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+## Administrative Instruction
+
+May 20, 2015
+Incorporating Change 2, February 10, 2022
+SUBJECT: Historical Research in the Files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense References: See Enclosure 1
+1. PURPOSE.  In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5105.53 (Reference (a)) and Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (c)), this administrative instruction (AI) reissues AI 50 (Reference (d)), to implement policy and update procedures for the programs that permit authorized personnel to perform historical research in records created by or in the custody of OSD consistent with References (e) through (l)). 2. APPLICABILITY.  This AI applies to:
+a. OSD, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities in the National Capital Region that are serviced by Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) (referred to collectively in this AI
+as the "WHS-serviced Components")
+b. All historical researchers as defined in the Glossary. c. Cabinet level officials, former Presidential appointees (FPAs) to include their personnel, aides, and researchers, seeking access to records containing information they originated, reviewed, signed, or received while serving in an official capacity.
+
+3. POLICY.  It is OSD policy that:
+a. Pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (Reference (e)), anyone requesting access to classified material must possess the requisite security clearance.
+
+b. Members of the public seeking the declassification of DoD documents under the provisions of section 3.5 of Reference (e) will contact the appropriate OSD Component as listed in DoD 5230.30-M (Reference (f)).
+
+c. Records and information requested by FPA and approved historical researchers will be accessed at a facility under the control of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), NARA's Archives II in College Park, Maryland, a Presidential library, or an appropriate U.S. military facility or a DoD activity, in accordance with Volume 3 of DoD Manual 5200.01 (Reference (i)).
+d. Access to records and information will be limited to the specific records within the scope of the proposed research request over which OSD has authority and to any other records for which the written consent of other agencies with authority has been granted in accordance with Reference (i).
+e. Access to unclassified OSD Component records and information will be permitted consistent with the restrictions of the exemptions of section 552(b) of Title 5, United States Code (also known and referred to in this AI as the "Freedom of Information Act" (FOIA) (Reference (m)), DoD Manual 5400.07 (Reference (g)), Enclosure 2 of this AI, and consistent with DoD 5400.11-R (Reference (h)).  The procedures for access to classified information will be used if the requested unclassified information is contained in OSD files whose overall markings are classified.
+
+f. Except as otherwise provided in (Reference (i), no person may have access to classified information unless that person has been determined to be trustworthy and access is essential to the accomplishment of a lawful and authorized purpose.
+
+g. Persons outside the Executive Branch who are engaged in approved historical research projects may be granted access to classified information, consistent with the provisions of References (e) and (i), provided that the OSD official with classification jurisdiction over that information grants access.
+
+h. Contractors working for Executive Branch agencies may be allowed access to classified OSD Component files provided the contractors meet all the required criteria for such access as an historical researcher including the appropriate level of personnel security clearance set forth in paragraphs 3a and 3i of this enclosure.  No copies of OSD records and information may be released directly to the contractors.  The Washington Headquarters Services Records and Declassification Division (WHS/RDD) will be responsible for ensuring that the contractor safeguards the documents and the information is only used for the project for which it was requested per section 4.1 of Reference (e).
+i. All DoD-employed requesters, to include DoD contractors, must have critical nuclear weapons design information (CNWDI) to access CNWDI information.  All other non DoD and non-Executive Branch personnel must have a Department of Energy-issued "Q" clearance to access CNWDI information in accordance with Part 117 of Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (Reference (n)).
+
+j. The removal of federal records and information from OSD custody is not authorized; this includes copies and e-mail according to Part 1230.10 of Title 36, CFR (Reference (j)).  Copies of records and information that are national security classified will remain under the control of the agency.
+
+k. Access for FPAs is limited to records they originated, reviewed, signed, or received while serving as Presidential appointees, unless there is another basis for providing access, in accordance with Reference (i).
+
+l. Authorization is required from all agencies whose classified information is, or is expected to be, in the requested files before granting approval for access.  Separate authorizations for access to records and information maintained in OSD Component office files or at the federal records centers will not be required in accordance with Reference (i).
+
+## 4. Responsibilities.  See Enclosure 3.
+
+5. PROCEDURES.  See Enclosures 4 - 9. 6. RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release**.  This AI is available on the DoD Issuances Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. 7. SUMMARY OF CHANGE 2.  The changes to this issuance are administrative and, in accordance with the February 1, 2022 WHS Memorandum (Reference (q)):
+a. Reassigns the Director of Administration, Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense responsibilities and duties to the Director of Administration and Management (DA&M) in accordance with Section 901 of Public Law 116- 283 (Reference (r)), which eliminated the position of the Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense effective January 1, 2021, and Reference (c), which implemented Reference (q) and reestablished the DA&M.
+
+b. Updates references, websites, and organizational symbols for currency and accuracy.
+
+8.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This AI is effective May 20, 2015.
+
+
+
+David Tillotson III
+
+Assistant Deputy Chief Management Officer Enclosures
+
+1.  References 2.  Explanation of FOIA Exemptions and Classification Categories 3.  Responsibilities
+4.  Procedures for Historical Researchers Permanently Assigned Within the Executive
+Branch Working on Official Projects
+5.  Procedures for the DoS Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Series
+6.  Procedures for Historical Researchers Not Permanently Assigned to the Executive Branch 7.  Procedures for Document Review for the FRUS Series 8.  Procedures for Copying Documents
+9.  General Guidelines for Researching DoD Records
+
+## Glossary Enclosure 1 References
+
+
+(a)
+DoD Directive 5105.53, "Director of Administration and Management (DA&M),"
+February 26, 2008
+(c) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Re-establishment of the Assistant to the
+Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight and the Director of Administration and Management," January 11, 2021
+(d) Administrative Instruction 50, "Historical Research in the Files of the Office of the
+Secretary of Defense," July 23, 2007 (hereby cancelled)
+(e) Executive Order 13526, "Classified National Security Information," December 29, 2009
+(f)
+DoD Manual 5230.30-M, "DoD Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Program,"
+December 22, 2011, as amended
+(g) DoD Manual 5400.07, "DoD Freedom of Information Act Program," January 25, 2017 (h) DoD 5400.11-R "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 14, 2007
+(i)
+DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, "DoD Information Security Program:  Protection of
+Classified Information," February 24, 2012, as amended
+(j)
+Parts 1230.10 and 1236 of Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations
+(k) DoD Instruction 5230.09, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release," January 25,
+2019
+(l)
+Part 197.5 of Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations
+(m) Section 552(b) of Title 5, United States Code
+(n) Part 117 of Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations
+(o) DoD Instruction 5230.29, "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public
+Release," August 13, 2014, as amended
+(p) Public Law 102-138, "Title IV - The Foreign Relations of the United States Historical
+Series," October 28, 1991
+(q) Washington Headquarters Services Memorandum, "Approval of Administrative Changes to
+ODA&M DoD Issuances," February 1, 2022
+(r)
+Public Law 116-283, "William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act
+for Fiscal Year 2021," January 1, 2021
+
+
+## Enclosure 2 Explanation Of Foia Exemptions And Classification Categories
+
+ 1.  EXPLANATION OF FOIA EXEMPTIONS.  Exemptions and their explanations are provided in the Table.  See Section 5 of Reference (g) for further information.
+
+## Table.  Explanation Of Foia Exemptions
+
+ Exemption
+Explanation
+(b)(1)
+Applies to records and information currently and properly classified in the interest of national security.
+(b)(2)
+Applies to records related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.
+(b)(3)
+Applies to records and information protected by another law that specifically exempts the information from public release.
+(b)(4)
+Applies to records and information on trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a private source which would cause substantial competitive harm to the source if disclosed.
+(b)(5)
+Applies to records and information of internal records that are deliberative in nature and are part of the decision making process that contain opinions and recommendations.
+(b)(6)
+Applies to records or information the release of which could reasonably be expected to constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals.
+(b)(7)
+Applies to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes that could:  (a) reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings; (b) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication; (c) reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others; (d) disclose the identity of a confidential source; (e) disclose investigative techniques and procedures; or (f) reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.
+(b)(8)
+Applies to records and information for the use of any agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.
+(b)(9)
+Applies to records and information containing geological and geophysical information (including maps) concerning wells.
+
+ 2.  CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES.  Information will not be considered for classification unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security in accordance with section 1.2 of Reference (e), and it pertains to one or more of the following:
+a.  Military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
+
+
+b.  Foreign government information;
+c.  Intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or
+cryptology;
+d.  Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
+e.  Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
+f.  U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
+g.  Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or
+protection services relating to the national security; or
+h.  The development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.
+
+
+## Enclosure 3 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  DA&M.  The DA&M, or designee, is the approval authority for access to DoD information in OSD Component files and in files at the National Archives, Presidential libraries, and other similar institutions in accordance with Reference (f). 2.   OSD RECORDS ADMINISTRATOR.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the DA&M, through the Director, WHS, the OSD Records Administrator:
+a.  Exercises approval authority for research access to OSD and WHS Serviced Components records, information, and the Historical Research Program.
+
+b.  Maintains records necessary to process and monitor each case.
+
+c.  Obtains all required authorizations.
+
+d.  Obtains, when warranted, the legal opinion of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense regarding the requested access.
+
+e.  Coordinates, with the originator, on the public release review on documents selected by the researchers for use in unclassified projects in accordance with DoD Instruction 5230.09 (Reference (k)) and DoD Instruction 5230.29 (Reference (o)).
+
+f.  Coordinates requests with the OSD Historian.
+
+g.  Provides prospective researchers the procedures necessary for requesting access to OSD
+Component files. 3.  WHS-SERVICED COMPONENTS HEADS.  The WHS-serviced Components heads, when requested:
+a.  Determine whether access is for a lawful and authorized government purpose or in the interest of national security.
+
+b.  Determine whether the specific records requested are within the scope of the proposed historical research.
+
+c.  Determine the location of the requested records.
+
+d.  Provide a point of contact to the OSD Records Administrator.
+
+## Enclosure 4 Procedures For Historical Researchers Permanently Assigned Within The Executive Branch Working On Official Projects
+
+ 1.  In accordance with Part 197.5 of Title 32, CFR (Reference (l)), the WHS-serviced Components heads, when requested, will:
+a.  Make a written determination that the requested access is essential to the accomplishment of a lawful and authorized U.S. Government purpose, stating whether the requested records can be made available.  If disapproved, cite specific reasons.
+
+b.  Provide the location of the requested records, including accession and box numbers if the material has been retired to the Washington National Records Center (WNRC).
+
+c.  Provide a point of contact for liaison with the OSD Records Administrator if any requested records are located in OSD Component working files. 2.  The historical researcher or requestor will:
+a.  Submit a request for access to OSD files to:
+
+
+OSD Records Administrator
+
+WHS/Records and Declassification Division
+
+4800 Mark Center Drive
+
+Suite 02F09-02
+
+Alexandria, VA  22350-3100
+b.  All requests must be signed by an appropriate official and must contain:
+
+
+(1)  The name(s) of the researcher(s) and any assistant(s), level of security clearance, and the federal agency, institute, or company to which the researcher is assigned.
+
+
+(2)  A statement on the purpose of the project, including whether the final product is to be classified or unclassified.
+
+
+(3)  An explicit description of the information being requested and, if known, the originating office, so that the identification and location of the information may be facilitated.
+
+
+(4)  Appropriate higher authorization of the request.
+
+
+(5)  Ensure researcher's security manager or **personnel security office** verifies his or her security clearances in writing to the OSD Records Administrator's Security Manager.
+
+
+c.  Maintain the file integrity of the records being reviewed, ensuring that no records are removed and that all folders are replaced in the correct box in their proper order.
+
+d.  Make copies of any documents pertinent to the project, ensuring that staples are carefully removed and that the documents are re-stapled before they are replaced in the folder.
+
+e.  Submit the completed manuscript for review before public presentation or publication to:
+Department of Defense
+
+Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
+
+1155 Defense Pentagon
+
+Washington DC  20301-1155
+f.  If the requester is an official historian of a federal agency requiring access to DoD records at the National Archives facilities or a Presidential library, the requested must be addressed directly to the pertinent facility with an information copy sent to the OSD Records Administrator.  The historian's security clearances must be verified to the National Archives or the Presidential library. 3.  The use of computers, laptops, computer tablets, personal digital assistants, recorders, or similar devices listed in Enclosure 9 of this instruction is prohibited.  Researchers will use lettersized paper (approximately 8 12 by 11 inches), writing on only one side of the page.  Each page of notes must pertain to only one document. 4.  The following applies to all notes taken during research:
+a.  All notes are considered classified at the level of the document from which they were taken.
+
+b.  Indicate at the top of each page of notes the document:
+
+
+
+(1)  Originator.
+
+(2)  Date.
+
+(3)  Subject (if the subject is classified, indicate the classification).
+
+(4)  Folder number or other identification.
+
+(5)  Accession number and box number in which the document was found.
+
+(6)  Security classification of the document.
+c.  Number each page of notes consecutively.
+
+
+d.  Leave the last 1 1/2 inches on the bottom of each page of notes blank for use by the reviewing agencies.
+
+e.  Ensure the notes are legible, in English, and in **black** ink.
+
+f.  All notes must be given to the staff at the end of each day.  The facility staff will forward the notes to the OSD Records Administrator for an official review and release to the researcher. 5.  The OSD Records Administrator will:
+a.  Process all requests from Executive Branch employees requesting access to OSD
+Component files for official projects.
+
+b.  Determine which OSD Component originated the requested records and, if necessary, request an access determination from the OSD Component and the location of the requested records, including but not limited to electronic information systems, databases or accession number and box numbers if the hardcopy records have been retired offsite.
+
+c.  Request authorization for access from other OSD Component as necessary.
+
+
+(1)  Official historians employed by federal agencies may have access to the classified information of any other agency found in DoD files, as long as authorization for access has been obtained from these agencies.
+
+
+(2)  If the requester is not an official historian, authorization for access must be obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Council (NSC), Department of State (DOS), and any other non-DoD agency whose classified information is expected to be found in the files to be accessed.
+
+d.  Make a written determination as to the researcher's trustworthiness based on the researcher having been issued a security clearance.
+
+e.  Compile all information on the request for access to classified information, to include evidence of an appropriately issued personnel security clearance, and forward the information to the DA&M; OSD Component; or designee, who will make the access determination.
+
+f.  Notify the researcher of the authorization and conditions for access to the requested records or of the denial of access and the reason(s).
+
+g.  Ensure that all conditions for access and release of information for use in the project are met.
+
+h.  Make all necessary arrangements for the researcher to visit the review location and review the requested records.
+
+
+i.  Provide all requested records and information under OSD control in electronic formats consistent with Part 1236 of Reference (j).  For all other information, a staff member will be assigned to supervise the researcher's copying of pertinent documents at the assigned facility.
+
+j.  If the records are maintained in the OSD Component's working files, arrange for the material to be converted to electronic format for the researchers to review.
+
+k.  Notify the National Archives, Presidential library, or military facility of the authorization and access conditions of all researchers approved to research OSD records held in those facilities.
+
+## Enclosure 5 Procedures For The Dos Foreign Relations Of The United States (Frus) Series
+
+ 1.  The DOS historians will:
+a.  Submit requests for access to OSD files.  The request should list the names and security clearances for the historians doing the research and an explicit description, including the accession and box numbers, of the files being requested.  Submit request to:
+OSD Records Administrator
+
+
+WHS/Records and Declassification Division
+
+4800 Mark Center Dr
+
+Suite 02F09-02
+
+Alexandria, VA 22380-2100
+
+b.  Submit to the OSD Records Administrator requests for access for members of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation to documents copied by the DOS historians for the series or the files reviewed to obtain the documents.
+
+c.  Request that the DOS Diplomatic Security staff verify all security clearances in writing to the OSD Records Administrator's Security Manager.
+
+d.  Give all document copies to the OSD Records Administrator staff member who is supervising the copying as they are made.
+
+e.  Submit any OSD documents desired for use or pages of the manuscript containing OSD
+classified information for declassification review before publication to the Chief, Security Review Division at:
+Department of Defense
+
+
+Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
+
+1155 Defense Pentagon
+
+Washington DC  20301-1155
+ 2.  The OSD Records Administrator will:
+a.  Determine the location of the records being requested by the DOS for the FRUS series according to Title IV of Public Law 102-138 (Reference (p)).
+
+b.  Act as a liaison with the CIA, NSC, and any other non-OSD agency for access by DOS
+historians to records and information and such non-DoD agency classified information expected to be interfiled with the requested OSD records.
+
+
+c.  Obtain written verification from the DOS Diplomatic Security staff of all security clearances, including "Q" clearances.
+
+d.  Make all necessary arrangements for the DOS historians to access, review, and copy documents selected for use in their research in accordance with procedures in accordance with Enclosure 4 of this AI.
+
+e.  Provide a staff member to supervise document copying in accordance with the guidance provided in Enclosure 7 of this AI.
+
+f.  Compile a list of the documents that were copied by the DOS historians.
+
+
+g.  Scan and transfer copies to DOS in NARA an approved electronic format.
+
+h.  Submit to the respective agency a list of CIA and NSC documents copied and released to the DOS historians.
+
+i.  Process DOS Historian Office requests for members of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation with appropriate security clearances to have access to documents copied and used by the DOS historians to compile the FRUS series volumes or to the files that were reviewed to obtain the copied documents.  Make all necessary arrangements for the Advisory Committee to review any documents that are at the WNRC.
+
+
+
+## Enclosure 6 Procedures For Historical Researchers Not Permanently Assigned To The Executive Branch
+
+ 1.  The WHS-serviced Components heads, when required, will:
+a.  Recommend to the DA&M, or his or her designee, approval or disapproval of requests to access OSD information.  State whether access to, release, and clearance of the requested information is in the interest of national security and whether the information can be made available.  If disapproval is recommended, specific reasons should be cited.
+
+b.  Provide the location of the requested information, including but not limited to the office, component, information system or accession and box numbers for any records that have been retired to the WNRC.
+
+c.  Provide a point of contact for liaison with the OSD Records Administrator if any requested records are located in OSD Component working files. 2.  The OSD Records Administrator will:
+a.  Process all requests from non-Executive Branch researchers for access to OSD or WHS-
+serviced Components files.  Certify via the WHS Security Officer that the requester has the appropriate clearances.
+
+b.  Determine which OSD Component originated the requested records and, as necessary, obtain written recommendations for the research to review the classified information.
+
+c.  Obtain prior authorization to review their classified information from the DOS, CIA, NSC, and any other agency whose classified information is expected to be interfiled with OSD records.
+
+d.  Obtain agreement from the researcher(s) and any assistant(s) that they will comply with conditions governing access to the classified information (see Figure).
+
+## Figure.  Form Letter - Conditions Governing Access To Official Records For Historical Research Purposes
+
+
+(LETTERHEAD STATIONERY)
+
+
+Date: OSD Records Administrator WHS/Records and Declassification Division 4800 Mark Center Drive Suite 02F09-02 Alexandria Va 22350-3100 To Whom It May Concern: I understand that the information to which I have requested access for historical research purposes may include information concerning the national defense or foreign relations of the United States.  Unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage, serious damage, or exceptionally grave damage to the national security regardless of the classification of that information.  If granted access, I therefore agree to the following conditions governing access to OSD files: 1.  I will abide by any rules and restrictions issued in your letter of authorization, including those of other agencies whose information is interfiled with that of the OSD. 2.  I agree to safeguard the classified information to which I gain possession or knowledge in a manner consistent with Part 4 of Executive Order 13526, "Classified National Security Information," and the applicable provisions of the DoD issuances concerning safeguarding classified information, including DoD Instruction 5200.01, "DoD Information Security Program and Protection of Sensitive Compartmented Information." 3.  I agree not to reveal to any person or agency any information obtained as a result of this access except as authorized in the terms of your authorization letter or a follow-on letter.  I further agree that I will not use the information for purposes other than those set forth in my request for access. 4.  I agree to submit my research notes to determine if classified information is contained in them before their removal from the specific area assigned to me for research.  I further agree to submit my manuscript for a security review before its publication or presentation.  In each of these reviews, I agree to comply with any decision of the reviewing official in the interests of the security of the United States, including the retention or deletion of any classified parts of such notes and manuscript whenever the federal agency concerned deems such retention or deletion necessary. 5.  I understand that failure to abide by the conditions in this statement constitutes sufficient cause for canceling my access to OSD information and for denying me any future access and may subject me to criminal provisions of federal law as referred to in paragraph 6. 6.  I have been informed that provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code impose criminal penalties, under certain circumstances, for the unauthorized disclosure, loss, copying, or destruction of defense information. 7.  Removal Subject to a Nondisclosure Agreement.  Cabinet Level officials may remove copies of unclassified information and/or materials not previously released to the public or with clearly identified restrictions upon request of the departing official if he or she signs a non-disclosure agreement.  The former official must agree not to release or publish the information, orally or in writings (paper or electronically), without the written approval of the DoD.  Upon request by the Cabinet level official, the DoD will perform an official review of the information.  The review may result in possible denial or redaction of the information. The Director of Administration and Management will serve as the appellate authority to any denials or redactions that may be contested.
+
+Signature THIS STATEMENT IS MADE TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO ENABLE IT TO EXERCISE ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY.  I UNDERSTAND THAT ANY MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT THAT I MAKE KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY SHALL SUBJECT ME TO THE PENALTIES OF TITLE 18, U.S. CODE, SECTION 1001.
+
+
+e.  If the requester is an FPA, submit a memorandum after completion of the actions described in this enclosure to WHS, Human Resources Directorate, Security Operations Division, requesting the issuance (including an interim) or reinstatement of an inactive security clearance for the FPA and any assistant and a copy of any signed form letters.  The Security Division will contact the researcher(s) and any assistant(s) to obtain the forms required to reinstate or initiate the personnel security investigation to obtain a security clearance.  Upon completion of the adjudication process, notify the OSD Records Administrator in writing of the reinstatement, issuance, or denial of a security clearance.
+
+f.  Make a written determination as to the researcher's trustworthiness based on his or her having been issued a security clearance.
+
+g.  Compile all information on the request for access to classified information, to include either evidence of an appropriately issued or reinstated personnel security clearance.  Forward the information to the DA&M, or designee, who will make the final determination on the applicant's eligibility for access to classified OSD or WHS-serviced Component files.  If the determination is favorable, the DA&M, or designee will then execute an authorization for access, which will be valid for not more than 2 years.
+
+h.  Notify the researcher of the approval or disapproval of the request.  If the request has been approved, the notification will identify the files authorized for review and specify that the authorization:
+
+(1)  Is approved for a predetermined time period.
+
+
+
+(2)  Is limited to the designated files.
+
+
+(3)  Does not include access to records and/or information of other federal agencies, unless such access has been specifically authorized by those agencies.
+
+i.  Make all necessary arrangements for the researcher to visit the WNRC and review any requested records that have been retired there, to include written authorization, conditions for the access, and a copy of the security clearance verification.
+
+j.  If the requested records are at the WNRC, make all necessary arrangements for the scanning of documents.
+
+k.  If the requested records are maintained in OSD or WHS-serviced Component working files, make arrangements for the researcher to review the requested information and, if authorized, copy pertinent documents in the OSD or WHS-serviced Component's office. Provide the OSD Component with a copy of the written authorization and conditions under which the access is permitted.
+
+l.  Compile a list of all the documents requested by the researcher.
+
+m.  Coordinate the official review on all notes taken and documents copied by the researcher.
+
+n.  If the classified information to be reviewed is on file at the National Archives, a Presidential library, or other facility, notify the pertinent facility in writing of the authorization and conditions for access. 3.  The researcher will:
+a.  Submit a request for access to OSD Component files to OSD Records Administrator, WHS/Records and Declassification Division, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Suite 02F09-02, Alexandria VA  22350-3100.  The request must contain:
+
+(1)  As explicit a description as possible of the information being requested so that identification and location of the information may be facilitated.
+
+
+(2)  A statement as to how the information will be used, including whether the final project is to be classified or unclassified.
+
+
+(3)  A statement as to whether the researcher has a security clearance, including the level of clearance and the name of the issuing agency.
+
+
+(4)  The names of any persons who will be assisting the researcher with the project.  If the assistants have security clearances, provide the level of clearance and the name of the issuing agency.
+
+
+(5)  A signed copy of their agreement (see Figure) to safeguard the information and to authorize a review of any notes and manuscript for a determination that they contain no classified information.  Each project assistant must also sign a copy of the letter.
+
+
+(6)  The forms necessary to obtain a security clearance, if the requester is an FPA
+without an active security clearance.  Each project assistant without an active security clearance will also need to complete these forms.  If the FPA or assistant have current security clearances, their **personnel security office** must provide verification in writing to the OSD Records Administrator's Security Manager.
+
+b.  Maintain the integrity of the files being reviewed, ensuring that no records are removed and that all folders are replaced in the correct box in their proper order.
+
+c.  If copies are authorized, give all copies to the custodian of the files at the end of each day.  The custodian will forward the copies of the documents to the OSD Records Administrator for a declassification review and release to the requester.
+
+
+(1)  For records at the WNRC, if authorized, provide the requested information in an electronic format.  Review will occur only in the presence of an OSD Records Administrator staff member.
+
+
+(2)  Ensure that all staples are carefully removed and that the documents are re-stapled before the documents are replaced in the folder.
+
+
+(3)  Submit all classified and unclassified notes made from the records to the custodian of the files at the end of each day of research.  The custodian will transmit the notes to the OSD Records Administrator for an official review and release to the researcher at the completion of researcher's project.
+
+
+(4)  Submit the final manuscript to the OSD Records Administrator for forwarding to the Chief, Security Review Division, Office of Security Review, for a security review and public release clearance in accordance with References (k) and (n) before publication, presentation, or any other public use.
+
+## Enclosure 7 Procedures For Document Review For The Frus Series
+
+ 1.  When documents are being reviewed, a WHS/OSD Records Administrator (WHS/RDD) staff member must be present at all times. 2.  The records maybe reviewed at the Archives II, College Park Maryland, WNRC, Suitland, Maryland, or an appropriate military facility.  All requested information will remain under the control of the WHS/RDD staff until a public release review is completed, and then provided in electronic formats. 3.  If the requested records have been reviewed in accordance with the automatic declassification provisions of Reference (e), any tabs removed during the research and copying must be replaced in accordance with Reference (i). 4.  The number of boxes to be reviewed will determine which of the following procedures will apply.  The WHS/RDD staff member will make that determination at the time the request is processed.  When the historian completes the review of the boxes, he or she must contact the WHS/RDD to establish a final schedule for scanning the documents.  To avoid a possible delay, a tentative schedule will be established at the time that the review schedule is set.
+
+a.  For 24 boxes or fewer, review and scanning will take place simultaneously.  Estimated time to complete scanning is 7 work days.
+
+b.  For 25 boxes or more, the historian will review the boxes and mark the documents that are to be scanned using WHS/RDD authorized reproduction tabs.
+
+c.  If the review occurs at facilities that OSD does not control ownership of the document, the documents must be given to the WHS/RDD staff member for transmittal for processing. 5.  WHS/RDD will notify the historian when the documents are ready to be picked up.  All administrative procedures for classified material transfers will be followed in accordance with References (i) and (n) and appropriate receipt for unclassified information will be used.
+
+## Enclosure 8 Procedures For Copying Documents
+
+ 1.  The records will be reviewed and copied at Archives II, College Park Maryland, WNRC, Suitland, Maryland, or an appropriate U.S. military facility. 2.  If the requested records have been reviewed in accordance with the automatic declassification provisions of Reference (e), any tabs removed during the research and copying must be replaced in accordance with Reference (i). 3.  The researcher will mark the documents that he or she wants to copy using WHS/RDD authorized reproduction tabs. 4.  Any notes taken during the review process must be given to the WHS/RDD staff member present for transmittal to the WHS/RDD. 5.  All reproduction charges are to the responsibility of the researcher. 6.  All documents requested will be copied to an approved electronic format by WHS/RDD staff after official review.
+
+a.  The researcher will need to bring paper, staples, staple remover, and stapler.
+
+b.  When the researcher completes the review of the boxes, he or she must contact the WHS/RDD to establish a final schedule for scanning the requested documents.
+
+c.  When the documents are scanned, the WHS/RDD will notify the researcher.
+
+d.  All questions pertaining to the review, copying, or transmittal of OSD documents must be addressed to the WHS/RDD staff member.
+
+## Enclosure 9 General Guidelines For Researching Dod Records
+
+DoD records and information are unique and often cannot be replaced should they be lost or damaged.  In order to protect its collections and archives, the OSD Records Administrator has set rules that researchers must follow.
+
+a.  Researchers will work in room assigned.  Researchers are not allowed in restricted areas.
+
+b.  Special care must be taken in handling all records.  Records may not be leaned on, written on, folded, traced from, or handled in any way likely to damage them.
+
+c.  Records should be kept in the same order in which they are presented.
+
+d.  Items that may not be brought into these research areas include, but are not limited to:
+
+
+
+(1)  Briefcases.
+
+(2)  Cases for equipment (laptop computers).
+
+(3)  Computers.  This includes laptops, tablet computers, personal digital assistants,
+smart phones, and other similar devices.
+
+(4)  Cellular phones.
+
+
+(5)  Computer peripherals including handheld document scanners and digital or analog cameras.
+
+
+(6)  Containers larger than 9.5" x 6.25" (e.g., paper bags, boxes, backpacks, shopping bags, and sleeping bags).
+
+
+(7)  Food, drinks (includes bottled water) and cigarettes, cigars, or pipes.
+
+
+
+(8)  Handbags or purses larger than 9.5" x 6.25".
+
+(9)  Luggage.
+
+(10)  Musical instruments and their cases.
+
+(11)  Newspapers.
+
+(12)  Outerwear (e.g., raincoats and overcoats).
+
+
+(13)  Pets (exception for service animals, i.e., any guide dog or signal dog that is trained to provide a service to a person with a disability).
+
+
+(14)  Scissors or other cutting implements.
+
+
+
+(15)  Televisions and audio or video equipment.
+
+(16)  Umbrellas.
+e.  Eating, drinking, or smoking is prohibited.
+
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+AI
+administrative instruction
+
+
+CIA
+Central Intelligence Agency
+CFR
+Code of Federal Regulations
+CNWDI
+critical nuclear weapons design information
+
+
+DA&M
+Director of Administration and Management
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DOS
+Department of State
+
+
+FOIA
+Freedom of Information Act
+FPA
+former Presidential appointees
+FRUS
+Foreign Relations of the United States
+
+
+NARA
+National Archives and Records Administration
+NSC
+National Security Council
+
+
+WHS/RDD Washington Headquarters Services Records and Declassification Division
+WNRC
+Washington National Records Center
+WHS
+Washington Headquarters Services
+
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+
+These terms and their definitions are for the purposed of this AI. access.  The availability of or the permission to consult records, archives, or manuscripts.
+
+The ability and opportunity to obtain classified, unclassified, or administratively controlled information or records. electronic records.  Records stored in a form that only a computer can process and satisfies the definition of a federal record, also referred to as machine-readable records or automatic data processing records (including e-mail).
+
+
+historical researcher or requestor.  A person approved to conduct research in OSD files for historical information to use in a DoD approved project (e.g., agency historical office projects, books, articles, studies, or reports), regardless of the person's employment status.  Excluded are Military personnel assigned to OSD; OSD employees, contractors, and students conducting research in response to academic requirements. recorded information.  All traditional forms of records, regardless of physical form or characteristics, including information created, manipulated, communicated, or stored in digital or electronic form. records (also referred to as federal records or official records).  The term "records" includes all recorded information, regardless of form or characteristics, made or received by a federal agency under federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the United States Government or because of the informational value of data in them; and does not include library and museum material made or acquired and preserved solely for reference or exhibition purposes or duplicate copies of records preserved only for convenience.

