U.S. leadership of having to overturn a fait accompli. 3-2.  The pacing threat Our adversaries' capabilities to successfully carry out such strategies will increase through 2035, as rapid innovation in key technologies increases their capabilities to challenge U.S. forces across multiple domains.  Russia will be our pacing threat, and will pose the most sophisticated and challenging threat during at least the first half of this period.  It has already been investing for more than a decade in new capabilities to "overmatch" U.S. airpower, precision targeting, and the U.S. ability to deploy into a decisive theater.8F9  In addition to a whole array of new weapons systems it has developed, Moscow has been studying and investing technologies, such as robotics, advanced computing, hypersonics, space systems, and biological enhancements to human performance.9F10  China also is rapidly modernizing its armed forces and developing new approaches to warfare.  Beijing has invested significant resources into research and development of a wide array of advanced technologies.10F11  Coupled with its time-honored practice of reverse engineering technologies or systems it purchases or acquires through espionage, this effort likely will allow China to surpass Russia as our most capable threat somewhere in the second half of the period.  North Korea and Iran will continue to pose significant regional threats, although each has unique capabilities to threaten U.S. forces or interests outside of its direct region:  North Korea in the form of its ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, and cyber capabilities11F12, and Iran's ability to rely on proxies and a global state-sponsored terrorist infrastructure.12F13,
+13F14  It also is likely that Iran will develop and deploy nuclear weapons by the latter half of this time period.  Nonstate actors - radical ideologues, super-empowered individuals, and international criminal elements -- could take advantage of some of the same factors that nation-states have considered, yet will match them with a willingness to rely on other, non-conventional capabilities to achieve their own objectives.  No matter which permutation of non-state actor we face, each will be able to draw upon the same advances in technology and the speed of human interaction to raise their capabilities.  This may include partnering with, or accepting the support of nation states to acquire advanced weapons, taking advantage of the availability of commercial technology to enhance their own capabilities, developing their own unique systems and capabilities, and relying upon a deft understanding of social media and online communications to wage their own information operations. 3-3.  True strategic competitors At some point during this time period, and really for the first time since the Second World War, it is likely that the United States could face a true strategic competitor who will have an ability to operate in multi-domains, a capability to deny domains to U.S. forces, and who will be able to operate with certain technological advantages over a U.S. force.  This challenge is further
+
+http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/Autumn_2014/11_BruusgaardKristin_Crimea%20an d%20Russia's%20Strategic%20Overhaul.pdf.
+
+tic_Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF.
+
+compounded by our reliance on coalition warfare with allies that might not be able or willing to modernize at the same pace as the U.S.  The United States will face a situation where its strategic advantages held during the post-Cold War period - our broad network of alliances and partners that allowed for the forward deployment of a sophisticated, highly-capable joint force - will erode, allowing for increasingly aggressive challengers fielding a full-range of modern, advanced capabilities with hybrid strategies to challenge our ability to bring forces to the fight while undermining our political and national will to do so.  Our adversaries' investments in electronic warfare and space control will threaten our command and control and multi-domain capabilities, while remaining forward bases, naval forces, and aircraft are menaced by advanced integrated air defense systems and long-range fires, including cruise and ballistic missiles.  The ability of our joint force to operate effectively in the air and maritime domains hundreds of miles from our coasts will be challenged, which in turn will create new complications for forces operating in the ground domain.  By 2035, it is likely that military capabilities among key great powers and even by relatively capable regional powers - augmented dramatically by rapid technological innovations and their convergence with each other in a number of areas - will create an uneasy balance, with no one power having a dramatic relative advantage over its rivals. Chapter 4 The Era of Contested Equality (2035-2050):  A View of the Future 4-1.  Changing warfare The changes encountered in the Era of Accelerated Human Progress begin a process that will reshape the global security situation and fundamentally alter the character of warfare.  While its nature remains constant, the speed, automation, ranges, both broad and narrow effects, its increasingly integrated multi-domain conduct, and the complexity of the terrain and social structures in which it occurs will make mid-century warfare both familiar and utterly alien.
+Before delving further into an analysis of warfare in 2035-2050, we need to first look at the Contested Era's broad OE. 4-2.  Strategic strength During the Era of Contested Equality, great powers and rising challengers have converted hybrid combinations of economic power, technological prowess, and virulent, cyber-enabled ideologies into effective strategic strength.  They apply this strength to disrupt or defend the economic, social, and cultural foundations of the old Post-World War II liberal order and assert or dispute regional alternatives to established global norms.  State and non-state actors compete for power and control, often below the threshold of traditional armed conflict - or shield and protect their activities under the aegis of escalatory weapons of mass destruction (WMD), cyber, or longrange conventional options and doctrines. It is not clear whether the "2+3" threats faced in the Era of Accelerated Human Progress persist, although it is likely that China and Russia will remain key competitors, and that some form of non-state ideologically motivated extremist group(s) will exist.  Iran and North Korea may remain threats, may have fundamentally changed their worldviews, or may not even exist by mid-century, while other states, and combinations of states will rise and fall as challengers during the 2035-2050 timeframe.  The security environment in this period will be characterized
+
+## Potential Game Changers Through 2050
+
+
+Revolutionary technologies that, when developed and fielded, will provide a decisive edge over adversaries not similarly equipped.  This technological advantage will most probably be temporary.
+
+
+
+-
+Laser and Radio Frequency Weapons - Scalable lethal and non-lethal directed energy
+weapons can counter aircraft, UAS, missiles, projectiles, sensors, and swarms.
+-
+Rail Guns and Enhanced Directed Kinetic Energy Weapons - Non-explosive
+electromagnetic projectile launchers provide high-velocity/high-energy weapons.
+-
+Energetics - Provides increased accuracy and muzzle energy.
+-
+Synthetic Biology - Engineering and modification of biological entities has potential weaponization.
+-
+Internet of EveryThing - Every device, both military and commercial, will have network
+connectivity. Everything becomes a sensor, and everything becomes hackable. Opportunity
+and vulnerability.
+-
+Power - Future effectiveness depends on renewable sources and reduced consumption. Small nuclear reactors are potentially a cost effective source of stable power.
+ by conditions that will facilitate competition and conflict among rivals, and lead to endemic strife and warfare, and will have several defining features. a.  The nation-state perseveres.  The nation-state will remain the primary actor in the international system, but it will face both new and growing challenges domestically and globally. Trends of fragmentation, competition, and identity politics will challenge global governance and broader globalization, with both collective security and globalism in decline.14F15,
+15F16  As the world becomes further digitized, states will share their strategic environments with networked societies which can pose a threat by circumventing governments that are unresponsive to their citizens' needs.  These online organizations are capable of gaining power, influence, and capital to a degree that challenges traditional nation-states.  Many states will face challenges from insurgents and global identity networks - ethnic, religious, regional, social, or economic - whose members may feel a stronger affinity to their online network than to their nationality, which could result in either resisting state authority or ignoring it altogether. b.  Diffusion of elite capabilities.  Russia, China, and the United States will continue to lead the world in power, dominance, and technology, but other states and actors will develop more advanced abilities in specific arenas.  Rising competitors will be able to acquire capabilities through a broad knowledge diffusion, cyber intellectual property theft, and their own targeted investments without having to invest into massive "sunken" research costs.  This diffusion of knowledge and capability and the aforementioned erosion of long-term collective security will lead to the formation of ad hoc communities of interest.  The costs of maintaining global hegemony at the mid-point of the century will be too great for any single power, meaning that
+
+##
+
+the world will be multi-polar and dominated by complex combinations of short-term alliances, relations, and interests. c.  This era will be marked by contested norms and persistent disorder, where multiple state and non-state actors assert alternative rules and norms, which when contested, will use military force, often in a dimension short of traditional armed conflict. Chapter 5 Warfare in the Deep Future 5-1.  The more things change, the more they are the same.....but are different During the Era of Accelerated Human Progress, we began to see and understand that the character of warfare was beginning to change.  These changes included warfare that was contested in all domains, required faster decisions and decision analysis to be made, needed to take advantage of narrower - in terms of time and space - opportunities, often characterized as windows, saw the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, occurred in complex, congested terrain, involved hybrid strategies and combatants, and was increasingly difficult to resolve conclusively. By mid-century, warfare likely will follow a similar pattern, but will be enhanced by more advanced, sophisticated capabilities, take advantage of artificial intelligence to improve decisionmaking and even further increase speed in terms of integration, decision-making, and operational imperatives, occur at even longer ranges, and deliver a range of effects whose impact and destructiveness are both broader and more precisely delivered.  Unmanned systems, including advanced battlefield robotic systems acting both autonomously and as part of a wider trend in man-machine teaming, will account for a significant percentage of a combatant force.  Swarms of small, cheap, scalable, and disposable unmanned systems will be used both offensively and defensively, creating targeting dilemmas for sophisticated, expensive defensive systems. Swarming systems on the future battlefield will include not only unmanned aerial systems (UAS) but also swarms across multiple domains with self-organizing, self-reconstituting, autonomous, ground, maritime (sub and surface), and subterranean unmanned systems.  Laser and radiofrequency weapons drawing upon small, lighter, and much more portable sources of power, will become more practical, and will further increase the ranges and lethality of direct fire weapons, particularly defensive weapons designed to counter aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and ground systems.  Communications will be critical, and advances in quantum computing, networking, and the Internet of Things will make the need to communicate both easier, and more difficult in the face of the same technologies used to counter an enemy's communications capabilities.  Advances in hypersonic delivery systems, space systems, hypervelocity rail guns, and other systems, coupled with new types of conventional and unconventional warheads will dramatically increase the scope of battlefields, with precision strike effects capable of being delivered rapidly from a continent away.  Advances in WMD, including the development of a range of nuclear payloads, advanced chemical weapons employing new technologies and understanding of chemistry and chemical engineering, and perhaps most significantly, biological weapons, present a devastatingly lethal and disruptive WMD threat profile.  Exquisite precision weapons allow an adversary to regularly produce critical effects necessary to further their plan.
+
+## Human Evolution Boosted By Technology
+
+Singularity is the point at which AI exceeds the collective intelligence of mankind, which will radically and irrevocably change the relationship between man and machine.  There are several divergent possibilities regarding the singularity:
+
+-
+As optimistic singularity advocates such as Ray Kurzweil have suggested, AI improves human
+life in every way, from healthcare, to emotional evolution, to intergalactic space travel.
+-
+Unboxed general artificial superintelligence improves and evolves at such an exponential rate it escapes human restrictions, perspectives, and morality.  It threatens the very existence of
+humanity.
+-
+Humans evolve their own cognitive abilities through learning developments, brain implants, artificial stimulants, and non-AI high-performance computing to match, or at least keep pace
+with AI.
+
+AI has the capacity to change paradigms, revolutionize everyday life, and take mankind to exciting new horizons.  However, it also may be capable of incredible destruction, malice, and lines of thinking and decision making that are dangerous to mankind.  This duality will be critical as actors develop military applications for AI.
+
+
+## Figure 5-1.  Human Evolution Boosted By Technology
+
+ Destruction of key nodes in an opposing force or enemy nation allows measured effects to produce desired conditions.  Massed fires and weapons of mass effects retain great utility to produce cognitive shock and possibly disintegrate the coherency of an armed force.  Although mass effects do destroy the means for war, they are more properly viewed as an attack on the will to continue the fight.  The speed of engagements in this era - which routinely involve lasers, hypersonic weapons, cyber-attacks, and artificial intelligence - will far exceed the reaction time of humans.  The decision-making process will require much greater speed; information and intelligence will need to be quickly gathered and assessed so that commanders can make the decisions at increasingly rapid rates.  As a result, engagements will be fast, but campaigns could be protracted series of kinetic engagements or conflicts short of war. 5-2.  Information operations Under these conditions, no one nation will have an overwhelming technological advantage over its rivals.  As a result, sophisticated information operations, enabled by advances in artificial intelligence, high-performance computing, detailed socio-political analysis, data analytics, and a detailed understanding of social media means that the Era of Contested Equality competitors will engage in a fight for information on a global scale.  The information battle will be waged with well-crafted ideas and narratives combined with pervasive and globally-reaching cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, and psychological warfare tools.  Coercion through the cognitive dimension is not only possible, but often is the first, and the decisive recourse in conflict, and is an ongoing, persistent activity between opposing powers.  Winning the war before the battle is fought through information operations will become an imperative, and land forces will need to contribute to perception management in the cognitive dimension as a core element of military operations. Chapter 6 The Changing Character of Warfare in the Era of Contested Equality The changing character of warfare in the Era of Contested Equality is best understood as a series of enduring competitions that would be recognizable to commanders in any era of history.  What is different, however, are changes in the operational environment and technology that are so significant, extensive, and pervasive, that they collectively manifest a distinct, and transformed character of warfare that is faster, occurs at longer ranges, is more destructive, targets civilians and military equally across the physical, cognitive, and moral dimensions, and if waged effectively, secures its objectives before actual battle is joined. a.  Finders vs hiders.  As in preceding decades, that which can be found, if unprotected, can still be hit. By mid-Century, it will prove increasingly difficult to stay hidden.  Most competitors can access space-based surveillance, networked multi-static radars, drones, and swarms of drones in a wide variety, and a vast array of passive and active sensors that are far cheaper to produce than to create technology to defeat them.16F17  Quantum computing and quantum sensing will open new levels of situational awareness.  Passive sensing, especially when combined with artificial intelligence and big-data techniques may routinely outperform active sensors, leading to a counter-reconnaissance fight between autonomous sensors and countermeasures - "a robot-onrobot affair."  These capabilities will be augmented by increasingly sophisticated civilian capabilities, where commercial imagery services, a robust and mature Internet of Things, and near unlimited processing power generate a battlespace that is more transparent than ever before. This transparency may result in the demise of strategic and operational deception and surprise. Hiding is possible, but will require dramatic reduction of thermal, electromagnetic, and optical signatures.  For a hider to defeat a finder, it generally must not move or emit.  Tactical techniques, such as going to and below ground, or hiding in plain sight through dispersion or near constant relocation can augment technological solutions to assist the hiders, with dense urban areas offering the best option for hiding.  The complete destruction of the near ubiquitous sensors arrayed against a land force will not be feasible, although high-powered microwave systems may be able to clear limited corridors.  More successful methods would involve techniques to deceive finders vice destroy them.  These could include cognitive, autonomous electronic warfare assets that assess signals and develop real-time countermeasures during engagements.  Land forces also will employ advanced camouflage, cover, and deception, ranging from tactical obscurants, decoys, and signature reduction through elaborate strategic, multidomain deception operations. b.  Strikers vs shielders.  The competition between strikers and shielders is one of the most telling examples of the change in the character of warfare in this era.  Precision strike will improve exponentially through mid-century, with the type of precision formerly reserved for high-end aerospace assets now extended to all domains and at every echelon of engagement.
+The proliferation of intelligent munitions will enable strikers to engage targets at greater distances, collaborate in teams to seek out and destroy designated targets, and defeat armored and other hardened targets, as well as defiladed and entrenched targets.  Combatants, both state and non-state, will have a host of advanced delivery options available to them, including advanced kinetic weapons, hypersonics, directed energy, including laser, microwave, and electromagnetic pulse, and cyber.  A maneuver Brigade Combat Team has over 2,500 pieces of equipment dependent on space-based assets for position, navigation, and timing and Low Earth Orbit is cluttered with satellites, debris, and thousands of pieces of refuse.  Space-based assets will become increasingly integrated into these striker-shielder complexes, with sensors, antisatellite weapons, and even space-to-earth strike platforms fielded by many actors.  At the same time, and on the other end of the spectrum, it will be possible to deploy swarms of massed, lowcost, self-organizing unmanned systems directed by bi-mimetic algorithms to overwhelm opponents, which offers an alternative to expensive, exquisite systems.  With operational range spanning from the strategic - including the homeland - to the tactical, the application of advanced fires from one domain to another will become routine.  A wide range of effects can be delivered by a striker, ranging from point precision to area suppression using thermobarics, brilliant cluster munitions, and even a variety of nuclear, chemical, or biological systems. Shielders, on the other hand, will focus on an integrated approach to defense, which target enemy finders, their linkages to strikers, or the strikers themselves.  To defeat defenses, a striker must win the salvo competition by increasing the size and pace of their attacks, which may require using smaller weapons carried in larger numbers of strike platforms.  Finally, there is a cost curve competition, in which advanced technology and artificial intelligence could create large numbers of inexpensive, but capable systems which could overcome more expensive capable systems.  As a result of these developments, mid-century combatants will have to make decisions along a sliding scale between mass and precision, with capabilities giving actors an unprecedented ability to make choices and trade-offs in terms of capability, effect, and cost. c.  Planning and judgment vs reaction and autonomy.  The mid-century duel for the initiative has a unique character.  New operational tools offer extraordinary speed and reach and often precipitate unintended consequences.  Commanders will need to open multi-domain windows through which to deliver effects by the sophisticated balancing of careful planning to set conditions with the ability to rapidly exploit opportunities and vulnerabilities as they appear to achieve success against sophisticated defensive deployments and shielder complexes.  This will place an absolute imperative on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as on intelligence analysis augmented by artificial intelligence, big data, and advanced analytic techniques to determine the conditions on the battlefield, and specifically when, and for how long, a window of operation is open.  Decision cycle times will decrease with AI-enabled intelligence systems conducting collection, collation, and analysis of battlefield information at machine speed, freeing up warfighters and commanders to do what they excel at - fight and make decisions.  Man-machine teaming will become the norm in terms of staff planning, with carefully trained, educated, and often cognitive performance-enhanced personnel working to create and exploit opportunities.  This means that armies no longer merely adapt between wars, but do so between and during engagements. d.  Escalation vs de-escalation.  The competition between violence escalation and deescalation will be central to stability, deterrence, and strategic success.  Violence is readily available to a wide-range of actors, and on unprecedented scales.  Conventional and cyber capabilities can be so potent as to generate effects on the scale of WMD.  During the Era of Accelerated Human Progress, we encountered hybrid strategies and "Gray Zone" operations, which essentially demonstrated a willingness to escalate a conflict to a level of violence that
+
+## Mid-Century Revolution:  A Changed Character Of Warfare
+
+-
+The moral and cognitive dimensions are ascendant.
+-
+Integration across the DIME.
+-
+Limitation of military force.
+-
+The primacy of information.
+-
+Expansion of the Battle Area / hyper-destruction.
+-
+Ethics of warfare shift.
+exceeded the interests of an adversary to intervene.  Over time, these tentative, early steps evolved into a more subtle understanding of how cyber effects could devastate without overt violence, and how disparate non-violent activities can quickly compound to significant strategic consequence.  Additionally, long-range strikers and shielder complexes, which extend from the terrestrial domains into space - taken together with cyber technology and more ubiquitous finders - are significantly destabilizing and allow a combatant a freedom of maneuver to achieve objectives short of open war.  The ability to effectively escalate and de-escalate along a scalable series of options will be a prominent feature of force design, doctrine, and policy at mid-century. Chapter 7 To a Changed Character of Warfare Our vision of the OE brings with it an inexorable series of movements which lead us to ponder a critical question; what do these issues mean for the nature and character of warfare?  The nature of war, which has remained relatively constant from Thucydides through Clausewitz, to the Cold War and to the present, certainly remains constant through the Era of Accelerated Human Progress.  War is still waged because of fear, honor, and interest, and remains an expression of politics by other means. However, as the Era of Accelerated Human Progress advances, and we move to the Era of Contested Equality, it becomes apparent that the character of warfare has changed to a point where other basic questions, such as those contemplating the very definition of war or those looking at whether fear or honor are removed as part of the equation.17F18  In the
+2035-2050 timeframe, warfare does indeed look different from its early-century model in several key areas. a.  The moral and cognitive dimensions are ascendant.  The proliferation of high technology coupled with the speed of human interaction and pervasive connectivity means that no one nation will have an absolute strategic advantage in capabilities, and even when breakthroughs occur, the advantages they confer will be fleeting, as rivals quickly adapt.  While individual nations may have real advantages in certain technologies or capabilities, it is unlikely that any will have a decisive edge, meaning that a rough strategic parity will prevail.  Under such conditions, the physical dimension of warfare may become less important than the cognitive and the moral. Military operations will increasingly be aimed at utilizing the cognitive and moral dimensions to target an enemy's will.  As a result, there will be fewer self-imposed restrictions by some powers on the use of military force, and hybrid strategies involving information operations, direct cyberattacks against individuals, segments of populations, or national infrastructure, terrorism, the use of proxies, and WMD will aim to prevail against an enemy's will. b.  Integration across the DIME.  Clausewitz's timeless dictum that war is policy by other means takes on a new importance, as the distance between war and policy recedes, but also must take into account other elements of national power to form true whole-of-government and when possible, collective security approaches to national security issues.  The interrelationship across the DIME will require a closer integration across all elements of government, and joint decisionmaking bodies will need to quickly and effectively deliver DIME effects across the physical, the cognitive, and moral dimensions.  Military operations are an essential element of this equation, but may not necessarily be the decisive means of achieving an end state.  Building an effective and credible military deterrent will become an increasingly important and relevant policy tool, and it must be capable of operating across multiple dimensions and domains, while retaining the flexibility to integrate with other elements of national power. c.  Limitations of military force.  While mid-century militaries will have more capability than at any time in history, their ability to wage high-intensity conflict will become more limited. Force-on-force conflict will be so destructive, will be waged at the new speed of human and AI-
+enhanced interaction, and will occur at such extended long-ranges that exquisitely trained and equipped forces facing a strategic competitor will rapidly suffer significant losses in manpower and equipment that will be difficult to replace.  Robotics, unmanned vehicles, and man-machine teaming activities offer partial solutions, but warfare will still revolve around increasingly vulnerable human beings.  Military forces may only be able to wage short duration campaigns before having to replace expensive equipment, and even more priceless personnel.  Militaries under these conditions will need to balance exquisite, expensive capabilities against less-capable, cheaper alternatives, and also carefully balance the ratio of human soldiers to robotic or unmanned systems.  As the skills and experiences that humans need to learn or acquire to be effective on these battlefields take long-times to develop, but will be expended quickly on the destructive mid-century battlefield, militaries will need to consider how advances in AI, bioengineering, man-machine interface, neuro-implanted knowledge, and other areas of enhanced human performance and learning can quickly help reduce this long lead time in training and developing personnel. d.  The primacy of information.  In the timeless struggle between offense and defense, information will become the most important and most useful tool at all levels of warfare.  The ability of an actor to use information to target the enemy's will, without necessarily having to address its means will increasingly be possible.  In the past, nations have tried to target an enemy's will through kinetic attacks on its means - the enemy military - or through the direct targeting of the will by attacking the national infrastructure or a national populace itself. Sophisticated, nuanced information operations, taking advantage of an ability to directly target an affected audience through cyber operations or other forms of influence operations, and reinforced by a credible capable armed force can bend an adversary's will before battle is joined. This will allow a nation to demonstrate to an adversary, or more specifically, to the adversary's political leadership or national populace, that the "value of the object" in Sir Julian Corbett's words, is too high to risk national treasure or lives.  The most effective campaigns are ones that wield all elements of national power to compel an adversary to take or to acquiesce to a specific action, and it will be much easier, cheaper, and effective to use information, backed by credible military force, to achieve these goals.  It also means that nations will increasingly look to use military force as a means of setting conditions for success in the political, economic, or even information spheres.  The balkanization of the internet into multiple national "intranets" could provide fewer opportunities for influence platforms and impact cyber operations.  The growing presence of fake news, data, and information, coupled with deepfakes and hyper-connectivity, changes the nature of information operations.  The convergence of deepfakes, AI-generated bodies and faces, and AI writing technologies - that appear authentic - are corrosive to trust between governments and their populations present the potential for devastating impact on nation-states' will to compete and fight. e.  Expansion of the battle area.  Nations, non-state actors, and even individuals will be able to target military forces and civilian infrastructure at increasing - often over intercontinental - ranges using a host of conventional and unconventional means.  The revolution in connected devices and virtual power projection will increase the potential for adversaries to target our installations.  Hyper-connectivity increases the attack surface for cyber-attacks and the access to publicly available information on our Soldiers and their families, making personalized warfare and the use of psychological attacks and deepfakes likely.  A force deploying to a combat zone will remain vulnerable from the Strategic Support Area - including individual Soldiers' personal residences, home station installations, and ports of embarkation - all the way forward to the Close Area fight during its entire deployment.  Adversaries also will have the ability to target or hold at risk non-military infrastructure and even populations with increasingly sophisticated, nuanced and destructive capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction, hypersonic conventional weapons, and perhaps most critically, cyber weapons and information warfare. WMD will not be the only threat capable of directly targeting and even destroying a society, as cyber and information can directly target infrastructure, banking, food supplies, power, and general ways of life.  Limited wars focusing on a limited area of operations waged between peers or strategic competitors will become more dangerous, as adversaries will have an unprecedented capability to broaden their attacks to their enemy's homeland.  The U.S. Homeland likely will not avoid the effects of warfare and will be vulnerable in at least eight areas (see figure 7-2.) f.  Shift in the ethics and law of warfare.  Traditional norms of warfare, definitions of combatants and non-combatants, and even what constitutes military action or national casus belli will be turned upside down and remain in flux at all levels of warfare.  The changed character of warfare may result in challenges and stresses to the existing law of warfare paradigm with corresponding significant changes on how the future Army operates.  Does cyber activity, or information operations aimed at influencing national policy rise to the level of warfare?  Is using cyber capabilities to target a national infrastructure legal if it has broad societal impacts?  Can one target an electric grid that supports a civilian hospital, but also powers a military base a continent away from the battle zone from which unmanned systems are controlled?  What is the threshold for WMD use?  Is the use of autonomous robots against human soldiers legal?  Is using a human Soldier in a dangerous situation ethical when there are robots available?  These, and more questions will arise, and likely will be answered differently by individual actors. g.  The changes in the character of war by mid-century will be pronounced, and are directly related and traceable to our present.  The natural progression of the changes in the character of war may be a change in the nature of war, perhaps sometime in the later end of this assessment or in the second half of the century.
+
+## Homeland Sectors Vulnerable To Disruption
+
+Targeting the Homeland allows an adversary to delay U.S. forces' ability to deploy or intervene in a conflict and directly target the nation's political decision-making process and will to fight.
+
+
+
+-
+Agriculture & food supply - Those areas affecting acquisition, processing, and availability of foodstuff
+-
+Finance, banking, and commerce - Disruption of financial networks, availability of funds,
+confidence in markets, and access to retail
+-
+Rule of Law / Government institutions - Degrade confidence in the Government's ability to provide functioning, stable, and legitimate law and order, services, and governance
+-
+Transportation - Prolonged interruption of air, cargo, and public sectors
+-
+Medical - Loss of services, corruption of supply chain, inability to react to pandemics
+-
+Water - Contamination of public supply, disruption of distribution, and loss of access to
+water
+-
+Power - Disruption to the electromagnetic spectrum over wide areas and interdiction of power generation
+-
+Entertainment and information - Attacks against arenas and public gathering places, prolonged internet denial, and loss of confidence in journalism
+ Chapter 8 Conclusion 8-1.  Precipice of change Forecasting the future, particularly the deep future, is a daunting task, but the global trends that we have discerned through our study of the OE and captured in this assessment in terms of how we live, create, think, and prosper, are rapidly gathering momentum and shaping every facet of society and international discourse, including security policy and warfare.  An analysis of the OE shows these trends to be inexorable, bringing with them rapid and often uncomfortable changes that will force us to reevaluate many aspects of strategy, policy, and our very lives.  So what can we, as an Army, learn from this analysis?  The first, and most important lesson is to understand and internalize the idea that we stand at a precipice of change, where our time-honored successes and the ideas, concepts, doctrine, equipment, training, and personnel that achieved them probably are insufficient to achieve successes in the near term, and certainly are, if not revised or re-assessed, insufficient in the mid- to long-terms.  We already have seen our most capable potential challengers - the "2+3" - take advantage of new technologies and military thought to form niche, and in some select cases, even wide-spread overmatch against U.S. joint capabilities. Starting with this present, and our understanding of the transformative impact of technology and the increasing speed of human interaction, an analysis of the OE shows that these trends will only intensify, moving through an Era of Accelerated Human Progress, where the distance between our own capabilities and effectiveness and our adversaries', recedes and then levels, to a mid-century point where capabilities and technologies are relatively even between actors, and true advantage comes in the art of mastering a series of interconnected competitions across all domains that seek effects in multiple dimensions.
+
+## 8-2.  Laying The Groundwork For The Army, The Ultimate Drivers Of The Future Will Depend Largely On The Imminent Decisions We Make Today With Respect To Strategy And Policy, Concepts, Innovation, And Adaptation. Although The Future That We Postulate In This Paper Is Not Certain, The Trends We See Demonstrate That The Character Of Warfare Is Changing.  For The Nation And The Army To Succeed, We Must Quickly Learn And Internalize This Fact, And Lay The Groundwork Today For Success In The Future. Glossary Section I Abbreviations Afc United States Army Futures Command
+
+AI
+
+artificial intelligence
+
+DIME
+diplomatic, information, military, and economic
+
+OE
+
+Operational Environment
+TRADOC
+U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
+
+## Section Ii Terms Deepfakes A Technique For Human Image Synthesis Using Artificial Intelligence And Generative Adversarial Networks That Superimposes False Images Or Videos Onto Original Images Or Videos Creating The Impression That The Edited Version Is Authentic. Operational Environment (Oe) A Composite Of The Conditions, Circumstances, And Influences That Affect The Employment Of Capabilities And Bear On The Decisions Of The Commander.
+
+
+
+DISTRIBUTION A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. V.6. 09/01/2019