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+# Department Of Defense Directive Number 2000.12
+
+August 18, 2003
+Certified Current as of December 13, 2007
+
+#
+
+ASD(SO/LIC&IC)
+SUBJECT:  DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program
+
+References: (a)  DoD Directive 2000.12, "DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP)
+Program," April 13, 1999 (hereby canceled)
+(b)  Section 134 of title 10, United States Code
+(c)  Unified Command Plan, *March 1, 2005*1
+(d)  DoD USS Cole Commission Report2, January 9, 2001
+(e)  through (an), see Enclosure 1
+
+
+## 1.  Reissuance And Purpose
+
+This Directive:
+1.1.  Changes the name of the DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program to the DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program.
+
+1.2.  Reissues Reference (a) to update DoD policies and assigns responsibilities for implementing the procedures for the DoD AT Program, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 134; Unified Command Plan; DoD USS Cole Commission Report, dated January 9, 2001; GAO Report, dated September 19, 2001; Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated May 9, 2001; and Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated August 14, 2001 (References (b) through (g)).
+
+1.3.  Continues to authorize the publication of DoD Instruction 2000.16 and DoD
+2000.12-H (References (h) and (i)), pursuant to the requirements of DoD Instruction 5025.015025.1-M (Reference (j)).
+
+## 2.  Applicability And Scope
+
+2.1.  This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components").  The term "Military Services," as used herein, refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard (when operating as a Military Service in the Navy).  The term "commanders," as used in this Directive, refers to personnel assigned to command positions at all levels and the heads of the Defense Agencies and Field Activities.
+
+2.2.  This Directive also applies to DoD military and civilian personnel and their dependent family members; DoD contractors; DoD installations and facilities; DoD-owned, leased, or managed infrastructure and assets critical to mission accomplishment; and other DoD-owned, leased, or managed mission essential assets (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD Elements and Personnel") overseas and in the United States, its territories, and possessions.  DoD Elements and Personnel under the security responsibility of the Department of State (DoS) pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 4801 - 4805, DoD Instruction 5210.84, Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense and the Department of State on Security of DoD Elements and Personnel in Foreign Areas dated December 16, 1997, and Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of State and the Department of Defense on Overseas Security Support, dated September 17, 1990 (References (k) through (n)) and other DoD-DoS Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) shall comply with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) and DoS security standards instead of DoD standards prescribed by this Directive and References (h) and (i).
+
+2.3.  The OSD Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) and the DoD Components shall implement their AT responsibilities, functions, and authorities in compliance with this Directive.  Nothing herein shall be interpreted to subsume or replace the functions, responsibilities, or authorities of the OSD PSAs or those of the DoD Components prescribed by law or other DoD guidance.
+
+2.4.  The scope of this Directive only addresses the AT element (defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, including limited response and containment by local military forces) of the Department of Defense's combating terrorism (CbT) activities.
+
+## 3.  Definitions
+
+Terms used in this Directive are defined in Enclosure 2.
+
+## 4.  Policy
+
+It is DoD policy that:
+4.1.  The DoD Components and the DoD Elements and Personnel shall be protected from terrorist acts through a high priority, comprehensive AT program.  The Department of Defense's AT program shall be all encompassing using an integrated systems approach.
+
+4.2.  The Commanders at all levels have the responsibility and authority to enforce appropriate security measures to ensure the protection of DoD Elements and Personnel subject to their control and shall ensure the AT awareness and readiness of all DoD Elements and Personnel (including dependent family members) assigned or attached.  Commanders must ensure appropriate AT protection and readiness of DoD Elements and Personnel while pursuing mission accomplishment.
+
+4.3.  The geographic Combatant Commanders' AT policies take precedence over all AT
+policies or programs of any DoD Component operating or existing in that command's area of responsibility (AOR) except for those under the security responsibility of a Chief of Mission
+(COM) (References (m) and (n)).  All DoD Personnel traveling into a Combatant Commander's AOR will familiarize themselves with all AOR-specific AT policies and comply.
+
+4.4.  A Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CbT-RIF) is maintained to provide a flexible means to respond to emergent and/or emergency AT requirements (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5261.01EB, Reference (o)).
+
+4.5.  All DoD military, DoD civilians, DoD dependent family members, and DoD
+contractors shall comply with theater, country, and special clearance requirements (DoD Directive 4500.54 and DoD 4500.54-G (References (p) and (q)) before overseas travel.
+
+4.6.  The Commanders do not have the same legal responsibility to provide security for DoD contractors as that provided for military forces or direct-hire employees.  Contractors remain private U.S. citizens.  The Department of Defense shall assist the Department of State (DoS), where militarily feasible, in supporting efforts to protect U.S. citizens abroad. Contractors are required to contact the Combatant Command to obtain, and comply with, the specific AT guidance for that particular area.  Commanders are required to offer AT training to contractors under the terms specified in the contract.  Contractors working within a U.S. military facility or in close proximity of U.S. Forces shall receive incidentally the benefits of measures undertaken to protect U.S. Forces.
+
+4.7.  Compliance with the "No Double Standard" policy on dissemination of terrorist threat information is maintained.  (See definition E2.1.29. at Enclosure 2.)
+4.8.  The Department of Defense's AT program is one of several security-related programs that fall under the overarching Combating Terrorism and Force Protection programs.  The AT
+program shall be a collective, proactive effort focused on the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks against DoD personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment as well as the preparation to defend against and planning for the response to the consequences of terrorist incidents.  Although not elements of AT, plans for terrorism consequence management preparedness and response measures as well as plans for continuing essential military operations are important adjuncts to an effective AT program.  The minimum elements of an AT program shall be AT risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource generation, and a program review.
+
+
+
+## 5.  Responsibilities
+
+5.1.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and /Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)), under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), shall:
+5.1.1.  Serve as the PSA and civilian advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense to provide overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation of resources for the AT activities of the Department of Defense (References
+(b), (e), and (f)).
+
+5.1.2.  Establish AT standards and monitor DoD Component AT programs to reduce the vulnerability of the DoD Components and the DoD Elements and Personnel to terrorist attack in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other Heads of the DoD Components.
+
+5.1.3.  Provide the OSD representative to the Interagency Deputies Committee and the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG).
+
+5.1.4.  Through the DoD Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee (ATCC), its subcommittees (see Enclosure 3), and other organizations, provide policy oversight and guidance to the DoD Components in support of respective AT program efforts.
+
+5.1.5.  Develop, publish, and maintain References (h) and (i) and other appropriate issuances necessary to provide standards and guidance on protective measures that serve to reduce the vulnerability of the DoD Components and the DoD Elements and Personnel from terrorist acts.
+
+5.1.6.  Develop, publish, and update the DoD Antiterrorism Strategic Plan to provide an overarching framework to guide the DoD Components' long-term AT program efforts.
+
+5.1.7.  Sponsor the DoD Worldwide Combating Terrorism Conference as a continuing forum for DoD Components and interagency officials to provide guidance, exchange ideas, and generate policy recommendations that shall reduce DoD vulnerabilities to terrorism.  The conference provides significant support to the ASD(SO/LIC&IC)'s efforts to maintain strategic direction and focus across the broad spectrum of CbT activities, including AT activities.
+
+5.1.8.  Coordinate DoD AT Program physical security issues with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the DoD Physical Security Review Board, the DoD
+Physical Security Equipment Action Group (PSEAG), the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), and other relevant security boards and committees.
+
+5.1.9.  Coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on physical security technology development and the application of new technology to meet AT needs.
+
+5.1.10.  Coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD*&ASA*)) regarding policy and oversight of the AT Program, as it affects the DoD Components and the DoD Elements and Personnel in the 50 United States, its territories, and possessions.
+
+5.1.11.  Coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
+(ASD(HA)) on all medical and medically related aspects of DoD AT plans and programs.
+
+5.1.12.  Coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to validate submissions for CbT-RIF requests.
+
+5.1.13.  Monitor resource requirements resulting from Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) trends in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the USD(AT&L), the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)), and the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).
+
+5.1.14.  Review, in conjunction with the appropriate PSAs, the adequacy of the plans and programs of the DoD Components in meeting the requirements of the DoD AT Program and, in particular, the AT programs of the Combatant Commanders.  In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advise the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on changes needed to meet requirements.
+
+5.1.15.  Provide centralized policy and instruction for Protective Service Operations
+(PSO) assigned to dignitaries and personnel in high-risk billets.
+
+5.2.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD*&ASA*)), under the USD(P), shall:
+5.2.1.  Serve as the PSA and civilian advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense to provide supervision for Domestic policy, program planning and execution, and allocation of resources for the Domestic AT activities of the Department of Defense.
+
+5.2.2.  Coordinate domestic DoD AT policy issues with the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) to ensure DoD policy consistency.
+
+5.2.3.  Provide a member to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.2.4.  Serve as the DoD Domestic Incident Manager for DoD support to State and local civil authorities.
+
+5.3.  The *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (ASD(GSA))*Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation
+(DUSD(TSP&C)), under the USD(P), shall:
+5.3.1.  Serve as the PSA and civilian advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on issues related to the proliferation of military and dual-use technology to terrorists, terrorist organizations and/or networks, and State sponsors of terrorism.
+
+5.3.2.  Conduct regular reviews and assessments of the state of AT-focused export controls for their effectiveness and efficacy.  The assessments shall include specific recommendations and action plans to remedy any deficiencies identified within domestic or international laws, regulations, and practices.
+
+5.3.3.  Provide a representative to the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism and an observer to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.4.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+(USD(AT&L)) shall:
+5.4.1.  In coordination with the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) and the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (PDUSD(P&R)), under the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), ensure that the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) (Reference (r)) reflects current DoD AT security requirements for defense contractors.  Specifically, pursuant to DoD Instruction 3020.37 (Reference (s)) establish requirements in the DFARS for defense contractors performing DoD contracts outside the United States to:
+5.4.1.1.  Affiliate with the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) (if the contractors are U.S. companies).
+
+5.4.1.2.  Ensure that their personnel who are U.S. citizens register with the U.S.
+
+Embassy and advise those who are third-country nationals to comply with the requirements of the embassy of their nationality.
+
+5.4.1.3.  Provide AT awareness information to personnel (before they travel outside the United States) commensurate with the information the Department of Defense provides to its military, DoD civilian personnel, and families (to the extent such information may be made available).
+
+5.4.1.4.  Receive the most current AT guidance for personnel and comply with References (p) and (q), as appropriate.
+
+5.4.2.  Be the DoD official responsible for AT technology development and expeditious application of new technology to meet AT needs.
+
+5.4.3.  Be the DoD official responsible for evaluating and testing commercial-off-theshelf products to support the rapid acquisition and quick field integration of state-of-the-art AT
+technology.
+
+5.4.4.  Provide a member to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.5.  The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)), under the USD(AT&L), shall:
+5.5.1.  Serve as the PSA and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the USD(AT&L) for all matters concerning the formulation of policy and plans for nuclear weapons safety and security, chemical and biological defense programs, to include Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear material, and high-yield Explosives (CBRNE) protection programs in support of the Department of Defense's AT Program.
+
+5.5.2.  In coordination with the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) and the ASD(HD*&ASA*), develop and maintain CBRNE standards for installation protection efforts in support of the Department of the Defense's AT Program.  These standards shall serve to supplement DoD AT Standards (Reference (h)) by synchronizing CBRNE protection with AT defensive measures.
+
+5.5.3.  Provide an observer to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.6.  The Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), under the USD(AT&L), pursuant to DoD Directive 5105.62, DoD Directive 5105.67 (References (t) and (u)), and the current MOU between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and DTRA, shall:
+5.6.1.  In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conduct vulnerability assessments of DoD assets worldwide based on this Directive and References (h)
+and (i).  Also, support assessments of Combatant Command and Military Service headquarters' AT programs, Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises, air/sea ports of embarkation/debarkation, and intransit forces.  Provide copies of all vulnerability assessments conducted to the DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA).
+
+5.6.2.  Provide assessment teams and maintain the necessary supporting resources as required per OSD direction.
+
+5.6.3.  Maintain a vulnerability assessment database interoperable with the DIA and the JITF-CT and provide periodic analytic products to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support the AT readiness of the DoD Components.
+
+5.6.4.  Maintain the capability to provide follow-up assistance to assessed organizations; assist in training Combatant Commander, Military Service, and DoD Agency vulnerability assessment teams; conduct special, tailored Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffdirected vulnerability assessments; and provide other specialized assistance within its area of expertise.
+
+5.6.5.  Provide an observer to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.7.  The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)) shall:
+5.7.1.  Provide a member to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.7.2.  Provide information and guidance to the DoD Components on displaying AT
+resources within the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting*, and Execution* System (PPBE)
+system program and budget submissions (DoD Directive 7045.14, Reference (v)).
+
+5.7.3.  Provide reports on AT funds as requested by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
+
+5.8.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) shall:
+5.8.1.  Provide policy, guidance, and oversight for information management, intelligence, counterintelligence, physical security, personnel security, operations security, critical infrastructure protection, information operations, technical security countermeasures, security and investigative matters, and information assurance to assist the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) on matters pertaining to the AT program.
+
+5.8.2.  Review the DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and information operations support provided under this Directive for compliance with References (l), DoD
+Directive 5240.2, DoD Directive *3020.40*5160.54, and DoD Directive 8500.1 (References (w), through (y)).
+
+5.8.3.  Monitor Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) execution of AT responsibilities.  See Enclosures 4, 5, and 6 for DIA, NSA, and CIFA responsibilities.
+
+5.8.4.  Provide a member to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.  Provide the senior DoD voting member to the OSPB.
+
+5.8.5.  Annually, as part of the PPBES cycle and in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, review the adequacy of physical security, counterintelligence, intelligence, and other security resources to determine whether they adequately support AT
+program objectives.  Assist and support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in advising the Secretary of Defense of any changes that are needed to meet AT requirements.
+
+5.8.6.  Monitor the DIA's activities as the DoD Executive Agent for diplomatic security matters (References (l) through (n)).
+
+5.9.  The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+(PDUSD(P&R), under the (USD(P&R)), shall:
+5.9.1.  Provide a member to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.9.2.  Ensure the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) AT programs are adequately resourced with AT-trained administrators and security personnel, effective AT protective measures are incorporated into daily operations, and programs are synchronized with the appropriate Combatant Commander to provide AT protection for the DoD Elements and Personnel engaged in DoDEA-sponsored activities.
+
+5.9.3.  Coordinate with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders of the Combatant Commands, and the Directors of the Defense Agencies concerning AT considerations in establishing tour lengths and determine whether restrictions should be placed on accompanying dependent family members for personnel assigned overseas.  In coordination with the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), submit appropriate personnel and readiness recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
+
+5.10.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)), under the USD(P&R), shall:
+5.10.1.  Provide a member to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.10.2.  Support the DoD AT Program by interfacing with the National Disaster Medical System to ensure appropriate protection for the DoD Elements and Personnel.
+
+5.10.3.  Advise and provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on appropriate medical countermeasures to maximize Force Health Protection (FHP).
+
+5.10.4.  Provide policy, guidance, and oversight in setting requirements for CBRNE
+health and medical response, and related functions to include, but not limited to, vaccine protection, emergency decontamination at Medical Treatment Facilities, medical surveillance, medical management resulting from exposure to weapons of mass destruction, preventive medicine functions, and medical training.
+
+5.11.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA)), under the
+(USD(P&R)), shall:
+5.11.1.  Provide an observer to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.11.2.  Monitor Military Departments' Reserve component readiness and training policies and funding to provide for domestic and overseas AT preparedness.
+
+5.12.  The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO))
+shall:
+5.12.1.  Pursuant to DoD Directive 5148.11 (Reference (z)), review the DoD
+intelligence and counterintelligence support provided under this Directive for compliance with DoD Directive 5240.1 and DoD 5240.1-R (References (aa) and (ab)).
+
+5.12.2.  Provide an observer to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.13.  The Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (Dir, PA&E) shall:
+5.13.1.  Serve as the PSA to the Secretary of Defense for program analysis and evaluation to analyze and evaluate the plans, programs and budgets of the DoD Components.
+
+5.13.2.  Provide a member to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.14.  The Directors of the Defense Agencies and the DoD Field Activities, the OSD
+Principal Staff Assistants, and those who report directly to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense shall:
+5.14.1.  Support the geographic Combatant Commanders as they exercise overall responsibility for AT within their respective AOR.  Pursuant to this Directive and References (c) and (h), institute AT Programs, ensure that Defense Agencies and Field Activities conduct vulnerability assessments that address terrorism as a potential threat to the DoD Elements and Personnel, and incorporate AT measures into contingency response plans.
+
+5.14.2.  Use References (h) and (i) for the AT planning and execution for their headquarters and all activities under their cognizance: consider mission, characteristics of the activity, geographic location, threat level, and Force Protection Condition (FPCON).  Establish prescriptive AT standards for installations and facilities not located on U.S. military installations.  Coordinate with the applicable Combatant Commander to ensure that AT plans and polices are in concert with the geographic Combatant Commanders' overall responsibility for the AOR.
+
+5.14.3.  Comply with Reference (h) requirements to maintain an AT training program.
+Ensure that all assigned personnel comply with References (p) and (q).  Ensure that personnel are aware of any travel security advisories in effect at the time of travel.  Ensure that all DoD
+Personnel (including dependent family members) scheduled for permanent changes of station to foreign countries receive required AT training or briefing specified in Reference (h).
+
+5.14.4.  Provide members to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.14.5.  As part of the PPBES cycle, identify and document resource requirements necessary to implement and maintain AT programs.  Submit AT requirements to the Secretary of Defense with an information copy to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the appropriate Combatant Commanders.  Include resource requirements in program and budget submissions.  For emergent and/or emergency AT requirements that cannot be funded through other means, submit requirements through the appropriate Combatant Commander to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for CbT-RIF consideration.  Implement accounting procedures to enable precise reporting of data submitted to Congress in the Congressional Justification Book (CJB), including the number and cost of personnel directly supporting the Department of DefenseDoD's AT activities.
+
+5.14.6.  Identify and designate incumbents of high-risk billets and dependent family members requiring AT resident training.  Ensure that AT resident training is provided to personnel assigned to high-risk billets and others, as applicable.
+
+5.14.7.  Ensure that current physical security technology and security requirements are incorporated into all new contracts, where appropriate.
+
+5.14.8.  Ensure AT protective features for facilities and installations are included in the planning, design, and execution of military and minor construction projects to mitigate AT vulnerabilities and terrorist threats (UFC 4-010-01, UFC 4-010-0210, and UFC-4-021-01, References (ac), through (ae)).
+
+5.14.9.  Develop an AT Strategic Plan that details the vision, mission, goals, and performance measures in support of the Department of Defense's AT Strategic Plan.
+
+## 5.15.  The Secretaries Of The Military Departments Shall:
+
+5.15.1.  Support the geographic Combatant Commanders as they exercise overall responsibility for AT within their respective AOR.  Pursuant to this Directive and References (c) and (h), institute AT Programs (to include Reserve components), ensure that installations conduct vulnerability assessments that address terrorism as a potential threat to DoD Elements and Personnel, and incorporate AT measures into contingency response plans.
+
+5.15.2.  Support the geographic and functional Combatant Commanders as they comply with DoD Directive 5100.1 and DoD Directive 5100.3 (References (af) and (ag)) by ensuring that sufficient resources are programmed in Military Department budgets to implement Combatant Commander AT Programs.
+
+5.15.2.1.  Ensure life-cycle costs are programmed and funded for CbT-RIF
+projects (Reference (o)).  Ensure CbT-RIF projects are not programmed for funding through other sources and determine optimum technology available to meet requirements.
+
+5.15.2.2.  Maintain a centralized database of all vulnerability assessments.
+Prepare and disseminate analyses of Military Department-wide AT vulnerability trends as they relate to the PPBES process.
+
+5.15.2.3.  Implement accounting procedures to enable precise reporting of data submitted to Congress in the CJB, including the number and cost of personnel directly supporting the Department of Defense's AT activities.
+
+5.15.3.  Institute AT training programs pursuant to Reference (h).  Ensure doctrine developed for AT is compatible with joint doctrine and is incorporated in applicable Military Service schools.  Ensure AT instruction is commensurate with the level of responsibility or the command for which the school is designed.  Maximize the use of Advanced Distributed Learning technologies, when appropriate.
+
+5.15.4.  Identify and designate incumbents of high-risk billets and dependent family members requiring AT resident training.  Provide AT resident training to those personnel assigned to high-risk billets and others, as applicable.
+
+5.15.5.  Implement procedures for Military Department personnel and their dependent family members to satisfy the requirements of References (p) and (q).  Also implement procedures for the DoD Personnel (including dependent family members) scheduled for permanent change of station to foreign countries to receive required training specified in Reference (h).
+
+5.15.6.  Promptly disseminate information on terrorist threats, including specific warning of threats against the DoD Elements and Personnel pursuant to References (aa) and (ab), and the "No Double Standard" policy.  (See definition at E2.1.29, Enclosure 2.)
+5.15.7.  Ensure current physical security technology and security requirements are incorporated into all new contracts, where applicable.
+
+5.15.8.  Ensure AT protective features for facilities and installations are included in the planning, design, and execution of military and minor construction projects to mitigate AT vulnerabilities and terrorist threats (References (ac), through (ae)).
+
+5.15.9.  Ensure that installations and activities develop, maintain, and implement AT
+plans and programs that incorporate AT measures in concert with DoD standards and conduct comprehensive AT program reviews and assessments (Reference (h)).  Ensure AT program reviews include a validation of the thoroughness of the AT risk management methodology used to assess asset criticality, terrorist threat, and vulnerabilities.  AT program reviews shall also evaluate installation and activity preparedness to respond to terrorist incidents (including CBRNE incidents), and the plans for managing the consequences of terrorist incidents and maintaining continuity of essential military operations.  Ensure installations and activities coordinate AT plans with tenant units to incorporate tenant AT program requirements into the host AT plan.
+
+5.15.10.  Provide Military Department representatives as members of the DoD ATCC
+and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.15.11.  Ensure Service component commands have the capability to collect, receive, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate all relevant data on terrorist activities, trends, and indicators of imminent attack.  Develop the capability to fuse suspicious activity reports from military security, law enforcement, and counterintelligence organizations with national-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection activities.
+
+5.15.12.  Develop a Military Department AT Strategic Plan that details the vision, mission, goals, and performance measures in support of the Department of Defense and Combatant Commanders' AT Strategic Plans.
+
+5.16.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
+5.16.1.  Serve as the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all DoD
+AT issues.
+
+5.16.2.  Prepare joint doctrine and assist the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) in the development and maintenance of AT standards and procedures.  Review doctrine, standards, and procedures of the DoD Components.  Review, coordinate, and oversee for the Secretary of Defense and in conjunction with the DoD Components, the AT training for all DoD Personnel (including their dependent family members).
+
+5.16.3.  Ensure the Chairman's Program Review and the Chairman's Program Assessment include a summary of AT requirements as determined by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and derived from Combatant Commander Integrated Priority Lists.
+
+5.16.4.  Annually, as part of the DoD program and PPBES cycle, assist the Military Departments in determining the merit of AT requirement submissions.  Review the adequacy of resources proposed by the Military Departments to determine whether they meet AT objectives and support Combatant Commanders' AT programs.  Coordinate and make recommendations on unresolved AT requirements during programming and budget reviews.  These reviews shall be done in conjunction with OSD PSAs having resource, program, and budget oversight responsibilities for the functional areas that comprise the AT budget aggregate.  Advise the Secretary of Defense of any changes needed to meet AT requirements.
+
+5.16.5.  Assess the DoD Components' AT policies and programs for the protection of DoD Elements and Personnel, including DoD-owned, leased, or managed infrastructure and assets critical to mission accomplishment and other DoD-owned, leased or managed mission essential assets pursuant to this Directive and References (h) and (x).  Ensure assessments are conducted of Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises, air/sea ports of embarkation/debarkation, and intransit forces.
+
+5.16.6.  Assess AT as an element of the overall force planning function of any force deployment decision.  Periodically reassess AT posture of deployed forces.  Review Reference (c), approved by the President, and the Secretary's "Forces for Unified Commands" Memorandum (Reference (ah)) to determine the impact on this Directive and the Department of Defense's AT Program.  Recommend revisions to these plans or this Directive, as required. Review Combatant Commanders' joint operation plans (OPLANS, CONPLANS, and functional plans), deployment orders, and other relevant documents for AT considerations.
+
+5.16.7.  Assess the implementation of FPCONs for uniform implementation and dissemination as specified by this Directive and References (h) and (i).
+
+5.16.8.  Provide representatives to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees as required under Enclosure 3.  Provide an observer to the OSPB.  Appoint the Director for Operations, Joint Staff (J3) to co-chair the Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee - Senior Steering Group (ATCC-SSG) and the *Joint Staff* Deputy Director for Global Operations
+(Antiterrorism/*Homeland Defense (DD AT/HD)*Force Protection) Joint Staff to co-chair the ATCC under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.16.9.  Coordinate with the USD(I) and the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) on sharing of terrorism intelligence and counterintelligence data and information on AT.  This includes threats posed to the DoD Components and the DoD Elements and Personnel by domestic and foreign terrorists.
+
+5.16.10.  Assess the capability of the Military Departments, the Combatant Commands, and the Defense intelligence and security organizations to collect, receive, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate all relevant data on terrorist activities, trends, and indicators of imminent attack. Also assess the capability to fuse suspicious activity reports from military security, law enforcement, and counterintelligence organizations with national-level intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection activities.
+
+5.16.11.  In coordination with the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), manage and administer the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CbT-RIF pursuant to Reference (o).  Ensure out-year maintenance costs for CbT-RIF-funded projects are identified and coordinated with the Military Departments so that they are addressed during the PPBES cycle.
+
+5.16.12.  Maintain a centralized database of all vulnerability assessments conducted.
+Prepare and disseminate analysis of DoD-wide AT vulnerability trends correlated to Military Department efforts within the PPBES process.
+
+5.17.  The Geographic Combatant Commanders have overall AT responsibility within their AOR (Reference (c)), except for those DoD Elements and Personnel for whom a COM has security responsibility pursuant to law (Reference (k)) or a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) per Reference (m).  Accordingly, they shall:
+5.17.1.  Establish AT policies and programs for the protection of all DoD Elements and Personnel in their AOR, including those for whom the Combatant Commander assumes AT responsibility based on a MOA with a COM (Reference (m)).  Coordinate with the COMs in the AOR to identify all non-Combatant Commander DoD Components and DoD Elements and Personnel.  In instances where AT protection may be more effectively provided through the Combatant Commander, establish country-specific MOAs per Reference (m).
+
+5.17.2.  Ensure AT policies and programs include specific prescriptive standards derived from Reference (h) to address specific terrorist threat capabilities and geographic settings, particularly regarding infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment and other DoD- owned, leased, or managed mission essential assets (Reference (x)).
+
+5.17.3.  Exercise tactical control (TACON) (for force protection) over all DoD
+Elements and Personnel (including force protection responsibility for DoD dependent family members) (except those under the security responsibility of a COM) within the Combatant Commander's AOR.  TACON (for force protection) applies to all DoD personnel assigned permanently or temporarily, transiting through, or performing exercises or training in the Combatant Commander's AOR.  TACON (for force protection) is in addition to a Combatant Commander's normal exercise of operational control (OPCON) over assigned forces.
+
+5.17.4.  Periodically, assess and review the AT programs of all Combatant Commander-assigned DoD Components in their AOR per this Directive and Reference (h).  Also assess the AT programs of all DoD Components performing in their AOR that are not under the security responsibility of a COM.  Military Service component commands or other subordinate commands reporting to the Combatant Commander may conduct the assessments.  Ensure AT
+program reviews include a validation of the thoroughness of the AT risk management methodology used to assess asset criticality, terrorist threat, and vulnerabilities.  AT program reviews shall also evaluate installation and activity preparedness to respond to terrorist incidents (including CBRNE incidents), and the plans for managing the consequences of terrorist incidents and maintaining continuity of essential military operations.  Relocate forces as necessary and report to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pertinent actions taken for AT protection.
+
+5.17.5.  Consistent with Reference (l) and the MOUs (References (m) and (n)), serve as the DoD point of contact with host-nation officials on matters involving AT policies and measures.
+
+5.17.6.  Provide updates to Reference (p) and Reference (q) stating command travel requirements and theater entry requirements.
+
+5.17.7.  Ensure all assigned military, DoD civilians, Defense contractors, and their family members receive applicable AT training and briefings pursuant to Reference (h).  Ensure personnel traveling in the AOR comply with References (p) and (q).  Ensure personnel are aware of any Travel Warnings in effect at the time of travel.  Ensure that all DoD Personnel (including dependent family members) scheduled for permanent change of station to the geographic Combatant Commander's AOR or to another geographic Combatant Commander's AOR receive required AT training and briefings (e.g., AOR Updates) in compliance with Reference (h).
+Identify and disseminate to deploying force providers specific AOR pre-deployment training requirements that all personnel must complete before arrival in theater.
+
+5.17.8.  Identify, document, validate, prioritize, and submit to the Joint Staff the resource requirements necessary to achieve the AT program objectives for each activity under the Combatant Commander or for which that Commander has AT responsibility.  Work with the Joint Staff and the Service component commands to ensure that resource requirements to implement the AT programs are identified and programmed according to PPBES procedures.
+
+5.17.9.  Establish command relationships and policies for subordinate commands, including Joint Task Forces, to ensure that effective mechanisms are in place to maintain an AT protective posture commensurate with the terrorist threat.
+
+5.17.10.  Assess the terrorist threat for the AOR according to this Directive, and provide threat assessment information to the DoD Components and the COMs in the AOR. Develop risk mitigation measures and maintain a database of those measures and the issues that necessitated their implementation.  On the basis of the threat assessment, identify and designate incumbents of high-risk billets and dependent family members to receive AT resident training.
+
+5.17.11.  Keep subordinate commanders informed of the nature and degree of the threat.  Ensure that commanders are prepared to respond to changes in threats and local security circumstances.  Ensure that the COMs are fully and currently informed of any threat information relating to the security of those DoD Elements and Personnel under their security responsibility, but not under the command of the Combatant Commander.
+
+5.17.12.  Ensure compliance with the "No-Double-Standard" policy.  (See definition E2.1.29., Enclosure 2.)
+5.17.13.  Ensure that FPCONs are uniformly implemented and disseminated as specified by this Directive and References (h) and (i).
+
+5.17.14.  Provide a representative to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.17.15.  Ensure that a capability exists to collect, receive, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate all relevant data on terrorist activities, trends, and indicators of imminent attack. Develop the capability to fuse suspicious activity reports from military security, law enforcement, and counterintelligence organizations with national-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection activities.
+
+5.17.16.  Submit to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emergent and/or emergency AT requirements that cannot be funded by the Military Departments for CbT-RIF funding consideration (Reference (o)).
+
+5.17.17.  Coordinate AT program issues with the functional Combatant Commanders, the COMs, the Defense Agencies/Activities, and the Military Departments, as appropriate.
+
+5.17.18.  Develop a geographic AOR, Combatant Commander-oriented AT Strategic Plan that details the vision, mission, goals, and performance measures in support of the Department of Defense's AT Strategic Plan.
+
+## 5.18.  The Functional Combatant Commanders Shall:
+
+5.18.1.  Establish AT policies and programs for assigned DoD Elements and Personnel including assessment and protection of facilities and appropriate level of AT training and briefings.  Coordinate programs with the appropriate Combatant Commanders and the COMs.
+
+5.18.2.  Coordinate with the geographic Combatant Commanders to ensure adequate AT protection of forces (References (c) and (ah)).
+
+5.18.3.  Ensure that subordinate elements, which are tenant units on Military Service installations, coordinate their AT programs and requirements with the host installation commander.  Differences shall be resolved through the applicable Combatant Commander and the Service component command chain of command.
+
+5.18.4.  Identify and designate incumbents of high-risk billets and dependent family members requiring AT resident training.  Provide AT resident training to personnel assigned to high-risk billets and others, as applicable.
+
+5.18.5.  For emergent and/or emergency AT requirements that cannot be funded through other means, submit requirements to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for CbT-
+RIF consideration (Reference (o)).
+
+5.18.6.  Provide a representative to the DoD ATCC and appropriate subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+5.18.7.  Identify, document, and submit to the Joint Staff the resource requirements necessary to achieve AT program objectives for each activity under the Combatant Command or for which the Commander has AT responsibility.  Work with the Service component commands to ensure that resource requirements to implement the AT programs are identified and programmed according to PPBES procedures.
+
+5.18.8.  Develop a functional Combatant Commander-oriented AT Strategic Plan that details the vision, mission, goals, and performance measures in support of the Department of Defense and geographic Combatant Commanders' AT Strategic Plans.
+
+## 6.  Information Requirements
+
+The DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and information operations support activities described in this Directive are exempt from licensing in accordance with paragraphs C4.4.1., C4.4.2., and C4.4.8., of DoD 8910.1-M (Reference (ai)).
+
+## 7.  Effective Date
+
+This Directive is effective immediately.
+
+
+
+## Enclosures - 6
+
+E1.  References, continued E2.  Definitions E3.  ATCC and ATCC-SSG E4.  DIA AT Responsibilities E5.  NSA AT Responsibilities E6.  CIFA AT Responsibilities
+
+## E1.  Enclosure 1 References, Continued
+
+
+
+(e)
+Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Civilian Oversight of DoD Combating Terrorism and
+
+Consequence Management Activities,"3 May 9, 2001
+(f)
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Civilian Oversight of DoD Combating
+
+Terrorism Activities,"4 August 14, 2001
+(g)
+GAO Report, "Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DoD Antiterrorism
+
+Program Implementation and Management,"5 September 19, 2001
+(h)
+DoD Instruction 2000.16, "DoD Antiterrorism *(AT)* Standards," October 2, 2006
+
+June 14, 2001
+(i)
+DoD Handbook 2000.12-H, "Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of
+
+Terrorism and Political Turbulence," February *4, 2004*19, 1993
+(j)
+DoD Instruction 5025.1, "DoD Directives Program," October 28, 2007
+
+DoD 5025.1-M, "DoD Directives System Procedures," March 5, 2003
+(k)
+Sections 4801 - 4805 of title 22, United States Code
+(l)
+DoD Instruction 5210.84, "Security of DoD Personnel at U.S. Missions Abroad,"
+
+January 22, 1992
+(m) Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense and the Department of
+State on Security of DoD Elements and Personnel in Foreign Areas,6 December 16, 1997
+(n)
+Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of State and the Department of
+
+Defense on Overseas Security Support,7 September 17, 1990
+(o)
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5261.01EB, "Combating Terrorism
+
+Readiness Initiative Fund," *April 27, 2007*July 1, 2001
+(p)
+DoD Directive 4500.54, "Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad," May 1, 1991
+(q)
+DoD 4500.54-G, "DoD Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG),"8 current edition
+(r)
+Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, 1998  *current* edition
+(s)
+DoD Instruction 3020.37, "Continuation of Essential DoD Contractor Services During
+
+Crisis," November 6, 1990
+(t)
+DoD Directive 5105.62, "Defense Threat Reduction Agency," November 28, 2005
+
+September 30, 1998
+(u)
+DoD Directive 5105.67, "DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity," February 19, 2002
+(v)
+DoD Directive 7045.14, "The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS),"
+
+May 22, 1984
+(w) DoD Directive 5240.2, "DoD Counterintelligence," May 22, 1997
+(x)
+DoD Directive 3040.40, "Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP),"
+
+August 19, 2005DoD Directive 5160.54, "Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)," January
+
+20, 1998
+(y)
+DoD Directive 8500.1E, "Information Assurance," October 24, 2002
+(z)
+DoD Directive 5148.11, "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
+
+(ATSD(IO))," *May 21, 2004*July 1, 1994
+(aa) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," *August 27, 2007*April 25, 1988
+(ab) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence" December 1,
+1982
+(ac) Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01, "DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for
+Buildings," *October 8, 2003*July 31, 2002
+(ad) Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-0210, "DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff
+Distances for Buildings," July 31, 2002
+(ae) Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-021-01, "Design and O&M: Mass Notification
+Systems," December 18, 2002
+(af) DoD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major
+
+Components," August 1, 2002
+(ag) DoD Directive 5100.3, "Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and
+Subordinate Joint Commands," November 15, 1999
+(ah) "Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum," current edition (ai) DoD 8910.1-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of Information Requirements,"
+June 30, 1998
+(aj) Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,"
+May 7, 2002, *as amended*
+(ak) Section 1072(2) of title 10, Unites States Code (al) DoD Directive 3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities," February 18, 1997 (am) DoD Directive 5105.47, "US Defense Representatives (USDR) in Foreign Countries,"
+September 20, 1991
+(an) DoD Instruction 5105.57, "Procedures for the US Defense Representative (USDR) in
+Foreign Countries," December 26, 1995
+
+
+## E2.  Enclosure 2 Definitions
+
+
+
+E2.1.1.  Antiterrorism (AT).  Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, including limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces (Reference (i)).
+
+E2.1.2.  Antiterrorism (AT) Awareness.  Fundamental knowledge of the terrorist threat and measures to reduce personal vulnerability to terrorism (JCS Pub 1-02, Reference (aj).
+
+E2.1.3.  Antiterrorism (AT) Program.  The AT program is one of several security-related programs that fall under the overarching Combating Terrorism and Force Protection programs.
+The AT program is a collective, proactive effort focused on the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks against DoD personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment as well as the preparation to defend against and planning for the response to the consequences of terrorist incidents.  Although not elements of AT, plans for terrorism consequence management preparedness and response measures as well as plans for continuing essential military operations are important adjuncts to an effective AT program.  The minimum elements of an AT program are AT risk management, planning, training and exercises, resource generation, and a program review.
+
+E2.1.3.1.  AT risk management is the process of systematically identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits.  The end products of the AT program risk management process shall be the identification of areas and assets that are vulnerable to the identified threat attack means.
+From the assessment of risk based upon the three critical components of AT risk management
+(threat assessment, asset criticality assessment, and vulnerability assessment), the Commander must determine which assets require the most protection and where future expenditures are required to minimize risk of attack or lessen the severity of the outcome of an attack.  The Commander must decide on how best to employ given resources and AT force protection measures to deter, mitigate, or prepare for a terrorist incident.
+
+E2.1.3.2.  AT planning is the process of developing specific guidance and executionoriented instructions for subordinates.
+
+E2.1.3.3.  AT training is the development of individual, leader, and collective skills as well as conducting comprehensive exercises to validate plans for antiterrorism, incident response, consequence management, and continuity of essential military operations.
+
+E2.1.3.4.  AT resource generation is the process of identifying and submitting requirements through existing PPBES, CbT-RIF, and other funding mechanisms.  Central to success of resource generation is tracking, and ensuring sufficient funding for identified AT
+program life-cycle costs and assessed shortfalls to mitigate risk associated with terrorist capabilities.
+
+E2.1.3.5.  Comprehensive AT program review is the systematic assessment of the AT
+program against standards prescribed by DoD Instruction 2000.16 (Reference (h)).
+
+E2.1.4.  Chief of Mission (COM)/Diplomatic Security Responsibility.  A COM is responsible for protecting all official U.S. personnel and facilities, except those under the security responsibility of the Combatant Commander.  The COM administers the security programs through the regional security officer (RSO) in accordance with DoS and OSPB policies and standards.  Depending on the local conditions, the COM may also elect to implement security procedures, as deemed necessary, that exceed required levels set forth by the OSPB. When a Combatant Commander agrees to relinquish, and the COM accepts "security responsibility" for DoD Elements and Personnel pursuant to the DoD-DoS MOU (Reference (m)), all DoS, OSPB, and locally implemented RSO security policies apply to the DoD elements under the COM's security responsibility.  The security programs typically covered by the RSO include, but not are limited to: physical, personal, procedural, and residential security; technical security including computer security and protection of sensitive national security information and equipment; and new arrival briefing programs on crime, terrorism, and counterintelligence.
+They also include the conduct of criminal and personnel investigations, operational supervision of Marine Security Guard and local National Guard programs, surveillance detection operations and liaison activities with senior host-country security and law enforcement officials, and an official relationship (Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC)) with private U.S. businesses located abroad to provide security advice, threat warning, and other information, including suspicious activity reports.  The RSO is the Ambassador's law enforcement and security advisor and represents the U.S. Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities not resident in the country.  All RSOs and assistant RSOs are special agents of the Diplomatic Security Service.
+
+E2.1.5.  Combatant Command.  Nontransferable command authority establish by Section
+164 of title 10, United States Code ("Armed Forces"), exercised only by the Commanders of Combatant Commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant Command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a Combatant Commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction of all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.  Combatant Command
+(command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate Joint Force Commanders and Service and/or Functional Component Commanders.  Combatant Command (command authority)
+provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the Combatant Commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.  Operational control is inherent in Combatant Command (command authority) (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.6.  Combating Terrorism (CbT).  Combating terrorism within the Department of Defense encompasses all actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts), counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent (preempt), deter (disrupt), and respond to terrorism), terrorism consequence management (preparation for and response to the consequences of a terrorist incident/event), and intelligence support (collection and dissemination of terrorism-related information), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum, including terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear materials, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) devices.
+
+E2.1.7.  Consequence Management (CM).  Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential Government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a CBRNE situation.  For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government through the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA), to provide assistance as required.  The Department of State is the LFA for Foreign Consequence Management.
+
+E2.1.8.  Counterintelligence (CI).  Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.9.  Counterterrorism (CT).  Offensive measures taken to prevent (preempt), deter
+(disrupt), and respond to terrorism (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.10.  Crisis Management.  Measures to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under Federal law.  Crisis Management shall include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the LFA (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.11.  Critical Asset.   Any facility, equipment, service or resource considered essential to DoD operations in peace, crisis, and war and warranting measures and precautions to ensure its continued efficient operation, protection from disruption, degradation, or destruction, and its timely restoration.  Critical assets may be DoD assets or other Government or private assets, (e.g., industrial or infrastructure critical assets), domestic or foreign, the disruption or loss of which would render DoD critical assets ineffective or otherwise seriously disrupt DoD operations.  Critical assets include traditional "physical" facilities and equipment, non-physical assets (such as software systems), or "assets" that are distributed in nature (such as command and control networks, wide area networks or similar computer-based networks) (Reference (i)).
+
+E2.1.12.  Critical Infrastructure.  Infrastructure deemed essential to DoD operations or the functioning of a Critical Asset (Reference (x)).
+
+E2.1.13.  Criticality Assessment.  Identifies key assets and infrastructure that support DoD
+missions, units, or activities and are deemed mission critical by military commanders or civilian agency managers.  It addresses the impact of temporary or permanent loss of key assets or infrastructures to the installation or a unit's ability to perform its mission.  It examines costs of recovery and reconstitution including time, dollars, capability, and infrastructure support.
+
+E2.1.14.  DoD Civilian Work Force.  U.S. citizens or foreign nationals working for the Department of Defense and paid from appropriated or non-appropriated funds under permanent or temporary appointment.  This includes employees filling full-time, part-time, intermittent, or on-call positions.  Specifically excluded are all Government contractor employees.
+
+E2.1.15.  Defense Contractor.  Any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal non-Federal entity that enters into a contract directly with the Department of Defense to furnish services, supplies, or both, including construction.  Thus, Defense contractors may include U.S. nationals, local citizens, or third country nationals.  Defense contractors do not include foreign governments or representatives of foreign governments that are engaged in selling to the Department of Defense or a DoD Component, or foreign corporations wholly owned by foreign governments (Reference (i)).
+
+E2.1.16.  Domestic Terrorism.  Terrorism perpetrated by the citizens of one country against persons in that country.  This includes acts against citizens of a second country when they are in the host country, and not the principal or intended target.
+
+E2.1.17.  Emergency (CbT-RIF Requirement).  An unanticipated requirement created by a combination of circumstances or the resulting state that requires immediate action to prevent, deter, or respond to a terrorist act.  (See Reference (o) for a detailed discussion of CbT-RIF request procedures.)
+E2.1.18.  Emergent (CbT-RIF Requirement).  Newly formed, unexpected requirement resulting as a logical consequence of unforeseen circumstances and calling for prompt action.
+(See Reference (o) for a detailed discussion of CbT-RIF request procedures.)
+E2.1.19.  Family Member.  Individuals defined as "Dependent" in Section 1072(2) of title
+10 U.S.C. (Reference (ak)).  Includes spouses; unmarried widows; unmarried widowers;
+unmarried legitimate children, including adopted children or stepchildren, who are under 21, incapable of self support; or under 23 and enrolled in a full-time institution of higher learning. Also, the family members of DoD civilian employees, particularly as it pertains to those assigned overseas.  The DoD standard for family members requiring Level I AT awareness training is 14 years or older (or younger at discretion of the DoD sponsor, Reference (h)).
+
+E2.1.20.  Food and Water Security.  The protection of food and water sources from disruption and contamination or other terrorist acts that could severely impact operations.  Food and water security measures include those actions taken to detect, prevent, and mitigate the effects from intentional acts designed to disrupt or contaminate food and water sources.
+
+E2.1.21.  Force Health Protection (FHP).  All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel.  These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometry, medical food, and medical intelligence services (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.22.  Force Protection (FP).  Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DoD personnel (including family members), resources, facilities, and critical information.  These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the Joint Force while degrading the opportunities of the enemy.
+Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.23.  Force Protection Condition (FPCON).  A DoD-approved system standardizing the Department's identification, recommended preventive actions, and responses to terrorist threats against U.S. personnel and facilities.  This system is the principal means for a commander to apply an operational decision on how to protect against terrorism and facilitates inter-Service coordination and support for antiterrorism activities. (See Reference (i) for a detailed description of the five progressive levels within the DoD FPCON System.)
+E2.1.24.  High-Risk Billet.  Authorized personnel billet (identified and recommended by the appropriate authority) that because of grade, assignment, travel itinerary, or symbolic value may make a person filling it an especially attractive or accessible terrorist target (Reference (h)).
+
+E2.1.25.  High-Risk Personnel.  Personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value or relative isolation, are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets (Reference (aj)).
+
+## E2.1.26.  Intelligence
+
+E2.1.26.1.  The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.
+
+E2.1.26.2.  Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.27.  Military Department.  One of the Departments within the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended: the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.28.  Military Service.  The Military Services are the United States Army, United States Navy, United States Air Force, United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard
+(when operating as a Military Service in the Navy) (Reference (aj)).
+
+## E2.1.29.  "No Double Standard Policy"
+
+E2.1.29.1.  It is the policy of the U.S. Government that no double standard shall exist regarding the availability of terrorist threat information and that terrorist threat information be disseminated as widely as possible.  Officials of the U.S. Government shall ensure that information that might equally apply to the public is readily available to the public.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for the release of information to the public in the 50 United States, its Territories, and Possessions.  The Department of State (DoS) is responsible for release of terrorist threat information to the public in foreign countries and areas.
+Threats directed against or affecting the public (in the 50 United States, its Territories, and Possessions) or U.S. citizens abroad shall be coordinated with the DHS, the DoS, or the appropriate U.S. Embassy before release.
+
+E2.1.29.2.  Commanders may disseminate terrorist threat information immediately to DoD Elements and Personnel for threats directed solely against the Department of Defense.  In foreign countries and areas, the threat information also shall be passed up the chain of command to the lowest level that has direct liaison with the DoS or the appropriate U.S. Embassy(ies) (or for non-Combatant Commander assigned forces, the U.S. Defense Representative (USDR)). Within the 50 United States, its Territories, and Possessions, the threat information shall be passed up the chain of command to the lowest level that has direct liaison with the DHS.  Except when immediate notice is critical to the security of DoD Elements and Personnel, the appropriate DoS/U.S. Embassy(ies)/DHS should be informed of the threat information before release to DoD
+Elements and Personnel.  When immediate notice is critical to the security of DoD Elements and Personnel, Commanders may immediately disseminate the information to, and implement appropriate AT protective measures for, DoD Elements and Personnel; and as soon as possible, inform the DoS/U.S. Embassies or the DHS, as appropriate, through the chain of command.
+
+E2.1.29.3.  Commanders also shall inform the DoS/U.S. Embassy(ies) or the DHS of any changes to FPCON Levels or the security posture that significantly affects the host nation/U.S. public.  When FPCONs are changed based upon received threat information, both the threat information and notice of the changed FPCON shall be passed up the chain of command to the lowest level that has direct liaison with the DoS/U.S. Embassy(ies) (or for non- Combatant Command assigned forces, the USDR) or the DHS.  Coordination and cooperation with the DoS/U.S. Embassy or the DHS in these cases is NOT a request for concurrence.  Rather, it is informing the COM or Secretary of Homeland Security of the DoD response to a given terrorist threat.  Although the COM or Secretary of Homeland Security may not agree with the commander's assessment, the ultimate responsibility for protection of DoD Elements and Personnel rests with the commanders in the chain of command.  In areas outside the purview of
+the DHS, the DoS is responsible to determine whether to release the threat information to U.S.
+
+citizens abroad and to deal with the sensitivities of the host nation(s).  In the areas under the purview of the DHS, the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible to determine whether to release the threat information to the U.S. public.
+
+E2.1.30.  Operational Control (OPCON).  Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of Combatant Command.
+Operational control is inherent in Combatant Command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.  Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.  Operational control includes authoritative direction over force protection (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.31.  Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC).  The OSAC was established by the DoS in 1985 to foster the exchange of information between American companies with overseas operations and the U.S. Government.  Government and business representatives have joined to use OSAC as a forum to produce a series of publications providing guidance, suggestions, and planning techniques on a variety of security-related issues, including terrorism.
+
+E2.1.32.  Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB).  The OSPB is a National Security Council body established to consider, develop, coordinate, and promote security policies, standards, and agreements on overseas security operations, programs and projects that affect all U.S. Government Agencies under the authority of a U.S. Chief of Mission abroad.  The DoS Director for Diplomatic Security chairs the OSPB.
+
+E2.1.33.  Physical Security.  That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft
+(Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.34.  Protective Service Operations (PSO).  Protective Service Operations entail the protection of dignitaries and other high-risk personnel in the Combatant Commander's AOR
+where significant threats exist.  Those threats include assaults, kidnappings, assassinations, and attempts to embarrass the U.S. Government.  This condition may result in the requirement to provide increased safety and security through the assignment of protective service details.
+
+E2.1.35.  Reserve Components (RC).  The RC of the Armed Forces of the United States are those Reserve members, units, and full-time support personnel of the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and during time of war when directed by the President, the Coast Guard Reserve.  Within each RC, a Reserve member is placed in one of three Reserve categories: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, or Retired Reserve
+(Reference (aj)).
+
+## E2.1.36.  Security
+
+E2.1.36.1.  Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation, to protect against all acts designed to, or that may, impair its effectiveness.
+
+E2.1.36.2.  A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.37.  Security Organizations.  Military law enforcement, military criminal investigative organizations, and DoD-contracted security personnel.
+
+E2.1.38.  Service Component Command.  A command consisting of the Service component command and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a Combatant Command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.39.  Tactical Control (TACON).  Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.  Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.40.  TACON (for force protection).  TACON (for force protection) enables the geographic Combatant Commander to order implementation of force protection measures (of which AT measures are integral) and to exercise the security responsibilities outlined in any respective MOA concluded under the December 1997 Department of State/Department of Defense MOU on the Security of DoD Elements and Personnel in Foreign Areas (known as the Universal MOU) (Reference (m)).  Further, TACON (for force protection) authorizes the geographic Combatant Commander to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce force protection measures for covered forces.  This relationship includes the authority to inspect and assess security requirements and direct DoD activities to identify the resources required to correct deficiencies and to submit budget requests to parent organizations to fund identified corrections.
+The geographic Combatant Commander can also direct immediate force protection measures
+(including temporary relocation and departure) when, in his judgment, such measures must be accomplished without delay to ensure the safety of the DoD Personnel involved.  Persons subject to the geographic Combatant Commander's TACON (for force protection) authority include not only active duty and Reserve component personnel in the Commander's AOR, but also, all DoD
+civilian employees and all family members in the AOR.
+
+E2.1.41.  Terrorism.  The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear and intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological (Reference (aj)).
+
+E2.1.42.  Terrorist Threat Level.  An intelligence threat assessment of the level of terrorist threat faced by U.S. personnel and interests.  The assessment is based on a continuous intelligence analysis of a minimum of four elements: terrorist group operational capability, intentions, activity, and operational environment.  There are four threat levels: LOW, MODERATE, SIGNIFICANT, and HIGH.  Threat levels should not be confused with Force Protection Conditions (FPCON).  Threat-level assessments are provided to senior leaders to assist them determining the appropriate local FPCON.
+
+E2.1.43.  Threat Analysis.  In antiterrorism, a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups that could target the DoD Components or the DoD Elements and Personnel.  A threat analysis shall review the factors of a terrorist group's existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate.  Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying probability of terrorist attack and results in a threat assessment.
+
+E2.1.44.  Threat Assessment.  The process used to conduct a threat analysis and develop an evaluation of a potential terrorist threat.  Also, it is the product of a threat analysis for a particular unit, installation, or activity (Reference (h)).
+
+E2.1.45.  U.S. Defense Representative (USDR).  The USDR is the in-country representative of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commander for coordination of security matters for all in-country noncombat DoD Elements and Personnel (those personnel and organizations not assigned to, or attached to, or under the command of a Combatant Commander).  The USDR shall act as the Department of Defense's single point of contact for security issues relating to the Combatant Commander/COM MOU (References (l) and (m)).
+
+## E2.1.46.  Vulnerability
+
+E2.1.46.1.  In antiterrorism, a situation or circumstance, if left unchanged and taken advantage of by terrorists, that may result in the loss of life or damage to mission-essential resources.
+
+E2.1.46.2.  The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight diminished.
+
+E2.1.46.3.  The characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation
+(incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) hostile environment.
+
+E2.1.46.4.  In information operations, a weakness in information system security design, procedures, implementation, or internal controls that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to information or an information system (References (h) and (aj)).
+
+E2.1.47.  Vulnerability Assessment.  An evaluation (assessment) to determine the vulnerability to a terrorist attack against an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence, facility, or other site.  Identifies areas of improvement to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism (Reference (aj)).  The process the commander uses to determine the susceptibility to attack from the full range of threats to the security of personnel, family members, and facilities, which provide a basis for determining antiterrorism measures that can protect personnel and assets from terrorist attacks (Reference (h)).
+
+## E3.  Enclosure 3 Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee (Atcc) And Senior Steering Group (Atcc-Ssg) E3.1.  Purpose
+
+E3.1.1.  Enable expeditious resolution of AT issues affecting the Department of Defense. E3.1.2.  Serve as a forum for the exchange of AT information to assist OSD staff elements with their oversight roles.
+
+E3.1.3.  Act as a clearinghouse for policy recommendations to the Secretary of Defense concerning protection of DoD personnel and their family members, facilities, critical infrastructure, and other material resources from terrorist acts.
+
+E3.1.4.  Facilitate coordination of AT actions and taskings.
+
+E3.1.5.  Review AT reports to the Secretary of Defense on the status of AT activities undertaken in support of this Directive.
+
+
+
+## E3.2.  Leadership
+
+E3.2.1.  The ASD(SO/LIC&IC) under the USD(P) shall:
+E3.2.1.1.  Co-chair the ATCC-SSG. E3.2.1.2.  Appoint the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism (DASD(SO/CT)) to co-chair the ATCC.
+
+E3.2.2.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
+E3.2.2.1.  Appoint the Director for Operations, Joint Staff (J3) to co-chair the ATCC-
+SSG.
+
+E3.2.2.2.  Appoint the Deputy Director for Global Operations
+(Antiterrorism/*Homeland Defense* Force Protection), Joint Staff to co-chair the ATCC.
+
+
+
+## E3.3.  Membership
+
+E3.3.1.  Membership in the ATCC-SSG shall consist of the following principals: the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the USD(AT&L), the USD(C), the USD(P&R), the DoD GC, the DoD IG, the USD(I), the PDUSD(P&R), the ASD(HA), the ASD(HD*&ASA*), the ASD(LA), the ASD(PA), the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), the Director, PA&E, the Joint Staff (J3), the Director of the DIA, the Director of the DSCA, the Director of the CIFA, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, or their senior representative.
+
+E3.3.2.  Membership in the ATCC shall consist of one representative from each office as identified by the ATCC-SSG principals listed in paragraph E3.3.1. above, and representatives from the Combatant Commands.  Observers from other OSD offices may be authorized on an as required basis.
+
+
+
+## E3.4.  Subcommittees
+
+E3.4.1.  Subcommittees shall be chaired by the Office of Primary Responsibility for the particular AT activity being addressed and shall consist of representatives from those offices that have clear responsibilities with regard to that particular AT activity.
+
+E3.4.2.  Standing subcommittees are Intelligence; Doctrine and Training; Operations;
+Overseas Security; Requirements, Programs, and Budget; Technology; and Congressional Liaison.  Other subcommittees may be established as needed.
+
+All Federal Agencies are required to take all steps necessary to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks.  The ATCC and ATCC-SSG were established to meet this requirement and to support the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in fostering cooperation and coordination for AT activities within the Department of Defense and among the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government Agencies and organizations.
+
+## E4.  Enclosure 4 Defense Intelligence Agency Antiterrorism (At) Responsibilities
+
+E4.1.1.  Establish and operate a Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism
+(DIA/JITF-CT) to direct collection, exploitation, analysis, fusion, and dissemination of all-source intelligence in support of DoD combating terrorism operations, planning, and policy, including DoD AT requirements.  The JITF-CT serves as the single national-level, all-source foreign terrorism intelligence effort within the Department of Defense.   The JITF-CT is designated to serve as the central repository of all foreign terrorism-related intelligence for the Department of Defense.  Military Department Secretaries and Service Chiefs shall conduct terrorism intelligence activities as a component of or in consonance with the JITF-CT.
+
+E4.1.2.  DIA/JITF-CT shall provide prompt dissemination of intelligence on foreign terrorist threats, including specific warning of threats against DoD Personnel (including family members), facilities, and other DoD material resources to comply with DoD Directive 5240.1
+and DoD 5240.1-R (References (aa) and (ab)).  Warnings to DoD Personnel (including family members) shall be in accordance with the "No Double Standard" policy as defined in Enclosure 2.  The DIA/JITF-CT is the focal point within the Department of Defense for the analysis of data and information pertaining to domestic and foreign terrorist threats to DoD Personnel (excluding threats posed by U.S. persons who have no discernable foreign control or connections).
+
+E4.1.3.  Operate a 24-hour terrorism intelligence Warning and Fusion Center within the JITF-CT; ensure terrorist threat intelligence is disseminated to the appropriate DoD Components.
+
+E4.1.4.  Send a representative to the Interagency Committee on Terrorism, and provide the DoD input to the national intelligence foreign terrorism warning process.
+
+E4.1.5.  Maintain a foreign terrorism database, which includes information on foreign terrorist groups, capabilities, facilities, incidents, biographies, and foreign counterterrorism policies and response capabilities.
+
+E4.1.6.  Subject to the provisions of References (aa) and (ab), assess the foreign terrorist threat worldwide, ensure dissemination to the DoD Components, and produce daily foreign terrorist threat awareness reports.
+
+E4.1.7.  Provide a member to the DoD Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee (ATCC) and subcommittees, as required under Enclosure 3.
+
+E4.1.8.  Function as the DoD Executive Agency for diplomatic security matters, pursuant to DoD Instruction 5210.84 (Reference (l)).  Establish, manage, and operate a DoD diplomatic security element that shall:
+E4.1.8.1.  Ensure the Department of Defense's compliance with the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) and DoS security standards.
+
+E4.1.8.2.  Ensure that deficiencies and equities in the diplomatic security support received from the COMs are addressed.
+
+E4.1.8.3.  Ensure DoD representation at the National Security Council's OSPB and other committees, subcommittees, and working groups, where appropriate pursuant to this Directive and References (h), (i), and (k) through (n)).
+
+E4.1.9.  Provide the senior DIA voting member to the OSPB and provide the alternate DoD
+senior-voting member to the OSPB.
+
+E4.1.10.  Provide and conduct security assistance visits and vulnerability assessments for all DIA elements, as well as other defense component offices under the security responsibility of the Chiefs of Mission (COMs) on a routine and emergency basis (References (h), (l) through (n), DoD Directive 3025.15, DoD Directive 5105.47, and DoD Instruction 5105.57 (References (al) through (an)).  Provide completed vulnerability assessments or security assistance visit reports to the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), the geographic Combatant Commanders, the Director of the CIFA, the DoD Inspector General, the DoS Inspector General, the Unified Commands' Inspector Generals, the DoS Diplomatic Security Services, the U.S. Defense Representatives (USDRs), and the respective COMs.  Provide semi-annual updates to the Combatant Commanders and the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) on trend items and lessons learned.
+
+E4.1.11.  Maintain a centralized database of all vulnerability assessments conducted concerning DoD Elements under COM security responsibility.
+
+E4.1.12.  In coordination with the cognizant Combatant Commander and DoS personnel, ensure that the appropriate reference is used to plan and execute AT for all DoD activities under the security responsibility of the COMs.
+
+E4.1.13.  Ensure DIA personnel are aware of DoD travel security policy and required actions for travelers enroute to, or through, DoD-designated high potential physical threat countries.
+
+E4.1.14.  Ensure DIA personnel assigned to high-risk billets and to others, as recommended by appropriate authority to the Military Departments, receive appropriate AT training.
+
+E4.1.15.  Provide the Combatant Commanders with tailored analytical products, studies, and analyses pertaining to foreign terrorist threats to the DoD Components, Elements and Personnel.
+
+E4.1.16.  Set DoD terrorist threat levels by country worldwide.  Terrorism threat levels shall be established as the result of all-source analysis and incorporation of Combatant Command and Military Department input.
+
+E4.1.17.  Attend Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) meetings pertaining to terrorism, in conjunction with the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) and the Joint Staff (J3).
+
+E4.1.18.  Provide Protective Service Operations (PSOs) for DIA personnel assigned to highrisk billets and to others as recommended by appropriate DoD and DIA counterintelligence and security authority.
+
+## E5.  Enclosure 5 National Security Agency Antiterrorism (At) Responsibilities
+
+E5.1.1.  Disseminate, on a timely basis to the intelligence community and the Department of Defense, signals intelligence (SIGINT) reports on foreign terrorist threat against U.S. interests globally.  Ensure compliance with the "No Double Standard" policy.  (See definition E2.1.29., Enclosure 2.)
+E5.1.2.  Operate a 24-hour foreign terrorism desk within the National Security Operations Center.  This desk shall provide cryptologic support to combat terrorism.
+
+E5.1.3.  Maintain a foreign terrorism communication profile database, which shall include foreign terrorist group communications systems and foreign terrorist group profiles based on SIGINT.
+
+E5.1.4.  Produce and coordinate SIGINT-based foreign terrorist threat warnings. E5.1.5.  Through the Signals Intelligence Directorate, Counter Terrorism Product Line, serve as the focal point for coordination of foreign terrorist issues with the Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, and Law Enforcement elements.
+
+E5.1.6.  Provide AT SIGINT support to major U.S. deployments, as required. E5.1.7.  Provide a representative to the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB).
+E5.1.8.  Provide defensive travel briefings, when appropriate, to affiliates who have been approved for foreign travel.
+
+## E6.  Enclosure 6 Department Of Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity Antiterrorism Responsibilities
+
+E6.1.1.  Establish a threat analysis capability designed to collect, fuse and analyze domestic law enforcement information with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information in support of the DoD CbT mission.  As a designated DoD law enforcement and counterintelligence activity, CIFA shall support the efforts of the JITF-CT, serving as the bridge between intelligence related to international terrorism and domestic law enforcement information.
+
+E6.1.2.  Maintain a domestic law enforcement database that includes information related to potential terrorist threats directed against the Department of Defense.
+
+E6.1.3.  Support the JITF-CT, the Combatant Commands, and the Military Services in preparing threat assessments and advisories.
+
+E6.1.4.  Conduct specific risk assessments in support of the *Defense* Critical Infrastructure Protection Program.  Identify and maintain a database of critical DoD assets and infrastructure.
+This database shall include vulnerability assessments of all DoD facilities.
+
+E6.1.5.  Support DoD counterintelligence components in preparing threat assessments by providing tailored analytical and data-mining services.
+
+E6.1.6.  Establish and manage DoD Force Protection Detachments at high-threat in-transit locations overseas, ensuring required counterintelligence and force protection support is provided to DoD Elements transiting these locations.
+
+E6.1.7.  Assign DoD counterintelligence and criminal investigative personnel to the National Joint Terrorism Task Force and designated Joint Terrorism Task Forces within CONUS.  Provide program oversight and coordination for assigned counterintelligence assets and serve as the repository for information obtained.
+
+E6.1.8.  Provide countersurveillance support to the Combatant Commands upon request, subject to the approval of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
+
+E6.1.9.  Provide a member to the DoD ATCC and subcommittees as required pursuant to Enclosure 3 of this Directive.
+
+E6.1.10.  Assist the DIA in the execution of its diplomatic security function.  Such assistance shall include:
+E6.1.10.1.  Representation at the National Security Council's Overseas Security Policy Board and other related committees, subcommittees, and working groups.
+
+E6.1.10.2.  Support the DIA security assistance visits and vulnerability assessments for all DoD Elements under the security responsibility of the COMs.

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+## Dod Directive 3000.10 Contingency Basing Outside The United States
+
+ Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Effective:
+August 27, 2021 Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Directive 3000.10, "Contingency Basing Outside the United States,"
+January 10, 2013 Approved by:
+Kathleen H. Hicks, Deputy Secretary of Defense
+ Purpose: This issuance establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DoD contingency basing outside the United States.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 5
+2.1.  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. ........ 5 2.2.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment. ........ 5 2.3.  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness........ 6 2.4.  Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. ........ 7 2.5.  Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. ........ 7 2.6.  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. ........ 7
+2.7.  DoD Chief Information Officer. ........ 7 2.8.  OSD and DoD Component Heads. ........ 7 2.9.  Secretaries of the Military Departments. ........ 8 2.10.  CJCS. ........ 9 2.11.  Geographic Combatant Commanders. ........ 9
+GLOSSARY ........ 11
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 11 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 11
+REFERENCES ........ 13
+
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+a.  This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+b.  This issuance does not apply to contingency basing inside of the United States.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+a.  The DoD will pursue increased effectiveness and efficiency in contingency basing by:
+(1)  Promoting scalable interoperable capabilities that support joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners in execution of contingency operations.
+
+(2)  Providing common standards for planning, design, and construction in accordance with DoD Directive (DoDD) 4270.05; developing common standards for contingency services; and establishing standards for equipment, base operations, and base transition or closure.
+
+(3)  Pursuing energy resilient systems and contingency locations in accordance with Sections 2911(a) and 2926(a) of Title 10, United States Code, and the strategy for operational energy required by Section 2926(d) of Title 10, United States Code; and DoDD 4180.01.
+
+(4)  Minimizing waste and conserving water and other resources. (5)  Integrating comprehensive risk management into planning, design, and operations for:
+(a)  Environment, safety, and occupational health in accordance with DoDD
+4715.01E and DoD Instructions (DoDIs) 4715.22, 6055.01, and 6055.05.
+
+(b)  Explosives safety in accordance with DoDI 6055.16.
+(c)  Emergency management in accordance with DoDI 6055.17.
+(d)  Deployment health in accordance with DoDI 6490.03.
+(e)  Pest management in accordance with DoDI 4150.07. (f)  Mission assurance in accordance with DoDI 3020.45.
+(g)  Security in accordance with DoDD 5200.43.
+(6)  Minimizing the logistics footprint by optimizing the delivery of materiel solutions, contractor support, and services.
+
+(7)  Providing the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel competencies in the DoD total force planning process in accordance with DoDI 1100.22.
+
+(8)  Conducting contingency basing education and training for military and civilian personnel in accordance with DoDD 1322.18 and DoDD 5124.02.
+
+(9)  Minimizing adverse impacts on local populations and cultural resources in accordance with DoDD 4715.1E.
+
+(10)  Ensuring contingency basing resilience by assessing the risks associated with vulnerability to extreme weather effects (e.g., flooding or tidal surge, wildfire, and drought).
+
+(11)  Ensuring contingency basing security by following established security and base access policies.
+
+(12)  Implementing deployment health activities before, during, and after deployments to contingency locations as required by DoDI 6490.03.
+
+(13)  As appropriate, providing review and verification of ongoing contingency construction projects when mission changes occur.
+
+b.  Through the posture planning process, contingency locations whose mission requirements extend beyond 60 months will be adjudicated between the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Global Posture Executive Council, and the Chief of the identified lead Military Service for each location to determine if the contingency location should be:
+
+(1)  Retained as a contingency location;
+(2)  Transitioned to an enduring location; or (3)  Closed.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities 2.1.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Acquisition And Sustainment.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.8., the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment:
+a.  Designates a senior official responsible for oversight of all aspects of contingency basing policy, including the designation or establishment of a governance body in accordance with DoDI 5105.18.
+
+b.  Leads rapid acquisition and procurement efforts in support of Combatant Commanders'
+requirements to provide immediate capabilities for contingency basing.
+
+c.  Establishes a process to identify the minimum level of competency for contracting officers who support contingency basing.
+
+d.  Establishes and provides specific training requirements for contracting officers who support contingency basing.
+
+e.  Recommends to the Deputy Secretary of Defense priorities for plans, analyses, capabilities, and investment strategies relevant to contingency basing.
+
+## 2.2.  Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Sustainment.
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment oversees all aspects of contingency basing policy and ensures DoD alignment in the following areas:
+a.  Integrates contingency basing requirements with DoD's global footprint, through coordination with Global Posture Executive Council processes, as appropriate.
+
+b.  Develops energy-related policies for contingency locations; facilitates materiel and nonmateriel improvements in generation, storage, distribution, and use of energy at contingency locations.
+
+c.  Develops DoD-wide master planning policy related to energy, facilities, construction standards, and real property accountability for contingency basing.
+
+d.  Develops comprehensive environmental, emergency management, explosives safety, pest management, and fire service policies for contingency basing in accordance with DoDD 4715.01E and DoDI 4715.22.
+
+e.  Develops policy for common use sustainment materiel for contingency basing.
+
+f.  Develops policy and establishes procedures for contractor support for contingency basing.
+
+g.  Develops criteria for facilities, equipment, and services for initial, temporary, and semipermanent contingency locations.
+
+h.  Develops and establishes DoD logistics policies and guidelines for contingency basing that support and facilitate programs for materiel interoperability and standardization with multinational partners in accordance with DoDI 2010.06.
+
+i.  Integrates and annually updates contingency basing considerations into the DoD Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan.
+
+j.  Coordinates with the Military Departments and the Global Posture Executive Council, and approves CJCS recommendations for designation of a lead Military Service (referred to in this issuance as a "lead Service") for each semi-permanent contingency location.
+
+k.  Designates the lead Service of contingency locations if consensus cannot be reached among the DoD Components concerned.
+
+l.  Designates a contingency basing program administrator to be responsible for integration of contingency basing requirements into the global posture planning process in accordance with DoDI 3000.12.
+m.  Develops policy for contingency basing resilience.
+
+n.  Provides guidance for implementation of open-air burn pits in accordance with DoDI
+4715.19.
+
+## 2.3.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Personnel And Readiness.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.8., the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness:
+a.  Ensures contingency basing is incorporated into health and medical affairs policy in accordance with DoDD 5124.02 and force health protection policy in accordance with DoDD 6200.04.
+
+b.  Integrates DoD total force requirements for contingency basing into the DoD total force planning process.
+
+c.  Ensures DoD expeditionary civilian requirements to implement this issuance are included in the DoD Expeditionary Civilian Plan in accordance with Directive-type Memorandum 17-004.
+d.  Develops training policy to institutionalize contingency basing. e.  Issues safety and occupational and environmental health policy that includes risk assessment and risk management requirements at contingency locations in accordance with DoDIs 6055.01, 6055.05, 6055.07, 6055.20, and 6490.03.
+
+## 2.4.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Intelligence And Security.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.8., the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security ensures the defense security framework supports contingency basing security requirements in accordance with DoDD 5200.43 and biometrics data collection in accordance with DoDI O-3300.04.
+
+## 2.5.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Research And Engineering.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.8., the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering establishes joint standardization boards, as described in DoD Manual 4120.24, to achieve commonality and interoperability among the DoD Components for contingency location facilities, processes, and equipment in accordance with DoDI 5105.18.
+
+## 2.6.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.8., the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
+a.  Ensures that the policies of this issuance are integrated into national security and defense strategy documents.
+
+b.  Ensures that DoD mission assurance and combating terrorism policies support the protection requirements for contingency basing outside the United States.
+c.  Coordinates, as appropriate, with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the CJCS to conduct Global Posture Executive Council reviews of contingency location developments, including associated agreements and resourcing requests.
+
+## 2.7.  Dod Chief Information Officer.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.8. and in accordance with DoDD 5144.02, the DoD Chief Information Officer develops and oversees information policies required to implement this issuance.
+
+## 2.8.  Osd And Dod Component Heads.
+
+The OSD and DoD Component heads:
+
+a.  Provide policy and direction within their Component to implement this issuance.
+b.  Plan, program, and budget for contingency basing requirements.
+c.  Manage a process to consider the incorporation of this issuance into Component current and emerging doctrine.
+
+d.  Incorporate contingency basing into existing training programs for deployable personnel
+(including military, DoD civilians, and contractor support).
+
+e.  Recruit DoD civilians to meet the supported Combatant Command requirements for contingency basing.
+
+f.  Incorporate contingency basing considerations into joint training events (including military, DoD civilians, and contractor support).
+
+g.  Ensure energy resilience considerations are included in existing training programs for contingency locations (including military, DoD civilians, and contractor support).
+
+h. Ensure that operational contract support supports energy resilient contingency locations.
+
+i.  Ensure contingency basing resilience by assessing the risks associated with vulnerability to extreme weather effects (e.g., flooding or tidal surge, wildfire, and drought).
+
+j.  Ensure personnel exposures to industrial, occupational, operational, and environmental hazards at contingency locations are assessed, managed, and recorded in accordance with DoDIs 6055.05 and 6490.03.
+
+k.  Incorporate deployment safety and occupational and environmental health considerations, as required by DoDIs 6055.01, 6055.05, and 6490.03, into deployment planning and deployment operations to protect the safety and health of DoD operations and personnel at contingency locations l.  As appropriate, provide review and verification of ongoing contingency construction projects when mission changes occur.
+
+## 2.9.  Secretaries Of The Military Departments.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.8., the Secretaries of the Military Departments:
+a.  Develop contingency basing capabilities that are scalable and interoperable in the joint community.
+
+b.  Ensure the planning, design, coordination of requirements, construction, provision of base operations support, and operation of the location support the mission and tenants (e.g., military, government civilians, and contractors) when designated the lead Service for a contingency location.
+
+c.  Provide contingency basing support, including deployment health support, at the contingency locations where their respective Military Service is designated the lead Service, in accordance with this issuance and DoDI 6490.03
+d.  Coordinate requirements with the lead Service when a tenant at a contingency location in accordance with DoDI 4000.19.
+
+e.  Pursue energy resilient contingency locations through maximum use of cost effective, energy efficient designs, equipment, and materiel.
+
+f.  Ensure contingency basing requirements are met in accordance with operation plans and supporting plans.
+
+g.  Provide and maintain a sufficient number of personnel trained to effectively support energy resilience at contingency locations (including military, DoD civilians, and contractor support).
+
+h.  Maintain sufficient real property data elements to be able to obtain a real property unique identifier in accordance with DoDI 4165.14, should the site transition to an enduring location.
+
+## 2.10.  Cjcs.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.8., the CJCS:
+a.  Oversees operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to ensure contingency basing requirements identified by the DoD Components are vetted up to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for validation.
+
+b.  Revises or develops joint doctrine in support of this issuance.
+c.  Incorporates this issuance into the joint professional military education curriculum.
+d.  Reviews Combatant Command proposals for designation of a lead Service for each semipermanent contingency location and provides a recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment.
+
+## 2.11.  Geographic Combatant Commanders.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.8., the geographic Combatant Commanders:
+a.  Assess the operational environment at critical milestones to determine contingency basing requirements and maintain a contingency location master list for contingency locations within their respective area of responsibility.
+
+b.  Designate the lead Service component responsible for each initial and temporary contingency location.
+
+c.  Propose to the CJCS the designation of a lead Service for each semi-permanent contingency location.
+
+d.  Establish, in coordination with the involved DoD Components, contingency basing criteria in operation plans and supporting plans.  Ensure plans are within defense strategy documents and in accordance with DoDI 3000.15.
+
+e.  Specify the common service standard to be provided by contingency location base operations support.
+
+f.  Coordinate contingency location base operations support requirements for joint special operations forces with United States Special Operations Command or appropriate special operations component command(s).
+
+g.  Categorize contingency locations as initial, temporary, or semi-permanent (depending on expected duration of location).
+
+
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+
+
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+contingency basing
+The lifecycle process of planning, designing, constructing, operating, managing, transferring, and transitioning, transferring, or closing a non-enduring location supporting a Combatant Commander's requirements.
+contingency location
+A non-enduring location outside of the United States that supports and sustains operations during contingencies or other operations and is categorized by mission life-cycle requirements as initial,
+temporary, or semi-permanent.
+
+enduring location
+A geographic site designated by the DoD for strategic access and use to support U.S. security interests for the foreseeable future.  The following types of sites are considered enduring for U.S. Government purposes:  Main Operating Base; Forward Operating Site; and Cooperative Security Location.  All 3 types of locations may be
+composed of more than one distinct site.
+
+initial contingency location
+A location that is intended to support missions up to 9 months in duration.  It is designed and established on an expedient basis using organic Service capabilities and is characterized by rapidly deployable, austere facilities requiring minimal engineering effort to initiate mission operations.  It is intended for use by operational units upon arrival in theater for a limited time, typically up to 9 months. When mission activities at an initial contingency are likely to extend beyond 9 months, the geographic Combatant Commander will enhance, re-categorize, and sustain the site as a temporary contingency location.
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+lead Service
+The Military Service that ensures the planning, design, coordination of requirements, construction, operation of the location, and provision of base operations support to the mission and tenants at a contingency location.
+semi-permanent contingency location
+A location that is intended to support missions 24-60 months in duration and is characterized by well-developed facilities and infrastructure requiring engineer efforts above that required for temporary contingency locations.  The geographic Combatant
+Commander should provide the designated lead Service with periodic
+updates on anticipated duration of use and mission requirement changes to facilitate the lead Service's programming, site planning, design, and construction management activities.  When mission activities at a semi-permanent contingency location are likely to extend or already have exceeded beyond 60 months, the geographic
+Combatant Commander will nominate the site as an enduring location in accordance with procedures outlined in DoDI 3000.12.
+
+temporary contingency location
+A location that is intended to support missions that are expected to last up to 24 months.  It requires additional engineering effort above that required for an initial contingency location, but the number and
+robustness of facilities remains limited.  Construction is low cost and expedient, using locally available materials and equipment.  When mission activities at a temporary contingency location are likely to extend beyond 24 months, the geographic Combatant Commander
+will enhance, re-categorize, and sustain the site as a semi-permanent
+contingency location.
+United States
+Includes the land area, internal waters, territorial sea, and airspace of
+the United States, including:
+
+U.S. territories. Other areas over which the U.S. Government has complete
+jurisdiction and control or has exclusive authority or defense responsibility.
+
+## References
+
+Directive-type Memorandum 17-004, " Department of Defense Expeditionary Civilian
+Workforce," January 25, 2017, as amended
+DoD Directive 1322.18, "Military Training," October 3, 2019 DoD Directive 4180.01, "DoD Energy Policy," April 16, 2014, as amended DoD Directive 4270.05, "Military Construction," February 12, 2005, as amended
+DoD Directive 4715.01E, "Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health (ESOH)," March 19,
+2005, as amended
+DoD Directive 5124.02, "Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+(USD(P&R))," June 23, 2008
+DoD Directive 5144.02, "DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO)," November 21, 2014, as
+amended
+DoD Directive 5200.43, "Management of the Defense Security Enterprise," October 1, 2012, as
+amended
+DoD Directive 6200.04, "Force Health Protection (FHP)," October 9, 2004, as amended
+DoD Instruction 1100.22, "Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix," April 12,
+2010, as amended
+DoD Instruction 2010.06, "Materiel Interoperability and Standardization with Allies and
+Coalition Partners," July 29, 2009, as amended
+DoD Instruction 3000.12, "Management of the U.S. Global Defense Posture (GDP)," May 6,
+2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 3000.15, "Plan Review and Approval Process," November 3, 2020 DoD Instruction 3020.45, "Mission Assurance (MA) Construct," August 14, 2018 DoD Instruction O-3300.04, "Defense Biometric Enabled Intelligence (BEI) and Forensic
+Enabled Intelligence (FEI)," May 25, 2012, as amended
+DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," April 25, 2013, as amended
+DoD Instruction 4150.07, "DoD Pest Management Program," December 26, 2019 DoD Instruction 4165.14, "Real Property Inventory (RPI) and Forecasting," January 17, 2014, as
+amended
+DoD Instruction 4715.19, "Use of Open-Air Burn Pits in Contingency Operations," November
+13, 2018
+DoD Instruction 4715.22, "Environmental Management Policy for Contingency Locations,"
+February 18, 2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5105.18, "DoD Intergovernmental and Intragovernmental Committee
+Management Program," July 10, 2009, as amended
+DoD Instruction 6055.01, "DoD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program," October 14,
+2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 6055.05, "Occupational and Environmental Health (OEH)," November 11,
+2008, as amended
+DoD Instruction 6055.07, "Mishap Notification, Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping,"
+June 6, 2011, as amended
+DoD Instruction 6055.16, "Explosives Safety Management Program," July 29, 2008, as amended
+DoD Instruction 6055.17, "DoD Emergency Management (EM) Program," February 13, 2017, as
+amended
+DoD Instruction 6055.20, "Assessment of Significant Long-Term Health Risks from Past
+Environmental Exposures on Military Installations," June 6, 2017, as amended
+DoD Instruction 6490.03, "Deployment Health," June 19, 2019
+DoD Manual 4120.24, "Defense Standardization Program (DSP) Procedures," September 24,
+2014, as amended
+United States Code, Title 10