markdown/misc/adf-sw.md

@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+## Working Draft
+
+A Dossier on the NRO Aerospace Data Facility Southwest NGA Integrated Operations Center Southwest NASA White Sands Complex/TDRSS Ground Station Las Cruces, New Mexico Version of 2012-07-16
+
+## Working Draft
+
+To support this constellation, the NRO depends on a network of ground stations.  This network includes the Aerospace Data FacilityEast at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia; the Aerospace Data FacilitySouthwest at the White Sands Missile Test Range, New Mexico; and the Aerospace Data FacilityColorado at Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado. Each is a multi-mission facility that supports worldwide defense operations and the collection, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of intelligence information for multiple agencies. The NRO also maintains a presence at several locations overseas. These include the Joint Defense Facility Pine Gap in Alice Springs, Australia and RAF Menwith Hill, in Harrogate, United Kingdom. The NRO supports joint missions at these locations through the provision of technical systems and shared research and development. The NRO's participation is achieved with the consent of the host governments and contributes to the national security of the countries involved. In addition to its intelligence collection systems, the NRO maintains an extensive global communications network that supports both NRO operators and other military and intelligence users. The NRO's communications infrastructure includes for example, its encrypted satellite data relay system and messaging systems essential for the organization to function, such as the Special Operations Communications (SOCOMM) system.
+
+https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=aaa465790b6d479b3e2ef935518ae88f&tab=core&_cview=0
+[EXCERPTS] Print Server Solicitation Number: HM0177-09-T-0067 Agency: Other Defense Agencies Office: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Location: Acquisition Technology (ACT) Original Synopsis Aug 19, 2009 7:38 am Solicitation Number: HM0177-09-T-0067 Synopsis: Added: Aug 19, 2009 7:38 am The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has a requirement for an HP Print Server. Contracting Office Address: ACT Mail Stop P-158 12310 Sunrise Valley Road Reston, Virginia 20191-3449 Place of Performance: IOC-SW 12400 NASA Road Las Cruces, New Mexico 88012 United States http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/spysatellites/RECON1.pdf http://www.icahst.org/docs/2010-06-10/Martin%20Feedback%20email%2011%20June%202010.pdf From: Fredrick T. Martin [mailto:ftmartin@topsecretnet.com] Sent: Friday, June 11, 2010 3:49 PM To: ICAHST Council Members (icahst@topsecretnet.com) Cc: Fredrick T. Martin (fredrick.martin@dhs.gov) Subject: Feedback from 10 June 2010 ICAHST Quarterly Meeting Feedback from 10 June 2010 ICAHST Quarterly Meeting [ICAHST: Interagency Council for Applied Homeland Security Technology ] [EXCERPT] ICAHST Working Group Status: Mr. Frank Toomer, ICAHST Outreach Director, NRO, presented an update on current outreach activities, including the ICAHST membership efforts; the Civil Applications Committee (CAC), chaired by the US Geological Survey; and the NRO Law Enforcement / Homeland Security Technology Exchange Working Group (TEWG). Mr. Toomer invited all ICAHST members to participate in TEWG activities. The next meeting of the TEWG will be held at FBI facilities at Quantico, VA from 10:00am to 12:00pm on Thursday 17 June. A SECRET Security clearance is required to enter the FBI grounds. If you are interested in attending, please contact Bob Hamburg at 703-808-3222. The TEWG is also planning a visit with TS/SCI briefings at US Air Force (ADF-SW), El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and the DoD Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N) during 22-23 June 2010. For additional information, please contact Mr. Toomer at 703-808-2328 or Mr. Kevin Lewis at 703-808-2125.
+
+http://www.mors.org/UserFiles/file/MDA%20Briefs/NORAD%20Maritime%20Warning%20Mission%20-%20Salchert.pdf
+
+## Job Descriptions
+
+This is Google's cache of http://www.americajob.com/job.asp? cid=0&tid=89473167&no=3918252&retPage=%2FNew-Mexico%2Fadmin-management-jobs-4.asp. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Jun 5, 2010 08:01:36 GMT.
+
+## Duties:
+
+ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: The Integrated Operations Center-Southwest (IOC-SW) is a diverse Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Community spanning most of NGA's corporate and functional management responsibilities to include tasking; processing; exploitation; analysis and production; dissemination; national and international partnerships; GEOINT policy; training and outreach; research and development; acquisition; and technology insertion. Located in Las Cruces, New Mexico at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Aerospace Data Facility-Southwest (ADF-SW), the IOC-SW is not a traditional, hierarchical organization working a narrow NGA mission set under a single chain of command. Rather, it is a microcosm of NGA and includes elements of other GEOINT organizations as well responsible for 12 different core missions and a host of enabling activities. At present, this GEOINT Community consists of individuals representing 16 different NGA home offices from nine KC's and two military service components, with most members organizationally, programmatically, and operationally linked to those external offices/components. The Integrated Operations Center-Southwest (IOC-SW) is seeking a staff officer who is self-starting, energetic and able to handle multiple tasks. The selectee will report to the IOC-SW Chief of Staff (CoS), and will serve as the focal point of contact for the IOC-SW Business Continuity Plan (BCP) and Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP), policy development and implementation, various administrative duties such as task management and corporate communications. The selectee will represent the IOC-SW CoS in various forums and inform IOC-SW leadership of any relevant topics, issues or actions of interest to the IOC-SW community. They will also provide backup to other IOC-SW staff to ensure day-to-day administrative tasks are accomplished. This will require the selectee to obtain a working knowledge of other IOC-SW staff roles and responsibilities.
+
+This is Google's cache of http://www.jobcentral.com/jobs/Lockheed_Martin/NM/Systems_Engineer_Stf/010481234/job.
+
+ It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on May 18, 2009 05:12:30 GMT.
+
+Systems Engineer Stf Job in New Mexico Title : Systems Engineer Stf Company : Lockheed Martin Location : New Mexico Date Acquired : 4/22/2009 12:28:17 AM Date Updated : 5/11/2009 12:18:54 AM Req ID 121471BR Industry Job Title Systems Engineer Stf Standard Job Code/Title E1464:Systems Engineer Stf Required skills Current ADF-SW site experience In depth knowledge of site specific activities Established relationships with Ground and Systems Operation GPOCs Systems Integration experience Strong NRO experience Desired skills Team lead experience Full Spectrum Leadership attributes and ability Specific Job Description High visibility position where individual will be a member of the site System Integration team for Program 606 working directly at remote customer location. This position will support approximately 50% Ground and 50% System Operations support. This person will already be located in the southwest region, will have domain experience, and will have established relationships with site customers. The candidate will be a proven team player, have ability to adapt to rapidly changing work environments, possess strong negotiation skills, have proven project management skills, ability to coordinate across multi-int environment with diplomacy and tact, influential with customer as needed to defend the ultimate mission goals, along with being highly organized. Requires full life cycle engineering experience, including transition to operations, with strong analysis skills. Specific tasks include, but are not limited to: communication and collaboration with SI SO and GEI teams; document update and control; RFC assessment, analyze/assess schedules, requirements/specification development, integration, test and transition, readiness activities, ground processing, ground operations, CONOPS development, experience at the ADF-SW, knowledge/ experience with ICDs/specifications for the ADF-SW and ADF-E; coordination with RFC authors for requirements clarification; provide technical assessments for SOERB and GMM ERB; coordinate and conduct design reviews, technical reviews, program management reviews, and other technical forums as required; ability to coordinate across multiple customer domains and contractors; approximately 15% travel with customer to support reviews as needed. Applicants selected will be subject to a government security investigation and must meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information. Standard Job Description Performs technical planning, system integration, verification and validation, cost and risk, and supportability and effectiveness analyses for total systems. Analyses are performed at all levels of total system product to include: concept, design, fabrication, test, installation, operation, maintenance and disposal. Ensures the logical and systematic conversion of customer or product requirements into total systems solutions that acknowledge technical, schedule, and cost constraints. Performs functional analysis, timeline analysis, detail trade studies, requirements allocation and interface definition studies to translate customer requirements into hardware and software specifications.
+
+## Security Clearance Top Secret/Special Security Requirements
+
+Typical Minimums Bachelors degree from an accredited college in a related discipline, or equivalent experience/combined education, with 9 years of professional experience; or 7 years of professional experience with a related Masters degree. Considered an emerging authority. LMCareers Business Unit ESS9995 EI GROUP (S0807) Business Area Info Systems & Global Services Program P606 Department 8N3D:NPD_ISU-P606 Clin 5 Field_18 Job Class Systems Engineering: Other Job Category Experienced Professional State New Mexico Virtual No Relocation Available No Req Type Full-Time Direct/Indirect Direct http://www.ihirelogistics.com/PremiumJobResponse.asp?
+
+PJobID=338058&campaigntype=SearchEngine&Campaign=IndeedOrganic
+[Accessed 2010-08-10]
+
+## Job Title:Supply Chain Mgr K At Adf-Sw Company:Boeing Location:Las Cruces, Nm
+
+Job Description: Manages and integrates employees activities across more than one area in materials management and transportation. Develops and executes project and process plans, implements policies and procedures and sets operational goals. Acquires resources for projects and processes, provides technical management of suppliers and leads process improvements. Develops and maintains relationships and partnerships with customers, stakeholders, peers, partners and direct reports. Provides oversight and approval of technical approaches, products and processes. Manages, develops and motivates employees. Supply Chain Logistics Manager is responsible for day-to-day management of all Supply Chain Management efforts, including but not limited to Transportation and Mail Processing, Property/Asset Management, Support Services which includes Conference Center Support, Cafeteria Services, Copier Maintenance, Fleet Services and other associated support services. Because of the critical mission being conducted by the customer, close coordination with customer stakeholders is required to maintain 100% mission critical infrastructure and minimal interruption to ancillary operations. This requires 24 X 7 attention to operations including daily teleconferences and meetings with customer and Site Manager and Staff to ensure continuity of mission. In this role, the Supply Chain Logistics Manager reports to Site Manager and has direct interface with multiple customers. The Supply Chain Logistics Manager will lead a management team and workforce of approximately XX personnel executing the logistics and support functions. Workforce consists of logisticians, transportation specialists and trades skills. The Supply Chain Logistics Manager will insure standard operating procedures are being followed and ad hoc events (site emergencies, system failures, delivery interruptions) are handled and to the customers satisfaction. The successful candidate will also work with other Supply Chain Logistics Managers to coordinate, develop, and implement common practices that will enhance operations by developing standard approaches across multiple sites. In addition, the successful candidate will develop processes and systems that allow for analyzing and forecasting for strategic warehouse utilization, strategic resource allocation, transportation network optimization and innovation. Manages and integrates employees activities across more than one area in materials management and transportation. Develops and executes project and process plans, implements policies and procedures and sets operational goals. Acquires resources for projects and processes, provides technical management of suppliers in support of strong supply chain methodology to include Just in Time Logistics, vendor managed stocking, and leads process improvements. Develops and maintains relationships and partnerships with customers, stakeholders, peers, partners and direct reports. Provides oversight and approval of technical approaches, products and processes. Manages, develops and motivates employees. Position is located in Las Cruces, New Mexico.
+
+http://manassas-virginia.olx.com/facilities-engineering-sr-mgr-iid-268393487
+[Accessed 2012-07-16]
+Facilities Engineering Sr Mgr - Manassas Location: Manassas, Virginia, United States Date Posted: October 23 [2011] Description Req ID 215968BR Industry Job Title Facilities Engineering Sr Mgr Standard Job Code/Title L1516:Facilities Engineering Sr Mgr Required skills * Visionary * Technial expert in facility engineering or related discipline * Proven Full Spectrum Leader * Excellent oral and written communication skills * Strong track record of success * Current, active TS/SCI clearance Desired skills * Licensed Professional engineer * Other related professional certification * Sustainability experience Specific Job Description CFOAM is a $25M/ YR CPAF contract covering 3 sites: ADF-E, ADF-SW and customer HQ. As a subcontractor, LMC provides the following services at ADF-E: facility operations and maintenance (including some continuous shift), construction services, construction project management, security systems O&M, vehicle management and maintenance, janitorial, registry, courier, waste destruct, grounds maintenance (including snow removal), Environmental Safety and Health, facility help line, work flow management, process improvement, video system installation and maintenance as well as some web design. -Technical: Responsible to the Boeing (Prime) site manager for the strategic direction of facility infrastructure maintenance, recapitalization and improvements. Develops and implements a long range plan to meet customer goals regarding Facility Condition Index. Thought leader on the continuous discussion and annual submittal of the recapitalization, site road map and preventive maintenance review CDRLs. Ensures recapitalization planning is in synch with customer priorities. Works closely with the customer and monitors mission plans and their impact on facility infrastructure requirements. Matches the site's power and cooling capacity with new and emerging requirements, including required reserves, and mitigates with sustainable solutions. Identifies and champions the implementation of equipment and facility related sustainability programs including construction materials and techniques, power and cooling solutions and maintenance practices. The successful candidate will have continuous interaction with the government customer and our industry partners. Strong communication, technical writing, presentation, team building and negotiating skills are keys to success in this challenging environment. -Functional: Full spectrum leaders for a team of 150 mission focused LMC service professionals with 8 subordinate managers as the major subcontractor on an enterprise facility O&M contract. CFOAM has adopted a "one team" approach that often blends working groups from multiple industry partners under the day to day direction of a Boeing or LMC leader. Additional duties in a program leadership role as assigned by the prime contractor. Standard Job Description: Manages the planning, design, and oversight of the reconfiguration, maintenance, and alteration of equipment, machinery, buildings, structures, and other facilities. Responsible for coordinating subordinate employee recruitment, selection and training, performance assessment, work assignments, salary, and recognition/disciplinary actions. Oversees the gathering and review of data concerning facility or equipment specifications, company or government restrictions, required completion date, and construction feasibility. Monitors the coordination with architecture/engineering firms in developing design criteria and preparing layout and detail drawings. Directs the preparation of bid sheets and contracts for construction and facilities acquisition. Oversees the review and estimation of design costs including equipment, installation, labor, materials, preparation, and other related costs. Directs the inspection of construction and installation progress to ensure conformance to established drawings, specifications, and schedules. Security Clearance: TS/SCI w/Poly Typical Minimums: Appropriate degree from an accredited college, or equivalent experience/combined education, with professional experience and specialized training commensurate with assignment. LMCareers Business Unit ESS0160 IS&GS-NATIONAL (S8200) Business Area Info Systems & Global Sol Program CFOAM Department 6351001:CFOAM_SI Job Class Facilities Job Category Experienced Professional State virginia Virtual No Relocation Available Negotiable Work Schedule STANDARD-Mon-Fri/8 hours a day Req Type Full-Time Direct/Indirect Direct Shift First
+
+## Training Instructor - Las Cruces, Nm - Hits06101035 Description:
+
+Training Instructor Job Code:HITS06101035
+
+Job Description: - Work as part of a team of contract and government geospatial intelligence analysis instructors that will provide instruction in AGI, SAR,imagery analysis, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Remote Sensing (RS) and sensors - Teach the application of AGI with a prime focus on SAR, analysis techniques and instruct on the theory, techniques, procedures and sensors used to produce digital and hardcopy AGI products from radar imagery - Development and revision of AGI (SAR) courses that are instructional systems design (ISD) compliant.  To include the integration of multi-media course instructional materials, equipment and non-traditional (NTM, commercial, advanced geospatial intelligence) data - Provide instruction in tailored intelligence analysis and production utilizing SAR to support customer requirements from offices in NGA/P and the rest of the intelligence community - Classroom management - Delivery and support of mobile training team, provide SAR training to external customers - Prepare for possible Mobile Training Team assignments Qualifications: - BS degree in image science, remote sensing, earth science, physics or related discipline, plus a minimum of 10 years related work experience - Demonstrated experience providing instructional materials in classroom setting - Experience with SAR AGI - Demonstrated skills and abilities necessary to provide SAR subject matter - Expertise to NGA and community customers - Knowledge of spectral imaging systems technology and collection parameters - Experience with applied image processing and analysis - Knowledge of process improvement techniques for improving customer support
+
+## Preferred Additional Skills: - Excellent Oral And Written Communication Skills This Position Requires The Candidate To Already Possess An Active Ts/Ssbi Clearance And To Maintain The Clearance.
+
+http://careers.northropgrumman.com/tasc/getJobPostDetail.do?sequenceNumber=206468
+[Accessed 2010-08-11]
+Title:  Engineer Info Assurance 5 Category:  Security Location:  Las Cruces, NM / USA   |   Sector:  TASC Posting ID:  TA/116505 Description: General Description: TASC is seeking an Information System Security Engineer (ISSE) to join our team of qualified, diverse individuals. This position will be located in Las Cruces, NM. The qualified applicant will become part of TASC's Team, and with minimal supervision, design, develop, and implement specific Information Assurance (IA) countermeasures for network environments. An ISSE is a senior level security professional who provides consistent application of security best practices in the areas of information systems, network security, telecommunications security, and Technical Security Countermeasures (TSCM), product evaluations and other related security technology to the Intelligence Community (IC) and IC sponsored facilities. Represent the USG at federal and industrial sponsored meetings and symposiums, facility and systems security policy committees, and working groups. Have direct interaction with senior USG officials and various contractor personnel. Ensure that network system designs support the incorporation of IC and DoD-directed security guidelines, requirements matrices, and IA vulnerability solutions. Develop and implement security designs ensuring the design of hardware, operating systems, and software applications adequately address IA security requirements. Assess the effectiveness of information protection measures used. Develop approaches to mitigate vulnerabilities and recommend changes to network or network system components as needed. Review and write Certification and Accreditation (C&A) documentation to ensure compliance with security requirements. Review and provide comments on IA documents and instructions. Candidates with these desired skills will be given preferential consideration: Microsoft, Linux, or VMWare and Cisco certification with in-depth experience in security engineering. CISSP and other certifications a plus. Candidate must possess strong problem solving/analytical, communication, organizational and teambuilding skills; as well as the ability to write/review corresponding documentation using the MS Office Suite. Experience with the Information Assurance Technical Framework or ISSE Processes, DIACAP or NIST C&A processes & documentation a must. Must be a U.S. Citizen and possess an active TS/SCI security clearance with CI Polygraph. Some travel may be required. Start date contingent upon contract award estimated on 1 December 2010. Position Summary / Responsibilities Designs and implements information assurance and security engineering systems with requirements of business continuity, operations security, cryptography, forensics, regulatory compliance, internal counter-espionage (insider threat detection and mitigation), physical security analysis (including facilities analysis, and security management). Assesses and mitigates system security threats and risks throughout the program life cycle. Validates system security requirements definition and analysis. Establishes system security designs. Implements security designs in hardware, software, data, and procedures. Verifies security requirements; performs system certification and accreditation planning and testing and liaison activities. Supports secure systems operations and maintenance. Additional Requirements: Knowledge, Skills and Ability Apply advanced technical principles, theories, and concepts. Contributes to the development of new principles and concepts. Problem Solving Work on unusually complex technical problems and provide solutions which are highly innovative and ingenious. Discretion/Latitude Works under consultative direction toward predetermined long-range goals and objectives. Assignments are often self-initiated. Determine and pursue courses of action necessary to obtain desired results. Work checked through consultation and agreement with others rather than by formal review of superior. Impact Develops advanced technological ideas and guides their development into a final product. Erroneous decisions or recommendations would typically result in failure to achieve critical organizational objectives and effect the image of the organization technological capability. Liaison Serves as organization spokesperson on advanced projects and/or programs. Acts as advisor to management and customers on advanced technical research studies and applications. Typical Minimum Education / Experience 14 Years with Bachelors in Science; 12 Years with Masters; 9 Years with PhD. Security Clearance Required.
+
+## Software Engineer - Las Cruces Radiantblue Technologies Posted On: 7/30/10 Minimum Security Clearance Top Secret/Sci
+
+We are seeking forward thinking technologists and software developers who apply cutting edge technologies to solve problems of national security. The software engineer will work in a prototyping environment to build and integrate COTS, open source, and proprietary technologies to deliver novel solutions to challenging problems. Will be responsible for choosing the right technologies to solve problems. Must be able to work independently and as part of a team to see a vision successfully implemented. Will work closely with users and stake-holders to help understand needs and shape requirements.
+
+Position Requirements: - Java, C++, or C# programming expertise - Web services/Service oriented architectures (SOA) expertise - Familiarity with SQL database development - BS in Computer Science or related discipline - Selected applicants will be subject to a government security investigation and must meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information. An active TS/SCI clearance is required.
+
+## Preferred Experience/Knowledge: - Familiarity With The Intelligence Community - Experience With Highly-Scalable And Highly-Available Web Service Environments - Experience With Oracle
+
+About RadiantBlue Technologies: RadiantBlue is a specialized provider of information technology development, consulting, and program support services for the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community. We are focused on the rapid development, integration, and delivery of innovative technologies that provide value for our customers. As a RadiantBlue employee you will have the opportunity to apply your talent and ideas to solve challenging problems that are of importance to the nation's defense and security. Please visit our web site www.radiantblue.com to apply or to get more information about the company and employee benefits. RadiantBlue Technologies is an equal opportunity employer. Preferences 5+ yrs experience Employee Industry Category: IT Software-Prog YY4VQTUUFVQMET1T815QEEACWFMX26PM9DG1E7KVOK9ICUANP15W9K1NQKXQHKM
+VGIVSCN4H5D4W9IL47TIN7G5SELOIZ9KGWMUSCMET5NFA7VRV65BNVTIQ0KVTIQ0L3H
+7ATQ8
+[Accessed 2009-05-25]
+Job Category  FAC - Facilities / Physical Security Req ID 142634 Able to obtain security clearance?
+
+Top Secret/SCI w/ CI Polygraph Currently possess security clearance?
+
+Top Secret SCI
+Location Las Cruces, NM
+Relocation No Requirements: SAIC seeks a highly qualified mid-level Information Security Engineer to perform as an Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) supporting a high-priority real-time operational center that directly impacts US national security. The position is in the Las Cruces, NM area. An active and current Top Secret SCI clearance is required, with the ability to obtain a CI polygraph.
+
+## Job Description:
+
+The position involves information security analysis and engineering; and participating in various information security activities required to ensure the integrity of the customer's networks, applications, and information. The selected candidate will assist in developing and maintaining the overall system security documentation in accordance with the DCID 6/3. In addition, the individual will work closely with certifiers to navigate the customer's certification & accreditation process and produce all appropriate accreditation documentation. Duties include ensuring systems are designed, operated, maintained and retired in accordance with established policies and procedures; that users are properly briefed on information security responsibilities and processes; initiating protective or corrective measures in response to security incidents; and conducting periodic reviews to ensure compliance. The candidate will interact with government and other contractor personnel on a regular basis to provide IT security consulting for other security documents such as security incident reports, equipment/software inventories, operating instructions, technical vulnerability reports, and contingency plans. Occasional travel to government and contractor facilities within the continental US may be required once or twice per year. EDUCATION: Bachelor's Degree required, preferably in a technical discipline. Candidate must possess at least 5 years of relevant information security experience associated with the certification and accreditation of classified systems. REQUIRED SKILLS: Current TOP SECRET SCI is required. Candidate must have expertise in securing networks and systems with a thorough understanding of network topologies and associated hardware and software; and operating systems (UNIX, Windows, and Linux). Knowledge of systems engineering and system development lifecycle is required. The ISSO shall possess strong communication and interpersonal skills as he/she operates as part of a multi-contractor team and directly engages in a customer-facing role. Must possess experience with DCID 6/3 standards along with computer security best practices. DESIRED SKILLS: Ideal candidate should have expertise with IDS-SourceFire, Trusted Guard, Firewalls and Solaris Log analysis; knowledge of Cisco and Juniper devices. A current Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) or similar security professional certification is highly desired.
+
+http://www.3001inc.com/GeoHome/careers.asp http://www.3001inc.com/GeoHome/careers.asp
+
+## Job Description National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Job Announcement Number: 080473
+
+Project Scientist SALARY RANGE: 36,030.00 - 59,895.00 USD per year Salary may vary depending on locality. Please refer to www.nga.mil/careers for additional salary information.OPEN PERIOD: Monday, March 10, 2008 to Friday, March 21, 2008 SERIES & GRADE: NI-0000-02/02POSITION INFORMATION: Full Time This is a permanent position. DUTY LOCATIONS: 1 vacancy - White Sands Missile Range, NM WHO MAY BE CONSIDERED: All Sources ONLY ELECTRONIC SUBMISSIONS WILL BE ACCEPTED. JOB SUMMARY: The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the World Leader in Geospatial Intelligence. Imagine being able to identify anything on, above, or beneath the Earth's surface and display that information visually to provide a meaningful foundation for decision-making to ensure the safety of the world. That's the job of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.  We analyze imagery and data from many sources and incorporate it into visual displays of essential information for use in national defense, homeland security, and safety of navigation.  Central to the success of our mission are the extraordinary talents and skills of our teams of analysts and other professionals. We need the best minds to provide the information edge, continuing NGA's role as the premier provider of Geospatial Intelligence worldwide. NGA - Know the Earth . . .Show the Way. JOB DESCRIPTION: Project Scientists are responsible for the day-to-day execution and technical oversight of a variety of scientific activities. They develop project schedules, determine resource requirements, provide technical guidance and oversight, and report results. Project Scientists apply in-depth expertise from a variety of scientific disciplines (e.g., Photogrammetry, Geodesy, Computer Science, Mathematics, Image Science) to develop, analyze, evaluate, and apply new technology; develop expertise and tradecraft for the Agency; and advise senior management on new and evolving technology. They participate in strategic planning, propose and defend program plans, and communicate and market results to customers and decision-makers. They may additionally serve as COR. KEY REQUIREMENTS: U.S. CitizenshipDrug TestingSecurity Investigation Send Mail to: NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 12310 Sunrise Valley Drive Reston, VA 20190 For questions about this job: Recruitment Phone: 703-755-5900 JOB REQUIREMENTS 080473
+Project Scientist QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED: MANDATORY QUALIFICATION CRITERIA: Experience that equipped the applicant with the particular knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform successfully the duties of this position, and that is typically in or related to the work of this position. For this particular job, applicants must have experience in the following: Customer Service; Interpersonal Relationship Development/Networking; Oral Communication; Briefing and Oral Presentation; Non-technical Writing; Leadership; Planning and Scheduling; Problem Identification, Analysis and Resolution. DESIRABLE QUALIFICATION CRITERIA: In addition to the mandatory qualifications, experience in the following is desired: a demonstrated knowledge of Intelligence Community (IC) membership, mission, goals, and priorities; Customer service principles; Decision-making processes; Civilian agencies (e.g., USGS, DOS); Technical writing; Testing and Evaluation. EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS: A. Education: Bachelor's degree in Engineering, Mathematics, Physical Science, or a related discipline that includes 24 semester (36 quarter) hours in Physical Science and/or a related Engineering Science. Such coursework includes, but is not limited to, Astronomy, Cartography, Chemistry, Computer Science, Dynamics, Electrical Engineering, Geodesy, Geology, Geophysics, Geospatial Information Systems, Mathematics, Orbital Mechanics, Photogrammetry, Physics, Remote Sensing, or Surveying. Although not mandatory, coursework in differential and integral calculus is preferred. -OR- B. Combination of Education and Experience: A minimum of 24 semester (36 quarter) hours of college education in any areas listed in option A plus experience that demonstrates the ability to successfully perform the duties associated with this work. As a rule, every 30 semester (45 quarter) hours of college work is equivalent to one year of experience. Candidates should show that their combination of education and experience totals to 4 years.
+
+SPECIAL INFO: - Direct Deposit Required - Two Year Probationary Period - U.S. Citizenship Required - Position Subject to Drug Testing - Security Clearance Required - Top Secret - Sensitive Compartmented Information - Polygraph Test Required
+SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: You must be able to obtain and retain a Top Secret security clearance with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information. This process may take up to one year or more to be completed. In addition, you may be required to successfully complete a polygraph examination for the current position you applied for and/or for any future position(s). NARRATIVES REQUIRED: The following required narratives will supplement the information contained in the applicant's resume. Applicants are REQUIRED to submit a narrative on the following KSAs. Entire narrative CANNOT exceed the specific limits provided on the KSA field. Pages exceeding this limit will not be considered. FAILURE TO SUBMIT NARRATIVE RESPONSES TO THE KSA WILL DISQUALIFY AN APPLICANT FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION. Applicants should place their narrative information in the appropriate field at the Job History and KSA Text Page. The KSAs are: 1. Demonstrate your ability to effectively manage multiple assignments within established time constraints. 2. Demonstrate your ability to communicate effectively both orally and in writing. JOB RESPONSIBILITIES,  DUTIES, TASKS 080473 Project Scientist Additional Duty Location Info:1 vacancy - White Sands Missile Range, NM ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: The employee selected for this position will have an important role in the Advanced Geospatial Intelligence (AGI) work being performed through the Geospatial Intelligence Advancement Testbed (GIAT) Portfolio (IIG) efforts to acquire and exploit advanced sources for geospatial intelligence and to integrate these sources into AGI analysis and problem solutions. Duties include analysis, test and evaluation of commercial software applications; scientific problem solving and development of prototype processes and applications for customers in the Integrated Operations Center - Southwest (IOC-SW), NGA, IC and DoD; investigation of potential new sources of AGI; the use of Multi-Intelligence data sources (SIGINT, MASINT) to develop future capabilities for IOC-SW intelligence initiatives; information visualization; and engaging in collaborative partnerships for rapid solution development. PERMANENT CHANGE IN STATION: Travel/Transportation expenses are not authorized. HOW TO APPLY JOB BENEFITS AND OTHER INFORMATION 080473 Project Scientist BENEFITS: Pay is only part of the compensation you will earn working for the Federal Government. We offer a broad array of benefits programs and family friendly flexibilities to meet the needs of you and your family. Here are some highlights. Look for additional information along with links to pages that spell out the details below. You may participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits program, with costs shared with your employer. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#FEHB Life insurance coverage is provided. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#life Long-Term Care Insurance is offered and carries into your retirement. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#ltci New employees are automatically covered by the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). If you are transferring from another agency and covered by CSRS, you may continue in this program. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#retr You will earn annual vacation leave. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#VACA You will earn sick leave. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#SKLV You will be paid for federal holidays that fall within your regularly scheduled tour of duty. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#HOLI In addition to federal benefits, NGA employees are also eligible for a suite of benefits offered only to the Intelligence Community (IC). The Compass Rose Benefits Group (CRBG) offers insurance products and services to all IC civilian employees. Compass Rose benefits include: Term Life Insurance, Group Accident Plan, Income Replacement, and Long Term Care Insurance. For more information on this highly-restricted opportunity, please visit the Compass Rose website: http://www.compassrosebenefits.com Source Strategies Analyst Job Information Post Date:
+May 22, 2009
+Type:
+Full time Start Date:
+- n/a -
+Salary: - n/a -
+Location:
+New Mexico - White Sands Missile Range Job Reference: - n/a -
+Job Details Description Open date: 2009-02-09 Close date: 2009-02-20 The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the World Leader in Geospatial Intelligence. Imagine being able to identify anything on, above, or beneath the Earth's surface and display that information visually to provide a meaningful foundation for decision-making to ensure the safety of the world. That's the job of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. We analyze imagery and data from many sources and incorporate it into visual displays of essential information for use in national defense, homeland security, and safety of navigation. Central to the success of our mission are the extraordinary talents and skills of our teams of analysts and other professionals. We need the best minds to provide the information edge, continuing NGA's role as the premier provider of Geospatial Intelligence worldwide. NGA - Know the Earth . . .Show the Way. ASSIGNMENT DESCRIPTION: Source Strategies Analysts collaborate with customers and source providers to develop comprehensive multi-INT, multi-source strategies to address intelligence problems. They create tasking and dissemination requirements, adjudicate requirements, analyze and investigate collection performance, assess and report on end-to-end GEOINT system performance data, and advise customers in support of the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence (NSG). ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: The Source Directorate, Source Strategies Office, Source Fusion Center Southwest is seeking a highly qualified and motivated individual to support a key element of its distributed Source Fusion Center "Community Support" operations team that will enable multi-intelligence collection initiatives with mission partners and the IC customer base. The selected individual will champion horizontal integration between a wide range of national technical means, maximizing the value of GEOINT as a mechanism to drive analytical and complementary intelligence efforts in a real time environment. The individual must have a fundamental understanding of all intelligence disciplines, with an emphasis on GEOINT, SIGINT, ONIR and other technical means and must be capable of operating in dynamic situations, and responding to stakeholders within and outside their direct supervisory chain. The selected individual will be required to exercise verbal and written communication skills in the preparation and presentation of technical analysis, position papers, operational briefings, and operational procedures. The selected individual will also be required to maintain a close working relationship with the NGA analytical elements at multiple physical locations and will be required to provide direct support for both the Integrated Operations Center South West (IOC-SW) and Integrated Operations Center Special Programs (IOC-SP) while maintaining a basic understanding of the architectures that support such activities.
+
+[Accessed 2009-06-28]
+Technical Writer-01076817 Description Key Role: Write, develop, and deliver Advanced Geospatial-Intelligence (AGI) correspondence, articles, policies, and a CONOPS plan for delivery to the geospatial intelligence community. Aid in content decisions on various media and staff responses thru various communication means. Create AGI graphics and materials that creatively portrays all programs to customers, both internal and external. Support the intelligence community director with AGI and other miscellaneous written materials, including draft and edit executive briefing materials, such as PowerPoint slides and notes for presentation to other directorates, IC partners, service schools, associations, and public industry. This position is located in Las Cruces, NM.
+
+## Qualifications
+
+Basic Qualifications: -2+ years of experience with technical writings and reports -Experience with reviewing and editing technical reports for formatting and accuracy -Experience with Microsoft Word, and PowerPoint -Experience with graphics design -TS/SCI clearance
+
+## Additional Qualifications:
+
+-Ability to show participation in or directing the activities of highly skilled technical and analytical teams with analytical and intelligence problems -Ability to work alone and share information with team members and customers in a timely manner -Possession of excellent oral and written communication skills -Possession of excellent customer support skills -BA or BS degree preferred
+
+## Clearance:
+
+Applicants selected will be subject to a security investigation and may need to meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information; TS/SCI clearance is required. Integrating the full range of consulting capabilities, Booz Allen is the one firm that helps clients solve their toughest problems, working by their side to help them achieve their missions. Booz Allen is committed to delivering results that endure. We are proud of our diverse environment, EOE, M/F/D/V. Job Writing Primary Location United States-New Mexico-Las Cruces http://www.simplyhired.com/job-id/kyuwtokka6/software-engineer-jobs/
+[Accessed 2009-06-29]
+
+## Software Engineer Saic - Las Cruces, Nm
+
+The Space and Geospatial Intelligence Business Unit currently has an opening for a Software Engineer at White Sands Missile Range located in Las Cruces, NM. Candidates must have an active Top Secret/SCI security clearance and must be able to obtain a CI Polygraph. POSITION DUTIES: The Software Engineer will work with other SAIC Software Engineers analyzing requirements, developing and integrating appropriate technical solutions, and delivering and maintaining business support capabilities for a government customer. At a minimum, the Software Engineer will: 1) Work with the customer and developer staff to identify and prioritize tasks as well as provide analysis and recommendations for the appropriate technical solutions to customer requirements 2) Promote a collaborative work environment with... Location: Las Cruces, NM Area Code: 505 Tax Term: FULLTIME Pay Rate: tbd Length: Position ID: HITS06091008 Dice ID: harrisme Travel Required: none Telecommute: no Title:  Software Engineer Skills:Previous software development experience Date: 6-25-2009 Job Description: Responsible for research, design, and development of computer software systems, in conjunction with hardware product development Analyze software requirements to determine feasibility of design within time and cost contraints Consult with electrical and/or mechanical engineers and other engineering staff to evaluate interface between hardware and software, and operational performance requirements of the overall system Develop and direct software system testing procedures, programming and documentation
+
+## Qualifications:
+
+Successful candidates will have a Bachelors Degree (or the equivalent ) in Computer Science (or related technical field) as well as 5 years relevant professional experience Requires the application of the principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis Previous software development experience Experience working in a team environment with minimal direct supervision This position requires the candidate to be able to obtain a TS/SCI security clearance. In order to obtain a clearance you need to be a US Citizen and show proof of citizenship. By submitting your resume for this position, you understand and agree that Harris Corporation may share your resume, as well as any other related personal information or documentation you provide, with its subsidiaries and affiliated companies (including Harris Stratex Networks, Inc.) for the purpose of considering you for other available positions. Harris MS D-11B Melbourne, FL 32919 Web: http://www.careers.harris.com This is Google's cache of http://www.jobcentral.com/jobs/The_Boeing_Company/NM/Facilities_Mechanical_Engineer_3/010520541/job.
+
+It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on May 7, 2009 22:50:50 GMT.
+
+Title : Facilities Mechanical Engineer 3 Company : The Boeing Company Location : Las Cruces, NM 88004 Date Acquired : 4/24/2009 11:32:58 PM Date Updated : 5/4/2009 1:23:48 AM
+
+## Facilities Mechanical Engineer 3
+
+Requisition Number: 09-1004080 Job Status: Activated - Posting Type: Posted Internally and Externally. - Posting Status: Available Location Las Cruces, NM Business Unit Integrated Defense Sys Division Global Services & Support Program Defense & Government Services Relocation Money Available? No Date Posted 04/24/2009 Closing Date (Things you should know about closing dates) 06/23/2009
+
+## Position Description
+
+Develops moderately complex conceptual designs, final designs, cost estimates and provides maintenance support for the mechanical phases of buildings, equipment installations, utility systems and grounds. Reviews mechanical designs to assess compliance with customer requirements, building codes and applicable regulations by applying knowledge of construction principles, practices, and materials. Ensures accuracy of drawing archives/libraries by reviewing contractor redlines. Identifies errors and documents construction changes to comply with regulatory requirements, facility standards, and record retention requirements. Manages or supports construction projects by providing input on vendor selection; reviews contractor proposals; interfaces with government/regulatory agencies; monitors project progress and vendor/consultant performance. Prepares and presents project information to ensure compliance with applicable construction documents and jurisdictional requirements and to meet project objectives. Produces or procures detailed design documents. Uses appropriate resources to produce project drawings, specifications, and permit application packages in accordance with project parameters. Coordinates designs. Reviews and approves documents. Translates customer requirements into design options with documents and estimates. Identifies appropriate materials, equipment, and services by applying engineering principles and methodology. With limited supervision, develops and updates design standards and site-specific operating procedures in order to establish common practices. Provides input to strategic, short-term, and long-term infrastructure planning; completes studies; analyzes current conditions and future requirements; recommends capital improvements; gathers and analyzes data; and works with both internal and external customers in order to identify and assess alternatives and impacts. Translates customer requirements into conceptual design by analyzing intended use/occupancy and desired aesthetics, conducting code research, developing preliminary design elements, determining interdisciplinary engineering support requirements, estimating resource costs/requirements, identifying materials, equipment, and services, and developing initial project schedule in order to establish project scope in response to customer requirements. Plans, manages, and executes projects. Leads a team of stakeholders in the acquisition and modification of assets to enable the customer to achieve the defined business objectives in accordance with company and accounting policies. Manages project expenditures within authorized budgets. Creates, maintains, and communicates project management information. Assists in the creation of contract scope. Ensures suppliers comply with all contract obligations. Interprets and analyzes applicable regulations, standards, codes, and ordinances with respect to project requirements. Offers project alternatives in order to assure compliance. Provides support, as required, to secure permits.
+
+## Competencies General
+
+[deletia]
+
+## [ + ] Planning And Organizing
+
+Identifies more critical and less critical activities and assignments; adjusts priorities when appropriate. Determines project or assignment requirements by breaking them down into tasks and identifying types of equipment, materials, and people needed. Allocates appropriate amounts of time for completing own work; avoids scheduling conflicts. Takes advantage of available resources (individuals, processes, departments, and tools) to complete work efficiently; coordinates with internal and external partners. Uses time effectively and prevents irrelevant issues or distractions from interfering with work completion. [deletia] Typical Education/Experience Degree and typical experience in engineering classification: Bachelor's and 5 or more years' experience, Master's degree with 3 or more years' experience or PhD degree with experience. Bachelor, Master or Doctorate of Science degree from an accredited course of study, in engineering, computer science, mathematics, physics or chemistry. ABET is the preferred, although not required, accreditation standard.
+
+## Other Job Related Information This Position Is Located In Las Cruces, Nm. Candidate Is Preferred To Have A Current Ts/Sci Clearance With Ci Polygraph, Or Must Have The Ability To Obtain These Clearance Requirements. Us Citizenship Is Required Of Candidate. Subsidiary Benefits. This Position Is Contingent Upon Contract Award.
+
+*** Please note that depending on the specific position, you may be required to pass additional medical tests, credit checks, and/or other requirements. These additional items are required for the Company to comply with various laws and regulatory rules.***
+http://www.jobsontheline.com/index.php?post_id=26445
+JAVA Programmer Analyst - Paragon Dynamics - Las Cruces, NM Posted date: 2009-Jun-07
+
+## Location: Las Cruces, Nm
+
+JAVA Programmer Analyst - Paragon Dynamics - Las Cruces, NM Date: Sat, 06 Jun 2009 21:40:30 GMT requires US Citizenship and a Top Secret\SCI Security Clearance and ability to successfully pass a polygraph examination. Job Location: Las Cruces, New Mexico.
+
+## Paragon Dynamics, Inc
+
+JAVA Programmer Analyst Location:
+Las Cruces, NM
+Job Code:
+15830
+# of openings: 1
+
+## Description
+
+JAVA Programmer Analyst - Software engineer responsible for development, maintenance, and enhancements of existing proprietary collaboration software application. Candidate will be responsible for overall user requirements, system design and analysis, coding, test & integration, and general system administration. Application is a web enabled, sophisticated virtual collaboration environment developed using J2EE, JBOSS, MySQL, Eclipse, and CVS running on Windows servers with Unix and Windows clients. Candidate will perform software engineering and produce architecture and requirements documentation products. Qualified candidate will monitor system reliability, develop process improvements and ensure system interoperability across future systems development efforts as well as legacy systems. Technical writing skills are necessary to develop user and system administrator documentation. Must be able to interface daily with customers and users. Minimum requirements: Two years of specific experience in software engineering expertise to include analysis, design, and coding experience; experience developing JAVA applications using J2EE on a Windows based operating system using object oriented techniques; knowledge of application servers, web servers, data bases; ability to work in a team environment or independently to perform design, coding and unit test of software units of work; one year demonstrated Java software design and development experience; experience in developing Java applications and applets to monitor and control automated processing systems; and experience and ability to develop software using Java on Windows platforms. UNIX and Windows system administration skills are critical for success in this position. Education:
+
+## A Bachelor's Degree In Engineering Is Required With Two Years Experience, However, A Substitute Degree (Listed Below) With Equivalent Experience May Also Qualify. Typical Degrees Include: Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Information Systems, Information Technology, Computer Information Systems, Computer Systems Engineering. This Position Requires Us Citizenship And A Top Secret\Sci Security Clearance And Ability To Successfully Pass A Polygraph Examination. Job Location: Las Cruces, New Mexico.
+
+Founded in 1997, Paragon Dynamics, Inc. (PDI) is a wholly owned subsidiary of KOR Electronics, Inc and is a small business with headquarters in Aurora, Colorado. PDI provides innovative systems, software and mission engineering solutions to a variety of Department of Defense and Aerospace clients. We specialize in system design, architecture and integration; software development and implementation; and mission operations, analysis and support. Our expertise is applied to government and aerospace National Systems Programs through the dedicated professionals at PDI who consist of highly qualified engineers with direct experience in government and commercial satellite, DoD Intelligence Community, and IT infrastructure programs. Our projects -- past and presentinclude: on-orbit space programs; ground based processing programs; C4ISR system development programs; and analysis, design and integration programs. Our engineers, scientists, and project managers possess extensive experience in all aspects of systems development and integration from conception to implementation of complex ground and satellite systems. Paragon Dynamics is strategically located in major defense and mission operational hubs - Colorado, California, and the Washington, DC metro area - to completely serve our customer segments.
+
+=simplyhired Location: Las Cruces, NM Area Code: 505 Tax Term: FULLTIME Pay Rate: tbd Length: Position ID: HITS02091056 Dice ID: harrisme Travel Required: none Telecommute: no Title: Electrical Engineer - TS/SSBI Required Skills:Position requires a current Top Secret/SSBI Security Clearance Date:5-23-2009 Description: Job Responsibilities: * Responsible for designing, developing, modifying and evaluating electronic parts, components, or integrated circuitry for electronic equipment or other hardware systems * Determines design approaches and parameters. Analyzes electrical requirements to determine feasibility of design within time and cost constraints * Analyzes equipment to establish operating data, conducts experimental tests and evaluates results * Selects components and equipment based on analysis of specifications and reliability * May also review vendor capability to support development Qualifications: * Requires a Bachelors degree and 5+ years of experience * Knowledge of basic AC and DC power and grounding principles. Knowledge of heat dissipation and cooling principles * Experience in hardware systems installation / integration * Experience in the use of Electronic Test equipment to include oscilloscopes and multi-meters * Experience in basic system evaluation, design, modification and repair * Computer skills to include basic administration for MS Windows, Linux and UNIX * Use of MS office for documentation generation/updates * Working experience of Autocad and Visio drawing programs * Applicants selected will be subject to a government security investigation and must meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information. Position requires a current Top Secret/SSBI Security Clearance By submitting your resume for this position, you understand and agree that Harris Corporation may share your resume, as well as any other related personal information or documentation you provide, with its subsidiaries and affiliated companies (including Harris Stratex Networks, Inc.) for the purpose of considering you for other available positions Harris MS D-11B Melbourne, FL 32919 Web: http://www.careers.harris.com http://www.simplyhired.com/job-id/rsc23cvttq/technical-writer-jobs/
+[Accessed 2009-05-29]
+    * TECHNICAL WRITER 3 CACI International - New Mexico Duties and Responsibilities:Part-time (20 hours/week) technical writer/subject matter expert (SME) supporting the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency in White Sands, NM. TS/SCI clearance required. SME will assist IOC-SW Director and all elements of IOC-SW develop, propose, provide, advise, update, and maintain an active program of information sharing both within and external to IOC-SW, using a variety of media and formats. Must possess superior writing skills and have an advanced level of understanding of Advanced Geospatial-Intelligence sensors, tools, and techniques. These tasks include: * Must write, develop and deliver basic, intermediate and advanced levels of AGI correspondence, articles, policies, CONOPS Plan focusing on SAR for delivery to NGA and other geospatial intelligence community... Systems Engineer I Raytheon Posted on: 8/9/10 Minimum Security Clearance: Top Secret/SCI Location: Las Cruces, New Mexico  88001 (map) Workplace: On-Site/Office Travel: 25% - defined as 25% of your time traveling Job Description: Raytheon is currently seeking a System Engineer who will support the Double Eagle Program, a program that is responsible for Mission Management and Command and Control functions for an operational system. Responsibilities include performing technical planning, system integration, verification and validation, cost and risk, and supportability and effectiveness analyses for total systems. Analyses are performed at all levels of total system product to include: concept, design, fabrication, test, installation, operation, maintenance and disposal. The individual selected for this position will also ensures the logical and systematic conversion of customer or product requirements into total systems solutions that acknowledge technical, schedule, and cost constraints, performs functional analysis, timeline analysis, detail trade studies, requirements allocation and interface definition studies to translate customer requirements into hardware and software specifications. This position is responsible for developing, integrating and verifying a conflict free resource schedule. This plan serves as the basis of daily communications and special applications testing. The position requires interactive responses to complex operational and engineering software as well as real time analysis of test results to obtain desired outcome. Internal and external segment coordination is required to generate recurring, unique and special test activities. The position is also responsible for the initiation of timely contingency planning activities as a result of system problems or abnormal circumstances. Specific responsibilities include but not limited to:
+
+    * Supporting operational procedure development to include identifying necessary cross-functional procedural requirements * Supporting the successful completion of major program milestones * Executing real-time control activities, and monitoring operational systems * Interacting with external personnel on technical matters often requiring coordination between organizations
+
+## Required Skills:
+
+    * Must have a B.S. degree in Engineering or related discipline or possess equivalent experience in lieu of a degree * Must have strong system engineering, analytical, and problem solving skills in a team environment * Must be able to work productively in a complex, multi-customer, contractor and technology environment * Must have basic computer skills sufficient for use of multiple proprietary software systems simultaneously * Must be able to work with general directions and determine and develop approaches to solutions * Must be able to frequently interact within the organization as well as have frequent outside customer contacts * Must be able to ensure that projects are completed on time * Must be able to complete training to comply with positional certification requirements * Must have strong analytical Skills
+ * Must have strong communication and interpersonal skills * Must be available to work a Rotating Shift work schedule involving a variety of fluctuating schedules including work shifts, rotating through days, nights, weekends and holidays. Qualified applicants may be subject to a security investigation and must meet minimum qualifications for access to classified information. U.S. Citizenship with eligibility to satisfy requirements for a TS/SCI SSBI security clearance required . Geospatial Analyst Job Date: Sep 22, 2011 Location: Las Cruces, NM, US Geospatial Analyst-01112197
+
+## Description
+
+Key Role: Perform research, contribute to the preparation of analytical and technical reports and publications, prepare graphics, and maintain hard and soft copy files, including target folders, film files, collateral files, and other publications. Create and maintain databases, summary data, spreadsheets, and graphic documents and maintain Intelink Web sites. Use Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to extract or access geospatial information, derivative information, and multi-intelligence data to provide requirements, currency, accuracy, readiness, responsiveness, data integrity, and relevancy recommendations that support the analysis and visualization of geospatial data available for use by the military, intelligence, and policy-making communities. This position is located in Las Cruces, NM.
+
+## Qualifications
+
+Basic Qualifications: -18+ months of experience in working with Geographic Information Systems (GIS) -Experience with ERDAS Imagine, SOCCET, GXP, or ESRI Arc suite, including ArcGIS, ArcMap, ArcIMS, and ArcSDE -Experience with modeling, spatial regression analysis, or human terrain analysis -Top Secret clearance -BS degree in Remote Sensing, Earth Science, or Physical Science; or equivalent experience with the military Additional Qualifications: -Experience with NGA -TS/SCI clearance preferred
+
+## Clearance: Applicants Selected Will Be Subject To A Security Investigation And May Need To Meet Eligibility Requirements For Access To Classified Information; Top Secret Clearance Is Required.
+
+Integrating the full range of consulting capabilities, Booz Allen is the one firm that helps clients solve their toughest problems, working by their side to help them achieve their missions. Booz Allen is committed to delivering results that endure. We are proud of our diverse environment, EOE, M/F/D/V. Job: Intelligence Analysis Primary Location: United States-New Mexico-Las Cruces Travel: Yes, 15% of the time http://www.job.com/my.job/jobdisplay/page=jobview/pt=2/key=101873444/
+Configuration Analyst II Company: Raytheon Location: Las Cruces, New Mexico Salary: Not Specified Category: Administrative / Clerical Date Posted: 10/11/2011 Job Description: Raytheon is seeking a Configuration Analysts II that will be responsible for configuration control of the operational baseline, managing the Configuration Management database (CMDB) and performing the analysis of proposed product changes to determine effect on overall CMDB system. Ensures all configuration items (CI) are identified and controlled and that status accounting and audits are performed. Also responsible for providing advice and guidance on methods, procedures and requirements to individuals responsible for entering CI's into the CMDB. Position is located in Las Cruces, NM Required Skills: Must have a BS Degree in an IT related field or possess equivalent experience in lieu of a degree Must have a minimum of 2 years related experience in creating Change Requests and maintaining documentation for IT networks Must have experience in overseeing Change boards Must have experience in maintaining Interface Control Documentation Must be proficient in use of VISIO or similar drawing package Must have Security + certification Must become 8570 Certified within 6 months of start date! Qualified applicants may be subject to a security investigation and must meet minimum qualifications for access to classified information. U. S. Citizenship and an active TS/SCI security clearance with a CI Polygraph required. Qualified applicants may be subject to a security investigation and must meet minimum qualifications for access to classified information. U. S. Citizenship and an active TS/SCI security clearance with a CI Polygraph required. Job ID:  HITS09111223
+
+Scientist - Las Cruces, NM - HITS09111223 Description: Job Title: Scientist Job Code:  HITS09111223 Job Description: Leads the assimilation of new algorithm processes into operations. Design the research approach and structure proof-of-concept demonstrations to determine operational feasibility of new algorithms. Possess experience and knowledge of basic SAR AGI systems and platforms, operations, phenomenology, the impact on SAR processing, analysis and exploitation. Possess knowledge of, and demonstrated ability to perform, SAR AGI analysis. Experience in conducting research and development activities. Act as a liaison between operators and the research and development scientists. Lead the refinement of algorithms and processes and in the migration of mature processes to automated mainstream systems. Independently seeks sources of knowledge to share with operations team. Assists engineers on maintenance with preliminary investigation of reported software and hardware anomalies. Assists operators as needed in performing manual product processing using new and mature algorithms. Provide Help Desk support. On-call will be required. Qualifications:
+
+    Requires a MS degree (or the equivalent) in a related field with a minimum of 6 years of related experience. Proficiency in Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) required. Ability to solve complex problems.
+Preffered Additional Skills: Familiarity with various programming, UNIX, MatLab preferred, but not required
+
+## This Position Requires The Candidate To Already Possess An Active Ts/Sci Clearance And To Maintain The Clearance. Sar Scientist - Booz Allen Hamilton, Las Cruces, Nm Location: Las Cruces, Nm Date: 10/17/2011 Job Code: 985107 Job Details
+
+SAR Scientist-01108836 Description Key Role: Work in a team environment with other multidisciplinary remote sensing scientists and engineers supporting AGI processing and exploitation. Provide scientific analysis and products from the exploitation of SAR data from multiple sources for the customer, who will leverage the value-added support to sharpen their assessments of current issues. Use knowledge of SAR to direct and support research and development in support of SAR, use current TPED processes to task, process, exploit, and distribute data, and design new TPED processes for future sensors. Provide results to the customer in the requested format and content, such as Web dissemination, databases, or direct reporting to analysts and management. Provide ad-hoc informational briefings to educate analysts and managers about the capabilities of SAR and its benefits. Support and participate in community exploitation and technology forums on a limited ad-hoc basis, sometimes requiring presentation of technical information of case studies resulting from operational support requests. Monitor the community and industry for new near-term technologies that can be inserted for operational use. This position is located in Las Cruces, NM. Qualifications Basic Qualifications: -4 years of experience with using AGI processing and exploitation software -3 years of experience with radar science -3 years of experience with programming, including developing with C, C , IDL, or MATLAB executable code -2 years of experience with using software development tools, such as MATLAB -Knowledge of advanced radar AGI collection systems, operations, and phenomenology and their impact on radar AGI processing, analysis and exploitation -TS/SCI clearance Additional Qualifications: -Possession of excellent oral and written communication skills -PhD or MD degree in Remote Sensing, Earth Science, Physical Science, Eengineering, or Mathematics Clearance: Applicants selected will be subject to a security investigation and may need to meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information; TS/SCI clearance is required. Integrating the full range of consulting capabilities, Booz Allen is the one firm that helps clients solve their toughest problems, working by their side to help them achieve their missions. Booz Allen is committed to delivering results that endure. We are proud of our diverse environment, EOE, M/F/D/V. Job Imagery and Remote Sensing Primary Location United States-New Mexico-Las Cruces Travel Yes, 20% of the time http://www.jigsaw.com/scid49209218/tom_tijerina.xhtml
+[Retrieved 2012-07-16]
+http://www.linkedin.com/pub/dan-wright/12/b97/776
+[Accessed 2012-07-16]
+http://www.linkedin.com/pub/marcus-johnson/1b/65b/341
+[Accessed 2012-07-16]
+http://www.linkedin.com/pub/dir/Glen/Santos
+[Accessed 2012-07-16]
+Javier Gil's Experience * Principal Analyst EWA June 2008 - Present (1 year) Electronic Warfare Associates, Herndon, VA. Defense and technology solutions company, providing contractual intelligence support to government customer. Provides government lead course development updates. Remains abreast of current GEOINT node operations, evolving technolgy, assesses technology and training methods to tailor training to class population. Student base includes soldiers, sister service members, Federal Service civilians and contractors. Maintains equipment inventory and ensures readiness of collection sensors. Performs duties as a Training Developer and instructor for MOS specific training programs and courses in Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT); trains Soldiers on/and integrates MASINT sensors and products into tactical, operational and strategic intelligence and force protection architectures; schedules students for MASINT and AGI courses.
+
+## *
+
+Lead Imagery Analyst BAE Systems October 2005 - March 2008 (2 years 6 months) BAE Systems Information Techonolgy, Washington, D.C. Provide enterprise IT solutions and support to technical and program management activities for governmental agencies. Worked within the UFAC to support NGA and outside customers for all underground issues within our AOR. I am one of two subject matter experts in our country/region for all underground issues as well as nuclear sites. Worked hand in hand with UFAC 1 on Nuclear and Ballistics issues for targets in our country of interest. Producing numerous construction chronologies, baseline reports and facility assessments. Helped other members of our contract on exploiting and authoring reports for nuclear sites in their country of interest. Facilitate inter-agency and intra-agency group participation nationwide, provide technological support to personnel, and integrate new technology into current working environment. Manage project orders at multiple locations nationwide and systematically increased the customer base. * SAR MASINT Analyst L-3 Communications October 2003 - June 2005 (1 year 9 months)
+
+## L-3 Communications Government Services Inc, Las Cruces, Nm Provide Advanced Geospatial Intelligence Support To Clients. Worked As A Sar Masint Analyst Exploiting And Disseminating Masint Products To The Dgs-1, Dgs-2, And Dgs-4. On A Daily Basis I Also Provided System Specific Products, Such As Color Multi- Views, Dynamic Images And Coherent Change Detection Products.
+
+Built up and trained the SAR AGI team; facilitated the transition between old and new programs. Served as a liaison between managers, GPOCs, course developers, instructors, system administrators, maintenance personnel, and system integrators. Supported SAR AGI instructor teams [Note: SAR apparently means "synthetic aperture radar" here] * Product Quality Engineer Boeing Satellite Systems December 2001 - October 2003 (1 year 11 months)
+
+## Boeing Space & Intelligence Systems, Las Cruces, Nm
+
+Defense and technology solutions company, providing contractual intelligence support to government customer. Worked within the Joint Processing Center (JPC) conducting MASINT product processing and quality assessments. Additionally, perform system/software integration and testing to ensure proper software and tool performance.
+
+## I Provided On-Site Customer Support And Training And System Specific Products,Such As Color Multi- Views (2Cmv's, 3Cmv's), Dynamic Images (Di's) And Coherent Change Detection Products (Ccd's). As Well As Hi Res Dem's, Dem's, Tercat's, Polcat's, Glint Smear Reduction (Gsr's) And Real Site 3D Site Models To Requesting Clients Outside The Local Production Footprint. Provided Subject Matter Expertise For The Development And Revision Of Sar Agi Courses.
+
+    * Imagery Analyst US Army July 1997 - June 2001 (4 years) United States Army, Ft Bragg, NC Provide imagery interpretation in support of national security. Managed daily exploitation including target assignment, edit, release, and archival of imagery reports. Applied advanced softcopy exploitation analysis techniques to imagery from national reconnaissance systems in a time sensitive, current intelligence environment. Initiated tasking and re tasking of national systems. Produced cables, reports, and comprehensive intelligence documents in support of national intelligence requirements and to the Department of the Army. Exploited and disseminated SPOT 1, SPOT 3 and SEARCH imagery. Processed, exploited, and disseminated raw imagery and finished intelligence products derived from the PREDATOR, GLOBALHAWK, U2, SYERS and ASARS platforms, as well as (EO), (IR), and (SAR) platforms.
+
+## Michael Sanjume Squadron Commander, Adf-Sw/Oss At Us Air Force Las Cruces, New Mexico Area Current
+
+        * Squadron Commander, ADF-SW/OSS at US Air Force
+
+## Past
+
+        * Chief of Staff, SIGINT Directorate at US Air Force * Chief, Ground Integration Group at US Air Force * Program Element Monitor, MILSATCOM Programs at US Air Force * Squadron Operations Officer at National Reconnaissance Office * Chief, Program Management Division at National Reconnaissance Office
+
+## Education
+
+        * Joint Military Intelligence College * University of California, Davis
+
+University of Southern California
+# Kenneth Zang - Current Ts/Sci Ssbi W/Cl Poly
+
+## Educational Experience
+
+Provo, Utah Brigham Young University Degree: Associate of Science Major: Genealogical Research Dates: 9/68 - 4/73
+Las Cruces, NM
+NGA College Degree: Certification Major: SAR 110 & SAR 210
+Dates: November 2007
+
+## Ted Cope's Experience
+
+    * Special Functional Exec (FX) for NSG R&D NGA Currently holds this position * NGA Space Radar IPO Deputy Director for TPED National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
+
+## September 2003 - December 2007 (4 Years 4 Months) * Director, Integrated Operations Center Southwest National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
+
+      October 2005 - December 2006 (1 year 3 months) * Colonel US Air Force 1973 - 2005 (32 years) * Chief Science Advisor for RADAR National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency August 2002 - August 2003 (1 year 1 month) * CIO Deputy Director National Reconnaissance Office February 2000 - August 2002 (2 years 7 months) * Deputy Director, IMINT Systems Engineering National Reconnaissance Office September 1998 - February 2000 (1 year 6 months)
+
+## Additional Information
+
+http://www.simplyhired.com/job-id/cz5vm45dua/sr-systems-jobs/
+Sr Systems Engineer - Collaboration Cell Manager with Security Clearance Apply Now Company: Raytheon Location: Springfield, VA Job Description: Raytheon is currently seeking a Collaboration Cell Manager who will represent the organization as the prime technical contact on contracts and projects in support of the Double Eagle Program. This is a shift position that is responsible for 24x7 operations as well as coordination with the on-duty Government Point of Contact (POC). The Collaboration Cell support the intelligence community (IC) and the war fighter (DOD) by assisting users in requesting the appropriate products to accomplish their mission from a variety of up to date intelligence products and services. The candidate is required to work a 12 hour rotating shift. 24x7 operations include the following; monitoring multi-security level chat and user group traffic, transform intelligence needs to the facilities... From ClearanceJobs.com - 17 days ago [Accessed 2010-08-10]
+http://www.simplyhired.com/job-id/txo3lpsrd4/systems-engineer-jobs/
+Systems Engineer Staff Company: Lockheed Martin Location: Lorton, VA Description: This position, called the Collaboration Operator, is a 12 hour shift position on the Double Eagle Program. It is part of a Collaboration Cell that supports the intelligence community (IC) and the warfighter (DOD) by assisting users in requesting the appropriate products to accomplish their mission from the sites most accurate and up-to-date geospacial intelligence products and services. The candidate will establish a collaborative relationship between intelligence users and the site's product and service providers. Personnel will operate in a 24x7 shift work environment, monitor multi-security level chat and user group traffic, translate intelligence needs to the site's available products and services, connect users (new customer) to service providers within the cell and... From Monster - 11 days ago [Accessed 2010-08-10] https://sjobs.brassring.com/1033/ASP/TG/cim_jobdetail.asp? SID=&jobId=171689&type=search&JobReqLang=1&recordstart=4001&JobSiteId=5010&JobSiteInfo=171689 _5010&GQId=0&partnerid=25037&siteid=5010 Lockheed Martin - Colorado Req ID 164437BR Industry Job Title Systems Engineer Standard Job Code/Title E1462:Systems Engineer
+
+## [Accessed 2010-08-10]
+
+Required skills The ability to work in small groups is essential and occasional travel may be required. Attention to detail, self motivation and the ability to think outside the box are all required traits for the PA position. Desired skills Data analysis, processing and reporting, and Mission Planning. Familiarity with military functions, operations, and philosophies. Former military experience as 98J, CTT, or 1N5. Familiar with STK, or similar products. Experience with national-requirements-populated databases. [98J- -Electronic Intelligence Interceptor/Analyst CTT -- Cryptologic Technician (Technical) 1N5 - Imagery Interpretation STK -  Satellite Tool Kit] Specific Job Description This position is on the Double Eagle (Denver) program in the Enterprise Mission Optimization Group as part of the Planner Analyst (PA) team. The PA primarily defines and builds database products from tasking. The PA works closely with customer counterparts to assist in mentoring and training of their personnel, to strategize and to ultimately design sophisticated engineering solutions that satisfy national requirements. The PA also works closely with support staff, technical advisors and calibration experts to assist in developing strategies and optimizing products. Responsibility is shared for the scheduling of products, and as such, the PA works closely with Scheduling Branch, to advise and ensure scheduling of tasks. Performs functional analysis, timeline analysis, detailed trade studies, requirements allocation and interface definition studies to translate customer requirements into hardware and software specifications. Optimization studies, what if analyses and general performance assessment are performed to ensure optimal task satisfaction. A comprehensive OJT program is in place, as a thorough knowledge of capabilities; software and mission are required to perform the job. The PA may be called upon to support Mission Planning (MP) Staff. Frequent use and application of technical principles, theories and concepts in the field is required. Standard Job Description Performs technical planning, system integration, verification and validation, cost and risk, and supportability and effectiveness analyses for total systems. Analyses are performed at all levels of total system product to include: concept, design, fabrication, test, installation, operation, maintenance and disposal. Ensures the logical and systematic conversion of customer or product requirements into total systems solutions that acknowledge technical, schedule, and cost constraints. Performs functional analysis, timeline analysis, detail trade studies, requirements allocation and interface definition studies to translate customer requirements into hardware and software specifications.
+
+## Security Clearance Ts/Sci
+
+Typical Minimums Bachelors degree from an accredited college in a related discipline, or equivalent experience/combined education, with 2 years of professional experience; or no experience required with a related Masters degree. Considered experienced, but still a learner.
+
+http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=48977
+
+## Committee Membership Information
+
+Project Title:
+Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis PIN:
+DELS-O-08-01-A
+Major Unit: Division on Earth and Life Studies Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences RSO:
+Parker, Stephen Committee Membership Date Posted:   10/17/2008 Ms. Katherine Hall BAE Systems Katherine Hall is Director of Strategy and Plans for Global Analysis at BAE Systems. Prior to joining BAE, she directed the analysis and production section of the National Geospatial-lntelligence Agency (NGA), which is responsible for the management and strategic direction of several thousand intelligence analysts. Ms. Hall led the NGA's Integrated Operations Center in Denver which was cited by the DNI as a model of interagency cooperation. Prior to moving to NGA, she was a Senior Intelligence Officer with the CIA. As part of CIA's Office of Military Support, she directed CIA's Representative to NORAD/USSPACECOM where she acted as a senior intelligence advisor to the Commander. Ms. Hall was also a national intelligence officer and head of the National Intelligence Council's Analytic Group, an organization of senior intelligence officers responsible for the production of national estimates. She personally drafted several national intelligence estimates and with others was the developer of the first US Government model to estimate the spread and impact of AIDS. She also served in several senior positions in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence such as Deputy Director of the CIA's Office of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis and Director of the Office of Africa and Latin America. She began her career as a military and weapons analyst. Ms. Hall received her BA in history and physics from Mount Holyoke College and her MA in international relations from George Washington University. Ms. Hall's inclusion on this committee will ensure that the committee has an understanding of the quality of inputs upon which DHS must base its counter-terrorism risk analyses.
+
+http://www.thesecretofhennybogan.com/aboutmark.html I rejoined government civilian service in April 2002, accepting an appointment with NIMA.  I served as a Branch Chief for Future Concepts and was given responsibility for NIMA's Persistent Surveillance portfolio, including Space Base Radar (SBR), the New Imaging System, Laser Imaging Detection and Ranging and Airborne Integration Program efforts, including Global Hawk, Predator, JSTARS and the U-2.  I was later assigned as the NIMA SBR Program Manager and helped establish the NIMA Persistent Surveillance Office.  I was promoted to the Executive Service (Defense Intelligence Senior Level) in November 2003.  I am currently the Deputy Director, Integrated Operations Center-Special Projects, Analysis & Production Directorate, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Bethesda, Maryland, with duty at the Washington Navy Yard. http://www.americasjobexchange.com/seeker/jobsearch/quick? action=JobSearchViewJob&JobSearch_JobId=536002977&source=juju&utm_source=juju&utm_medium=feed &utm_campaign=organic
+
+## [Accessed 2010-08-11] Senior Image Quality Systems Engineer
+
+LOCKHEED MARTIN HAS ANNOUNCED PLANS TO DIVEST MOST OF THE ENTERPRISE INTEGRATION GROUP (EIG) LINES OF BUSINESS. THIS JOB OPENING IS PART OF THE CURRENT EIG BUSINESS THAT WILL BE DIVESTED. IF YOU ARE A CURRENT LOCKHEED MARTIN EMPLOYEE, PLEASE CONTACT THE IS&GS STAFFING TEAM (FC-LMISS, LM CAREERS) MAILBOX TO DISCUSS THIS DEVELOPMENT. Provide technical product quality assurance operational support as a member of NGA's Image Quality and Utility (NIQU) Program resident within the NGA Integrated Operations Center-Special Projects (IOC-SP) analytical workspace at the Washington Navy Yard. Interface with IOC-SP analysts to provide technical understanding of key concerns and issues encountered with IOC-SP products. Support NIQU in assessing the image and product quality impacts of IOC-SP and NSG systems and processes used in the collection, processing, exploitation, storage, and dissemination of IOC-SP GEOINT data. Ensure that products produced by IOC-SP systems meet predefined standards and specifications. Coordinate the review of IOC-SP operational product quality issues with other IOC-SP NIQU members, IOC-SP analyst personnel, and IOC-SP Mission Partners. Support the planning, coordination, development, and execution of product quality IOC-SP system transition checkout activity, as well as the testing of IOC-SP segments and software. Applicants selected will be subject to a government security investigation and must meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information.- Bachelors degree in image science, physics, engineering, or related technical discipline
+
+- Basic technical understanding of image formation and processing techniques - Several years experience in Image Quality, Systems Engineering or an associated field - Proficiency in using the RemoteView Electronic light Table software package - Proficiency in using other Electronic Light Table software packages: SOCET GXP, ERDAS IMAGINE, ENVI - Familiarization of the NSG systems architecture and its dissemination, processing, storage, and exploitation of imagery and imagery products - Programming experience (C, C++, or scripting) - Proficiency with MS Office software - Ability to work with NGA Analysts in an operational environment - Strong writing skills with special proficiency in test plan and technical report writing - Presentation experience
+As deputy director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Lloyd Rowland assists the director in formulating policy and managing agency activities in order to accomplish NGA's mission. Before his appointment as NGA deputy director in October 2006, Rowland served in numerous leadership positions throughout NGA, including business executive, deputy director of the Office of Business Transformation, director of global operations, associate deputy director of operations, director of geospatial information, deputy director of the Central Imagery Tasking Office and associate director of assessments. He was appointed to the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service in 1996. During his 24 years in the Air Force, Rowland commanded a squadron in Operation Desert Storm and had various postings around the world. Most of his career involved reconnaissance force employment and imagery management. His awards include the Distinguished Flying Cross for combat operations, Presidential Meritorious Rank, Legion of Merit, Defense Superior Service Medal and the Air Medal. Rowland has degrees from Memphis State University and the University of Southern California. Rowland was interviewed by MGT Editor Harrison Donnelly. Q: What are some of the operational improvements you expect to gain once the agency is installed in its new headquarters? A: What's really important about the new campus is not the building, but it's about moving the mission to our facility in Springfield. The new facility will be a place where intelligence analysts from across the community can come together to accomplish the intelligence mission. We're on course and glide-slope to start moving our analysts in January 2011. We'll be fully operational there by September of that year. Right now we're located in seven or eight locations around the Washington, D.C., area. Admiral Murrett and I and other leaders in the agency spend a lot of our time every day moving from location to location. That will slow down certainly; but first and foremost, we're going to be able to bring together all of our analysts from around the Washington area to one central location, where they'll be able to work and collaborate together more easily. That's a huge benefitcollaboration on high-profile intelligence issues will be much easier. The NGA Integrated Operations Center, which is now dispersed among our operating locations, will be put together centrally and located within the same operational footprint. They will be surrounded by the regional and functional intelligence experts, and will be able to work together as a more cohesive team. Thirdly, the new Campus East allows us to consolidate our East Coast libraries and information repositories, thus providing analysts with faster and broader access to our entire collection of research holdings. Additionally, the large conference center that we'll have there will provide an opportunity for the entire community to come together at NGA to collaborate on intelligence problem sets and issues of mutual concern. So as you can see the new campus will provide us with many mission improvement opportunities.
+
+## Imagery
+
+32.50 N, 106.61 W
+As of 27 May 2007
+The White Sands Ground Terminal is at the bottom of the picture and the Second TDRSS Ground Terminal is at the top.
+
+WSGT as of Sunday, October 3, 1998
+WSGT as of Monday, October 11, 2004 (Columbus Day, a US federal holiday).
+
+The appearance is essentially unchanged since the first available imagery of October 3, 1998.
+
+ Note the large number of unused parking spaces in the parking lot at the center of the image.
+
+What appear to be construction materials are present to the left of the large building at the center of the image.
+
+WSGT as of Sunday, July 31, 2005 [This date may be in error.]
+Construction has begun on a large addition on the central building.
+
+WSGT on Sunday, May 27, 2007.
+
+The building addition appears complete, an extension has been added to the east side of  the existing parking lot and a new lot has appeared to the south of the old one.
+
+A new 20-meter dish antenna, perhaps WS-1, has been installed to the south of the existing three.
+
+WSGT on Sunday, April 17, 2010.
+
+STGT as of July 4, 2005.
+
+The appearance is essentially the same as in previous Google Earth images.
+
+STGT as of May 27, 2007.
+
+A new area containing a 20-meter dish antenna and what appear to be the foundations for one or two more has appeared to the south of the existing antennas.
+
+ These may be the antennas meant to support the Solar Dynamics Observer mission
+
+## Nasa Facilities Nasa Unveils New Antenna Network In White Sands, N.M. 11.08.07 Engineers From Nasa's Goddard Space Flight Center In Greenbelt, Md., Showcased The New 18-Meter Ka Band Antenna Network, The First Such System In Agency History, During A Ribbon-Cutting Ceremony At The White Sands Test Facility In New Mexico On November 8.
+
+"Ka band" refers to a section within the microwave portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Much like how listeners can't pick up FM waves on AM radios and vice-versa, Ka band signals require special equipment to receive them. The three new dishes help meet the growing demand for ground stations to handle high volumes of science data generated by today's new satellites. The Ka band system allows satellites to transmit more data to the ground than ever before, in the area of 45 terabytes a month. That's about the equivalent of 1,152 fully loaded 40-gigabyte iPods, or 67,408 CDs! The dishes are 18.2 meters in diameter, and they need to be able to rotate quickly to acquire satellite signals. To make the dishes lighter they are largely held together with glue, rather than bolts and other fasteners. But this is no ordinary wood glue. The network makes use of a two-part epoxy developed at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Calif. Tests have shown the glue and the dishes will last for decades, according to Raymond Pages, chief of Goddard's Ground System Development Office. The first missions to use the network will be the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) and the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO). SDO will study solar variations that affect life on Earth. LRO will focus on selecting landing sites, identifying lunar resources and studying how the moon's environment will affect humans. Both probes are slated for launch in late 2008. "The design, development, and delivery of three 18-meter Ka band antenna systems in just over two years is a major accomplishment for Goddard and NASA," Pages said. "People will be munching on data [from these missions] for years to come." Once SDO and LRO conclude, the antenna network will be available for other missions. White Sands was chosen as the location for the new antennas because of the existing infrastructure available there, making it a cost-effective option. Weather was also a factor in the decision, because data must be able to reach the antennas with as little weather interference as possible for optimum quality. Datron Advanced Technologies in Simi Valley, Calif., built the antennas. Honeywell Technology Solutions Inc. in Columbia, Md., built and assembled the ground station. The Cospal Composites Srl in Ambivere, Italy, manufactured the primary reflectors. Honeywell, Datron and Goddard helped to design the antennas. Goddard manages the White Sands Complex for NASA. The total development cost of the new antenna system was $20 million.