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+## Department Of Defense Directive
+
+NUMBER 3115.13
+December 9, 2010
+Incorporating Change 3, August 26, 2020
+
+## Usd(I&S)
+
+SUBJECT: DoD Support to the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG)
+References: See Enclosure 1
+1. PURPOSE.  This Directive establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for providing DoD support to the HIG in accordance with the National Security Council "Charter for Operations of Interagency High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group" (Reference (a)). 2. APPLICABILITY.  This Directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").
+
+## 3. Definitions.  See Glossary
+
+4. POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a. The Department of Defense shall support the HIG, in accordance with applicable U.S. law and policy, including Reference (a), DoD Directive 3115.09 (Reference (b)), U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3, (Reference (c)), section 1385 of title 18, United States Code (Reference (d)), DoD Instruction 3025.21 (Reference (e)), DoD 5240.1-R (Reference (f)), DoD Manual 5240.01 (Reference (g)), and DoD Directive 5148.13 (Reference (h)).  All DoD administrative and logistic support to non-DoD elements of the HIG shall be provided in accordance with DoD Instruction 4000.19 (Reference (i)).
+b. DoD personnel selected to support the HIG on a permanent or temporary-duty basis shall be assigned or attached to the DoD element of the HIG, as appropriate.  DoD personnel assigned or attached to the DoD element of the HIG shall report to and be accountable to the Director of the HIG through the DoD Deputy Director of the HIG.  DoD personnel shall remain subject to all U.S. laws and policies that apply to DoD personnel.  DoD personnel may exercise any DoD authorities that have been delegated to them consistent with applicable U.S. law and policy.
+
+c. DoD personnel shall promptly report all reportable incidents through the DoD Deputy Director of the HIG to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), in accordance with Reference (b).
+
+d. Within the United States, DoD personnel assigned or attached to the HIG shall not provide direct assistance to civilian law enforcement authorities in civilian law enforcement activities.  Direct assistance includes active participation in civilian law enforcement activities such as arrests, searches, seizures, or interrogations.  This prohibition does not apply to DoD personnel who participate in HIG interrogations for the military purpose of collecting foreign intelligence (i.e., information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, international terrorists, or their agents), nor does it apply to DoD personnel who have been detailed to a civilian law enforcement agency and are not subject to control by a military official. 5. RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 6. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.  The reporting requirements in this Directive are exempt from review and approval procedures according to Paragraphs 1.b.(1), 1.b.(7), and
+1.b.(8) of Enclosure 3 of Volume 1 of DoD Manual 8910.01 (Reference (j)).
+
+7. RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release.**  This directive is available on the Directives Division Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. 8. SUMMARY OF CHANGE 3.  This administrative change updates the title of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security in accordance with Public Law 116-92, (Reference (k)).
+
+9. EFFECTIVE DATE.  This Directive is effective December 9, 2010.
+
+Enclosures
+1. References 2. Responsibilities Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+(a)
+National Security Council, "Charter for Operations of Interagency High-Value Detainee
+Interrogation Group," April 19, 20101
+(b)
+DoD Directive 3115.09, "DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning," October 11, 2012, as amended
+(c)
+U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3, "Human Intelligence Collector Operations," September 6, 2006
+(d)
+Section 1385 of title 18, United States Code (also known as "The Posse Comitatus Act")
+(e)
+DoD Instruction 3025.21, "Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies," February 27, 2013
+(f)
+DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons," December 1982, as amended
+(g)
+DoD Manual 5240.01, "Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities," August 8, 2016
+(h)
+DoD Directive 5148.13, "Intelligence Oversight," April 26, 2017
+(i)
+DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," April 25, 2013
+(j)
+DoD Manual 8910.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Collections Manual: Procedures for DoD Internal Information Collections," June 30, 2014, as amended
+(k)
+Public Law 116-92, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020," December 20, 2019
+(l)
+DoD Instruction S-5200.42, "Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Related Intelligence Activities (U)," December 8, 2009, as amended
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY (USD(I&S)). The USD(I&S) shall:
+a. Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of DoD policy for DoD support to the HIG.
+b. Serve as the DoD resource advocate for DoD support to the HIG.
+
+c. In consultation with the Heads of the DoD Components, determine the level of administrative and logistic support, including personnel, that the Heads of the DoD Components shall provide to the DoD element of the HIG to enable it to perform its mission effectively.
+
+d. Immediately notify the Secretary of Defense of all decisions to employ an MIT to interrogate a high-value detainee.
+
+e. Monitor and assess the effectiveness of DoD support to the HIG and recommend changes to DoD policy, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), as appropriate. 2. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA).  In addition to the responsibilities in section 7 of this enclosure, the Director, DIA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S), shall:
+a. Establish the DoD element of the HIG to which all DoD personnel who support the HIG
+shall be assigned or attached, as appropriate.
+
+b. Manage DoD support to the HIG.
+c. Select and assign a senior executive-level official to serve as the DoD Deputy Director of the HIG in accordance with Reference (a).
+
+d. Together with the Director or designated deputy-level officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, determine whether to employ a mobile interrogation team (MIT) to interrogate a high-value detainee in accordance with Reference (a).
+
+e. Communicate directly with the Heads of the DoD Components and U.S. Government
+(USG) agencies, or their designees, as necessary to carry out responsibilities assigned in this Directive.
+
+f. Enter into interservice and intragovernmental support agreements with the Heads of the DoD Components and USG agencies in accordance with Reference (i) as necessary to carry out responsibilities assigned in this Directive.
+
+g. Monitor and assess the effectiveness of DoD support to the HIG and recommend changes to DoD policy and DOTMLPF, as appropriate.
+
+h. As General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) Manager:
+(1) Plan, program, and budget to fund all administrative and logistic support, including personnel, provided to the DoD element of the HIG pursuant to section 1.c. of this Enclosure.
+(2) Coordinate all resource requests with the USD(I&S) and the Director of National Intelligence, as appropriate, throughout all planning, programming, budgeting, and execution phases and processes.
+
+(3) In consultation with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, realign existing GDIP billets to meet the needs of the HIG.
+
+i. In collaboration with the Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Executors, coordinate the training of DoD personnel to meet HIG training requirements.
+
+j. Supervise the DoD Deputy Director of the HIG.
+k. Immediately notify the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(I&S) of all decisions to employ an MIT to interrogate a high-value detainee.
+
+l. Identify, integrate, and validate HIG requirements in support of National Intelligence Program planning, programming, and budgeting processes.
+
+3. GENERAL COUNSEL OF DIA.  The General Counsel of DIA, in consultation with the General Counsels of the DoD Components that provide support to the HIG, shall provide legal advice to the DoD Deputy Director of the HIG on all matters related to DoD support to the HIG. 4. DoD DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE HIG.  The DoD Deputy Director of the HIG, under the authority, direction, and control of the Director, DIA, shall:
+a. Identify HIG training requirements for DoD personnel and provide these to the Director, DIA or designee.
+
+b. Supervise DoD personnel assigned or attached to the DoD element of the HIG. c. Ensure that DoD personnel assigned or attached to the DoD element of the HIG comply
+with applicable U.S. law and policy.
+d. Communicate directly with the Heads of the DoD Components and USG agencies, or their designees, as necessary to carry out responsibilities assigned in this Directive.
+
+e. Keep the Director, DIA, the Joint Staff Director for Intelligence (J-2), and the USD(I&S)
+informed of significant HIG activities.
+
+f. Receive all requests for DoD support to the HIG, including permanent and temporary personnel support.  Process these requests in accordance with guidance issued by the Director, DIA.
+
+g. Establish a process to ensure that relevant DoD intelligence requirements and target nominations are provided to the HIG.
+
+h. Disseminate intelligence information derived from MIT interrogations to the DoD
+Components in a timely manner and at the lowest appropriate classification level in accordance with DoD Instruction S-5200.42 (Reference (l)).
+
+i. Request, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the approval of the geographic Combatant Commander before the HIG employs an MIT to interrogate a high-value detainee in DoD custody within the geographic Combatant Commander's area of responsibility (AOR).
+
+j. Notify the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of impending MIT travel into a geographic Combatant Commander's AOR and provide operational updates, as appropriate.
+
+k. Notify the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the team composition of an MIT
+preparing to travel into a geographic Combatant Commander's AOR for Service notification purposes.
+
+l. Coordinate MIT employments with the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attache in the country where the MIT will be employed.
+
+m. Consult the DIA General Counsel for legal advice on all matters related to DoD support to the HIG, as required.
+
+n. Monitor and assess the effectiveness of DoD support to the HIG and recommend changes to DoD policy and DOTMLPF, as appropriate. 5. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (GC, DoD).  The GC, DoD, shall provide legal advice to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the OSD Component Heads, and, as appropriate, the Heads of the other DoD Components on all matters related to DoD support to the HIG. 6. DOD SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT OFFICIAL (SIOO).  The DoD SIOO conducts staff assistance visits and inspections of the DoD element of the HIG to verify that personnel are in compliance with U.S. law and policies governing the conduct of intelligence and intelligence-related activities.
+
+7. HEADS OF THE DoD COMPONENTS.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
+a. Provide administrative and logistic support, including personnel, as funded by the GDIP
+Manager, to the DoD element of the HIG.
+
+b. In consultation with the DoD Deputy Director of the HIG, identify, select, and assign or attach qualified personnel to the DoD element of the HIG.
+
+c. Monitor and assess the effectiveness of DoD support to the HIG and recommend changes to DoD policy and DOTMLPF, as appropriate.
+
+8. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 7 of this enclosure, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
+a. Coordinate with the geographic Combatant Commander before the HIG employs an MIT
+to interrogate a high-value detainee in DoD custody within the geographic Combatant Commander's AOR.
+
+b. Notify affected geographic Combatant Commanders of impending MIT travel into their AORs and provide operational updates, as appropriate.
+
+c. Notify the Service Chiefs of the impending travel of their personnel outside the United States. 9. COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 7 of this enclosure, the Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall:
+a. Exercise approval authority over HIG requests to send an MIT to interrogate a high-value detainee in DoD custody within their respective AOR.
+
+b. Ensure that MIT interrogations of detainees in DoD custody within their respective AOR
+are conducted in accordance with References (b) and (c).
+
+c. Notify the DoD Deputy Director of the HIG, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when a high-value individual has been detained or when operations are underway to detain such an individual.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+| AOR                                                                           | area of responsibility                                           |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ATSD(IO)                                                                      | Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight |
+| DIA                                                                           | Defense Intelligence Agency                                      |
+| DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, |                                                                  |
+| personnel, and facilities                                                     |                                                                  |
+| GC, DoD                                                                       | General Counsel of the Department of Defense                     |
+| GDIP                                                                          | General Defense Intelligence Program                             |
+| HIG                                                                           | High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group                          |
+| HUMINT                                                                        | human intelligence                                               |
+| J-2                                                                           | Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence                         |
+| MIT                                                                           | mobile interrogation team                                        |
+| USD(I&S)                                                                      | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security         |
+| USG                                                                           | United States Government                                         |
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Directive. Defense HUMINT Executor.  The senior DoD intelligence officials as designated by the Heads of the DoD Components who are authorized to conduct HUMINT and related intelligence activities, i.e., DIA Deputy Director of Human Intelligence and the senior intelligence officials as designated by the Secretaries of the Military Departments for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and by the Commanders of the Combatant Commands. DoD element of the HIG.  A subordinate element of the DIA to which all DoD permanent and temporary duty personnel selected to support the HIG are assigned or attached for DoD administration and support.
+
+HIG.  The interagency body under the administrative control of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that was established to assemble and dispatch mobile interrogation teams to interrogate high-value detainees.
+
+high-value detainee.  A high-value individual who is in U.S. or foreign custody. high-value individual.  An individual who is assessed by the HIG to possess information about: terrorist threats to the United States or its allies; the location of high-value terrorism subjects, particularly the leadership of terrorist groups that pose a threat to the United States or its allies; strategic-level plans or intentions of any terrorist or insurgent entity directing operations against deployed U.S. or allied forces; or strategic level knowledge of the organization, structure, leadership and key operatives, financial support, and communications methods of designated foreign terrorist organizations.
+
+mobile interrogation team.  An interagency team of expert interrogators, analysts, subject-matter experts, behavioral science experts, interpreters, and other support personnel that is organized, trained, equipped, and dispatched by the HIG to interrogate high-value detainees.
+
+personnel.  A civilian employee or military member from either an Active or Reserve Component.

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+## Department Of Defense Directive
+
+May 2, 2013
+
+USD(P)
+
+## Subject: Information Operations (Io)
+
+ References: See Enclosure 1
+
+
+1.  PURPOSE.  This directive: a.  Reissues DoD Directive 3600.01 (Reference (a)) in accordance with the authority in DoD
+Directive 5111.1 (Reference (b)) and, pursuant to the authority and guidance in Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (c)), updates established policy and assigned responsibilities for IO. b.  Updates IO definitions.
+
+
+c.  Directs the establishment of the Information Operations Executive Steering Group (IO
+ESG).
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY.  This directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD
+(hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components"). 3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  IO will be the principal mechanism used during military operations to integrate, synchronize, employ, and assess a wide variety of information-related capabilities (IRCs) in concert with other lines of operations to effect adversaries' or potential adversaries' decisionmaking while protecting our own. b.  IRCs constitute tools, techniques, or activities employed within a dimension of the information environment (IE) that can be used to achieve a specific end at a specific time and place.  IRCs can include, but are not be limited to, a variety of technical and non-technical activities that intersect the traditional areas of electronic warfare, cyberspace operations, military information support operations (MISO), military deception (MILDEC), influence activities, operations security (OPSEC), and intelligence. c.  The development and management of individual IRCs will be the responsibility of various DoD Components and will be brought together at a specific time and in a coherent and integrated fashion for use against adversaries and potential adversaries in support of military operations.
+
+d.  DoD IO will be synchronized with information and influence activities of other U.S.
+
+Government (USG) organizations to ensure consistency across USG activities in the IE. e.  DoD IO will be coordinated and, as practicable, integrated with related activities conducted by allied nations and coalition partners.
+
+f.  Consistent with existing statutory requirements and manpower polices, Service and joint IO forces must be an appropriate and cost effective total force mix of active and reserve military personnel, government civilian personnel, and contracted support.
+
+
+g.  IO will be included across Active and Reserve Components, and government civilian professional education curriculums to foster an understanding of IO and IRCs across all ranks and positions within DoD.
+
+h.  IO tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); technologies; and lessons learned will be shared among DoD Components and, as practicable, with allied nations and coalition partners to fully facilitate the synchronization, integration, and effectiveness of IO while reducing redundancies in capabilities across the DoD. i.  IO will be integrated into joint exercises and joint training, security cooperation guidance for theater planning, communication strategy, and deliberate and contingency planning.
+
+j.  DoD IO programs and activities will incorporate an explicit means of assessing the results of operations in relation to expectations. k.  DoD IO activities will not be directed at or intended to manipulate audiences, public actions, or opinions in the United States and will be conducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. statutes, codes, and laws. l.  DoD IO information gathering programs and activities will be coordinated and deconflicted with DoD intelligence activities as set forth in DoD Directive S-5200.37 (Reference
+(d)) and DoD 5240.1-R (Reference (e)).  Human-derived information gathering activities in support of IO will remain separate from authorized HUMINT and related intelligence activities.
+
+
+
+m.  All DoD IO activities will be conducted in accordance with CJCS Instruction 3121.01B
+(Reference (f)).
+
+n.  The IO ESG will serve as the primary coordination forum within DoD to inform, coordinate, and resolve IO issues among the DoD Components and, as appropriate, deconflict IO issues as they are represented in established DoD policy and programmatic decision forums.  The IO ESG's organization, membership, policies, and procedures will be established in a separate DoD Instruction.
+
+4.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2.
+
+5.  RELEASABILITY.  **Unlimited**.  This directive is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. 6.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This directive:
+
+a.  Is effective May 2, 2013.
+
+b.  Must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication in accordance with DoD Instruction 5025.01 (Reference (g)).  If not, it will expire May 2, 2023 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website.
+
+
+
+Ashton B. Carter
+
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Enclosures
+
+1.  References
+2.  Responsibilities
+Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Directive 3600.01, "Information Operations (IO)," August 14, 2006, as amended
+(hereby cancelled)
+
+(b) DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))," December 8,
+1999
+(c) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Strategic Communication and Information Operations
+in the DoD (U)," January 25, 2011
+(d) DoD Directive S-5200.37, "Management and Execution of Defense Human Intelligence
+(HUMINT) (U)," February 9, 2009, as amended
+(e) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That
+Affect United States Persons," December 7, 1982
+(f) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, "Standing Rules of Engagement
+/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)," June 13, 2005
+(g) DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," September 26, 2012 (h) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Changing the Term Psychological Operations
+(PSYOP) to Military Support information Operations (MISO) (U)," December 3, 2010
+(i) "Trilateral Memorandum of Agreement signed by the Department of Defense, the
+Department of Justice and the Intelligence Community Regarding Computer Network Attack and Exploitation Activities," May 9, 2007
+(j) Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities 1.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy (Usd(P)).  The Usd(P):
+
+
+a.  Serves as the Principal Staff Advisor (PSA) to the Secretary of Defense for oversight of IO in the DoD.  In this capacity, the USD(P):
+
+(1)  Is the primary coordination point of contact for DoD Components and other USG
+organizations for issues related to IO.
+
+
+(2)  Is the single point of fiscal and program accountability for IO. (3)  Links OSD, Joint, and Service IO policies, capabilities, and programs. (4)  Fully integrates IO with national and DoD strategy and planning functions.
+
+
+b.  Provides policy oversight, guidance, and advice for DoD IO to include providing policy guidance on IO force development and employment.
+
+
+c.  Coordinates within OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services to address the Combatant Commanders' IO requirements, which includes the development of IRCs, ensuring adequate test and evaluation resources, and ensuring IRC integration across the CCMDs.
+
+
+d.  In coordination with the DoD Components responsible for the individual IRCs:
+
+
+(1)  Oversees, coordinates, and assesses the efforts of DoD Components to plan, program, and develop IRCs for use in the IE.
+
+
+(2)  Assesses the effectiveness of the IRCs as part of IO in operational applications. e.  Provides IO policy guidance for all phases of operations planning, including security cooperation.
+
+f.  Establishes DoD policy on MISO matters in accordance with Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (h)), and reviews and approves all CCMD MISO programs to be conducted during peacetime or in contingencies short of declared war. g.  Establishes and oversees DoD policy regarding the coordination of IO conducted by DoD
+Components with other USG organizations in support of U.S. national security strategy and policy in accordance with Reference (h), so specific information objectives, target audiences, themes, and actions are synchronized.  This specifically includes coordinating MISO policy, plans, and programs with other USG departments, agencies, and activities.
+
+
+h.  Establishes and oversees DoD policy regarding the coordination and, where practicable, the integration of IO efforts with allied and coalition partners. i.  Coordinates with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+(USD(P&R)) on policies for the establishment and maintenance of professionally trained and educated Service and joint IO forces.  These forces will consist of a total force mix as described in paragraph 3f above the signature of this directive.
+
+
+j.  Develops standardized fiscal methodologies for IRCs in accordance with Reference (c)
+and in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense (USD(C)/CFO), and the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE).  As part of this responsibility, the USD(P) will maintain procedures to ensure fiscal accountability for IO
+as well as the individual IRCs. k.  Conducts programmatic assessments of DoD IO in coordination with DCAPE.
+
+l.  As one of the co-chairs of the IO ESG, establishes and maintains the IO ESG.
+
+m.  Assists in the development of Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO)
+policy and coordinates with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and Commander, United States Strategic Command
+(USSTRATCOM) regarding the development, acquisition, and employment of JEMSO
+capabilities used to support IO. n.  Coordinates with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to ensure that DoD IO is consistent with the policy established in this directive and that DoD IO is not directed at or intended to manipulate U.S. audiences, public actions, or opinions and is conducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. statutes, codes, and laws.
+
+o.  In coordination with the USD(I):
+
+(1)  Provides policy oversight for OPSEC; MILDEC; deconfliction of DoD IO and intelligence activities; and the development, acquisition, and integration of MILDEC capabilities used to support IO.
+
+
+
+(2)  Provides input to the DoD OPSEC program as required.
+
+
+(3)  Coordinates on intelligence related matters that support the integration of IRCs used during military operations.
+
+
+(4)  Assists in the development and maintenance of a DoD instruction on policy for intelligence support to IO, information gathering activities, and IE characterization.
+
+2.  USD(I).  The USD(I):
+
+a.  Facilitates coordination of IO activities within the Intelligence Community consistent with Memorandum of Agreement (Reference (i)).
+
+b.  Serves as the OSD program management lead for the DoD OPSEC and MILDEC
+programs. c.  In coordination with the USD(P):
+(1)  Develops and oversees the implementation of policy for intelligence support to IO, information gathering activities, and IE characterization. (2)  Establishes and oversees the implementation of policies and procedures for the conduct of DoD OPSEC and MILDEC as warfighting enablers and military competencies, and the coordination and deconfliction of DoD IO and intelligence activities.
+
+
+(3)  Coordinates on intelligence related matters that support the integration of IRCs used during military operations.
+
+(4)  Develops, approves, and maintains DoD instruction on policy for intelligence support to IO, information gathering activities, and IE characterization.
+
+
+3.  USD(AT&L).  In partnership with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the USD(AT&L) researches IRCs affecting IO and coordinates these activities with the USD(P). 4.  USD(P&R).  The USD(P&R):
+a.  Develops policies for the establishment and maintenance of professionally trained and educated Military Service and joint IO forces in coordination with the USD(P) and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.  These forces will consist of a total force mix.
+
+b.  Develops and distributes polices for the establishment and maintenance of professionally trained and educated Military Service and joint IO forces in collaboration with USD(P).
+
+
+
+5.  USD(C)/CFO.  The USD(C)/CFO:
+a.  In coordination with the USD(P) and DCAPE, develops standardized fiscal methodologies for IRCs when applied to support IO.  Included in this activity is the maintenance of procedures to ensure fiscal accountability for IO as well as the individual IRCs when they are employed in support of IO.
+
+b.  Requires all organizations conducting MISO to capture costs for MISO as a separate and distinct entity from other IO-related costs. 6.  DCAPE.  The DCAPE:
+
+a.  As appropriate, reviews IO programs, costs, and effectiveness.
+
+b.  In coordination with the USD(P) and USD(C)/CFO, develops standardized fiscal methodologies for IRCs and IO activities.
+
+
+7.  DOD COMPONENT HEADS.  The DoD Component heads:
+a.  Assign responsibilities and establish procedures within their respective DoD Components to implement this directive. b.  Support IO planning, coordination, operations, and deconfliction within DoD Components and other USG organizations. 8.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments:
+a.  In coordination with the USD(P) and CJCS, implement joint IO policy and doctrine and develop, plan, and program IO into the full spectrum of military operations.
+
+b.  Develop and implement Service component IO policy, doctrine, and TTPs that are compatible with DoD and joint IO policy and doctrine.
+
+c.  Provide education and training to meet IO military and civilian force development goals to meet joint IO requirements.
+
+
+d.  Provide intelligence oversight training to IO staffs and units in accordance with
+Reference (e). e.  Share IO TTPs and technologies with DoD Components and, when release of such information and technologies is permitted, allied and coalition partners.
+
+
+f.  Establish and oversee policies that provide for IO reporting and assessment as well as the integration of individual IRCs to meet Combatant Commanders' needs and objectives. g.  In accordance with Reference (c) and in coordination with the USD(P), USD(C)/CFO, and DCAPE, annually provide comprehensive Service inputs required to ensure fiscal accountability for IO as well as individual IRCs. 9.  CJCS.  The CJCS:
+
+a.  Serves as the joint IO proponent.  Functions as the oversight authority for IO policy execution within the CCMDs and joint task forces.
+
+b.  Develops procedures for a professionally trained and educated joint IO force in coordination with the USD(P&R) and USD(P). c.  Emphasizes the importance of including IO as an instrumental part of military operations through the development and validation of joint IO doctrine. d.  Validates IO needs through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.
+
+e.  Incorporates IO into all military planning efforts, including joint exercises and training.
+
+f.  Serves as the joint proponent for MILDEC and OPSEC. g.  Ensures all joint education, training, plans, and operations are consistent with joint IO
+policy, strategy, and doctrine. h.  Evaluates the joint IO education and training system and conducts assessments of IO to ensure the requirements of the Combatant Commanders are met. i.  Consistent with Reference (c), oversees the Joint IO Warfare Center as a Chairman's Controlled Activity. j.  As one of the co-chairs of the IO ESG, establishes and maintains Joint Staff participation in the IO ESG. k.  Ensures coordination and deconfliction of joint IO and intelligence activities in all operational planning and execution. l.  Establishes a framework for sharing TTPs as well as lessons learned among DoD
+Components and allied and coalition partners.
+
+10.  COMBATANT COMMANDERS.  The Combatant Commanders:
+a.  Utilize IO as the principal mechanism to integrate, synchronize, employ, and adapt all IRCs in the IE to accomplish operational objectives against adversaries and potential adversaries. b.  Develop, plan, program and assess IO as well as IRC execution in support of IO during all phases of military engagement and at all levels of war. c.  In coordination with the USD(P) and CJCS, identify in advance and seek, as appropriate, the delegated authorities required for employing IRCs in support of IO across the full range of military operations.
+
+d.  Identify and prioritize IO needs on their respective integrated priority lists. e.  Integrate IO into joint exercises and training, security cooperation guidance for theater planning, and deliberate and contingency planning.
+
+
+f.  Develop and share IO lessons learned through written and oral assessments communicated to other DoD Components and allied and coalition partners as appropriate. g.  Ensure that joint IO staffs and units under CCMD command and control have received intelligence oversight training in accordance with Reference (e). h.  Ensure coordination and deconfliction of CCMD IO and intelligence activities in all operational planning and execution. 11.  COMMANDER, USSTRATCOM.  The Commander, USSTRATCOM, is the joint proponent for JEMSO and computer network operations.  In addition to the responsibilities outlined in section 10 of this enclosure and in coordination with the USD(P) and through the CJCS, the Commander, USSTRATCOM, coordinates JEMSO, space operations, and cyberspace operations in support of IO. 12.  COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM).  The Commander, USSOCOM, is the joint proponent for MISO.  In addition to the responsibilities outlined in sections 8 and 10 of this enclosure and in coordination with the USD(P) and through the CJCS, the Commander, USSOCOM, coordinates joint force MISO in support of IO. 13.  DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES.  The Directors of the Defense Agencies:
+a.  Integrate IO into joint exercises, training, and deliberate and contingency planning. b.  Develop and share IO lessons learned through written and oral assessments communicated to other DoD Components and, as applicable, allied and coalition partners.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+ CAPE
+Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
+CCMD
+Combatant Command
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+
+
+DCAPE
+Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
+
+
+IE
+information environment
+IO
+information operations
+IO ESG
+Information Operations Executive Steering Group
+IRC
+information related capability
+
+
+JEMSO
+Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
+
+
+MILDEC
+military deception
+MISO
+military information support operations
+
+
+OPSEC
+operations security
+
+
+PSA
+Principal Staff Advisor
+PSYOP
+psychological operations
+
+
+TTP
+tactics, techniques, and procedures
+
+
+USD(AT&L)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+USD(C)/CFO
+Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense
+USD(I)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+USD(P&R)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+USG
+United States Government
+USSOCOM
+United States Special Operations Command
+USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+ These terms and their definitions are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Publication 1-02 (Reference (j)).
+
+
+
+IE.  An environment that is an aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. IO.  The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.
+
+IO force.  A force consisting of units, staff elements, and individual military professionals in the Active and Reserve Components, and DoD civilian employees who conduct or directly support the integration of IRCs against adversaries and potential adversaries during military operations as well as those who train these professionals. IRC.  A capability that is a tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension(s) of the information environment that can be used to achieve a specific end(s).

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+##
+
+# Dod Directive 3610.01
+
+## Electromagnetic Spectrum Enterprise Policy
+
+
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the DoD Chief Information Officer
+
+Effective:
+September 4, 2020
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+Approved by:
+David L. Norquist, Deputy Secretary of Defense
+
+Purpose: This issuance establishes policy and assigns responsibilities to enable superiority in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) by taking an enterprise approach to all activities necessary for DoD electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO).
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 5
+2.1.  DoD CIO. ........ 5 2.2.  Director, Defense information Systems Agency (DISA). ........ 5 2.3.  USD(R&E). ........ 6 2.4.  USD(A&S). ........ 6 2.5.  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. ........ 7
+2.6.  Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. ........ 7
+2.7.  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness........ 7 2.8.  Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. ........ 8 2.9.  Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. ........ 8 2.10.  Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of the Defense Agencies,
+Excluding DISA. ........ 8
+2.11.  CJCS. ........ 9 2.12.  Combatant Commanders. ........ 9 2.13.  CDRUSSTRATCOM. ........ 10
+GLOSSARY ........ 11
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 11 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 11
+REFERENCES ........ 13
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+a.  This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+b.  Nothing in this issuance alters or supersedes the existing authorities and policies of the Director of National Intelligence regarding the protection of sensitive compartmented information or timely transmission of critical intelligence as directed by Executive Order 12333
+and other laws and regulations.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+It is DoD policy that:
+a.  An enterprise approach be applied to all activities necessary for DoD EMSO, to ensure that DoD maintains access to and control of the EMS.  In support of operations, including effective organization and management of the EMS used by DoD in accordance with Section 488 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.); DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.01; DoDD 5144.02; DoDD 3222.04; DoD Instruction (DoDI) 4650.01; DoDI 3222.03; DoDI 8320.05; the DoD EMS Strategy; the Joint Concept for EMSO; and Joint Doctrine Note 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.
+
+b.  EMSO must be conducted to provide flexible access and maneuver within the EMS.
+Therefore:
+(1)  DoD will seek and leverage intelligence concerning all electromagnetic environments
+(EMEs), using appropriate intelligence processes and authorities, that DoD operates in globally.
+
+(2)  All spectrum-dependent systems, developmental or non-developmental, hereafter referred to as EMS-dependent systems, must be designed to operate in contested and congested EMEs, as appropriate.
+
+(3)  DoD will conduct command, control, and coordination to achieve EMS superiority through the full range of military operations.
+
+(4)  Readiness processes and policies for the use of the EMS must be defined and fully developed, tracked, and integrated with other DoD transformation initiatives.
+
+c.  The EMS enterprise will span all DoD business processes, enabling agile and resilient EMSO.  Therefore:
+(1)  Executive governance will be provided by the DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD
+CIO) for oversight and guidance on EMS-related activities.
+
+(2)  DoD officials will work to ensure that national and international EMS-related policy processes enable global EMS access and maneuver.
+
+d.  Developmental and operational testing must be designed to evaluate developmental and non-developmental EMS-dependent systems in contested and congested EMEs.
+
+e.  Training range capabilities and metrics must be developed to support EMSO readiness in contested and congested EMEs.
+
+f.  EMS enterprise activities must be coordinated, as appropriate, with allies, coalition partners, and other governmental and non-governmental agencies.
+
+g.  Execution and management of EMSO in a contested and congested environment will be included in all joint training events.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities 2.1.  Dod Cio.
+
+The DoD CIO:
+a.  Serves as the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) to the Secretary of Defense on matters related to the EMS and EMS regulatory activities globally, including national and international fora, in accordance with DoDD 5100.01 and DoDD 5144.02.
+
+b.  In coordination with the DoD Components heads:
+(1)  Develops and provides guidance on DoD strategies and policies in support of operations in the EMS.
+
+(2)  Informs DoD strategies on EMS command, control, and coordination system investments.
+
+(3)  Develops instructions to clarify EMS roles and responsibilities in greater detail.
+
+c.  Advises the DoD Component heads on DoD investment strategies for EMS-dependent systems.
+
+d.  Establishes a review and evaluation process that considers all EMS requirements, regardless of classification, in accordance with Section 488(a) of Title 10, U.S.C.
+
+e.  Ensures all DoD EMS users are involved in the DoD decision-making process concerning:
+
+(1)  Potential sharing of spectrum;
+(2)  Reassigning of spectrum; (3)  Reallocating of spectrum; or
+(4)  Relocation of the EMS by the DoD, in accordance with Section 488(a) of Title 10, U.S.C.
+
+f.  In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
+(USD(R&E)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), and the CJCS, provides oversight of EMS-related capability development to the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee as the governance structure.
+
+## 2.2.  Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (Disa).
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the DoD CIO, the Director, DISA, supports the DoD Components with engineering, planning, policy, technology assessment, capability development, and support for operations in the EMS.
+
+2.3.  USD(R&E).
+
+The USD(R&E):
+a.  Serves as the PSA to the Secretary of Defense on issues relating to research, engineering, and technology development on all EMS-dependent systems, in accordance with Section 133a of Title 10, U.S.C.
+
+b.  Establishes DoD policies on, and supervision of, research and engineering of EMS-
+dependent systems for operations in contested and congested EMEs, in coordination with the DoD Component heads.
+
+c.  Oversees developmental and non-developmental research and engineering of DoD EMS
+command, control, and coordination systems, in coordination with the DoD Component heads.
+
+d.  Advises the DoD Component heads on DoD investment strategies for developmental EMS-dependent systems.
+
+e.  Serves as the PSA and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for developmental test and evaluation, and issues guidance and procedures for developmental testing of EMS-dependent systems within contested and congested EMEs, in accordance with DoDI 5134.17.
+
+f.  Conducts or approves independent technical risk assessments on EMS-dependent major defense acquisition programs in accordance with Section 2448b of Title 10, U.S.C.
+
+g.  In coordination with the DoD CIO, the USD(A&S), and the CJCS, provides oversight of EMS-related capability development to the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee.
+
+2.4.  USD(A&S).
+
+The USD(A&S):
+a.  Serves as the PSA to the Secretary of Defense on issues relating to EMS-dependent system acquisition and sustainment, in accordance with Section 133b of Title 10, U.S.C.
+
+b.  Establishes DoD policies on and supervision of acquisition and sustainment for developmental and non-developmental EMS-dependent systems for operations in contested and congested EMEs, in coordination with the DoD Component heads.
+
+c.  Oversees the acquisition and sustainment of developmental and non-developmental DoD
+EMS command, control, and coordination systems, in coordination with the DoD Component heads.
+
+d.  In coordination with the DoD CIO, the USD(R&E) and the CJCS, provides oversight of EMS-related capability development to the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee.
+
+## 2.5.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy.
+
+The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
+a.  Serves as the PSA to the Secretary of Defense for oversight of information operations and provides policy guidance and oversight on roles and responsibilities for the integration of EMSO and other information-related capabilities in accordance with DoDD 3600.01.
+
+b.  Incorporates:
+(1)  EMS considerations into defense guidance.
+(2)  DoD EMS policy in mission areas, under the cognizance of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, including:
+
+(a)  International activities. (b)  Homeland defense. (c)  Stability operations.
+(d)  Cyberspace. (e)  Special operations.
+(f)  Low-intensity conflict missions.
+c.  Designates representatives to participate in the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee for capabilities developed for EMS-related activities.
+
+## 2.6.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Intelligence And Security.
+
+The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security:
+a.  Serves as the PSA and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security ensures intelligence support to inform requirements, acquisition, and operations for the EMS
+enterprise, in accordance with DoDD 5143.01.
+
+b.  Designates representatives to participate in the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee for capabilities developed for EMS-related activities.
+
+## 2.7.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Personnel And Readiness.
+
+The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness:
+a.  Serves as the PSA to the Secretary of Defense for readiness and training, in accordance with DoDD 1322.18 and must:
+(1)  Develop EMS readiness requirements to be incorporated into the Defense Readiness Reporting System, in accordance with DoDD 7730.65.
+
+(2)  Provide policy oversight, guidance, and advice on implementing EMSO, including providing guidance on EMSO training in Service and joint training events.
+
+b.  Designates representatives to participate in the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee for capabilities developed for EMS-related activities.
+
+## 2.8.  Director Of Operational Test And Evaluation.
+
+The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation:
+a.  Serves as the PSA and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for operational test and evaluation.
+
+b.  Issues guidance and procedures for testing of EMS-dependent system operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and survivability within contested and congested EMEs, in accordance with DoDD 5141.02.
+
+c.  Designates representatives to participate in the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee for capabilities developed for EMS-related activities.
+
+## 2.9.  Director Of Cost Assessment And Program Evaluation.
+
+The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation:
+a.  Serves as the PSA and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials in the DoD for independent cost assessment, program evaluation, and analysis.
+
+b.  Analyzes and evaluates plans, programs, and budgets with respect to EMS dependencies within DoD programs, in accordance with DoDD 5105.84.
+
+## 2.10.  Secretaries Of The Military Departments And Directors Of The Defense Agencies, Excluding Disa.
+
+The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of the Defense Agencies, excluding DISA:
+
+a.  Budget resources to field training and operational systems that enable EMSO.
+b.  Organize, train, and equip Service members for operations in contested and congested
+EMEs.
+c.  Develop or provide EMSO command, control, and coordination capabilities to achieve EMS superiority.
+
+d.  In coordination with the Commander, United States Strategic Command
+(CDRUSSTRATCOM) and the CJCS, develop EMS command and control concepts, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be incorporated in joint operations.
+e.  Support the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security in the intelligence activities necessary to support and inform requirements, acquisition, and operations for the EMS enterprise.
+
+f.  Designate representatives to participate the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee for capabilities developed for EMS-related activities, as appropriate.
+
+## 2.11.  Cjcs.
+
+The CJCS:
+a.  Serves as the Principal Military Advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the other members of the National Security Council on joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
+(JEMSO).
+b.  In coordination with the other DoD Component heads, identifies, assesses, and prioritizes EMS-dependent system requirements in support of operations in contested and congested EMEs.
+
+c.  Incorporates JEMSO considerations into strategic and contingency planning and into force apportionment.
+d.  Develops and maintains strategy, policy, and doctrine for JEMSO.
+
+e.  Ensures joint education and training are consistent with JEMSO policy, strategy, and doctrine.
+f.  In coordination with the DoD CIO, the USD(R&E), and the USD(A&S), provides oversight of EMS-related capability development to the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee.
+
+## 2.12.  Combatant Commanders.
+
+The Combatant Commanders:
+
+a.  Identify and prioritize EMS command, control, and coordination gaps and requirements. b.  Include joint and coalition use of the EMS into operational planning.
+c.  Include EMS command, control, and coordination capabilities into joint and coalition exercises to validate requirements and capabilities.
+
+d.  Support CDRUSSTRATCOM's assessments of JEMSO capabilities.
+
+## 2.13.  Cdrusstratcom.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.12., the CDRUSSTRATCOM:
+a.  Coordinates with the other DoD Component heads to identify and prioritize JEMSO
+requirements.
+
+b.  Establishes and maintains a JEMSO organization that:
+
+(1)  Provides reach-back support to the other CCMDs.
+(2)  Supports CCMD training and planning related to electronic warfare.
+(3)  Assesses EMS capability vulnerabilities, development, and the incorporation and evaluation of JEMSO-related tactics, techniques, and procedures in support of warfighter requirements.
+c.  Assists the CCMDs and Military Departments in planning, executing, and assessing JEMSO across all domains.
+
+d.  Designates representatives to participate in the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee for capabilities developed for EMS-related activities.
+
+
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+CCMD
+Combatant Command
+CDRUSSTRATCOM
+Commander, United States Strategic Command
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+DISA
+Defense Information Systems Agency
+DoD CIO
+DoD Chief Information Officer
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+EME
+electromagnetic environment
+EMS
+electromagnetic spectrum
+EMSO
+electromagnetic spectrum operations
+JEMSO
+joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
+PSA
+Principal Staff Assistant
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+USD(A&S)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+USD(R&E)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
+
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
+EME EMS-dependent systems
+All electronic systems, subsystems, devices, and equipment that depend on the use of the spectrum to properly accomplish their functions without regard to how they were acquired (e.g., full acquisition, rapid acquisition, Joint Concept Technology Demonstration) or procured (e.g., commercial off-the-shelf, government off-the-shelf, non-developmental items).
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+
+
+EMS enterprise
+
+The organizing construct consisting of DoD EMS assets, processes, activities and resources required to enable EMS superiority through
+the conduct of DoD EMSO.  This includes policy, governance, organization, equipment, procedures, doctrine, information, facilities, training, and material responsibilities to ensure that DoD maintains access and control of EMS across the full spectrum of operations.
+EMS superiority
+The advantage of dominance in the EMS that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference, while affecting an adversary's ability to do the same.
+EMSO
+Coordinated military actions to exploit, attack, protect, and manage
+the EME.
+
+
+## References
+
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "(U) Joint Concept for Electromagnetic Spectrum
+Operations (JCEMSO)," March 18, 20151
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Doctrine Note 3-16 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
+Operations," October 20, 2016
+DoD Directive 1322.18, "Military Training," October 3, 2019 DoD Directive 3222.04, "Electronic Warfare (EW) Policy," March 26, 2014, as amended DoD Directive 3600.01, "Information Operations (IO)," May 2, 2013, as amended DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003, as amended DoD Directive 5100.01, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,"
+December 21, 2010
+DoD Directive 5105.84, "Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation," August 14,
+2020
+DoD Directive 5141.02, "Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)," February 2,
+2009
+DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD
+(I&S))," October 24, 2014, as amended
+DoD Directive 5144.02, "DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO)," November 21, 2014, as
+amended
+DoD Directive 7730.65, "Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS),"
+May 11, 2015, as amended
+DoD Instruction 3222.03, "DoD Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Program,"
+August 15, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 4650.01, "Policy and Procedures for Management and Use of the
+Electromagnetic Spectrum," January 9, 2009, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5134.17, "Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and
+Evaluation (DASD(DT&E))." October 25, 2011, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8320.05, "Electromagnetic Spectrum Data Sharing," August 18, 2011, as
+amended
+Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," December 4, 1981, as amended Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition
+Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, "DoD Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy," September 11, 20132
+United States Code, Title 10

markdown/dod/d5030_19.md

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+## Directive
+
+#
+
+## Usd(At&L)
+
+ SUBJECT: DoD Responsibilities on Federal Aviation References:  See Enclosure 1
+1.  PURPOSE.  This directive:
+a.  Reissues DoD Directive 5030.19 (Reference (a)).
+
+b.  Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities under the statutory authorities, Executive orders, and policies relating to Federal Aviation matters cited in Enclosure 2.
+
+c.  Designates the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+(USD(AT&L)), on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, to provide policy guidance and oversight of DoD interactions with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on all National Airspace System (NAS) matters.
+
+d.  Establishes and assigns responsibilities, in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI)
+5105.18 (Reference (b)), for the DoD Policy Board on Federal Aviation (PBFA).
+
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY.  This directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this directive as the "DoD Components"). 3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy to:
+a.  Align DoD programs and initiatives in a comprehensive and cohesive effort to provide aviation security and defense of the U.S. NAS in support of National Security Presidential Directive-47/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-16 (Reference (c)) and the National Strategy for Aviation Security (Reference (d)).
+
+
+
+b.  Support the interagency partnership established in accordance with section 709 of Public Law 108-176 (Reference (e)) to plan and implement the future air transportation system for the United States and related international initiatives.
+
+
+
+c.  Ensure applicable DoD activities are aligned with NAS planning and development efforts for an efficient and cost effective development process while maintaining focus on the national security and homeland defense requirements of the United States, including responsibilities prescribed by Executive Order 11161 (Reference (f))
+d.  Ensure the DoD Components have sufficient access to airspace and the equipment necessary to meet worldwide operational, training, exercise, test, and evaluation requirements for peacetime, contingency, and wartime operations.
+
+
+e.  Support creation of appropriate international civil and military cooperation mechanisms in the interest of effective and efficient management of airspace systems.
+
+f.  Release airspace designated for military use to the FAA or to other air navigation service providers, as appropriate, when the airspace is not needed for military requirements.
+
+
+
+g.  Actively participate as members in U.S. Government delegations to international aviation, air traffic control, and airspace management forums.
+
+h.  Ensure operational and system interoperability among DoD, FAA, and global civil and military systems, except where unique military requirements, security, or other need-to-know issues require otherwise.
+
+i.  Ensure policies and procedures are in place to reduce the hostile use of navigation signals in compliance with part 245 of Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations (Reference (g)). 4.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2.
+
+5.  RELEASABILITY.  **Unlimited.**  This directive is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. 6.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This directive:
+a.  Is effective September 13, 2013.
+
+
+b.  Must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication to be considered current in accordance with DoD Instruction 5025.01 (Reference (h)).
+
+
+c.  Will expire effective September 13, 2023 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website if it hasn't been reissued or cancelled in accordance with Reference (h).
+
+
+
+Ashton B. Carter
+
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities
+
+3.  DoD PBFA
+Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Directive 5030.19, "DoD Responsibilities on Federal Aviation and National Airspace System Matters," June 15, 1997 (hereby cancelled)
+
+(b) DoD Instruction 5105.18, "DoD Intergovernmental and Intragovernmental Committee
+Management Program," July 10, 2009, as amended
+(c) National Security Presidential Directive-47/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-16,
+"Aviation Security Policy," June 26, 2006
+(d) National Strategy for Aviation Security, March 26, 2007
+(e) Section 709 of Public Law 108-176, "Vision 100 - Century of Aviation Reauthorization
+Act," December 12, 2003
+(f)
+Executive Order 11161, "Relating to Certain Relationships Between the Department of
+Defense and the Federal Aviation Agency," July 7, 1964, as amended
+(g) Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations
+(h) DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," September 26, 2012, as amended
+(i)
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Implementation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System within the Department of Defense," December 28, 2007
+(j)
+Section 358 of Public Law 111-383, "The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act
+for Fiscal Year 2011," January 7, 2011, as amended
+(k) Section 44718 of Title 49, United States Code
+(l)
+North Atlantic Treaty Organization Document AC/92-D(2010)0003, "Guidelines for ATM
+Coordination in Crisis Situations," July 2, 20101
+(m) Title 10, United States Code
+
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  USD(AT&L).  The USD(AT&L) provides policy guidance and oversight of DoD interactions with the FAA on all NAS matters for the Secretary of Defense. 2.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION (ASD(A)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), the ASD(A):
+a.  Provides policy recommendations and oversight of DoD interactions with the FAA on all NAS matters, except those specifically assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) in the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (i)).
+
+b.  Develops DoD policy and oversees DoD matters related to air traffic control; airspace;
+military airports; and associated communication, navigation, surveillance and air traffic management (CNS/ATM) systems development and acquisition activities.
+
+c.  Maintains policies and procedures that ensure military access to airspace and protect military equities with regard to training, testing, and operational mission requirements.
+
+d.  Supports the guidance in References (c) and (d) to align DoD aviation security programs and initiatives in a comprehensive and cohesive national effort to provide active layered aviation security and defense in-depth for the United States.
+
+e.  Designates the Chair of the PBFA.
+
+f.  Through the PBFA Chair, approves selection of the PBFA Executive Director.
+
+g.  Facilitates the transfer of DoD technology in support of the NAS architecture in accordance with Reference (d) such that national security, homeland defense, and mission capability are not jeopardized.
+
+h.  Provides policy oversight of DoD's interaction with federal, State, and other public and private sector entities with respect to the National Information Sharing Strategy concept and airspace architecture.
+
+i.  Designates the Chair of the Overarching Integrated Product Team under the Defense Acquisition Board for providing acquisition guidance related to all CNS/ATM.
+
+j.  Provides representatives to the PBFA working group and subgroups when requested by the PBFA Chair or Executive Director.
+
+
+k.  Serves as a focal point for issues that concern appropriate interagency or international acquisition planning and technology transfer by the DoD to support the development of the NAS.
+
+3.  DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT(DUSD(I&E)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L) and in accordance with section 358 of Public Law 111-383 (Reference (j)) and part 211 of Reference (g), the DUSD(I&E) advises the ASD(A) and PBFA on:
+
+a.  Issues related to siting and permitting proposed projects that are filed with the Secretary of Transportation pursuant to section 44718 of Title 49, United States Code (Reference (k)). b.  The mitigation of electromagnetic interference impacts that the proposed projects may have on DoD aviation activities.
+
+
+4.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)).  The USD(P) provides oversight and guidance on policy matters as they pertain to this directive. 5.  ASD(HD&ASA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the ASD(HD&ASA):
+a.  Provides policy recommendations and oversight with respect to defense of the homeland, to include the air domain and defense policy issues.
+
+b.  Provides policy recommendations and oversight of DoD interaction with FAA and other federal agencies related to:
+
+(1)  The security and defense of the homeland in the air domain, particularly, but not exclusively, as they pertain to the implementation of References (c), (d), and (i). (2)  Homeland air defense operations conducted by North American Aerospace Defense Command, United States Northern Command, United States Pacific Command, and other Combatant Commands, as required.
+
+c.  Appoints a representative to the PBFA and, when requested by the PBFA Chair or Executive Director, provides representatives to the PBFA working group and subgroups.
+
+6.  DoD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (DoD CIO).  The DoD CIO:
+a.  Provides policy recommendations and oversight related to information technology (IT), network-centric, and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities, to include navigation warfare (Navwar) policies affecting federal airspace matters.
+
+
+b.  Provides policy recommendations and oversight of DoD interaction with FAA and other federal agencies related to:
+(1)  The employment of IT and PNT capabilities in the air domain and Navwar capabilities affecting the air domain, as they pertain to the implementation of References (c), (d), (i), and part 245 of Reference (g). (2)  Development of tactics, techniques, and procedures by North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command, as required, to implement of part 245 of Reference (g).
+
+c.  Appoints a representative to the PBFA and, when requested by the PBFA Chair or Executive Director, provide representatives to the PBFA working group and subgroups.
+
+
+
+7.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)).  The USD(I) provides representatives to the PBFA working group and subgroups when requested by the PBFA Chair or Executive Director. 8.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (USD(C)/CFO).  The USD(C)/CFO:
+a.  Appoints a representative to the PBFA and, when requested by the PBFA Chair or Executive Director, provides representatives to the PBFA working group and subgroups.
+
+b.  Cooperates with the FAA and the interagency partnership specified in Reference (i) in identifying programs that appropriately align with the development of the NAS. 9.  GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (GC DOD).  The GC DoD appoints a representative to the PBFA and, when requested by the PBFA Chair or Executive Director, provides representatives to the PBFA working group and subgroups. 10.  DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION (DOT&E).  The DOT&E appoints a representative to the PBFA and, when requested by the PBFA Chair or Executive Director, provides representatives to the PBFA working group and subgroups. 11.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments:
+a.  Appoint a representative to the PBFA and, when requested by the PBFA Chair or Executive Director, provide representatives to the PBFA working group and subgroups.
+
+
+b.  Coordinate with the PBFA, as appropriate, for CNS/ATM issues in order to synchronize policies and decisions concerning airspace access.
+
+c.  Support the guidance in References (c) and (d) to align DoD aviation security programs and initiatives in a comprehensive and cohesive national effort to provide active layered aviation security and defense in-depth for the United States.
+
+d.  Notify the PBFA of potential risks affecting military equities in terms of access to airspace for training, testing, and operational mission requirements.
+
+e.  Ensure that DoD technology transferred in accordance with Reference (i) is accomplished in such a way that national security, homeland defense, and mission capability are not jeopardized.
+
+
+
+f.  Coordinate agency-unique NAS or international airspace system issues directly with the FAA or appropriate foreign office of primary concern.
+
+g.  Advise the PBFA Chair and the PBFA Executive Director whenever substantial changes are planned to the use of military airports, landing areas, missile or rocket sites, or other facilities that may affect the NAS or international air traffic.
+
+h.  Coordinate all common future CNS/ATM-related research, development, and acquisition efforts with the PBFA Chair and Executive Director.
+
+12.  SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 11 of this enclosure, the Secretary of the Air Force:
+a.  Sources and supports the PBFA Executive Director and the PBFA Secretariat under the direction of the PBFA Chair.
+
+
+b.  Consults with the ASD(A) on the selection of the PBFA Executive Director, which will be the individual's primary responsibility.
+
+c.  Executes the responsibilities of Lead Service for Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) as delineated in Reference (i) and in cooperation with the DoD Siting Clearinghouse, as established in Reference (j).
+
+
+d.  Serves as the DoD representative to the NextGen Senior Policy Committee as established in Reference (i).
+
+e.  Provides personnel for the DoD Air Traffic Service's Cell in accordance with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Document AC/92(ATM)WP(2001)3 (Reference (l)).
+
+13.  CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
+a.  Appoints a representative to the PBFA and, when requested by the PBFA Chair or Executive Director, provides representatives to the PBFA and PBFA working group and subgroups.
+
+b.  Supports the guidance in References (c) and (d) to align DoD aviation security programs and initiatives in a comprehensive and cohesive national effort to provide active layered aviation security and defense in-depth for the United States. 14.  GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS.  The geographic Combatant Commanders and their component commands, as appropriate:
+a.  Provide representatives to the PBFA working group and subgroups when requested by the PBFA Chair or Executive Director.
+
+b.  Support the guidance in References (c) and (d) to align DoD aviation security programs and initiatives in a comprehensive and cohesive national effort to provide active layered aviation security and defense in-depth for the United States.
+
+c.  Notify the PBFA Chair and the PBFA Executive Director of potential risks affecting military equities in terms of access to airspace for training, exercise, contingency and wartime operational mission requirements.
+
+d.  Coordinate Combatant Command and component command-unique airspace system issues directly with partner nation(s) and advise the PBFA Chair and the PBFA Executive Director of their actions.
+
+e.  Advise the PBFA Chair and the PBFA Executive Director whenever substantial changes are planned to the use of military airports, landing areas, missile or rocket sites, or other facilities that may affect international air traffic.
+
+
+## Enclosure 3 Dod Pbfa
+
+ 1.  ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
+a.  Membership of the PBFA will include representatives at the three star level from the USD(AT&L); USD(P); USD(C)/CFO; GC DoD; DOT&E; one representative from the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and one representative from each of the Military Departments.
+
+b.  The PBFA Chair is designated by the ASD(A).
+
+
+
+c.  The PBFA Executive Director designated by the Secretary of the Air Force in consultation with ASD(A) is responsible for the daily management of the PBFA activities and the PBFA Secretariat.
+
+d.  The PBFA Chair or Executive Director may establish subgroups, as needed, with representatives from the organizations comprising the PBFA.  The Executive Director, in consultation with the PBFA Chair and representatives from the organizations comprising the PBFA, may establish working groups and advisory bodies, as necessary, to support activities of the PBFA.
+
+e.  The PBFA Chair or Executive Director may invite other U.S. Government organizations that have an interest in federal aviation and NAS matters to be represented at the PBFA or any of its subgroups, on an ex-officio basis, or to participate in the meetings when matters relevant to their interests are addressed provided the individuals are full-time or permanent part-time federal employees.
+
+f.  The PBFA Secretariat will assist the PBFA Chair and the PBFA Executive Director to execute their responsibilities prescribed by this directive and Reference (f).
+
+2.  FUNCTIONS
+a.  The PBFA will advise and assist the ASD(A) on air traffic control, airspace management, NAS matters, joint systems acquisition, and related international affairs.
+
+b.  The PBFA will establish policies, procedures, and priorities in coordination with the USD(P) for the effective development of international civil and military aviation cooperation programs.
+
+c.  The PBFA principal members serve as the Senior Advisory Group (SAG) to the DoD on military aviation matters as relates to future NAS design, as described in Reference (i).
+
+
+
+d.  The PBFA represents the DoD in the Interagency Group on International Aviation.
+
+e.  The PBFA serves as the DoD liaison with the Department of Transportation and the FAA
+on federal aviation matters and issues that affect the collective members of the PBFA, except for matters pertaining to Reference (k), and will appoint a National Airspace System Requirements Officer as required.  This role is not intended to restrict individual Military Departments'
+authority or responsibilities under Title 10, United States Code (Reference (m))
+
+
+f.  The PBFA and NextGen Lead Service Office support the DoD Siting Clearinghouse Board of Directors and operate under policy and procedures established by that body to govern DoD activities in relation to Reference (k).  The PBFA Executive Director and the DoD Siting Clearinghouse Executive Director coordinate to eliminate redundancies and to ensure seamless operations between their two functions.
+
+
+
+g.  The PBFA serves as one of the DoD liaisons with international aviation organizations and with foreign nation civil and military aviation departments, agencies, and air navigation service providers.
+
+h.  The PBFA will notify the FAA whenever substantial changes are planned to the use of U.S. military airports, landing areas, missile or rocket sites, or other facilities that may affect the NAS.
+
+i.  The PBFA Chair, PBFA Executive Director, and SAG will synchronize DoD-wide policies and decisions concerning the NAS throughout the DoD.
+
+j.  The PBFA Working Group shall provide the mechanism for addressing medium to longterm user and interoperability requirements planning for the NAS.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+ ASD(A)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
+ASD(HD&ASA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
+Security Affairs
+
+
+CNS/ATM
+communication, navigation, surveillance/air traffic management
+
+
+DoD CIO
+DoD Chief Information Officer
+DoDI
+DoD Instruction
+DOT&E
+Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
+DUSD(I&E)
+Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment
+
+
+FAA
+Federal Aviation Administration
+
+
+GC DoD
+General Counsel of the Department of Defense
+
+
+IT
+information technology
+
+
+NAS
+National Airspace System
+Navwar
+Navigation Warfare
+NextGen
+Next Generation Air Transportation System
+
+
+PBFA
+Policy Board on Federal Aviation
+PNT
+positioning, navigation, and timing
+
+
+SAG
+Senior Advisory Group
+SPC
+Senior Policy Committee
+
+
+USD(AT&L)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+USD(C)/CFO
+Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense
+USD(I)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+
+These terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this directive. air domain.  The global airspace, including domestic, international, and foreign airspace, as well as all manned and unmanned aircraft operating, people and cargo present in that airspace, and all aviation-related infrastructures. CNS/ATM.  The exchange of voice and data information between pilots and air traffic controllers or flight information centers.  It includes communication of navigation information from aircraft to air traffic control centers, which facilitates the continuous mapping of the relative positions of aircraft.
+NAS.  The common network of U.S. airspace-air navigation facilities, equipment and services; airports or landing areas; aeronautical charts; information and services; rules, regulations and procedures; technical information; and manpower and material.
+
+NextGen.  The FAA's comprehensive overhaul of the NAS that is planned to be fully implemented by 2025.  NextGen is a continuous rollout of improvements and upgrades that will provide the capability to guide and track air traffic more precisely and efficiently while ensuring safety and reducing environmental impact.

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+## Dod Directive 5132.03 Dod Policy And Responsibilities Relating To Security Cooperation
+
+
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+
+Effective:
+December 29, 2016
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release. Available on the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
+
+Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Directive 5132.03, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to
+Security Cooperation," October 24, 2008
+
+Approved by:
+Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense
+
+Purpose: Pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, provisions in various National Defense Authorization Acts, and administrative practices relevant to certain security assistance authorities administered on behalf of the Department of State, this issuance establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the administration of security cooperation to encourage and enable allied and partner nations to apply their military capabilities and capacities, consistent with U.S. strategy, priorities, and defense objectives.
+
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 5
+2.1.  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))........ 5 2.2.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities (ASD(SPC)). ........ 6 2.3.  Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)) and
+Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (ASD(APSA)). ........ 6
+2.4.  Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security
+(ASD(HD&GS)) and Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)). ... 7
+2.5.  Director, DSCA........ 7 2.6.  Director, Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA). ........ 8 2.7.  USD(AT&L). ........ 8 2.8.  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of the
+Department of Defense (USD(C)/CFO). ........ 9
+2.9.  Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)). ........ 9 2.10.  USD(P&R). ........ 10 2.11.  Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). ........ 10 2.12.  Secretaries of the Military Departments And Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB). . 10 2.13.  CJCS. ........ 11 2.14.  Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs)........ 12 2.15.  Functional Combatant Commanders (FCCs). ........ 13
+SECTION 3:  THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SECURITY COOPERATION ........ 14 GLOSSARY ........ 16
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 16 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 16
+REFERENCES ........ 18
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information
+
+1.1.  APPLICABILITY.  This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments and Services,
+the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+1.2.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  DoD will prioritize, plan, conduct, and align resources for security cooperation as an integral element of the DoD mission and a tool of national security and foreign policy.  DoD
+security cooperation, which includes DoD-administered security assistance programs and international armaments cooperation, will be undertaken to achieve specific ends in support of defense and national security strategy, rather than serving as an end unto itself.  It will be used to:
+
+(1)  Develop allied and partner defense and security capabilities and capacity for selfdefense and multinational operations.
+(2)  Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.
+(3)  Build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests. (4)  Take other actions in support of U.S. objectives.
+b.  Geographic Combatant Command theater campaign plans, developed in accordance with DoD strategic guidance and the requirements in Section 3 of this issuance, serve as the primary vehicle for the development and articulation of integrated DoD security cooperation plans.  Such security cooperation plans will articulate how security cooperation activities and resources are aligned to achieve strategic campaign objectives in support of defense strategy.
+
+c.  Theater campaign plan country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and should inform and be informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.  Each country-specific security cooperation section will identify specific lines of effort that:
+
+(1)  Represent the significant security cooperation initiatives planned for the country.
+(2)  Articulate specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives in
+support of such initiatives.
+d.  Consistent with Presidential Policy Directive 23, security cooperation plans will support the integration of DoD security cooperation activities with broader national security goals and articulate how such activities are synchronized and implemented through a whole-of-government process toward common objectives.
+
+e.  Security cooperation planning is a requirement-driven, risk- and resource-informed process that will be undertaken through a holistic approach that identifies and addresses capability requirements across a comprehensive spectrum of materiel and non-materiel inputs.
+Such planning approaches will ensure adequate consideration of feasibility of success, including allied and partner nation security sector governance challenges, absorptive capacity, and strategic alignment with U.S. national security goals.
+
+f.  DoD will maintain a robust program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation to provide policymakers, planners, program managers, and implementers the information necessary to evaluate outcomes, identify challenges, make appropriate corrections, and maximize effectiveness of future security cooperation activities.
+
+g.  DoD personnel will not, without appropriate authorization, make commitments involving future U.S. Government programs, performance, or the availability of U.S. Government resources.
+h.  The selection of U.S. DoD personnel engaged in security cooperation activities, particularly those to be assigned as senior defense officials/defense attaches and to security cooperation organizations (SCOs), must be in accordance with DoD Directive (DoDD) 5205.75, DoD Instruction 5132.13, and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Manual 5105.38- M.  Such personnel in the field should draw upon support from relevant subject matter experts throughout the DoD to ensure effective planning, execution, and evaluation.
+
+i.  The classification, disclosure, and safeguarding of security cooperation information must be consistent with DoD Manual 5200.01, DoDD 5230.11, and National Disclosure Policy-1.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities 2.1.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy (Usd(P)).  The Usd(P):
+
+a.  Serves as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of security cooperation policy and oversight to further national security objectives.
+
+b.  Oversees and advises the DoD Components by issuing guidance on priorities for security cooperation, reviewing Combatant Command-integrated security cooperation plans, and providing guidance on the transfer of defense articles, including prioritization of delivery and diversion.
+
+c.  Recommends funding levels and budget programming adjustments for DoD security cooperation and, as appropriate, security assistance under Chapters 32 and 39 of Title 22, United States Code, also known and referred to in this issuance as the "Foreign Assistance Act of 1961"
+and the "Arms Export Control Act of 1976," respectively.  Such recommendations include allocations of security cooperation resources.
+d.  Represents DoD, as directed, in matters involving foreign governments and other U.S.
+
+Government departments and agencies, to establish security cooperation priorities and enable a whole-of-government approach to engagements with allied and partner nations.
+
+e.  Establishes policy guidance for and provides oversight of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation activities.
+
+f.  Oversees development and maintenance of a global theater security cooperation information management system (G-TSCMIS) to support security cooperation planning and monitoring, and to facilitate a worldwide common operating picture of security cooperation activities.  Where he or she has lead planning responsibilities, ensures that security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities.
+
+g.  Develops and leads processes to identify and address gaps and adjudicate discrepancies in security cooperation authorities, resources, U.S. military capabilities, and DoD Component execution.
+
+h.  In coordination with the geographic Combatant Commands and other stakeholders, as appropriate, identifies, prioritizes, and pursues international agreements to facilitate access to allied and partner nations to conduct security cooperation activities, information sharing, and reciprocal logistics supplies and services (other than Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, which are managed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).
+
+i.  Establishes DoD policy for international technology transfers.  Implements National Disclosure Policy-1 and directs the operation of the National Disclosure Policy Committee, in accordance with DoDD 5230.11.
+
+j.  In coordination with the USD(AT&L), leads the development of policies and procedures for transfers of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to allied and partner nations, and co-chairs the Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group, in accordance with DoDD 5111.21, to ensure such policies and procedures comply with national laws and regulations, including technology security and foreign disclosure requirements.
+
+k.  In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+(USD(P&R)) and the USD(AT&L), advises DoD Components on security cooperation workforce issues to ensure that the workforce is appropriately sized and possesses the requisite education, skills, and tools necessary to plan, implement, and assess DoD security cooperation, as outlined in DoD Instruction 5132.13.
+
+## 2.2.  Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Strategy, Plans And Capabilities (Asd(Spc)).  Under The Authority, Direction, And Control Of The Usd(P), The Asd(Spc):
+
+a.  Develops policies and methodologies for prioritizing, integrating, and evaluating global security cooperation activities and resources.  Develops recommendations, with input from regional and functional offices and other OSD organizations, for adjudicating unresolved differences in planning and resource allocations among DoD Components.
+
+b.  In coordination with the CJCS, develops and manages a process to address impediments to campaign plan execution that the Combatant Commands identify.  Informs the appropriate DoD Components of the impediments and develops recommendations for resolution, as appropriate.  These impediments may include shortfalls in security cooperation authorities, resources, or joint capabilities.
+
+c.  In cooperation with regional and functional offices, ensures that global force management is sufficiently aligned to support effective implementation of security cooperation priorities.
+
+## 2.3.  Assistant Secretaries Of Defense For International Security Affairs (Asd(Isa)) And Asian And Pacific Security Affairs (Asd(Apsa)). Under The Authority, Direction, And Control Of The Usd(P), The Asd(Isa) And Asd(Apsa):
+
+a.  Develop strategy, policy, guidance, and priorities to translate regional and functional goals into regional and bilateral security cooperation guidance and plans, specific to their respective areas of assigned responsibility.
+
+b.  Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of policies and recommendations concerning security cooperation, within their respective areas of assigned responsibility, to promote effective and efficient implementation of security cooperation programs, aligned with policy goals.
+c.  Participate in processes allocating security cooperation resources to ensure appropriate alignment of resources with policy goals, within their respective areas of assigned responsibility.
+d.  Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) in interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations on security cooperation issues, specific to their respective areas of assigned responsibility.
+
+## 2.4.  Assistant Secretaries Of Defense For Homeland Defense And Global Security (Asd(Hd&Gs)) And Special Operations And Low- Intensity Conflict (Asd(So/Lic)).  Under The Authority, Direction, And Control Of The Usd(P), The Asd(Hd&Gs) And Asd(So/Lic):
+
+a.  Develop security cooperation strategy, policy, and guidance specific to functional areas of assigned responsibility, and coordinate the integration of such functional areas into regional and bilateral strategy, policies, and guidance.
+
+b.  In coordination with regional offices and other OSD offices, oversee the implementation of policies and activities concerning security cooperation, within areas of assigned responsibility, to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of security cooperation programs, aligned with policy goals.
+
+c.  Participate in processes allocating security cooperation resources to ensure appropriate alignment of resources with policy goals, within their respective areas of assigned responsibility.
+
+d.  Represent the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense in interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations on security cooperation issues specific to the programs and mission areas within their respective assigned areas of responsibilities.
+
+e.  In coordination with the ASD(SPC) and other OSD offices, develop recommendations for effective implementation of security cooperation programs in fragile states and stability operations.
+
+2.5.  DIRECTOR, DSCA.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Director, DSCA:
+a.  Provides DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S.
+
+missions for the execution of DoD security cooperation programs.
+
+b.  Supports DoD Components on planning and execution of security cooperation and the appropriate use, integration, and execution of security cooperation programs to develop comprehensive, sustainable approaches to building allied and partner nation defense and security capabilities and capacity, and to achieve other defense policy goals.
+
+c.  Manages and administers those Title 10 and 22, United States Code, programs for which DSCA has responsibility, consistent with security cooperation priorities.
+
+d.  Communicates directly with the heads of the DoD Components on security cooperation matters over which DSCA has responsibility.
+e.  In coordination with the DoD Component heads, ensures the security cooperation workforce is appropriately sized, selected, trained, and deployed to support security cooperation priorities.
+
+f.  Approves, in coordination with the CJCS, SCO joint manpower programs involving the establishment of new SCOs or changes in manpower authorizations or organizational structure, in accordance with DoDD 5205.75.
+g.  Manages the development and operation of G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities, and enters those activities into the database as appropriate.
+
+h.  Acts as the Executive Agent for DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies, in accordance with DoDD 5200.41E.
+
+i.  In coordination with the USD(P) and the USD(AT&L), as appropriate, supports the development of foreign disclosure and sales policies and procedures for defense information, technology, and systems.
+2.6.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (DTSA).
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Director, DTSA:
+a.  Develops DoD technology security policies related to foreign transfers of defense-related articles, services, and technologies.
+b.  Builds technology security capabilities of U.S. allied and partner nations to increase interoperability and protect critical technology and information.
+
+c.  In coordination with DoD Component heads, provides the security cooperation enterprise with information on allied and partner nations' willingness and ability to protect sensitive U.S. information and technologies and how that may affect DoD security cooperation efforts.
+
+d.  In coordination with Director, International Cooperation, Office of the USD(AT&L), prioritizes and pursues policies and defense agreements required to facilitate transfer of defenserelated articles, services, and technologies to allied and partner nations, including development of DoD anticipatory policies to support accelerated timelines to transfer such items to support security cooperation priorities.
+
+## 2.7.  Usd(At&L).  The Usd(At&L):
+
+a.  Establishes and maintains policies for the effective development of international acquisition, technology, and logistics programs, including international armaments cooperation (e.g., collaboration in science and technology; research, development, test, and evaluation; and
+acquisition, in-service, and logistics support (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements)), to support security cooperation goals.
+
+b.  In coordination with the USD(P), leads the development of policies and procedures for the transfer of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to foreign countries, and co-chairs the Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group, to ensure such policies and procedures comply with national laws and regulations, including technology security and foreign disclosure requirements.
+
+c.  In coordination with the USD(P) and the Department of State, identifies, prioritizes, and pursues defense acquisition-related agreements required to facilitate the cooperative development, acquisition, and transfer of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to allied and partner nations.
+
+d.  Engages with industry to provide DoD priorities for allied and partner nation capability investments.
+
+e.  Ensures that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities.
+
+f.  Manages and administers those Title 10, United States Code, programs for which the USD(AT&L) has responsibility, consistent with security cooperation priorities.
+
+g.  Coordinates on security cooperation policy guidance and theater campaign plans.
+
+## 2.8.  Under Secretary Of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer Of The Department Of Defense (Usd(C)/Cfo).  The Usd(C)/Cfo:
+
+a.  Develops and implements policies and procedures for security cooperation activities involving financial management, accounting, audit readiness, budgeting for reimbursements to DoD appropriation accounts and revolving funds, and international payments.
+
+b.  Coordinates with the USD(P) on budget levels, program adjustments, and allocations that support security cooperation activities.
+
+## 2.9.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Intelligence (Usd(I)).  The Usd(I):
+
+a.  In coordination with the USD(P), provides guidance for, and oversight of, intelligencerelated security cooperation, including programs and resources, to build allied and partner nation intelligence information-sharing capabilities and intelligence capacity in support of security cooperation priorities.
+
+b.  Ensures defense intelligence collection and analysis efforts are sufficient to support security cooperation planning, execution, and assessment, monitoring, and evaluation efforts.
+
+c.  Reviews Combatant Command campaign plans, orders, country security cooperation sections, strategies, defense agreements, and other security cooperation documents, as appropriate, to ensure that they:
+
+(1)  Integrate USD(I) policies, priorities, procedures, and guidance.
+(2)  Plan, program, budget, and execute those intelligence-related activities to support cooperation objectives.
+
+d.  In coordination with the USD(P) and the Department of State, identifies, prioritizes, and pursues defense agreements required to facilitate intelligence information-sharing with allied and partner nations.
+e.  Where he or she has lead planning responsibilities, ensures that security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities.
+
+f.  Works with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to coordinate and deconflict security cooperation activities with the intelligence foreign partner engagement and capacity building activities of the intelligence community.
+
+## 2.10.  Usd(P&R).  The Usd(P&R):
+
+a.  In coordination with the USD(P), advises DoD Component heads on security cooperation workforce issues to ensure that the workforce is appropriately sized and possesses the requisite education, skills, and tools necessary to execute DoD security cooperation priorities.
+
+b.  Directs, administers, and provides guidance over security cooperation resources and programs for which USD(P&R) has responsibility, consistent with security cooperation priorities.
+
+c.  Ensures that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities.
+
+2.11.  DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION (CAPE).  In coordination with the USD(P), the Director, CAPE, analyzes data provided through G-TSCMIS
+and evaluations of security cooperation initiatives to recommend budget levels, program adjustments, and allocations for security cooperation resources.
+
+## 2.12.  Secretaries Of The Military Departments And Chief, National Guard Bureau (Ngb).  The Secretaries Of The Military Departments And The Chief, Ngb:
+
+a.  Support geographic Combatant Command security cooperation assessment, planning, implementation, and monitoring through plans, policies, doctrine, guidance, and implementation.
+Ensure the integration of their security cooperation planning and activities into geographic Combatant Command theater campaign plans, and allocate resources to achieve objectives.
+
+b.  Ensure Service- and NGB-specific security cooperation policies, respectively, are consistent with DoD-wide security cooperation policies.
+
+c.  Provide qualified military and civilian personnel to carry out security cooperation assignments according to approved tables of distribution and other authorizations, directives, and requests.
+
+d.  Conduct international armaments cooperation with eligible allied and partner nations and international organizations in accordance with policies and criteria established by the USD(AT&L).
+e.  Conduct military education and training and sales of defense articles and defense services to eligible foreign countries and international organizations in accordance with policies and criteria established by the USD(P) and the Director, DSCA.
+f.  Ensure conformance with technology transfer, classified military information release, and disclosure policies for their respective areas of responsibility while conducting security cooperation activities.
+
+g.  Designate Service proponents for security cooperation to ensure that U.S. forces have the requisite skills, training, resources, and capabilities to support security cooperation priorities.
+
+h.  Align policies and procedures related to cooperative development, acquisition, and foreign transfers of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to security cooperation priorities established by USD(P) anticipatory policies to support accelerated timelines to transfer such items to priority partners.
+i.  Ensure that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to plan and monitor security cooperation activities.
+
+## 2.13.  Cjcs.  The Cjcs:
+
+a.  Provides military advice to the Secretary of Defense concerning security cooperation.
+b.  Identifies where security cooperation activities may be able to mitigate risk from shortfalls in joint force capabilities or presence overseas.
+
+c.  Directs, administers, and provides guidance over security cooperation resources and programs for which he or she has responsibility, consistent with security cooperation priorities.
+
+d.  Designates a joint proponent for security cooperation to lead the collaborative development and integration of joint capability to support security cooperation priorities. Develops and maintains joint security cooperation doctrine, education, training, lessons learned, and concepts.
+e.  Ensures that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities.
+
+f.  In coordination with the USD(P), develops and manages a process to address obstacles to campaign plan execution that the Combatant Commands identify.
+g.  Reviews, in coordination with the USD(P), Combatant Command-integrated security cooperation plans.
+
+h.  Ensures that global force management processes and procedures account for force requirements for security cooperation.
+
+2.14.  GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS (GCCs).  In addition to the responsibilities in Section 3 of this issuance, the GCCs, through the CJCS:
+a.  Maintain responsibility for all security cooperation matters in their assigned areas of responsibility.  In accordance with Policy-issued guidance on priorities and objectives, develop country-specific security cooperation sections in support of theater campaign plans, integrating inputs from DoD stakeholders and interagency partners.
+
+b.  Provide guidance to, and oversight of, senior defense officials/defense attaches and chiefs of SCOs to direct the planning and execution of security cooperation activities in alignment with DoD policies and priorities.
+c.  Assess a foreign partner's security environment and political will, willingness, and ability to protect sensitive information and technologies, and its ability to absorb and sustain assistance to determine how best to apply resources.
+
+d.  Assess foreign partner defense and security capabilities, identifying capability requirements to support of U.S. objectives and develop comprehensive approaches to building partner capabilities across the full spectrum of required inputs.
+
+e.  Coordinate security cooperation plans with other U.S. Government security sector assistance plans and activities and, where possible, with security cooperation activities of allies and partner nations.  Provide DoD input to Integrated Country Strategies and Joint Regional Strategies, in accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 23.
+
+f.  Coordinate with relevant GCCs where security cooperation efforts cross geographic Combatant Command boundaries.
+
+g.  Monitor and evaluate ongoing security cooperation activities to gauge effectiveness, determine whether corrections are needed, and capture lessons learned.
+
+h.  Ensure that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to plan and monitor security cooperation activities.
+
+i.  Inform the CJCS and the USD(P) of obstacles to execution of plans, including shortfalls in security cooperation authorities or resources, joint capability shortfalls, or shortfalls in partners' capabilities.
+
+
+2.15.  FUNCTIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDERS (FCCs).  The FCCs, through the CJCS:
+a.  Where appropriate, develop functional security cooperation strategies and plans to support policy priorities and objectives.
+
+b.  Ensure the integration of functional security cooperation planning and priorities into GCC
+theater campaign plans.
+
+c.  Inform the CJCS and the USD(P) of obstacles to execution of plans, including shortfalls in security cooperation authorities, resources, or joint capabilities.
+
+d.  Ensure that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to plan and monitor security cooperation activities.
+
+## Section 3:  Theater Campaign Plan Responsibilities For Security Cooperation
+
+3.1.  In accordance with Paragraph 1.2.b., the GCCs are responsible for theater campaign plans, which serve as the primary vehicle for the development of integrated DoD security cooperation plans based on DoD strategic guidance.  The GCCs will seek input from the FCCs, Military Departments, OSD, the Joint Staff, NGB, relevant field agencies, and interagency partners.
+3.2.  In these plans, the GCCs will include country-specific security cooperation sections for each allied or partner nation where the GCCs intend to apply significant time and resources. These country-specific security cooperation sections should serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and should inform and be informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.
+
+3.3.  Each country-specific security cooperation section will identify specific lines of effort that represent the significant security cooperation initiatives planned for the country, and will articulate specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives in support of such initiatives.  These lines of effort will prioritize, integrate, and sequence security cooperation activities, and will identify critical gaps or impediments to execution, such as inadequate authorities or resources, or shortfalls in an allied or partner nation's ability to absorb or sustain security assistance.
+
+a.  In accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 23, security cooperation plans will seek to situate DoD security cooperation activities within a deliberate and inclusive whole-ofgovernment approach to ensure alignment of activities and resources with common national security objectives.  Where possible, U.S. security cooperation planning will also consider security cooperation activities of allied and partner nations, as well as international organizations.
+
+b.  The application of security cooperation resources and activities will be informed by ongoing analyses of the security environment, political will, willingness and ability to protect sensitive information and technologies, and absorptive capacity of allied and partner nations, as well as by policy and legal constraints.  Except in cases of overriding security considerations, efforts to build allied and partner nation defense and security capabilities will only be pursued when the foreign country is able to, or is working toward being able to, absorb, sustain, and responsibly deploy such capabilities in support of U.S. security objectives.
+
+c.  Proposed materiel solutions must be integrated with non-materiel solutions and with other security cooperation activities (e.g., combined exercises, military education and training, defense institution building) to maximize the allied or partner nation's ability and willingness to employ and sustain the capability.  Comprehensive approaches to building allied and partner nation defense and security capabilities will consider the full spectrum of capability development through the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy Framework, as referenced in CJCS Instruction 3170.01I.
+
+d.  In accordance with relevant DoD-wide policies and standards, significant security cooperation initiatives will be monitored and evaluated on a regular basis to gauge effectiveness, determine whether corrections are needed, and capture lessons learned.  Planning for security cooperation activities and resources must incorporate, and be informed by, assessment, monitoring, and evaluation elements.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+| ASD(APSA)                                                                          | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs            |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ASD(HD&GS) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security |                                                                                  |
+| ASD(ISA)                                                                           | Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs                |
+| ASD(SO/LIC)                                                                        | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict |
+| ASD(SPC)                                                                           | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities              |
+|                                                                                    |                                                                                  |
+| CAPE                                                                               | Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation                                           |
+| CJCS                                                                               | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff                                            |
+|                                                                                    |                                                                                  |
+| DoDD                                                                               | DoD Directive                                                                    |
+| DSCA                                                                               | Defense Security Cooperation Agency                                              |
+| DTSA                                                                               | Defense Technology Security Administration                                       |
+|                                                                                    |                                                                                  |
+| FCC                                                                                | Functional Combatant Commander                                                   |
+|                                                                                    |                                                                                  |
+| GCC                                                                                | Geographic Combatant Commander                                                   |
+| G-TSCMIS                                                                           | global theater security cooperation management information system                |
+|                                                                                    |                                                                                  |
+| NGB                                                                                | National Guard Bureau                                                            |
+|                                                                                    |                                                                                  |
+| SCO                                                                                | security cooperation organization                                                |
+|                                                                                    |                                                                                  |
+| USD(AT&L)                                                                          | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics            |
+| USD(C)/CFO                                                                         | Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of the          |
+| Department of Defense                                                              |                                                                                  |
+| USD(I)                                                                             | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence                                      |
+| USD(P&R)                                                                           | Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness                           |
+| USD(P)                                                                             | Under Secretary of Defense for Policy                                            |
+|                                                                                    |                                                                                  |
+
+G.2.  DEFINITIONS.  Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance.
+country-specific security cooperation section.  A section of the theater campaign plan in which the GCCs articulate their intent to apply time, money, and effort through security cooperation programs in a specific country to further U.S. defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan.  Country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and inform and are informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.
+Integrated Country Strategy.  Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23. international agreements.  Agreements binding under international law that facilitate defense and security cooperation with allied and partner nations and international organizations.
+defense institution building.  Defined in DoDD 5205.82.
+
+
+SCOs.  DoD organizations permanently located in foreign countries and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions in accordance with Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  SCOs may include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, and Offices of Defense and Military Cooperation, designated to perform security cooperation functions.  SCOs do not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities, such as mobile training and education teams, or operational units.
+
+
+senior defense official/defense attache.  The chief of mission's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, or the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy.  The senior defense official/defense attache in the U.S. Mission can be the defense attache or the chief of the SCO, as designated by the Secretary of Defense.
+
+
+security assistance.  Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.  Security assistance is one element of security cooperation, which is funded and authorized by the Department of State and administered by the DSCA.
+
+security cooperation.  All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations.  This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.
+
+security sector assistance.  Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23.
+
+
+
+## References Security Cooperation Authorities The Following Are Referred To Collectively In This Issuance As "Security Cooperation Authorities:"1
+
+United States Code, Title 102
+United States Code, Title 223 United States Code, Title 504
+Public Laws, including Public Law 113-291, "Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015," December 19, 2014, and similar previous and annually recurring provisions, if enacted, in subsequent years5
+
+## Other References Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff Instruction 3170.01I, "Joint Capabilities Integration And Development System (Jcids)," January 23, 2015
+
+Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M, "Security Assistance Management
+Manual," April 30, 2012
+DoD Directive 5111.21, "Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group and
+Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Office," October 14, 2014
+DoD Directive 5200.41E, "DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies," June 30, 2016 DoD Directive 5205.75, "DoD Operations at U.S. Embassies," December 4, 2013 DoD Directive 5205.82, "Defense Institution Building," January 27, 2016
+DoD Directive 5230.11, "Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments
+and International Organizations," June 16, 1992
+DoD Instruction 5132.13, "Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the
+Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel," January 9, 2009
+DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 2, "DoD Information Security Program," February 24, 2012, as
+amended
+
+184, 401, 402, 404, 407, 408, 409, 421, 443, 1050, 1050a, 1051, 1051a, 1051b, 1051c, 2010, 2011, 2166, 2249c, 2249d, 2282, 2341-50, 2350a-d, 2350m, 2358, 2557, 2561, 2805, 4344, 4345, 4345a, 6957, 6957a,  6957b, 7046,
+9344, 9345, 9345a, 9381, 9415.
+3 Chapter 32 is also known as "The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)," as amended, and Chapter 39 is also known as
+"The Arms Export Control Act (AECA)," as amended.
+
+3751).
+
+National Disclosure Policy-1, "National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations," October 2,
+20006
+Presidential Policy Directive 23, "Security Sector Assistance," April 5, 20137
+Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Guidance for the Employment of the Force," current edition8