markdown/misc/bseg-concept.md

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+Biological Sciences Experts Group CONCEPT PAPER
+
+I.
+
+(U) TITLE
+
+(U) Biological Sciences Experts Group
+
+II.
+
+(U) PURPOSE
+
+(U//FOUO) The National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has identified a series of significant scientific and technical issues that are of common concern to several Intelligence Community (IC) elements and relate to potential biological threats and biological weapons of mass destruction (B-WMD).  To effectively and expeditiously address these issues, expertise that lies outside of the United States (U.S.) government (USG) must be enlisted and applied on an integrated and strategic basis.    To do this, NCPC will retain a cadre of life-sciences experts to provide technical advice and counsel on specific scientific and technical issues relevant to the IC's mission to counter the threat posed by the potential proliferation of biological weapons and related technologies.   This program will be known as the NCPC Biological Sciences Experts Group (BSEG).
+
+III.
+
+(U) AUTHORITY
+
+(U//FOUO) BSEG experts will provide technical advice to the Director of the National Counterproliferation Center (D/NCPC) on life-science issues that are of importance and concern to elements of the IC.
+
+(U//FOUO) The BSEG supports The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction's recommendation in Chapter Thirteen: The Changing Proliferation Threat and the Intelligence Response: "Working with the Biological Sciences Community."  The BSEG will reach outside of the Federal government to our nation's leading life-science experts to develop a more robust and mutually beneficial relationship with the IC in order to counter better the threats posed by biological agents.
+
+
+IV.
+
+(U) FUNCTION
+
+(U//FOUO) The purpose of the BSEG program is to leverage and apply specialized scientific and technical life-science expertise that is predominantly resident outside of the USG, to specific technical and scientific issues of significant common concern to the IC, relating to the threat posed by existing or potential biological threats agents.
+
+(U//FOUO) Its purview extends to work done by the IC relevant to: known and emerging biological threat agents (BTA), or materiel; existing state BT programs and the potential threats from BT materiel or expertise available to/from state programs and/or terrorists, including B-WMD.
+
+(U//FOUO) Any element of the Intelligence Community may suggest to the D/NCPC specific topics or issues for research or analysis by BSEG experts.   The D/NCPC, through the NCPC Senior Bio Advisor, shall then designate specific topics or issues for tasking to specific BSEG contractors.   The D/NCPC may task these projects to be undertaken by individual BSEG contractors, or by groups of individual BSEG contractors, as appropriate.  The D/NCPC, or their designee, shall establish the terms and conditions for each contracted assignment.
+
+V.
+
+(U) DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
+
+(U//FOUO) To strengthen the integration of the life-science and intelligence communities and facilitate access of the IC to life-science experts outside of the Federal government, the types of issues that the Director of NCPC may assign to the BSEG are:
+1. (U//FOUO) Supporting the IC customers in the design of scientific/technical experimental protocols, intelligence analyses, or collection methodologies against BTA, biological warfare (BW) agents, and/or state and non-state actors which do, or may pose a threat to the U.S.;
+
+2. (U//FOUO) Advising on strategies to improve the execution, or interpretation of results of experimental protocols, analysis, and collection against the aforementioned agents and or actors;
+
+3. (U//FOUO) Undertaking technical assessments/performance review of the IC's scientific/technical programs, analytical products, and collection methodologies against the aforementioned agents and or actors;
+
+4. (U//FOUO) Address any other issues as requested by the D/NCPC or IC's departments or agencies. (U//FOUO) The BSEG shall neither produce analytical intelligence products nor engage in collection.
+
+VI.
+
+(U) STRUCTURE
+
+A.
+
+BSEG Membership:
+
+(U//FOUO) It is currently contemplated that initially approximately 12 non-USG
+individuals will be retained to serve as experts/independent contractors for the BSEG program.  These experts will be selected by the D/NCPC.   They shall be retained under the auspices of the National Intelligence Council Associates program (NIC Associates).
+
+
+(U//FOUO) The work of the BSEG experts will be administered by the Senior Bio
+Advisor to the D/NCPC, on behalf of the D/NCPC, and the BSEG Executive Secretariat.
+(U//FOUO) It is currently contemplated that, to the extent possible, the initial
+BSEG individuals will include contractors with expertise in the following areas:
+ Microbiology (bacteriology/virology/genetics, et al.)
+ Molecular Biology  Synthetic Biology (e.g. structural/functional genomics, proteomics)  Forensic Sciences (e.g. microbial forensics)  Biochemistry  Medicine
+ Pharmacology  Pathology (human/animal/plant)  Immunology  Public Health/ Epidemiology  Veterinary Medicine  Food Safety/ Security/ Production  Agricultural Sciences  Pharmaceutical-, Biotechnology-manufacturing/production  Pharmaceutical/ Biotechnology business practices  Biosecurity (to include biosafety, biocontainment, bio-assurancy, et al.)
+ Counterproliferation/counterterrorism issues  Former or current state bioweapons programs  Former or current BT terrorist programs
+
+(U//FOUO) Each contractor will be retained under a one-year contract, with an
+option for additional renewals, at the discretion of the D/NCPC.   It is anticipated, that contractors will be available to serve for at least 3-4 years. (U//FOUO) BSEG experts will be and retain the status of independent contractors for the
+U.S. Government and will be bound and obligated by all laws and regulations that pertain
+to that status.  At the discretion of the D/NCPC they may be tasked to undertake assignments individually or, as appropriate, in groups.
+B.
+BSEG Network Membership: (U//FOUO) The BSEG shall be supported through a network of non-USG subject
+matter experts, hereafter referred to as the 'Network.'  The Network shall serve as
+consultants to the BSEG members and IC representatives on an as-needed basis. (U//FOUO) The D/NCPC, BSEG members, or IC representatives may nominate
+individuals to be added to the Network in order to accomplish requests for actions.
+
+Appointment: (U//FOUO) Each contractor will be retained under a one-year contract, with an
+option for additional renewals, at the discretion of the Director of NCPC.   It is anticipated, that contractors will be available to serve for at least 3-4 years.
+
+C.
+Intelligence Community Representatives:
+
+(U//FOUO) A steering group of IC representatives will be established to advise
+the D/NCPC, through his Senior Advisor on Bio Issues, on the utilization of BSEG
+contractors.   That steering group may include representatives from:
+
+ Office of the Director of National Intelligence
+ National Counterterrorism Center
+ Central Intelligence Agency  Department of Defense  Department of Energy  Department of Homeland Security  Department of State  Department of the Treasury  Department of Justice/ Federal Bureau of Investigation  National Geospatial Intelligence Agency  National Reconnaissance Office  National Security Agency
+ Others as appropriate
+
+D.
+BSEG Executive Secretariat:
+
+(U//FOUO) A BSEG Executive Secretariat will be established to support the
+mission of the BES.  The responsibilities of the Secretariat shall include supporting and managing the BSEG's day-to-day operations and serve as the point-of-contact for the BSEG issues with the Core and Network contractors and the IC representatives. (U//FOUO) The BSEG Executive Secretariat will be responsible for obtaining
+contractor personnel and other administrative support necessary to support the mission of the BSEG. (U//FOUO) The BSEG Executive Secretariat will be responsible for managing the
+taskings to and reports from the BSEG members.
+VII.
+(U) TASKING PROCEDURES
+
+(U//FOUO) Any agency of Intelligence Community may suggest to the Senior Bio
+Advisor to the Director/NCPC with specific topics or issues for tasking to BSEG
+contractor(s).  As noted above, in selecting issues and topics for assignment to BSEG contractors, the D/NCPC shall consider the significance of the issue in relation to the IC's
+mission to identify and help counter existing or potential biological threats to the U.S.;
+whether the issue is significant primarily for one IC element, or whether it has broader implications across the IC; whether there are existing programs within the IC that are available for addressing the issue; the appropriateness of the issue for tasking to non- USG independent contractors; and, whether there are any contractors in the BSEG
+program that appear to have specialized expertise that is particularly relevant to the proposed problem or issue.   Intelligence Community elements may be called upon to work with specific BSEG contractors, to help them fulfill specific tasks or assignments.
+
+(U//FOUO) The IC members may submit request for action(s) to the BSEG chairs for prioritization of the project to the BSEG according to criteria in the aforementioned paragraph.  Submission of requests will be through a standardized template to be generated by the BSEG Executive Secretariat.
+
+(U//FOUO) The IC members shall be invited to all formal meetings of the BSEG.
+
+
+(U//FOUO) The IC members shall receive quarterly updates on the BSEG's activities.
+
+
+VIII. (U) MEETINGS
+
+(U//FOUO) Plenary BSEG meetings shall be held at least quarterly and may be convened on as-needed basis as requested by the D/NCPC, IC members, or the co-chairs.
+
+The purpose of the meetings is to provide updated intelligence briefings to the members of the BSEG and obtain the members' comments on the work being done.
+
+(U//FOUO) Whenever possible, the Executive Secretariat will facilitate virtual meetings of the Core members, network members, or individuals, as needed, for a specific request for action through appropriately secure communications channels.
+
+
+(U//FOUO) BSEG Members may request intelligence briefings on subjects relevant to their research subject to discretion of the D/NCPC.
+
+IX.
+
+(U) COMPENSATION
+
+(U//FOUO) Members shall be paid at a rate of $_____, plus per diem and travel expenses as authorized by ____________.   Representatives who are officers or employees of the United States government shall not receive compensation for service.
+
+XI.
+
+(U) REPORTS
+
+(U//FOUO) The BSEG will author and provide to the D/NCPC an annual report of its actions and accomplishments.
+
+(U//FOUO) The IC members will be requested for an annual performance evaluation of the BSEG's activities and value to their mission. (U//FOUO) BSEG contractors may be required to provide the results of their work to the D/ NCPC or to selected IC elements at any time.  They may be asked to provide written reports and make themselves available for direct consultations, as determined by the D/NCPC.
+
+XI.
+
+(U) TERMINATION DATE
+
+(U//FOUO) It is currently contemplated that this program will be maintained for three years, from the date of the hiring of the first BSEG contractor.   Upon the completion of one year after the BSEG is stood up, the D/NCPC will consult with participating elements of the IC to solicit their views as to the utility of this initiative and whether it should be continued.  The D/NCPC will then make a recommendation to the DNI regarding the continuation of this program and the renewal of any charter.
+
+Definitions:
+
+Offensive Biological warfare program: Offensive BW programs are those whose objective is to research, develop, produce, and weaponize biological agents for overt or covert delivery against civilian or military targets, including personnel and agricultural targets. Biological warfare agents: BW agents include such living pathogens as bacteria and viruses, as well as biological toxins, designed to incapacitate, injure, or kill humans, crops, or livestock. Biological weapons: A device fabricated for the purpose of delivering and disseminating a biological warfare agent.
+
+
+Bio-defense:  The development and use of countermeasures (medical and non-medical) to predict, prepare for, protect against, and respond to attacks using biological threat agents. Biological warfare applicable: Material and nonmaterial resources which are capable of being exploited in the development of an offensive biological warfare capability. Dual-use technology: Research, equipment, materials, technology and expertise with legitimate scientific purpose that might be misused to pose a threat to public health, homeland and/or national security.

markdown/misc/btf.md

@@ -0,0 +1,1015 @@
+Biometric Collection, Transmission and Storage Standards Technical Reference
+
+
+24 July 2006
+ Version 1.1
+Department of the Army Biometrics Task Force Executive Agent for Biometrics
+
+## Report Documentation Page Omb No. 0704-0188
+
+Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
+
+1. REPORT DATE
+24 JUL 2006
+2. REPORT TYPE
+N/A
+3. DATES COVERED
+  -
+5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
+4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
+Biometric Collection, Transmission and Storage Standards
+5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
+6. AUTHOR(S)
+5d. PROJECT NUMBER REPORT NUMBER
+
+7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
+Department of the Army Biometrics Task Force Executive Agent for
+Biometrics Arlington, VA
+
+NUMBER(S)
+
+## 12. Distribution/Availability Statement Approved For Public Release, Distribution Unlimited 13. Supplementary Notes The Original Document Contains Color Images.
+
+14. ABSTRACT
+
+15. SUBJECT TERMS
+
+16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
+17. LIMITATION OF
+ABSTRACT
+SAR
+18. NUMBER
+OF PAGES
+29
+19a. NAME OF
+RESPONSIBLE PERSON
+a. REPORT
+unclassified
+b. ABSTRACT
+unclassified
+c. THIS PAGE
+unclassified
+
+## Document History
+
+| Version                              | Date        | Document Status    | Participants/Comments                      |
+|--------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------|
+| 0.1                                  | 25 Apr 2006 | Working Draft      | Internal Reviews                           |
+| 0.2                                  | 23 May 2006 | Working Draft      | Presented to BSWG; editorial changes       |
+| 0.3                                  | 26 May 2006 | Working Draft      | Editorial changes                          |
+| 0.4                                  | 05 Jun 2006 | Working Draft      | Editorial changes and additional comments  |
+| from peer review integrated          |             |                    |                                            |
+| 0.5                                  | 06 Jun 2006 | Working Draft      | CBEFF concerns resolved, sent to technical |
+| editor                               |             |                    |                                            |
+| 0.6                                  | 07 Jun 2006 | Working Draft      | Distributed to BSWG for two-week review;   |
+| technical edits integrated           |             |                    |                                            |
+| 1.0                                  | 21 Jul 2006 | Working Draft      | Incorporated comments from BSWG based on   |
+| the approved disposition of comments |             |                    |                                            |
+| 1.1                                  | 24 Jul 2006 | Released version   | Edition includes comments from BTF         |
+| technical editor                     |             |                    |                                            |
+
+##
+
+
+Contact Information For comments or questions, please contact:
+Dale Hapeman, DoD Biometrics Task Force Standards Team, 304-326-3029
+James B. Hutchinson, DoD Biometrics Task Force Standards Team, 703-984-0430
+Executive Summary
+
+This document provides a comprehensive technical reference that lists published biometric standards and describes their applicability to the biometric functions described in the Capstone Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Department of Defense (DoD) Biometrics in Support of Identity Superiority.  It was prepared by the DoD Biometrics Standards Working Group (BSWG)
+to assist in the development of future system-specific policy and technical documents, such as standard operating procedures, architecture technical views, and application profiles.  This document provides support for a number of biometric modalities, including:  fingerprints, face images, iris images, signature/sign data, hand geometry, and palm prints.  It also describes the status of biometric standards in the DoD Information Technology Standards Registry.  The appendices of this document contain a brief overview of the criteria for DoD adoption of standards and information on the collection of non-standardized biometric data, including DNA
+and voice recording samples.  The DoD BSWG will update this document on a regular basis as new biometric standards emerge and to maintain consistency with the CONOPS.
+
+## 1 Introduction
+
+1.1
+Authority
+
+This document is developed by the DoD Biometric Standards Working Group (BSWG).  The BSWG is chartered to champion the development of biometric standards at the national and international levels, to coordinate and advocate DoD interests, and to build a consensus on standards development, evaluation, adoption, and implementation issues across the DoD and in coordination with other federal agencies.  Members of this working group include: U.S. Army U.S. Air Force Department of the Navy DoD Biometrics Task Force DoD Program Manager, Biometrics Defense Manpower Data Center Defense Information Systems Agency Defense Information Technology Standards Registry Information Assurance Technical Working Group Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks & Information Integration National Institute of Standards and Technology National Biometrics Security Project Intelligence Community Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Homeland Security U.S. Coast Guard West Virginia University
+1.2
+Scope and Purpose This document serves as a technical reference that lists published biometric standards and describes their applicability to the "Collect," "Store," and "Share" functions defined in the CONOPS document.  It also describes the status of biometric standards in the DoD Information Technology Standards Registry (DISR).  This document follows the CONOPS capabilities-based approach and does not address any specific system, application, or platform.  Figure 1 depicts the Biometric Process defined in the CONOPS.
+
+## 1.3 Document Structure
+
+The remainder of Section 1 describes this document's structure and its intended use.  Section 2
+lists the meanings of acronyms and terms used in this document.  Section 3 lists published
+standards and specifications for collecting biometric data, including any requirements pertaining
+to that collection.  The biometric modalities included in Section 3 are:
+
+- Fingerprints - Face Images
+- Iris Images
+- Signature/Sign Data
+- Hand Geometry
+- Palm Prints
+ For each modality, a subsection describes related equipment, image or sample capture, quality control (where applicable), and formatting.  Section 4 addresses standards and specifications for the transmission of biometrics and related data between systems and organizations.  Standards concerning the storage and archival of biometric data are listed in Section 5. This document is structured to correspond to a generic collection, transmission, and storage process as illustrated in Figure 2.
+
+
+
+1.4
+Intended Use of Document This document should be used as a reference to assist in the development of future systemspecific policy and technical documents, such as standard operating procedures, architecture technical views, and application profiles.  The selection of appropriate biometric standards for a particular biometric system implementation is based on the unique circumstances of the system, including the business need, system requirements, and applicable DoD system interfaces. For example, an application may be required to collect 10 rolled fingerprints, face, and iris samples.  The application may also be required to store the fingerprint data in a local database but transmit all biometric data to a remote database, such as DoD Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS).  Figure 3 demonstrates how various sections of this document may be applied to identify standards that may be implemented to support the collection, transmission, and storage functions of the application.
+
+
+
+## 1.5 Published Biometric Standards And Disr Status
+
+In 2004, the DISR officially replaced the Joint Technical Architecture in compliance with the
+2004 *Memorandum for DoD Executive Agent for Information Technology Standards* and in accordance with DoD Directives 4350.5 and 5101.7.  The DISR serves as a central repository for DoD-approved information technology standards, including biometric standards.  Use of the DISR is mandated for the development and acquisition of new or modified fielded IT and National Security Systems throughout the DoD. The following Table 1 contains descriptions of published biometric standards and their status in DISR.  More information about standards adoption criteria and process can be found in Appendix A.
+
+## Table 1:  Published Biometric Standards And Disr Status
+
+|                                                                                  |               | Category of    | DISR    |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------|
+| Standards                                                                        | Standard Name | Description    | Status  |
+| ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Data Format for the                                         |               |                |         |
+| Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & Scar Mark &                                |               |                |         |
+| Tattoo (SMT) Information                                                         |               |                |         |
+| This standard defines the content, format, and units of measurement for the      |               |                |         |
+| exchange of fingerprint, palm print, facial/mug shot, and SMT full-image         |               |                |         |
+| information that may be useful in identifying a subject.                         |               |                |         |
+| Mandated                                                                         |               |                |         |
+| Fingerprint Image                                                                |               |                |         |
+| ANSI INCITS 381-2004 Finger Image-Based Data                                     |               |                |         |
+| Interchange Format                                                               |               |                |         |
+| This standard specifies an interchange format for the exchange of image-         |               |                |         |
+| based fingerprint and palm print recognition data.  It defines the content,      |               |                |         |
+| format, and units of measurement for such information.  This standard is         |               |                |         |
+| intended for those identification and verification applications that require the |               |                |         |
+| use of raw or processed image data containing detailed pixel information.        |               |                |         |
+|                                                                                  |               |                |         |
+| Pending                                                                          |               |                |         |
+| (Change                                                                          |               |                |         |
+| Request (CR)                                                                     |               |                |         |
+| Submitted as                                                                     |               |                |         |
+| Mandated                                                                         |               |                |         |
+| Standard)                                                                        |               |                |         |
+| ISO/IEC 19794-4 Biometric Data Interchange                                       |               |                |         |
+| Formats - Part 4:  Finger Image Data                                             |               |                |         |
+| This standard specifies a data record interchange format for storing,            |               |                |         |
+| recording, and transmitting the information from one or more finger or palm      |               |                |         |
+| image areas within an ISO/IEC 19785-1 Common Biometric Exchange                  |               |                |         |
+| Formats Framework (CBEFF) data structure.  This can be used for the              |               |                |         |
+| exchange and comparison of finger image data.                                    |               |                |         |
+| Pending (CR                                                                      |               |                |         |
+| Submitted  as                                                                    |               |                |         |
+| Emerging                                                                         |               |                |         |
+| Standard)                                                                        |               |                |         |
+| ANSI INCITS 378-2004 Finger Minutiae Format                                      |               |                |         |
+| for Data Interchange                                                             |               |                |         |
+| This standard defines a method of representing fingerprint information using     |               |                |         |
+| the concept of minutiae.  It defines the placement of the minutiae on a          |               |                |         |
+| fingerprint, a record format for containing the minutiae data, and optional      |               |                |         |
+| extensions for ridge count and core and delta information.                       |               |                |         |
+| Pending (CR                                                                      |               |                |         |
+| Submitted as                                                                     |               |                |         |
+| Mandated                                                                         |               |                |         |
+| Standard)                                                                        |               |                |         |
+| Fingerprint Template                                                             |               |                |         |
+| ANSI INCITS 377-2004 Finger Pattern-Based                                        |               |                |         |
+| Interchange Format                                                               |               |                |         |
+| This standard specifies an interchange format for the exchange of pattern-       |               |                |         |
+| based fingerprint recognition data.  It describes the conversion of a raw        |               |                |         |
+| fingerprint image to a cropped and down-sampled finger pattern                   |               |                |         |
+| followed by the cellular representation of the finger pattern image to create    |               |                |         |
+| the finger pattern interchange data.                                             |               |                |         |
+|                                                                                  |               |                |         |
+| Pending (CR                                                                      |               |                |         |
+| Submitted as                                                                     |               |                |         |
+| Mandated                                                                         |               |                |         |
+| Standard)                                                                        |               |                |         |
+| ISO/IEC 19794-2 Biometric Data Interchange                                       |               |                |         |
+| Formats - Part 2:  Finger Minutiae Data                                          |               |                |         |
+| This standard specifies a concept and data formats for representation of         |               |                |         |
+| fingerprints using the fundamental notion of minutiae.  It is generic in that it |               |                |         |
+| may be applied and used in a wide range of application areas where               |               |                |         |
+| automated fingerprint recognition is involved.  ISO/IEC 19794-2:2005             |               |                |         |
+| contains definitions of relevant terms, a description of how minutiae shall be   |               |                |         |
+| determined, data formats for containing the data for both general use and for    |               |                |         |
+| use with cards, and conformance information.                                     |               |                |         |
+| Pending (CR                                                                      |               |                |         |
+| Submitted as                                                                     |               |                |         |
+| Emerging                                                                         |               |                |         |
+| Standard)                                                                        |               |                |         |
+| Category of                                                                      | DISR        |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| Standards                                                                        |             |
+| Standard Name                                                                    | Description |
+| Status                                                                           |             |
+| ANSI INCITS 385-2004 Face Recognition Format                                     |             |
+| for Data Interchange                                                             |             |
+| This standard specifies definitions of photographic environment, subject         |             |
+| pose, focus, digital image attributes, and a face interchange format for         |             |
+| relevant applications, including human examination and computer-                 |             |
+| automated face recognition.                                                      |             |
+| Pending (CR                                                                      |             |
+| Submitted as                                                                     |             |
+| Mandated                                                                         |             |
+| Standard)                                                                        |             |
+| Face                                                                             |             |
+| ISO/IEC 19794-5 Biometric Data Interchange                                       |             |
+| Formats - Part 5:  Face Image Data                                               |             |
+| This standard specifies scene, photographic, digitization, and format            |             |
+| requirements for images of faces to be used in the context of both human         |             |
+| verification and computer automated recognition.  The format is designed to      |             |
+| allow for the specification of visible information discernible by an observer    |             |
+| pertaining to the face, such as gender, pose, and eye color.                     |             |
+| Pending (CR                                                                      |             |
+| Submitted as                                                                     |             |
+| Emerging                                                                         |             |
+| Standard)                                                                        |             |
+| ANSI INCITS 379-2004 Iris Image Interchange                                      |             |
+| Format                                                                           |             |
+| This standard describes a format for the exchange of iris image information.     |             |
+| It contains a definition of attributes, a data record format, sample records,    |             |
+| and conformance criteria.  Two alternative formats for iris image data are       |             |
+| describedone based on a Cartesian coordinate system and the other on a          |             |
+| polar coordinate system.                                                         |             |
+| Mandated                                                                         |             |
+| Standard                                                                         |             |
+| Iris                                                                             |             |
+| ISO/IEC 19794-6 Biometric Data Interchange                                       |             |
+| Formats - Part 6:  Iris Image Data                                               |             |
+| This standard specifies two alternative image interchange formats for            |             |
+| biometric authentication systems that use iris recognition.  The first is based  |             |
+| on a rectilinear image storage format and the second is based on a polar         |             |
+| image specification.                                                             |             |
+| Pending (CR                                                                      |             |
+| Submitted as                                                                     |             |
+| Emerging                                                                         |             |
+| Standard)                                                                        |             |
+| ANSI INCITS 396-2005 Hand Geometry Format                                        |             |
+| for Data Interchange                                                             |             |
+| This standard specifies an interchange format for the exchange of hand           |             |
+| geometry data in a silhouette format.  It defines the content, format, and units |             |
+| of measurement for such information.  This standard is intended for those        |             |
+| identification and verification applications that require the use of an          |             |
+| interoperable hand geometry template.                                            |             |
+| Other                                                                            |             |
+| Modalities                                                                       |             |
+| Pending (CR                                                                      |             |
+| Submitted as                                                                     |             |
+| Mandated                                                                         |             |
+| Standard)                                                                        |             |
+| ANSI INCITS 395-2005 Biometric Data                                              |             |
+| Interchange Formats - Signature/Sign Data                                        |             |
+| This Standard specifies a data interchange format for representation of          |             |
+| digitized sign or signature data, for the purposes of biometric enrollment,      |             |
+| verification, or identification through the use of Raw Signature/Sign Sample     |             |
+| Data or Common Feature Data.  The data interchange format is generic in          |             |
+| that it may be applied and used in a wide range of application areas where       |             |
+| electronic signs or signatures are involved.  No application-specific            |             |
+| requirements or features are addressed in this standard.                         |             |
+| Signature                                                                        |             |
+| Sign Data                                                                        |             |
+| N/A                                                                              |             |
+| Category of                                                                    | DISR        |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| Standards                                                                      |             |
+| Standard Name                                                                  | Description |
+| Status                                                                         |             |
+| Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification                              |             |
+| (EFTS) (v7.1)                                                                  |             |
+| The purpose of this document is to specify certain requirements to which       |             |
+| agencies must adhere to communicate electronically with the FBI's              |             |
+| Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS).  This          |             |
+| specification is based on ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 and covers the IAFIS            |             |
+| electronic transmissions involving fingerprints.                               |             |
+| N/A                                                                            |             |
+| Transmission                                                                   |             |
+| Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification                                |             |
+| (EBTS) (v1.1)                                                                  |             |
+| This specification describes customizations of EFTS transactions that are      |             |
+| necessary to use the DoD ABIS.                                                 |             |
+| Pending (CR                                                                    |             |
+| Submitted as                                                                   |             |
+| Mandated                                                                       |             |
+| Standard)                                                                      |             |
+| ANSI INCITS 358-2002 BioAPI Specification                                      |             |
+| (v1.1)                                                                         |             |
+| This standard provides a high-level generic biometric authentication model     |             |
+| suited for any form of biometric technology.  It covers the basic functions of |             |
+| enrollment, verification, and identification and includes a database interface |             |
+| to allow a biometric service provider to manage the identification population  |             |
+| for optimum performance.                                                       |             |
+| Mandated                                                                       |             |
+| Standard                                                                       |             |
+| Technical Interfaces                                                           |             |
+| ANSI INCITS 398-2005 [NISTIR 6529-A]                                           |             |
+| Common Biometric Exchange Formats                                              |             |
+| Framework (CBEFF)                                                              |             |
+| This standard describes a set of data elements necessary to support biometric  |             |
+| technologies in a common way.  These data elements can be placed in a          |             |
+| single file used to exchange biometric information between different system    |             |
+| components or between systems.  The result promotes interoperability of        |             |
+| biometric-based application programs and systems developed by different        |             |
+| vendors by allowing biometric data interchange.                                |             |
+| Mandated                                                                       |             |
+| Standard                                                                       |             |
+| OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of                                     |             |
+| Structured Information Standards) eXtensible                                   |             |
+| Markup Language (XML) Common Biometric                                         |             |
+| Format 1.1                                                                     |             |
+| This specification defines a common set of secure XML encodings for the        |             |
+| patron formats specified in CBEFF (NISTIR 6529).  Much of the                  |             |
+| information included in this standard has been incorporated into a more        |             |
+| recent standard, ANSI X9.84-2003.                                              |             |
+| Emerging                                                                       |             |
+| Standard                                                                       |             |
+| NIST Special Publication 800-76 - Biometric Data                               |             |
+| Specification for Personal Identity Verification                               |             |
+| Special Publication 800-76 (SP 800-76) is a companion document to Federal      |             |
+| Information Processing Standard 201.  It describes technical acquisition and   |             |
+| formatting specifications for the biometric credentials of the Personal        |             |
+| Identity Verification (PIV) system, including the PIV card itself.  The        |             |
+| primary design objective behind these particular specifications is high        |             |
+| performance universal interoperability.                                        |             |
+|                                                                                |             |
+| Application                                                                    |             |
+| Profiles                                                                       |             |
+| Pending (CR                                                                    |             |
+| Submitted as                                                                   |             |
+| Mandated                                                                       |             |
+| Standard)                                                                      |             |
+
+## 2 Terms And Acronyms 2.1 Terms
+
+The following terms are used in this document as indicated.
+
+- Application Profile - a document that identifies a set of two or more existing prerequisite
+biometric standards and identifies the classes, subsets, options, and parameters of those
+base standards that are necessary for accomplishing a particular function.
+- Collection Personnel - the DoD-authorized individual collecting biometric data from
+another person.
+- Electronic Fingerprint Sensors - also referred to as live scan devices.
+- Person - the individual from whom biometric data are being collected.
+
+2.2
+Acronyms
+ABIS - DoD Automated Biometric Identification System
+ANSI - American National Standards Institute
+BioAPI - Biometrics Application Programming Interface
+BIR - Biometric Identification Record
+BTF - U.S. Army Biometrics Task Force BSWG - Biometric Standards Working Group
+CBEFF - Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework
+CJIS - Criminal Justice Information Services
+CONOPS - Concept of Operations
+DISR - Defense Information Technology Standards Registry
+DNA - deoxyribonucleic acid
+DoD - Department of Defense EBTS - Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification
+EFTS - Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification
+ESP - Encapsulating Security Payload
+FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
+FIQM - Finger Image Quality Measurement
+IAFIS - Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
+IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission
+IETF - Internet Engineering Task Force
+IKE - Internet Key Exchange INCITS - International Committee for Information Technology Standards
+IP - Internet Protocol
+IPSEC - Internet Protocol Security
+ISO - International Organization for Standardization
+ITL - Information Technology Laboratory
+NFIQ - NIST Finger Image Quality
+NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology
+NISTIR - NIST Interagency Reports
+OASIS - Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
+PIV - Personal Identity Verification
+ppi - pixels per inch
+SMT - Scar, Mark, & Tattoo S/MIME - Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions SOP - Standard Operating Procedure SSH - Secure Shell TLS - Transport Layer Security VPN - Virtual Private Network XML - eXtensible Markup Language
+
+
+## 3 Collection 3.1 Rolled Live Scan Fingerprints
+
+3.1.1 Equipment
+- All electronic fingerprint sensors, commonly known as live scan devices, shall be certified
+by the FBI to conform to Appendix F of the EFTS (Reference a) and shall appear on the
+FBI-certified devices list (Reference b).
+
+3.1.2 Image Capture
+- Collection of samples from each person shall include the following images:
+o 10 separately rolled fingers.
+o Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the right hand (no thumb).
+o Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the left hand (no thumb).
+o Left thumb plain impression.
+o Right thumb plain impression.
+- Rolled impressions shall be rolled from one side of the fingernail to the other.
+- Images shall be captured at a resolution of either 500 or 1,000 pixels per inch (ppi).
+
+3.1.3 Quality Control
+- Rolled live scan fingerprint images shall be evaluated with an automated tool that
+implements one of the following DoD-approved quality algorithms:
+o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Finger Image Quality (NFIQ)
+Tool (Reference q).
+o DoD Finger Image Quality Measurement (FIQM) Tool (Reference r).
+
+3.1.4 Formatting
+- Rolled live scan fingerprint images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one of
+the following formats:
+o EBTS Type-4 logical records (Reference k).  Only 500-ppi images shall be stored in
+Type-4 records.  Note that EBTS Type-4 records are identical to EFTS and American
+National Standards Institute (ANSI)/NIST Type-4 records.
+o EBTS Type-14 logical records (Reference k).  500-ppi and 1,000-ppi images may be
+stored in Type-14 records.  Note that EBTS Type-14 records are identical to EFTS and
+ANSI/NIST Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) 1-2000 Type-14 records.
+o ANSI International Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) 381-
+2004 Finger Image standard (Reference d).
+o ANSI INCITS 378-2004 Finger Minutiae standard (Reference h).
+o ANSI INCITS 377-2004 Finger Pattern standard (Reference i).
+o International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical
+Commission (IEC) 19794-4 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 4:  Finger
+Image Data (Reference hh).
+o ISO/IEC 19794-2 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 2:  Finger Minutiae Data
+(Reference ii).
+- ANSI INCITS- and ISO/IEC-formatted rolled live scan fingerprint data shall be embedded
+in a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference j).
+- EBTS-formatted rolled live scan fingerprint data may be embedded in a CBEFF Patron
+Format (Reference j).
+- Rolled live scan fingerprint data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of
+one of the CBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the
+specific application.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified
+in section 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the Biometrics
+Application Programming Interface (BioAPI) 1.1 storage format (Format C - The BioAPI
+Biometric Identification Record (BIR)) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).
+
+3.2
+Plain Live Scan Fingerprints
+3.2.1 Equipment
+- All electronic plain scan fingerprint sensors shall be certified by the FBI to conform to
+Appendix F of the EFTS (Reference a) and shall appear on the FBI-certified devices list
+(Reference b).
+
+3.2.2 Image Capture
+- Plain live scan fingerprints may be either "segmented" or "unsegmented."
+- Collection of segmented plain live scan finger samples shall include the following 14
+images:
+o 10 individual plain impressions of separate fingers.
+o Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the right hand (no thumb).
+o Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the left hand (no thumb).
+o Left thumb plain impression.
+o Right thumb plain impression.
+- Collection of unsegmented plain live scan finger samples shall include the following three
+images:
+o Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the right hand (no thumb).
+o Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the left hand (no thumb).
+o Combined plain impression of the two thumbs.
+- Images shall be captured at a resolution of either 500 or 1,000 ppi.  Special consideration
+should be given to the Patron Format specified in section 6 of NIST Special Publication
+800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage format (Format C - The BioAPI BIR)
+specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).
+
+3.2.3 Quality Control
+- Plain live scan fingerprint images shall be evaluated with an automated tool that
+implements one of the following DoD-approved quality algorithms:
+o NFIQ Tool (Reference q).
+o DoD FIQM Tool (Reference r).
+
+3.2.4 Formatting
+- Plain live scan fingerprint images shall be formatted in and in conformance with one of the
+following formats:
+o EBTS Type-4 logical records (Reference k).  Only 500-ppi images shall be stored in
+Type-4 records.  Note that EBTS Type-4 records are identical to EFTS and
+ANSI/NIST Type-4 records.
+o EBTS Type-14 logical records (Reference k).  500-ppi and 1,000-ppi images may be
+stored in Type-14 records.  Note that EBTS Type-14 records are identical to EFTS and
+ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Type-14 records.
+o ANSI INCITS 381-2004 Finger Image standard (Reference d).
+o ANSI INCITS 378-2004 Finger Minutiae standard (Reference h).
+o ANSI INCITS 377-2004 Finger Pattern standard (Reference i).
+o ISO/IEC 19794-4 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 4:  Finger Image Data
+(Reference hh).
+o ISO/IEC 19794-2 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 2:  Finger Minutiae Data
+(Reference ii).
+- All ANSI INCITS- and ISO/IEC-formatted plain live scan fingerprint data shall be
+embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference j).
+- All EBTS-formatted plain live scan fingerprint data may be embedded in a CBEFF Patron
+Format (Reference j).
+- Plain live scan fingerprint data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of
+one of the CBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the
+specific application.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified
+in section 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage
+format (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j). 3.3
+Single Fingerprints
+3.3.1 Equipment
+- All electronic single-fingerprint sensors shall implement a software interface that complies
+with BioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).
+
+3.3.2 Image Capture
+- Image capture requirements shall be stated using the "Image Acquisition Settings Levels"
+in Table 1 of Clause 6, "Image Acquisition Requirements," of ANSI INCITS 381-2004,
+"Finger Image-Based Data Interchange Format" (Reference d).
+
+3.3.3 Quality Control
+- Rolled live scan fingerprint images shall be evaluated with an automated tool that
+implements one of the following DoD-approved quality algorithms:
+o NFIQ Tool (Reference q). o DoD FIQM Tool (Reference r).
+
+3.3.4 Formatting
+- Single fingerprint images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one of the
+following formats:
+o ANSI INCITS 381-2004 Finger Image standard (Reference d).
+o ANSI INCITS 378-2004 Finger Minutiae standard (Reference h).
+o ANSI INCITS 377-2004 Finger Pattern standard (Reference i).
+o ISO/IEC 19794-4 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 4:  Finger Image Data
+(Reference hh).
+o ISO/IEC 19794-2 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 2:  Finger Minutiae Data
+(Reference ii).
+- Single fingerprint images embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of
+the CBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific
+application.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in
+section 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage
+format (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).
+
+3.4
+Latent Fingerprints
+
+## 3.4.1 Equipment
+
+There is no further guidance related to equipment.
+
+3.4.2 Image Capture
+- It is highly recommended that latent fingerprint images be captured at 1,000-ppi or higher
+resolution.
+- Grayscale digital imaging should be at a minimum of 8 bits per pixel.
+- Color digital imaging should be at a minimum of 24 bits per pixel.
+
+3.4.3 Formatting
+- Latent fingerprint images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one of the
+following formats:
+o EBTS Type-4 logical records (Reference k).  Only 500-ppi images shall be stored in
+Type-4 records.  Note that EBTS Type-4 records are identical to EFTS and
+ANSI/NIST Type-4 records.
+o EBTS Type-7 logical records (Reference k).  500-ppi and higher resolution images
+may be stored in Type-7 records.  Note that EBTS Type-7 records are identical to
+EFTS and ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Type-7 records.
+o EBTS Type-9 logical records (Reference k).  Note that EBTS Type-9 records are
+identical to EFTS and ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Type-9 records.
+
+
+## 3.5 Rolled Ink-On-Card Fingerprints
+
+3.5.1 Equipment
+- Rolled ink fingerprints shall be captured on DoD-acceptable fingerprint cards (examples
+are FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Forms FD-249 (Criminal Card) and
+FD-258 (Applicant Card)).
+- All electronic fingerprint scanners shall be certified by the FBI to conform to Appendix F
+of the EFTS (Reference a) and shall appear on the FBI-certified devices list (Reference b).
+
+3.5.2 Image Capture
+- Collection of samples from each person shall include the following images:
+o 10 separately rolled fingers.
+o Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the right hand (no thumb).
+o Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the left hand (no thumb).
+o Left thumb plain impression.
+o Right thumb plain impression.
+- Rolled impressions shall be rolled from one side of the fingernail to the other.
+- Images taken from the fingerprint cards shall be captured at a resolution of either 500 or
+1,000 ppi.
+
+3.5.3 Formatting
+- Rolled ink-on-card fingerprint images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one
+of the following formats:
+o EBTS Type-4 logical records (Reference k).  Only 500-ppi images shall be stored in
+Type-4 records.  Note that EBTS Type-4 records are identical to EFTS and
+ANSI/NIST Type-4 records.
+o EBTS Type-14 logical records (Reference k).  500-ppi and 1,000-ppi images may be
+stored in Type-14 records.  Note that EBTS Type-14 records are identical to EFTS and
+ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Type-14 records.
+
+
+## 3.6 Face Images
+
+3.6.1 Equipment
+- All photographs shall be taken using color cameras.
+- All facial image capture equipment shall implement a software interface that complies with
+BioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).
+
+3.6.2 Image Capture
+- The camera lens orientation shall be pointed to the front of the person, aligned
+approximately in the center of the face, and taken from a distance of approximately five
+feet.
+- The orientation(s) of the person for facial photos shall be taken from the following
+positions:
+o Frontal view (also known as full-frontal pose).
+o 90 degrees left side.
+o 45 degrees left side. o 90 degrees right side. o 45 degrees right side.
+- When photographed, the person shall not be allowed to wear any glasses, sunglasses,
+headgear, headdress, or other items obscuring the area photographed.  There are no
+constraints on cosmetics.
+- The full frontal pose shall conform to the requirements of ANSI INCITS 385-2004, "Face
+Recognition Format for Data Interchange" (Reference e), clauses 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 (The
+Full Frontal Image Type).
+
+3.6.3 Formatting
+- Facial images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one of the following
+formats:
+o EBTS Type-10 logical records (Reference k).  Note that EBTS Type-10 records are
+identical to EFTS and ANSI/NIST Type-10 records.
+o ANSI INCITS 385-2004 Face Recognition Format standard (Reference e).
+o ISO/IEC 19794-5 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 5:  Face Image Data
+(Reference jj).
+- ANSI INCITS- and ISO/IEC-formatted facial image data shall be embedded in a CBEFF
+Patron Format (Reference j).
+- EBTS-formatted facial image data may be embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format
+(Reference j).
+- Facial image data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the
+CBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific
+application.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in
+section 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage
+format (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).
+
+
+## 3.7 Iris Images
+
+3.7.1 Equipment
+- All iris image capture equipment shall implement a software interface that complies with
+BioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).
+- All iris image capture equipment shall collect separate images of the left and right irises of
+each person.  Note:  This does not imply that two images must be collected.  The
+requirement is that, if both the left and right eyes are captured, the process must result in
+two images.
+
+3.7.2 Image Capture
+- Images should be captured in accordance with Annex A, Iris Image Capture Best Practices,
+of ANSI INCITS 379-2004, the Iris Image Interchange Format (Reference f).
+
+3.7.3 Formatting
+- Iris images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one of the following formats:
+o EBTS Type-16 logical records (Reference k).  Note that there are no EFTS or
+ANSI/NIST Type-16 records that are equivalent to EBTS Type-16 records.
+o ANSI INCITS 379-2004 Iris Image Format standard (Reference f).
+o ISO/IEC 19794-6 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 6:  Iris Image Data
+(Reference kk).
+- ANSI INCITS- and ISO/IEC-formatted iris image data shall be embedded in a CBEFF
+Patron Format (Reference j).
+- EBTS-formatted iris image data may be embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference
+j).
+- Iris image data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the
+CBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific
+application.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in
+
+## Section 6 Of Nist Special Publication 800-76 (Reference L) Or To The Bioapi 1.1 Storage Format (Format C - The Bioapi Bir) Specified In Annex C Of Cbeff (Reference J). 3.8 Signature/Sign Data
+
+3.8.1  Equipment
+- All signature/sign data capture equipment shall implement a software interface that
+complies with BioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).
+
+3.8.2  Data Capture
+There is no further guidance related to data capture.
+
+3.8.3 Formatting
+- Signature/sign data shall be formatted in, and in conformance with:
+o ANSI INCITS 395-2005 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Signature/Sign Data
+(Reference nn).
+- Signature/sign data shall be embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference j).
+- Signature/sign data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the
+CBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific
+application.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in
+section 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage
+format (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).
+
+
+## 3.9 Hand Geometry Samples
+
+3.9.1 Equipment
+- All hand geometry capture equipment shall implement a software interface that complies
+with BioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).
+
+3.9.2 Data Capture
+There is no further guidance related to data capture.
+
+3.9.3 Formatting
+- Hand geometry data shall be formatted in, and in conformance with:
+o ANSI INCITS 396-2005 Hand Geometry Format standard (Reference n).
+- Hand geometry data shall be embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference j).
+- Hand geometry data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the
+CBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific
+application.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in
+section 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage
+format (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).
+
+## 3.10 Palm Prints
+
+3.10.1 Equipment
+- All palm print capture equipment shall meet the equipment requirements contained in
+ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Section 22 (Reference p).
+
+3.10.2 Image Capture
+- All palm print capture equipment shall meet the image capture requirements contained in
+ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Section 22 (Reference p).
+
+3.10.3 Formatting
+- Palm print images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with:
+o ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Type-15 records.
+- ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 formatted palm print image data may be embedded in a CBEFF
+Patron Format (Reference j).
+- Palm print data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the
+CBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific
+application.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in
+section 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage
+format (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).
+
+
+## 4 Transmission 4.1 Format
+
+4.1.1 EBTS Transactions
+- May be used for transmitting the following:
+o finger images in Type-4 or Type-14 logical records.
+o latent images in Type-7 logical records.
+o finger minutiae in Type-9 logical records.
+o facial images in Type-10 logical records.
+o SMT images in Type-10 logical records.
+o iris images in Type-16 logical records.
+- Shall conform to EBTS Version 1.1 (Reference k).
+- May be used to transmit to the DoD ABIS.
+
+4.1.2 EFTS Transaction
+- May be used for transmitting the following:
+o finger images in Type-4 or Type-14 logical records.
+o latent images in Type-7 logical records.
+o finger minutiae in Type-9 logical records.
+o facial images in Type-10 logical records.
+o SMT images in Type-10 logical records.
+- Shall conform to EFTS (Reference a).
+- May be used to transmit to DoD ABIS and FBI IAFIS.
+
+4.1.3 CBEFF Patron Format
+- Any CBEFF Patron Format may be used for transmitting any biometric data that have a
+Format Type value assigned by a registered Format Owner (see CBEFF, Section 6.3
+(Reference j)).
+- CBEFF-formatted data should make use of one of the CBEFF Patron Formats, preferably
+one of those that are being commonly used or are required by the specific application.
+Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in section 6 of NIST
+Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage format (Format C -
+The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).
+
+4.2
+Transport
+
+4.2.1 Transport to DoD ABIS
+- Accepts transactions submitted via:
+o E-mail on NIPRNet. o E-mail on SIPRNet.
+o FTP on NIPRNet.
+o Computer media (CD-ROM, DVD).
+
+4.2.2 Transport to FBI IAFIS
+- Accepts transactions submitted via:
+o E-mail on the CJIS Wide Area Network
+
+4.3
+Protection
+
+4.3.1 File Security
+- CBEFF
+o X9.84 specifies the minimum security requirements for effective management of
+biometric data (Reference gg).  The application profile will detail the specific
+implementation of X9.84 to avoid possible incompatibility with CBEFF.
+o PIV Patron Format (Reference l).
+- Data Protection
+o Cryptographic Message Syntax (1999) - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
+Request for Comments (RFC) 2630 (Reference t).
+o Cryptographic Message Syntax (2004) - IETF RFC 3852 (Reference u).
+
+4.3.2 Message Security
+- Secure e-mail
+o Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3, Message
+Specification - IETF RFC 2633 (Reference v).
+o S/MIME Version 3.1 Message Specification - IETF RFC 3851 (Reference w).
+
+4.3.3 Transport Security
+- Secure Socket
+o Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.0 - IETF RFC 2246 (Reference x).
+o TLS Protocol Version 1.1 - IETF RFC 4346 (Reference y).
+- Secure File Transfer
+o File Transfer Protocol (FTP) Security Extensions - IETF RFC 2228 (Reference z).
+o Secure Shell (SSH) File Transfer Protocol - IETF Internet Draft (Reference mm).
+
+- Virtual Private Network (VPN)
+o Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) with Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (1998).
+ Internet Protocol (IP) Authentication Header - IETF RFC 2402 (Reference aa).
+ IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) - IETF 2406 (Reference cc).
+ The IKE - IETF RFC 2409 (Reference ee).
+o IPSec with IKE (2005)
+ IP Authentication Header - IETF RFC 4302 (Reference bb).
+ ESP - IETF 4303 (Reference dd).
+ IKE v2 Protocol - IETF RFC 4306 (Reference ff).
+
+
+## 5 Storage 5.1 Format
+
+5.1.1 PIV Card
+- The storage format for data on the PIV card is in NIST Special Publication 800-76
+(Reference l).
+5.1.2 PIV Enrollment Agency
+- The storage format for data saved by the agency executing a PIV card enrollment is in
+NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l).
+5.1.3 Other Biometric Repository
+- The internal storage format of biometric data in a repository should be specified
+based on system requirements.  However, the biometric repository shall be capable of
+constructing at least one of the standardized data interchange and transmission
+formats listed in this document.  This construction capability shall enable the system
+to format biometric files according to the standards listed in this document for the
+purpose of successfully sharing those files with other standardized DoD-recognized
+systems.  Each biometric modality listed in this document contains published
+standardized formats for performing successful transmissions.
+
+
+## 5.2 Archiving
+
+5.2.1 DoD ABIS
+- Data transmitted to the DoD ABIS may indicate that data be retained or not retained.
+5.2.2 FBI IAFIS
+- Data transmitted to the IAFIS may indicate that data be retained or not retained.
+
+5.3
+Protection
+5.3.1 File Security
+- CBEFF
+o X9.84 specifies the minimum security requirements for effective management of
+biometric data (Reference gg).  The application profile will detail the specific
+implementation of X9.84 to avoid possible incompatibility with CBEFF.
+o PIV Patron Format (Reference l).
+- Data Protection
+o Cryptographic Message Syntax (1999) - IETF RFC 2630 (Reference t).
+o Cryptographic Message Syntax (2004) - IETF RFC 3852 (Reference u).
+
+Appendix A:  Adoption of Biometric Standards
+
+Published standards should be adopted and used whenever possible to permit the development of open systems and avoid use of vendor-specific, proprietary solutions.  Standards provide structure and a framework by which development, interoperability, interchange, and functionality may be achieved. Adoption is a process by which an organization expresses formal acceptance of a standard for use in direct procurement, as a reference in another document, or as guidance in its design, manufacturing, testing, or support activities.  Adoption of biometric standards is a crucial component of a successful implementation of biometric technologies.  Common biometric standards should be used throughout DoD to facilitate interoperability and data sharing within DoD, the federal government, and foreign partners.  As new standards are published, these standards must be evaluated and possibly adopted by DoD.
+
+A.1  DoD DISR Overview In 2004, the DISR officially replaced the Joint Technical Architecture in compliance with the
+2004 *Memorandum for DoD Executive Agent for Information Technology Standards* and in accordance with DoD Directives 4350.5 and 5101.7.  The DISR serves as a central repository for DoD-approved information technology standards, including biometric standards.  Use of the DISR is mandated for the development and acquisition of new or modified fielded IT and National Security Systems throughout the DoD. To support the adoption of biometric standards, the BSWG selects published standards based on priorities identified by the DoD Biometrics Community of Interest and submits formal Change Requests to the DISR. A.2  Criteria for Submission of Standards to the DISR
+Standards must successfully satisfy the following criteria for submission and acceptance into the DISR:  net-centricity, interoperability, technical maturity, implementability, publicly available, consistent with authoritative sources, and applicability to DoD.  The standards selection criteria focus on mandating only those items critical to net-centricity and interoperability (Reference s).
+
+-
+Net-centric Interoperability - How does this technology provide users the ability to access
+applications and services through Web services (an information environment composed
+of interoperable computing and communication components)?
+-
+Technical Maturity - How technically mature and stable is the standard?  Does it have
+strong support in the commercial marketplace?  What commercial products exist for this
+standard?  How long has this standard been used?  Is a follow-on standard in
+development?  When is its estimated completion date?  Should the sunset status be added
+to the current mandated status?
+-
+Public Availability - To what URL can a system developer go to get a copy of the
+standard?  Is a copy of the standard free, or must it be purchased?
+-
+Implementability - Who specifically in DoD or the Intelligence Community is using this
+standard?  What specific commercial organizations have developed implementations of
+this standard?
+-
+Authoritative - What standards body developed and now maintains this standard?  Is it an
+international, national, or military standard?  What is the process for maintaining and
+developing this standard?  Is the process open or closed?
+-
+Applicability - Is the standard applicable to the entire DoD?  The standard must have
+Department-wide applicability since, under the Clinger-Cohen Amendment, the DoD
+Chief Information Officer has authority to "ensure that information technology and
+national security systems standards that will apply throughout the Department of Defense
+are prescribed."  This would preclude mandates for Component-unique standards or
+duplicate standards for the same capability that are not interoperable.
+Each standard accepted to the DISR is assigned a status, which is one of the following:
+
+-
+Emerging standards - candidate standards to help the program manager determine
+those areas likely to change within three years and to suggest those areas in which
+"upgradeability" should be a concern.  They may be implemented, but shall not be
+used in lieu of a mandated standard without a waiver.  An emerging standard is
+expected to be elevated to mandatory status within three years.  Those that continue
+in an emerging status for longer than three years will require justification.
+-
+Mandated standards - essential for providing interoperability and net-centric services
+across the DoD enterprise.  They are the minimum set of essential standards for
+implementation in the acquisition of all DoD systems that produce, use, or exchange
+information and, when implemented, facilitate the flow of information in support of
+the warfighter.  These standards are mandated for the management, development, and
+acquisition of new or improving systems throughout the DoD.
+Appendix B:  Data Collection for Non-Standardized Modalities
+
+Currently, there are no published national or international standards for voice or DNA biometric
+data.  The following sub-sections provide recommendations based on the practices existing
+within the DoD.
+B.1  Voice Recording Samples B.1.1  Equipment
+- A dedicated microphone(s) shall be used.  Microphones built in to a laptop, personal
+digital assistant, or similar device shall not be used.
+- Voice sample capture equipment should implement a software interface that complies with
+BioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).
+
+B.1.2  Sample Capture
+- Microphone(s) shall be positioned 6 to 12 inches from the person.
+- The person shall read a prepared script no less than 30 seconds in length in his native
+language and speaking style.
+- If possible, multiple voice samples should be collected from each person on different days
+and at differing times of the day (e.g., morning, mid-day, and evening).
+- Voice samples shall be collected in an indoor location relatively free of background noise.
+The room used for voice data collection shall use materials such as carpeting, cubicle
+walls, blankets, or similar materials to suppress reflective noise and echo effects.
+
+B.1.3  Formatting
+- Captured voice files shall be formatted in a .wav file format defined in ISO/IEC 13818 -
+Generic coding of moving pictures and associated audio information (Reference m).
+- Formatted voice files shall be embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference j).
+- Voice files embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the CBEFF
+Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific application.
+Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in section 6 of NIST
+Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage format (Format C -
+The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).
+
+B.2  DNA Samples
+This section describes the requirements for the collection of biological material suitable for transfer, temporary storage, and DNA analysis for use in federal counter-terrorism investigations and operations, to include military support for the Global War on Terrorism.  These samples may be tested by short tandem repeat marker systems that include the 13 Combined DNA Index System loci.  These samples may also undergo mitochondrial DNA analysis, Y-chromosomal analysis, or other forensic testing as deemed appropriate by the Joint Federal Agencies Antiterrorism DNA Database working group, which consists of members drawn from the DoD
+and federal law enforcement and intelligence communities.  The FBI DNA Advisory Board,
+"Quality assurance standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories and for Convicted
+
+Offender DNA Databasing Laboratories" (Reference g) provides additional information on
+requirements and quality assurance metrics for DNA testing. U.S. military units shall collect two buccal (intra-oral cheek) swabs from each person.
+Collection Personnel shall collect one swab from the inside of each cheek (right and left).  The
+person must not have consumed food or drink; chewed gum; or chewed, dipped, or smoked
+tobacco or any other products for at least 15 minutes prior to the DNA sample being collected. B.2.1  Collection and Labeling
+- DoD personnel shall label each container of two swabs with the person's name, the date
+and location of acquisition, and the name and unit of the individual responsible for the
+collection.  The containers must be labeled using a permanent marker or pen.
+- DoD personnel shall collect DNA samples using a sterile cotton-tipped applicator for the
+buccal swabs.  Briskly rub the inside of the person's inner cheek up and down 10 times
+with the buccal swab, concentrating on scraping cells from the oral mucosa, (inner cheek)
+not just collecting saliva.
+- The two swabs should be air dried for at least thirty minutes when possible prior to
+repackaging and transport.  DoD personnel shall place the dried oral swabs in a properly
+labeled paper envelope or paper box (never plastic) and seal with evidence tape.  Gloves
+should be worn when packaging the swabs.
+
+B.2.2  Transfer to Laboratory
+- U.S. military units shall maintain a chain of custody for each pair of swabs using
+appropriate documentation and procedures or similar document.
+- It is important that all individuals handling the DNA samples use gloves and avoid direct
+skin, hair, or breath contact that might contaminate the samples.
+- Combatant Commands shall establish written procedures to transfer persons' swabs to the
+FBI.  DoD and the federal law enforcement and intelligence communities cooperatively
+process the swabs.
+- The DoD shall maintain DNA profiles in a joint database that shall be traceable to the
+person's other biometric information.
+
+## Appendix C:  References
+
+a. Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification (EFTS), version 7.1, May 2, 2005,
+http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis/efts71/efts71.pdf.
+b. "Products certified for compliance with the FBI Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
+System image quality specifications," http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis/cert.htm.
+c. ANSI INCITS 358-2002, "BioAPI Specification (Version 1.1)."
+d. ANSI INCITS 381-2004, "Finger Image Based Data Interchange Format" (This standard is
+copyrighted, and licensed copies are available from the Biometrics Task Foce (BTF)).
+e. ANSI INCITS 385-2004, "Face Recognition Format for Data Interchange" (This standard is
+copyrighted, and licensed copies are available from the BTF).
+f. ANSI INCITS 379-2004, "Iris Image Interchange Format" (This standard is copyrighted, and
+licensed copies are available from the BTF).
+g. Federal Bureau of Investigation DNA Advisory Board, "Quality assurance standards for Forensic
+DNA Testing Laboratories and for Convicted Offender DNA Databasing Laboratories," Jul 00,
+http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2000/codispre.htm.
+h. ANSI INCITS 378-2004, "Finger Minutiae Format for Data Interchange."
+i. ANSI INCITS 377-2004, "Finger Pattern Data Interchange Format."
+j. ANSI INCITS 398-2005/NISTIR 6529-A, "Common Biometric Exchange Framework Format
+(CBEFF)."
+k. DoD Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification (EBTS), version 1.1, 23 Aug 05,
+http://www.biometrics.dod.mil/Documents/DoD_ABIS_EBTS.pdf.
+l. NIST Special Publication 800-76, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-76/sp800-76.pdf. m. ISO/IEC 13818, "Generic Coding Method of Moving Pictures and of Associated Sound" for
+various applications such as digital storage media, television broadcasting, and communication.
+n. ANSI INCITS 396-2005, "Hand Geometry Format for Data Interchange."
+o. "Capstone Concept of Operations For DoD Biometrics In Support Of Identity Superiority,"
+(version 1.0).
+p. ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000, American National Standards Institute/National Institute of Standards
+and Technology (ANSI/NIST), "Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & Scar
+Mark & Tattoo (SMT) Information," Sep 00,
+ftp://sequoyah.nist.gov/pub/nist_internal_reports/sp500-245-a16.pdf.
+q. NIST Finger Image Quality (NFIQ) Tool, NISTIR 7151, "Fingerprint Image Quality," Aug 04, by
+Elham Tabassi, Charles L. Wilson, and Craig I. Watson.
+r. DoD Finger Image Quality Measurement (FIQM) Tool, "Fingerprint Image Quality Measurement
+Algorithm," Jan 06, by Dr. Joseph Guzman and Robert Yen.
+s. Department of Defense, "Standard Operating Procedures for the Information Technology
+Standards Committee (ITSC) and Its Technical Working Groups (TWGs)," Dec 04.
+t. IETF RFC 2630 Cryptographic Message Syntax, R. Housley, June 1999.
+u. IETF RFC 3852 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), R. Housley, July 2004.
+v. IETF RFC 2633 S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification, B. Ramsdell, Ed., June 1999.
+w. IETF RFC 3851 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1
+Message Specification, B. Ramsdell, Ed., July 2004.
+x. IETF RFC 2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1.0. T. Dierks, C. Allen, January 1999.
+y. IETF RFC 4346 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1, T. Dierks, E.
+Rescorla, April 2006.
+z. IETF RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions, M. Horowitz, S. Lunt, October 1997.
+aa. IETF RFC 2402 IP Authentication Header, S. Kent, R. Atkinson, November 1998.
+bb. IETF RFC 4302 IP Authentication Header, S. Kent, December 2005.
+cc. IETF RFC 2406 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), S. Kent, R. Atkinson, November
+1998.
+dd. IETF RFC 4303 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), S. Kent, December 2005.
+ee. IETF RFC 2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), D. Harkins, D. Carrel, November 1998.
+ff. IETF RFC 4306 Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol, C. Kaufman, Ed., December
+2005.
+gg. ANSI X9.84-2003, "Biometric Information Management and Security for the Financial
+Services Industry"
+hh. ISO/IEC 19794-4 "Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 4:  Finger Image Data"
+ii. ISO/IEC 19794-2 "Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 2:  Finger Minutiae Data"
+jj. ISO/IEC 19794-5 "Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 5:  Face Image Data"
+kk. ISO/IEC 19794-6 "Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 6:  Iris Image Data"
+ll. "National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Biometrics Standards (BS) Interagency
+Coordination Plan (ICP)," Current copies of this document are obtained by request at the
+discretion of the Director of the BTF.
+mm.
+T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt,
+January 2001, work in progress material.
+nn. ANSI INCITS 395-2005 "Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Signature/Sign Data"

markdown/misc/chinese-americans.md

@@ -0,0 +1,787 @@
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+
+
+Best Practices to Protect Privacy, Civil
+
+Liberties, and Civil Rights of Americans of Chinese Descent in the Conduct of U.S.
+
+Intelligence Activities
+
+
+
+May 2022
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+2
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+Table of Contents
+
+EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........ 3
+
+REPORT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ........ 5
+
+INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ........ 7
+
+U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED SECURITY ACTIVITIES TO COUNTERACT
+
+AND MITIGATE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
+
+CHINA ........ .8
+
+CONCLUSION ........ 22
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+3
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
+
+This report responds to two congressionally directed actions concerning the potential effects on Americans of Chinese descent of activities conducted by the U.S. Intelligence
+
+Community (IC) to counteract national security threats posed by the People's Republic of China
+
+(PRC).  Specifically, Section 5712 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
+
+2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, required the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the
+
+Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency (CLPT), to submit a report to Congress reviewing "how the policies, procedures, and practices of the intelligence community that govern intelligence activities and operations targeting the People's Republic of China affect policies, procedures, and practices relating to the privacy and civil liberties of Americans of Chinese descent who may be targets of espionage and influence operations by China."  The law also requires that the report include recommendations "to ensure that the privacy and civil liberties of
+
+Americans of Chinese descent are sufficiently protected."  Subsequently, Section 620 of the
+
+Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, made the previously described report an annual requirement for the Director of National Intelligence and requires the report to address the civil rights of Americans of Chinese descent in addition to earlier references to privacy and civil liberties.
+
+As stated in the February 2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
+
+Community, the IC assesses that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) "will work to . . . undercut
+
+U.S. influence, drive wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that favor its authoritarian system."1  As a component of these efforts, the Annual Threat Assessment states that the PRC "will continue expanding its global intelligence and covert influence posture to better support the CCP's political, economic, and security goals, increasingly challenging U.S. influence."2  For this purpose, the PRC's foreign intelligence services have developed an aggressive human intelligence collection posture.  The CCP and the PRC pose these national security threats, however, not the people of China and emphatically not Americans of Chinese descent.
+
+The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) CLPT led an interagency examination of the privacy, civil liberties, and related civil rights controls used by the IC when conducting intelligence and counterintelligence activities to counter the national security threats posed by the PRC.  Specifically, the examination reviewed the privacy, civil liberties, and related civil rights controls, as well as related training, oversight, and avenues for the public to raise concerns regarding IC conduct.  The privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights protections embedded in these intelligence programs protect all Americans.  Consistent with the congressionally directed action, this examination reviewed the impact and efficacy of these privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights controls with respect to Americans of Chinese descent.
+
+Based on IC privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights offices' input, the ODNI CLPT focused the review on three broad categories of intelligence and related security activities
+
+
+1 See February 2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community at 6, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
+
+2 Id. at 8. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+4
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED conducted by IC agencies and components to counteract the national security threat posed by the
+
+PRC: (1) authorized foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection by the IC that intentionally collects information regarding a particular U.S. person,3 (2) incidental collection of
+
+U.S. person information (including of Americans of Chinese descent) acquired in the course of authorized foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities that do not target U.S. persons, and (3) processes related to the grant or revocation of a security clearance.  ODNI CLPT, in conjunction with the IC agencies' and components' privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers, examined the policies and procedures related to these three categories of intelligence and security related activities, as well as related training, oversight mechanisms, and redress processes as applicable.
+
+ODNI CLPT's examination determined that IC agencies and components have policies and procedures designed to protect the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights in the execution of these categories of intelligence and related security activities.  The IC has a solemn obligation to provide equal protection to all U.S. persons in accordance with the U.S. Constitution and applicable laws, policies, and regulations.  The law is clear: no IC agency or component may conduct an intelligence activity (to include the targeting or collection of information) or otherwise make an employment decision (to include the granting or revocation of a security clearance, or related investigatory steps) based upon the racial or ethnic background of any U.S. person.  Moreover, Executive Order 12968 makes clear that the U.S. Government "does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in granting access to classified information."
+
+In addition to these binding legal obligations, the IC has a deep commitment to securing the nation while also exemplifying America's values.  Those values include equitable and fair treatment to persons of every race and ethnicity.
+
+Conducting intelligence activities based upon race or ethnicity is also entirely inconsistent with the objective, fact-based criteria that underlie the tradecraft utilized by the IC.
+
+In a manner authorized by law, the IC must ground its foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection activities on fact-based determinations regarding whether individuals have access to the information needed for the IC to fulfill its mission.  Conducting intelligence activities or subjecting individuals to greater scrutiny during the security background process based upon race or ethnicity does not reflect the IC's commitment to objective intelligence collection.  Moreover, as discussed in this report, it is the IC's assessment that the
+
+PRC's foreign intelligence services prioritize other factors over race or ethnicity when those services evaluate the potential recruitment of human assets.
+
+Stated clearly, the IC may not target an individual in an intelligence collection activity because they are Chinese American.  An American of Chinese descent must also not be
+
+
+3 Executive Order 12333 defines a U.S. person as "a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence element concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments."  Executive Order 12333 at  3.5(k).  The Foreign
+
+Intelligence Surveillance Act contains a substantially similar definition of U.S. person.  See 50 U.S.C.  1801(i).
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+5
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED subjected to greater scrutiny in security clearance processes based on their race or ethnicity.
+
+Intelligence collection or security clearance actions based on such an unauthorized purpose violate the law, are inconsistent with the IC's values, and would not reflect the IC's fact and risk based approach to intelligence tradecraft.
+
+Although IC policies and procedures reflect an appropriate focus on the protection of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights in the targeting and scope of intelligence and related security activities, ODNI makes four recommendations to IC agencies and components to further ensure the protection of the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of all Americans, including
+
+Americans of Chinese descent.  First, ODNI recommends that IC agencies and components reemphasize the prohibition on conducting intelligence and related security activities based on race or ethnicity, to include those related to the granting or revocation of security clearances, in their training materials.4  Second, and relatedly, all IC agencies and components are encouraged to expand unconscious bias and cultural competency training to personnel involved in intelligence collection and security clearance processes.  Third, ODNI recommends that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers further develop and, when relevant, highlight the potential for disparate impacts on historically disadvantaged groups of U.S. persons, including Americans of Chinese descent, when conducting analyses and making recommendations regarding intelligence and related security activities.  Fourth, ODNI will explore its ability to generate and make public demographic metrics regarding the length of time and the results of security clearance processes.  These metrics would be utilized to identify and help rectify processes that may have a disparate impact on specific racial or ethnic groups.  Actions consistent with these recommendations that have already been initiated are detailed in this report.
+
+The ODNI will conduct an examination on an annual basis to monitor changes in IC practices based upon these recommendations and develop further recommendations as needed.
+
+ODNI expects those reviews will build on the findings in this report and anticipates that further examination will provide valuable perspective on whether the IC's protections provide equitable outcomes for other persons of color as well.
+
+REPORT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
+
+Section 5712(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
+
+contained the following Sense of Congress with respect to the PRC and intelligence activities:
+
+(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.It is the sense of Congress that
+
+(1) the People's Republic of China appears to be specifically targeting the
+
+Chinese-American community for intelligence purposes;
+
+
+4 For example, with respect to security adjudications, ODNI has issued clear direction that discrimination on the basis of race or national origin is prohibited in national security eligibility determinations.  See Security Executive
+
+Agent Directive 4: National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (hereinafter, SEAD-4), Appendix A,  1(c) (effective
+
+June 8, 2017) ("The U.S. Government does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in making a national security eligibility determination.").  ODNI recommends reemphasizing this clear prohibition throughout training materials.
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+6
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+(2) such targeting carries a substantial risk that the loyalty of such Americans may be generally questioned and lead to unacceptable stereotyping, targeting, and racial profiling;
+
+(3) the United States Government has a duty to warn and protect all Americans including those of Chinese descent from these intelligence efforts by the People's
+
+Republic of China;
+
+(4) the broad stereotyping, targeting, and racial profiling of Americans of Chinese descent is contrary to the values of the United States and reinforces the flawed narrative perpetuated by the People's Republic of China that ethnically Chinese individuals worldwide have a duty to support the People's Republic of China; and
+
+(5) the United States efforts to combat the People's Republic of China's intelligence activities should actively safeguard and promote the constitutional rights of all Chinese Americans.
+
+
+
+Based on these findings, the Act directed that:
+
+(b) ...the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Office of Civil
+
+Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency, in coordination with the civil liberties and privacy officers of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees containing
+
+(c)
+
+(1) a review of how the policies, procedures, and practices of the intelligence community that govern the intelligence activities and operations targeting the People's Republic of China affect policies, procedures, and practices relating to the privacy and civil liberties of
+
+Americans of Chinese descent who may be targets of espionage and influence operations by China; and
+
+(2) recommendations to ensure that the privacy and civil liberties of
+
+Americans of Chinese descent are sufficiently protected.
+
+
+
+ Subsequently, Section 620 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
+
+Pub. L. No. 116-260, modified this reporting requirement to also address the civil rights of
+
+Americans of Chinese descent in addition to earlier references to privacy and civil liberties.
+
+ODNI CLPT conducted its review of IC policies, procedures, and practices by working with IC privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers to identify the types of intelligence related activities most likely to impact the privacy and civil liberties of Americans of Chinese descent.  Having identified areas of potential privacy and civil liberties risk, the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers then identified and detailed related policies and procedures (to include policies and procedures addressing the use of race and ethnicity and associated civil rights protections), training, compliance and oversight mechanisms, and redress processes designed to mitigate the identified risks.  ODNI CLPT also consulted with subject matter experts at the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), the ODNI Office of IC,
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+7
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI), and the ODNI Office of Equal Employment Opportunity
+
+(OEEO).  Additionally, ODNI CLPT engaged with non-governmental organization experts regarding Asian American civil rights and civil liberties protection.  These meetings provided valuable perspective and substantially informed the recommendations made in this report.
+
+INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
+
+CHINA
+
+It is the IC's assessment that while the PRC promotes the false narrative that individuals of Chinese descent owe some allegiance to the PRC, neither race nor ethnicity is the primary criterion utilized by the PRC's intelligence services in their recruitment of intelligence assets.
+
+More specifically, the February 2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
+
+Community states that the CCP "will work to . . . undercut U.S. influence, drive wedges between
+
+Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that favor its authoritarian system."5  As a component of these efforts, the Annual Threat Assessment states that the PRC "will continue expanding its global intelligence and covert influence posture to better support the CCP's political, economic, and security goals, increasingly challenging U.S. influence."6
+
+In order to support the CCP's global ambitions, the PRC's foreign intelligence services including the Ministry of State Security and intelligence components of the People's Liberation
+
+Armyhave developed an aggressive human intelligence collection posture.  These efforts have led to the PRC's recruitment of numerous foreign citizens and intelligence, military, and civilian officials, including from within the U.S. Government.  A U.S. person's individual race or ethnicity, however, is not assessed as primary to the PRC's U.S.-focused human intelligence recruitment rubric.  PRC intelligence services instead prioritize the following factors: (1) the potential intelligence asset's past, present, or future access to information of PRC interest; (2) the potential asset's susceptibility to recruitment by the PRC intelligence services; (3) the potential asset's affinity for and willingness to cooperate with the PRC; and (4) the potential asset's accessibility to PRC intelligence officers for recruitment and handling by the PRC intelligence services.  For example, legal travel to China has presented PRC intelligence services with opportunities for recruitment and handling, and such PRC intelligence activities have focused on
+
+U.S. business persons, retired U.S. Government officials, students, academics, scientists, and tourists, regardless of race or ethnicity.  While some of these factors may in individual cases be correlated with having personal, financial, or professional connections with individuals or groups located within the PRC, it is the IC's assessment that PRC intelligence services do not rely merely on race or ethnicity in assessing the recruitment potential of intelligence assets.
+
+
+
+5 See February 2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community at 6, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
+
+6 Id. at 8.
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+8
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED SECURITY ACTIVITIES TO
+
+COUNTERACT AND MITIGATE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE
+
+PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
+
+The IC's mission is to provide timely, insightful, objective, and relevant intelligence and support to inform national security decisions and to protect our Nation and its interests.  Based on the significant threat posed by the PRC, IC agencies and components conduct numerous activities that seek insight about PRC plans and intentions in order to defend against counterintelligence and security threats posed by the PRC.  U.S. intelligence activities are focused on the threat posed by the PRC and the CCP, including the threat posed by PRC intelligence services' recruitment of human intelligence assets.
+
+It is important to note, however, that the CCP and the PRC pose these national security threats, not the people of China and, emphatically, not Americans of Chinese descent.  As stated above, the IC assesses that an individual's Chinese descent is not one of the primary criteria utilized by the PRC's intelligence services in identifying potential intelligence assets.
+
+Consistent with U.S. law and our shared values, the IC is not authorized to collect intelligence information, or conduct activities in support of security clearance processes, simply because an American is of Chinese descent.  The IC's activities, however, do have the potential to impact the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Americans; and the bar on intentionally collecting information on an individual because of their race or ethnicity does not mean that the resulting privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights impacts are necessarily uniformly distributed across all demographics.  As described in the methodology section above, in the course of this review IC agencies and components identified intelligence and related security activities they engage in to combat threats posed by the PRC that have the greatest potential to impact
+
+Americans of Chinese descent.  Based upon the IC agencies' and components' more detailed and classified input, ODNI CLPT identified the following three categories of relevant intelligence and related security activities, each of which is discussed in detail below: (1) authorized IC foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection that intentionally collects information regarding a particular U.S. person, (2) incidental collection of U.S. person information (including of Americans of Chinese descent) acquired in the course of authorized foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities that do not target U.S. persons, and (3) security investigations related to the grant or revocation of a security clearance.  Each of these categories of intelligence and related security activities is described in this section, followed by an analysis of the applicable privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights controls that guide and restrict these activities.
+
+Recommendations for improving the protection of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights are embedded in this analysis.
+
+A. Intentional Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Collection Regarding a
+
+Particular U.S. Person
+
+1. Intentional Collection Activities Potentially Impacting Americans of
+
+Chinese Descent:
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+9
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+Executive Order 12333, a foundational grant of Executive authority defining and delineating the authorities and structure of the IC, begins with the statement "[t]imely, accurate, and insightful information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States."
+
+(emphasis added).  As described in a previous section and the April 2021 Annual
+
+Threat Assessment, PRC activities present a threat by such a foreign power to
+
+U.S. national security.  But although the threat itself emanates from a foreign power, it does not follow that the IC may only collect information regarding foreign individuals to counter this threat.  For example, a U.S. person may be assessed to be acting, unintentionally or intentionally, as an agent of a foreign power like the PRC, by collecting information on behalf of that foreign power.  In such cases, the IC may seek to intentionally collect information concerning the
+
+U.S. person in order to mitigate the national security threat posed by the foreign power.
+
+2. Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights Protections for Intentional
+
+Collection:
+
+Because intentional collection is directed at a particular U.S. person, intentional collection presents some of the most significant privacy and civil liberties risks.  To mitigate these risks, the IC's authority to intentionally collect information regarding U.S. persons is prescribed by statutes, Executive Order, and mandated agency policies.
+
+The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) governs and restricts the IC's authority to target a U.S. person through collection techniques such as electronic surveillance or the search of private property.7  Such electronic surveillance or searches targeting U.S. persons require a determination by a judge on a specialized court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), that there is probable cause to believe that the U.S. person in question is an "agent of a foreign power."8  In order to make this showing that a U.S. person is an "agent of a foreign power," the government must provide facts to the FISC demonstrating that there is probable cause to believe that the U.S. person is engaged in knowing and intentional conduct in support of the foreign power.9  This is a determination that must be made based on the individual's conduct; the individual's race or ethnicity does not provide lawful basis for the court to determine that a U.S. person is an agent of a foreign power.
+
+Other intelligence collection activities are governed by Executive Order
+
+12333.  Executive Order 12333 describes the types of intelligence collection that
+
+
+7 See 50 U.S.C.  1801, et seq.
+
+8 See 50 U.S.C.  1801  1805, 1821  1824, 1881b  1881d.
+
+9 See 50 U.S.C.  1801(b)(2).
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+10
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED each IC agency or component may acquire.  Some IC agencies or components are limited to collecting overtly or from publicly available sources, while other IC agencies may also collect through clandestine or other means.  In all cases,
+
+Executive Order 12333 requires that any acquisition of U.S. person information be collected only pursuant to procedures approved by the head of the IC agency or component and the Attorney General, after consultation with the Director of
+
+National Intelligence.10  Collection efforts governed by such procedures include everything from the collection of "information that is publicly available or collected with the consent of the person concerned," to "information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence [or] counterintelligence . . . investigation," to "information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts for the purposes of determining their suitability or credibility."11
+
+Each of these Executive Order 12333 Attorney General procedures contains specific restrictions and requirements governing the intentional collection of information targeting a U.S. person.  The specific requirements, factual basis, and approval levels for such targeted collection activities vary based on each IC agency or component's authorities and mission and the sensitivity of the underlying collection effort (from less sensitive activities, such as the collection of publicly available information, to substantially more sensitive activities, such as the physical surveillance of a specific U.S. person).  A commonality, however, is that all intelligence activities conducted pursuant to
+
+Executive Order 12333, including intentional collection of intelligence information regarding any U.S. person, may only be conducted for an authorized intelligence or counterintelligence purpose.  For example, ODNI's Attorney
+
+General Procedures state that ODNI may only collect "information concerning
+
+U.S. persons if done in the course of the ODNI's duly authorized intelligence activities and in fulfillment of the ODNI's national security responsibilities."12
+
+The Attorney General-approved procedures of other IC agencies and components contain comparable provisions.13
+
+
+10 See Executive Order 12333  1, 2.3.
+
+11 See id.  2.3.
+
+12 See ODNI's Intelligence Activities Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order
+
+12333 (hereinafter, "ODNI Procedures"), Section 2.2.4, available at https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/ODNI%20guidelines%20as%20app roved%20by%20AG%2012.23.20_OCR.pdf.
+
+13 See, e.g., Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Activities:  Procedures Approved by the Attorney General
+
+Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (hereinafter, "CIA Procedures"), Section 2.3, available at https://www.cia.gov/static/54871453e089a4bd7cb144ec615312a3/CIA-AG-Guidelines-Signed.pdf; DHS's Office of
+
+Intelligence and Analysis Intelligence Oversight Guidelines (hereinafter, "DHS Procedures") at Section 2.1, available at available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/office-of-intelligence-and-analysis intelligence-oversight-program-and-guidelines.pdf. https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/ODNI%20guidelines%20as%20approved%20by%20AG%2012.23.20_OCR.pdf https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/ODNI%20guidelines%20as%20approved%20by%20AG%2012.23.20_OCR.pdf https://www.cia.gov/static/54871453e089a4bd7cb144ec615312a3/CIA-AG-Guidelines-Signed.pdf https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/office-of-intelligence-and-analysis-intelligence-oversight-program-and-guidelines.pdf https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/office-of-intelligence-and-analysis-intelligence-oversight-program-and-guidelines.pdf
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+11
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+Targeting intelligence collection to disadvantage an individual because they are an American of Chinese descentor any other race or ethnicityis never an authorized intelligence or counterintelligence purpose; to the contrary, targeting for such a purpose is unlawful.  U.S. intelligence activities must comply with all aspects of U.S. law, including the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law.  These legal requirements are reflected in every IC agency and component's Attorney General-approved procedures.  For example, the Executive Order 12333 Attorney General Procedures for the Department of
+
+Defense (DoD) state that in carrying out intelligence activities, DoD components
+
+"must carry out all activities in all circumstances in accordance with the
+
+Constitution and laws of the United States."14  The procedures of other IC agencies and components, such as the Central Intelligence Agency15 and the U.S.
+
+Coast Guard,16 take a comparable approach.  As stated in the ODNI Guidelines, but equally applicable to all IC agencies and components, "[t]he United States
+
+Government, including the ODNI, has a solemn obligation to protect fully the legal rights of all U.S. persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by federal law, including in the conduct of intelligence activities."17  In addition, several IC agencies or components, particularly those with the most significant domestic authorities, have additional language that more specifically addresses race or ethnicity.  For example, the Executive Order 12333
+
+Attorney General Procedures for the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) state that "I&A personnel are not permitted to engage in intelligence activities based solely on an individual's or group's race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, country of birth, or nationality."18  Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Attorney
+
+General Procedures make clear that the Department of Justice's policies restricting the use of race and ethnicity in law enforcement activities also apply equally to the FBI's conduct of intelligence activities.19
+
+ Intentionally collecting intelligence information about individuals solely based on their race or ethnicity is also entirely inconsistent with the objective,
+
+
+14 Department of Defense Manual 5240.01: Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities
+
+(hereinafter, "DoD Procedures"), Section 1.2(b), available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/524001_dodm_2016.pdf?ver=2017-07-31
+143413-363.
+
+15 See CIA Procedures, Sections 1.1 and 3.3.
+
+16 See U.S. Coast Guard's Appendix A to COMDTINST M3820.12A:  Attorney General Guidance for Coast Guard
+
+National Intelligence Element Activities (hereinafter Coast Guard Procedures), Procedure 1.A.2, available at https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/CIM3820.12A_Final_26_JAN_21.p df%20(CG2%20Signature)_OCR.pdf.
+
+17 ODNI Guidelines, Section 1.2.
+
+18 DHS Procedures, Section 1.
+
+19 See The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (hereinafter, "FBI Procedures"), Section
+
+I.C.3, available at https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/guidelines.pdf. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/524001_dodm_2016.pdf?ver=2017-07-31-143413-363
+https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/524001_dodm_2016.pdf?ver=2017-07-31-143413-363
+https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/CIM3820.12A_Final_26_JAN_21.pdf%20(CG2%20Signature)_OCR.pdf https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/CIM3820.12A_Final_26_JAN_21.pdf%20(CG2%20Signature)_OCR.pdf https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/guidelines.pdf
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+12
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED fact-based criteria that underlie the tradecraft utilized by the IC.  In a manner authorized by law, the IC must focus its foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection targeting specific U.S. persons based on fact-based determinations regarding whether individuals have access to the information the
+
+IC needs to fulfill its mission.  Targeting intelligence collection based upon invidious discrimination provides no such objective criteria.
+
+3. Recommendations and Actions
+
+While there is unanimity within the IC that race and ethnicity do not provide a basis for conducting an authorized intelligence activity to collect information on a U.S. person, ODNI recommends more clearly articulating this restriction in required privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights training programs to help ensure these restrictions are understood and enforced.  All IC agencies and components conduct training to ensure that intelligence activities comply with all aspects of U.S. law, but the amount of training specifically concerning non discrimination in intelligence collection decisions varied.  FBI, for example, incorporates into their basic training for all new FBI agents and analysts specific components on the restrictions of the use of race, ethnicity, religion, and national origin in the conduct of investigations.  This is a best practice.  Role-based and scenario-driven training provide personnel with specific and actionable information to help IC personnel identify, prevent, and report to oversight entities any intelligence collection that may be driven by impermissible considerations, to include the use of race or ethnicity as a justification for intelligence collection.
+
+Even when restrictions are fully understood, unintentional but still harmful bias can potentially affect operational decisions.  ODNI therefore recommends the expansion of existing unconscious bias training.  Such training is widely offered throughout the IC to address and minimize unlawful discrimination in the workplace.  Identifying and mitigating previously unidentified biases also plays an important role in the current training provided to intelligence analysts.  ODNI recommends more broadly offering comparable unconscious bias training in the intelligence operational context so those engaged in collecting intelligence information may more readily identify and mitigate unintentional bias that may impact their collection decisions.  IC agencies and components are encouraged to adequately resource such unconscious bias training for intelligence operators, as well as evaluate the most effective approaches to such training in the operational context.  The use of real world operational scenarios, for example, involving fact patterns featuring Americans of a variety of backgrounds may be one effective approach to conveying the importance of minimizing unconscious bias to reach more objective operational decisions.
+
+B. Incidental Collection of U.S. Person Information
+
+1. Incidental Collection Potentially Impacting Americans of Chinese
+
+Descent:
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+13
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+In some forms of intelligence collection, authorized collection against a valid foreign intelligence or counterintelligence target also inherently results in the incidental collection of information regarding others who are not being targeted.  This incidental collection may include information concerning U.S. persons.  For example, pursuant to FISA or Executive Order 12333, the IC may target for collection the communications of a non-U.S. person outside the United
+
+States for a valid foreign intelligence purpose.  Such collection could include collecting the telephone calls of that non-U.S. person.  If an American inside the
+
+United States calls the validly targeted non-U.S. person outside the United States, the IC collects not just the words spoken by the non-U.S. person overseas, but the whole telephone call, including the words spoken by the American in the United
+
+States.  The IC refers to collection of such U.S. person information as "incidental collection."20
+
+The IC neither has, nor could realistically generate, demographic information regarding U.S. persons whose information has been incidentally collected.  Because these individuals are not targeted for collection, the IC often has little information regarding the identities of such Americans.  In addition, and for the reasons described above, even when incidental collection did provide information of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence interest, demographic information such as race or ethnicity would be generally irrelevant to the IC as it is not relevant to the authorized purpose for the collection.  Conducting additional and potentially invasive intelligence activities to acquire such demographic information would raise its own privacy and civil liberties concerns.
+
+Despite the lack of metrics, the IC does not presume that the impact of incidental collection is evenly distributed across the American public.  Because intelligence collections must be appropriately targeted and scoped to obtain information regarding foreign threats, an American's increased interaction with a foreign threat actor may increase the likelihood that their information may be incidentally collected.  As discussed above, IC agencies and components conduct numerous activities that seek insight about PRC plans and intentions in order to defend against counterintelligence and security threats from the PRC.  While many Americans have no interactions with the PRC, some Americans may have interactions with the PRC as a result of familial, social, or business ties to China.
+
+Such interactions with the PRC do not in any way guarantee that the IC has collected information concerning their interactions with the PRC, but there may
+
+
+20 Targeting a non-U.S. person for the purpose of collecting information about a U.S. person without appropriate authorization to collect information about the U.S. person is referred to as "reverse targeting."  Reverse targeting is prohibited.  See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.  1881a(b)(2) (stating that FISA Section 702 acquisitions "may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States");  50 U.S.C.  1881a(g) (requiring related Attorney General-approved guidelines to ensure compliance with the reverse targeting prohibition); and
+
+50 U.S.C.  1881c (providing an authorized process for targeting U.S. persons located outside the United States under circumstances in which a warrant would be required if the acquisition were conducted in the United States for law enforcement purposes).
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+14
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED be an increased risk of such incidental collection.  Insofar as some Americans of
+
+Chinese descent may have greater interactions with the PRC, the risk of incidental collection increases for those individuals.  This increased risk is also true for
+
+Americans not of Chinese descent with comparable connections to the PRC; the increased risk is therefore a function of actual relationships and not a function of race or ethnicity.  Some impact may be correlated with race or ethnicity, however, due to an increased likelihood for underlying familial, social, or business connections with individuals or entities located in China.
+
+2. Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights Protections for Incidentally
+
+Collected Information
+
+The privacy, civil liberties, and potential for related civil rights impacts of incidental collection have long been recognized and are accounted for and mitigated through specific procedures designed to minimize the collection, retention, and dissemination of incidental U.S. person information.  For collection conducted pursuant to Executive Order 12333, these restrictions are found within the Attorney General-approved procedures discussed above.21  Although these
+
+Attorney General procedures also cover the more limited instances in which intentional collection is appropriate, the majority of these procedures deal with the more frequent occurrence of incidental collection of U.S. person information in the process of gathering intelligence or counterintelligence information.  Under
+
+FISA, comparable rules for minimizing collection, retention, and dissemination of
+
+U.S. person information are required.22
+
+More specifically, IC agencies' and components' Executive Order 12333
+
+Attorney General procedures have restrictions addressing the entire data lifecycle of incidental collection.  As with intentional collection, the procedures require that a collection activity may only be conducted for an authorized purpose.23
+
+Collection activities must also be properly scoped to this authorized purpose.  For example, the DHS Procedures permit incidental collection of U.S. person information only when "the incidentally acquired information is not itself deliberately sought" and "it would create an unreasonable burden to collect the information about the target without collecting the additional, non-targeted information."24  Subject to exceptions, many of the procedures restrict the length
+
+
+21 See Executive Order 12333,  2.3.
+
+22 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.  1801 (h) (defining minimization procedures) and 1804(a)(4) (requiring a statement regarding the proposed minimization procedures in any application for electronic surveillance).  As FISA procedures apply to a narrower swath of intelligence activities and the requirements of the FISA minimization procedures are generally comparable, or more restrictive, than those found in the Executive Order 12333 Attorney General procedures, the analysis that follows focuses on the IC agencies' and components' Executive Order 12333
+
+procedures.
+
+23 See footnotes 12 and 13 and accompanying text.
+
+24 DHS Procedures, Section 2.1.3.2.  See also DoD Procedures at Section 3.2(f)(4) (limiting the collection of non publicly available U.S. person information to "no more information than is reasonably necessary" within the limits
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+15
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED of time unevaluated data that potentially contains incidental U.S. person information may be retained for evaluation by IC agencies or components.25
+
+Access limitations, training requirements, and restrictions on queries to seek information concerning a specific U.S. person in unevaluated information provide further protections in many IC agency and component procedures.26  Permanent retention of U.S. person information, including incidentally acquired information, or the dissemination of U.S. person information outside the IC (for example, in an intelligence report) generally require specific findings with respect to the U.S. person information.27
+
+None of these protections for incidental collection turns on the race or ethnicity of the individual whose information has been incidentally collected.
+
+These rules apply equally to all Americans, including Americans of Chinese descent.  As with intentional collection, the race or ethnicity of a U.S. person does not provide an authorized justification for modifying the scope of collection, retaining information for a longer period of time, querying collected information, or disseminating intelligence information in a different manner.
+
+3. Recommendations and Actions
+
+For the same rationale as was applicable to targeted collection, ODNI recommends that IC training more specifically focus on preventing discriminatory conduct in the collection, handling, and dissemination of incidental collection.
+
+Expanding the scope of unconscious bias training to those involved in the collection, handling, and dissemination of incidental collection will also help ensure that unintentional, but still harmful, bias plays no role in such important decisions.
+
+In addition, while (as previously discussed) metrics regarding the demographics of those subject to incidental collection may be difficult or
+
+
+of practicality); CIA Procedures, Section 3.3 ("In any collection activity, the CIA shall collect only the amount of information reasonably necessary to support that purpose.") and 5.2(c) (requiring for collections of information in bulk or which cannot be promptly reviewed for retention that, among other requirements, the approving official document "any reasonable steps that were or will be taken to limit the information to the smallest subset of data containing the information necessary to achieve the purpose of the collection.").
+
+25 See, e.g., DoD Procedures, Section 3.3(c)(2) (generally limiting the evaluation period of incidental collection obtained from targeting a person in the United States to five years, with potential for an extension under prescribed procedures).
+
+26 See, e.g., Department of Energy Procedures for Intelligence Activities (hereinafter DOE Procedures), Section
+
+V.E.1 (detailing requirements for access, querying, and training) available at https://www.directives.doe.gov/files/department-of-energy-procedures-for-intelligence-activities/@@images/file.
+
+27 See, e.g., ODNI Procedures, Sections 6.1 (detailing standards for permanently retaining information concerning a
+
+U.S. person and requiring that any U.S. person personally identifiable information (USPII be retained only if that
+
+USPII is "necessary, or it is reasonably believed that the USPII may become necessary, to understand, assess, or act on the information") and Section 7.2 (permitting dissemination of U.S. person information outside the Intelligence
+
+Community only when the retention standard has been met). https://www.directives.doe.gov/files/department-of-energy-procedures-for-intelligence-activities/@@images/file
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+16
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED inappropriate to obtain, there are instances when the potential for disparate impact on certain groups of Americans can and should be taken into account.  ODNI recommends that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers further develop and, when relevant, highlight the potential for disparate impacts into their analyses and recommendations regarding intelligence programs.  For example, the
+
+DNI's 2020 Principles of Artificial Intelligence (AI) Ethics for the Intelligence
+
+Community28 requires the IC to "take affirmative steps to identify and mitigate bias" and the accompanying AI Ethics Framework for the Intelligence
+
+Community29 further defines steps that should be taken to minimize bias, including determining whether the AI will "avoid perpetuating historical biases and discrimination."  While specific mechanisms for evaluating the potential for disparate impact will vary depending upon the nature of the intelligence activity and available data, privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers should use relevant tools and information to evaluate and, where practicable, mitigate privacy and civil liberties concerns that fall disproportionately on historically disadvantaged demographic groups.  The IC Civil Liberties and Privacy Council, which led the development of the AI Ethics Framework for the Intelligence
+
+Community, will take the lead in developing and sharing such best practices and tools for conducting disparate impact analysis.
+
+C. Security Clearances
+
+1. Security Clearance Investigatory and Adjudicatory Activities Potentially
+
+Impacting Americans of Chinese Descent
+
+ All U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, and other individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information are required to undergo an investigation and adjudication to determine their "loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment, as well as freedom from conflicting allegiances and potential for coercion, and willingness and ability to abide by regulations governing the use, handling, and protection of classified information."30  Applicants for new or renewed access to classified information must provide extensive and sensitive information regarding their associations, financial interests, and personal conduct in the course of security clearance investigations.31  Security clearance investigations may entail interviews with the subject's past or present neighbors, associates, and co workers.  These interviews also may result in requests for, and receipt of,
+
+
+28 The Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics for the Intelligence Community are available at https://www.intelligence.gov/images/AI/Principles_of_AI_Ethics_for_the_Intelligence_Community.pdf.
+
+29 The Artificial Intelligence Ethics Framework for the Intelligence Community is available at https://www.intelligence.gov/images/AI/AI_Ethics_Framework_for_the_Intelligence_Community_1.0.pdf.
+
+30 Executive Order 12968,  3.1(b) (Aug. 2, 1995); see also SEAD-4, Appendix A,  1.
+
+31 Before security clearance background investigations are initiated, the applicant signs consent forms authorizing the U.S. Government to collect all the information required in a security clearance investigation.
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+17
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED sensitive information regarding the subject of the investigation.  As a result, these investigative activities impact the privacy of Americans of Chinese descent, and other U.S. citizens, seeking to obtain or retain a security clearance.
+
+
+
+Information collected in the course of the security clearance investigation provides the basis for a security clearance adjudication.  Security clearance adjudications require the "careful weighing of a number of variables of an individual's life to make an affirmative determination that the individual is an acceptable security risk.  This is known as the whole-person concept."32  In evaluating the "whole person," the adjudicator is required to consider myriad factors, including but not limited to the subject's "allegiance to the United States,"
+
+the potential for "foreign influence" on the subject, "foreign preference" by the subject, as well as the subject's "sexual behavior," "personal conduct," "alcohol consumption," prior "handling [of] protected information," and other factors.33
+
+
+
+The stakes are high for all involved in the security clearance process.  For the U.S. Government, ensuring that individuals with access to properly classified information do not pose an unacceptable risk is a vital national security interest.34
+
+For individuals, obtaining and maintaining a security clearance is a prerequisite for many positions within and outside the U.S. government; denial or even delay of a security clearance may have a significant impact on their careers, livelihoods, or personal reputations.  In addition, subjects of a security clearance investigation must entrust the U.S. government will appropriately collect, use, and protect the detailed and sensitive information needed to fully evaluate the security risk posed by the individual.
+
+
+
+2. Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights Protections in Security
+
+Clearance Investigations
+
+All security clearance investigations and adjudications must be conducted according to requirements set forth in law and subject to common standards.
+
+Specifically, security clearance investigations must be conducted pursuant to the
+
+Federal Investigative Standards, December 2012, adopted by the Security
+
+Executive Agent and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management.35
+
+Adjudications must comply with the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines,
+
+
+32 SEAD-4, Appendix A,  2 (a).
+
+33 See SEAD-4, Appendix A, Guidelines A  M.
+
+34 See Executive Order 12968,  3.1(b) ("Eligibility shall be granted only where facts and circumstances indicate access to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States, and any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the national security.")
+
+35 See, e.g., Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 704.1  C.1 (requiring all background investigations for access to sensitive compartmented information comply with the Federal Investigative Standards).  In May 2022, the
+
+Federal Investigative Standards were updated in the Federal Personnel Vetting Investigative Standards.  Future reports will examine how these updates have affected and protected the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of
+
+Americans of Chinese descent.
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+18
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED which establish "the single, common adjudicative criteria for all covered individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information."36  Uniform standards narrow the discretion of security clearance processes to help ensure the protection of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights.
+
+In addition, strict access and use limitations apply to information acquired in the course of security investigations in order to protect the privacy and civil liberties of both the subjects of security clearance investigations and individuals who provide information in the course of such investigations.37
+
+In the course of this review, non-governmental organizations representing
+
+Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders and some individuals within the Federal government expressed concerns that Americans of Chinese descent were subject to longer and more invasive security clearance investigations, or that any associations or connections they may have with individuals in the PRC may have resulted in disparate results in the security clearance adjudicative process.
+
+Discrimination in any aspect of the security clearance process is unlawful.
+
+Executive Order 12968 explicitly bars discrimination "on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in granting access to classified information."38  The same explicit bar on such unlawful discrimination features prominently in the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines.39  As a result, an individual's race or ethnicity are never an acceptable or authorized basis for granting or withholding a security clearance or conducting related investigative activities with respect to that individual.
+
+Stated clearly, the law prohibits an individual from being subjected to greater scrutiny because they are an American of Chinese descent.  Nor does their status as a Chinese American have any bearing on the adjudicative factors that may, or may not, make them eligible to hold a security clearance.
+
+In contrast to impermissible factors such as race and ethnicity, the potential for a prospective or current security clearance-holder to be vulnerable to foreign influence is an important aspect of security clearance adjudications.
+
+Under the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines, "[f]oreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance.  [Foreign contacts and interests] may also be a national security concern if they create
+
+
+36 SEAD-4  B.
+
+37 See, e.g., ODNI Systems of Record Notice -17, ODNI Personnel Security Records, 76 Fed. Reg. 42739 (July 19,
+
+2011) (requiring administrative, physical, and technical safeguards on ODNI security clearance records and limiting the sharing of such records).
+
+38 Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(c).
+
+39 SEAD-4, Appendix A,  1(c) ("The U.S. Government does not discriminate on the basis or race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in making a national security eligibility determination."
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+19
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with
+
+U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest."40  Risk factors are not limited to instances in which a foreign adversary has affirmatively sought to compromise a U.S. citizen, but extend more broadly to a variety of potentially disqualifying conditions, including "contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion."41  Such security concerns can also be mitigated by a number of factors, including instances in which the subject "has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be respected to resolve any conflict or interest in favor of the U.S. interest."42
+
+Foreign contacts and interests alone are not disqualifying factors to obtain a security clearance; to the contrary, in some instances they help provide the experiences and skills required by the IC.  The success of the IC's mission requires that each agency or component recruit personnel with a broad range of experiences to meet our national security challenges.  In particular, individuals with experience studying, living, and working abroad can provide unique and valuable skills, including knowledge of foreign languages and cultural competency, which are critical to providing objective and nuanced intelligence information and analysis.
+
+Adjudication of the risks posed by foreign contacts and interests is not country-agnostic.  The National Security Adjudicative Guidelines states that
+
+"[a]ssessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether [the country] is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information."43  As discussed above, the IC assesses the PRC conducts extensive efforts to obtain access to classified information and, as a result, foreign contacts and interests with individuals located in the PRC receive greater scrutiny than contacts with individuals in other foreign countries that have been assessed to pose a lesser counterintelligence risk.
+
+An individual's status as an American of Chinese descent is not a "foreign influence."  Nor does a Chinese American's race or ethnicity have any bearing on their "deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States."
+
+Many Americans of Chinese descent have no contacts with the PRC, while other
+
+
+40 SEAD-4, Appendix A, Guideline B (6).
+
+41 SEAD-4, Appendix A, Guideline B (7)(a) (emphasis added).
+
+42 SEAD-4, Appendix A, Guideline B (8)(b).
+
+43 SEAD-4, Appendix A, Guideline B (6).
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+20
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+Chinese Americans have family or financial interests in China that present acceptably low risks.  For individuals of any race or ethnicity, only actual foreign contacts and interests qualify for potential scrutiny in the security clearance process.  The risks posed by those actual foreign contacts and interests, the intelligence practices of the particular foreign country in question, and the degree to which the individual's actions and loyalties mitigate these risks are the only relevant factors to determining whether the individual could be vulnerable to foreign influence.
+
+3. Recommendations and Actions
+
+The Administration has prioritized the importance of a diverse national security workforce.  Executive Order 14035, Diversity Equity, Inclusion, and
+
+Accessibility in the Federal Workforce, requires all Federal entities to "make advancing diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility a priority component of the agency's management and agency strategic planning.44  Specifically to national security, the President has stated that "[i]t is the policy of my
+
+Administration to prioritize diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility as a national security imperative, in order to ensure critical perspectives and talents are represented in the national security workforce."45  The following recommendations are consistent with, and a component of, the IC's broader implementation of these priorities.
+
+First, the opacity of the security clearance process, as well as the many factors required to be considered in the "whole person" review, may result in the subject of the security clearance process inferring that the length or outcome of their security investigation and adjudication has been affected by unlawful racial animus or bias.  Assessing whether this is the case in any particular security clearance process is a fact-intensive process.  On a more systemic scale, ODNI
+
+CLPT and NCSC are using existing data to investigate whether race or ethnicity of security clearance holders affects various points in the security clearance process, to include the length of security clearance investigations and the adjudicative results.  If the data demonstrates that security timelines, adjudicative decisions, or other aspects of the security clearance process differ by race or ethnicity, NCSC would attempt to determine potential root causes of these differences, such as whether individuals with relatively more foreign contacts of significant counterintelligence risk, like those from the PRC, experience comparable outcomes in the security clearance process.  If resulting metrics indicate such a difference, NCSC and CLPT would determine points in the investigative and adjudicatory process that could benefit from additional training, more granular guidance, or enhanced oversight.
+
+
+44 Executive Order 14035  4 (June 25, 2021).
+
+45 National Security Memorandum, Revitalizing America's Foreign Policy and National Security Workforce,
+
+Institutions, and Partnerships,  1(c) (Feb. 4, 2021).
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+21
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+Second, ODNI further recommends that IC agencies and components ensure that all individuals involved in the security clearance process receive effective training on the long-standing non-discrimination principles that undergird the security clearance process.  During the course of this review, representatives from non-governmental organizations provided examples of conduct that did not exhibit the professionalism and cultural competency expected of all personnel involved in the security clearance process.  In response to these concerns, NCSC's Acting Director issued a February 2021 memo to all IC agencies and components stating "adjudicative and investigative elements must be educated on ethnic and cultural differences among Americans, consistent with existing law and policy, to ensure the fair and equal treatment of individuals in the security clearance process."46  In February 2022, the DNI issued the Federal
+
+Personnel Vetting Engagement Guidelines, which among other things, provide specific guidance on the approach security personnel must use in engaging with the public in a manner that fosters public trust, enables the government to assist individuals in entering the workforce in a timely manner, and shapes a culture of personal accountability and shared responsibility.  Additionally, ODNI expects that forthcoming updates to the National Training Standards will reemphasize for personnel vetting background investigators and adjudicators the importance of ensuring that vetting processes promote equitable treatment of individuals in alignment with the DNI's stated objectives to recruit and retain a diverse and talented IC workforce.
+
+In training to the non-discrimination requirements and the Federal
+
+Personnel Vetting Engagement Guidelines, it is a best practice to incorporate real world scenarios in which these principles are applied.  For example, training for security clearance investigators should include preferred methods for verifying the U.S. citizenship status of associates of the clearance applicant without asking questions that would suggest an individual's race, ethnicity, or the languages spoken in their home are indicators that an individual is not a U.S. citizen.
+
+Privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers and agency/component diversity and inclusion personnel should provide assistance in the development of such effective training.
+
+
+
+46 Memorandum, Acting Director Michael Orlando, National Counterintelligence Surveillance Center, Avoiding
+
+Discrimination in Security Clearance Actions (Feb. 1, 2021).
+
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+
+
+22
+
+
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+While continuing to combat the significant national security threat posed by the PRC, IC agencies and components must ensure that their intelligence activities and security clearance processes protect the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Americans of Chinese descent and all other Americans.  Adherence to the law and policies that govern the IC, as well as the IC's values and professional tradecraft standards, help ensure equal protection and treatment to all
+
+Americans.

markdown/misc/cnci.md

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+## The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
+
+President Obama has identified cybersecurity as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation, but one that we as a government or as a country are not adequately prepared to counter. Shortly after taking office, the President therefore ordered a thorough review of federal efforts to defend the U.S. information and communications infrastructure and the development of a comprehensive approach to securing America's digital infrastructure.
+
+In May 2009, the President accepted the recommendations of the resulting Cyberspace Policy Review, including the selection of an Executive Branch Cybersecurity Coordinator who will have regular access to the President. The Executive Branch was also directed to work closely with all key players in U.S. cybersecurity, including state and local governments and the private sector, to ensure an organized and unified response to future cyber incidents; strengthen public/private partnerships to find technology solutions that ensure U.S. security and prosperity; invest in the cutting-edge research and development necessary for the innovation and discovery to meet the digital challenges of our time; and begin a campaign to promote cybersecurity awareness and digital literacy from our boardrooms to our classrooms and begin to build the digital workforce of the 21st century. Finally, the President directed that these activities be conducted in a way that is consistent with ensuring the privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed in the Constitution and cherished by all Americans.
+
+The activities under way to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Policy Review build on the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) launched by President George W. Bush in National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/
+HSPD-23) in January 2008. President Obama determined that the CNCI and its associated activities should evolve to become key elements of a broader, updated national U.S. cybersecurity strategy. These CNCI initiatives will play a key role in supporting the achievement of many of the key recommendations of President Obama's Cyberspace Policy Review. The CNCI consists of a number of mutually reinforcing initiatives with the following major goals designed to help secure the United States in cyberspace:
+
+
+Toestablishafrontlineofdefenseagainsttoday'simmediatethreatsby creating or
+enhancing shared situational awareness of network vulnerabilities, threats, and events within the Federal Governmentand ultimately with state, local, and tribal governments and private sector partnersand the ability to act quickly to reduce our current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions.
+
+Todefendagainstthefullspectrumofthreatsby enhancing U.S. counterintelligence capabilities and increasing the security of the supply chain for key information technologies.
+
+
+Tostrengthenthefuturecybersecurityenvironmentby expanding cyber education; coordinating and redirecting research and development efforts across the Federal Government; and working to define and develop strategies to deter hostile or malicious activity in cyberspace.
+In building the plans for the CNCI, it was quickly realized that these goals could not be achieved without also strengthening certain key strategic foundational capabilities within the Government. Therefore, the CNCI includes funding within the federal law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities to enhance such key functions as criminal investigation; intelligence collection, processing, and analysis; and information assurance critical to enabling national cybersecurity efforts. The CNCI was developed with great care and attention to privacy and civil liberties concerns in close consultation with privacy experts across the government. Protecting civil liberties and privacy rights remain fundamental objectives in the implementation of the CNCI.
+
+In accord with President Obama's declared intent to make transparency a touchstone of his presidency, the Cyberspace Policy Review identified enhanced information sharing as a key component of effective cybersecurity. To improve public understanding of Federal efforts, the Cybersecurity Coordinator has directed the release of the following summary description of the CNCI.
+
+## CnciInitiativeDetails
+
+Initiative#1.ManagetheFederalEnterpriseNetworkasasinglenetworkenterprisewithTrusted InternetConnections.The Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative, headed by the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Homeland Security, covers the consolidation of the Federal Government's external access points (including those to the Internet). This consolidation will result in a common security solution which includes: facilitating the reduction of external access points, establishing baseline security capabilities; and, validating agency adherence to those security capabilities. Agencies participate in the TIC initiative either as TIC Access Providers (a limited number of agencies that operate their own capabilities) or by contracting with commercial Managed Trusted IP
+Service (MTIPS) providers through the GSA-managed NETWORX contract vehicle.
+
+Initiative#2.DeployanintrusiondetectionsystemofsensorsacrosstheFederalenterprise.
+Intrusion Detection Systems using passive sensors form a vital part of U.S. Government network defenses by identifying when unauthorized users attempt to gain access to those networks. DHS is deploying, as part of its EINSTEIN 2 activities, signature-based sensors capable of inspecting Internet traffic entering Federal systems for unauthorized accesses and malicious content. The EINSTEIN 2 capability enables analysis of network flow information to identify potential malicious activity while conducting automatic full packet inspection of traffic entering or exiting U.S. Government networks for malicious activity using signature-based intrusion detection technology. Associated with this investment in technology is a parallel investment in manpower with the expertise required to accomplish DHS's expanded network security mission. EINSTEIN 2 is capable of alerting US-CERT in real time to the presence of malicious or potentially harmful activity in federal network traffic and provides correlation and visualization of the derived data. Due to the capabilities within EINSTEIN 2, US-CERT analysts have a greatly improved understanding of the network environment and an increased ability to address the weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Federal network security. As a result, US-CERT has greater situational awareness and can more effectively develop and more readily share security relevant information with network defenders across the U.S. Government, as well as with security professionals in the private sector and the American public. The Department of Homeland Security's Privacy Office has conducted and published a Privacy Impact Assessment for the EINSTEIN 2 program.
+
+Initiative#3.PursuedeploymentofintrusionpreventionsystemsacrosstheFederalenterprise.
+This Initiative represents the next evolution of protection for civilian Departments and Agencies of the Federal Executive Branch. This approach, called EINSTEIN 3, will draw on commercial technology and specialized government technology to conduct real-time full packet inspection and threat-based decision-making on network traffic entering or leaving these Executive Branch networks. The goal of EINSTEIN 3 is to identify and characterize malicious network traffic to enhance cybersecurity analysis, situational awareness and security response. It will have the ability to automatically detect and respond appropriately to cyber threats before harm is done, providing an intrusion prevention system supporting dynamic defense. EINSTEIN 3 will assist DHS US-CERT in defending, protecting and reducing vulnerabilities on Federal Executive Branch networks and systems. The EINSTEIN 3 system will also support enhanced information sharing by US-CERT with Federal Departments and Agencies by giving DHS the ability to automate alerting of detected network intrusion attempts and, when deemed necessary by DHS, to send alerts that do not contain the content of communications to the National Security Agency
+(NSA) so that DHS efforts may be supported by NSA exercising its lawfully authorized missions. This initiative makes substantial and long-term investments to increase national intelligence capabilities to discover critical information about foreign cyber threats and use this insight to inform EINSTEIN 3
+systems in real time. DHS will be able to adapt threat signatures determined by NSA in the course of its foreign intelligence and DoD information assurance missions for use in the EINSTEIN 3 system in support of DHS's federal system security mission. Information sharing on cyber intrusions will be conducted in accordance with the laws and oversight for activities related to homeland security, intelligence, and defense in order to protect the privacy and rights of U.S. citizens.
+
+DHS is currently conducting a exercise to pilot the EINSTEIN 3 capabilities described in this initiative based on technology developed by NSA and to solidify processes for managing and protecting information gleaned from observed cyber intrusions against civilian Executive Branch systems. Government civil liberties and privacy officials are working closely with DHS and US-CERT to build appropriate and necessary privacy protections into the design and operational deployment of EINSTEIN 3.
+
+Initiative#4:Coordinateandredirectresearchanddevelopment(R&D)efforts.No single individual or organization is aware of all of the cyber-related R&D activities being funded by the Government. This initiative is developing strategies and structures for coordinating all cyber R&D sponsored or conducted by the U.S. government, both classified and unclassified, and to redirect that R&D where needed. This Initiative is critical to eliminate redundancies in federally funded cybersecurity research, and to identify research gaps, prioritize R&D efforts, and ensure the taxpayers are getting full value for their money as we shape our strategic investments.
+
+Initiative#5.Connectcurrentcyberopscenterstoenhancesituationalawareness. There is a pressing need to ensure that government information security offices and strategic operations centers share data regarding malicious activities against federal systems, consistent with privacy protections for personally identifiable and other protected information and as legally appropriate, in order to have a better understanding of the entire threat to government systems and to take maximum advantage of each organization's unique capabilities to produce the best overall national cyber defense possible. This initiative provides the key means necessary to enable and support shared situational awareness and collaboration across six centers that are responsible for carrying out U.S. cyber activities. This effort focuses on key aspects necessary to enable practical mission bridging across the elements of U.S. cyber activities: foundational capabilities and investments such as upgraded infrastructure, increased bandwidth, and integrated operational capabilities; enhanced collaboration, including common technology, tools, and procedures; and enhanced shared situational awareness through shared analytic and collaborative technologies. The National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC) within the Department of Homeland Security will play a key role in securing U.S. Government networks and systems under this initiative by coordinating and integrating information from the six centers to provide cross-domain situational awareness, analyzing and reporting on the state of U.S. networks and systems, and fostering interagency collaboration and coordination.
+
+Initiative#6.Developandimplementagovernment-widecybercounterintelligence(CI)plan.A
+government-wide cyber counterintelligence plan is necessary to coordinate activities across all Federal Agencies to detect, deter, and mitigate the foreign-sponsored cyber intelligence threat to U.S. and private sector information systems. To accomplish these goals, the plan establishes and expands cyber CI education and awareness programs and workforce development to integrate CI into all cyber operations and analysis, increase employee awareness of the cyber CI threat, and increase counterintelligence collaboration across the government. The Cyber CI Plan is aligned with the National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America (2007) and supports the other programmatic elements of the CNCI.
+
+Initiative#7.Increasethesecurityofourclassifiednetworks.Classified networks house the Federal Government's most sensitive information and enable crucial war-fighting, diplomatic, counterterrorism, law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security operations. Successful penetration or disruption of these networks could cause exceptionally grave damage to our national security. We need to exercise due diligence in ensuring the integrity of these networks and the data they contain.
+
+Initiative#8.Expandcybereducation. While billions of dollars are being spent on new technologies to secure the U.S. Government in cyberspace, it is the people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to implement those technologies who will determine success.  However there are not enough cybersecurity experts within the Federal Government or private sector to implement the CNCI, nor is there an adequately established Federal cybersecurity career field. Existing cybersecurity training and personnel development programs, while good, are limited in focus and lack unity of effort. In order to effectively ensure our continued technical advantage and future cybersecurity, we must develop a technologically-skilled and cyber-savvy workforce and an effective pipeline of future employees. It will take a national strategy, similar to the effort to upgrade science and mathematics education in the 1950's, to meet this challenge.
+
+Initiative#9.Defineanddevelopenduring"leap-ahead"technology,strategies,andprograms.
+One goal of the CNCI is to develop technologies that provide increases in cybersecurity by orders of magnitude above current systems and which can be deployed within 5 to 10 years. This initiative seeks to develop strategies and programs to enhance the component of the government R&D portfolio that pursues high-risk/high-payoff solutions to critical cybersecurity problems. The Federal Government has begun to outline Grand Challenges for the research community to help solve these difficult problems that require 'out of the box' thinking. In dealing with the private sector, the government is identifying and communicating common needs that should drive mutual investment in key research areas.
+
+Initiative#10.Defineanddevelopenduringdeterrencestrategiesandprograms.Our Nation's senior policymakers must think through the long-range strategic options available to the United States in a world that depends on assuring the use of cyberspace. To date, the U.S. Government has been implementing traditional approaches to the cybersecurity problemand these measures have not achieved the level of security needed. This Initiative is aimed at building an approach to cyber defense strategy that deters interference and attack in cyberspace by improving warning capabilities, articulating roles for private sector and international partners, and developing appropriate responses by both state and non-state actors.
+
+Initiative#11.Developamulti-prongedapproachforglobalsupplychainriskmanagement.
+
+Globalization of the commercial information and communications technology marketplace provides increased opportunities for those intent on harming the United States by penetrating the supply chain to gain unauthorized access to data, alter data, or interrupt communications.  Risks stemming from both the domestic and globalized supply chain must be managed in a strategic and comprehensive way over the entire lifecycle of products, systems and services. Managing this risk will require a greater awareness of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with acquisition decisions; the development and employment of tools and resources to technically and operationally mitigate risk across the lifecycle of products (from design through retirement); the development of new acquisition policies and practices that reflect the complex global marketplace; and partnership with industry to develop and adopt supply chain and risk management standards and best practices. This initiative will enhance Federal Government skills, policies, and processes to provide departments and agencies with a robust toolset to better manage and mitigate supply chain risk at levels commensurate with the criticality of, and risks to, their systems and networks.
+
+Initiative#12.DefinetheFederalroleforextendingcybersecurityintocriticalinfrastructure
+domains.The U.S. Government depends on a variety of privately owned and operated critical infrastructures to carry out the public's business. In turn, these critical infrastructures rely on the efficient operation of information systems and networks that are vulnerable to malicious cyber threats. This Initiative builds on the existing and ongoing partnership between the Federal Government and the public and private sector owners and operators of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR). The Department of Homeland Security and its private-sector partners have developed a plan of shared action with an aggressive series of milestones and activities. It includes both short-term and long-term recommendations, specifically incorporating and leveraging previous accomplishments and activities that are already underway. It addresses security and information assurance efforts across the cyber infrastructure to increase resiliency and operational capabilities throughout the CIKR sectors. It includes a focus on public-private sharing of information regarding cyber threats and incidents in both government and CIKR.