markdown/dod/d5144_02.md

@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+## Department Of Defense Directive
+
+NUMBER 5144.02
+November 21, 2014
+Incorporating Change 1, September 19, 2017
+DCMO
+SUBJECT: DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) References: See Enclosure 1. PURPOSE.  Under the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by section 113 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (a)), this directive:
+a. Assigns the responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities of the DoD CIO, pursuant to sections 2222-2224 of Reference (a), section 11315 of Title 40, U.S.C. (Reference (b)), and sections 3102, 3506, and 3544 of Title 44, U.S.C. (Reference (c)).
+
+b. Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 5144.02 (Reference (d)).  Any reference in any law, rule, regulation, or issuance to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) will be deemed to be a reference to the DoD CIO, unless otherwise specified by the Secretary of Defense.
+
+c. Authorizes the DoD CIO, as a Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, to establish DoD policy in DoD issuances within the responsibilities, functions, and authorities assigned in this directive, in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI)
+5025.01 (Reference (e)).
+
+2. APPLICABILITY.  This directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD
+Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this directive as the "DoD Components").
+
+3. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS.  The DoD CIO is the PSA and senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense for information technology (IT) (including national security systems and defense business systems), information resources management (IRM) and efficiencies.  The DoD CIO is responsible for all matters relating to the DoD information enterprise, including communications; spectrum management; network policy and standards; information systems;
+cybersecurity; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) policy; and the DoD information enterprise that supports DoD command and control (C2).  In this capacity, the DoD CIO:
+a.  Develops DoD strategy and policy on the operation and protection of all DoD IT and information systems, including development and promulgation of enterprise-wide architecture requirements and technical standards, and enforcement, operation, and maintenance of systems, interoperability, collaboration, and interface between DoD and non-DoD systems.
+
+b.  Serves as the Agency Chief Information Officer for the DoD with the responsibilities, duties, and qualifications, pursuant to section 11315 of Reference (b), and the additional responsibilities, pursuant to section 2223 of Reference (a).  In performance of these duties, the DoD CIO will:
+
+
+(1)  Develop, maintain, and manage the implementation of a sound, secure, and integrated DoD IT architecture, ensure the interoperability of IT throughout the DoD, and prescribe IT standards, including network and cybersecurity standards that apply throughout the DoD.
+
+
+(2)  Ensure compliance by the Military Department chief information officers (CIOs)
+with their responsibilities, pursuant to section 2223 of Reference (a), and ensure compliance by all DoD Component CIOs with DoD policy under the purview of the DoD CIO.
+
+
+(3)  Maintain a consolidated inventory of DoD mission-critical and mission-essential information systems, identify interfaces between these systems, and develop and maintain contingency plans for responding to disruptions in the operation of any of these information systems.
+
+
+(4)  Monitor and evaluate the performance of DoD IT investments through applicable performance measurements and advise the Secretary of Defense, and advise relevant PSAs on investments under their purview, on whether to continue, modify, or terminate such investments.
+
+
+(5)  Review and provide recommendations on the DoD IT budget requests and the management of information resources.
+
+
+(6)  Provide for the elimination of duplicate DoD IT (including systems, applications, and infrastructure) within and between the DoD Components and interagency partners, and identify opportunities for improving IT efficiencies.
+
+
+(7)  Develop and maintain, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), a process for maximizing the value of, and assessing and managing the risks related to, DoD IT acquisitions.  Such a process will:
+
+
+(a)  Be integrated with other key DoD decision support systems and processes that support capability identification; planning, programming, budgeting and execution; and acquisitions.
+
+
+
+(b)  Provide for analyzing, selecting, monitoring, and evaluating DoD IT investments.
+
+
+
+(c)  Be performance, cost, and results based.
+
+
+
+(8)  Perform all other responsibilities and functions as required by statute, directive, or regulation pertaining to an agency CIO role.
+
+c.  Serves as the CIO for DoD with the responsibilities, pursuant to section 3506 of Reference
+(c), related to Federal information policy.  In performance of these duties, the DoD CIO will:
+
+(1)  Advise and assist the PSAs and DoD Component heads on Federal information policy responsibilities related to issues that are under their purview.
+
+
+
+(2)  Oversee the management of information resources to reduce information collection burdens on the public; increase program efficiency and effectiveness; and improve the integrity, quality, and utility of information to all users within and outside DoD, including capabilities for ensuring dissemination of public information, public access to government information, and protections for privacy.
+
+
+(3)  Ensure that privacy impact assessments are conducted and reviewed, pursuant to section 208 of Public Law 107-347 (Reference (f)), prior to the initiation of new information collections or the development or procurement of any DoD IT that collects, maintains, or disseminates information.
+
+
+(4)  Provide guidance and oversight on the administration of DoD internet services, use of internet-based capabilities, and all internet domain-related functions.
+
+
+(5)  In cooperation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense (USD(C)/CFO), develop a full and accurate accounting of DoD IT expenditures, related expenses, and performance metrics.
+
+
+(6)  Develop and maintain a strategic information resources management plan.
+
+
+(7)  In consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Administrator of General Services, and the Archivist of the United States, maintain a current and complete inventory of the agency's information resources, including directories necessary to fulfill the requirements of section 3511 and chapter 35 of Reference (c).
+
+d.  Consistent with section 932 of Public Law 113-66 (Reference (g), as implemented by Secretary of Defense memorandum (Reference (h)) and Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum (Reference (i), directs, manages, and provides policy guidance and oversight of the DoD cybersecurity program, which includes responsibility for the Defense Information Assurance Program, pursuant to section 2224 of Reference (a), and information security, pursuant to section 3544 of Reference (c).  In the performance of these duties, the DoD CIO, in consultation and coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, will provide policy guidance to the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service
+(DIRNSA/CHCSS), regarding network operations and cybersecurity matters.
+
+e.  Ensures compliance with the requirements of National Security Directive 42 (Reference
+(j)) and collaborates with the DIRNSA/CHCSS on the performance of DIRNSA/CHCSS duties, pursuant to Reference (j) and Executive Order 12333 (Reference (k)), as the National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security.
+
+f.  Consistent with section 171(a) of Reference (a) supports the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System by providing policy guidance and oversight for the DoD information enterprise that supports DoD C2.  This includes the communications, information sharing capabilities, and National Leadership Command Capabilities integrating national, strategic, operational, and tactical C2 and communications systems and programs, including support to the White House Military Office.  The DoD CIO
+develops and oversees contingency and crisis response communications policies and planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations carried out by the DoD with emphasis given to those executed in concert with the U.S. Government interagency process, including DoD interaction with foreign nations and nongovernmental organizations.
+
+g.  Provides guidance and oversight for DoD network operations, including the standards for day-to-day defense and protection of DoD information networks; DoD IT support to military and joint missions; and resilience and reliability of information and communication networks.
+
+h.  Provides policy, oversight, and guidance for matters related to PNT.  The DoD CIO:
+
+(1)  Serves as the lead for PNT policy within the DoD and the DoD representative for all interagency, domestic, and international forums related to PNT.
+
+
+(2)  Develops and maintains the Federal Radio Navigation Plan.
+
+
+(3)  Provides policy, oversight, and guidance on PNT enterprise-wide architecture and requirements.
+
+i.  Provides policy, oversight, and guidance for all DoD matters related to the electromagnetic spectrum and serves as the DoD lead for the management and use of the electromagnetic spectrum; and for electromagnetic environmental effects within DoD, nationally and internationally.  The DoD CIO serves as the DoD lead for coordination, approval, and representation of DoD positions on all spectrum matters within the U.S. Government as well as in regional, national, and international spectrum management forums and organizations.
+
+j.  Provides guidance and oversight for the content of those portions of the defense business enterprise architecture that support information technology infrastructure or cybersecurity activities, pursuant to section 2222 of Reference (a).
+
+
+k.  Directs, manages, and provides policy guidance and oversight of the DoD Records Management Program, pursuant to chapters 31 and 33 of Reference (c).
+
+
+l.  Provides guidance and oversight with regard to the recruiting, retention, training, and professional development of the DoD IT and cybersecurity workforce, pursuant to section 11315 of Reference (b) and section 3544 of Reference (c).  The DoD CIO will assess the requirements for agency personnel regarding IRM knowledge and skill and conduct formal training programs to educate agency program and management officials about IRM.
+
+m.  Establishes, maintains, and chairs the DoD CIO Executive Board as the single senior governance forum for DoD IT.  The DoD CIO Executive Board provides advice and information to the DoD CIO on the full range of statutory and regulatory matters related to information and DoD IT.
+
+n.  Provides advice on issues related to all assigned responsibilities and functions to:
+
+
+(1)  The Defense Business Systems Management Committee and the Defense Business Council, as a co-chair.
+
+
+(2)  The Defense Acquisition Board, as a member.
+
+
+(3)  The Joint Requirements Oversight Council and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process, as an advisor, when appropriate.
+
+
+(4)  The Defense Space Council, as a member.
+
+
+(5)  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Command, Control, and Communications Board, as the DoD representative.
+
+
+(6)  The Cyber Investment Management Board, as a member.
+
+
+(7)  The Council on the Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System (NLC3S), as a member.
+
+o.  Serves as the chair of the Committee on National Security Systems, pursuant to Reference
+(j) and Executive Order 13231 (Reference (l)), and the co-chair of the National Security and Emergency Preparedness Communications Executive Committee, pursuant to Executive Order 13618 (Reference (m)).
+
+p.  Serves on boards, committees, and other groups pertaining to DoD CIO functional areas, and represents the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on DoD CIO matters outside DoD.
+
+q.  Participates in those planning, programming, budgeting, and execution activities that relate to assigned areas of responsibility.
+
+r.  Reviews assigned functions and responsibilities periodically to ensure that DoD Executive Agent responsibilities resident under the cognizance of the DoD CIO are in conformance with DoDD 5101.1 (Reference (n)).
+
+s.  Ensures that DoD CIO policies and programs are designed and managed to improve performance standards, economy, and efficiency, and that the Defense Information Systems Agency is attentive to the requirements of its organizational customers, both internal and external to the DoD.
+
+t.  Performs such other duties as the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
+
+
+
+4.  RELATIONSHIPS
+a.  In the performance of assigned responsibilities and functions, the DoD CIO:
+
+
+(1)  Reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.
+
+
+(2)  Exercises authority, direction, and control over the Director, Defense Information Systems Agency, in accordance with DoDD 5105.19 (Reference (o)).
+
+
+(3)  Coordinates and exchanges information with other OSD officials, the DoD
+Component heads, and Federal officials having collateral or related responsibilities and functions.
+
+
+(4)  Works directly with the DoD Component CIOs.
+
+
+(5)  Uses existing systems, facilities, and services of the DoD or other Federal agencies, when possible, to avoid duplication and to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.
+
+
+(6)  Collaborates with and provides integrated support to the Principal Cyber Advisor
+(PCA), in the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, on matters related to the PCA's assigned responsibilities, consistent with Reference (g) as implemented by References (h) and (i).
+
+
+(7)  Supports and informs the USD(AT&L) on all IT and cyber infrastructure acquisition matters and investment decisions, including IT-intensive software systems such as business systems, related to AT&L responsibility for management of the Defense Acquisition System and on programs for which AT&L is the Milestone Decision Authority.
+
+b.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments, through their Component CIOs, will coordinate and exchange information with the DoD CIO on:
+
+(1)  Budgets and budget requests for all DoD IT under their purview.
+
+
+
+(2)  Compliance with government and DoD standards on IT.
+
+(3)  Interoperability of DoD IT within DoD and with relevant IT systems of other
+Federal, State, tribal, and local government agencies, and with relevant IT systems of foreign
+governments.
+
+c.  The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, through the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, will coordinate and exchange information with the DoD CIO on all matters under the Commander's purview related to the authorities, responsibilities, and functions assigned in this directive.
+
+d.  The other PSAs and the DoD Component heads will coordinate with the DoD CIO on all matters under their purview related to the authorities, responsibilities, and functions assigned in this directive.
+
+5.  AUTHORITIES.  Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense, and subject to his or her authority, direction, and control, and in accordance with DoD policies and issuances, the DoD CIO is hereby delegated authority to exercise, within assigned responsibilities and functional areas, all authority of the Secretary of Defense derived from statute, Executive order, or interagency agreement, except where specifically limited by statute or Executive order to the Secretary of Defense, and is hereby delegated authority to:
+a.  Establish, in DoDIs and directive-type memorandums (DTMs), DoD policy within the authorities and responsibilities assigned in this directive, including authority to identify collateral responsibilities of other OSD PSAs and the DoD Component heads.  This authority cannot be redelegated.
+
+
+(1)  Such issuances must be fully coordinated, in accordance with Reference (e).
+
+
+(2)  In areas of assigned responsibilities and functions, the DoD CIO has authority to approve and sign other DoDIs, DoD manuals, and DTMs, in accordance with Reference (e), that implement policy approved by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.
+
+
+(3)  Instructions to the Military Departments must be issued through the Secretaries of the Military Departments.  Instructions to the Combatant Commands normally are communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
+
+b.  Obtain reports and information, in accordance with DoDI 8910.01 (Reference (p)), as necessary, to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions.
+
+c.  Communicate directly with the DoD Component heads, as necessary, to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions, including transmitting requests for advice and assistance. Communications to the Military Departments must be transmitted through the Secretaries of the Military Departments, their designees, or as otherwise provided in law or directed by the Secretary of Defense in other DoD issuances.  Communications to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands normally are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
+
+d.  Communicate with other Executive Branch officials, State and local officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, members of the public, and representatives of foreign governments, as appropriate, in carrying out assigned responsibilities and functions.
+Communications with representatives of the Legislative Branch must be conducted through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs or the USD(C)/CFO, as appropriate, and be consistent with the DoD Legislative Program.
+
+e.  Communicate directly with the CIOs of the DoD Components on all matters for which the DoD CIO is assigned responsibilities herein.
+
+f.  Negotiate and conclude international agreements, in accordance with DoDD 5530.3
+(Reference (q)), and other arrangements with non-Federal entities in areas of assigned responsibility, in coordination with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
+
+g.  Nothing in this directive shall be construed to mean that the DoD CIO has operational responsibility for cyber defensive or offensive missions.
+
+6.  RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED.  This directive is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
+Cleared for public release.  This directive is available on the Directives Division Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+7.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This directive is effective immediately: November 21, 2014.
+
+Robert O. Work
+
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Enclosure References Glossary
+
+
+## Enclosure References
+
+ (a)
+Title 10, United States Code
+
+(b)
+Title 40, United States Code
+(c)
+Title 44, United States Code
+(d) DoD Directive 5144.02, "DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO)," April 22, 2013
+(hereby cancelled)
+(e)
+DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Issuances Program," June 6, 2014 *August 1, 2016*, as amended
+(f)
+Section 208 of Public Law 107-347, "The E-Government Act of 2002," December 17,
+2002
+(g) Section 932 of Public Law 113-66, "The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
+Year 2014," December 26, 2013
+(h) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Guidance Regarding Cyberspace Roles,
+Responsibilities, Functions and Governance within the Department of Defense," June 9,
+2014
+(i)
+Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Designation of the DoD Principal Cyber Advisor,"
+July 17, 2014
+(j)
+National Security Directive 42, "National Policy for the Security of National Security
+Telecommunications and Information Systems," July 5, 1990
+(k) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," as amended (l)
+Executive Order 13231, "Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age,"
+October 16, 2001, as amended
+(m) Executive Order 13618, "Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness
+Communications Functions," July 6, 2012
+(n) DoD Directive 5101.1, "DoD Executive Agent," September 3, 2002, as amended
+(o) DoD Directive 5105.19, "Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)," July 25, 2006 (p)
+DoD Instruction 8910.01, "Information Collection and Reporting," May 19, 2014
+(q) DoD Directive 5530.3, "International Agreements," June 11, 1987, as amended
+(r)
+DoD Instruction 8500.01, "Cybersecurity," March 14, 2014
+(s)
+DoD Directive 8000.01, "Management of the Department of Defense Information
+Enterprise *(DoD IE)*," February 10, 2009 March 17, 2016, as amended
+(t)
+DoD Instruction 8550.01, "DoD Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities,"
+September 11, 2012
+
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+ASD(NII)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration
+
+
+C2
+command and control
+CIO
+chief information officer
+
+
+DIRNSA/CHCSS Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service DoD CIO
+DoD Chief Information Officer
+DoDD
+DoD Directive
+DoDI
+DoD Instruction
+DTM
+directive-type memorandum
+
+
+IRM
+information resources management
+IT
+information technology
+
+
+PCA
+Principal Cyber Advisor
+PNT
+positioning, navigation, and timing
+PSA
+Principal Staff Assistant
+
+
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+USD(AT&L)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+USD(C)/CFO
+Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense
+
+
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+ Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this directive.
+
+cybersecurity.  Defined in DoDI 8500.01 (Reference (r)). DoD information enterprise.  Defined in DoDI 8000.01 (Reference (s)). DoD information.  Defined in Reference (r). DoD IT.  Defined in Reference (r).
+
+internet-based capabilities.  Defined in DoDI 8550.01 (Reference (t)). IRM.  Defined in section 3502 of Reference (c).
+
+IT.  Defined in section 11101 of Reference (b). national security systems.  Defined in section 3542 of Reference (c).