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+
+# The Department Of Defense Cyber Strategy
+
+
+April 2015
+THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK
+
+
+THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
+1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
+WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000
+When researchers at the Advanced Research Projects Agency first invented the precursor to the Internet in 1969, there's no way they could have imagined how their creation would change our world. What began as a tool for scientists to share information grew quickly into the global network of computers, systems, and data that we now call the Internet. An engine of innovation and wonder, today the Internet connects nearly every person on the planet, helps deliver goods and services all over the globe, and brings ideas and knowledge to those who would otherwise lack access.
+
+The United States relies on the Internet and the systems and data of cyberspace for a wide range of critical services. This reliance leaves all of us - individuals, militaries, businesses, schools, and governments - vulnerable in the face of a real and dangerous cyber threat. As we have seen, today state and non-state actors plan to conduct disruptive and destructive cyberattacks on the networks of our critical infrastructure and steal U.S. intellectual property to undercut our technological and military advantage.
+
+Working with other agencies of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for defending the U.S. homeland and US. interests from attack, including attacks that may occur in cyberspace. The purpose of this cyber strategy, the Department's second, is to guide the development of DoD's cyber forces and strengthen our cyber defense and cyber deterrence posture. It focuses on building cyber capabilities and organizations for DoD's three cyber missions: to defend DoD networks, systems, and information; defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. national interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence;
+and support operational and contingency plans.
+
+These
+        are
+             significant
+                          responsibilities
+                                           and
+                                                 require
+                                                           focused
+                                                                     and
+                                                                           timely
+                                                                                    action
+                                                                                            by
+organizations across DoD as well as the support of other agencies of the U.S. government. A
+
+tool for management and communications, this strategy puts us on course to capitalize on
+our strengths, meet our challenges, and fulfill our missions.
+                                                                                      It therefore sets clear and
+specific objectives for the Department to achieve over the next five years and beyond. We
+seek to be open and transparent with the American people and the world about our
+capabilities and plans.
+
+[ am invested in the success of this strategy and I will hold the Department accountable for meeting each goal and objective. Working with our partners - in the U.S. government, the private sector, and around the world - we will move quickly and efficiently to build the capabilities we need to defend the United States and its interests in the digital age.
+
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+
+
+ We live in a wired world. Companies and countries rely on cyberspace for everything from financial transactions to the movement of military forces. Computer code blurs the line between the cyber and physical world and connects millions of objects to the Internet or private networks. Electric firms rely on industrial control systems to provide power to the grid. Shipping managers use satellites and the Internet to track freighters as they pass through global sea lanes, and the U.S. military relies on secure networks and data to carry out its missions. The United States is committed to an open, secure, interoperable, and reliable Internet that enables prosperity, public safety, and the free flow of commerce and ideas. These qualities of the Internet reflect core American values - of freedom of expression and privacy, creativity, opportunity, and innovation. And these qualities have allowed the Internet to provide social and economic value to billions of people. Within the U.S. economy alone, anywhere from three to 13 percent of business sector value-added is derived from Internet-related businesses. Over the last ten years Internet access increased by over two billion people across the globe.. Yet these same qualities of openness and dynamism that led to the Internet's rapid expansion now provide dangerous state and non-state actors with a means to undermine U.S. interests. We are vulnerable in this wired world. Today our reliance on the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of data stands in stark contrast to the inadequacy of our cybersecurity. The Internet was not originally designed with security in mind, but as an open system to allow scientists and researchers to send data to one another quickly. Without strong investments in cybersecurity and cyber defenses, data systems remain open and susceptible to rudimentary and dangerous forms of exploitation and attack. Malicious actors use cyberspace to steal data and intellectual property for their own economic or political goals. And an actor in one region of the globe can use cyber capabilities to strike directly at a network thousands of miles away, destroying data, disrupting businesses, or shutting off critical systems. State and non-state actors conduct cyber operations to achieve a variety of political, economic, or military objectives. In conducting their operations, they may strike at a nation's values as well as its interests or purposes. As one example, in November, 2014, likely in retaliation for the planned release of a satirical film, North Korea conducted a cyberattack against Sony Pictures Entertainment, rendering thousands of Sony computers inoperable and breaching Sony's confidential business information. In addition to the destructive nature of the attacks, North Korea stole digital copies of a number of unreleased movies, as well as thousands of documents containing sensitive data regarding celebrities, Sony employees, and Sony's business operations. North Korea accompanied their cyberattacks with coercion, intimidation, and the threat of terrorism. The North Korean attack on Sony was one of the most destructive cyberattacks on a U.S. entity to date. The attack further spurred an already ongoing national discussion about the nature of the cyber threat and the need for improved cybersecurity. The increased use of cyberattacks as a political instrument reflects a dangerous trend in international relations. Vulnerable data systems present state and non-state actors with an enticing opportunity to strike the United States and its interests. During a conflict, the Defense Department assumes that a potential adversary will seek to target U.S. or allied critical infrastructure and military networks to gain a strategic advantage. Beyond the attacks described above, a sophisticated actor could target an industrial control system (ICS) on a public utility to affect public safety, or enter a network to manipulate health records to affect an individual's well-being. A disruptive, manipulative, or destructive cyberattack could present a significant risk to U.S. economic and national security if lives are lost, property destroyed, policy objectives harmed, or economic interests affected. Leaders must take steps to mitigate cyber risks. Governments, companies, and organizations must carefully prioritize the systems and data that they need to protect, assess risks and hazards, and make prudent investments in cybersecurity and cyber defense capabilities to achieve their security goals and objectives. Behind these defense investments, organizations of every kind must build business continuity plans and be ready to operate in a degraded cyber environment where access to networks and data is uncertain. To mitigate risks in cyberspace requires a comprehensive strategy to counter and if necessary withstand disruptive and destructive attacks.
+
+## Defending The United States In Cyberspace
+
+In concert with other agencies, the United States' Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for defending the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests from attack, including attacks that may occur in cyberspace. In a manner consistent with U.S. and international law, the Department of Defense seeks to deter attacks and defend the United States against any adversary that seeks to harm U.S. national interests during times of peace, crisis, or conflict. To this end the Defense Department has developed capabilities for cyber operations and is integrating those capabilities into the full array of tools that the United States government uses to defend U.S. national interests, including diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, and law enforcement tools.
+The May 2011 *Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace* guided the Defense Department's cyber activities and operations in support of U.S. national interests over the last four years. This new strategy sets prioritized strategic goals and objectives for DoD's cyber activities and missions to achieve over the next five years. It focuses on building capabilities for effective cybersecurity and cyber operations to defend DoD networks, systems, and information; **defend the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence;** and support operational and contingency plans. This strategy builds on previous decisions regarding DoD's Cyber Mission Force and cyber workforce development and provides new and specific guidance to mitigate anticipated risks and capture opportunities to strengthen U.S. national security. As a matter of first principle, cybersecurity is a team effort within the U.S. Federal government. To succeed in its missions the Defense Department must operate in partnership with other Departments and Agencies, international allies and partners, state and local governments, and, most importantly, the private sector.
+
+## Cybersecurity Activities
+
+To support its missions in cyberspace, the Defense Department conducts a range of activities outside of cyberspace to improve collective cybersecurity and protect U.S. interests. For example, the Defense Department cooperates with agencies of the U.S government, with the private sector, and with our international partners to share information, build alliances and partnerships, and foster norms of responsible behavior to improve global strategic stability.
+
+
+Information sharing and interagency coordination. To secure and advance U.S. interests in cyberspace, DoD seeks to share information and coordinate with U.S. government agencies in an integrated fashion on a range of cyber activities. For example, if DoD learns of malicious cyber activities that will affect important U.S. networks and systems that are vital for U.S. national and economic security or public safety, DoD supports agencies like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as they reach out to U.S. entities, and often other countries, to share threat information such as technical indicators of a potential attack. Such information sharing can significantly improve an organization's ability to defend itself against a broad range of cyberattacks. In addition
+to
+sharing
+information,
+DoD
+partners with other agencies of the U.S. government to synchronize operations and to share lessons-learned and cybersecurity bestpractices. This includes incident management and network defense response.
+
+
+Build bridges to the private sector. From application developers to Internet Services Providers, private companies provide the goods and services that make up cyberspace. The Defense Department relies on the private sector
+to
+build
+its
+networks,
+provide
+cybersecurity services, and research and
+develop advanced capabilities. The Defense Department has benefited from private sector innovation throughout its history. Going forward, DoD will work closely with the private sector to validate and commercialize new ideas for cybersecurity for the Department.
+
+
+
+Building alliances, coalitions, and partnerships abroad. The Defense Department engages
+in a broad array of activities to improve cybersecurity and cyber operations capacity abroad. DoD helps U.S. allies and partners to understand the cyber threats they face and to build the cyber capabilities necessary to defend their networks and data. Allies and partners also often have complementary capabilities that can augment those of the United States, and the United States seeks to build strong alliances and coalitions to counter potential adversaries' cyber activities. Strategically, a unified coalition sends a message that the United States and its allies and partners are aligned in collective defense. In addition to the Five Eyes treaty partners, DoD works closely with key partners in the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific, and Europe to understand the cybersecurity environment and build cyber defense capacity.
+
+## Three Primary Missions In Cyberspace
+
+The President has established principles and processes for governing cyber operations. The purpose of these principles and processes is to plan, develop, and use U.S. capabilities effectively, and to ensure that cyber operations occur in a manner consistent with the values that the United States promotes domestically and internationally. The Defense Department has three primary cyber missions. First, DoD must defend its own networks, systems, and information. The U.S. military's dependence on cyberspace for its operations led the Secretary of Defense in 2011 to declare cyberspace as an operational domain for purposes of organizing, training, and equipping U.S. military forces. The Defense Department must be able to secure its own networks against attack and recover quickly if security measures fail. To this end, DoD conducts network defense operations on an ongoing basis to securely operate the Department of Defense Information Network (DoDIN). If and when DoD detects indications of hostile activity within its networks, DoD has quick-response capabilities to close or mitigate vulnerabilities and secure its networks and systems. Network defense operations on DoD networks constitute the vast majority of DoD's operations in cyberspace. In addition to defense investments, DoD must prepare and be ready to operate in an environment where access to cyberspace is contested. During the Cold War, forces prepared to operate in an environment where access to communications could be interrupted by the adversary's advanced capabilities, to include the potential use of an electromagnetic pulse that could disrupt satellite and other global communications capabilities. Commanders conducted periodic exercises that required their teams to operate without access to communications systems. Through years of practice and exercise, a culture of resilience took root in the military and units were ready and prepared to operate in contested environments. Since the end of the Cold War, however, a younger generation has grown increasingly more accustomed to an environment of connectivity. The generation of military men and women that grew up since the end of the Cold War have had near constant access to information and communications, and the information revolution has led to a more agile and globally adaptive force.  In the face of an escalating cyber threat, the lessons of the previous generations must now be passed down. The Defense Department must be able to carry out its missions to defend the country. Organizations must exercise and learn to operate without the tools that have become such a vital part of their daily lives and operations. For its second mission, DoD must be prepared to defend the United States and its interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence. While cyberattacks are assessed on a case-by-case and factspecific basis by the President and the U.S. national security team, significant consequences may include loss of life, significant damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign policy consequences, or serious economic impact on the United States. If directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. military may conduct cyber operations to counter an imminent or on-going attack against the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests in cyberspace. The purpose of such a defensive measure is to blunt an attack and prevent the destruction of property or the loss of life. DoD seeks to synchronize its capabilities with other government agencies to develop a range of options and methods for disrupting cyberattacks of significant consequence before they can have an impact, to include law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic tools. As a matter of principle, the United States will seek to exhaust all network defense and law enforcement options to mitigate any potential cyber risk to the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests before conducting a cyberspace operation. The United States government has a limited and specific role to play in defending the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence. The private sector owns and operates over ninety percent of all of the networks and infrastructure of cyberspace and is thus the first line of defense. One of the most important steps for improving the United States' overall cybersecurity posture is for companies to prioritize the networks and data that they must protect and to invest in improving their own cybersecurity. While the U.S. government must prepare to defend the country against the most dangerous attacks, the majority of intrusions can be stopped through relatively basic cybersecurity investments that companies can and must make themselves. Third, if directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, DoD must be able to provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and contingency plans. There may be times when the President or the Secretary of Defense may determine that it would be appropriate for the U.S. military to conduct cyber operations to disrupt an adversary's militaryrelated networks or infrastructure so that the U.S. military can protect U.S. interests in an area of operations. For example, the United States military might use cyber operations to terminate an ongoing conflict on U.S. terms, or to disrupt an adversary's military systems to prevent the use of force against U.S. interests. United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) may also be directed to conduct cyber operations, in coordination with other U.S. government agencies as appropriate, to deter or defeat strategic threats in other domains.
+To ensure that the Internet remains open, secure, and prosperous, the United States will always conduct cyber operations under a doctrine of restraint, as required to protect human lives and to prevent the destruction of property. As in other domains of operations, in cyberspace the Defense Department will always act in a way that reflects enduring U.S. values, including support for the rule of law, as well as respect and protection of the freedom of expression and privacy, the free flow of information, commerce, and ideas. Any decision to conduct cyber operations outside of DoD networks is made with the utmost care and deliberation and under strict policy and operational oversight, and in accordance with the law of armed conflict.  As it makes its investments and builds cyber capabilities to defend U.S. national interests, the Defense Department will always be attentive to the potential impact of defense policies on state and non-state actors' behavior.
+
+## A New Cyber Mission Force
+
+The Defense Department requires the commitment and coordination of multiple leaders and communities across DoD and the broader U.S. government to carry out its missions and execute this strategy. Defense Department law enforcement, intelligence, counterintelligence, and policy organizations all have an active role, as do the men and women that build and operate DoD's networks and information technology systems. Every organization needs to play its part. For example, network service providers across DoD must be adaptive and active to follow cybersecurity best-practices and cyber defense orders. U.S. Cyber Command must synchronize its activities with other DoD organizations, particularly combatant commands, to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities. Installation owners and operators must partner with the Military Departments' Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), DHS, and USCYBERCOM to build adaptive defenses and continuity plans for mission-critical systems and the civil systems that support them. Success requires creative and strong intra-Departmental and interagency partnerships. Among DoD's cyber personnel and forces, the Cyber Mission Force (CMF) has a unique role within the Department. In 2012, DoD began to build a CMF to carry out DoD's cyber missions. Once fully operational, the CMF will include nearly 6,200 military, civilian, and contractor support personnel from across the military departments and defense components. The Cyber Mission Force represents a major investment by the Department of Defense and the United States as whole, and a central aim of this strategy is to set specific goals and objectives to guide the development of the Cyber Mission Force and DoD's wider cyber workforce to protect and defend U.S. national interests. The Cyber Mission Force will be comprised of cyber operators organized into 133 teams, primarily aligned as follows: Cyber Protection Forces will augment traditional defensive measures and defend priority DoD networks and systems against priority threats; National Mission Forces and their associated support teams will defend the United States and its interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence; and Combat Mission Forces and their associated support teams will support combatant commands by generating integrated cyberspace effects in support of operational plans and contingency operations. Combatant commands integrate Combat Mission Forces and Cyber Protection Teams into plans and operations and employ them in cyberspace, while the National Mission Force operates under the Commander of USCYBERCOM.  Outside of this construct, teams can also be used to support other missions as required by the Department.
+In 2013 the Department began to integrate the CMF into the larger multi-mission U.S. military force to achieve synergy across domains, assure the CMF's readiness within the force, and restructure the military and civilian workforce and infrastructure to execute DoD's missions. During the course of implementing this strategy, DoD will continue to build the CMF, and will continue to mature the necessary command, control, and enabling organizations required for effective operations. DoD will focus on ensuring that its forces are trained and ready to operate using the capabilities and architectures they need to conduct cyber operations, continue to build policy and legal frameworks to govern CMF employment, and integrate the CMF into DoD's overall planning and force development. This strategy recognizes that effective cybersecurity will require close collaboration within DoD and across the federal government, with industry, with international allies and partners, and with state and local governments. The pursuit of security in cyberspace requires a whole-of-government and international approach due to the number and variety of stakeholders in the domain, the flow of information across international borders, and the distribution of responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities across governments and the private sector. For each of DoD's missions, DoD must continue to develop routine relationships and processes for coordinating its cyber operations. Specific risks and opportunities inform this new strategy. For example, DoD's own network is a patchwork of thousands of networks across the globe, and DoD lacks the visibility and organizational structure required to defend its diffuse networks effectively. The Defense Department must further develop adequate warning intelligence of adversary intentions and capabilities for conducting destructive and disruptive cyberattacks against DoD and the United States. Beyond its own networks, DoD relies on civil critical infrastructure across the United States and overseas for its operations, yet the cybersecurity of such critical infrastructure is uncertain. To mitigate these and other risks and improve U.S. national security, this strategy sets strategic goals for the Department to achieve, and prescribes objectives and metrics for meeting each goal. All of the goals and objectives within this strategy reflect the goals of the 2015 United States *National Security Strategy* and the 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review*.
+
+## Dod Sets Five Strategic Goals For Its Cyberspace Missions:
+
+1. Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations;
+
+2. Defend the DoD information network, secure DoD data, and mitigate risks to DoD
+missions;
+
+3. Be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. vital interests from disruptive or
+destructive cyberattacks of significant consequence;
+
+4. Build and maintain viable cyber options and plan to use those options to control conflict
+escalation and to shape the conflict environment at all stages;
+
+5. Build and maintain robust international alliances and partnerships to deter shared threats
+and increase international security and stability.
+
+Key Cyber Threats From 2013-2015, the Director of National Intelligence named the cyber threat as the number one strategic threat to the United States, placing it ahead of terrorism for the first time since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Potential state and non-state adversaries conduct malicious cyber activities against U.S. interests globally and in a manner intended to test the limits of what the United States and the international community will tolerate. Actors may penetrate U.S. networks and systems for a variety of reasons, such as to steal intellectual property, disrupt an organization's operations for activist purposes, or to conduct disruptive and destructive attacks to achieve military objectives. Potential adversaries have invested significantly in cyber as it provides them with a viable, plausibly deniable capability to target the U.S. homeland and damage U.S. interests. Russia and China have developed advanced cyber capabilities and strategies. Russian actors are stealthy in their cyber tradecraft and their intentions are sometimes difficult to discern. China steals intellectual property (IP) from global businesses to benefit Chinese companies and undercut U.S. competitiveness. While Iran and North Korea have less developed cyber capabilities, they have displayed an overt level of hostile intent towards the United States and U.S. interests in cyberspace. In addition to state-based threats, non-state actors like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) use cyberspace to recruit fighters and disseminate propaganda and have declared their intent to acquire disruptive and destructive cyber capabilities. Criminal actors pose a considerable threat in cyberspace, particularly to financial institutions, and ideological groups often use hackers to further their political objectives.  State and non-state threats often also blend together; patriotic entities often act as cyber surrogates for states, and non-state entities can provide cover for state-based operators. This behavior can make attribution more difficult and increases the chance of miscalculation.
+
+## Malware Proliferation
+
+The global proliferation of malicious code or software ("malware") increases the risk to U.S. networks and data. To conduct a disruptive or destructive cyber operation against a military system or industrial control system requires expertise, but a potential adversary need not spend billions of dollars to develop an offensive capability. A nation-state, non-state group, or individual actor can purchase destructive malware and other capabilities on the black market. State and non-state actors also pay experts to search for vulnerabilities and develop exploits. This practice has created a dangerous and uncontrolled market that serves multiple actors within the international system, often for competing purposes.  As cyber capabilities become more readily available over time, the Department of Defense assesses that state and non-state actors will continue to seek and develop cyber capabilities to use against U.S. interests. Risk to DoD Networks and Infrastructure The Defense Department's own networks and systems are vulnerable to intrusions and attacks. In addition to DoD's own networks, a cyberattack on the critical infrastructure and key resources on which DoD relies for its operations could impact the U.S. military's ability to operate in a contingency. DoD has made gains in identifying cyber vulnerabilities of its own critical assets through its Mission Assurance Program - for many key assets, DoD has identified its physical network infrastructure on which key physical assets depend - but more must be done to secure DoD's cyber infrastructure. In addition to destructive and disruptive attacks, cyber actors steal operational information and intellectual property from a range of U.S. government and commercial entities that impact the Defense Department. Victims include weapons developers as well as commercial firms that support force movements through U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). State actors have stolen DoD's intellectual property to undercut the United States' strategic and technological advantage and to benefit their own military and economic development. Finally, the Defense Department faces a risk from the U.S. government's continued budgetary uncertainty.  Although DoD has prioritized the allocation of resources in its budget to develop cyber capabilities, continued fiscal uncertainty requires that DoD plan to build its cyber capabilities under a declining overall defense budget. DoD must continue to prioritize its cyber investments and develop the capabilities required to defend U.S. interests at home and overseas.
+
+## Deterrence In The Future Security Environment
+
+In the face of an escalating threat, the Department of Defense must contribute to the development and implementation of a comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy to deter key state and non-state actors from conducting cyberattacks against U.S. interests. Because of the variety and number of state and non-state cyber actors in cyberspace and the relative availability of destructive cyber tools, an effective deterrence strategy requires a range of policies and capabilities to affect a state or non-state actors' behavior. As DoD builds its Cyber Mission Force and overall capabilities, DoD assumes that the deterrence of cyberattacks on U.S. interests will not be achieved through the articulation of cyber policies alone, but through the totality of U.S. actions, including declaratory policy, substantial indications and warning capabilities, defensive posture, effective response procedures, and the overall resiliency of U.S. networks and systems. The deterrence of state and non-state groups in cyberspace will thus require the focused attention of multiple U.S. government departments and agencies. The Department of Defense has a number of specific roles to play in this equation.
+Deterrence is partially a function of perception. It works by convincing a potential adversary that it will suffer unacceptable costs if it conducts an attack on the United States, and by decreasing the likelihood that a potential adversary's attack will succeed. The United States must be able to declare or display effective *response* capabilities to deter an adversary from initiating an attack; develop effective defensive capabilities to *deny* a potential attack from succeeding; and strengthen the overall *resilience* of U.S. systems to withstand a potential attack if it penetrates the United States' defenses. In addition, the United States requires strong intelligence, forensics, and indications and warning capabilities to reduce anonymity in cyberspace and increase confidence in attribution.
+
+
+Response: The United States has been clear that it will respond to a cyberattack on U.S. interests through its defense capabilities. The United States has articulated this declaratory policy in the 2011 United States *International Strategy for Cyberspace*, in the Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report to Congress of 2011, and through public statements by the President and the Secretary of Defense.  The United States will continue to respond to cyberattacks against U.S. interests at a time, in a manner, and in a place of our choosing, using appropriate instruments of U.S. power and in accordance with applicable law.
+
+
+Denial: While DoD has made progress in building the Cyber Mission Force, DoD must increase its defensive capabilities to defend DoD networks and defend the nation from sophisticated cyberattacks, and must work with other departments, agencies,
+international
+allies
+and
+partners, and the private sector to strengthen deterrence by denial through improved cybersecurity.
+
+
+Resilience:
+Because
+the
+Defense
+Department's
+capabilities
+cannot
+necessarily
+guarantee
+that
+every
+cyberattack will be denied successfully, the Defense Department must invest in resilient and redundant systems so that it may continue its operations in the face of disruptive or destructive cyberattacks on DoD networks. The Defense Department cannot, however, foster resilience in organizations that fall outside of its authority. In order for resilience to succeed as a factor in effective deterrence, other agencies of the government must work with critical infrastructure owners and operators and the private sector more broadly to develop resilient and redundant systems that can withstand a potential attack. Effective resilience measures can help convince potential adversaries of the futility of commencing cyberattacks on U.S. networks and systems.
+Attribution is a fundamental part of an effective cyber deterrence strategy as anonymity enables malicious cyber activity by state and non-state groups. On matters of intelligence, attribution, and warning, DoD and the intelligence community have invested significantly in all source collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities, all of which reduce the anonymity of state and non-state actor activity in cyberspace. Intelligence and attribution capabilities help to unmask an actor's cyber persona, identify the attack's point of origin, and determine tactics, techniques, and procedures.  Attribution enables the Defense Department or other agencies to conduct response and denial operations against an incoming cyberattack.
+Public and private attribution can play a significant role in dissuading cyber actors from conducting attacks in the first place. The Defense Department will continue to collaborate closely with the private sector and other agencies of the U.S. government to strengthen attribution. This work will be especially important for deterrence as activist groups, criminal organizations, and other actors acquire advanced cyber capabilities over time. Finally, cyber capabilities present state and non-state actors with the ability to strike at U.S. interests in a manner that may or may not necessarily warrant a purely military response by the United States, but which may nonetheless present a significant threat to U.S. national security and may warrant a non-military response of some kind. In response to certain attacks and intrusions, the United States may undertake diplomatic actions, take law enforcement actions, and consider economic sanctions. For example, the United States used verifiable and attributable data to engage China about the risks posed by its economic espionage. The attribution of this data allowed the United States to express concerns regarding the impact of Chinese intellectual property theft on U.S. economic competitiveness, and the potential risks posed to strategic stability by Chinese activity. Because they broke the law and to deter China from conducting future cyber espionage, the Justice Department indicted five members of the People's Liberation Army for stealing U.S. intellectual property to directly benefit Chinese companies. The Defense Department will support the Justice Department and other agencies in exploring new tools and capabilities to help deter such activity in cyberspace.
+
+
+## Iii. Strategic Goals To Mitigate Risks And Defend U.S. Interests In The Current And Future Security Environment, The Defense Department Outlines Five Strategic Goals And Specific Objectives For Its Activities And Missions. Strategic Goal I: Build And Maintain Ready Forces And Capabilities To Conduct Cyberspace Operations. To Operate Effectively In Cyberspace, Dod Requires Forces And Personnel That Are Trained To The Highest Standard, Ready, And Equipped With Best-In-Class Technical Capabilities. In 2013 Dod Initiated A Major Investment In Its Cyber Personnel And Technologies By Initiating The Cmf; Now Dod Must Make Good On That Investment By Training Its People, Building Effective Organizations And Command And Control Systems, And Fully Developing The Capabilities That Dod Requires To Operate In Cyberspace. This Strategy Sets Specific Objectives For Dod To Meet As It Mans, Trains, And Equips Its Forces And Personnel Over The Next Five Years And Beyond. Strategic Goal Ii: Defend The Dod Information Network, Secure Dod Data, And Mitigate Risks To Dod Missions. While Dod Cannot Defend Every Network And System Against Every Kind Of Intrusion - Dod's Total Network Attack Surface Is Too Large To Defend Against All Threats And Too Vast To Close All Vulnerabilities - Dod Must Take Steps To Identify, Prioritize, And Defend Its Most Important Networks And Data So That It Can Carry Out Its Missions Effectively. Dod Must Also Plan And Exercise To Operate Within A Degraded And Disrupted Cyber Environment In The Event That An Attack On Dod's Networks And Data Succeeds, Or If Aspects Of The Critical Infrastructure On Which Dod Relies For Its Operational And Contingency Plans Are Disrupted. Finally, Dod Must Raise The Bar On Technology And Innovation To Stay Ahead Of The Threat By Enhancing Its Cyber Defense Capabilities, Including By Building And Employing A More Defendable Network Architecture In The Joint Information Environment (Jie). Outside Of Dod Networks, Dod Must Work With The Private Sector To Help Secure Defense Industrial Base Trade Data, And Be Prepared To Assist Other Agencies In Hardening U.S. Networks And Data Against Cyberattacks And Cyber Espionage. Strategic Goal Iii: Be Prepared To Defend The U.S. Homeland And U.S. Vital Interests From Disruptive Or Destructive Cyberattacks Of Significant Consequence.
+
+The Department of Defense must work with its interagency partners, the private sector, and allied and partner nations to deter and if necessary defeat a cyberattack of significant consequence on the U.S. homeland and U.S.
+
+interests.
+
+The Defense Department must develop its intelligence, warning, and operational capabilities to mitigate sophisticated, malicious cyberattacks before they can impact U.S. interests. Consistent with all applicable laws and policies, DoD requires granular, detailed, predictive, and actionable intelligence about global networks and systems, adversary capabilities, and malware brokers and markets. To defend the nation, DoD must build partnerships with other agencies of the government to prepare to conduct combined cyber operations to deter and if necessary defeat aggression in cyberspace. The Defense Department is focused on building the capabilities, processes, and plans necessary to succeed in this mission.
+
+## Strategic Goal Iv: Build And Maintain Viable Cyber Options And Plan To Use Those Options To Control Conflict Escalation And To
+
+SHAPE THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT AT ALL STAGES. During heightened tensions or outright hostilities, DoD must be able to provide the President with a wide range of options for managing conflict escalation. If directed, DoD should be able to use cyber operations to disrupt an adversary's command and control networks, military-related critical infrastructure, and weapons capabilities. As a part of the full range of tools available to the United States, DoD must develop viable cyber options and integrate those options into Departmental plans. DoD will develop cyber capabilities to achieve key security objectives with precision, and to minimize loss of life and destruction of property. To ensure unity of effort, DoD will enable combatant commands to plan and synchronize cyber operations with kinetic operations across all domains of military operations.
+
+## Strategic Goal V: Build And Maintain Robust International Alliances And Partnerships To Deter Shared Threats And Increase
+
+INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.
+
+
+All three of DoD's cyber missions require close collaboration with foreign allies and partners. In its international cyber engagement DoD seeks to build partnership capacity in cybersecurity and cyber defense, and to deepen operational partnerships where appropriate. Given the high demand and relative scarcity of cyber resources, the Department of Defense must make hard choices and focus its partnership capacity initiatives on areas where vital U.S. national interests are stake. Over the next five years, in addition to ongoing partner capacity building efforts in other regions, DoD will focus its international engagement on: the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific, and key NATO allies. Through the course of this strategy DoD will constantly assess the international environment and develop innovative partnerships to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities.
+
+THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK
+
+
+## Iv. Implementation Objectives Each Of Dod's Strategic Goals Requires Specific, Measurable Objectives For The Department To Achieve. The Office Of The Principal Cyber Advisor To The Secretary Of Defense, The Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, And Logistics, And The Joint Staff Will Work With Dod Components To Prioritize And Oversee The Implementation Of This Strategy And Its Objectives And To Assign Offices Of Primary And Support Responsibility For Managing Each Objective. The Office Of Primary Responsibility Will Develop A Project Plan For Each Objective; The Principal Cyber Advisor Will Track Progress In Achieving Each Objective And Ultimately The Success Of Each Strategic Goal. Strategic Goal I: Build And Maintain Ready Forces And Capabilities To Conduct Cyberspace Operations.
+
+
+Build the cyber workforce. To make good on DoD's significant investment in cyber personnel, and to help achieve many of the objectives in this strategy, DoD's first priority is to develop a ready Cyber Mission Force and associated cyber workforce. This workforce will be built on three foundational pillars: enhanced training; improved military and civilian recruitment and retention; and stronger private sector support.
+
+o *Maintain a persistent training environment.* DoD requires an individual and collective
+training capability to achieve the goals outlined in this strategy and to meet future operational requirements. U.S. Cyber Command will work with other components, agencies, and military departments to define the requirements for and create a training environment that will enable the total cyber force to conduct joint training (including exercises and mission rehearsals), experimentation, certification, as well as the assessment and development of cyber capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures for missions that cross boundaries and networks.
+
+o *Build viable career paths.* Throughout the course of this strategy, and following the
+CMF decisions of 2013, DoD will continue to foster viable career paths for all military personnel performing and supporting cyber operations.
+
+o *Draw on the National Guard and Reserve.* Throughout the course of this strategy, DoD
+will draw on the National Guard and Reserve Components as a resource for expertise and to foster creative solutions to cybersecurity problems. The Reserve Component offers a unique capability for supporting each of DoD's missions, including for engaging the defense industrial base and the commercial sector. It represents DoD's critical surge capacity for cyber responders.
+
+o *Improve civilian recruitment and retention.* In addition to developing highly-skilled
+military personnel, DoD must recruit and retain highly-skilled civilian personnel, including technical personnel for its total cyber workforce. Civilians must follow a welldeveloped career development and advancement track and be provided with best-inclass opportunities to develop and succeed within the workforce.
+o *Develop and implement exchange programs with the private sector.* To supplement
+DoD's civilian cyber workforce, DoD must be able to employ technical subject matter experts from the best cybersecurity and information technology companies in the country to perform unique engineering and analytic roles within DoD. The Defense Department will implement successful private sector exchange programs to bring measurable benefits to the Department of Defense through the design and development of new operational concepts for DoD's cyberspace missions.
+o *Support the National Initiative for Cyberspace Education.* DoD will develop policies to
+support the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education. Working with interagency partners, one or more educational institutions, as well as state and private sector partners, DoD will continue to support innovative workforce development partnerships focused on both the technical and policy dimensions of cybersecurity and cyber defense.
+
+
+Build technical capabilities for cyber operations. In 2013, DoD developed a model for achieving CMF readiness and for developing viable cyber military options to present to the President and Secretary of Defense. DoD must have the technical tools available to conduct operations in support of combatant command missions. Key initiatives include the following:
+
+o *Develop the Unified Platform.*  On the basis of planning requirements, DoD will
+develop the detailed requirements for integrating disparate cyber platforms and building an interoperable and extendable network of cyber capabilities. This Unified Platform will enable the CMF to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations in support of national requirements.
+
+o *Accelerate research and development.* The Defense Department will continue to
+accelerate innovative cyber research and development to build cyber capabilities. The
+DoD research and development community as well as established and emerging private sector partners can provide DoD and the nation with a significant advantage in developing leap-ahead technologies to defend U.S. interests in cyberspace. In addition to supporting current and planned investments, DoD will focus its basic and applied research agenda on developing cyber capabilities to expand the capacity of the CMF and the broader DoD cyber workforce.
+
+
+
+Validate and continually refine an adaptive command and control mechanism for cyber operations. DoD has made significant progress in recent years in developing command and control for all three of its missions, but its command and control model must be finalized, resourced, and tested to ensure effectiveness. The command and control model must support USCYBERCOM and the combatant commands.  It must be efficient and practical, and must promote unity of effort of effort across all three cyber missions.
+
+Establish an enterprise-wide cyber modeling and simulation capability. DoD will work in collaboration with the intelligence community to develop the data schema, databases, algorithms, and modeling and simulation (M&S) capabilities necessary to assess the effectiveness of cyber operations.
+
+Assess Cyber Mission Force capacity. Assess the capacity of the projected Cyber Mission
+Force
+to
+achieve
+its
+mission
+objectives when confronted with multiple contingencies.
+o The Joint Staff, with support from
+USCYBERCOM
+and
+other
+DoD
+components,
+will
+propose,
+collect,
+analyze, and report a set of appropriate metrics to the Principal Cyber Advisor to measure the operational capacity of the CMF. These metrics will include updates on
+the
+status
+of
+USCYBERCOM
+contingency
+capabilities,
+to
+include
+capability development and proficiency as well as accesses and tools that may be required in a contingency. In response to this analysis, DoD will develop a plan for ensuring that the CMF has the appropriate capacity and flexibility available to respond to changes in the strategic environment.
+
+## Strategic Goal Ii: Defend The Dod Information Network, Secure Dod Data, And Mitigate Risks To Dod Missions.
+
+
+Build the Joint Information Environment (JIE) single security architecture. The Defense Department will build DoD information networks to meet the JIE's single security
+architecture. The single security architecture will adapt and evolve to mitigate cyber threats; it will help DoD to develop and follow best-in-class cybersecurity practices, and its small network footprint will allow USCYBERCOM, combatant commands, and DoD components to maintain comprehensive situational awareness of network threats and mitigations.
+
+
+o The JIE's single security architecture will enable a robust network defense and shift the
+focus from protecting service-specific networks and systems to securing the DoD enterprise in a unified manner. The JIE's single security architecture must be developed with enhanced cyber situational awareness, deployed in response to validated requirements, and able to accommodate future defensive measures.
+o As a part of JIE planning DoD will develop a framework for developing and integrating
+new defensive techniques into DoD's cybersecurity architecture, to include anomalybased detection capabilities, data analytics to identify vulnerabilities and threats, and advanced encryption methods.
+
+
+Assess and ensure the effectiveness of the Joint Force Headquarters for DoD information network (DoDIN) operations. Operating under USCYBERCOM, the Joint Force Headquarters-DoDIN will coordinate network defense and mitigate cyber risks to DoD operations and missions across the defense enterprise. DoD will assess, validate, and fully implement the Joint Force Headquarters-DoDIN concept to operate DoD networks securely, defend DoD networks, and mitigate cyber risks to DoD missions.
+
+
+Mitigate known vulnerabilities. The Defense Department will implement a capability to mitigate all known vulnerabilities that present a high risk to DoD networks and data. In addition to zero-day vulnerabilities, one of the greatest threats to DoD networks and systems lies in known, high-risk vulnerabilities that potential adversaries can exploit. DoD often finds itself rushing to close vulnerabilities once an adversary has penetrated a system. The DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) will lead an effort to implement an automated patch management capability to distribute software and configuration patches, updates, and fixes to mitigate known, major vulnerabilities on DoD networks and systems against threats.
+
+Assess DoD's cyber defense forces. The Defense Department will assess its cyber defense forces' ability to conduct integrated, adaptive, and dynamic defensive operations. Enterprise-level and Cyber Protection Team (CPT) network defenders must be able to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities to defend the DoD information network.
+
+Improve the effectiveness of the current DoD Computer Network Defense Service Provider (CNDSP) construct in defending and protecting DoD networks. Computer network defense service providers deliver cybersecurity solutions for DoD networks, to include monitoring, detection, and protection capabilities. The Defense Department will determine whether current CNDSP processes are sufficient to defend networks against known and projected threats in cyberspace and whether current CNDSP forces are adequately trained and equipped to defend against advanced threats. Finally, DoD will
+determine whether its CNDSP forces can integrate into the broader cyberspace command and control construct and how that integrated construct will perform in the face of cyber threats that span CNDSP and CPT protected networks and data.
+
+
+
+Plan for network defense and resilience. The Defense Department must identify and plan to defend the networks that support key DoD missions. The Department must make a careful assessment of the priority assets that it must defend in cyberspace to assure DoD missions and exercise to defend those assets effectively.
+o *Integrate cyber into mission assurance assessments.* The Defense Department will
+integrate cybersecurity requirements and assessments into the DoD Mission Assurance program and update DoD policy appropriately. Currently DoD components take varying approaches to measuring and assessing
+cyber
+risks
+for
+mission
+assurance. DoD will develop a Joint Mission Assurance Assessment Program that
+includes
+the
+integration
+of
+cybersecurity assessments, cybersecurity requirements, and cyber operations' requirements.
+o Assess Cyber Protection Team (CPT)
+capabilities. DoD will complete an assessment of CPT capacity, capability, and employment model in regard to mission assurance priorities as set by combatant command requirements.
+
+o *Improve weapons systems cybersecurity.* DoD will assess and initiate improvements to
+the cybersecurity of current and future weapons systems, doing so on the basis of operational requirements. For all future weapons systems that DoD will acquire or procure, DoD will mandate specific cybersecurity standards for weapons systems to meet. Acquisition and procurement policy and practice will be updated to promote effective cybersecurity throughout a system's life cycle.
+o *Build and exercise continuity plans.* All DoD components will identify and build
+resiliency plans to maintain continuity of their most critical operations in the event of network disruption and degradation. Military campaign plans must fully incorporate the ability to operate in a degraded cyber environment; military forces must exercise and be able to conduct military campaigns in a degraded cyber environment where access to networks and data is uncertain. Components must balance cyber risks effectively to ensure that they can continue to carry out their missions in the physical world.
+
+
+Red team DoD's network defenses. The Defense Department has developed mature red team capabilities to test vital networks and mission systems for vulnerabilities and to better
+prepare its cyber defense forces. Going forward, DoD must focus its red team capabilities on priority networks and mission systems to assure DoD's ability to carry out its most critical missions. As a part of this work, every major DoD exercise should include a cyber red team to test DoD's cyber defenses in a realistic scenario where the Department could have its operations disrupted by an adversary. Components will be audited regularly to ensure progress in incorporating red team findings and improving their cybersecurity posture.
+
+
+
+Mitigate the risk of insider threats. The nation's defense depends upon the fidelity of those entrusted with the nation's secrets. The Defense Department has invested in the technological and personnel solutions necessary to identify threats before they can impact U.S. national security. The Defense Department continues to deploy and implement these solutions through continuous network monitoring, improved cybersecurity training for the workforce, and improved methods for identifying, reporting, and tracking suspicious behavior.
+
+
+o This work extends beyond information technology and includes matters of personnel
+and reliability. Mitigating the insider threat requires good leadership and accountability throughout the workforce. Beyond implementing policies and protocols, leaders will strive to create a culture of awareness to anticipate, detect, and respond to insider threats before they have an impact.
+
+Exercise to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Under its existing and planned force structure, DoD will develop a framework and exercise its Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) capabilities in support of DHS and other agencies and with state and local authorities to help defend the federal government and the private sector in an emergency if directed.
+
+
+o DoD's annual exercise program, to include Cyber Guard, will include exercising with
+DHS and the FBI for contingencies that may require emergency allocation of forces to
+help
+protect
+critical
+infrastructure,
+under
+partner agencies' lead. This framework will describe how combatant commands and combat support agencies can partner with DHS and FBI and other agencies to improve integration, training and support.
+
+Define and refine the National Guard's
+
+role
+        in
+              supporting
+                              law
+                                     enforcement,
+
+Homeland Defense, and Defense Support of
+Civil Authorities missions. DoD will work
+with the National Guard to define the
+coordinate, train, advise, and assist (C/TAA)
+roles of the National Guard force and refine
+implementation through Cyber Guard 16-1.
+Under its existing and planned force structure,
+
+National Guard forces will exercise to coordinate, train, advise, and assist state and local agencies and domestic critical infrastructure and to provide support to law enforcement, Homeland Defense, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities activities in support of national objectives.
+
+
+
+Improve accountability and responsibility for the protection of data across DoD and the DIB. The Defense Department will ensure that policies and any associated federal rules or contract language requirements have been implemented to require DIB companies to report data theft and loss to the Defense Cyber Crime Center.
+
+o DoD will continue to assess Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
+(DFARS) rules and associated guidance to ensure they mature over time in a manner consistent with known standards for protecting data from cyber adversaries, to include standards promulgated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
+
+o DoD will continue to expand companies' participation in threat information sharing
+programs, such as the Cyber Security/Information Assurance program.
+
+o As the certification authority for DIB cleared defense contractor sites, the Defense
+Security Service will expand education and training programs to include material for DoD personnel and DIB contractors to enhance their cyber threat awareness.
+o In addition, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will review the
+sufficiency of current classification guidance for critical acquisition and technology programs to protect information on contractor networks.
+
+
+Strengthen DoD's procurement and acquisition cybersecurity standards. To defend DoD networks, DoD must strengthen the cybersecurity requirements of DoD's network acquisition and procurement items by integrating cybersecurity standards into contract vehicles for research, development, and procurement. DoD will specify additional cybersecurity standards for industry to meet for components of any DoD procurement item.
+
+Build collaboration between the acquisition, intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement, and operations communities to prevent, mitigate, and respond to data loss. DoD will establish a Joint Acquisition Protection and Exploitation Cell (JAPEC) to link intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agents with acquisition program managers to prevent and mitigate data loss and theft. DoD will conduct comprehensive risk and damage assessments of cyber espionage and theft to inform requirements, acquisition, programmatic, and counterintelligence courses of action.
+o The DoD CIO, in collaboration with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
+Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, will assess and update specific information system security controls that underpin the DFARs for defense contractors within the NIST and DFARS standards.
+
+
+o To safeguard critical programs and technologies DoD will work with companies to
+develop alert capabilities and build layered cyber defenses.
+o Finally, the Defense Cyber Crime Center, the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of
+Defense, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will collaborate with the Services' Damage Assessment Management Offices to streamline risk and damage assessment processes to better inform decisions to maintain, modify, or cancel penetrated programs.
+
+Use DoD counterintelligence capabilities to defend against intrusions. The Military Departments and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in consultation with the Principal Cyber Advisor, will develop a strategy for the Secretary of Defense's approval that maximizes the capabilities and authorities of the military departments' counterintelligence agencies to identify, attribute, and defend against cyber intruders.
+
+
+o Counterintelligence authorities are uniquely positioned to improve our insight into and
+frustrate and defeat cyber espionage. The strategy will specify how DoD's counterintelligence agencies will collaborate more effectively with the broader U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities on investigations and human and technical operations to thwart cyber-enabled intellectual property theft against the United States and its allies and partners.
+
+
+
+Support whole-of-government policies and capabilities to counter intellectual property theft. The Defense Department will continue to work with other agencies of the U.S. government to counter the threat posed by intellectual property theft through cyberspace.
+
+## Strategic Goal Iii: Be Prepared To Defend The U.S. Homeland And U.S. Vital Interests From Disruptive Or Destructive Cyberattacks Of Significant Consequence.
+
+
+Continue to develop intelligence and warning capabilities to anticipate threats. To defend the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence, DoD will work with the broader intelligence community to develop intelligence capabilities about adversary activities and prepare to disrupt cyberattacks before they can impact the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests. To meet combatant command contingency requirements, DoD will expand its intelligence of key adversary human and technical networks. To operate effectively in cyberspace DoD requires cyber intelligence and warning and shared situational awareness through all phases of a potential operation. All intelligence collection will follow the law and guidance outlined in executive orders.
+
+
+
+Develop and exercise capabilities to defend the nation. The National Mission Force and other relevant DoD components will train and partner with key interagency organizations
+to prepare to conduct cyber operations to defend the nation from cyberattacks of significant consequence. In addition, DoD will practice emergency procedures through regular exercises at all levels of the Department and support interagency exercises to practice emergency and deliberate cyber action procedures.
+
+
+o Build partnerships to defend the nation.
+DoD will have a framework in place to cooperate
+with
+other
+government
+agencies to conduct defend the nation operations. DoD will work with FBI, CIA, DHS
+and
+other
+agencies
+to
+build
+relationships and integrate capabilities to provide the President with the widest range of options available to respond to a cyberattack of significant consequence to the United States.
+o Conduct
+an
+annual
+comprehensive
+The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Plan X program is a foundational cyber warfare program that is developing platforms for the Defense Department. DARPA uses advanced touch-table displays to use finger gestures and motions to advance the state of the art in cyber operations. (Photo courtesy of DARPA)
+
+review of DoD's defend the nation capabilities. The Defense Department's requirements and capabilities for its mission to defend the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence will evolve over time. On an annual basis, DoD will conduct an in-depth review of the capabilities available and required for the mission. As a part of this review, DoD will validate new requirements and identify gaps and initiatives to pursue.
+
+
+Develop innovative approaches to defending U.S. critical infrastructure. DoD will work with DHS to improve the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program and encourage additional critical infrastructure entities to participate, with a particular emphasis on increasing the number of defense critical infrastructure participants.
+
+
+Develop automated information sharing tools. To improve shared situational awareness DoD will partner with DHS and other agencies to develop continuous, automated, standardized mechanisms for sharing information with each of its critical partners in the U.S. government, key allied and partner militaries, state and local governments, and the private sector. In addition, DoD will work with other U.S. government agencies and Congress to support legislation that enables information sharing between the U.S. government and the private sector.
+
+Assess DoD's cyber deterrence posture and strategy.  Building off of the Defense Science Board's Task Force on Cyber Deterrence, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), in coordination with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, will assess the Department of Defense's ability to deter specific state and non-state actors from conducting cyberattacks of significant consequence on the U.S. homeland and against U.S. interests, to
+include loss of life, significant destruction of property, or significant impact on U.S. foreign and economic policy interests.
+
+o In conducting its analysis, USSTRATCOM must determine whether DoD is building the
+capabilities required for attributing and deterring key threats from conducting such attacks and recommend specific actions that DoD can take to improve its cyber deterrence posture.  Careful attention should be devoted also to deterring non-state actors that may fall outside of traditional deterrence frameworks but which could pose a considerable threat to U.S. interests.
+
+## Strategic Goal Iv: Build And Maintain Viable Cyber Options And Plan To Use Those Options To Control Conflict Escalation And To Shape The Conflict Environment At All Stages.
+
+
+Integrate cyber options into plans. To meet strategic end-states as defined by the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, combatant command plans, and other strategic guidance documents, DoD will work with agencies of the U.S. government as well as U.S. allies and partners to integrate cyber options into combatant command planning.
+o *Accelerate the integration of cyber requirements into plans.* The Defense Department
+will accelerate the integration of cyber requirements into combatant command plans. Plans must outline and define specific cyberspace effects against targets. To facilitate this work, the Joint Staff will work with USSTRATCOM to synchronize and integrate requirements into planning and provide recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the alignment, allocation, assignment, and apportionment of Cyber Mission Forces.
+
+## Strategic Goal V: Build And Maintain Robust International Alliances And Partnerships To Deter Shared Threats And Increase International Security And Stability.
+
+
+Build partner capacity in key regions. Under its existing and planned force structure, DoD will work with key allies and partners to build partner capacity and help secure the critical infrastructure and key resources on which DoD missions and U.S. interests depend.  The Defense Department will work regularly with other agencies of the U.S. government, to include the Department of State, in building partner capacity. Priority regions include the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, and Europe.
+
+
+o Support the hardening and resiliency of Middle Eastern allies' and partners' networks
+and systems. As a part of its cyber dialogue and partnerships, DoD will work with key Middle Eastern allies and partners to improve their ability to secure their military networks as well as the critical infrastructure and key resources upon which U.S. interests depend. Key initiatives include improved information sharing to establish a
+unified understanding of the cyber threat, an assessment of our mutual cyber defense posture, and collaborative approaches to building cyber expertise.
+
+
+o Support the hardening and resiliency of
+Northeast Asian allies' networks and systems. As a part of its broader cyber dialogue with Asian allies, DoD will work with key allies and partners to improve their ability to secure their military networks and critical infrastructure and key resources upon which U.S. and allied interests depend.
+o Build new strategic partnerships in the
+Asia-Pacific
+region.
+The
+Defense
+Department will work with key states across the Asia-Pacific to build cyber capacity and minimize risk to U.S. and allied interests, in a manner consistent with
+DoD's
+International
+Cyberspace
+Security Cooperation Guidance.
+o *Work with key NATO allies to mitigate cyber risks to DoD and U.S. national interests.*
+The Defense Department will develop these partnerships through the defense consultations that DoD holds with its key NATO allies.
+
+o DoD will remain flexible and agile as it builds alliances and partnerships to best respond
+to shifts in the strategic environment.
+
+
+Develop solutions to counter the proliferation of destructive malware. State and non-state actors seek to acquire destructive malware. The uncontrolled spread of destructive malware to hostile actors presents a significant risk to the international system. Working with the Department of State and other agencies of the U.S. government as well as U.S. allies and partners, the Defense Department will draw on best-practices to counter the proliferation of destructive malware within the international system.  In addition to international regimes and best-practices, the U.S. government has a range of domestic export control regimes for governing dual-use technologies that can be used to prevent proliferation.
+
+
+Work with capable international partners to plan and train for cyber operations. Throughout the course of this strategy, DoD will strengthen its international alliances and partnerships to develop combined capabilities to achieve cyber effects in support of combatant command plans.
+
+
+Strengthen the United States cyber dialogue with China to enhance strategic stability. Through the course of this strategy, as part of the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks and related dialogues, such as the Cyber Working Group, DoD will continue to hold discussions with China to bring greater understanding and transparency of each nation's
+military doctrine, policy, roles and missions in cyberspace. The goal of this work is to reduce the risks of misperception and miscalculation that could contribute to escalation and instability. DoD will support U.S. government efforts to strengthen confidence-building measures to bring a greater level of trust to the U.S.-China relationship. In addition, DoD will continue to raise concerns about China's cyber enabled theft of U.S. intellectual property, trade secrets, and confidential business information.1
+
+V. MANAGING THE STRATEGY To achieve the goals and objectives outlined in this strategy will require hard choices regarding cyber forces and personnel, organizations, and capabilities. The financial choices that DoD makes in the course of implementing this strategy will have national and global implications for years to come, and DoD must operate in an effective and cost-efficient manner to guarantee the best return on its investments. To that end, DoD will pursue the following management objectives to govern its cyber activities and missions.
+
+
+Establish the Office of the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense. In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2014, Congress required the Defense Department to designate a Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense to review military cyberspace activities, cyber mission forces, and offensive and defensive cyber operations and missions. In addition, the Principal Cyber Advisor will govern the development of DoD cyberspace policy and strategy for the DoD enterprise.
+o The 2014 NDAA also stipulated that this Principal Cyber Advisor integrate the cyber
+expertise and perspectives of key organizations to build an intradepartmental team of key players to ensure effective governance of cyber issues within DoD.  The Principal Cyber Advisor responsibilities assigned by the FY14 NDAA shall not be interpreted to affect the existing responsibilities and authorities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; or any other Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) in the office of the Secretary of Defense in cyber-related responsibilities and authorities.
+o *An intradepartmental team.* The Principal Cyber Advisor will work with DoD
+components through the Cyber Investment and Management Board (CIMB) to review DoD's cyber management. The CIMB will be a forum for synchronization, coordination, and project management. It will not replicate existing programmatic and budgetary mechanisms or interfere with previously defined Principal Staff Assistant roles and authorities, nor will it interfere in any way with the military chain of command; rather, it will provide a single forum to integrate cyber initiatives, it will manage projects through
+completion, and streamline DoD's cyber governance structures.  The PCA will work with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Joint Staff to build an intradepartmental team of DoD representatives to support the CIMB in this work.
+
+
+
+o *A senior executive forum.* Subordinate and reporting to the CIMB, a senior executive
+forum will provide initial senior-level coordination on key cyber issues.  The senior executive forum will recommend courses of action to the CIMB and will coordinate with other OSD and Joint Staff governance bodies to facilitate unity of effort and resolve management issues at appropriate levels.
+o If and when a budgetary or financial matter comes into play during the Program and
+Budget Review process, the Principal Cyber Advisor will use the senior executive forum and the CIMB to coordinate recommendations for the Deputy's Management Action Group or other financial and budgetary organizations, vetting options and alternatives through the issue teams as appropriate.
+
+Improve cyber budgetary management. DoD will develop an agreed-upon method to more transparently and effectively manage the DoD cyber operations budget. Today cyber funding is spread across the DoD budget, to include the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), in multiple appropriations, budget lines, program elements, and projects. In addition, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, on behalf of DoD, ensures that all National Intelligence Program (NIP) investments are aligned to support DoD missions. The diffuse nature of the DoD cyber budget presents DoD with a challenge for effective budgetary
+management; DoD must develop a new method for managing cross-program funding to improve mission effectiveness and achieve management efficiencies.
+
+Develop DoD's cyber operations and
+cybersecurity policy framework. Consistent with Presidential guidance, DoD will align and simplify its cyber operations and cybersecurity policy management and identified gaps, overlaps, seams, conflicts, and areas in need of revision in current documentation. This effort will help translate national and departmental guidance and policy into tactical operations. It is essential to clarifying conflicts in existing documentation that currently complicate cyber operations and cybersecurity governance.
+
+
+Conduct an end-to-end assessment of DoD's cyber capabilities. U.S. Cyber Command will lead a comprehensive operational assessment of its posture. In coordination with the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Office of the Director of Coast Assessment and Program Evaluation, USCYBERCOM will provide short- and long-term recommendations through the CIMB to provide to the Secretary of
+Defense regarding organizational structure, command and control mechanism, rules of engagement, personnel, capabilities, tools, and potential operational gaps. The goal of this posture assessment will be to provide a clear understanding of the future operational environment; key stakeholder views; as well as strategic priorities, choices, and resources for planning and operations.
+
+
+
+THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK
+
+## Conclusion
+
+We live in a time of growing cyber threats to U.S. interests. State and non-state actors threaten disruptive and destructive attacks against the United States and conduct cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property to undercut the United States' technological and military advantage. We are vulnerable in cyberspace, and the scale of the cyber threat requires urgent action by leaders and organizations across the government and the private sector. Since developing its first cyber strategy in 2011, the Defense Department has made significant progress in building its cyber capabilities, developing its organizations and plans, and fostering the partnerships necessary to defend the country and its interests. More must be done. Stemming from the goals and objectives outlined in this strategy, appropriate resources must be aligned and managed to ensure progress. This strategy presents an aggressive, specific plan for achieving change. For DoD to succeed in its mission of defending the United States and its interests in cyberspace, leaders from across the Department must take action to achieve the objectives outlined in this document. They must also hold their organizations accountable. Because of the nature of networks and computer code, no single organization can be relied upon to do this work. Success requires close collaboration across DoD, between agencies of the U.S. government, with the private sector, and with U.S. allies and partners. The strategic environment can change quickly. That is especially true in cyberspace. We must be dynamic, flexible, and agile in this work. We must anticipate emerging threats, identify new capabilities to build, and determine how to enhance our partnerships and planning.  As always, our women and men - both uniformed and civilian personnel - will be our greatest and most enduring strength and a constant source of inspiration. By working together we will help protect and defend the United States and its interests in the digital age.