markdown/dod/d5145_01.md

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+## Department Of Defense Directive
+
+
+NUMBER 5145.01
+December 2, 2013
+Incorporating Change 2, Effective January 30, 2015
+
+DA&M *DCMO* SUBJECT: General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC DoD)
+
+References: See Enclosure 1.  PURPOSE.  This directive:
+a.  R*eissues* DoD Directive (DoDD) 5145.01 (Reference (a)) to update the responsibilities and functions, relationships, and authorities of the GC DoD, pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by sections 113 and 140 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.)
+(Reference (b)).
+
+
+b.  Incorporates and cancels Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference(c)). 2.  APPLICABILITY.  This directive applies to the OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the DoD (referred to collectively in this directive as the "DoD Components"). 3.  RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS.  The GC DoD is the chief legal officer of the DoD and:
+a.  Advises the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding all legal matters and services performed within or involving the DoD.
+
+b.  Provides legal advice to OSD organizations and, as appropriate, other DoD Components.
+
+c.  Oversees, as appropriate, legal services performed within the DoD, including establishing professional responsibility standards and determining, or referring to the cognizant authority, DoD attorneys' adherence to these standards, except within the Office of the General Counsel to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, pursuant to section 8(h) of the Appendix to
+
+Title 5, U.S.C., also known as "The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended"
+(Reference (cd)).
+
+d.  Coordinates with DoD Components on appeals from denials of requests under section 552
+of Reference (cd), also known as "The Freedom of Information Act, as amended" as appropriate, in accordance with DoDD 5400.07 (Reference (de)).
+
+e.  Establishes policy for and oversees the Standards of Conduct Program within the DoD, in accordance with DoDD 5500.07 (Reference (ef)), to include providing guidance on, and coordination of, significant legal ethics issues and, as necessary, conducting program reviews of ethics programs within the DoD to ensure consistency.
+
+f.  Serves as the Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO) for OSD and all DoD
+organizations that are not defined as separate agencies in part 3601 of Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (Reference (fg)), in accordance with DoD 5500.07-R (Reference (gh)), and designates an alternate DAEO and Deputy DAEOs, as appropriate.
+
+g.  Advises on the conflict of interest statutes, federal standards of conduct and financial disclosure reporting obligations of OSD and other DoD Component personnel, as appropriate.
+
+h.  Provides legal advice on legislative proposals; coordinates on Congressional requests for views on legislation; provides legislative drafting services; and coordinates, drafts, and approves all Departmental and interagency actions concerning Executive orders (E.Os.) and Presidential Proclamations.
+
+i.  Provides for the coordination of significant legal issues before the Department of Justice, including litigation involving the DoD and other matters in which the DoD has an interest.
+
+j.  Establishes DoD policy on general legal issues, determines the DoD position on specific legal problems, and resolves disagreements within the DoD on such matters.
+
+
+
+k.  Performs functions relating to the DoD security program, including oversight of DoD
+personnel security programs, in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5145.03 and DoDD
+5205.07 (References (hi) and (ij)), as the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense may assign.
+
+l.  As lead counsel for the DoD in all international negotiations conducted by the DoD Components:
+
+(1)  Coordinates on all proposed international agreements prior to:
+
+
+
+(a)  Their submission to prospective parties.
+
+
+(b)  The initiation of negotiations.
+
+
+(c)  Conclusion of proposed international agreements.
+
+
+(2)  Oversees legal reviews performed by the DoD Components with respect to the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, in accordance with DoDD 5530.3
+(Reference (jk)).
+
+m.  Maintains the central repository for all international agreements coordinated, negotiated, or concluded by DoD personnel.
+
+n.  Provides guidance on, and coordination of, significant legal issues in:
+
+(1)  International law, including those presented by military operations requiring the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
+
+
+
+(2)  The DoD Law of War Program, in accordance with DoDD 2311.01E
+(Reference (kl)).
+
+
+(3)  The review of the legality of weapons, in accordance with DoDD 5000.01 (Reference
+(lm)), including:
+(a)  Non-lethal weapons, in accordance with DoDD 3000.03E (Reference (mn)). (b)  Autonomy in weapon systems, in accordance with DoDD 3000.09
+(Reference (no)). (c)  The review of the legality of cyber capabilities, in accordance with Reference (kl).
+
+
+(4)  DoD activities in the United States, including those presented by military operations in support of other federal departments and agencies.
+
+o.  Analyzes the legal impact on the DoD of mergers and acquisitions involving major defense suppliers and:
+
+
+(1)  Coordinates contacts between DoD personnel and the government agency responsible for the antitrust aspects of such mergers and acquisitions, in accordance with DoDD
+5000.62 (Reference (op)).
+
+
+(2)  Reviews other agreements between competitors or potential competitors involving major defense suppliers that may have an adverse impact on competition.
+
+
+
+(3)  Coordinates contacts between DoD personnel and the government agency responsible for the antitrust aspects related to arrangements and agreements between competitors or potential competitors, in accordance with Reference (op).
+
+p.  Determines whether legislation proposed by the DoD or any DoD Component has federalism implications or imposes unfunded mandates.
+
+q.  Advises the Secretary of Defense and, as appropriate, other senior government officials on all military justice matters requiring the attention of the Secretary of Defense.  Oversees the annual review of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (Reference (pq)) by the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, in accordance with DoDD 5500.17 (Reference (qr)).
+
+r.  Provides overall legal guidance on matters concerning the Office of Special Counsel, in accordance with DoDD 5500.19 (Reference (rs)).
+
+s.  Provides overall legal guidance on DoD implementing policies related to partisan political activities of DoD personnel, pursuant to the Memorandum of President of the United States (Reference (st)).
+
+
+t.  Coordinates on execute orders, deployment orders, and other authorizations for the deployment or employment of resources or capabilities requiring the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
+
+u.  Serves, in accordance with DoDI 5105.04 (Reference (tu)), as the DoD sponsor for advisory committees as determined by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or the Director of Administration and Management.
+
+v.  Designs and manages Office of the GC DoD policies and programs to improve performance standards, economy, and efficiency, and ensures that all Offices of General Counsel in the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities attend to the requirements of their organizational clients, both internal and external to the DoD.
+
+w.  Establishes policy and prescribes procedures for the release of official information in litigation and for the presentation of witness testimony by DoD personnel during litigation, pursuant to United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951) (Reference (uv)).
+
+x.  Accepts service of process for the DoD and the Secretary of Defense and establishes procedures for handling service of process throughout the DoD.
+
+y.  Performs such other duties as the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
+
+4.  RELATIONSHIPS
+a.  In performing assigned responsibilities and functions, the GC DoD:
+
+
+
+(1)  Reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.
+
+(2)  Serves as the Director, Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA), in accordance with
+DoDD 5145.04 (Reference (vw)).
+
+
+(3)  Exercises authority, direction, and control over:
+
+
+(a)  The DLSA.
+
+
+
+(b)  Such subordinate officials and organizations as may be assigned.
+
+
+(4)  Serves as the representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Department of Justice on all appropriate matters.
+
+
+(5)  Coordinates actions and exchanges information with other OSD officials, the DoD
+Component heads, and officials of federal agencies having collateral or related responsibilities and functions.
+
+
+
+(6)  Uses existing systems, facilities, and services of the DoD or other federal agencies, when possible, to avoid duplication and to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.
+
+b.  The other OSD Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) and the DoD Component heads will coordinate with the GC DoD on matters under their purview related to the authorities, responsibilities, and functions assigned in this directive. 5.  AUTHORITIES.  Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense, subject to his or her authority, direction, and control, and in accordance with DoD policies and issuances, the GC DoD is hereby delegated authority to exercise, within assigned responsibilities and functional areas, all authority of the Secretary of Defense derived from statute, E.O., or interagency agreement, except where specifically limited by statute or E.O. to the Secretary of Defense, and is hereby delegated authority to:
+a.  Establish, in DoDIs and directive-type memorandums (DTMs), DoD policy within the authorities and responsibilities assigned herein, including authority to identify collateral responsibilities of other OSD PSAs and the DoD Component heads in accordance with DoDI
+5025.01 (Reference (wx)).  This authority will not be redelegated.  Such issuances will be fully coordinated.  Further, in areas of assigned responsibilities and functions, the GC DoD has authority to approve and sign other DoDIs, DoD manuals, and DTMs, in accordance with Reference (wx), that implement policy approved by the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense.  Assignment of responsibilities in DoD issuances to the Military Departments must be to the Secretaries of those Departments.  Assignment of responsibilities in DoD issuances to the Combatant Commanders must be coordinated with the CJCS.
+
+b.  Obtain reports and information, in accordance with DoDI 8910.01 (Reference (xy)), as necessary, to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions.
+
+c.  Communicate directly with the DoD Component heads, as necessary, to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions, including the transmission of requests for advice and assistance.  Communications to the Military Departments must be transmitted through the Secretaries of the Military Departments, or as otherwise provided in law or directed by the Secretary of Defense in other DoD issuances.  Communications to the Combatant Commanders must be in accordance with paragraph 4b(3)(c) above the signature line of DoDD 5100.01
+(Reference (yz)).
+
+
+
+d.  Communicate with other government officials, members of the public, and representatives of foreign governments, as appropriate, to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions. Communications with representatives of the Legislative Branch must be conducted through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, except for communications with the Defense Appropriations Committees, which must be coordinated through the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense.
+
+
+e.  Grant or deny applications for waiver of indebtedness arising from the erroneous payment of pay (including salary) and allowances (including travel and transportation allowances), pursuant to section 2774(a)(1) of Reference (b), section 5584(a)(1) of Reference (c), and section
+716(a)(1) of Title 32, U.S.C. (Reference (zaa)).
+
+f.  Issue advance decisions, pursuant to section 3529 of Title 31, U.S.C. (Reference (aaab)).
+
+g.  Exercise the authority of the Secretary of Defense to adjudicate, settle, assign duties for handling, or otherwise resolve claims, or other matters incident to such claims, against or involving the United States or the DoD arising under:
+
+(l)  Sections 1089(f), 2575, 2771, 4712, and 9712 of Reference (b).
+
+
+
+(2)  Chapter 163 of Reference (b).
+
+(3)  Section 420 of Title 24, U.S.C. (Reference (abac)).
+
+(4)  Sections 1346(b), 2671-2680 of Title 28, U.S.C. (Reference (acad)).
+
+(5)  Sections 3701, 3702, 3711, and 3721 of Reference (aaab).
+
+(6)  Sections 714 and 715 of Reference (zaa).
+
+(7)  Sections 2651-2653 of Title 42, U.S.C. (Reference (adae)).
+
+
+(8)  North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (4 United States Treaty 1972, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2846) (Reference (aeaf)) and similar SOFAs.
+
+h.  Serve as the DoD Dispute Resolution Specialist, pursuant to section 571 of Reference (c)
+note and Public Law (PL) 101-552 (Reference (afag)), as amended.
+
+i.  Oversee and manage the DoD alternative dispute resolution program, pursuant to PL 104-
+320 (Reference (agah)), as amended.
+
+
+j.  Exclude any DoD employee or group of DoD employees in OSD from any or all of the reporting requirements of the confidential financial disclosure reporting system, pursuant to section 2634.905 of Reference (fg).
+
+
+k.  Provide advance decisions, pursuant to section 484 of Title 37, U.S.C. (Reference (ahai)), that the Secretary of Defense is authorized to make.
+
+l.  Exercise authorities of the Secretary of Defense under applicable law with respect to the establishment of qualifications for DoD civilian attorneys.
+
+m.  Establish DoD policy and assign responsibilities regarding the use of copyrighted sound and video recordings within the DoD.
+
+
+
+n.  Exercise authorities of the Secretary of Defense and assign responsibilities under sections
+181, 182, and 184 of Title 35, U.S.C. (Reference (aiaj)) concerning certain inventions and patents.
+
+o.  Exercise authorities and responsibilities vested in the Secretary of Defense under section
+330 of PL 102-484 (Reference (ajak)), as amended, relating to indemnification of transferees of closing defense property.  These authorities and responsibilities may be redelegated in writing to a level not below that of Deputy GC DoD, except the authority to acknowledge receipt of a claim, which may be delegated to any attorney in the Office of the GC DoD.
+
+p.  Administer oaths of office to personnel within the DoD, including, without limitation, the authority to administer oaths, pursuant to section 2903 of Reference (cd).  This authority may be redelegated only:
+
+(1)  On a case-by-case basis.
+
+
+
+(2)  With Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense approval.
+
+q.  In response to a litigation request or demand, and after any required coordination with the Department of Justice, determine whether the DoD may release official information and whether DoD personnel may be interviewed, contacted, or used as fact or expert witnesses concerning official information.
+
+r.  Accept service of process for the DoD and the Secretary of Defense.
+
+s.  The GC DoD may redelegate these authorities, as appropriate and in writing, except as otherwise specifically indicated or as otherwise provided by law or regulation.
+
+6.  RELEASABILITY.  Unlimited.*Cleared for public release.*  This directive is  approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. 7.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This directive a.  Iis effective December 5, 2013.
+
+b.  Must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication to be considered current, in accordance with Reference (wx).
+
+c.  Will expire effective December 5, 2023 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website if it has not been reissued or cancelled, in accordance with Reference (wz). Enclosure References Glossary
+
+## Enclosure References
+
+
+(a) DoD Directive 5145.01, "General Counsel of the Department of Defense," May 2, 2001, as
+amended (hereby cancelled)
+(b) Title 10, United States Code
+(c) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Delegations of Authorities and
+Responsibilities Under Section 330 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, as Amended," October 13, 2004, hereby cancelled
+(cd) Title 5, United States Code
+(de) DoD Directive 5400.07, "DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program," January 2,
+2008, as amended
+(ef) DoD Directive 5500.07, "Standards of Conduct," November 29, 2007 (fg) Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (gh) DoD 5500.07-R, "Joint Ethics Regulation (JER)," August 30, 1993, as amended (hi) DoD Instruction 5145.03, "Oversight of the DoD Personnel Security Programs,"
+January 10, 2013
+(ij) DoD Directive 5205.07, "Special Access Program (SAP) Policy," July 1, 2010 (jk) DoD Directive 5530.3, "International Agreements," June 11, 1987, as amended (kl) DoD Directive 2311.01E, "DoD Law of War Program," May 9, 2006, as amended (lm) DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003 (mn) DoD Directive 3000.03E, "DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and
+NLW Policy," April 25, 2013
+(no) DoD Directive 3000.09, "Autonomy in Weapon Systems," November 21, 2012 (op) DoD Directive 5000.62, "Impact of Mergers or Acquisitions of Major DoD Suppliers on
+DoD Programs," October 21, 1996
+(pq) Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (qr) DoD Directive 5500.17, "Role and Responsibilities of the Joint Service Committee (JSC)
+on Military Justice," May 3, 2003
+(rs) DoD Directive 5500.19, "Cooperation with the United States Office of Special Counsel
+(OSC)," May 24, 2004
+(st) Memorandum of President of the United States, "Delegation of Authority," 59 Federal
+Register 54515, October 27, 1994 (5 U.S.C. 7321 note)
+(tu) DoD Instruction 5105.04, "Department of Defense Federal Advisory Committee
+Management Program," August 6, 2007
+(uv) Volume 340 of the United States Reports (1951), United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen (vw) DoD Directive 5145.04, "Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)," April 16, 2012 (wx) DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives *Issuances* Program," September 26, 2012June
+6, 2014, as amended
+(xy) DoD Instruction 8910.01, "Information Collection and Reporting," March 6, 2007May 19,
+2014, as amended
+(yz) DoD Directive 5100.01, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major
+Components," December 21, 2010
+(zaa)   Title 32, United States Code (aaab) Title 31, United States Code (abac) Section 420 of Title 24, United States Code (acad) Title 28, United States Code
+(adae) Title 42, United States Code (aeaf) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement (4 United States Treaty
+1972, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2846)
+(afag) Public Law 101-552, "Administrative Dispute Resolution Act," November 15, 1990,
+as amended
+(agah) Public Law 104-320, "Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996," October 19,
+1996, as amended
+(ahai) Section 484 of Title 37, United States Code (aiaj) Title 35, United States Code
+(ajak) Public Law 102-484, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993,"
+October 23, 1992, as amended
+
+
+## Glossary Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+
+
+| DAEO    | Designated Agency Ethics Official    |
+|---------|--------------------------------------|
+| DLSA    | Defense Legal Services Agency        |
+| DoDD    | DoD Directive                        |
+| DoDI    | DoD Instruction                      |
+| DTM     | directive-type memorandum            |
+
+
+E.O.
+Executive order
+
+
+
+GC DoD General Counsel of the Department of Defense
+
+
+| PL    | Public Law                |
+|-------|---------------------------|
+| PSA   | Principal Staff Assistant |
+
+
+SOFA
+status of forces agreement
+
+
+
+U.S.C.
+United States Code

markdown/dod/d5210_88.md

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+## Directive
+
+# Number 5210.88 February 11, 2004
+
+USD(I)
+
+## Subject:  Safeguarding Biological Select Agents And Toxins
+
+References:  (a)  Directive-Type Memorandum, "Safeguarding Biological Select Agents,"
+February 4, 2003
+(b)  Title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73, "Department of Health
+and Human Services; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, Interim Final Rule," current edition
+(c)  Title 7, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 33l, "Animal and Plant
+Health Inspection Service," and Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 121, "Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins, Interim Rule," current edition
+(d)  DoD 5200.2-R, "Personnel Security Program," January 1987 (e)  through (i), see enclosure 1
+
+## 1.  Purpose
+
+Pursuant to reference (a) this Directive establishes security policy and assigns responsibilities for safeguarding biological select agents and toxins.
+
+## 2.  Applicability And Scope
+
+This Directive applies to:
+2.1.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components") that furnish, have custody, or have possession of biological select agents or toxins justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research or other peaceful purpose to support biological defense programs, medical research, clinical diagnostic testing, or teaching.
+
+2.2.  All contracts through incorporation of its provisions into those contracts for which performance depends on access to DoD biological select agents or toxins.
+
+2.3.  Cooperative Research and Development Agreements and Memoranda of Agreement with other research partners and government agencies that involve furnished DoD biological select agents and toxins for a DoD effort.
+
+## 3.  Definitions
+
+Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2.
+
+## 4.  Policy
+
+It is DoD policy that:
+4.1.  The Department of Defense shall be in full compliance with the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention to which the United States is a party.
+
+4.2.  All DoD facilities using, possessing, transferring, or receiving biological select agents or toxins and contract facilities furnished DoD-supplied biological select agents or toxins, shall be registered in accordance with Title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73 and Title 7, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 331 (references (b) and (c)).
+
+4.3.  All biological select agents and toxins shall be properly safeguarded against loss, theft, diversion, and unauthorized access or use in accordance with the minimum standards in the instruction to be issued by the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (USD(I)).
+
+4.4.  A current list shall be maintained of all DoD and contractor facilities that work with, transport, or store DoD biological select agents and toxins identified by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA), listed at references (b) and (c).
+
+4.5.  Individuals who have a legitimate need to handle or use biological select agents and toxins, or whose duties afford access to storage and work areas, storage containers and equipment containing biological select agents or toxins shall be screened initially for suitability and reliability.   This means that they shall be emotionally and mentally stable, trustworthy, and adequately trained to perform the assigned duties and shall be the subject of a current and favorably adjudicated National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks and Credit Checks for military and contractor employees and an Access National Agency Check with credit checks and written inquiries for civilian employees with a reinvestigation every 5 years and they shall be evaluated on a continuing basis using the criteria issued by the USD(I).
+
+4.6.  If access to classified information is required, the appropriate personnel security clearance investigation shall be requested in accordance with DoD 5200.2-R, reference (d).
+
+4.7.  A restricted person, as defined in section 73.8 of reference (b) and the Denial, Revocation, and Suspension of Registration Section of reference (c), may not have access to biological select agents or toxins.
+
+4.8.  Biosafety Level (BSL) 2, 3, and 4 facilities and laboratories containing biological select agents or toxins shall be designated as restricted areas, as defined in enclosure 2.
+
+4.9.  Visits, assignments, and exchanges of foreign nationals shall be processed in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.20 (reference (e)).
+
+4.10.  The DoD Components using biological select agents or toxins for combating terrorism shall be included in antiterrorism programs for a collective, proactive effort focused on the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks pursuant to the requirements, policy, and responsibilities specified in DoD Directive 2000.12 (reference (f)).
+
+4.11.  A security baseline vulnerability assessment shall be conducted, reviewed annually, or updated as a new vulnerability or threat becomes apparent.   The threat assessment shall be reviewed and updated more frequently if the threat or other circumstances affecting security measures change.
+
+4.12.  Material weaknesses shall be reported in compliance with DoD Directive
+5010.38 (reference (g)).
+
+4.13.  Export Control requirements for biological select agents and toxins shall be implemented in accordance with DoD Directive 2040.2 (reference (h)).
+
+## 5.  Responsibilities
+
+5.1.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall:
+5.1.1.  Issue a DoD Instruction establishing the minimum security standards for safeguarding biological select agents and toxins.
+
+5.1.2.  Establish a Biological Personnel Reliability Program for individuals with access to biological select agents and toxins.
+
+5.1.3.  Conduct oversight visits to assess the adequacy of security safeguards for biological select agents and toxins.
+
+5.1.4.  Ensure the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, produces a multidiscipline baseline threat assessment addressing the Foreign Intelligence and Security Services, terrorism, information operations, sabotage, and proliferation threats related to biological select agents and toxin triennially, or more frequently if required.
+
+5.2.  The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)), under the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquistion, Technology, and Logistics) shall:
+5.2.1.  Establish and maintain a secure database of all biological select agents and toxins for certified activities at DoD-owned and -operated facilities registered with, and withdrawn from, the HHS Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and/or the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and of the register of current and previous Responsible and Alternate Responsible Officials.
+
+5.2.2.  Establish and maintain a secure database of all DoD-supplied biological select agents and toxins for certified activities at DoD contractor facilities registered with, and withdrawn from, the CDC and/or APHIS, and of the register of current and previous Responsible and Alternate Responsible Officials.
+
+5.2.3.  Establish procedures and a coordination plan for effective responses to accidents or incidents involving biological select agents or toxins.
+
+## 5.3.  The Heads Of The Dod Components Shall:
+
+5.3.1.  Ensure that Responsible and Alternate Responsible Officials are designated to fulfill requirements in accordance with references (b) and (c).
+
+5.3.2.  Ensure compliance with policy established herein to include planning and programming fiscal and personnel resources necessary to implement the policy.
+
+5.3.3.  Notify the ATSD(NCB) prior to registration of any new DoD BSL
+facility.
+
+5.3.4.  Ensure biological select agents, toxins, and facilities are registered in accordance with Federal, State, and local regulations, including CDC and APHIS guidelines.
+
+5.3.5.  Establish maximum allowable amounts of any reproducible select agent generated by growth in any liquid or solid media and/or maximum allowable quantities for toxins at each facility, to include research and/or test quantities, based on program requirements.
+
+5.3.6.  Develop a security plan that includes security measures designed to ensure that all biological select agents and toxins are safeguarded against loss, theft, diversion, and unauthorized access or use.
+
+5.3.7.  Develop procedures to comply with the minimum security standards issued by the USD(I).
+
+5.3.8.  Coordinate public releases of information regarding biological select agents or toxins with the Directorate, Freedom of Information and Security Review, Washington Headquarters Services, in accordance with DoD Instruction 5230.29 (reference (i)).
+
+5.3.9.  Establish and maintain a secure inventory database system to account for biological select agents and toxins for certified activities at DoD and DoD contractor BSL facilities registered with, and withdrawn from, the CDC and/or APHIS, and a register of current and previous Responsible and Alternate Responsible Officials.   This information will be provided to the ATSD(NCB) upon request.
+
+## 5.4.  The Secretary Of The Army Shall:
+
+5.4.1.  Develop and coordinate security classification guidance, as appropriate, and provide that guidance to the DoD Components to ensure consistency in classification and dissemination of information related to biological select agents and toxins.
+
+5.4.2.  Stay current on the list of CDC and APHIS biological select agents and toxins and inform the USD(I) and the ATSD(NCB) of any changes in the lists.
+
+## 6.  Effective Date
+
+This Directive is effective immediately.
+
+Enclosures - 2
+E1.  References, continued E2.  Definitions
+
+## E1.  Enclosure 1 References, Continued
+
+(e)  DoD Directive 5230.20, "Visits, Assignments, and Exchanges of Foreign Nationals,"
+August 12, 1998
+(f)  DoD Directive 2000.12, "DoD Antiterriorism Program (AT)," August 13, 2003 (g)  DoD Directive 5010.38, "Management Control (MC) Program," August 26, 1996 (h)  DoD Directive 2040.2, "International Transfers of Technology, Goods, Services, and
+Munitions," January 17, 1984
+(i)  DoD Instruction 5230.29, "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for
+Public Release," August 6, 1999
+
+## E2.  Enclosure 2 Definitions
+
+E2.1.1.  Biosafety Levels (BSL).   Specific combinations of work practices, safety equipment, and facilities designed to minimize the exposure of workers and the environment to infectious agents.   There are four biosafety levels.
+
+E2.1.2.  Biological Agent.   Living microorganism or their byproduct (toxins), when natural or modified, including viruses or infectious pathogens derived from them that causes disease or death in humans, plants, or animals.   Biological agents may exist as purified and concentrated cultures, but may also be present in a variety of materials such as body fluids, tissues, soil samples, etc.
+
+E2.1.3.  Biological Select Agents and Toxins.   Biological agents and toxins selected by the CDC and APHIS that present a high bioterrorism risk to national security and have the greatest potential for adverse public health impact with mass casualties of humans and/or animals or that pose a severe threat to plant health or to plant products. The lists of select agents and toxins, overlap select agents and toxins, and biological agents and toxins, are reviewed and updated by the CDC and APHIS, and are found in references (b) and (c).   These agents are also known as high consequence livestock pathogens and toxins, non-overlap agents and toxins, and listed plant pathogens.
+
+E2.1.4.  Overlap Agents.   Select agents and toxins regulated by both agencies, HHS
+and USDA, are identified as "overlap" select agents and toxins.
+
+E2.1.5.  Restricted Area.   An area that entry is subject to special restrictions or control for security reasons, or to safeguard property or material.emsp; This does not include those designated areas restricting or prohibiting overflight by aircraft.
+Restricted areas may be of different types depending on the nature and varying degree of importance of the security interest, or other matter contained therein.
+
+E2.1.6.  Responsible Official.   An individual designated by the Installation Commander/Head of the DoD Agency, certified and approved by the CDC or APHIS for access to biological select agents and toxins, and has the authority and responsibility to ensure requirements are met in accordance with references (b) and (c).
+
+E2.1.7.  Toxins.   Toxins are poisonous compounds produced by a living organism.
+
+Unlike organisms, toxins cannot replicate.
+
+E2.1.8.  Vulnerability Assessment.   An evaluation (assessment) to determine the vulnerability to a terrorist attack against an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence, facility, or other site.   Identified areas of improvement to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism.   The process used to determine the susceptibility to attack from the full range of threats to the security of personnel, family members, and facilities, which provide a basis for determining antiterrorism measures that can protect personnel and assets from terrorist attacks.

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+## Directive
+
+#
+
+
+                                                                                                                                      USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: Explosives Safety Management and the DoD Explosives Safety Board
+
+References: (a) DoD Directive 6055.9, "DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) and DoD
+
+
+Component Explosives Safety Responsibilities," July 29, 1996 (hereby
+
+
+canceled)
+
+(b) Section 172 of title 10, United States Code
+
+(c) DoD 6055.9-STD, "DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards,"
+
+
+October 25, 2004
+
+(d) DoD Instruction 4145.26, "DoD Contractor's Safety Requirements for
+
+
+Ammunition and Explosives," April 9, 2005
+
+(e) through (l), see enclosure 1
+1.  REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE This Directive:
+1.1.  Reissues reference (a); updates policies, authorities, and responsibilities for DoD
+Explosives Safety Management (ESM); implements reference (b) in the Department of Defense; and continues to operate the DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) as a standing joint board.
+1.2.  Continues to authorize references (c) and (d), consistent with DoD 5025.1-M (reference
+(e)), and requisite DoD ESM guidance; and sets the requirement for developing, implementing, and maintaining effective DoD ESM.
+1.3.  Continues to designate the Secretary of the Army as the DoD Executive Agent for DoD
+emergency response to transportation mishaps involving DoD military munitions according to DoD Directive 5101.1 (reference (f)).
+2.  APPLICABILITY This Directive applies to:
+
+2.1.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the
+"DoD Components").  The term "Military Services," as used herein, refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.
+
+2.2.  ESM associated with DoD operations, activities, and installations worldwide, including Government-owned/contractor-operated facilities, and where on-base or nearby non-DoD
+activities or operations encumber the Department of Defense.
+
+3.  DEFINITION
+
+Explosives Safety Management.  A cost-effective risk management process, including policies, procedures, standards, engineering, and resources, that addresses potential probabilities and consequences of mishaps involving DoD military munitions or other encumbering explosives or munitions, to sustain operational capabilities and readiness and to protect people, property, and the environment.
+
+
+
+4.  POLICY Consistent with peacetime, contingency, or wartime operational requirements and corresponding DoD military munitions requirements, it is DoD policy to:
+4.1.  Provide the maximum possible protection to people and property from the potential damaging effects of DoD military munitions (explosive and chemical).  According to reference
+(b) and consistent with the U.S. Attorney General Opinion of October 27, 1949 (reference (g)), the explosives safety standards promulgated by the Department of Defense are binding, minimum safety standards.
+
+4.2.  Comply with reference (c) and, when outside the United States, comply with hostnation, multinational, or U.S. explosives safety standards, whichever are more stringent unless standards applicability is mandated by international agreement.
+
+4.3.  Develop quantitative risk-based explosives safety assessment tools and criteria and utilize such as decision-making aids when appropriate.
+
+
+4.4.  Minimize exposures consistent with safe and efficient operations (i.e., expose the minimum number of people for the minimum time to the minimum amount of explosives or chemical agents).
+
+
+4.5.  Enhance readiness and mission capability by providing for ESM considerations throughout the military munitions life-cycle.
+
+4.6.  Implement and maintain effective ESM programs within the DoD Components.
+
+4.7.  Prohibit the disposal (e.g., burying, dumping) of DoD military munitions on land or in water except when specifically authorized by the Head of the DoD Component concerned or his or her designee.  This prohibition does not preclude the covering of munitions with earth to control fragments and noise during authorized testing or destruction by detonation, or the use of in situ capping, when implemented as an engineered remedy under an authorized munitions response action.
+
+4.8.  Give precedence to ESM principles and requirements that provide for immediate protection of people and property while complying with applicable environmental regulations.
+
+4.9.  Conduct appropriate munitions response actions on real property that are known or suspected to contain munitions and explosives of concern, according to appropriate environmental law including Chapter 103 of title 42, United States Code, and Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations Part 300 (references (h) and (i)), using the most appropriate technology to ensure the protection of public safety, health, and the environment, consistent with the current land use or appropriate future use of the property.
+
+5.  RESPONSIBILITIES
+
+
+5.1.  The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment
+(DUSD(I&E)), under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+(USD(AT&L)), shall:
+
+5.1.1.  Establish objectives, guidance, and procedures for ESM, as authorized by DoD
+Directives 5134.1 and 4715.1E (references (j) and (k)).
+
+
+5.1.2.  Integrate ESM principles and values into DoD military munitions acquisition.
+
+
+5.1.3.  Recommend an individual to fill the OUSD(AT&L) Joint-credit DDESB
+Chairman's billet, from officers in the grade of O-6 or higher nominated by the Secretaries of the Military Departments or a civilian government employee equivalent, to the USD(AT&L).  The position customarily rotates among the Military Departments when filled by an officer who serves a minimum 3-year term.
+
+
+5.1.4.  Promulgate ESM performance auditing, measurement, and reporting processes.
+
+
+5.1.5.  Establish DoD ESM priorities for use by the DoD Components in ESM planning, programming, and budgeting.
+
+
+5.1.6.  Continue to reissue reference (c) as necessary.
+
+5.2.  The Director of Defense Research and Engineering, under the USD(AT&L) shall ensure research and engineering (R&E) investments address ESM technology requirements in coordination with the DUSD(I&E); the Secretaries of the Military Services; and the Chairman, DDESB.
+
+5.3.  The Chairman, DDESB shall report to the DUSD(I&E) and on behalf of the USD(AT&L) and the DUSD(I&E), shall:
+
+
+5.3.1.  Continue to serve as the Department of Defense's principal executive representative and advisor on ESM matters.
+
+
+5.3.2.  Exercise DoD-wide executive-level management and oversight of DoD
+Component-level ESM programs to maintain effective DoD ESM, including performing programmatic or systemic reviews and installation-level compliance surveys.
+
+
+5.3.3.  Collaborate with the Military Service-appointed voting DDESB members to recommend ESM objectives and priorities, and ESM performance auditing, measurement, and reporting processes; maintain the explosives safety standards in reference (c); identify ESM technology requirements and programmatic and systemic ESM issues; and identify and analyze R&E, special study, and testing proposals for consideration for programming to maintain effective DoD ESM.
+
+
+5.3.4.  Provide advice and technical assistance on explosives and chemical agent issues throughout all DoD functional areas and activities.
+
+
+5.3.5.  Collect, aggregate, and assess data from the DoD Components and annually provide the Secretary of Defense and the Heads of the DoD Components a written report on the ESM posture in the Department of Defense.
+
+5.4.  The Director, Defense Contract Management Agency, under the USD(AT&L), shall:
+
+5.4.1.  Include requisite aspects of commercial endeavors connected with the DoD
+military munitions life-cycle, including pre-award and post-award contract monitoring, in his or her ESM program and in coordination with the Chairman, DDESB.
+
+
+5.4.2.  Support the DDESB as the agency technically responsible for maintaining reference (d) and DoD 4145.26-M (reference (l)).  Maintain direct coordination with the Army Joint Munitions Command and the Joint Ordnance Commanders' Group Safety Subgroup on this effort.
+
+
+
+5.5.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
+
+5.5.1.  Implement this Directive and any implementing guidance.
+
+
+5.5.2.  Establish, resource, implement, and maintain effective DoD Component-level ESM programs.  Annually audit their programs to assess efficacy and provide timely assessment reports to the Chairman, DDESB.
+
+
+5.5.3.  Implement DoD Component-level explosives safety standards consistent with reference (c) to ensure effective ESM while meeting mission requirements.
+
+
+5.5.4.  Accept risk greater than that afforded by the minimum explosives safety standards only when required by strategic or compelling operational necessity and when acceptance is supported by a written risk assessment leading to an informed management decision by an appropriate leadership authority.  When a compelling necessity exists, documentation may occur after the risk acceptance decision has been made.
+
+
+5.5.5.  Submit timely copies of all DoD Component-approved waivers and exemptions from minimum explosives safety standards, including supporting rationale documentation, to the applicable Combatant Command and to the Chairman, DDESB.
+
+
+5.5.6.  Ensure fully informed ESM decisions by appropriate authorities are fully documented throughout the DoD military munitions life-cycle.
+
+
+5.5.7.  Develop and maintain coordinated DoD Component-level ESM R&E, special study, and testing programs overseen and coordinated by the Chairman, DDESB.
+
+
+5.5.8.  Address the Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO)
+throughout the DoD military munitions life-cycle, consistent with DoD Directive 3222.3 (reference (m)).
+
+
+5.5.9.  Investigate and report all DoD military munitions mishaps to the Chairman, DDESB according to DoD Instruction 6055.7 (reference (n).
+
+
+5.5.10.  Conduct appropriate munitions response actions on real property known or suspected to contain munitions and explosives of concern, according to appropriate environmental law including references (h) and (i), using the most appropriate technology to ensure the protection of public safety, health, and the environment, consistent with the current land use or appropriate future use of the property.
+
+
+5.5.11.  Submit all explosives and chemical agent safety provisions pursuant to early transfer or lease of real property from DoD control prior to cleanup and all requisite documentation to the Chairman, DDESB for review and approval.
+
+
+
+5.5.12.  Provide the DDESB with timely access to installations and facilities, requested programmatic information, and DoD military munitions mishap sites and data.
+
+5.6.  The Secretary of the Army shall:
+
+5.6.1.  Provide the Chairman, DDESB and associated staff with sufficient resources (e.g., budgeting, funding, civilian personnel, security, secure communications) and required administrative services, including special compartmented information billet support, to maintain effective DoD-wide executive-level ESM and oversight.
+
+
+5.6.2.  Facilitate timely access to DoD-wide ESM-related accident data and lessons learned; explosives safety waivers, exemptions, and certificates of compelling reasons; and joint hazard classification records.
+
+
+5.6.3.  Fund a DoD-level ESM R&E, special study, and testing program to maintain effective DoD ESM.
+
+
+5.6.4.  Assign one qualified (i.e., experienced in military munitions management and/or explosive ordnance disposal, and hereafter referred to as "qualified") officer in the grade of O-6
+to the DDESB staff on a full-time basis.
+
+
+5.6.5.  Appoint two additional qualified individuals (a primary and alternate) in the grade of O-6 or higher, or civilian government employee equivalent, to act as his or her DDESB voting members for maintaining reference (c).
+
+
+5.6.6.  Ensure Army career programs develop personnel qualified to serve as ESM
+subject matter experts.
+
+
+5.6.7.  Serve as the DoD Executive Agent for DoD emergency response to transportation mishaps involving DoD military munitions.  Responsibilities are limited to developing command and control procedures; maintaining the DoD coordination center using the Defense Transportation Tracking System as the DoD focal point for initial notification of transportation mishaps involving DoD military munitions; establishing procedures, personnel qualifications, and training to ensure the safe commercial movement of DoD military munitions and the prevention of mishaps; and taking timely actions following a mishap by a commercial carrier involving the transportation of DoD military munitions.
+
+5.7.  The Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force shall each:
+
+5.7.1.  Assign one qualified officer in the grade of O-6 to the DDESB staff on a full-time basis.
+
+
+5.7.2.  Appoint two additional qualified individuals (a primary and alternate) in the grade of O-6 or higher, or civilian government employee equivalent, to act as their DDESB voting members for maintaining reference (c).
+
+
+
+5.7.3.  Ensure their Military Service career programs develop personnel qualified to serve as ESM subject matter experts.
+
+5.8.  The Secretary of the Navy shall also:
+
+5.8.1.  Assign one qualified officer in the grade of O-5 from the Marine Corps to the DDESB staff on a full-time basis.
+
+
+5.8.2.  Appoint two additional qualified individuals (a primary and alternate) in the grade of O-6 or higher, or civilian government employee equivalent, to act as his or her Marine Corps DDESB voting members for maintaining reference (c).
+
+
+5.8.3.  Ensure the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard agrees to use DoD ESM
+practices to enable seamless ESM transitions when Coast Guard units are assigned to operate as part of the Navy.
+
+5.9.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
+
+5.9.1.  Integrate ESM into operational and exercise planning.
+
+
+5.9.2.  Involve the DoD Components in ESM decision-making.
+
+
+5.9.3.  Facilitate timely DDESB access to installations and facilities, requested programmatic information, and DoD military munitions mishap sites and data.
+
+5.10.  The Commanders of the Combatant Commands (COCOM), through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:
+
+5.10.1.  Integrate ESM into all phases of contingencies, warfighting, and training, including addressing HERO consistent with reference (m).
+
+
+
+5.10.2.  Review for approval applicable DoD Component-approved waivers and exemptions from minimum explosives safety standards.  Submit timely copies of all COCOM- approved waivers and exemptions, including subordinate and supporting rationale documentation, to the Chairman, DDESB.  Provide timely feedback to the submitting DoD Components.
+
+
+5.10.3.  Notify and coordinate ESM decisions with all affected commands and, as appropriate, affected local and host nation government officials and citizens, to ensure continual awareness of the potential damaging effects of DoD military munitions mishaps.
+
+
+5.10.4.  Provide the DDESB with timely access to installations and facilities, requested programmatic information, and DoD military munitions mishap sites and data.
+
+
+5.10.5.  Involve the DoD Components in ESM decision-making.
+
+
+
+5.11.  The Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:
+
+5.11.1.  Include the requisite aspects of DoD military munitions transportation, terminal, and yard operations, for all modes of commercial carriage within the United States or from points of U.S. origin through aerial and sea ports of embarkation and debarkation worldwide, in his or her ESM program.
+
+
+5.11.2.  Obtain coordination with the Chairman, DDESB and the Secretary of Transportation regarding ESM matters related to transporting DoD military munitions.
+
+
+5.11.3.  Develop, coordinate, and maintain, in concert with the Military Services and the DDESB, requisite allowances, authorities, or preapprovals to be immediately activated when necessary to allow the expedited movement of DoD military munitions during periods of national emergency, contingency, or wartime.  Inform the Chairman, DDESB when any activations occur.
+
+6.  EFFECTIVE DATE This Directive is effective immediately.
+
+
+
+## Enclosure - 1 E1.  References, Continued
+
+
+
+E1.  ENCLOSURE 1
+
+REFERENCES, continued
+
+
+(e) DoD 5025.1-M, "DoD Directives System Procedures," March 5, 2003
+(f) DoD Directive 5101.1, "DoD Executive Agent," September 3, 2002 (g) U.S. Attorney General Opinion of October 27, 1949 (41 Op. Atty. Gen. 38 (1949)) (h) Chapter 103 of title 42, United States Code (i) Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 300, "National Oil and Hazardous Substances
+
+Pollution Contingency Plan," current edition
+(j) DoD Directive 5134.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
+Logistics (USD(AT&L))," April 21, 2000
+(k) DoD Directive 4715.1E, "Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health" March 19, 2005
+(l) DoD 4145.26-M, "DoD Contractors' Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives,"
+
+September 1997
+(m) DoD Directive 3222.3, "DoD Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Program,"
+
+September 8, 2004
+(n) DoD Instruction 6055.7, "Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping,"
+October 3, 2000