markdown/misc/forensics.md

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+# Nonproliferation Nuclear Forensics
+
+I. Hutcheon, M. Kristo, K. Knight
+
+## December 3, 2015
+
+Mineralogical Assocaition of Canada Short Course Series #43 Winnipeg, Canada May 20, 2013 through May 21, 2013
+Disclaimer
+
+This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
+
+
+CHAPTER 13: NONPROLIFERATION NUCLEAR FORENSICS Ian D. Hutcheon, Michael J. Kristo and Kim B. Knight Glenn Seaborg Institute Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory P.O. Box 808, Livermore, California, 94551-0808, USA
+e-mail: hutcheon1@llnl.gov INTRODUCTION
+Beginning with the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, unprecedented amounts of illicitly obtained radiological and nuclear materials began to be seized at border crossings and international points of entry. The first instances of this new criminal activity, "nuclear smuggling", were reported in 1991 in Italy and Switzerland and in subsequent years numerous incidents involving illicit trafficking of radioactive or nuclear material occurred in a number of central European countries. Between 1993 and 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recorded more than 2150 incidents of illicit trafficking of radioactive material (IAEA 2012) More than 400 of these incidents involve *bona fide* nuclear material, primarily depleted, natural or low-enriched uranium. Of special concern, moreover, are the 16 or so events involving highly enriched U or Pu (Table 13-1). The overt evidence of significant amounts of nuclear material outside lawful control has created international concern over the importance of maintaining global nuclear order and underscores U.S. President Obama's statement in Prague in 2009, "In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up."
+The new scientific discipline of Nuclear Forensics was developed out of the need not only to identify and characterize illicit nuclear materials but also to learn more about the original and intended use of the material, its origin and the putative trafficking route. In the U.S., the nuclear forensics effort was jump-started by taking advantage of several decades of experience developed through the nuclear weapons program, supplemented with expertise from geochemistry, material science and conventional forensics.
+Nuclear forensics is the technical means by which intercepted radioactive or nuclear material (and any associated non-nuclear material) is characterized to determine, for example, their chemical and isotopic composition, physical state
+
+Mineralogical Association of Canada Short Course 43, Winnipeg MB, May 2013, p. xxx-xxx.
+
+and age; these data are then interpreted to evaluate provenance, production history and trafficking route. The goal of these analyses is to identify forensic indicators in the interdicted nuclear and radiological samples or the surrounding environment, *e.g.*, container, transport vehicle or packaging. These indicators arise from known relationships between material characteristics and process history. Nuclear forensics requires a combination of technical data, relevant databases, and specialized skills and knowledge to generate, analyze, and interpret the data. When combined with law enforcement and intelligence data, nuclear forensics can suggest or exclude potential origins and thereby contribute to attribution of the material to its source or production facility.
+
+A primary objective of nuclear forensics is to identify the source, or sources, of stolen or illicitly trafficked nuclear materials and thereby prevent, or make more difficult, terrorist acts that would use material from these same sources (Mayer *et al.* 2007, Moody *et al.* 2005). The perception of effective nuclear forensics is likely to deter some of the individuals who would need to be involved in any act of nuclear terrorism and provides incentives to states to guard their materials and facilities better.
+The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001, greatly increased the visibility of nuclear forensics, as policy makers worldwide became increasingly concerned about the possibility of terrorist groups obtaining a nuclear weapon or using a radiological dispersal device (RDD or so-called "dirty bomb"). More recently, a consensus has developed among international leaders that the threat of nuclear terrorism poses a real and present danger to both national and international security. U.S. President Obama, the leaders of 46 other nations, the heads of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and numerous experts have called nuclear terrorism one of the most serious threats to global security and stability. The Communique of the 2012 Seoul National Security Summit
+
+## Table 13-1: Selected Interdictions Of Nuclear Material
+
+| Year          | Location                            | Type    |
+|---------------|-------------------------------------|---------|
+| Enrichment or |                                     |         |
+| 239           |                                     |         |
+| Pu            |                                     |         |
+| content       |                                     |         |
+| Mass          |                                     |         |
+| 1992          | Augsburg, Germany                   | LEU     |
+| 1992          | Podolsk, Russia                     | HEU     |
+| 1993          | Vilnius, Lithuania                  | HEU     |
+| 1993          | Andreeva Guba, Russia               | HEU     |
+| 1993          | Murmansk, Russia                    | HEU     |
+| 1994          | St. Petersburg, Russia              | HEU     |
+| 1994          | Tengen, Germany                     | Pu      |
+| 1994          | Landshut, Germany                   | HEU     |
+| 1994          | Munich, Germany                     | Pu      |
+|               |                                     | LEU     |
+| 1994          | Prague, Czech Republic              | HEU     |
+| 1995          | Prague, Czech Republic              | HEU     |
+| 1995          | Prague, Ceske Budejovice            | HEU     |
+| 1995          | Moscow, Russia                      | HEU     |
+| 1999          | Ruse, Bulgaria                      | HEU     |
+| 2001          | Paris, France                       | HEU     |
+| 2003          | Ignalina, Lithuania                 | LEU     |
+| 2003          | Georgia/Armenia Border, Georgia     | HEU     |
+| 2003          | Rotterdam, Netherlands              | NU      |
+| 2006          | Tbilisi, Georgia                    | HEU     |
+| 2007          | Pribenik-Lacacseke Border, Slovakia | NU      |
+| 2010          | Tbilisi, Georgia                    | HEU     |
+
+Adapted from Kristo (2012).  LEU, low enriched uranium; HEU, highly enriched uranium; NU, natural uranium; Pu, plutonium               .
+
+or radiological materials thoroughly in order to understand their origin and site of production, age, point of diversion, transit route, and intended end use. While nuclear forensics has been increasingly utilized to develop evidence for the potential prosecution of individuals who illegally possess nuclear materials, there is also increasing recognition of the utility of nuclear forensics to provide an independent and objective measure of state declarations concerning nuclear capabilities, as well as application and intent. "Nonproliferation nuclear forensics" (NNF) supports international efforts to safeguard the nuclear fuel cycle by supplying information necessary to verify declarations, *e.g.*, compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as well as attribute illegally transferred materials.
+
+While robust nuclear forensic practices serve individual national security regimes within the recognizes that nuclear forensics can be an effective tool in the battle against global nuclear terrorism and encourages states to work with one another, as well as with the IAEA, to develop and enhance nuclear forensics capabilities and underscores the importance of international cooperation both in technology and human resource development to advance nuclear forensics (Communique 2012).
+
+Although the term "nuclear forensics" was originally applied to the analysis of interdicted nuclear materials in support of law enforcement, the same analytical and interpretative capabilities used to examine interdicted samples may also be employed to investigate suspected proliferation at undeclared sites or to verify that declared nuclear programs are fully sanctioned (Dreicer *et al.* 2009, Fedchenko 2007, 2008). The challenges posed by illicit trafficking and nuclear proliferation share the requirement to identify the characteristics of nuclear
+
+include the application of modern material analysis techniques, knowledge of commercial and military nuclear fuel cycles, and scientific principles to analyze unknown nuclear materials or devices and provide information of value to decision makers. This problem is complex enough before considering the wide range of potential materials that may be encountered and the many different types of information that potentially may be required. As in classical forensics, nuclear forensics relies on the fact that certain measurable parameters in a sample are characteristic for a given material. Using these characteristic parameters, also known as
+"signatures", nuclear forensic analysis seeks to draw conclusions on the origin and intended use of the intercepted material.
+The technical response to specific nuclear incidents requires a graded, iterative approach. "Categorization" addresses the threat posed by specific interdicted material by identifying the risk to first responders, law enforcement personnel, and the public. Following this step is an assessment to determine if there is any indication of criminal activity or threat to national security.
+
+"Characterization" provides a more thorough analysis of the material to determine the nature of the radioactive and associated, non-nuclear evidence. "Interpretation" seeks to draw validated technical conclusions from the analytical results, correlating the characteristics of the material with material production history. While interpretation is the end product for the nuclear forensic laboratory, the nuclear attribution process only begins at this stage. Complete nuclear forensic analysis, therefore, includes characterization of all materials, traditional forensic analysis, and interpretation. This approach, predicated on the model action plan developed by the Nuclear Forensics ITWG, is described in much greater detail in the IAEA publication, "Nuclear Forensics Support," Nuclear Security Series Number 2 (Smith *et al.* 2008, IAEA 2006).
+
+Nuclear forensic interpretation is a deductive process (*e.g.*, Fig. 13-1), much like the scientific method itself. Initially, a hypothesis, or set of hypotheses, is developed based upon the initial analytical results. In most cases, the initial results will be consistent with multiple hypotheses, which may, in turn, suggest additional signatures. The team then develops additional measurements to verify the presence or absence of the signatures. If analyses show that the signature is absent, this hypothesis must be rejected or adjusted to fit the new  results.  If,  instead,  the  analyses  confirm  the context of illicit trafficking, the goals of nonproliferation nuclear forensics are global in scope and provide an international verification capability. NNF encourages governments to secure vulnerable inventories of nuclear materials and deters nation states and organizations from producing or transferring nuclear materials for malfeasant purposes.
+
+Illicit trafficking of nuclear/radiological materials, investigations of interdicted samples, and nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards are inherently international problems; no single country can hope to address these critical 21st century issues, even on a local scale, without global engagement. In this vein, many states have begun to develop international partnerships in nuclear forensics. In particular, global participation in the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) has led to the adoption of nuclear forensic best practices multi-laterally in more than 30 states and international organizations (Niemeyer & Koch 2002). The growing recognition of the importance of international engagement to accomplish both nuclear nonproliferation and counter-terrorism objectives underscores the need for a clearly articulated approach to international engagement that identifies and prioritizes foreign partners with respect to access to the nuclear fuel cycle and joint scientific endeavors.
+
+The requirements of many national nuclear forensic programs exceed those of commercial and international verification regimes. Nuclear forensic investigations require the sharing of validated protocols not only on major and minor isotopes, chemical (trace element) compositions, and physical forms (grain size, sorting, admixtures) of the materials, but also concerning the processes used in facilities across the nuclear fuel cycle. Access to this broad suite of information is critical to evaluate the source and route of smuggled or proliferated materials. There is also a compelling need to ensure that states conducting nuclear forensic measurements - either independently or cooperatively - have access to sufficient data for rigorous, high confidence, interpretation. The need to share data may, by necessity, infringe on proprietary or national security information; these concerns must be addressed at the outset of any exchange and the potential to reveal specific capabilities or methods used by states as part of counter-terrorism and nonproliferation programs may restrict an unfettered exchange of information.
+
+Basic challenges facing nuclear forensics signature, then either the investigation has come to a unique  technical  interpretation   (*i.e.*,   the   desired result) or additional tests to exclude other remaining hypotheses must be developed. In the ideal case, only a single hypothesis or interpretation will eventually prove consistent with all results, although this is seldom true in practice.
+
+Signatures
+
+
+The term "signatures" is used to describe material characteristics that may be used to link samples to people, places, and processes, much as a written signature can be used to link a document to a particular individual. "Signatures" describe any characteristic or group of characteristics that can be used to help distinguish materials from one another or identify the processes history of a material. Signatures are essentially combinations of variables used to make comparisons. Some signatures, such as those associated with U or Pu isotopic analyses, may provide only general clues that serve to place the material in a broad category, *e.g.*, Depleted Uranium (DU) or Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), or, perhaps, narrow the field of potential countries of origin. Other signatures, such as characteristic dimensions or markings, are generally applicable to only a restricted class of materials, *e.g.*, reactor fuel elements or sealed sources, but may provide valuable clues identifying a specific facility or date of manufacture. In some cases, data generated in a nuclear forensic investigation may provide useful information only when combined with other, complementary results. Signatures for nuclear materials are intimately connected to the nuclear fuel cycle since each step in the fuel cycle (Fig. 13-2) both creates new signatures and erases or modifies some existing signatures. An on-going challenge for nuclear forensics is to validate signatures for each step in the fuel cycle and understand the processes that control a signature's persistence.
+
+Almost without exception, a single signature is insufficient to answer all of the relevant questions. Independent signatures that reach the same conclusion increase confidence in the technical interpretation, while results that provide different or conflicting conclusions decrease the level of confidence. Nuclear forensic investigations are most successful when independent signatures representing a variety of material characteristics can be linked and point toward a unique conclusion. Figure 13-3 illustrates this process schematically by depicting the universe of potential nuclear material sources and processes. Each individual signature defines a subset of known materials from which an intercepted sample may have originated. In the ideal case, the use of multiple signatures leads to a unique point of intersection of multiple subsets corresponding to a unique identification of the source and/or process.
+Signatures generally fall into two broad categories: comparative signatures and predictive signatures. Comparative signatures involve the comparison of the measured properties (*e.g.*, grain size, color, chemical and isotopic composition) of an unknown sample (or "questioned sample" in law enforcement parlance) to a similar set of properties for one or more reference samples. The critical question to be addressed is whether or not the characteristics of an unknown sample are the same as, or at least are similar to, those of one or more of the reference samples. The use of comparative signatures to identify an interdicted sample may involve either a point-to-point comparison or a point-to-population comparison. Point-to-point comparisons are relatively rare and rely on the intercomparison of two or more closely matched samples, *e.g.*, HEU samples interdicted in Bulgaria in 1999 and in Paris in 2001 (Adamson *et al.* 2001, Baude 2008, Baude *et al*. 2008). Point-to-population comparisons look for similarities between the characteristics of an unknown sample and those of a population of potentially similar materials and are more broadly applicable. Point-to-population comparisons usually require access to databases containing information on hundreds or thousands of samples, or to nuclear forensic sample archives, which may contain tens or hundreds of physical samples. The value of the comparative approach then depends strongly on the relevance and coverage of the database and/or sample archive (see, e.g., Dolgov *et al.* 1999, Robel *et al.* 2009).
+
+
+Predictive signatures, in contrast, come into play when representative data for a suite of appropriate reference materials are unavailable. Predictive signatures typically derive from underlying scientific principles, such as isotopic and chemical fractionation in the case of U ore and ore concentrate, neutron capture activation and fission in the case of nuclear reactor modeling, or radioactive decay in the case of age dating. Predictive signatures seek to calculate material characteristics useful for attribution based on a detailed understanding of the physical or chemical mechanisms responsible for producing the signatures. The advantage of the predictive approach is that the processes (and possibly locations) of unanalyzed nuclear materials can be inferred from their measured characteristics, something of critical importance for types of materials that are not readily available, *e.g.*, materials from historical processes or tightly held materials from foreign countries. The disadvantage of the predictive approach is that significant effort must be expended to develop and validate the capability and to understand accurately the processes affecting signatures.
+
+New predictive signatures can also be developed through advances in the understanding of the processes affecting chemical and isotope distributions at the molecular, atomic and nuclear scale. The 234U/238U ratio, for example, exhibits bulk constituents of a sample to assess the threat posed by the material and confirm whether the interdicted material is contraband; categorization forms the basis for continued investigation. Categorization should occur on-site, at the point of interdiction and utilize non-destructive analytical techniques such as field-portable gamma-ray spectrometry, and hand-held X-ray fluorescence. These nondestructive analyses can quickly distinguish between naturally occurring radioactive material, special nuclear material, radioactively contaminated material, or a commercial radioactive source.
+
+The goal of **characterization** is to determine the nature of the radioactive evidence. Characterization provides full elemental analysis of the interdicted material, including major, minor and trace constituents. For major constituents of the radioactive material, characterization should also include determination of isotopic and phase (*i.e.*, molecular)
+properties.
+
+Characterization also includes measurement of physical properties, including accurate measurement of critical dimensions of solid samples, determination of particle size and morphology for powder samples, and high magnification imaging of the material by optical and scanning electron microscopy.
+The goal of **full nuclear forensic analysis** is to
+(i) analyze all radioactive and traditional forensic evidence, (ii) gather information to address questions of material origin, method of production, loss of legitimate control, transit route from point of diversion to interdiction, and (iii) assess the likelihood that additional material is available. Full nuclear forensic analysis also includes detailed interpretation and often includes comparison of measured signatures against information contained in nuclear forensics databases or sample archives or against predictive signatures generated by, *e.g.*, reactor modeling, to assist in the identification of the method of manufacture and most plausible source of the material.
+Nuclear forensics employs a wide array of analytical tools to detect signatures in radioactive material. The international nuclear forensics community has achieved a general consensus on the proper sequencing of analytical techniques to provide the most valuable information as early as possible during an investigation. This consensus was achieved through discussions at meetings of the ITWG, as well as the experiences of nuclear forensic laboratories in round-robin analyses. The ITWG and IAEA both recommend that the substantial variability in water, soil and sediment and U ore samples of different geographical origin
+(Gascoyne 1992). 234U is preferentially leached compared with 238U from solids due to radiation damage of the crystal lattice from alpha decay of
+238U, oxidation of insoluble tetravalent 234U to soluble hexavalent 234U, and alpha recoil of 234Th
+(and its daughter 234U) into fluid phases. Ores leached by groundwater over long periods of time exhibit significant depletions in 234U, whereas ores formed through deposition of those water leachates exhibit complementary enrichment in 234U; the full range in 234U concentration is nearly 20%. Modern mass spectrometry provides results of sufficient precision and accuracy to allow small variations in the 238U/235U ratio, once thought to be invariant in nature, to be measured.
+
+The depositional environment of an ore body appears to strongly influence the 238U/235U ratio with low temperature ores having systematically higher ratios than deposits formed at higher temperatures (Brennecka et al. 2010). In addition, naturally occurring variations in 236U content can also be exploited as a nuclear forensic signature. Generally considered to be an anthropogenic isotope, 236U is produced at very low levels in U ore bodies through neutron capture on 235U; the abundance of 236U is strongly influenced by the age of the ore body and the volume of water in contact with ore (Tumey *et al.*
+2009, Wilcken *et al.* 2008). All these features of the isotopic distribution of natural U are potentially useful (predictive) signatures for attribution of U ore and ore concentrate.
+
+Nuclear Forensic Analysis.
+
+Nuclear forensic analysis does not lend itself to a simple "cook-book" approach, universally applicable to all types of nuclear and radiological material. Instead, nuclear forensics involves an iterative approach, in which the results from one analysis are used to guide subsequent analyses. The international nuclear forensics community has defined 3 levels of analysis - categorization, characterization, and full nuclear forensic analysis - each of which serves a specific purpose in an investigation. In all cases, though, sampling and analysis must be performed with due regard for preservation of evidence and chain-of-custody requirements. Many of the analytical tools used in these analyses are destructive and consume some amount of sample during analysis. Proper selection and sequencing of analyses is, therefore, critical.
+
+The goal of **categorization** is to identify the nuclides of potential interest such as 14C and 3H)
+undergo -decay without accompanying photon emission.
+
+Gamma spectroscopy has a dual role in nuclear forensics. It is the first technique that is used when interdicted nuclear material is investigated. Since gamma rays are only slightly attenuated by packaging material (unless shielding like lead is used), initial measurements in the field (*e.g.*, at border-crossing stations) carried out with simple, portable gamma spectrometers provide rapid and accurate categorization of the material. For example, it is possible to distinguish between naturally occurring radioactive material, radioactive source, medical isotopes or anthropogenic nuclear material. In laboratories, more sophisticated high-resolution gamma spectrometers (HRGS) are used. Their energy resolution is much better compared to the portable instruments, allowing gamma rays with energies very close to each other to be resolved. HRGS provides an initial determination of the isotopic composition of U and/or Pu, as well as detection and quantification of trace fission and activation products. It should, however, be noted that some nuclides like 242Pu or 236U cannot be detected by gamma spectroscopy. In these cases, mass spectrometry offers a useful alternative.
+
+Alpha spectroscopy is used to quantify the abundance of -emitting radionuclides, particularly those with relatively short half-lives. Alpha particles are stopped for example by a paper sheet, because collection of time-sensitive or environmentally sensitive samples should occur within the first 24 hours after interdiction. Non-destructive analysis should be conducted before destructive analyses whenever possible. Table 13-2 shows the generally accepted sequence of analysis, broken down into techniques that should be performed within 24 hours, 1 week, or 2 months after interdiction. Table 13-3 provides an overview of many analytical techniques commonly used in nuclear forensic investigations; additional information may be found in (Moody *et al.* 2005).
+
+
+Radiometric Techniques measure the radiation emitted by radioactive nuclides during decay to a daughter nuclide. There are three types of radiation commonly encountered in nuclear forensics - alpha, beta and gamma radiation, each with its own properties and methods of detection. Most heavy nuclides (*e.g.*, U and Pu) decay by emitting an alpha particle. Gamma radiation is also often emitted after the alpha decay to bring the daughter nuclide from an excited state to the ground state. Each nuclide emits characteristic gamma rays with energies specific to an individual radioisotope. While useful for characterizing the performance of chemical separations in the laboratory,
+
+spectrometry is rarely employed as a quantitative technique. Most -emitting radionuclides also emit  rays characteristic of the decaying nuclides; however, a few radionuclides (including long-lived fission products such as 99Tc and 147Pm and other
+
+## Table 13-2.  Time Line Of Analyses In Nuclear Forensic Analyses
+
+| Techniques/Methods      | 24 hour                  | One week    |
+|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
+|                         |                          |             |
+| Radiological            | Estimated total activity |             |
+| Dose rate (, , , n)  |                          |             |
+| Surface contamination   |                          |             |
+|                         |                          |             |
+| Physical                |                          |             |
+| characterization        |                          |             |
+| Visual inspection       |                          |             |
+| Raadiography            |                          |             |
+| Photography             |                          |             |
+| Weight                  |                          |             |
+| Dimensions              |                          |             |
+| Optical microscopy      |                          |             |
+| Density                 |                          |             |
+| Traditional forensic    |                          |             |
+| analysis                |                          |             |
+| Fingerprints, fibers    |                          |             |
+| Radiochemical           |                          |             |
+| separations             |                          |             |
+| Isotope analysis        | -spectroscopy           |             |
+| -spectroscopy          |                          |             |
+| Mass spectrometry       |                          |             |
+| (SIMS, TIMS, ICP       |                          |             |
+| MS)                     |                          |             |
+| GC/MS                   |                          |             |
+| Elemental/chemical      |                          | ICPMS      |
+| XRF                     |                          |             |
+| Assay (titration, IDMS) |                          |             |
+Measurement goal
+Technique
+Type of
+information
+Typical detection
+        limit
+Spatial resolution
+Survey
+HRGS
+Isotopic
+ng - g
+
+Chemical Assay
+Elemental
+mg
+
+Elemental and Isotopic Bulk Analysis
+Radiochemistry/Radiometric Methods
+Isotopic, Elemental
+fg - pg
+
+TIMS
+Isotopic,
+Elemental
+pg - ng
+
+ICPMS
+Isotopic
+Elemental
+pg - ng
+
+XRF
+Elemental
+10 g/g
+
+XRD
+Molecular
+~1 at.%
+
+
+GC/MS
+Molecular
+ g/g
+
+Imaging
+Visual Inspection
+Macroscopic
+
+0.1 mm
+
+Optical Microscopy
+Microscopic
+Structure
+
+1 m
+
+SEM
+
+
+1 nm
+
+TEM
+
+
+0.1 nm
+Microanalysis
+SIMS
+Elemental
+Isotopic
+0.1 ng/g -
+10 g/g
+0.1 - 1 m
+
+SEM/EDS or WDS
+Elemental
+0.1 - 1 wt.%
+1 m
+
+FTIR
+Molecular
+0.1 - 1 wt.%
+10 m
+
+Raman
+Molecular
+~1 wt.%
+1 m
+mg =milligram = 103 gram
+g = microgram = 106 gram ng = nanogram = 109 gram
+pg = picogram = 1012 gram
+fg =femtogram = 1015 gram
+at.% = atom percent wt.% = weight percent ppm = parts per million by weight ppb = parts per billion by weight
+m = micrometre = 106 metre
+HRGS = High-Resolution Gamma Spectrometry TIMS = Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry ICPMS = Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry XRF = X-ray Fluorescence Analysis XRD = X-ray Diffraction Analysis GC/MS = Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry
+
+SEM = Scanning Electron Microscopy TEM = Transmission Electron Microscopy SIMS = Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry EDS = Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy WDS = Wavelength Dispersive Spectroscopy FTIR = Fourier Transform InfraRed Spectroscopy
+
+of their strong interaction with matter.
+
+Consequently, an alpha measurement through packaging material or shielding is impossible. Unlike -spectroscopy, -spectrometry is a destructive technique requiring rather laborious sample preparation. Source preparation is crucial for achieving good energy resolution in -spectroscopy and target elements are usually separated and purified before being deposited onto a flat surface. Quantification is achieved by spiking the samples with known amounts of an isotopic spike or tracer. Alpha spectrometry is especially suited for quantifying 232U and 238Pu due to their short halflives and, in the case of 238Pu, the potential interference from 238U in mass spectrometry. Alpha spectrometry is also used to quantify 241Am
+(daughter of 241Pu), whose concentration can then be used to calculate the date of the last Pu purification performed on a sample and 230Th (daughter of 234U), to determine a last purification date for U materials.
+
+
+Mass spectrometry Mass spectrometric techniques make use of small mass differences between nuclides. In mass spectrometry the atoms contained in a sample are converted to ions and then separated according to their respective mass to charge ratios and the intensities of the mass-separated ion beams measured. Mass spectrometry is used to determine both the elemental and isotopic compositions of nuclear materials, providing extremely high precision and accuracy, as well as the capability to analyze both radioactive and stable isotopes. Mass spectrometry can quantify elemental concentrations either by using an isotopic spike (isotopic dilution powerful and widely applied method for quantifying trace element abundances. The minimum detection limit for MCICPMS is typically <1 pg/g and can attain the fg/g range for favorable elements.
+Laser ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LAICPMS) uses a high energy light source and laser ablation cell and to supplant the spray chamber/nebulizer of a standard ICPMS instrument. Material is ablated from a sample using a pulsed laser (often a Nd-YAG tuned to 266 or 213 nm) and transported in an inert gas stream (typically He or Ar) to the plasma torch for ionization and subsequent mass analysis as per solution ICPMS. LAICPMS analyses require minimal sample preparation. While laser spot sizes can be reduced to several micrometres, sensitivity is degraded, and spatial resolution is typically ~10100 m. Matrix matched standards are preferred (but not always required) for accurate trace element and isotope analyses in LAICPMS. Depending on the quality of standards, LAICPMS accuracy for trace element abundances is typically 110% with limits of detection in the ng/g range. The combination of laser ablation and MCICPMS is capable of producing data with much higher precision and accuracy (*e.g.*, Arevalo *et al.* 2010).
+
+Secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) is a microanalytical technique applicable to samples ranging in size from centimetres to submicrometre particles and providing both elemental and isotopic information. SIMS uses a finely focused primary ion beam, *e.g.*, O2
++, O, Cs+, or Ga+, to sputter the sample surface, producing secondary ions that are then analyzed by a mass spectrometer. SIMS is capable of acquiring microscopic images of isotopic and elemental distributions with spatial resolution exceeding 50 nm and can be used to measure the concentration of any element, from H to Pu, with a dynamic range of more than nine orders of magnitude in concentration. SIMS is applied in nuclear forensics when only small amounts of sample are available or when the sample is inhomogeneous and spatially resolved analyses are required. The sputtering process is highly matrixdependent and accurate quantitation requires matrixmatched standards. The accuracy is typically 0.1 0.5% for isotope ratio measurements and 210% for trace element measurements. SIMS is the technique of choice to determine isotope ratios and trace element abundances in particulate samples. Using a sharply focused primary ion beam, SIMS can analyze particles in the m-size range, weighing <1 pg, with a precision and accuracy of better than mass spectrometry) or through calibration against standards. Nuclear forensic analysis utilizes a variety of different types of mass spectrometers, differing primarily in the way ions are generated and whether samples are introduced as liquids, gases or solids. One important exception is accelerator mass spectrometry, which accelerates ions to MeV energies rather that the keV energies used in most mass spectrometers.
+
+In Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry
+(TIMS), samples consisting of small (~fgg)
+quantities of chemically separated and purified analytes dissolved in a small volume (typically 110 ml) are deposited on a refractory metal filament
+(*e.g.*, high purity W or Re) and evaporated to dryness. The filament is then heated to temperatures of 1,0002,500C in the ion source by resistive heating or electron bombardment. If the ionization potential of the analyte is low compared to the work function of the filament, a fraction (typically <1%) of the analyte atoms will be ionized and emitted from the filament surface. Multi-collector TIMS instruments, employing multiple detectors able to measure over a dozen isotopes simultaneously, are capable of measuring differences in isotope abundance ratios as small as a few parts in 106.
+
+TIMS is the preferred technique for measuring Sr, Nd, U and Pb isotopes with the highest possible precision and accuracy. A disadvantage of TIMS is the laborious sample preparation. As in the case of -spectrometry, samples need to be dissolved and chemically purified to avoid mass interferences and achieve high sensitivity, accuracy and precision.
+In many laboratories TIMS has been supplemented by multi-collection inductively coupled plasma source mass spectrometers (MC ICPMS). For solution mode MCICPMS, a chemically separated and purified sample containing the element of interest is dissolved in an acid solution, which is converted into an aerosol spray using a nebulizer and subsequently aspirated into an Ar-based plasma. The analyte dissociates into atomic constituents and ionizes in the high temperature plasma (5,0008,000 K) with very high efficiency (>90% for elements with a first ionization potential of <8 eV). The salient features of ICPMS are multi-element capability, high sample throughput, good sensitivity and large dynamic range. Multi-collector instruments provide isotope measurements with high precision and accuracy for a variety of elements across the periodic table including Mg, Fe, Mo, Hf, Pb, U and Pu. In addition to measuring isotopic compositions, ICPMS is a instrument used to examine a sample in detail, and allows the forensic scientist to answer the simple, yet vital, question, "what does the sample look like?" before proceeding with more extensive, and often destructive, analyses. Optical microscopy reveals details of color, surface morphology and texture, shape and size, tool marks, wear patterns, surficial coatings, corrosion, and mineralogy (Grant et al. 1998, Moody *et al.* 2005). The stereomicroscope produces three-dimensional images at relatively low magnification (~280 ) and is very useful for dissecting or aliquoting samples for additional analyses. The polarizing microscope passes light through a set of polarizing filters to gain additional information about the sample from optical properties such as crystallinity, anisotropy, pleochroism and birefringence;
+polarizing microscopes can readily magnify an image to 1000 . The limit of resolution is set by the wavelength of light used to illuminate the sample; the theoretical resolution limit of conventional microscopes is 200 nm, but values closer to 1 m are more commonly achieved.
+In Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM), a finely focused electron beam is rastered over a sample and the interaction of the incident electron beam with the sample produces a variety of signals: back-scattered electrons, secondary electrons, Auger electrons, X-rays, and photons. By measuring the intensity of one or more of these types of particles as a function of raster position, an image of the sample is constructed. Each type of emitted particle conveys different information about the sample, and, by choosing the appropriate detection mode, either topographic or compositional contrast is revealed in the image. Secondary electrons arise from inelastic collisions between incident electrons and atomic electrons within the outer few nm of the surface and carry information about sample topology (*e.g.*, Fig, 13-4). Back-scattered electrons, in contrast, have energies comparable to the incident electron beam, carry information about the mean atomic number and can be used to construct maps of the distribution of phases with disparate chemical composition. With thermionic, W filament sources, image resolution is limited to ~10 nm, with a corresponding maximum magnification of 100,000. With field-emission electron sources, the resolution exceeds 1 nm with a corresponding maximum magnification of 1,000,000.
+Transmission electron microscopy (TEM) lies at the opposite end of the spectrum from optical microscopy - difficult to use and requiring elaborate
+0.5%. In many nuclear forensic applications, a few U- or Pu-bearing particles may be immersed in a sea of environmental detritus containing little forensic information. SIMS can be used in particle-search mode to locate and analyze these rare, but highly valued, particles. As with laser ablation ICPMS, the adoption of large geometry, multi-collector mass spectrometers has significantly improved SIMS capabilities, particularly for determination of lowabundance isotopes like 236U (*e.g.*, Ranebo *et al.*
+2009).
+
+Gas chromatographymass spectrometry (GC
+MS) is a technique for detecting and measuring trace organic constituents in a bulk sample. In GC
+MS, the components of a mixture are separated in a gas chromatograph and identified in a mass spectrometer. The primary component of a GC is a narrow-bore tube maintained inside an oven. In the simplest arrangement, the analyte mixture is flashvaporized in a heated injection port. The various components are swept through the column by a carrier gas for separation based upon relative absorption affinities. In an ideal case, components elute from the column separated in time and can be introduced into the mass spectrometer as a time series. The mass spectrometer detects and quantifies the concentration of each component as it elutes from the column. GCMS analyses provide very high specificity, allowing extremely complex mixtures to be accurately separated and individual species to be identified accurately. Limits of detection for scanning GCMS are on the order of ng of material, corresponding to sensitivities of ~1
+part in 1013 for simple samples and 1 part in 1011 for complex mixtures.
+
+
+
+Imaging Techniques The role of microscopy is to provide a magnified image of a sample, allowing the observation of features beyond the resolution of the unaided human eye (roughly 50100 m). The ability to identify and characterize diverse suites of samples rapidly and without compromising the integrity of the sample is an essential starting point of most forensic investigations. A variety of microscopy techniques are applied in nuclear forensic science, using photons, electrons, and X-rays to probe the physical, chemical, and structural make-up of samples at spatial scales ranging from nanometres to centimetres.
+Optical microscopy dates back more than 300
+years and remains one of the most basic and fundamental characterization techniques in nuclear forensics. The optical microscope is often the first sample preparation. Its unique capabilities for ultrahigh spatial resolution and for revealing microstructural information, however, make the TEM an important tool in many nuclear forensic investigations. In TEM, a high-energy electron beam is transmitted through a very thin sample (<300 nm thickness). In imaging mode TEM produces a magnified image of the sample providing information on thickness, crystallinity, crystal orientation, defects and deformations. Understanding how contrast is generated is key to distinguishing among these competing effects and presents a significant challenge in image interpretation. The diffraction mode provides an electron diffraction pattern, analogous to an X-ray diffraction pattern. Electron diffraction patterns can be indexed by the same procedures used in X-ray diffraction and used to identify phases on an extremely fine spatial scale. Just as in SEM, characteristic X-rays are generated by the interaction of the electron beam with the sample. X- ray analysis can be combined with TEM imaging and diffraction to provide comprehensive information on a specimen's internal microstructure, with nm spatial resolution. TEM is capable of an extremely wide range of magnification (from ~ 50  to several million ) and is able to image extremely fine structural detail, but at the expense of severe restrictions on sample thickness.
+The characteristic X-rays generated by interactions between energetic electrons and the sample in SEM or TEM carry information on chemical composition and provide an important method to determine elemental concentrations for most solid samples, including micrometre-size particles. Characteristic X-rays can be analyzed by one of two methods. An energy-dispersive X-ray spectrometer
+(EDS)
+uses the photoelectric absorption of X-rays in a semiconductor detector, usually Si(Li), to measure the energy and intensity of incident X-rays simultaneously. EDS systems provide an easy-to-use method of measuring X-ray spectra over a broad energy range and can detect elements from B to U. Detection limits are typically ~0.1% for silicate and oxide materials. A wavelength-dispersive spectrometer (WDS) operates on the principle of Bragg diffraction; X-rays are dispersed according to wavelength, rather than energy. WDS provides much higher energy resolution and sensitivity (~10 ) compared to EDS and can detect elements from Be to Pu, with detection limits of 0.01%. X-ray microanalysis is particularly valuable in nuclear forensic investigations for the speed with which X-ray intensities can be accurately quantified to yield elemental concentrations in interdicted samples. Other techniques. X-ray diffraction (XRD) is the standard method for identifying the chemical structure of crystalline materials. A collimated beam of X-rays impinging on regularly ordered lattices undergoes constructive and destructive interference depending on the spacing of the lattice, the wavelength of the X-rays, and the angle of incidence of the X-ray beam. By rotating a sample relative to a fixed X-ray source, variations in interference lead to characteristic diffraction patterns. These diffraction patterns can be compared to reference spectra to identify specific crystalline phase. XRD is not applicable to amorphous (noncrystalline) materials.
+
+X-ray fluorescence (XRF) provides nondestructive quantification of chemical concentrations in both solid samples and solutions for elements from Mg to Pu. A beam of high energy X-rays excites characteristic secondary X-rays whose intensities are quantified using a wavelengthor energy-sensitive detector. The detection limits for XRF are generally in the range of tens of g/g, although actinide matrices generate many X-rays that interfere with the lower energy X-rays of lighter elements, potentially decreasing signal-to-noise ratios and increasing detection limits. Wavelength dispersive analysis (WDS) provides higher energy resolution than energy dispersive analysis (EDS), and is capable of resolving some of these interferences. XRF is often used as a screening tool in nuclear forensic analyses to guide additional analyses using mass spectrometry.
+Infrared Spectroscopy (IR) is useful for the identification of organic compounds. Through the use of an infrared microscope, IR can be performed on samples as small as 10 m and is an important microanalytical technique in nuclear forensics. Molecular bonds vibrate at characteristic frequencies and if a particular molecular vibration results in a change in a bond's dipole moment, the molecule will absorb infrared radiation corresponding to that characteristic frequency. In IR, a sample is irradiated with a broad band of infrared frequencies and the intensity of the reflected or transmitted radiation is measured as a function of frequency. Absorption at specific frequencies is characteristic of specific bonds and the IR spectrum identifies the various bonds and functional groups within the molecule. Extensive libraries of IR spectra help identify unknown compounds but unambiguous identification usually requires an additional analytical technique, such as mass spectrometry or NMR.
+
+
+Chronology. Radionuclides linked to one another by radioactive decay have relative concentrations that can be calculated by the simple laws of radioactive in-growth or, in more complicated cases, by the Bateman equations. The measurement of the relative concentrations of parent and daughter isotopes provides a direct measure of the time since the daughter radionuclides were last removed from the respective parent isotopes. In nuclear forensic investigations, the interval between the time a sample was purified and the time it was subsequently analyzed is defined as the "age" of the material (Moody *et al.* 2005, Mayer *et al.* 2005).
+
+The presence of both U and Pu provides the opportunity to measure the age of a sample through as many as a dozen different chronometers. If the ages given by different chronometers "agree" with each other (concordant ages), then we have high confidence the assumptions for accurate age-dating are satisfied and the model ages reflect the time since purification. If the chronometers do not agree with each other (discordant ages), caution must be exercised in the way model ages are interpreted, as they may fail to indicate accurately the time since purification. Table 13-4 lists the quantities of heavyelement daughter nuclides present in a 1 gram sample of weapons grade Pu after an in-growth period of one year. If the sample was completely purified during the last chemical separation, all of the chronometers should yield the same age.
+
+However, while the 232U236Pu, 234U238Pu, 235U
+239Pu and 236U240Pu chronometers all yield the same age in most U.S. weapons grade Pu metal samples, 241Am241Pu often gives a significantly larger value. This discordance indicates that when U was last removed from the Pu, some Am was left behind. As a result, there will be more 241Am in the sample than can be explained by in-growth, resulting in an apparent age that is too large. An example of the application of several radiochronometers to HEU and the ability to tightly constrain the sample age is contained in the discussion of the Bulgarian seizure below.
+
+
+Case Studies The ultimate test for protocols developed in the laboratory in a controlled environment is posed by their application to real world samples, obtained under uncontrolled conditions and whose properties often contain unexpected features. Case studies are normally conducted in cooperation with government or law enforcement agencies with responsibility for sample collection. The agency responsible for collecting the sample works with the nuclear forensic scientists to develop a Statement of Work (SOW) specifying the material properties to be measured. In most cases the SOW follows the nuclear forensics Model Action Plan described in IAEA *Nuclear Security Series #2* (IAEA 2006). The SOW also lays out the time lines for analysis and reporting of final results.
+
+Nuclide
+Half-life
+(Myr)
+Mass
+(ng)
+Activity
+(dpm)
+230Th
+0.075
+1.3 x 10-3
+0.06
+231Pa
+0.033
+1.3 x 10-5
+0.0013
+233U
+0.16
+5.6x 10-5
+0.0012
+234U
+0.25
+915
+12700
+235U
+704
+26300
+126
+236U
+23.4
+6250
+897
+238U
+4470
+0.42
+3.2 x 10-4
+237Np
+2.14
+355
+555
+241Am
+4.32 x 10-4
+427000
+3.3e9
+
+Counterweight - A Nuclear Smuggling Hoax. A
+dense, dark gray ~9 kg metal sample was involved in a sale of illicit nuclear materials in Hong Kong in 1988. The sample was originally offered for sale as "nuclear weapon-useable material" by a Southeast Asian military official and then subsequently rediscovered in a U.S. consulate nearly 10 years later. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was contacted with a request for forensic characterization (a photograph of the sample may be found in Grant *et al.* 1998).
+HRGS analysis revealed that the main radioactive component of the specimen was U, considerably depleted in 235U. Bulk analysis of the sample yielded a density of (17  0.3) g/cm3, somewhat less than the theoretical density of U metal. The reduced density of the part suggested that voids could be present or that it was composed of two or more inhomogeneous phases.
+After consultation with the collecting agency, the sample was characterized using radiochemical analysis, electron microprobe, SIMS, ICPMS and XRF. The results showed that the material was depleted U containing ~0.3 wt.% 235U and was a metal alloy of 90% U with 10% Mo. The sample was coated with electroplated Ni ranging in thickness between 85 to 150 m. The crenulated outer margin implied that the piece had been cast and then not machined prior to Ni plating. Radiochronometry based on 234U230Th determined the date of last chemical purification as 1961 ( 3 years).
+
+Once the nuclear forensic information was collected, LLNL carried out a complementary investigation using conventional forensics and determined the part had been made by the National Lead Company of Albany, NY and then transferred to Nuclear Metals, Inc. The interdicted specimen was most plausibly a piece of an aircraft counterweight assembly, most plausibly from a U.S. military aircraft.
+
+In the nuclear smuggling world, this sample was one of the earliest contraband items in what ultimately became known as the "Southeast Asian Uranium" scam. This hoax was a pervasive swindle, first reported in 1991, and especially prevalent in Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Transactions of irregularly shaped metal parts, alleged to be 235U, with asking prices of ~$10,000 per item, are not uncommon. Similar material has also been used for barter as substitute currency in drug-trafficking operations.
+
+
+High Enriched Uranium Interdicted in Bulgaria.
+
+Just after midnight on 29 May 1999, a Turkish citizen, Urskan Hanifi, was stopped at a border crossing in Ruse, Bulgaria, on his way into Romania. Although claiming to be returning from an extended trip to Turkey, the Bulgarian border guard became suspicious because the car's interior was very tidy and appeared to contain no luggage. A search of the car turned up a certificate for the purchase of "99.99% uranium 235" written in Cyrillic and a lead container labeled "uranium 235" concealed inside an air compressor in the trunk of the car. Inside the container was a glass ampoule filled with several grams of fine black powder that Bulgarian scientists confirmed to be highly enriched uranium (Fig. 13-5). Hanifi then tried to bribe the customs officials, who, to their credit, refused his money and instead arrested him. According to press reports, Mr. Hanifi, told police he had purchased the uranium in Moldova and had been trying to sell it in Turkey; having failed, he was attempting to return to Moldova.
+
+
+frequency analysis of grains showed a wide distribution of sizes, spanning the interval from 30 to 550 nm, with a mean diameter of only ~160 nm. The abundance of very small grains with diameters of <300 nm, provided an important clue to the manufacturing process used to make the HEU, as such small sizes are difficult to generate by mechanical grinding and milling.
+
+The concentrations of 72 elements, ranging from Li to Th, were measured using a variety of analytical techniques. Individual elements vary widely in concentration, from <2 ng/g to ~200 g/g.
+
+The total impurity inventory, 500 to 800 g/g, is high compared to other HEU samples, with 4
+elements (Cl, S, Fe, and Br) accounting for ~60% of the total inventory. The enrichment of the volatile, electronegative elements, S, Cl, and Br, is most readily interpreted as a signature of chemical reprocessing. Overall, the trace element abundances are much higher than expected for laboratory scale reprocessing and suggest the HEU is an aliquot of batch reprocessing.
+The concentrations of 35 radionuclides, spanning 15 orders of magnitude in concentration, were determined by - and -spectrometry following radiochemical separation. The major constituents are the six U isotopes - 238U, 236U, 235U, 234U, 233U, and 232U - plus 230Th (produced by decay of 234U);
+241Am, five Pu isotopes - 242Pu, 241Pu, 240Pu, 239Pu, and 238Pu - 237Np and the fission products - 125Sn,
+134Cs, and 137Cs - were also detected. The presence of the three fission products provides incontrovertible evidence the sample is reprocessed U, irradiated in a nuclear reactor.
+Roughly one year after the U-filled vial was seized in Bulgaria, the U.S. Dept. of State arranged for it to be sent to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory with the hope that detailed analyses could offer clues to the material's origin. Over the next 9 or so months, a team of nuclear forensic scientists from LLNL and several other Dept. of Energy laboratories performed an exhaustive study of the HEU and the associated packaging materials, revealing a wealth of information that ultimately led investigators to the source of the HEU (Adamson et al. 2001).
+
+Following an initial evaluation by HRGS, revealing that the HEU contained ~72% 235U, 1%
+234U and no significant Pu, the sample and packaging materials were characterized using optical microscopy, SEM and TEM, both with energy dispersive X-ray analysis, XRD, radiochemistry followed by - and -spectrometry and mass spectrometry, optical emission spectrometry, ion-, gas- and gel- permeation chromatography, GCMS, IR spectrometry, X-ray photo-electron spectroscopy, and XRF.
+
+The HEU is a very fine-grained powder composed predominantly of U3O8. The powder formed loosely compacted clumps ranging to 100 m in size. Individual particles are irregularly shaped and distinctive morphologies are absent at the resolution provided by the SEM. TEM performed on an aliquot of the sample revealed two distinctive classes of particles. Equant to slightly ovoid grains dominate the population, comprising ~90% of the total, with rod-shaped and plate-shaped grains making up the remainder (Fig. 13-6). A size
+The isotopic composition of U was determined by three different techniques - SIMS, TIMS, and MCICPMS - and the Pu isotopic composition was determined by TIMS. SIMS provided a rapid (within 24 hours of sample aliquoting), reasonably accurate, initial analysis of the major U isotopes. TIMS and MCICPMS provided data on all six U
+isotopes, including the low abundance isotopes 232U
+and 233U, with much higher accuracy than SIMS or HRGS. The analyses by all of the instrumental methods yielded a consistent U isotopic composition for the HEU powder, notable especially for the extremely high 236U content. These data are summarized in Table 13-5. The U isotope abundances identify the material as HEU containing ~73% 235U, i.e., weapon-usable material. The U isotope abundances suggest an initial enrichment of ~90% and the high concentration of 236U indicates a prolonged irradiation history. The isotopic composition of Pu is consistent with weapon-useable material but the concentration (~2 ng/g) is much too low for the HEU to be a significant source of weaponizable Pu.
+
+The age of the sample was determined using nine radio-chronometers, based on the decay of U and Pu. The mean age of the HEU was 6.5 y, relative to the date the radiochemical separation was carried out at LLNL, 17 April 2000, indicating the HEU was reprocessed on 30 October 1993 with an uncertainty of <1 month. The agreement in age for the nine radio-chronometers indicates that the trace level of Pu in the sample was introduced during reprocessing and is not a recently added contaminant. The ability to determine sample age with high accuracy is significant from a Safeguards perspective. In principle, if the HEU had been diverted from a facility subject to International Atomic Energy Agency oversight, and if reprocessing records were complete, the identity of the sample could be determined on the basis of the accurate age determination alone.
+
+| Isotope    | Abundance (atom %)   |
+|------------|----------------------|
+| 1          |                      |
+|            |                      |
+| 232        |                      |
+| U          | (1.06  0.06) x 10   |
+| -6         |                      |
+|            |                      |
+| 233        |                      |
+| U          | (3.0  0.18) x 10    |
+| -5         |                      |
+|            |                      |
+| 234        |                      |
+| U          | 1.175  0.003        |
+| 235        |                      |
+| U          | 72.657  0.012       |
+| 236        |                      |
+| U          | 12.133  0.004       |
+| 238        |                      |
+| U          | 14.045  0.011       |
+
+Collateral Evidence. The Pb container was examined via optical and scanning electron microscopy. Marks on the outer surface provided clear evidence of coarse filing by hand for shaping and smoothing; marks indicative of the use of machine tools are absent. The overall appearance of the container, especially the irregular form, suggests the container was cast in a crude sand mold and shaped by hand. This supposition was later confirmed by metallurgical examination.
+
+A small fragment was cut from the container, polished, and etched to reveal the microstructure. The structure, consisting of Pb dendrites surrounded by a two-phase eutectic region, is characteristic of common, cast Pb metal. SEM/EDS showed ~5 wt.% Sb had been added to the Pb to produce an alloy with greater malleability. The SEM also revealed remnants of an aluminosilicate, similar to kyanite
+(Al2SiO5), trapped in the Pb. Kyanite, a naturally occurring mineral, is commonly used for hightemperature insulation and may have been used as a mold wash, liner, or release agent in the casting process.
+The yellow wax filling the interior of the Pb container was analyzed by Fourier transform infrared spectrometry to identify molecular compounds. Based on FTIR spectra, the wax was identified as a paraffin derivative with composition inconsistent with many commercial waxes but strikingly similar to the paraffin-based wax, Parowax. The coloring agent was identified using methylene chloride to extract the paraffin from the inorganic component and then XRF to examine the residue. XRF identified the inorganic residue as Ba chromate
+(BaCrO4), once commonly used as yellow pigment in paints, glass, and ceramic over-glazes, as an oxidizer in pyrotechnics, and as an oxidizer in heat powders and igniters. Barium chromate is rarely used today in the U.S. or most western countries because of environmental and health concerns but widespread use persists in Brazil, China, India, and eastern European countries.
+
+The two paper samples retrieved from the Pb container were characterized using forensic microscopy to determine the composition of the wood fibers making up the paper. The quality of the paper is similar to commercial office paper. Fibers from the inner paper liner separating the ampoule from the paraffin wax consisted of 61% bleached softwood and 39% bleached hardwood, while fibers from the label removed from the cap on the shield consisted of 38% bleached softwood, 23% semibleached softwood and 39% bleached hardwood. Both the softwood and the hardwood fibers were produced with the Kraft pulping process. The fibers in these papers are not found in North America, Western Europe, or Scandinavia and the two paper samples were most plausibly produced in Eastern Europe.
+
+Nuclear Forensic Interpretation. The primary goal of nuclear forensic interpretation is to identify the original source of the material, the intended, or original, use, and the responsible individual or organization. Typically, interpretation proceeds in stages, focusing first on unambiguous signatures
+(*e.g.*, U isotopic composition), then proceeding to more subtle signatures (*e.g.*, trace elements and physical properties), and finally considering collateral signatures found, *e.g.*, in packaging. The dominant signature of the HEU is the U isotopic composition. The U isotope abundances, especially the unusually high concentration of 236U, clearly indicate the sample is HEU irradiated and then reprocessed reactor fuel. The HEU had an initial
+235U abundance of ~90%, immediately excluding material manufactured in the United States, since most U.S. HEU has a 235U content of ~93%. The
+90% enrichment is consistent with HEU produced in the one of the states of the former Soviet Union (hereafter, FSU).
+
+Other characteristics of the fuel and packaging also point to an origin in the FSU. The grain size is characteristic of material prepared for specialized use, *e.g.*, powder metallurgy. The extremely fine grain size of the powder is unlike that found in U.S. facilities, where coarser sizes are used to minimize the health hazard created by respiration of fine dust. The HEU has the characteristics of feedstock for fabrication of fuel pellets and blending with other batches of U oxide at U fuel conversion facilities in the FSU. Multiple samples, similar to the one discussed here, are commonly taken from batches of U oxide product for analysis and archive.
+
+Determining the type of reactor in which the HEU was irradiated is a much more involved process, using knowledge of reactor designs and operating conditions and computer modeling of fuel burn-up. Calculations were performed with the ORIGEN2 code to determine the initial isotope abundances and the reactor neutron spectrum most consistent with the observed U isotope abundances. These calculations indicate that a thermal energy spectrum and a burn-up exposure of ~350,000 MWD/MT best match the measured U isotope abundances. The most likely source is a light water reactor, possibly a pressurized water reactor, test facility, a research reactor for naval propulsion systems, or a materials test reactor. The low abundance of 241Pu suggests the fuel was stored for
+1020 y after discharge before reprocessing.
+The data for the non-nuclear samples reinforces the assertion that the sample originated in the former Soviet Union. The ampoule has been identified by visitors to FSU nuclear facilities as strongly resembling the glass containers used to preserve aliquots of production runs for archival material. The Ba chromate giving the wax its distinctive yellow color is banned in the U.S. and most Western countries but is still widespread in Brazil, China, India and many of the Newly Independent States. The paper products are derived from mixtures of hardwood and softwood trees not found in the U.S. or Western Europe, but common in Eastern Europe. Finally, the Pb isotope composition of the container is inconsistent with Pb mined in the U.S. but compatible with lead from Asia or Eastern Europe.
+
+The preponderance of the evidence thus points to an origin in the FSU. Efforts to refine this attribution analysis are continuing, including recent efforts to compare the characteristics of the HEU seized in Bulgaria with similar material interdicted in Paris (Baude 2008, Baude *et al*. 2008).
+
+Recent interdictions (Sokova & Potter 2008, Global Security Newswire 2010, 2011) suggest that attempts to smuggle weapon-useable nuclear materials across international borders still continue. Illicit trafficking in nuclear materials remains an important area of concern for the International Atomic Energy Agency, Europol, and national law enforcement agencies, and has gained increased attention in the context of recent Nuclear Security Summits.
+
+
+CONCLUSIONS
+Nuclear forensics is an emerging science, driven primarily by national security objectives, including those of both law enforcement and national intelligence. Nuclear forensics is one input into nuclear attribution, in which responsibility is assigned, along with other sources of information, such as law enforcement and intelligence. Nuclear forensics is used to generate technical conclusions by applying validated signatures to analytical results from the interdicted material. These validated signatures include both comparative signatures, in which the interdicted material is compared to the results from material of known origins, and predictive signatures, in which conclusions are
+
+generated without reference to other samples. Valid analytical results, in turn, depend on appropriately validated analytical methods, proper analytical sampling, and a quality control/assurance program.
+
+ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
+We thank the members of the LLNL nuclear
+forensics team for their many contributions and stimulating engagement and who deserve full credit for the activities described herein. We also thank A. Simonetti for a thorough review and helpful comments. This chapter was prepared by a contractor of the U.S. Government under contract number DE-AC52-07NA27344. Accordingly, the
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+INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (2012):
+Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), IAEA, Vienna. http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp
+KRISTO, M.J. (2012): Nuclear Forensics. In
+Handbook of Radioactivity Analysis, 3rd edition,
+M.F. L'Annunziata, (ed.) 1281-1302, Elsevier
+Press.
+MAYER, K., WALLENIUS, M. AND RAY, I. (2005):
+Nuclear forensics - a methodology providing
+clues on the origin of illicitly trafficked nuclear
+materials, *Analyst* 130, 433-441.
+MAYER, K., WALLENIUS, M. & FANGHANEL, T.
+(2007): Nuclear Forensic Science - from cradle to
+maturity, *J. Alloys & Compounds* **444-445**, 50
+56.
+MOODY, K., HUTCHEON, I.D. & GRANT, P.M.
+(2005): *Nuclear Forensic Analysis*, Taylor and
+Francis, 432 pp.
+NIEMEYER, S. & KOCH, L. (2002): The nuclear
+smuggling International Technical Working Group: Making a difference in combating illicit
+trafficking. In Proceedings, Conference on
+Advances in Destructive and Non-Destructive Analysis for Environmental Monitoring and Nuclear Forensics, Karlsruhe, Germany, October 21-23, 2002, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, pp. 17-19.
+RANEBO, Y., HEDBERG, P.M.L., WHITEHOUSE, M. J.,
+INGENERI, K & LITTMANN, S. (2009): Improved

markdown/misc/iqt-cloud.md

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+## On Our Radar Cloud Computing Is Here; Now What?
+
+By Greg Shipley In the fall of 2011, the *IQT Quarterly* tackled some of the issues surrounding the promise and hype of cloud computing. While the discussion is far from over, three years later we find ourselves with a bit more insight into some of the key questions. How secure is cloud-based infrastructure? Answer: about as secure (and insecure) as the IT infrastructure that preceded it. Does using cloud-based services save money? Answer: it depends - in some cases, yes, but in many others, no. Does cloud computing have an impact on the IT labor force? Answer: definitely, but that impact is often more about change, and less about reduction.
+
+Most debates regarding the long-term viability of cloud computing are over; the movement has become "the new normal" in corporate America. We believe that the changes related to the rise of cloud computing will continue to have a profound impact on the future of enterprise computing. However, both questions and misconceptions remain, and much work lies ahead.
+
+## The Evolution Of Enterprise It
+
+The story is all too familiar: a business unit or mission group has specific technology needs, becomes frustrated with its enterprise IT organization, and decides to use some of its coveted budget dollars to stand up pieces of its own IT infrastructure - independent of enterprise IT. While not often discussed, these secondary IT teams, or "shadow IT," exist in both government and corporate contexts, and in some cases have been around as long as the IT departments themselves. Their presence is not new; however, there is a rising trend in corporate America of using cloud-based service providers as a third option - another path around enterprise IT organizations. The trend raises an interesting question: have cloud-based service providers simply become the latest incarnation of shadow IT? There's little doubt that a more "frictionless" IT environment is the end state that developers, IT
+operations personnel, and end users alike are all seeking. Who doesn't dream about resources on-demand, provisioning within minutes, and lower barriers to use? This is the lure of a cloud-enabled world and the reason Amazon Web Services' revenue is now measured in billions. These are achievable goals, but understanding the broader story is essential to executing against this vision. For the technology portion of the tale, much of what drives the largest cloud providers remains a blend of traditional approaches and technology combined with some modern and significant shifts. For example, technology vendors like Cisco and Juniper continue to supply IT teams with significant quantities of network infrastructure. However, some of the largest providers are now embracing software-defined networking (SDN) concepts running on top of more generic "white box" switches; both cost and functionality are driving this change. Dell, HP, and IBM may still be selling thousands of servers into data centers, but companies like Facebook - now one of the largest purchasers of server hardware on the planet - claim to be using 100 percent Open Compute-based hardware. Cost reduction was a driver here, too: Facebook credits its Open Compute initiative with saving the company over a billion dollars in the last three years.
+
+increasingly relevant to their total delivery costs. This realization resulted in a re-engineered approach to data centers, and has saved them billions of dollars. Yet even today, most large organizations lack teams populated by facilities managers, building engineers, and IT personnel; the groups certainly communicate, but the disciplines remain far from integrated. But perhaps the most relevant human component to the story will be the acute and growing need for cloud technology advisors, translators, and educators. Many IT personnel will need to transform into cloud ambassadors: advisors who help consult about when, where, and how services should be migrated or delivered. It's not just greater understanding of the technical "big picture" that will be important - it is the ability to help teams make the best choices and effectively serve as service brokers and enablers.
+
+## The Next Chapter
+
+VMware remains the dominant virtualization player in the traditional enterprise infrastructure space, but the growing popularity and momentum behind the open source OpenStack project is undeniable. Configuration management and orchestration technologies from projects like Ansible, Chef, Puppet Labs, and SaltStack are far more prevalent in the cloud space than equivalents from the larger, legacy software vendors. These technologies also influence how new applications are developed, deployed, and scaled as the lines between developers and system administrators continue to become less defined. Finally, traditional relational database technologies are still powering thousands of cloud applications, but NoSQL-based counterparts offering graph and document-based alternatives continue to gain popularity. So does the use of object-based storage systems (e.g., Amazon S3, OpenStack Swift, Cleversafe) by a growing group within the development community. These significant shifts in technology usage will have lasting effects.
+
+There has historically been much discussion around when, where, and why to deploy cloud related technologies, and debate about whether cloud computing models will eventually consume all of IT. Similar discussions occurred regarding the mainframe, as well as the migration to "client-server" computing models. Decades later, these technologies remain active in our computing environments, and perhaps regrettably, the domain of "legacy IT" does not appear to be leaving any time soon. As time goes on, it appears less likely that the question will be, "do we move to the Cloud?" and more likely to be, "which applications do we move, and to which cloud do we move them?" Savvy IT personnel will build out the criteria to answer these and related questions.
+
+Cloud-enabled IT teams are facing new considerations and skill set requirements. For example, understanding resource constraints, and specifically bandwidth usage requirements, is even more essential. If the dynamic capabilities of cloud-enabled applications are realized, applications and workloads have the potential to be resized or moved. In a traditional model where static resources (e.g., servers) reside in a single physical data center with relatively static network connections, there are a number of variables that can affect performance. In a cloud-enabled world, that number of variables increases substantially. In effect, moving a 500 GB image file between two systems within the same data center is one thing, moving it between two data centers is quite another, and having it moved automatically is even more complicated. In some cases, having cloudenabled applications will actually *increase* complexity; a counter-intuitive notion to some, but a harsh reality for those who are already living in the world of dynamic resource allocation.
+
+From lowering the cost and resources required to launch companies to inspiring entrepreneurs to build cloud-enabling technologies, the impact of public and private cloud technologies has been profound in the startup community. Questions relating to the security, cost, and functionality of the shift to Cloud will soon be replaced by more specific inquires relating to the security/cost/functionality delta between Cloud Provider X and existing infrastructure. Transparency has never been more important.
+
+The need for greater collaboration between facilities teams and IT personnel is another area in which organizations are becoming more mindful. For example, both Facebook and Google realized early on that their power, space, and cooling footprints would become The answers to these questions will determine how much cloud, and how much computing, lies ahead.
+Infrastructure Practice, where he is responsible for cloud and next generation infrastructure investments. Shipley also helps guide IQT's investments in information security areas. Prior to joining IQT, he was the founder and Chief Technology Officer for Neohapsis, an industry leader in information security and IT risk management. Shipley also ran the Chicago test lab for Network Computing magazine, was a contributing editor for Information Week magazine, and spent over a decade testing and reviewing technology on behalf of Fortune 500 companies.

markdown/misc/jfaidd.md

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+Searchable database of DNA profiles from detainees and
+Searchable database of DNA profiles from detainees and
+known or suspected terrorists
+known or suspected terrorists
+ Partnership with defense, intelligence, and law enforcement
+Partnership with defense, intelligence, and law enforcement
+
+## Joint Federal Agencies Intelligence Dna Database Joint Federal Agencies Intelligence Dna Database Joint Federal Agencies Intelligence Dna Database

markdown/misc/mobile.md

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+Supplementalto the 304th Ml Bn Periodic Newsletter Sample Overview: alQaida-Like Mobile Discussions & Potential Creative Uses By 304th Ml Bn OSINT Team October 16, 2008
+This is a draft FOUO product The above examples of Nokia Map Functions are displayed in a Pro Islamic State of lraq (aI Qaida) Discussion thread at http ://www,muslm.nethb/showthread. ohp ? o= I 79747 3 with sofruare description and download instructions. Posting date March 24, 2008.
+
+## Overview
+
+Terrorists and persons sympathetic to terrorism recommend a variety of different mobile to web technologies, software, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VolP)r for their mobile phone use. Some of the tactics are old, some of the tactics are still emerging, and some tactics may emerge from hacker, activist, and criminal non-terrorist use. This paper briefly covers a few examples of terrorist use and potential use of mobile to web and web to mobile technologies and tactics from an open source perspective.
+
+The paper includes the following five topics: Pro Tenorist Propaganda Mobile lnterfaces, Mobile Phone GPS for Movements, Ops, Targeting, and Exploitation, The Mobile Phone as a Surueillance Tool, Voice Changers for Terroist Phone Calls, a Red Teaming Perspective on the PotentialTerrorist Use of Twifter, and a sample of software that is recommended on one pro terrorist website for mobile phone activities. There are numerous possibilities that are not covered in this paper due to time and research constraints.
+
+For example, Google Earth, Mobile GPS Mashups2
+and Mobile Phone Number Spoofing techniques are not addressed in this paper but are certainly worth Open Source Intelligence
+(OSINT) consideration and probably deserve a paper (if not a book) unto itself.
+
+Please note the following caveats to this article. The first limitation is the discussed technologies were not independently verified in a red teaming scenario, so it is unclear whether some of the discussed tactics and methodologies would actually work. For example, extremist suggestions to include integrating a mobile phone camera into a missile warhead seem highly improbable. Second, a majority of the information was extracted from al Qaida-like websites from uncollaborated postings made by terrorists, persons sympathetic to terrorism, or honey pots3. Third, the research used to generate this paper was conducted from open sources only and has not been compared and/or contrasted with information in non-open source (classified)
+venues. Fourth, each topic is merely an introduction into the subject and deserves further research and contemplation.
+
+Fifth, the author is not a linguist, but used rudimentary Arabic language skills and the Google translating toolto extract website context. Finally, the potential for use of certain web to mobile technologies and tactics is dependent upon the mobile service available in different states and regions. For example, terrorists could theoretically use Twitter social networking in the U.S. as an operation tool. However, it is unclear whether that same theoretical use would be available to terrorists in other countries and to what extent.
+
+What did become clear from conducting research on this topic is that there are numerous different tactics, tools, and software services that can be used by terrorists to conduct activities that go well beyond the original intent of the mobile phone voice communications and that these burgeoning capabilities are available for OSINT
+exploitation. Further, there may be a possibility to profile a portion of particular cyber
+2 http://sea-eves.com/vb/t33O6.html t Honey Pot is defined as something (example a website) that is set up in order to allure select audience members so that they may be tracked and monitored.
+
+terrorist-like groups and their audiences based on the particular set of software and phones that the group recommends from OSINT exploitation.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+| PRO TERRORIST PROPAGANDA CELL PHONE INTERFACES                    |    2 |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| CELL PHONE GPS FOR MOVEMENTS. OPS. TARGETING & EXPLOITATION 3     |      |
+| MOBTLE PHONE SURVEILLANCE                                         |    4 |
+| VOICE CHANGERS FOR TERRORIST TELEPHONE CALLS?                     |    5 |
+| POTENTIAL FOR TERRORIST USE OF TWITTER: A RED TEAMING PERSPECTM 7 |      |
+| SAMPLE OF OTHER MOBILE PHONE TOPICS & SOFTWARE RECOMMENDATIONS 9  |      |
+
+Pro Terrorist Propaganda Cett ptrone Interfaces The mobile phone provides an active outlet for terrorist propaganda. Currently there are thousands of multimedia clips (audio, video, photo, Power Point, text, PDF)that may be up loaded to mobile phones from multiple websites and multimedia bunkers. In addition, mobile phone texting appears to be consistently and possibly increasingly popular among pro terrorist audiences (just as it is with non-terrorist audiences). Some terrorist organizations are further branded by a specific cell phone interface, which makes the actual phone a piece of propaganda.
+
+Following are two examples:
+Army of the Mujahedeen Cell Phone Interface (Advertized cel Phone screen Appearance)
+
+| 293031    | t    | 2    | 3   |
+|-----------|------|------|-----|
+10
+
+The software for the above interfaces is advertized as being available for download on select extremist websites, such as tamkeen.iraqserve.com.
+
+Source: Arabic Discussion Forum http://llvan.oro/vb/showthread.pho?t=5844
+(From Google Search Result Descriplion: "Make your love for God, Eid and satisfaction and your obedience and Mwalatk and Zkirk and lslamic Jihad ....
+
+Sailing fast and easy navigation system with A-GPS maps and the application of Nokia Maps."
+Compare the previous text with a vendo/s write-up "Sailing fast and easy navigation sysfern with A-GPS and Nokia Maps application maps. Find your destination on foot or in the car with a compass for navigation Sena. Take pictures and video through the use of high-quality 3.2-megapixel camera with flash The advantage Panoramic 240 x 320QVGA See maps, pictures and videos on the screen QVGA stunning 2.4-inch size and the quality of 320 x 240
+Browse the Internet, send e-mail your uploaded content quickly connect via high-speed 3.5G ''
+of Supplies." The following three Graphics were associated with this posting.
+
+One response to the topic thread was that city images and pictures were not adequate because additional information, such as geocoordinates, was needed for deserts and forests
+(non-urban areas). A
+later posting in the thread discussed the pros and cons of GPS under the title "An lntensive Course in the Use of LG PSV GPS" (Reference screen capture on next page) which briefly covered some of the benefits and detriments of using GPS. The article mentioned the use of geo coordinates for border crossings, item concealment, and for identifying enemy locations. The article also mentioned that GPS would be useful for identifying terrain and natural resources, such as water. In addition, the article mentioned that attained enemy GPS can be usefulfor information exploitation.
+
+Cell Phone GPS for Movements, Ops, Targeting &
+Exploitation Nokia 6210 Navigatorand other GPS cell phone services could be used by our adversaries for travel plans, surveillance and targeting.
+
+Following is an example of one extremist discussion thread surrounding the use of Mobile Phone GPS (there are multiple postings on this issue which could be a paper unto itself.) On May 3, 2008 a discussion topic was posted in the pro terrorist forum al Hebash at www.alhesbah.net
+(now defunct)
+on the theoretical use of Nokia GPS for "Specialist use in Marksmanship, Border Crossings, and in Concealment Mobile Phone Surveillance On September
+6, 2008 an individual using the pseudonym of "Volcano"
+provided a theoretical discussion in the Mujahedeen Army of lraq Enabling lslamic Mobiles forum, www.tamkeen.iraqserve.com, on the use of mobile phones for target surveillance and attacks. Under the category of basic surveillance,
+"Volcano"
+recommended using the phone/video camera for monitoring enemy activities and operations in theater. Of unique interest is that "Volcano"
+posed severaltheoretical examples of how to use the mobile phone video and camera options in tandem with conducting attacks. For example,
+"Volcano"
+suggested that one could use the mobile phone for remote surveillance to tag the opportune time of attack. "Volcano" also hypothesized whether a mobile phone camera could be integrated into a missile head to film a target as it is being attacked. This recommendation probably would not work but provides insight into adversarial perspectives.
+
+(Reference the screen capture on the following page.)
+
+## Voice Changerc For Terrorist Telephone Calls?
+
+The nome of God the merciful AVVolce Chanqer Dlamond 6.0.'10
+You may have seen it in a movie, the villain calling the victim with an altered voice to hide his/her identity. In the movies, that theme is fairly common; the question really is whether our adversaries will consider voice changing technology for use in future operations. The answer could be yes. on September
+9, 2008 Abu Aisha the Moroccan, Technical Superuisor, of the TechnicalAudio Discussion of the Ansar al Jihad forum recommended voice changing software for making VOIP telephone calls. He mentioned that the software would be helpfulfor recommendation was posted most VOIP services including following public media repods Skype and Vonage. This of the Taliban using SKYPE.4 The timing was most likely coincidental and unrelated but the two concepts can complement one another. The Taliban and other like groups suspecting their VOIP
+communications are being be monitored could theoretically combine voice changing software with (or without) encryption and caller l.D. spoofing' in order to make basic detection more difficult. This tactic may or may not be effective to elude international intelligence agencies. However, it might be effective for calling in demands, interviews, and/or attack claims to media outlets. Abu Aisha the Moroccan specifically recommended AV Voice Changer Diamond 6.0.10 off a freeware download page. Audio for Fun, http://www.audio4fun.com/voice-over.htm, describes the software package as:
+"The latest edition in the VOICE CHANGER SOFTWARE series which is dedicated to voice changing and voice manipulating for online and local computer-based programs.
+
+The software is able to do a wide range of voice changing related tasks for many different purposes, such as voice-over and voice dubbing for audio/video clips, presentations, narrations, voice rnessages, voice mails, E-greeting cards, etc.; mimic the voice of any person, create animalsounds, change voices in songs, etc.
+
+This Diamond edition also presenfs a fasfer voice morphing algorithm, a professional looking interface, background effects library and numerous ready-to-use nickvoices. The many packages of parody voices will help users fo talk in the voices of many Hollywood stars and other celebrities.
+
+Voice Changer Software Diamond works wellwith many common VolP programs such as Net2Phone, SkypeOut, Vonage, etc., and many lnstant Messenger programs such as Yahoo Messenger with Voice, Skype, Windows Live Messenger, AlM, etc.
+
+KEY FEATURES: Ready-to-use nickvoices, Parody Maker, Frequency Morpher, Audio Stream Recorder, Pitch and Timbre Morpher graph, Equalizers Background Effects.
+
+MAIN BENEFITS:
+Voice Changer Software Diamond is usefulfor users who want to be the Voice Master of Media in cyberspace. They can use it to have fun while chatting using instanf messenge r programs, do voice dubbing and voice-overs for their own video/audio clips, mimic the voice of their favorite ldol, and more."
+Terrorists may or may not be using Voice Changing software but it should be of open source interest that on line terrorists and/or terrorist enthusiasts are discussing it.
+
+Twitter is described as "a free Social Networking and Micro Bloggingo service that lets members keep in touch with people using the web, their phone, or lM (instant messaging)."'
+Twitter is similar to other social networking sites in that it allows people to create a community of interest and/or group of online friends.
+
+Twitter launched in July 2006 and has become an increasingly popular networking venue over the past two years.o On September
+26, 2008, there were 21,100,000
+Google Hits for doing a search on Twitter.com, which was advertised on a multitude of different language web pages, including English, Arabic, Armenian, Simplified Chinese, Croatian, Czech, Indonesian, Korean, Thai, and other languagese.
+
+What makes Twitter unique is that the member can send Tweets (messages)
+near realtime to Twitter cell phone
+6 Search Mobile Computing Online defines Micro Blogging as
+"Microblogging is the practice of sending brief posts to a personal blog on a microblogging Web site, such as Twitter or Jaiku.
+
+Microposts can be made public on a Web site and/or distributed to a private group of subscribers. Subscrbers can read microblog posts online or request that updates be delivered in real time to their desktop as an instant message or sent to a mobile device as an SMS text message."
+htto://searchmobilecomoutinq.techtaroet.com/sDef inition/0..sid40
+oci1265620.00.htm1
+"Flying to Bagram, Afghanistan ln 12 hourc. The journey ts about to beginl'
+Example Foft Huachuca Tweefs I Crunch Base, 'Twitter Company Profile," 2008, http ://www.cru nchbase. com/com panv/Twitte r e Google Search of Twitter.com, Sept. 27,2OOB
+"Email I just got: -We are changing all of the PMs taslrs at Ft Huachuca. I hope fhis does not add a lot of extra work on your end.' HAI"
+"...is at Ft. Huachuca. ltwas great s*ing him last night passing through Tucson Intemational."
+groups and to their online Twitter social networking page. They can also Mashup their Tweets with a variety of other tools including geo coordinates and Google Maps or other electronic files/artifacts. Members can direct and re-direct audience members to other websites and locations from "Tweets" and can engage in rapid-fire group social interaction. For example, the earthquake that occurred in Los Angeles on July 29,2008
+was reported via a Twitter member approximately four minutes prior to the information being reported by the news and within minutes there were hundreds of Tweets from people experiencing the earthquake first hand.10 Twitter has also become a social activism toolfor socialists, human rights groups, communists, vegetarians, anarchists, religious communities, atheists, political enthusiasts, hacktivists and others to communicate with each other and to send messages to broader audiences.ll Twitter is already used by some members to post and/or support extremist ideologies and perspectives. For example, there are multiple pro and anti Hezbollah Tweets. In addition, extremist and terrorist use of Twitter could evolve over time to reflect tactics that are already evolving in use by hacktivisfs and activists for surveillance. This could theoretically be combined with targeting. Twitter was recently used as a countersurveillance, command and control, and movement tool by activists at the Republican National Convention (RNC). The activists would Tweet each other and their Twitter pages to add information on what was happening with Law Enforcement near realtime.
+
+## Activist Use Of Twitter For Law Enforcement Counter Surveillance And Movement Coordination At The Most Recent Republican National Convention (Rnc)
+
+The following sample Tweets were collected and posted in a Computer World article
+'Twitter Helps Republican Convention Protestors Organize, Elude Police," on September 8, 2008 (htto://www.pcworld.ido.com.au/index.oho/id:7484771):
+
+o "Arrest teams are approaching
+seated protesters on Marion Bridge. Resisters
+are told they'll be met with force."
+o "Protestors
+are now fighting back. First reports of violence now"
+o "Western Ave. Bridge, west of capitol can be safely crossed."
+o 'City is on lockdown. Go to 14th and Jackson if you need help from tear gas
+pepper spray." (http://www.linuxworld.com.au/index.php/id:7484771
+)
+There are multiple red-teaming examples that could be created surrounding potential adversarial use of Twitter. Following are three red team scenarios:
+to Weaver, Matthew, "Did the Earth Tweet For You," UK Guardian Blog, July 30, 2008, http://www.ouardian.co.ul</news/bloq/2008/iul/30/laearthquakehitsrealihltv tt 3o4tn Ml Bn OSINT Team Review of Member Twitter Pages Scenario 1:
+Terrorist operative
+"A" uses Twitter with (or without) using a cell phone camera/video function to send back messages, and to receive messages, from the rest of his cell.
+
+Operative
+"A" also has a Google Maps Twitter Mash Up of where he is under a code word for other members of his cell (if they need more in-depth directions)
+posted on the WWW that can be viewed from their mobiles. Other members of his cell receive near real time updates (similar to the movement updates that were sent by activists at the RNC) on how, where, and the number of troops that are moving in order to conduct an ambush.
+
+Scenario 2:
+Terrorist operative
+"A" has a mobile phone for Tweet messaging and for taking images.
+
+Operative
+"A" also has a separate mobile phone that is actually an explosive device and/or a suicide vest for remote detonation. Terrorist operative "8" has the detonator and a mobile to view "A's" Tweets and images. This may allow "B" to select the precise moment of remote detonation based on near real time movement and imagery that is being sent by "A."
+Scenario 3:
+Cyber Terrorist operative
+"A" finds U.S. Army Smith's Twitter account. Operative
+"A"
+joins Smith's Tweets and begins to elicit information from Smith. This information is then used for a targeting package (targeting in this sense could be for identity theft, hacking, and/or physical.) This scenario is not new and has already been discussed for other social networking sites, such as My Space and/or Face Book.
+
+## Sample Of Other Mobile Phone Topics & Software Recommendations
+
+Sample Source: The mobile phone technology forum in www.tamkeen.iraqserve.com
+
+r
+Recommends
+and debates mobile phone brands (Samsung,
+Nokia, etc.)
+.
+Propaganda
+multimedia
+downloads
+for the phone (videos,
+audio clips, text files, PDF,
+etc.)
+.
+Mobile phone tips for surveillance
+activities
+.
+Uses of SMS text messaging
+.
+Windows Live Messenger
+for the mobile
+r
+Free advanced
+mobile messages
+to your mobile from website Huda 76
+.
+Mobile Phone GPS tracking options
+o
+How to upload software updates
+.
+Religious
+upload software,
+such as prayer times reminders
+.
+Religious
+and ideological
+background
+wall paper
+o The Software
+package-Mobile
+Master Professional
+7.0.1 Build 2699
+.
+Xilisoft 3GP Video Converter
+o convert 3GP to avi or mpg, and vice versa, as well as 3gp mpg, mpeg2, mpeg4,
+wmv, mp4, 3gp, mov, rm, dv, yuv, h264 and MP3, WAV, AC3, WMA, m4a, ogg
+.
+Ego Share Software (data recovery)
+.
+How to maintain
+and crack mobile phone security
+codes
+o How to make mobile software programs
+.
+Discussions
+on how to protect and penetrate Blue Tooth technology
+.
+PDA programs for the mobile phone (Some of the software downloads that were
+advertized
+are sub-listed below)
+o Best TaskMan v2.01
+o emTube V1.06
+o
+InstFast v0.01
+o
+lslamic Organizer v2.00
+o Blacklist v2.00
+o ActiveFilev 1.25
+o AnsweringMachine.vl.l0 o
+rotateMe v2.0.5
+o Symbian.Guru.BT.Guard.vl.00.S60v3.SymbianO59.l.Unsigned.Arabic-ArabPDA
+o Quick Office Premier Upgrade 4.5.25.0
+o Tobias Stoger.S60Ticker.S60v3.SymbianOS9.
+1 .Arabic-ArabPDA
+o CorePlayer.v1.1.2
+o
+Flashlite v3.0
+o Mobiola Media Player v2.1 o AudioNotes.v1.31
+o S60SpotOn
+v0.7
+o
+Pocket.Quran.v0.96b
+o Theme DIY v1.2 o
+FreeTones.vl
+.05.S60v3.SymbianOS9.
+1 .Unsigned.Arabic
+o SmartGuard
+v2.00
+o Total recall (advertized for wire tapping)
+o Best Dictaphone
+v1.0
+o Opera v8.65 (search engine)
+o KavMobile 6.1.8 (Antivirus)

markdown/misc/overview.md

@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+U.S. Intelligence Organization Profiles Program Managers
+
+Office of the Director of National Intelligence........    1
+
+
+|                                                                  | Central Intelligence Agency........    4      |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
+|                                                                  | Defense Intelligence Agency........ ........    5    |
+|                                                                  | Department of Justice                                    |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+|                                                                  | National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency........    9 |
+|                                                                  | National Reconnaissance Office........  11      |
+|                                                                  | National Security Agency........  12         |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+| Departmental Components                                          |                                                          |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+|                                                                  | Department of Justice                                    |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+|                                                                  | Department of Energy                                     |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+| Department of Homeland Security                                  |                                                          |
+|                                                                  | Office of Intelligence & Analysis........  15     |
+|                                                                  | Department of State                                      |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+|                                                                  | Department of the Treasury                               |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+| Service Components                                               |                                                          |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+|                                                                  | United States Army........  19           |
+|                                                                  | United States Navy........  21             |
+|                                                                  | United States Air Force........  22         |
+|                                                                  | United States Marine Corps........  23        |
+|                                                                  | United States Coast Guard........ 24           |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+| Directory of IC Legislative Affairs Offices ........  26 |                                                          |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+|                                                                  |                                                          |
+
+##
+
+
+
+Office of the Director of National Intelligence
+
+The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the Intelligence Community (IC) and is the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) for intelligence matters related to national security.  Also, the Director oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.  The President appoints the DNI and the Principal Deputy Director with the advice and consent of the Senate. The DNI's responsibilities, among others, are to lead the IC; oversee the coordination of foreign relationships between elements of the IC and intelligence services of foreign governments; establish requirements and priorities for collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence; coordinate reform of security clearance and acquisition processes; achieve auditable financial statements; support legislative, legal and administrative requirements; ensure compliance with statutory and Presidentially-mandated responsibilities; and transform the IC into a unified, collaborative and coordinated enterprise.
+
+The DNI Organization is composed of the DNI Staff and Intelligence Community Mission and Support Activities (MSAs).  The DNI Staff is primarily responsible for IC policy and oversight and the preparation of the National Intelligence Program Budget.  The MSAs are directly responsible for providing IC-wide substantive intelligence, counterintelligence strategy and strategic analysis, research and development, and training and education.  The Director of the Intelligence Staff is responsible for synchronizing and integrating efforts across the DNI Organization. There are four Deputy Directors of National Intelligence:
+
+Office of the Deputy Director for Policy, Plans and Requirements
+(DDNI/PPR) drives vital intelligence reform by coordinating IC-wide policy and strategy, plans, and requirements; modernizing security processes; and strengthening relationships with Federal, State, Local, foreign, and private sector partners.
+
+Office of the Deputy Director for Collection (DDNI/C) coordinates collection throughout the IC under the authorities of the DNI. The DDNI/C ensures that the President's and the DNI's priorities are appropriately reflected in future programming and systems acquisition decisions and puts into context for the DNI the way in which actions affect the total collection mission.
+
+Office of the Deputy Director for Analysis (DDNI/A) has responsibility for enhancing the quality, timeliness, and utility of analytic support to intelligence
+
+consumers. DDNI/A's approach for achieving this goal is to increase expertise and improve analytic tradecraft at individual, agency, and Community levels through specialization, collaboration, and cross-fertilization. The DDNI/A serves concurrently as the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and manages the production of the President's Daily Brief.
+Office of the Deputy Director for Future Capabilities (DDNI/FC) is the Intelligence Community's catalyst for technical innovation, responsive stewardship, and acquisition excellence.  Its approach is to address these key intelligence challenges by: leading advanced research and development focusing on disruptive technology leaps; acting as the DNI's Science &
+Technology advisor and integrating the Intelligence Community Science &
+Technology enterprise; developing and evaluating an IC-wide, end-to-end collection architecture to promote innovation and responsible financial stewardship; and establishing and maintaining an agile and transparent bestpractice environment that promotes IC acquisition success.
+
+Other elements of the DNI Staff include a **Civil Liberties Protection Office**, and an Office **of Equal Opportunity and Diversity** both of which drive IC-wide policies and programs in their respective areas. Three Mission Managers integrate IC-wide collection and analysis on North Korea, Iran and Cuba/Venezuela.
+
+IC Mission Support Activities
+
+The DNI organization includes ten functional mission support activities:
+
+National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) serves as the primary
+organization in the United States Government for integrating and analyzing all
+intelligence pertaining to terrorism possessed or acquired by the United
+States Government (except purely domestic terrorism).
+National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) is staffed by senior
+counterintelligence and other specialists from across the national intelligence and security communities. The NCIX mission is to exploit and defeat adversarial intelligence activities directed against U.S. interests; protect the integrity of the U.S. intelligence system; provide incisive, actionable intelligence to decision-makers at all levels; protect vital national assets from adversarial intelligence activities; and neutralize and exploit adversarial intelligence activities targeting the armed forces.
+National Counterproliferation Center **(NCPC)** is responsible for
+coordinating strategic planning within the IC to enhance intelligence support to United States efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems.
+The Special Security Center's (SSC) mission is to assist the DNI in protecting and sharing national intelligence information throughout the IC, the U.S. Government, U.S. contractors, state, local, tribal governments, and our foreign partners by conducting assessments of the security of sensitive compartmented information and other intelligence information under the DNI's authority; document overall IC security compliance for the DNI; monitor, coordinate and advise on significant unauthorized disclosures and compromises of classified national intelligence information; and provide feedback to support policy formulation and training initiatives.
+
+The National Intelligence University (NIU) operates under the DNI's authority to establish an integrated framework that brings together the educational components of the IC in order to promote a more effective and productive Intelligence Community through cross-disciplinary education and joint training.  The NIU is made up of the existing IC schools and universities, the Office of the Chancellor of the NIU, and the staff and curriculum that support the goals and authority of the DNI.
+
+Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity **(IARPA)** invests in highrisk/high payoff research that has the potential to provide the U.S. with an overwhelming intelligence advantage over our future adversaries.
+
+The Center for Security Evaluation's **(CSE)** mission is to strengthen overseas security standards, provide for inter-agency, life-cycle inspections, and aggressively pursue emerging security technologies with security solutions that are risk-based and realistic.  CSE is the organization that synchronizes IC emergency preparedness activities for the DNI and National leadership.
+
+The National Intelligence Council **(NIC)** is the IC's center for mid-term and long-term strategic analysis.  The NIC supports the DNI in his roles as head of the IC and principal advisor for intelligence matters to the President and the National Security and Homeland Security Councils, and serves as the senior intelligence advisor representing the IC's views within the U.S. Government.
+The NIC also provides key products and services, such as the National Intelligence Estimates assessing future trends on a wide range of global issues.
+
+The National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) was established in October 2007 in collaboration with the Department of Defense and several domestic agencies to provide a mechanism to coordinate intelligence activities across the entire U.S. Government. The NIC-C works to efficiently coordinate, collaborate, assess, and deploy our Nation's total array of intelligence collection capabilities.
+
+The Mission Support Center provides support services to all DNI Staff and Mission Support Activity components.
+
+## Central Intelligence Agency
+
+
+The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the largest producer of all-source national security intelligence to senior U.S. policymakers.  The CIA's intelligence analysis on overseas developments informs decisions by policymakers and other senior decision-makers in the national security and defense arenas.  CIA does not make foreign policy.
+
+
+The Director of the CIA is the **National Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Manager**
+and serves as the national authority for coordination, de-confliction, and evaluation of clandestine HUMINT operations across the IC, consistent with existing laws, Executive Orders, and interagency agreements.
+
+The National Clandestine Service **(NCS)** has responsibility for the clandestine collection (primarily HUMINT) of foreign intelligence that is not obtainable through other means.  The NCS engages in counterintelligence activities by protecting classified U.S. activities and institutions from penetration by hostile foreign organizations and individuals.  NCS also carries out covert action in support of U.S. policy goals when legally and properly directed and authorized by the President.
+
+
+The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analyzes all-source intelligence and produces reports, briefings, and papers on key foreign intelligence issues.  This information comes from a variety of sources and methods, including U.S. personnel overseas, human intelligence reports, satellite photography, open source information, and sophisticated sensors.
+
+
+The Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) accesses, collects, and exploits information to facilitate the execution of the CIA's mission by applying innovative scientific, engineering, and technical solutions to the most critical intelligence problems.
+
+The Directorate of Support (DS) delivers a full range of support, including acquisitions, communications, facilities services, financial management, information technology, medical services, logistics, and the security of Agency personnel, information, facilities, and technology.  DS services are both domestic and international in focus and are offered on a 24 hours a day/7 days a week basis.
+
+## Defense Intelligence Agency
+
+
+The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence for the Department of Defense and is a principal member of the United States Intelligence Community. Established on October 1, 1961, and designated a combat support agency in 1986, DIA's mission is to provide timely, objective, all-source military intelligence to policymakers, to U.S. armed forces around the world, and to the U.S. acquisition community and force planners to counter a variety of threats and challenges across the spectrum of conflict. The Director of DIA is a three-star military officer who serves as the principal advisor on substantive military intelligence matters to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, he or she is the Program Manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program which funds a variety of military intelligence programs at and above the corps level.  The Director also serves as Program Manager for the Department's Foreign Counterintelligence Program and is the Chairman of the Military Intelligence Board which examines key intelligence issues such as information technology architectures, program and budget issues, and defense intelligence inputs to National Intelligence Estimates. With headquarters in the Pentagon, DIA's more than 15,000 highly skilled civilian and military personnel are located around the world with major activities at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center on Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C.; the **Missile and Space Intelligence Center** at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama; and the **National Center for Medical Intelligence** at Fort Detrick, Maryland.  DIA also deploys military and civilian personnel worldwide during crises or conflicts to better support military forces.
+
+In December 2007, DIA established the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) to seamlessly integrate all defense intelligence resources on the transnational threats to U.S. national security and to enhance defense intelligence collaboration. The DIOCC collaborates with DoD and national intelligence resources to manage risk and resource requirements.  It integrates and synchronizes all-source military and national-level intelligence capabilities in support of the warfighters. Working closely with the DIOCC to help manage risk and intelligence resources is the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR).  The DIA Director is the commander of this U.S.
+
+Strategic Command organization.  The JFCC-ISR monitors Combatant Command intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) information needs; serves as the Intelligence Community's entry point into the DoD ISR system; works to maximize efficient use of ISR assets and identifies gaps in ISR coverage.
+
+Through the **Joint Staff J2**, DIA operates the intelligence component within the National Military Command Center, providing real-time indications and warning of breaking situations and serving as the national focal point for crisis intelligence support to military operations.  During a crisis or contingency, DIA establishes intelligence task forces, working groups or dedicated cells to closely monitor unfolding events.
+In an effort to strengthen management, synchronization and deconfliction of HUMINT and counterintelligence capabilities across the Department of Defense, including the military services and Combatant Commands, DIA established the Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center (DCHC) in August 2008. DIA's **Directorate for Human Intelligence (DH)**, conducts human intelligence operations worldwide to obtain critical intelligence often not available from technical collection means.  DH operations provide in-depth and actionable intelligence to policymakers and military forces in the field.  It manages the Defense Attache System, which has military attaches assigned to more than 137 U.S. embassies.
+To support DoD efforts in the global war on terrorism, DIA established the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism to consolidate and produce allsource terrorism-related intelligence.
+As more countries move their critical facilities underground, DIA's Underground Facility Analysis Center leverages the Nation's intelligence and other technical resources to coordinate the Intelligence Community's efforts to detect, identify, characterize, and assess for defeat hardened and deeply buried underground facilities and their associated programs worldwide.
+The DIA **Missile and Space Intelligence Center** is the DoD authority on manportable air defense systems and develops scientific and technical intelligence on foreign missile systems such as: short-range ballistic missile systems; surface-to-air missile systems; antitank guided missile systems; antiballistic missile systems; ground-based anti-satellite systems; and associated command and control systems.
+
+DIA's **National Center for Medical Intelligence** provides medical profiles of foreign countries and assesses real and potential health hazards to support U.S. Armed Forces worldwide operations to include humanitarian operations.
+DIA operates the **National Defense Intelligence College**, a fully accredited educational institution, to satisfy the growing need for trained intelligence professionals to help safeguard the Nation's interests.
+
+
+## Department Of Justice
+
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+
+The Federal Bureau of Investigation **(FBI)** is a threat-based, intelligence driven, national security organization that protects the United States from critical threats while safeguarding civil liberties.  As both a component of the Department of Justice and a full member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the FBI serves as a vital link between intelligence and law enforcement communities.  The FBI brings the discipline of the criminal justice system to its domestic intelligence activities in a manner that is consistent with American expectations and protections for privacy and civil liberties, and thus is uniquely situated to be effective against today's complex adversaries. The FBI's top priorities are combating the threat of terrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime.  As to counterterrorism, the FBI gives particular attention to terrorist efforts to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.  While numerous plots have been disrupted, the threat continues to evolve; the need for constant vigilance has not diminished.  The FBI must continuously adapt to trends in terrorist recruitment, financing and training, as well as terrorists' development of new explosive devices, biological and chemical agents. As to counterintelligence, foreign intelligence services continue their attempts to infiltrate the U.S. Government; we also face a growing presence of foreign businesspersons, students and scientists seeking to steal technology on behalf of foreign governments or commercial interests. Investigations of economic espionage, financial crimes, export control violations, cyber intrusions and the compromise of U.S. strategic intellectual property, such as innovations and patented inventions, are on the rise. Cyber threats cross all investigative categories, are borderless, and have the potential for disruption.  Of greatest concern are terrorists or foreign statesponsored elements targeting national information infrastructure, and criminal enterprises and individuals who illegally access computer systems or spread malicious code. There is also growing and evolving forms of identity theft, and use of the Internet to perpetrate fraud, child pornography and solicitation of children online.
+
+
+Public corruption and civil rights violations from hate crimes, abuse of power by law enforcement, and human trafficking including the exploitation of children, remain the FBI's top criminal priorities because of unique jurisdiction and the potential impact of these crimes on our democracy.  Other areas receiving priority focus are crimes that undermine the health of the economy, including large-scale financial institution frauds, securities and commodities or bank fraud, environmental crimes, health care fraud and telemarketing fraud. In the area of violent crimes, the FBI focuses on increasingly sophisticated national and transnational gangs, dangerous fugitives, and kidnappings.  We leverage our partnerships with over 800,000 state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies though task forces and fusion centers to collect and disseminate intelligence, serving as a unique link between the intelligence and law enforcement communities.
+
+Federal law, Attorney General authorities and Executive Orders give the FBI jurisdiction to investigate all federal crimes not assigned exclusively to another federal agency (28 U.S.C. Section 533) and to investigate threats to the national security (EO 12333; 50 U.S.C. Section 401 et seq; 50 U.S.C. Section 1801 et seq). Additionally, there are other laws that give the FBI responsibility to investigate specific crimes.  This combination of authorities gives the FBI the unique ability to address national security and criminal threats that are increasingly intertwined, and to shift between the use of intelligence tools such as surveillance or recruiting sources, and law enforcement tools of arrest and prosecution.  Regardless of which tools are employed, law and policy require that the FBI's information gathering activities use the least intrusive techniques possible to accomplish the objective and cannot be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment.
+
+
+
+## National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
+
+
+The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is a Department of Defense combat support agency and a member of the national Intelligence Community (IC). NGA develops imagery and map-based intelligence solutions for U.S. national defense, homeland security and safety of navigation. Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, NGA has major facilities in the Washington, D.C., Northern Virginia and St. Louis, Missouri, areas.  NGA also provides global support to IC mission partners through NGA representatives stationed around the world.
+
+Mission NGA provides timely, relevant and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security.
+
+GEOINT
+Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. GEOINT answers the questions "When?" and "Where?" It uses imagery to make sense of volumes of data and information. GEOINT builds the bridge from information to intelligencefrom decision to action.
+
+NGA's Role in the Intelligence Community NGA is the IC's principal producer of and adviser for GEOINT.  During the 20th century, NGA took a leadership role in collaborating with mission partners.  In the
+21st century, NGA is building on that tradition as it develops more efficient ways to exchange information and broaden access to all GEOINT sources and data to enable the production of high-quality intelligence throughout the IC. Know the Earth...Show the Way NGA supports the vision "Know the Earth...Show the Way" by developing and disseminating GEOINT in all its formsincluding imagery, imagery intelligence and geospatial informationto policymakers, decision-makers and warfighters, and by working alongside them to ensure their effective use of the specific GEOINT they need to carry out their missions.
+
+## Combat And Humanitarian Support
+
+As a Department of Defense combat support agency, NGA provides the warfighter with precise, timely GEOINT data, information and products. Accessibility and usability are the watchwords as NGA continues to focus on moving data to people, instead of moving people to data. In addition to supporting combat operations, NGA also supports disaster relief and homeland defense operations by providing GEOINT data, products and analyses to lead federal agencies and first responders.
+
+National System for Geospatial Intelligence The National System for Geospatial Intelligence is a unified community of GEOINT
+experts, producers and users organized around the goal of integrating technology, policies, capabilities and doctrine to produce GEOINT in a multi-intelligence environment. NGA, as the Functional Manager for the National System for Geospatial Intelligence, provides strategic thinking, guidance and direction to the IC concerning all aspects of GEOINT, from its acquisition to its utilization. NGA collaborates with mission partners to ensure that accurate and timely GEOINT is a part of decision making and operations where it is needed and when it is needed.
+
+The Future NGA is developing new partnerships, strengthening existing collaborations and advancing the agency's mission within the context of the larger IC to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world. As part of that effort, NGA continues to advance from a hardcopy orientation to a data-centric digital environment in which mission partners will have ready access to GEOINT databases through an open architecture of interoperable systems.
+
+## National Reconnaissance Office
+
+
+The National Reconnaissance Office **(NRO)** was established in September 1961
+as a classified agency of the Department of Defense.  The existence of the NRO and its mission of overhead reconnaissance were declassified in September 1992.  The NRO is the "nation's eyes and ears in space."  Headquartered in Chantilly, Virginia, the NRO is a joint organization engaged in the research and development, acquisition, launch, and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to meet the needs of the IC and the Department of Defense.  The NRO conducts other activities as directed by the Secretary of Defense and/or the DNI.  The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office is selected by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the DNI and also serves as the Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force (Intelligence Space Technology). The NRO's workforce includes personnel assigned to the NRO primarily from the Air Force, the CIA, and the Navy.  However, the other uniformed services and other elements of the Department of Defense and the IC are also represented.  Another important part of the NRO team includes some of this country's leading aerospace corporations and research centers. NRO's organizational goals are to:
+
+- Be a foundation for global situational awareness; and
+- Provide intelligence on timelines that are responsive to user needs. The NRO collaborates closely with its mission partners: NSA, NGA, CIA, U.S. Strategic Forces Command, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and the Department of the Navy, as well as other intelligence and defense organizations. Information collected using NRO satellites is used for intelligence and analysis for a variety of tasks, such as warning of potential foreign military aggression, monitoring weapons of mass destruction programs, enforcing arms control and environmental treaties, and assessing the impact of natural and manmade disasters.
+
+## National Security Agency
+
+
+The National Security Agency **(NSA)** is the U.S.'s cryptologic organization, with responsibility for protecting U.S. National Security information systems and collecting and disseminating foreign signals intelligence.  Areas of expertise include cryptanalysis, cryptography, mathematics, computer science, and foreign language analysis.  NSA is part of the Department of Defense, and is staffed by a combination of civilian and military personnel.
+
+NSA has an extensive customer outreach system, with representatives in many intelligence customer organizations in the Washington, DC, area, in other parts of the U.S., and around the world.  NSA's headquarters is at Fort Meade, Maryland.
+
+The **Signals Intelligence Directorate** is responsible for understanding customers'
+intelligence information needs, and for the collection, analysis and production, and dissemination of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).
+
+Operating under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, the Information Assurance Directorate ensures the availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation of national security and telecommunications and information systems (national security systems).
+
+The Central Security Service **(CSS)** oversees the function of the military cryptologic system, develops policy and guidance on the contributions of military cryptology to the Signals Intelligence / Information Security (SIGINT/INFOSEC) enterprise, and manages the partnership of NSA and the Service Cryptologic Components.  NSA as a whole is known as "NSA/CSS."
+The **NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center** monitors the operations of the global network to identify network-based threats and protect U.S. and allied networks.
+
+The **National Security Operations Center** is a 24 hours a day/7 days a week operations center that, on behalf of the NSA/CSS, provides total situational awareness across the NSA/CSS enterprise for both foreign Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance, maintains cognizance of national security information needs, and monitors unfolding world events.
+
+The **Research Directorate** conducts research on signals intelligence and on information assurance for the U.S. Government.
+
+
+
+Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration Office of National Security Intelligence
+
+The Drug Enforcement Administration **(DEA)** is responsible for enforcing the controlled substance laws and regulations of the U.S.  It brings to the criminal and civil justice system of the U.S., or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and the principal members of those organizations, involved in the growing, manufacturing, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the U.S.  In addition, DEA recommends and supports nonenforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets. DEA has 21 field divisions in the U.S. and more than 80 offices in over 60 countries worldwide.
+
+DEA's Office of National Security Intelligence **(ONSI)** became a member of the IC
+in 2006.  Located at DEA Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, ONSI facilitates full and appropriate intelligence coordination and information sharing with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community and homeland security elements. ONSI leverages the global law enforcement drug intelligence assets of DEA to report on matters relating to national security.  Its goal is to enhance U.S. efforts to protect national security, and combat global terrorism, as well as facilitate IC support to DEA's law enforcement mission.
+
+## Department Of Energy Office Of Intelligence And Counterintelligence
+
+The Department of Energy's (DoE) Office of Intelligence is the Intelligence Community's premier technical intelligence resource in four core areas: nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; energy security; science and technology; and nuclear energy, safety, and waste.  Tapping the broad technology base of DoE's national laboratories and the international reach of the DoE complex as a whole, the Office of Intelligence accomplishes a three-part mission:
+- To provide DoE, other U.S. Government policymakers, and the Intelligence Community with timely, accurate, high-impact foreign intelligence analyses.
+
+- To ensure that DoE's technical, analytical, and research expertise is made
+available to the intelligence, law enforcement, and special operations
+communities.
+- To provide quick-turnaround, specialized technology applications and
+operational support based on DoE technological expertise to the intelligence, law enforcement, and special operations communities.
+DoE's intelligence program traces its origins to the days of the Manhattan Project, when the former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was tasked to provide specialized analysis of the nascent atomic weapons program of the Soviet Union.
+Since then, that program--like the functions of the old AEChas come to reside within DoE.  It continues to evolve in close concert with changing policy needs and the strengths of DoE's unique scientific and technological base, from the world energy crisis of the 1970s, and consequent demand for intelligence expertise in international energy supply and demand issues, to growing concerns over nuclear proliferation and energy security in this decade.
+
+## Department Of Homeland Security
+
+Office of Intelligence & Analysis
+
+The Department of Homeland Security **(DHS)** is responsible for leading the unified national effort to secure the United States by preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and responding to threats and hazards.
+
+
+The **Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)** is DHS's headquarters intelligence element and is led by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, with guidance from the Homeland Security Council and Homeland Security Intelligence Council.  As a member of the IC, I&A is responsible for using information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the United States.  The Office of Intelligence and Analysis provides actionable intelligence to support national and DHS decision-makers while working closely with state, local, tribal, and private sector partners.  The Office of Intelligence and Analysis focuses on threats related to border security; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear issues, to include explosives and infectious diseases; critical infrastructure protection; extremists within the homeland; and travelers entering the homeland. Although they are not part of the Intelligence Community, several of DHS's other subcomponents have extensive interactions with the Intelligence Community, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, Secret Service, and Citizenship and Immigration Services.
+
+
+## Department Of State
+
+Bureau of Intelligence and Research
+
+The Bureau **of Intelligence and Research (INR)** provides expert intelligence analysis to the Secretary of State and senior policymakers, giving them "decision advantage" as they seek to protect and advance American interests around the world.  INR serves as the focal point within the Department of State for all policy issues and activities involving the Intelligence Community.  The INR Assistant Secretary reports directly to the Secretary of State and serves as the Secretary's principal adviser on all intelligence matters. INR's expert, independent foreign affairs analysts draw on all-source intelligence, diplomatic reporting, INR's public opinion polling, and interaction with U.S. and foreign scholars.  Their strong regional and functional backgrounds allow them to respond rapidly to changing policy priorities and to provide early warning and indepth analysis of events and trends that affect U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. INR analysts - a combination of Foreign Service officers often with extensive in-country experience and Civil Service specialists with in-depth expertise - cover all countries and regional or transnational issues. The Bureau provides daily briefings, reports, and memoranda to the Secretary and other Department principals.  INR also briefs members of Congress and their staffs as appropriate.  INR products cover the globe on foreign relations issues such as political/military developments, terrorism, narcotics, and trade.  INR contributes to the Community's National Intelligence Estimates, the Presidential Daily Brief and other analyses, offering its particular focus on relevance to policy.  In support of the statutory authority of the Secretary of State and Chiefs of Mission for the conduct of foreign policy and oversight of U.S. Government activities overseas, INR coordinates on behalf of the Department on issues concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, and special operations. INR participates in a wide variety of Intelligence Community working groups and policymaking committees, including those involving visa denial, intelligence sharing, analytic production, requirements and evaluation for collection in all intelligence disciplines. INR develops intelligence policy for the Department of State and works to harmonize all agencies' intelligence activities abroad with U.S. policy.   Acting to ensure that collection resources and priorities accord with U.S. diplomatic interests and requirements, INR engages Chiefs of Mission, Department resource managers, and the Intelligence Community for this purpose. In addition to all-source analysis and intelligence policy coordination, INR's third core activity is to serve as the DNI's recently named Executive Agent for Outreach.  In this role, INR leverages community resources to tap into the expertise of academia,
+
+think tanks, research councils, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector to expand the universe of knowledge available to policymakers and the intelligence community.  INR also analyzes geographical and international boundary issues.   Its **Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU)** serves as a nucleus for unclassified information related to complex emergencies and provides a coordinating mechanism for data sharing among the U.S. Government, the UN, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign governments. The Bureau also administers the Title VIII Grant Program, an initiative funded by Congress for senior level academic research in Russian, Eurasian and East European studies.
+
+
+
+## Department Of The Treasury
+
+Office of Intelligence and Analysis
+
+The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) was established by the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004.  The Act specifies that OIA shall be responsible for the receipt, analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence information related to the operation and responsibilities of the **Department of the Treasury**. OIA's strategic priorities:
+
+- *Terrorist Financing*: Over the past several years, the terrorist threat has
+become far more decentralized in nature, and many terrorist groups affiliated
+with al Qa'ida now pose a serious threat to U.S. national security.
+- *Insurgency Financing*: OIA will continue to improve its understanding of the
+insurgency financing, primarily through the Baghdad-based Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC) for which Treasury serves as co-lead with the Department of Defense.
+- *Rogue Regimes/Proliferation Financing*: OIA has assumed an increasingly
+important role in Treasury's effort to combat other national security threats, including rogue regimes involved in WMD proliferation.  OIA will continue to build on its efforts in these critical areas.
+
+## United States Army
+
+
+The Department of the Army's IC component is Army Military Intelligence
+(Army MI).  The **Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS),** G-2 is the Army Staff Principal responsible for Army MI.  The mission of the DCS G-2 is to formulate Army intelligence policy, plans, programs, and budgets and is responsible for Army-level oversight of multidisciplined intelligence operations, intelligence support to Computer Network Operations, MI personnel, training, readiness and equipping (with the DCS, G-8), security, foreign liaison and future threats.  The DCS G-2 plans and executes the Army Intelligence Campaign Plan in support of Army transformation, enabling effective all-source intelligence at Brigade Combat Team, Battalion, and Company levels, as well as other tactical Army organizations and activities.
+
+
+The **vision of the DCS** G-2 is to transform Army intelligence capabilities to enable decisive action by Army and Joint Commanders in an era of persistent conflict, complex environments, and asymmetric challenges; integrate advanced fusion and
+"find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze and disseminate" capabilities into Battle Command processes; and holistically adapt how we equip, train, share information, grow leaders and improve reasoning skills to generate actionable intelligence at the lowest possible level.
+
+The Army's operational-level intelligence organization is the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
+
+The Army's principal intelligence training organization is the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The USAIC reports to the U.S.
+
+Army Training and Doctrine Command.
+
+The Army's **Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC)** is responsible for overseeing Army Reserve intelligence activities and is co-located with INSCOM at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The MIRC reports to the U.S. Army Reserve Command.
+
+
+The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) provides the Army with military, scientific and technical intelligence. The NGIC is located in Charlottesville, Virginia, and reports to INSCOM.
+
+
+Army MI efforts are fully integrated with the Army Campaign Plan and focused on six key initiatives:
+- Increasing MI Capacity and Advanced Skills Readiness
+
+- Growing Army Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Capabilities
+- Force-wide Employment of Distributed Common Ground System-Army - Increasing Capacity of Army Cyberspace Operations - Expanding Persistent Surveillance & Exploitation Capabilities - Changing the Culture.
+
+
+## United States Navy
+
+ Naval Intelligence is the oldest continuous serving U.S. intelligence service, established on March 23, 1882.  Its mission today is to enable decision superiority for Navy commanders and operational forces by harmonizing intelligence and information operations efforts, and by achieving a penetrating knowledge of adversaries and a profound understanding of the maritime environment.
+
+The Director of Naval Intelligence, located in the Pentagon, is responsible for the oversight, planning, programming, strategy and policy of all Navy Intelligence organizations and activities.  The Navy's lead intelligence center, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), is headquartered at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) in Suitland, Maryland.  ONI is a major IC production center for maritime intelligence, analyzing and producing assessments of foreign naval capabilities, trends, operations and tactics, global civil maritime activity, and an extensive array of all-source analytical products. Naval Intelligence supports Joint Military Operations through embedded personnel in operational units or Expeditionary Intelligence teams.  Naval Intelligence also provides a maritime intelligence reach-back capability from ONI and an emerging network of Fleet intelligence centers, as well as Joint Task Force and Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers.
+
+
+
+## United States Air Force
+
+
+The Headquarters Air Force A2 is the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).  He or she provides policy, oversight, and guidance to all Air Force intelligence organizations.
+
+The Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AF ISR
+Agency), with headquarters at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, was activated on June 8, 2007.  Formerly, the Air Intelligence Agency, the Air Force ISR Agency is aligned under the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR as a Field Operating Agency. The Agency's mission is to organize, train, equip and present assigned forces and capabilities to conduct ISR for Combatant Commanders and the Nation.  It implements and oversees the execution of Air Force headquarters policy and guidance to expand Air Force ISR capabilities to meet current and future challenges. The Agency's 14,500 assigned personnel serve at 70 locations worldwide including the **70th Intelligence Wing** at Ft. Meade, Maryland, and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.  The AF ISR Agency commander serves as the Service Cryptologic Component under NSA, and oversees Air Force Signals Intelligence activities.
+
+## United States Marine Corps
+
+ The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) produces tactical and operational intelligence for tactical and operational commanders and their staffs, as well as for other customers.
+
+Its IC component is comprised of all intelligence professionals in the Marine Corps.
+
+Most Marine Corps intelligence professionals are integrated into operating forces at all echelons of command from battalion/squadron to Marine Expeditionary Force.
+
+The Marine Corps' **Director of Intelligence (DIRINT)** is its principal intelligence staff officer and is the service's functional manager for intelligence, counterintelligence, and cryptologic matters.
+
+Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), Quantico, Virginia, is the Marine Corps'
+service production center. In addition, MCIA supports other services and government organizations as appropriate.  It provides the Marine Corps with intelligence for planning, training, operations, systems development, and exercises.
+
+MCIA can be tasked to provide expeditionary warfare intelligence to support any national, theater, or operational command in the U.S. Armed Forces.  MCIA's analysis and production supports not only the Marine Corps, but also the national decisionmaker, theater commander, and tactical warfighter.
+
+## Department Of Homeland Security
+
+United States Coast Guard
+
+The United States Coast Guard is a military, multi-mission, maritime service within the Department of Homeland Security.  The Coast Guard is one of the Nation's five armed services.  A unique blend of humanitarian, law enforcement, regulatory, diplomatic, Intelligence Community, and military capabilities encompasses the five fundamental Coast Guard roles:  maritime security, maritime safety, protection of natural resources, maritime mobility and national defense.  It performs those missions in any maritime region in which those interests may be at risk, including international waters and America's coasts, ports, and inland waterways.  To assist in accomplishing the many diverse missions of the Coast Guard, senior leadership and operational commanders rely on the Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program. Because the Coast Guard employs unique expertise and capabilities in the maritime environment - in domestic ports, coastal waters, offshore regions, and even in foreign ports - where other U.S. Government agencies typically are not present, there exists the opportunity to collect intelligence that supports not only Coast Guard missions, but other national security objectives, as well.
+
+The Coast Guard's **Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program** includes its National Intelligence Element, the Criminal Investigations Service, the Counterintelligence Service, the Intelligence Coordination Center (the Coast Guard's production center) and the Cryptologic Service.  Its mission is to direct, coordinate, and oversee intelligence and investigative operations and activities that support all Coast Guard objectives by providing actionable (timely, accurate, and relevant) intelligence to strategic decision-makers, as well as operational and tactical commanders.  The Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Enterprise also supports the National Strategy for Homeland Security and applicable National Security objectives. The Coast Guard has fully implemented rigorous policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the mandatory information sharing provisions of Section 905(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act and Section 202 of the Homeland Security Act.  It continues to capture and share law enforcement information that is relevant to homeland security and national security with the Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence and Analysis Directorate and the Intelligence Community, where appropriate.
+
+
+Support to Coast Guard operations are also bolstered with the following intelligence and law enforcement activities:
+- Coast Guard Area Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (Pacific and Atlantic);
+
+- Sector Intelligence Officers at 26 Coast Guard Sectors;
+- Field Intelligence Support Offices at Coast Guard Sectors;
+- COASTWATCH and Targeting Programs at the ICC; - Global Maritime Intelligence Integration capability (partnering with the U.S.
+Navy and other key Intelligence Community members);
+- Permanent presence on the FBI's National Joint Terrorism Task Force
+(JTTFs) Offices and ad hoc JTTFs providing a maritime nexus and expertise;
+- Expanded participation in the Defense Attache System that provides unique
+access to non-traditional foreign partners;
+- National Tactical Integration Office - a TENCAP-like program that has
+increased the Coast Guard's maritime awareness in areas including fusion, identification of ships with imagery, anomaly detection and information sharing;
+- Operation Drydock, an interagency operation reviewing personnel holding
+Coast Guard-issued merchant mariner licenses and documents; and
+- Project Scorpion, a national-level collaborative effort with the Departments of
+Justice, Defense and Homeland Security to identify, track and intercept aliens of interest with possible terrorist or affiliate ties before they arrive in the United States via maritime means.
+
+Intelligence Community Legislative Affairs
+Points of Contact
+
+
+Telephone
+Fax
+Office of the Director of National Intelligence
+Office of Legislative Affairs
+(703) 275-2474
+(703) 275-1279 Central Intelligence Agency
+
+
+Office of Congressional Affairs
+(703) 482-4151
+(703) 482-0672 Defense Intelligence Agency Congressional Affairs Staff
+(703) 697-0012
+(703) 697-3687 Federal Bureau of Investigation
+
+Congressional Affairs
+(202) 324-4510
+(202) 324-6490
+
+National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
+Congressional Affairs Office
+(301) 227-7392
+(301) 227-7638 National Reconnaissance Office Congressional and Public Affairs
+(703) 808-1105
+(703) 808-1109 National Security Agency
+
+Legislative Affairs Office
+(301) 688-7246
+(443) 479-2888 Drug Enforcement Administration Congressional Affairs
+(202) 307-7423
+(202) 307-5512 Department of Energy Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
+(202) 586-5450
+(202) 586-4891 Department of Homeland Security Intelligence and Analysis Legislative Affairs
+(202) 447-5439
+(202) 772-9734 Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research
+(202) 647-2921
+(202) 647-2285
+
+Department of the Treasury
+Intelligence Support
+(202) 622-1900
+(202) 622-0534 U.S. Army Intelligence
+
+Legislative Liaison
+(703) 695-3918
+(703) 614-7599 U.S. Navy Intelligence Legislative Liaison
+(703) 695-4156
+(703) 693-0656 U.S. Air Force Intelligence Legislative Liaison
+(703) 693-9125
+(703) 697-8623 U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Legislative Liaison
+(703) 614-2522
+(703) 614-5888 U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence
+
+Legislative Liaison
+(202) 372-2700
+(202) 372-2973

markdown/misc/sand-uav.md

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+## Project Accomplishment Summary
+
+
+Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-
+AC04-94AL85000.
+
+
+Operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation Albuquerque, New Mexico
+
+# Project  Accomplishments  Summary Cooperative Research And Development Agreement (#1714) Between **Sandia National Labs** And Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation
+
+
+Note:  This Project Accomplishments Summary will serve to meet the requirements for a final abstract and final report as specified in Article XI of the CRADA.
+
+
+Title:  Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) Ultra-Persistence Research
+
+Final Abstract: Sandia National Laboratories and Northrop Grumman Corporation Integrated Systems, Unmanned Systems (NGIS UMS) collaborated to further ultra-persistence technologies for unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). The greatest shortfalls in UAV capabilities have been repeatedly identified as 1) insufficient flight persistence or "hang time," 2) marginal electrical power for running higher power avionics and payload systems, and 3) inadequate communications bandwidth and reach. NGIS UMS requested support from Sandia to develop an ultra-persistent propulsion and power system (UP3S) for potential incorporation into next generation UAV systems. The team members tried to determine which energy storage and power generation concepts could most effectively push UAV propulsion and electrical power capabilities to increase UAV sortie duration from days to months while increasing available electrical power at least two-fold. Primary research and development areas that were pursued included these goals: perform general system engineering and integration analyses; develop initial thermal and electrical power estimates; provide mass, volume, dimensional, and balance estimates; conduct preliminary safety assessments; assess logistics support requirements; perform, preliminary assessments of any security and safeguards; evaluate options for removal, replacement, and disposition of materials; generally advance the potential of the UP3S concept. The effort contrasted and compared eight heat sources technologies, three power conversion, two dual cycle propulsion system configurations, and a single electrical power generation scheme. Overall performance, specific power parameters, technical complexities, security, safety, and other operational features were successfully investigated. Large and medium sized UAV systems were envisioned and operational flight profiles were developed for each concept. Heat source creation and support challenges for domestic and expeditionary operations were considered. Fundamental cost driver analysis was also performed. System development plans were drafted in order to determine where the technological and programmatic critical paths lay. As a result of this effort, UAVs were to be able to provide far more surveillance time and intelligence information per mission while reducing the high cost of support activities. This technology was intended to create unmatched global capabilities to observe and preempt terrorist and weapon of mass destruction
+(WMD) activities. Various DOE laboratory and contractor personnel and facilities could have been used to perform detailed engineering, fabrication, assembly and test operations including follow-on operational support. Unfortunately, none of the results will be used in the near-term or mid-term future. NGIS UMS
+and SNL felt that the technical goals for the project were accomplished. NGIS UMS was quite pleased with the results of analysis and design although it was disappointing to all that the political realities would not allow use of the results. Technology and system designs evaluated under this CRADA had previously never been applied to unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). Based upon logistic support cost predictions, because the UAVs would not have had to refuel as often, forward basing support costs could have been reduced due to a decrease in the number and extent of support systems and personnel being required to operate UAVs in remote areas. Basic application of the advanced propulsion and power approach is well understood and industry now understands the technical, safety, and political issues surrounding implementation of these strategies.
+
+However, the overall economic impact was not investigated. The results will not be applied/implemented.
+
+No near-term benefit to industry or the taxpayer will be encountered as a result of these studies.
+
+
+Background: The state of the art in unmanned flight systems prior to this effort was to depend entirely on hydrocarbon or hydrogen fuels for propulsion and electrical power creation. This leads operational units to be reliant on costly and fragile long haul fuel supply chains in order to accomplish their missions. This CRADA effort was instituted to learn whether it was possible to break expensive traditional logistical support constructs and create a propulsion and power configuration that would drastically increase operational performance and remove the primary logistical load on operational units thereby allowing them to focus their critical resources on providing "more tooth" and "less tail." NGIS UMS and Sandia teamed to tackle this challenge since NGIS UMS had the industrial leadership position in unmanned flight systems while Sandia had extensive knowledge in the realm of alternative power technologies.
+
+Description: The purpose/objective of the project was to further ultra-persistence technologies for unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). The greatest shortfalls in UAV capabilities have been repeatedly identified as 1)
+insufficient flight persistence or "hang time," 2) marginal electrical power for running higher power avionics and payload systems, and 3) inadequate communications bandwidth and reach. This effort was broken into four task areas: Task 1 - UP3S Systems Engineering Analyses, Task 2 - UP3S Project Planning, Task 3 - Briefing Support, and Task 4 - Interim and Final Reports. Under task 1, Sandia conducted computer-based engineering and literature-based process analyses to meet the technical and programmatic requirements. Based on requirements and direction provided by NGIS
+UMS, Sandia performed focused studies to translate stated needs into conceptual designs and processes that could be transferred easily from Sandia to industry design and production personnel. Propulsion and power system topics included include fuel cycle analyses, scalability of systems, control systems, safety, security and safeguards analyses, electronic system survivability and hardness, decommissioning and disposal analyses, logistics support analyses including main operating base (MOB) issues, and life cycle cost analyses. Also, Sandia helped identify new processes, designs, hardware, software, safety, and reliability required for improved national UAV performance. Sandia assisted NGIS UMS to baseline at least one future UAV configuration with new energy and power systems to meet emerging U.S. military operational needs. Sandia conducted analyses at component and system-levels that emerged during the project. No physical asset testing or demonstrations was performed during this effort. Deliverables from Task 1 included the results of the analyses and studies, including presentation materials. Under task 2, Sandia and NGIS UMS developed technology development requirements, projected costs, schedule, manpower, facilities, equipment, associated resources, key experiments, demonstrations, tests, and decisions, operational system modifications versus new system acquisition. Deliverables from task 2
+included the results of the analyses and studies. Under task 3, Sandia helped the NGIS UMS UP3S team to develop and present briefing materials. Due to the nature of topical expertise required for the project and the dependence of NGIS UMS upon Sandia's subject matter experts (SMEs), Sandia supported NGIS UMS in providing "tag team" briefings to Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) upper management and non- NGC entities (e.g. industry partners, government). NGIS UMS staff presented the materials that NGIS
+UMS developed and in which they had expertise; Sandia did the same for its materials.  Finally, under task 4, Sandia provided progress reports to NGIS UMS at their request, using their format. Upon completion of the CRADA, Sandia provided a final out-brief to NGIS UMS. Accomplishments: The effort concentrated on propulsion and power technologies that went well beyond existing hydrocarbon technologies. It contrasted and compared eight heat sources technologies, three power conversion, two dual cycle propulsion system configurations, and a single electrical power generation scheme. Overall performance, specific power parameters, technical complexities, security, safety, and other operational features were successfully investigated. Large and medium sized UAV systems were envisioned and operational flight profiles were developed for each concept. Heat source creation and support challenges for domestic and expeditionary operations were considered. Fundamental cost driver analysis was also performed. System development plans were drafted in order to determine where the technological and programmatic critical paths lay. NGIS UMS and SNL felt that the technical goals for the project were accomplished. NGIS UMS was quite pleased with the results of analysis and design although it was disappointing to all that the political realities would not allow use of the results.
+
+Benefits to the Department of Energy: This project was intended to support specific strategic Defense Programs R&D goals, core competencies, and plans at the DOE facilities if the results were to be implemented. This project focused on supporting Sandia's Defense Systems and Assessments (DS&A) Strategic Management Unit (SMU) from the Integrated Military Systems (IMS) Center 5400 by promoting development of advanced propulsion and electric power generation for more electric unmanned aircraft (MEUA). Results were to be used in the next generation of unmanned air vehicles used for military and intelligence applications. Through these technologies, UAVs were to be able to provide far more surveillance time and intelligence information per mission while reducing the high cost of support activities. As investigation, development, and fielding of this new unmanned air vehicle (UAV) propulsion and power approach were to be achieved through the national labs, the United States would have created unmatched global capabilities to observe and preempt terrorist and weapon of mass destruction (WMD) activities. Various DOE laboratory and contractor personnel and facilities could have been used to perform detailed engineering, fabrication, assembly and test operations including follow-on operational support. None of the results are currently in use by DOE and it is doubtful that they will be used in the near-term or mid-term future. Currently, none of the results can be shared openly with the public due to national security constraints.
+
+Economic Impact: Technology and system designs evaluated under this CRADA have previously never been applied to unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). Use of these technologies would have provided system performance unparalleled by other existing technologies. Northrop Grumman and the U.S. military would have received new propulsion and power options that are not currently available. Based upon logistic support cost predictions, because the UAVs would not have had to refuel as often, forward basing support costs could have been reduced due to a decrease in the number and extent of support systems and personnel being required to operate UAVs in remote areas. Basic application of the advanced propulsion and power approach is well understood; however, the overall economic impact was not investigated due to termination of the effort. The results will not be applied/implemented. However, industry now understands the technical, safety, and political issues surrounding implementation of these strategies. Industry now knows how significantly aerial operations can be improved by using these propulsion and power approaches even though current political conditions will not allow use of the results. No near-term benefit to industry or the t axpayer will be encountered as a result of these studies.
+
+Project Status: Completed
+
+
+## Additional Information
+
+
+Laboratory/Department of Energy Facility Point of Contact for Information on Project Steven B. Dron
+Sandia National Laboratories PO Box 5800 MS 1158 Dept 5424, Bldg 971 Albuquerque, NM 87185 505.845.7126 (office) 505.284.1373 (FAX)
+Company Size and Points of Contact Industrial partner: Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems / Unmanned Systems (NGIS/UMS) Rancho Bernardo, CA Technical POC: Stephen Johnson 17066 Goldentop Rd Rancho Bernardo, CA stephen.johnson@ngc.com 949-678-9534
+CRADA Intellectual Property None Technology Commercialization No commercialization Project Examples There are no tangible items related to the project that could be used in a show and tell situation (e.g. during Congressional testimony). There are no photographs that help explain what was accomplished under the CRADA.
+
+## Project Accomplishments Summary
+
+Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (SCOS/01714)
+between Sandia National Laboratories and Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation This summary has been approved for public release by Sandia and Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation San~~Ji~i_~~ ~ab~~ories Principal Investigator Sandia National Laboratories WFO/CRADA Agreements Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation In order to expedite the process, if we do not receive your signed reply by 7 /z.t!/zOJ/
+we will assume your concurrence for the release of this document to the public.

markdown/misc/uap-2022.md

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+OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+## 2022 Annual Report On Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
+
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........ 2
+SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS ........ 3
+Scope ........ 3 Assumptions ........ 3
+GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES TO MANAGE UAP ISSUES ........ 4
+Establishment of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) ........ 4 ODNI Coordinating with AARO and Multi-Agency Partners, Seeking Opportunities to Assist in Collection, Reporting, and Analysis of UAP Incidents across the IC ........ 4
+CONTINUED REPORTING AND ROBUST ANALYSIS ARE PROVIDING BETTER
+FIDELITY ON UAP EVENTS, BUT MANY CASES REMAIN UNRESOLVED ........ 5
+UAP Reporting ........ 5 Partnerships and Collaboration ........ 5 Flight Safety Concerns and Health Implications ........ 6
+SUMMARY AND WAY AHEAD ........ 7 APPENDIX A: ANNUAL REPORT ON UAPFY 2022 NDAA ........ 8
+APPENDIX B: AARO ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE AND DUTIESFY 2022 NDAA
+........ 10
+APPENDIX C: INDEX OF KEY TERMS ........ 11
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) reporting is increasing, enabling a greater awareness of the airspace and increased opportunity to resolve UAP events.  In addition to the
+144 UAP reports covered during the 17 years of UAP reporting included in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) preliminary assessment, there have been 247 new reports and another 119 that were either since discovered or reported after the preliminary assessment's time period.  This totals 510 UAP reports as of 30 August 2022.  Additional information is provided in the classified version of this report.
+
+AARO and ODNI assess that the observed increase in the UAP reporting rate is partially due to a better understanding of the possible threats that UAP may represent, either as safety of flight hazards or as potential adversary collection platforms, and partially due to reduced stigma surrounding UAP reporting.  This increased reporting allows more opportunities to apply rigorous analysis and resolve events.
+
+The establishment of the Department of Defense (DoD) All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) should facilitate more coordinated UAP efforts, resulting in greater attribution of UAP.  While limited data on UAP continues to be a challenge, the establishment of AARO with its broad scope of authorities and responsibilities, and its replacement of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF)will allow for increased coordination of efforts against the UAP problem set.  AARO's authorities ensure that UAP detection and identification efforts will span across DoD and relevant interagency partners, as well as the Intelligence Community (IC), with the support and coordination of the National Intelligence Manager for Aviation (NIM-Aviation).  NIM-Aviation's and AARO's coordination efforts will improve U.S. Government awareness of objects in the airspace and resolution of UAP events (see Appendix B).
+
+UAP events continue to occur in restricted or sensitive airspace, highlighting possible concerns for safety of flight or adversary collection activity.  We continue to assess that this may result from a collection bias due to the number of active aircraft and sensors, combined with focused attention and guidance to report anomalies.  AARO, in conjunction with NIM-Aviation and the IC, will continue to investigate any evidence of possible foreign government involvement in UAP events.
+
+
+
+## Scope And Assumptions Scope
+
+This annual report is provided by ODNI in response to a requirement established in Section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Establishment of Office, Organizational Structure, and Authorities to Address Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.  Subsection (h) of that section states "the Director [of National Intelligence DNI], in consultation with the Secretary [of DefenseSECDEF], shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on unidentified aerial phenomena" (See Appendix A).
+
+In addition to responding to the required elements delineated in the NDAA, this report details the establishment and coordinating efforts between ODNI and the newly-created DoD
+AARO.  This report provides an overview for policymakers of UAP1 that have been reported since the 05 March 2021 information cut-off date for ODNI's preliminary assessment on UAP, published 25 June 2021.  Per the NDAA, AARO delivers quarterly reports on UAP to policymakers that contain greater detail regarding analysis and attribution of UAP events.
+
+This report was drafted by ODNI's NIM-Aviation in conjunction with AARO.  It includes input from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD[I&S]), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Air Force, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Energy (DoE), ODNI/NIM-Emerging and Disruptive Technology (NIM- EDT), ODNI/National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), and ODNI/National Intelligence Council (ODNI/NIC).
+
+## Assumptions
+
+Multiple factors affect the observation or detection of UAP, such as weather, illumination, atmospheric effects, or the accurate interpretation of sensor data.  Regarding review or analysis of UAP events, ODNI and AARO operate under the assumption that UAP reports are derived from the observer's accurate recollection of the event and/or sensors that generally operate correctly and capture enough real data to allow initial assessments.  However, ODNI and AARO acknowledge that a select number of UAP incidents may be attributable to sensor irregularities or variances, such as operator or equipment error.
+
+
+
+## Governmental Changes To Manage Uap Issues Establishment Of The All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (Aaro)
+
+The Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the USD(I&S) to establish an office with sufficient scope, authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities to continue the UAPTF efforts and meet the expanded criteria.  AARO was established as the UAPTF's successor entity on 20 July 2022.  Per its mandate, AARO has the authority to coordinate UAP efforts beyond DoD and is authorized to develop processes and procedures to synchronize and standardize collection, reporting, and analysis throughout not just DoD, but the IC as well, with the support and coordination of NIM-Aviation.  AARO will coordinate with other non-IC agencies such as the FAA, NASA, NOAA, and the non-IC elements of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy (DOE), as appropriate.  The broad scope of authority granted to AARO should enable them to leverage a multi-agency, whole-of-government approach to understanding, resolving, and attributing UAP in the future.
+
+## Odni Coordinating With Aaro And Multi-Agency Partners, Seeking Opportunities To Assist In Collection, Reporting, And Analysis Of Uap Incidents Across The Ic
+
+Since the June 2021 publication of ODNI's preliminary assessment on UAP, ODNI has developed strategic guidance to enhance further collection, which AARO and ODNI will leverage to prepare, collect, and report on UAP in a comprehensive manner for the IC.  NIM- Aviation will remain the IC's focal point for UAP issues, while AARO is the DoD focal point for these issues and related activities.  AARO will represent DoD to the interagency, Congress, media, and public, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OSD[PA]).  AARO's mission and responsibilities are contained in Appendix B.
+
+
+## Continued Reporting And Robust Analysis Are Providing Better Fidelity On Uap Events, But Many Cases Remain Unresolved Uap Reporting
+
+The ODNI preliminary assessment on UAP discussed 144 UAP reports and had an information cut-off date of 05 March 2021.  Since then, AARO received a total of 247 new UAP reports.  An additional 119 UAP reports on events that occurred before 05 March 2021, but were not included in the preliminary assessment, have been discovered or reported after the preliminary assessment's time period.  These 366 additional reports, when combined with the 144 reports identified in the preliminary assessment, bring the total UAP reports catalogued to date to 510.
+
+Since its establishment in July 2022, AARO has formulated and started to leverage a robust analytic process against identified UAP reporting.  Once completed, AARO's final analytic findings will be available in their quarterly reports to policymakers.  AARO's initial analysis and characterization of the 366 newly-identified reports, informed by a multi-agency process, judged more than half as exhibiting unremarkable characteristics:
+
+ 26 characterized as Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) or UAS-like entities;  163 characterized as balloon or balloon-like entities; and
+ 6 attributed to clutter.2
+Initial characterization does not mean positively resolved or unidentified.  This initial characterization better enables AARO and ODNI to efficiently and effectively leverage resources against the remaining 171 uncharacterized and unattributed UAP reports.  Some of these uncharacterized UAP appear to have demonstrated unusual flight characteristics or performance capabilities, and require further analysis.
+
+The majority of new UAP reporting originates from U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force aviators and operators who witnessed UAP during the course of their operational duties and reported the events to the UAPTF or AARO through official channels.  Regardless of the collection or reporting method, many reports lack enough detailed data to enable attribution of UAP with high certainty.
+
+## Partnerships And Collaboration
+
+ODNI and AARO are committed to the responsible sharing of UAP findings with interagency partners (such as FAA and NASA), other stakeholders, congressional oversight, international partners, and the public.  AARO is working closely with the OSD(PA) and mission partners to develop an information-sharing and messaging strategy that aims to maximize transparency, while maintaining appropriate protections of sensitive sources and methods.
+
+ODNI and AARO have maintained communication with our allied partners regarding UAP, keeping them informed of developments and U.S. initiatives.  The DoD and IC enterprises are working collaboratively to report, identify, and resolve UAP events.  Agencies across the IC have established standard operating procedures that will streamline UAP resolution.  For example, AARO's analytic methodology requires a whole-of-government approach to resolving UAP events, to include analysts and science and technology specialists, to help resolve UAP events.
+
+## Flight Safety Concerns And Health Implications
+
+UAP pose a safety of flight and collision hazard to air assets, potentially requiring aircraft operators to adjust flight patterns in response to their unauthorized presence in the airspace, operating outside of air traffic control standards and instruction.  To date, there have been no reported collisions between U.S. aircraft and UAP.  Regarding health concerns, there have also been no encounters with UAP confirmed to contribute directly to adverse health-related effects to the observer(s).  Acknowledging that health-related effects may appear at any time after an event occurs, AARO will track any reported health implications related to UAP should they emerge.
+
+
+
+## Summary And Way Ahead
+
+UAP continue to represent a hazard to flight safety and pose a possible adversary collection threat.  Since the publication of the ODNI preliminary assessment in June 2021, UAP
+reporting has increased, partially due to a concentrated effort to destigmatize the topic of UAP and instead recognize the potential risks that it poses as both a safety of flight hazard and potential adversarial activity.  Whereas there were previously 144 UAP reports covered during the 17 years of UAP reporting included in the ODNI preliminary assessment on UAP, there have been 247 more UAP reports during the 17 months since.  Combined with another 119 reports either discovered or reported late that fell within the original 17 year period but were not included in the preliminary assessment, a total of 510 UAP reports are currently catalogued.
+
+AARO has been established as the DoD focal point for UAP.  In an effort to gain fidelity on the nature of UAP and the possible risk UAP represent, Congress required the establishment of a central office for all UAP matters in the FY 2022 NDAA.  That office formally became operational as the AARO, under the USD(I&S), in July 2022.  AARO is the single focal point for all DoD UAP efforts, leading a whole-of-government approach to coordinate UAP collection, reporting, and analysis efforts throughout DoD, the IC, and beyond, to include other government agencies not in the IC, as well as foreign allies and partners of the United States.
+
+Coordinated efforts between DoD, the IC, and other government agencies to collect and report UAP events have resulted in increased data sets, spanning multiple security domains.  AARO, in coordination with the IC, is focused on identifying solutions to manage and alleviate the resulting data problem, including the intake, indexing, visualization, and analysis of that data across multiple security domains.  We are confident that continued multi-agency cooperative UAP prosecution activities will likely result in greater awareness of objects in and across the air, space, and maritime domains, as well as the nature and origin of UAP in the future.  The establishment of AARO and application of AARO's new analytic process to this detailed reporting will increase resolution of UAP events.
+
+
+
+## Appendix A: Annual Report On UapFy 2022 Ndaa
+
+Subsection (h) of section 1683 (Establishment of Office, Organizational Structure, and Authorities to Address Unidentified Aerial Phenomena) of the FY 2022 NDAA (Public Law 117-
+81) listed requirements for an Annual Report on UAP matters.  In the subsection, the term "the Director" refers to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and the term "the Secretary"
+refers to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).  The text of the subsection is below. (1) Requirement.  Not later than 31 October 2022, and annually thereafter until 31 October 2026, the Director, in consultation with the Secretary, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on unidentified aerial phenomena. (2) Elements.  Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the following information:
+(A) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during the one-year period. (B) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during a period other than that one-year period but were not included in an earlier report. (C) An analysis of data and intelligence received through each reported unidentified aerial phenomena related event. (D) An analysis of data relating to unidentified aerial phenomena collected through:
+
+(i) Geospatial intelligence; (ii) Signals intelligence; (iii) Human intelligence; and (iv) Measurement and signature intelligence.
+(E) The number of reported unidentified aerial phenomena over restricted air space of the United States during the one-year period. (F) An analysis of such incidents identified under subparagraph (E). (G) Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by unidentified aerial phenomena to the national security of the United States. (H) An assessment of any activity regarding unidentified aerial phenomena that can be attributed to one or more adversarial foreign governments. (I) Identification of any incidents or patterns regarding unidentified aerial phenomena that indicate a potential adversarial foreign government may have achieved a breakthrough aerospace capability. (J) An update on the coordination by the United States with allies and partners on efforts to track, understand, and address unidentified aerial phenomena. (K) An update on efforts underway on the ability to capture or exploit discovered unidentified aerial phenomena.
+
+(L) An assessment of any health-related effects for individuals that have encountered unidentified aerial phenomena. (M) The number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena with military nuclear assets, including strategic nuclear weapons and nuclearpowered ships and submarines. (N) In consultation with the Administrator for Nuclear Security, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena associated with facilities or assets associated with the production, transportation, or storage of nuclear weapons or components thereof. (O) In consultation with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena or drones of unknown origin associated with nuclear power generating stations, nuclear fuel storage sites, or other sites or facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (P) The names of the line organizations that have been designated to perform the specific functions under subsections (c) and (d), and the specific functions for which each such line organization has been assigned primary responsibility.
+
+## Notes:
+
+1. Subsection (c), referenced in subsection (h) (P) above, is titled Response to and Field
+Investigations of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.
+2. Subsection (d), referenced in subsection (h) (P) above, is titled Scientific,
+Technological, and Operational Analyses of Data on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.
+
+## Appendix B: Aaro Establishment Of Office And DutiesFy 2022 Ndaa
+
+Subsection (a) of section 1683 (Establishment of Office, Organizational Structure, and Authorities to Address Unidentified Aerial Phenomena) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81) established an office designated to replace the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF), later identified as the Alldomain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO).  AARO was established on 20 July 2022. Subsection (b) of section 1683 delineated that office's duties.  The text of these subsections is as follows:
+(a) Establishment of Office.  Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish an office within a component of the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to carry out the duties of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, as in effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act, and such other duties as are required by this section. (b) Duties.  The duties of the Office established under subsection (a) shall include the following:
+(1) Developing procedures to synchronize and standardize the collection, reporting, and analysis of incidents, including adverse physiological effects, regarding unidentified aerial phenomena across the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. (2) Developing processes and procedures to ensure that such incidents from each component of the Department and each element of the Intelligence Community are reported and incorporated in a centralized repository. (3) Establishing procedures to require the timely and consistent reporting of such incidents. (4) Evaluating links between unidentified aerial phenomena and adversarial foreign governments, other foreign governments, or nonstate actors.
+
+(5) Evaluating the threat that such incidents present to the United States. (6) Coordinating with other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, as appropriate, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Department of Energy. (7) Coordinating with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate, to better assess the nature and extent of unidentified aerial phenomena. (8) Preparing reports for Congress, in both classified and unclassified form, including under section (i).
+
+
+
+## Appendix C: Index Of Key Terms
+
+This report uses the following defining terms:
+
+ **Range Fouler:** Defined by U.S. Navy aviators based on observations of UAP
+interrupting pre-planned training or other military activity in military operating areas or restricted airspace.
+ **Transmedium Objects or Devices:** Objects or devices that are observed to transition
+between space and the atmosphere, or between the atmosphere and bodies of water, that are not immediately identifiable.
+ **Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP):** Airborne objects not immediately
+identifiable.  The acronym UAP represents the broadest category of airborne objects reviewed for analysis.
+ **UAP Event:** A holistic description of an occurrence during which a pilot or aircrew
+witnessed (or detected) a UAP.
+ **UAP Incident:** A specific part of the event.  **UAP Report:** Documentation of a UAP event to include verified chains of custody
+and basic information such as the time, date, location, and description of the UAP. UAP reports include Range Fouler reports and other reporting.

markdown/misc/unresolved.md

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+## Unresolved Questions Regarding Us Government Attribution Of A Mobile Biological Production Capacity By Iraq Milton Leitenberg
+
+On November 20, 2005, on April 11, 2006, and on June 25, 2006, three long stories appeared in the US press regarding the Iraqi informant codenamed "Curveball" and the information which contributed to the allegation of a mobile biological production capacity by Iraq.1  However, the largest and most detailed compendium of material regarding Curveball, the information that he provided, and its handling and interpretation by US intelligence officials appears in the Silberman- Robb Commission Report, The Report to the President of the United States by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.2  A second lengthy official source, the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report, is unfortunately marred by numerous and lengthy deletions.3
+During 2002, the very limited number of individuals in the US intelligence community who were privy to information about Curveball and his testimony were divided as to its credibility.  Expressions of doubt about his personal credibility were repeatedly prevented from reaching senior intelligence officials, and they were never disclosed to Secretary of State Powell.  Some officials doubted Curveball's stories, some believed them, and a critical few championed them with passion.  Eventually the question became a policy dispute rather than one of intelligence:  would reference to the supposed existence of an Iraqi mobile BW production capability be included in President Bush's State of the Union address early in January 2003, and then in Secretary of State Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council on February 4, 2003.  Some officials such as the CIA's European Operations Chief advised deletion, but the entry would nevertheless subsequently reappear, indication of either incredible incompetence or suggestive of the likelihood of the influence and channelling of raw intelligence through Vice President Cheney's office.
+The June 20, 2006 PBS TV documentary, "The Dark Side," alleged that I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, US Vice President Cheney's chief-of-staff drafted Powell's presentation to the United Nations.  If correct, this may explain the nature of much of its contents.4
+In the extensive discussion of "Curveball" in the Silberman-Robb Commission Report, one finds a very brief and cryptic reference to the supposed vehicles on page 98:  "Confirmation/replication of the described design by U.S. contractors (it works)."  The reference for this entry reads "Electronic mail from EA/DDCI from DO
+(Proofread) (Dec. 20, 2002)."  [EA refers to Executive Assistant, DDCI to Deputy Director Central Intelligence, and DO to Director of Operations.]5
+John E. McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, has now publicly released the information that "the processes he [Curveball] described had been assessed by an independent laboratory as workable engineering designs."6  It is plausible that this comment parallels the sentence in the Commission's report written by the EA/DDCI.  Since one does not know what the words "it works" in the CIA email entail, this sentence could imply less, the same, or more, but that is unknowable from the few words alone.  Several questions are immediately apparent:
+
+ What was the "independent laboratory" that carried out this work?
+ What does "workable engineering designs" mean?  Was it no more than a
+computer simulation of equipment and process, or was it a hardware mockup? And if it was a hardware mockup, was an attempt made to produce an actual agent or simulant using the mockup to literally demonstrate that "it works," as the two words imply?
+It is possible that information from a separate group of press reports may be relevant  but that is not immediately clear or certain.  In July 2003, there were three press reports about a truck platform that Dr. Steven Hatfill arranged to have constructed towards the end of 2001 under government contract at A.F.W.
+
+Fabrication, a metalworking plant in Frederick, Maryland.7  These reports describe this project as a contract to SAIC, the Science Applications International Corporation, by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, US Department of Defense, for the US Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  It was supposedly intended for use in training members of the Delta Force.  The *New York Times* reported that Three years ago the United States began a secret project to train Special Operations units to detect and disarm mobile germ factories of the sort that Iraq and some other countries were suspected of building... the heart of the effort was a covert plan to construct a mobile germ plant, real in all its parts, but never actually 'plugged in' to make weapons.  In the months before the war against Iraq, American commandos trained on this factory. ...The secret trainer is similar to the mobile units that the Bush administration has accused Iraq of building to produce biological weapons.
+The *Washington Post* report also described the platform as a "replica of the mobile biological weapons production laboratories that the Pentagon believed troops might encounter in Iraq."  The *New York Times* reporters quote "experts" that they had interviewed as saying that "The trainer's equipment includes a fermenter, a centrifuge, and a mill for grinding clumps of anthrax into the best size for penetrating human lungs."
+ The SAIC/Hatfill vehicle was built on an "18-wheel trailer" truck.  It was reportedly under construction beginning in September 2001.  Dr. Hatfill reportedly was provided with information by William Patrick on US designs for mobile anthrax production that had been prepared in the early 1950s.  Patrick is a well-known researcher who had worked in the US offensive biological weapons program that existed prior to 1969.   The *New York Times* reporters wrote, rather remarkably, that
+"Mr. Patrick described [to Dr. Hatfill] the old American plans in detail.... The collaboration, experts said, produced a novel design that demonstrated a number of ways to multiply viruses and bacteria, including the use of fermentation, chicken eggs, and tissue culture.  It was not meant to replicate Iraqi threats or American designs but instead to illustrate a range of mobile biological threats." 8  There are no publicly available photographs of the vehicle that was being constructed under the SAIC contract, but the inclusion of a capability for virus production, egg culture and tissue culture seems very improbable.  Military officers at Fort Bragg and at the headquarters of the US Special Operations Command interviewed for the three press reports as well as Mr. Patrick all claimed that the truck platform and the equipment that it carried was "nonfunctional," that piping was not connected. Can this truck-trailer platform also have served for what the CIA refers to as the "Confirmation/replication of the described design by U.S. contractors (it works)"? One would not think that the truck platform would be referred to as "an independent laboratory," but the possibility cannot be excluded that these words refer to the SAIC contractor.
+Curveball claimed that Iraq began production of BW agents in one of several mobile production units as early as 19979, although the Silberman-Robb report states that he had been released from his position at Iraq's Chemical Engineering and Design Center, the CEDC, in 1995.  This is explained in further detail below. CIA/WINPAC reporting became progressively wildly extravagant, stating that Iraq had a "broad range of lethal and incapacitating agents," that the "BW program is more robust than it was prior to the Gulf War," that Iraq "maintains a wide range of...biological agents and delivery systems," that use might even take place against the continental US, and that Iraq might employ as many as 21 different biological agents, a list in all likelihood composed of a sizable portion of the US CDC Select Agent list.10  All these internal US intelligence reports would prove to be total fantasy.
+
+Information obtained in interviews connects some of these questions, but alters the context of the vehicle's construction in an important way.  It suggests that:
+
+ The SAIC/Hatfill truck platform was constructed using Curveball's drawings.  (As
+will be explained in a moment, the public depiction of these was actually not
+Curveball's.)  This may or may not be consistent with the information provided to the press that the vehicle's design was more general, and/or based on old US conceptions dating from the 1950s.
+ That the US government contractor may have been the CIA's WINPAC division.
+Whether this contradicts the earlier press description, whether it is consistent with them, or whether it implies two different efforts is one of the central questions.
+ And that the truck also served as a "concept design" to support Secretary of State
+Powell's presentation to the United Nations on February 5, 2003.
+If construction of the SAIC/Hatfill vehicle began in September 2001, the genesis, planning and arrangements for the contract would have taken place in the spring or summer of 2001.  That is before any notion of invading Iraq was an active consideration by the administration, as it became in the days immediately following September 2001.11  And of course it was also long before anyone could envision that Secretary of State Powell would be making a presentation to the UN Security Council and what the content of that presentation might include.  It is, however, consistent with the timeline of the information provided by Curveball, which was essentially in US hands by 2000.  This would suggest that the original purpose of the platform was to test or to replicate Curveball's designs, but that as the deployment of US Special Forces to Iraq became imminent, it may also have served the function of their training.12  Finally, once Secretary Powell's UN presentation and the special CIA intelligence report were produced, the vehicle platform may have served as the
+"concept design" also.
+Where did the notion of the possibility of an Iraqi mobile BW production capability come from?  In 1995, Lt. General Amir al-Sa'adi told UNSCOM officials that in 1988 he had suggested that perhaps Iraq should develop its BW production on mobile platforms.  The suggestion was rejected as not being feasible, and some fixed facilities were converted from other uses, while others were constructed.
+During the war against Iran, General Sa'adi had been the head of the Iraq government's Special Office for Technical Industry (SOTI) and he later became the deputy to General Hussein Kammel, the head of all of Iraq's WMD programs, in the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI).  General Sa'adi proposed only "a concept."  He produced no specific drawings or plans.  Curveball could therefore not have seen any prior set of drawings.
+
+However, Curveball's drawings were reported to be very crude.  They bore no relation to General Sa'adi's "concept," and they probably also bore little relation to the illustrations which eventually appeared in Secretary Powell's UN presentation on February 4, 2003,13 or to the US CIA/DIA report released on May 28, 2003
+describing what would prove to be imaginary Iraqi BW production vehicles.14  These illustrations of a three-platform set of vehicles and the components mounted on them were obviously substantially elaborated by CIA draughtsman.  Secretary Powell clearly indicates this in his UN presentation by saying that "these drawings [are] based on their description," and by the preceding sentence that "The description our sources gave us of the technical features *required* by such facilities are highly detailed and extremely accurate...we know what the fermenters look like, we know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like."  It is important to note that in the days preceding Secretary Powell's UN presentation, he was never informed of doubts at the CIA and DIA concerning the credibility of information provided by Curveball.15    Not only was Secretary Powell's claim for the most part false, it indicated at the same time the "value added" input of the US intelligence agencies.  It should also be pointed out that a British government report also alleged the existence of such Iraqi vehicles, although it included no drawings.16
+The most exhaustive, detailed and authoritative compendium of information on the two single vehicle platforms that Iraq did possess, and that US forces found in Iraq in April and May 2003, exists in the report of the Iraq Survey Group.  They were the *Mobile Hydrogen Field Production System*, "...two trailers to produce hydrogen gas for meteorological station purposes."17  They produced hydrogen in a chemical reactor to fill balloons to test wind direction for artillery fire.
+
+But it was the ISG report Annex immediately preceding the one which describes the two hydrogen-producing trailers that is of even greater value for understanding the information provided by Curveball.  It discusses a Seed Purification Project to produce "agricultural seed sorting and fungicide treatment systems," presumably primarily for feed grains.18
+...The seed project began in 1994. ...The seed purification units were designed, fabricated, and installed by the CEDC.  The designer considered producing a mobile system, but decided on fixed plants in buildings.  The final plant design was based on the reverse engineering of a Germanmanufactured seed purification plant in Tikrit.19
+The CEDC was responsible not only for the seed purification project but also the "single cell protein project" that was, together with the insecticide BT, one of the two "covers" for Iraq's dedicated Al Hakam BW production facility for biological weapons.  Curveball was a chemical engineer working at the CEDC until 1995, when he lost his position.  This may serve to explain two things.  It may explain why Curveball could describe some sort of mobile platform, and perhaps also how he could have offered the technical details that so impressed, and as is acutely described in the Silberman-Robb report, fooled the CIA/WINPAC analyst. Alternatively, as discussed below, Curveball's CEDC position may simply have provided the bona fide for his credibility, even if his narrative about mobile BW production vehicles was not based on his own CEDC experience with a proposed mobile seed purification vehicle.
+
+After Curveball lost his position at the CEDC in 1995 he apparently traveled in North Africa before reaching Germany.  No one knows exactly where he was between 1997 and 1999.  During the period from the end of 1999 on, during which Curveball was providing information to the German intelligence service (BND), he disappeared on several occasions.  Curveball's brother served as a low-level bodyguard for Ahmad Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC).  The organization had been funded by the CIA and the DIA at different times, and it maintained an office in London at which Chalabi was often located.  If one looks at both Secretary Powell's UN presentation and the subsequent CIA/DIA report concerning the mobile vehicles, both refer to second, third and fourth sources that are described as corroborating Curveball's information.  If one reads the relevant lines carefully, the supposed "corroborations" are tenuous.  Secretary Powell's descriptions are by far the loosest and extended.  Two of these subsequent informants were supplied to US intelligence agencies by the INC.  The third approached the UK government, and apparently could only report hearsay.  It is conceivable that word of what Curveball was telling the BND reached INC
+headquarters, possibly via meetings with his brother, enabling INC officials to prompt the two informants that they subsequently supplied at least as to the general framework of what they should say.  There are other ways in which interactions between the INC, Chalabi, and Curveball could have taken place, or in which relevant information could have reached Chalabi.
+Curveball's information was provided to the German intelligence services from late-1999 through 2001, and much of it had reached US intelligence agencies during 2000.  (The Silberman-Robb report states that "Curveball began reporting in January
+2000"; this however is apparently when the first reports reached US intelligence services.)  Construction of the SAIC Hatfill-contracted vehicle reportedly began in September 2001.  The date on the EA/DDCI email message quoted in the Silberman- Robb report is dated December 20, 2002, more than a full year later. This suggests the likelihood that the claim that "it works," and the assessment "by an independent laboratory as workable engineering designs" was a separate endeavor. Where that took place, by which contractor it was carried out, and how far the evaluation of "workable" went, all remain unknown.
+
+Taken together the information provided here suggests two possibilities, perhaps all or in part contradictory, perhaps with overlapping particulars.  First, that the SAIC/Hatfill truck platform was based as much or more on the abstract conceptions of necessary components for such a vehicle, together with the CIA's elaborated illustrations, as it was on Curveball's possible drawings.  And that this platform is what is being referred to in the Silberman-Robb report, as well as in DDCI John McLaughlin's comment.  Additionally, that in some way it was used by the CIA to validate the information provided for President Bush's State-of-the-Union remarks as well as Secretary Powell's presentation to the United Nations.  Alternatively, it suggests that the quoted line in the Silberman-Robb Commission Report refers to a separate and as yet publicly unidentified effort.  All of these questions remain questions and they remain unresolved.
+
+home phone: 301-340-3049
+
+Washington Post, April 12, 2006; and Joby Warrick, "Warnings on WMD 'Fabricator' Were Ignored, Ex-CIA Aide Says," *Washington Post*, June 25, 2006.  See also David Barstow, "Doubts on Source for Key Piece of Data Were Suppressed, Report Says," *New York Times*, April 1, 2005.
+A sizable number of shorter press reports concerned with the same subject matter appeared in 2003,
+2004 and 2005.  Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, "Iraqi Defector's Tales Bolstered U.S. Case for War; Colin Powell presented the U.N. with details on mobile germ factories, which came from a nowdiscredited source known as 'Curveball'," *Los Angeles Times*, March 28, 2004; Glenn Kessler, "Powell Expresses Doubts About Basis for Iraqi Weapons Claim," *Washington Post*, April 3, 2004; Christopher Marquis, "Powell Blames C.I.A. for Error on Iraq Mobile Labs," *New York Times*, April 3, 2004; Douglas Jehl, "Agency Disputes View of Trailers as Labs," *New York Times*, June 26, 2003;
+Dafna Linzer and Barton Gellman, "Doubts on Weapons Were Dismissed, *Washington Post*, April 1,
+2005; Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, "'Curveball' Debacle Reignites CIA Feud; The former agency chief and his top deputy deny reports that they were told a key source for Iraqi intelligence was deemed unreliable," *Los Angeles Times*, April 2, 2005; and Evelyn Pringle, "About Iraq - Not So Fast Colin Powell," opednews.com, April 30, 2006.
+
+2 Released on March 31, 2005.  Chapter One, Biological Warfare, pp. 80-111; 214-225. 3 United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Washington, DC, July 7, 2004, pp. 148-162.
+
+4 PBS/Frontline, The Dark Side, 2006, http://www,obs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/. 5 The endnote for the line quoted appears on page 221 of the report, #340. 6 "Statement of John E. McLaughlin, Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Sunday, June 25,
+2006; Delivered April 1, 2005 in Response to Final Report of the Silberman-Robb
+> Commission," http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/24/AR2006062401194.html?referrer=email.
+
+The author has had a copy of this statement since April 2005.  The hope had been that several members of the press who also had the statement, or the critical line in it, for various periods of time in 2005 and 2006, might be able to get to the bottom of the unanswered questions reviewed here. But that has not happened.
+
+7 William J. Broad, David Johnston, and Judith Miller, "After The War:  Biological Warfare.  Subject of Anthrax Inquiry Tied to Anti-Germ Training," *New York Times*, July 2, 2003; Scott Shane, "Hatfill's Biowar Classes May Have Led to Scrutiny.  Training work that won commendation helped attract attention of FBI," *Baltimore Sun*, July 3, 2003; Maryland W. Thompson, "Anthrax Suspect Trained U.S. Team on Bioweapons:  Hatfill Had Lost his Security Clearance," *Washington Post*, July 3, 2003.
+
+The SAIC contract was reported as being in the name of "Dr. Joseph Soukup, a vice president for biomedical science," and Dr. Steven Hatfill.
+
+8 Broad , Johnston and Miller, "After the War," July 2, 2003. 9 Silberman-Robb, p. 83. 10 Silberman-Robb, p. 85.
+
+11 PBS/Frontline, The Dark Side, 2006, http://www,obs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/; Steven Coll. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, New York:  Penguin Books, 2004; and Ronald Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11, New York: Simon &
+Schuster, 2006.  See also, James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: the History of Bush's War Cabinet*, New York:  Viking, 2004 and James Bamford, A Pretext for War:  9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies, New York:  Doubleday, 2004.
+
+12 There is always the outside possibility that the Special Forces training purpose may be spurious, a
+"cover story," but that seems unlikely.
+
+
+15 See in particular, Silberman-Robb, and Warrick, "Warnings on WMD 'Fabricator'," June 25, 2006. 16 "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction:  The Assessment of the British Government," September 24,
+2002.
+Informally known as the "Iraq Dossier," on page 22 it states "UNSCOM established that Iraq considered the use of mobile biological agent production facilities.  In the past two years evidence from defectors has indicated the existence of such facilities.  Recent intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities.  These would help Iraq conceal and protect biological agent production from military attack or UN inspection," published in *Comparative Strategy*, 22 (2003), pp. 63-108.
+
+17 *The Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraqi WMD*, September 30, 2004, Annex D. Trailers Suspected of Being Mobile BW Agent Production Units, pp. 79-98.
+
+18 *The Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraqi WMD*, September 30, 2004, Annex C.  ISG Investigation of Iraq's Reported Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Capability, pp. 73-78.
+
+19 *Ibid*., pp. 73-75.

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