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+## Directive
+
+ SUBJECT: Management of the Department of Defense Information Enterprise (DoD IE) References: See Enclosure 1 1.  PURPOSE.  This directive:
+
+
+a.  Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 8000.01 (Reference (a)) to establish policy and assign responsibilities for DoD information resources management (IRM) activities to the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense (DoD CIO).
+
+b.  Implements sections 2222, 2223, and 2224 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.)
+(Reference (b)), chapter 113 of Title 40, U.S.C. (Reference (c)), chapters 35 and 36 of Title 44, U.S.C. (Reference (d)), and Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130 (Reference (e)) by establishing policy for the management of the DoD IE.
+
+c.  Provides direction on creating an information advantage for DoD personnel and mission partners and establishing and defining roles for chief information officers (CIOs) and IRM officials at various levels within DoD, in accordance with References (b), (c), (d), and (e).
+
+d.  Provides direction for information sharing among all DoD Components and with mission partners, in accordance with the DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8320.02 (Reference (f)) and the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, (Reference (g)). 2.  APPLICABILITY.  This directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within DoD (referred to collectively in this directive as the "DoD Components"). 3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  Information is considered a strategic asset to DoD.  It must be safeguarded, appropriately secured and shared, and made available to authorized DoD personnel and mission partners to the maximum extent allowed by law, DoD policy, and mission requirements, throughout the information life cycle.
+
+b.  Functional processes are to be examined, and if possible streamlined or improved, in order to improve effectiveness and reduce cost before investment is made in information technology.
+
+c.  Each DoD Component has a CIO or senior IRM official who coordinates directly with the Component head and with the DoD CIO on behalf of the Component head.  CIOs also may be designated at subordinate levels, although a reporting mechanism through the Component CIO must be maintained to ensure unity of purpose.
+
+d.  All aspects of the DoD IE, including the DoD information network infrastructure, DoD
+enterprise IT service and solutions, National Security Systems, Industrial Control Systems, and embedded computing of wired, wireless, mobile communication, and platforms will be planned, designed, developed, architected, configured, acquired, managed, operated, and protected in order to help achieve an information advantage and full spectrum superiority, deliver mission assurance, improve mission effectiveness, and realize IT efficiencies.
+
+e.  The architecture that describes the DoD IE, as defined in this directive, will be designated the DoD Information Enterprise Architecture (DoD IEA).  The DoD IEA will:
+(1)  Be developed, maintained, and applied to guide IT investment portfolio strategies and decisions, define IT capability and interoperability requirements, establish and enforce IT standards, and guide cybersecurity requirements in accordance with DoDI 8500.01 (Reference (h)), across the DoD. (2)  Serve as the DoD CIO's contribution to the DoD Enterprise Architecture (DoD EA), which consists of architectures from Intelligence, Warfighting, and Business Mission Areas as well as DoD Component architectures.
+
+f.  In accordance with DoDI 8115.02 (Reference (i)), IT investments should link mission needs, information, and technology while efficiently managing resources and implementing DoDI 8510.01 (Reference (j)).
+
+g.  Investments in information solutions should be managed through a capital planning and investment control process that:
+(1)  Is performance- and results-based. (2)  Provides for analyzing, selecting, controlling, and evaluating investments, as well as assessing and managing associated risks. (3)  Interfaces with the DoD key decision support systems for capability identification;
+planning, programming, budgeting, and execution; and acquisition. (4)  Requires the review of all information technology (IT) investments for compliance with architectures, IT standards, and related policy requirements. (5)  Addresses life-cycle management h.  IT will be developed in useful increments that are as narrow in scope and brief in duration as practical; each increment will solve a specific part of an overall mission problem and deliver a measurable net benefit independent of future increments.
+
+i.  Pilots, modeling and simulation, experimentation, and prototype/proof of concept projects should be considered, especially when large, high-risk investments in IT are involved.  These pilots, models, and other prototype or proof of concepts projects must be appropriately sized, and of limited duration to achieve desired objectives, and not used in lieu of testing or acquisition processes to implement the production version of the information solution.
+
+j.  A highly qualified and capable cyberspace workforce must be recruited, developed, and retained to evolve the DoD IE in order to maintain an information advantage consistent with DoDD 8140.01 Reference (k)).  The entire DoD workforce will need to be trained and prepared to work in the evolving DoD IE.
+
+k.  In accordance with section 794d of Title 29, U.S.C. (Reference (l)), DoD employees or members of the public with disabilities seeking information or services from the DoD must have access to and use of information and data comparable to the access and use by individuals without disabilities, unless such access and use would impose an undue burden on the DoD.
+
+(1)  In addition, section 794d of Reference (l) requires that federally conducted or assisted activities be reasonably modified to accommodate covered individuals with disabilities when the modifications are necessary to avoid unlawful discrimination of the basis of disability, unless making the modifications would result in an undue burden or fundamentally alter the nature of the activity, and section 791 of Reference (l) requires that a covered employee or applicant for employment with a disability be reasonably accommodated. (2)  These obligations may include reasonable modifications or accommodations to facilitate access to IT systems by covered individuals with disabilities.
+
+l.  To operationalize the DoD IE, DoD will, to the maximum extent practical, architect its systems for interoperability and openness, and deliver secure, device-agnostic, digital services for the best value in accordance with Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-13-13 (Reference (m)), DoDI 8330.01 (Reference (n)), and DoDI 8310.01 (Reference (o)).
+
+m.  New and existing IT investments and services will support achieving the goals and objectives of the DoD IRM Strategic Plan (Reference (p)) and support the implementation of the joint information environment (JIE) strategy (Reference (q)), and DoDI 8110.01 (Reference (r)). 4.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2.
+
+5.  RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release**.  This directive is available on the DoD
+Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. 6.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This directive is effective March 17, 2016.
+
+Robert O. Work
+
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+
+
+(a) DoD Directive 8000.01, "Management of the Department of Defense Information
+Enterprise," February 10, 2009 (hereby cancelled)
+(b) Title 10, United States Code (c) Title 40, United States Code (d) Title 44, United States Code (e) Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-130, "Management of Federal
+Information Resources," November 28, 2000
+(f)
+DoD Instruction 8320.02, "Sharing Data, Information, and Technology (IT) services in the Department of Defense," August 5, 2013
+(g) White House Office of the Press Secretary, "National Strategy for Information Sharing and
+Safeguarding," December 19, 2012
+(h) DoD Instruction 8500.01, "Cybersecurity," March 14, 2014 (i)
+DoD Instruction 8115.02, "Information Technology Portfolio Management Implementation," October 30, 2006
+(j)
+DoD Instruction 8510.01, "Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT)," March 12, 2014
+(k)
+DoD Directive 8140.01, "Cyberspace Workforce Management," August 11, 2015
+(l)
+Title 29, United States Code
+(m) Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-13-13, "Open Data PolicyManaging
+Information as an Asset," May 9, 2013
+(n)
+DoD Instruction 8330.01, "Interoperability of Information Technology (IT), Including
+National Security Systems (NSS)," May 21, 2014
+(o)
+DoD Instruction 8310.01, 'Information Technology Standards in the DoD," February 2, 2015
+(p) DoD FY2014 Information Resources Management Strategic Plan, May 30, 2014
+(q)
+The DoD Strategy for Implementing the Joint Information Environment, September 28 2013
+(r)
+DoD Instruction 8110.01, "Mission Partner Environment (MPE) Information Sharing Capability Implementation for the DoD," November 25, 2014
+(s)
+Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for The Joint Information Environment (JIE), v3.1,
+April 28, 2014
+(t)
+DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003
+(u)
+DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," January 7, 2015
+(v)
+CJCS Instruction 8010.01C, "Joint Community Warfighter Chief Information Officer," November 1, 2013
+(w) Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition
+
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  DoD CIO.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 4 of this enclosure, the DoD CIO:
+a.  Serves as the DoD senior official for IRM matters. b.  Reports to and advises the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on the information resource implications of strategic planning decisions. c.  Oversees the development and maintenance of, and facilitates the use of, a DoD
+Enterprise Architecture (DoD EA) by major processes of DoD. d.  Oversees DoD IT investments through the development, implementation and use of the DoD IEA, which describes the future DoD IE, including cybersecurity measures and practices, as follows:
+(1)  DoD investments for the information enterprise are supported by regularly updated inventory of DoD-wide IT hardware, software, networks, and computing and storage centers; and (2)  The DoD CIO will establish governance mechanisms and standards to ensure compliance with and management of changes to the DoD IEA.
+
+e.  Ensures the integration and synchronization of DoD IE activities. f.  Establishes mechanisms to facilitate organizationally tiered compliance reviews for IT
+investments to ensure compliance with enterprise architectures, privacy requirements, and IT standards, including networks, cybersecurity, data standards, and related policy requirements.
+DoD CIO will act as the oversight authority for IT compliance. g.  Serves as the JIE lead and guides DoD in the delivery of the JIE. h.  Guides the DoD Components in aligning their IRM activities with the desired outcomes and goals of the JIE in accordance with the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for The Joint Information Environment (JIE) (Reference (s)). i.  Oversees information policy and ensures IT capability requirements are reflected in architectures and plans across DoD as a means of guaranteeing information safeguarding, sharing, visibility, trustworthiness, accessibility, and interoperability. 2.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (USD(C)/CFO).  Pursuant to section 11316 of Reference (c), in addition to the responsibilities in section 4, and in coordination with the DoD CIO and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the USD(C)/CFO establishes policies and procedures to ensure that accounting, financial, and asset management systems and other related DoD information solutions are designed, developed, and maintained, and used effectively to provide financial data reliably, consistently, quickly, and in support of programmatic investment decisions. 3  DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 4, the Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense collaborates with the DoD CIO to ensure that the business transformation and DoD IE policies and program are designed and managed to improve performance standards, economy, and efficiency. 4.  OSD and DoD COMPONENT HEADS.  The OSD and DoD Component heads:
+a.  Improve DoD operations and procedures by ensuring the application of sound business practices and compliance with this directive. b.  Oversee the evaluation and improvement of functional processes before making significant investments in IT, to:
+(1)  Determine whether the function that IT will support is central to, or a priority for, DoD's mission. (2)  Determine the most appropriate and cost effective service provider for IT, ensuring that DoD's cybersecurity posture is not jeopardized and critical mission capabilities are retained. (3)  Determine whether the private sector or another government agency can perform the function more effectively, ensuring that DoD's cybersecurity posture is not jeopardized and critical mission capabilities are retained.
+
+c.  Ensure that information policy and functional requirements are reflected in architectures and plans across DoD and Component-level enterprises as a means to guarantee information safeguarding, sharing, visibility, trustworthiness, accessibility, and interoperability. d.  Participate in DoD oversight processes for IT acquisition and ensure functional leadership, management, and control of these resources throughout their life cycles. Those processes conducted under the Defense Acquisition System will be in accordance with DoDD 5000.01 (Reference (t)) and DoDI 5000.02 (Reference (u)).
+
+
+5.  DoD COMPONENT HEADS.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 4 of this enclosure, the DoD Component heads:
+a.  Appoint a Component CIO or senior IRM official with core knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience to carry out the IRM requirements of References (b), (c), (d), and (e), and the policies in this directive.
+
+
+(1)  Position the DoD Component CIO or senior IRM official to participate in the Component's strategic planning, management, and decision processes.
+
+
+(2)  Promote and forge a strong partnership among the Component's CIO and Comptroller, DoD Component Acquisition Executive or similar position, as well as other key senior managers and external mission partners.
+
+
+(3)  Designate subordinate-level CIOs or IRM officials, as needed, and ensure that the subordinate reporting mechanism goes through the Component CIO or senior IRM official.
+
+b.  Align the Component's IT investment portfolio with DoD IE policies and guidance, as required.
+
+c.  Oversee the DoD Component CIOs or senior IRM officials.  The DoD Component CIOs or senior IRM officials:
+(1)  Have responsibilities and authorities as delegated in this directive.  Military Department CIOs will have additional responsibilities as defined in Reference (b). (2)  Head an office responsible for ensuring that the component complies with, and promptly, efficiently, and effectively implements the policies and responsibilities in this directive and the requirements of References (b), (c), (d), and (e). (3)  Ensure that information policy and functional requirements are reflected in architectures and plans across the DoD and Component level enterprises as a means to guarantee information safeguarding, sharing, visibility, trustworthiness, and interoperability. (4)  Require that DoD IT is designed for interoperability and openness, and comply with established well-defined standards in order to deliver secure, device-agnostic, digital services for the best value, in accordance with References (m), (n) and (o). (5)  Ensure IT meets DoD regulations, instructions, and policies prior to installation into the DoD-wide enterprise. (6)  Establish programs to hire, train, and retain the information management, IT, and cybersecurity workforce, consistent with this directive. (7)  Participate in DoD CIO-led forums for governing the DoD IE.
+
+(8)  Ensure Component policy supports DoD-wide enterprise policy.
+6.  CJCS.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 4 and 5 of this enclosure, the CJCS appoints a Joint Community Warfighter CIO, consistent with CJCS Instruction 8010.01C, (Reference (v)).
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+CIO
+chief information officer
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+
+
+DoD CIO
+Department of Defense Chief Information Officer
+DoDD
+DoD Directive
+DoDI
+DoD Instruction
+DoD IE
+DoD Information Enterprise
+DoD IEA
+DoD Information Enterprise Architecture
+
+
+IRM
+information resources management
+IT
+information technology
+
+
+JIE
+joint information environment
+
+
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+USD(AT&L)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+USD(C)/CFO
+Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense
+
+
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+ Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this directive. cybersecurity.  Defined in Reference (h). cyberspace.  Defined in Joint Publication 1-02 (Reference (w)). device-agnostic.  A service that is developed to work regardless of the user's device, e.g. a website that works whether viewed on a desktop computer, laptop, smartphone, media tablet or e-reader. digital services.  Include the delivery of digital information (i.e., data or content) and transactional services (e.g., online forms, benefits applications) across a variety of platforms, devices, and delivery mechanisms (e.g., websites, mobile applications, and social media) DoD Enterprise Architecture.  A federation of descriptions that provides context and rules for accomplishing the DoD mission.  These descriptions are developed and maintained at the Department, Capability Area, and Component levels and collectively define the people, processes, and technology required in the "current" and "target" environments, and in the roadmap for transition to the target environment. DoD enterprise IT service.  An IT service that is offered by one DoD Component to all DoD Components. DoD IE.  The DoD information resources, assets, and processes required to achieve an information advantage and to share information across DoD and with mission partners.  It includes:
+The information itself and the Department's management over the information life cycle; The processes, including risk management, associated with managing information to accomplish the DoD mission and functions; Activities related to designing, building, populating, acquiring, managing, operating, protecting, and defending the information enterprise; and Related information resources such as personnel, funds, equipment, and IT, including internal use software and national security systems. DoD IEA.  The description of the DoD IE including the infrastructure, communications systems and services (i.e., systems and facilities for transferring data between persons and equipment), the computing systems and services (i.e., integrated sets of components for collecting, storing, and processing data for delivering information, knowledge, and digital products for organizations and individuals to manage their operations), and the functional processes (i.e., the structured activities or tasks that produce a specific service or product) for DoD IE customers.
+
+DoD information network.  Defined in Reference (w). information advantage.  The superior position or condition derived from the ability to access, share, and collaborate securely via trusted information in order develop to more rapidly awareness and to execute decisions than an adversary while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. information environment.  Defined in Reference (w). information life cycle.  The stages through which information passes, typically characterized as: creation or collection; processing; dissemination; use; storage; and disposition. Internal Use Software.  Software that:
+Is acquired or developed to meet the entity's internal or operational needs (intended purpose); and Is a stand-alone application, or the combined software components of an IT system that can consist of multiple applications, modules, or other software components integrated and used to fulfill the entity's internal or operational needs *(software type).* Internal Use Software can be purchased from commercial vendors "off-the-shelf", modified
+"off the shelf," internally developed, or contractor developed. IRM.  The process of managing information resources to accomplish agency missions and to improve agency performance, including through the reduction of the information collection burden on the public.  The term encompasses both information itself and the related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and IT. IT.  Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information by the executive agency.
+
+This includes if the equipment is used by the executive agency directly or is used by a contractor under a contract with the executive agency that requires the use of that equipment; or of that equipment to a significant extent in the performance of a service or the furnishing of a product. IT includes computers, ancillary equipment, software, firmware, and similar procedures, services (including support services), and related resources, but does not include any equipment acquired by a federal contractor incidental to a federal contract.
+
+
+IT investment.  The expenditure of IT resources to address mission delivery and management support.
+
+An IT investment may include a project or projects for the development, modernization, enhancement, or maintenance of a single IT asset or group of IT assets with related functionality, and the subsequent operation of those assets in a production environment.
+
+
+All IT investments should have a defined life cycle with start and end dates, with the end date representing the end of the currently estimated useful life of the investment, consistent with the investment's most current alternatives analysis if applicable. When the asset(s) is essentially replaced by a new system or technology, the replacement should be reported as a new, distinct investment, with its own defined life cycle information. IT service.  An IT capability designed to provide awareness of, access to, and delivery of data or information made available for consumption by one or more users. Users can be an individual, organization, or machine. JIE.  A secure environment, composed of shared IT infrastructure, enterprise services, and a single security architecture to achieve full-spectrum superiority, improve mission effectiveness, increase security, and realize IT efficiencies. mission partners.  Those with whom DoD cooperates to achieve national goals, such as other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, State and local governments, allies, coalition members, host nations and other nations, multinational organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. National Security System.  Defined in section 3552 of Reference (c).

markdown/dod/dtm-20-002.md

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+# Deputy Secretary Of Defense 1010 Defense Pentagon
+
+WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010
+
+#
+
+
+March 13, 2020
+
+# Incorporating Change 3, February 23, 2023
+
+ MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
+DEFENSE
+SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
+GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
+DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM
+EVALUATION
+INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
+DEFENSE
+ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE
+AFFAIRS
+ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC
+AFFAIRS
+DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
+DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
+DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES SUBJECT:
+Directive-type Memorandum 20-002 - "Missile Defense System Policies and Governance" References: See Attachment 1.
+
+
+Purpose.  In accordance with the April 4, 2019 Deputy Secretary of Defense
+(DepSecDef) Memorandum, this directive-type memorandum (DTM):
+
+- Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for
+missile defense system (MDS) research, development, test, and evaluation; procurement; and operations and sustainment in order to reduce risk and promote MDS element transfers to the Military Departments while maintaining agility in
+accordance with the 2019 Missile Defense Review.
+- Updates missile defense governance to account for the elimination of the
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the creation of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
+
+(USD(R&E)) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) in accordance with the July 13, 2018 DepSecDef Memorandum.
+
+- Modifies conditions for entry of all MDS elements into different phases of
+acquisition, per the review directed in the April 4, 2019 DepSecDef Memorandum.  The MDS elements that are included in the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) will continue to be managed under the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) nontraditional acquisition approach as modified by this DTM. The MDS elements that are not within the BMDS will be managed under this DTM and any otherwise applicable legal authorities.
+- Updates roles, responsibilities, and authorities of MDA, Military Departments,
+and OSD in the oversight, management, and execution of these acquisition phases, in accordance with the April 4, 2019 DepSecDef Memorandum.
+- Is effective August 21, 2020; it must be incorporated into DoD Directive
+5134.09, Missile Defense Agency Instruction 5013.02-INS, and Missile Defense Agency Manual 5013.14-M.  This DTM will expire effective March 1, 2024.
+Applicability.  This DTM applies to:
+
+- OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
+of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD.
+- MDS elements that have not reached product development decision (PDD)
+120 days after congressional notification.  MDS elements that have reached PDD will follow individual direction and guidance established specifically for those elements.
+Definitions.  See Glossary.
+
+Responsibilities.  See Attachment 2. Procedures.  See Attachment 3. Visual Summary of Responsibilities and Procedures.  See Attachment 4. Releasability.  Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+
+Summary of Change 3.  The expiration date of this DTM was extended and references were updated for currency and accuracy.
+
+
+
+Attachments: As stated
+
+## Attachment 1 References
+
+Department of Defense, "2019 Missile Defense Review," January 17, 2019 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Acquisition Roles and Responsibilities,"
+December 20, 2019
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Life
+Cycle Management Process," September 25, 2008
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Establishment of the Office of the Under Secretary
+of Defense for Research and Engineering and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment," July 13, 2018
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Funding Responsibilities for Ballistic Missile
+Defense System (BMDS) Elements," June 10, 2011
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB),"
+March 15, 2007
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Task to Review Missile Defense Agency
+Acquisition Approaches and Programs for Transfer," April 4, 2019
+DoD Directive 5134.09, "Missile Defense Agency (MDA)," September 17, 2009 DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework,"
+January 23, 2020, as amended
+Joint Publication 3-01, "Countering Air and Missile Threats," April 21, 2017 Missile Defense Agency Instruction 5013.02-INS, "Acquisition Management," August 24, 2013 Missile Defense Agency Manual 5013.14-M, "Acquisition Plan Development Process,"
+December 13, 2013
+
+Public Law 114-328, Section 1687 "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,"
+December 23, 2016
+Public Law 115-91, Section 1676, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,"
+December 12, 2017
+Public Law 115-232, Section 1681 "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,"
+December 13, 2018
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Acquisition Decision
+Memorandum, "Ballistic Missile Defense System Acquisition Decision Memorandum," May 8, 2013
+
+
+## Attachment 2 Responsibilities 1.  Director Of Cost Assessment And Program Evaluation (Dcape).  The Dcape:
+
+a.  Develops an independent cost estimate (ICE) before PDD and production decision
+(PD), informed by the life cycle cost estimate (LCCE) developed by the Director, MDA, in conjunction with the Secretary of the lead Military Department, for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+b.  Identifies, and recommends to the DepSecDef, sources of funding at a funding level consistent with the associated ICE for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+c.  Provides guidance and sufficiency review of analyses of alternatives for MDS
+elements.
+
+## 2.  Usd(A&S).  The Usd(A&S):
+
+a.  Unless delegated to the Director, MDA, serves as the decision authority at the Technology Development Decision (TDD), PDD, and PD for MDS elements that, as detailed in DoD Instruction 5000.02:
+(1)  Exceed the research, development, test, and evaluation dollar threshold for Acquisition Category I Programs; or
+(2)  May be of special interest.
+
+b.  Unless delegated to the Director, MDA, reviews and approves the acquisition strategy
+(AS) to support TDD, PDD, and PD for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment in accordance with the December 20, 2019 DepSecDef Memorandum.
+
+c.  Serves as the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) co-chairman for decisions regarding acquisition and the approval of acquisition and production milestones, in accordance with Section 1681 of Public Law 115-232.
+
+## 3.  Usd(R&E).  The Usd(R&E):
+
+a.  Conducts an independent technical risk assessment (ITRA) before PDD and a PD for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+b.  Assesses TDD, PDD, and PD readiness.  Raises significant concerns with respect to milestone approval to the DepSecDef.
+
+c.  Serves as the MDEB co-chairman for decisions regarding acquisition and the approval of acquisition and production milestones, and the MDEB chairman for all other matters, in accordance with Section 1681 of Public Law 115-232 and Section 1676 of Public Law 115-91. 4.  DIRECTOR, MDA.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(R&E), the Director, MDA:
+a.  Serves as decision authority at TDD, PDD, and PD for MDS elements that do not meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment, or when this authority is delegated by the USD(A&S).
+
+b.  In conjunction with the Secretary of the lead Military Department:
+(1)  Establishes a transfer agreement (TA) before PDD that provides MDS
+element transfer criteria to a lead Military Department, including funding responsibilities in accordance with the June 10, 2011 DepSecDef Memorandum.
+
+(2)  Establishes a hybrid program management office before PDD to facilitate transfer in accordance with the TA and the June 10, 2011 DepSecDef Memorandum.  Codifies the hybrid leadership team structure and operation in a memorandum of agreement (MOA).
+(3)  Develops a LCCE and affordability analysis and provides it to the DCAPE
+before PDD for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+c.  Supports the Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM)
+in conducting a capability and utility assessment (CUA) before PDD and PD for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+d.  In coordination with the Secretary of the lead Military Department, the CDRUSSTRATCOM, and the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) as applicable, develops a top level requirements document (TLRD) for MDS elements before PDD.
+e.  Supports the DCAPE in developing an ICE before PDD and PD for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+f.  Supports the USD(R&E) in developing an ITRA before PDD and PD for MDS
+elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.  In accordance with the December 20, 2019 DepSecDef Memorandum, follows USD(R&E)-published ITRA policy for MDS elements.
+
+g.  In coordination with the Service Acquisition Executives, develops an AS before TDD
+for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.  Updates the AS at PDD and PD, in coordination with the Service Acquisition Executive of the lead Military Department.
+
+h.  Notifies the MDEB of pending decisions to enter technology development, product development, or production for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+i.  As the DoD Technical Authority for Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) and in accordance with the May 8, 2013 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Acquisition Decision Memorandum:
+(1)  Works closely with the warfighter community (including the CCDRs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to develop the technical architecture for the MDS and to integrate it into the architecture for IAMD.
+(2)  Coordinates with the DoD Chief Information Officer to ensure implementation of the joint command and control architecture for the MDS is executed consistent with net-centricity requirements.
+
+5.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  In accordance with the September 25, 2008 DepSecDef Memorandum, the DepSecDef will designate a lead Military Department for MDS elements.  The Secretary of the lead Military Department:
+a.  Supports the CDRUSSTRATCOM in conducting a CUA before PDD and PD for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+b.  Supports the Director, MDA in developing a TLRD for MDS elements before PDD.
+
+c.  In conjunction with the Director, MDA, develops an LCCE and affordability analysis and provides it to the DCAPE, before PDD for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+d.  In conjunction with the Director, MDA, establishes, before PDD, a TA that provides criteria for MDS element transfers to a lead Military Department, including funding responsibilities in accordance with the June 10, 2011 DepSecDef Memorandum.
+
+e.  Supports the Director, MDA in developing an AS before TDD, to be updated at PDD
+and PD, for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+f.  In conjunction with the Director, MDA, establishes a hybrid program management office before PDD to facilitate transfer in accordance with the TA and the June 10, 2011
+DepSecDef Memorandum.  Codifies the hybrid leadership team structure and operation in an MOA.
+
+## 6.  Ccdrs.  The Ccdrs:
+
+a.  Support the CDRUSSTRATCOM in conducting a CUA before PDD and PD for MDS
+elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+b.  Support the Director, MDA in developing a TLRD for MDS elements before PDD.
+7.  CDRUSSTRATCOM.  In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 6 of this attachment, the CDRUSSTRATCOM, in coordination with the Director, MDA; the Secretary of the lead Military Department; and the CCDRs as applicable, conducts a CUA before PDD and PD for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of this attachment.
+
+## Appendix To Attachment 2 Changes To Responsibilities
+
+Original
+Reference(s),
+DTM
+Paragraph
+Description of Change
+Page No.
+N/A
+1.a.
+Adds responsibility to develop ICE before PDD and PD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+N/A
+1.b.
+Adds responsibility to identify and recommend funding sources for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+N/A
+1.c.
+Adds responsibility to provide guidance and sufficiency reviews for Analyses of Alternatives
+(DoDD
+2.a.
+USD(A&S) serves as TDD, PDD, and PD decision authority for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+5134.09), p. 3
+N/A
+2.b.
+Adds responsibility to approve the AS to support TDD, PDD, and PD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+2.c.
+Clarifies MDEB chairs for acquisition decisions.
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 3;
+(Mar 15, 2007
+DepSecDef
+Memo), p. 2
+(MDAI
+3.a.
+Requires an ITRA at PDD and PD, instead of a TRA only at PD, for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+5013.02-INS),
+p. 49
+N/A
+3.b.
+Adds responsibility to raise significant concerns with respect to milestone approval to the DepSecDef
+3.c.
+Clarifies MDEB chair
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 3;
+(Mar 15, 2007
+DepSecDef
+Memo), p. 2
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 3
+4.a.
+Director, MDA serves as TDD, PDD, and PD decision authority for MDS elements that do not meet dollar threshold and are not of special interest
+4.b.(1)
+Requires TA before PDD
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 5
+4.b.(2)
+Requires establishment of hybrid program office before PDD
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 5
+(MDAI
+5013.02-INS),
+4.b.(3)
+Requires LCCE and affordability analysis completion and submission to DCAPE for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+p. 47
+
+## Table 1.  Changes To Responsibilities Described In Attachment 2, Continued
+
+Original
+Reference(s),
+DTM
+Paragraph
+Description of Change
+Page No.
+(DoDD
+4.c.
+Specifies that CUA must be completed before PDD and PD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+5134.09), p. 9
+4.d.
+Adds responsibility to develop TLRD before PDD
+N/A N/A
+4.e.
+Adds responsibility to support CAPE ICE for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+N/A
+4.f.
+Adds responsibility to support USD(R&E) ITRA for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest, and follow USD(R&E)-published ITRA policy otherwise
+(MDAI
+5013.02-INS),
+p. 44
+4.g.
+Requires AS, developed in coordination with Service Acquisition Executives, before TDD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest.  Requires AS to be updated at PDD and PD, in coordination with Service Acquisition Executive of lead Military Department.
+N/A
+4.h.
+Adds responsibility to provide timely notification to the MDEB of decisions to enter Technology Development, Product Development, or Production for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 4
+4.i.
+Acknowledges MDA as Technical Authority for IAMD, explicitly mentions MDA will coordinate with Military Departments, and deletes references to ASD(NII)
+N/A
+5.a.
+Adds responsibility to support CUA development before PDD and PD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+5.b.
+Adds responsibility to develop TLRD before PDD
+N/A
+(MDAI
+5013.02-INS),
+5.c.
+Requires LCCE and affordability analysis completion and submission to DCAPE for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+p. 47
+5.d.
+Requires TA before PDD
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 5
+(MDAI
+5013.02-INS),
+p. 44
+5.e.
+Requires AS, developed in coordination with Service Acquisition Executives, before TDD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest.  Requires AS to be updated at PDD and PD, in coordination with the Service Acquisition Executive of lead Military Department.
+5.f.
+Requires establishment of hybrid program office before PDD
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 5
+N/A
+6.a
+Adds responsibility to support CUA development before PDD and PD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+6.b.
+Adds responsibility to support TLRD development before PDD
+N/A
+
+##
+
+Original
+Reference(s),
+DTM
+Paragraph
+Description of Change
+Page No.
+(DoDD
+7
+Specifies that the CUA must be completed before PDD and PD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+5134.09), p. 9
+
+## Attachment 3 Procedures
+
+1.  MDEB.  The MDEB, established in the March 15, 2007 DepSecDef Memorandum:
+a.  Reviews and approves a TLRD, staffed through the MDEB Operational Forces Standing Committee, established in the March 15, 2007 DepSecDef Memorandum, to support PDD for MDS elements that meet the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of Attachment 2.
+
+b.  Recommends a lead Military Department for DepSecDef designation before PDD, in accordance with the September 25, 2008 DepSecDef Memorandum.
+
+2.  TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PHASE.  For an MDS element to enter the technology development phase:
+a.  The Director, MDA must complete an AS in coordination with the Service Acquisition Executives and the USD(A&S) must approve the AS, when the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of Attachment 2 are met.
+
+b.  The USD(A&S) must provide approval as the TDD decision authority when the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of Attachment 2 are met.  The Director, MDA, must provide approval as the TDD decision authority when the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of Attachment 2 are not met.
+
+3.  PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PHASE.  For an MDS element to enter the product development phase:
+
+a.  The DepSecDef must designate a lead Military Department.
+b. The Director, MDA, in conjunction with the Secretary of the lead Military Department, must complete a TA.
+
+c.  The Director, MDA and the Secretary of the lead Military Department must sign an MOA to establish a hybrid program management office.
+
+d.  When the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of Attachment 2 are met:
+(1)  The CDRUSSTRATCOM must complete a CUA in coordination with the Director, MDA; Secretary of the lead Military Department; and the CCDRs as applicable.
+
+(2)  The USD(R&E) must complete an ITRA.
+(3)  MDEB must approve a TLRD developed by the Director, MDA, in coordination with the Secretary of the lead Military Department, CDRUSSTRATCOM, and the CCDRs as applicable.
+
+(4)  The Director, MDA must update the AS in coordination with the Service Acquisition Executive of the lead Military Department and the USD(A&S) must approve the AS.
+
+(5)  The Director, MDA must conduct an LCCE and an affordability analysis in conjunction with the Secretary of the lead Military Department, and provide them to the DCAPE
+before PDD.
+(6)  The DCAPE must provide an ICE.
+
+(7)  The USD(A&S) must provide approval as the PDD decision authority.
+e.  The Director, MDA must provide approval as the PDD decision authority when the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of Attachment 2 are not met.
+
+## 4.  Production Phase.  For An Mds Element To Enter The Production Phase:
+
+a.  When the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of Attachment 2 are met:
+(1)  The Director, MDA must update the AS in coordination with the Service Acquisition Executive of the lead Military Department and the USD(A&S) must approve the AS.
+
+(2)  The CDRUSSTRATCOM must update the CUA in coordination with the Director, MDA; Secretary of the lead Military Department; and the CCDRs as applicable.
+
+(3)  The USD(R&E) must update the ITRA. (4)  The DCAPE must provide an updated ICE. (5)  The USD(A&S) must provide approval as the PD decision authority.
+b.  The Director, MDA must provide approval as the PD decision authority when the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of Attachment 2 are not met.
+
+## 5.  Funding.
+
+a.  The MDA and the lead Military Department will manage and execute funding for all MDS elements in accordance with  the June 10, 2011 DepSecDef Memorandum and the TA.
+The level of funding will be consistent with an ICE provided by the DCAPE when the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of Attachment 2 are met.
+b.  The DCAPE will identify and recommend to the DepSecDef sources of funding consistent with the ICE for MDS elements meeting the criteria in Paragraph 2.a. of Attachment 2.
+
+## Appendix To Attachment 3 Changes To Procedures
+
+Original
+Reference(s),
+DTM
+Paragraph
+Description of Change
+Page No.
+1.a.
+Adds responsibility to review/approve TLRD at PDD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+N/A
+1.b.
+Adds responsibility to raise any acquisition decision concerns that could not be resolved by the MDEB to the DepSecDef
+(Sep 25, 2008
+DepSecDef
+Memo), p. 6
+(MDAI
+5013.02-INS),
+p. 44
+2.a.
+Requires AS, developed in coordination with the Service Acquisition Executives, before TDD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest.  Requires this AS to be approved by USD(A&S).
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 3
+2.b.
+Requires USD(A&S) approval for TDD as the decision authority for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest; otherwise requires Director, MDA approval.
+3.a.
+Requires lead Military Department designation before PDD
+(Sep 25, 2008
+DepSecDef
+Memo), p. 6
+3.b.
+Requires TA before PDD
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 5
+3.c.
+Requires establishment of hybrid program office before PDD
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 5
+(DoDD
+3.d.1.
+Requires CUA before PDD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+5134.09), p. 9
+N/A
+3.d.2.
+Adds procedure to complete ITRA before PDD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+(DoDD 5134.09),
+3.d.3.
+Adds procedure to review and approve TLRD before PDD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+p. 5
+(MDAI
+5013.02-INS),
+p. 44
+3.d.4.
+Updates AS, developed in coordination with the Service Acquisition Executive of the lead Military Department before PDD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest.  Requires this AS to be approved by USD(A&S).
+(MDAI
+5013.02-INS),
+3.d.5.
+Requires LCCE and affordability analysis completion and submission to DCAPE before PDD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+p. 47
+N/A
+3.d.6.
+Adds procedure to develop ICE before PDD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+
+##
+
+Original
+Reference(s),
+DTM
+Paragraph
+Description of Change
+Page No.
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 3
+3.d.7.
+Requires USD(A&S) approval for PDD as the decision authority for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 3
+3.e.
+Requires Director, MDA approval for PDD as the decision authority for MDS elements below dollar threshold and not of special interest
+(MDAI
+5013.02-INS),
+p. 44
+4.a.1.
+Updates AS, developed in coordination with the Service Acquisition Executive of the lead Military Department, before
+PD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special
+interest.  Requires this AS to be approved by USD(A&S).
+(DoDD
+4.a.2.
+Requires CUA to be updated before PD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+5134.09), p. 9
+N/A
+4.a.3.
+Adds procedure to update ITRA before PD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+N/A
+4.a.4.
+Adds procedure to update ICE before PD for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 3
+4.a.5.
+Requires USD(A&S) approval for PD as the decision authority for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+(DoDD
+5134.09), p. 3
+4.b.
+Requires Director, MDA approval for PD as the decision authority for MDS elements below dollar threshold and not of special interest
+N/A
+5.a.
+Adds procedure to provide funding according to CAPE ICE for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+N/A
+5.b.
+Adds procedure to identify and recommend funding sources for MDS elements exceeding dollar threshold or of special interest
+
+## Visual Summary Of Responsibilities And Procedures
+
+Figure 1 visually summarizes the responsibilities and procedures detailed in Attachments 2 and 3.1
+
+
+1 Proportions of shared responsibilities are notionally illustrated in this figure.  The actual proportions are defined in law, policy, and agreements between MDA
+and the lead Military Department.
+
+
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+| AS            | acquisition strategy                                       |
+|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+|               |                                                            |
+| CCDR          | Combatant Commander                                        |
+| CDRUSSTRATCOM | Commander, United States Strategic Command                 |
+| CUA           | capability and utility assessment                          |
+|               |                                                            |
+| DCAPE         | Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation         |
+| DepSecDef     | Deputy Secretary of Defense                                |
+| DTM           | directive-type memorandum                                  |
+|               |                                                            |
+| IAMD          | integrated air and missile defense                         |
+| ICE           | independent cost estimate                                  |
+| ITRA          | independent technical risk assessment                      |
+|               |                                                            |
+| LCCE          | life cycle cost estimate                                   |
+|               |                                                            |
+| MDA           | Missile Defense Agency                                     |
+| MDEB          | Missile Defense Executive Board                            |
+| MDS           | missile defense system                                     |
+| MOA           | memorandum of agreement                                    |
+|               |                                                            |
+| PD            | production decision                                        |
+| PDD           | product development decision                               |
+|               |                                                            |
+| TA            | transfer agreement                                         |
+| TDD           | technology development decision                            |
+| TLRD          | top level requirements document                            |
+|               |                                                            |
+| USD(A&S)      | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment |
+| USD(R&E)      | Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering    |
+|               |                                                            |
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+CUA.  An assessment showing the relationship between the capabilities provided by the system and the impact that operating that system has on basing, time phased force deployment data, manpower, maintenance, available fuel, and other secondary impacts on the ability of a Combatant Command or Military Department to carry out its mission.
+
+IAMD.  Defined in Joint Publication 3-01.
+MDS.  An evolving, integrated, and interoperable system, comprising multiple missile defense elements that provide a capability to intercept ballistic missiles in flight and also hypersonic missiles in flight.  Hypersonic missiles include hypersonic boost-glide vehicle capabilities and conventional prompt strike capabilities, in accordance with Section 1687 of Public Law 114-328, as well as hypersonic cruise missiles.
+
+MDS element.  An established program of record that is a component of the MDS.
+TLRD.  A document defining a tailored set of performance and functionality attributes or parameters unique for each MDS element that quantifies warfighter capability requirements.  For example, the TLRD for terrestrial radars may include parameters quantifying the requirements for discrimination, raid capacity, track accuracy, peak and average power, system reliability, and others.  The TLRD is derived from required MDS capabilities directed from the following: United States Strategic Command development requirements from the Warfighter Involvement Process (currently the Prioritized Capabilities List), inputs from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council or Joint Urgent Operational Need/Joint Emergent Operational Need processes, Presidential mandates and congressional direction.  The TLRD will be described in the MDS Systems Engineering Plan.

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+## Department Of Defense Instruction Usd(P&R)
+
+ SUBJECT:  National Security Education Program
+
+References: (a) DoD Directive 1025.2, "National Security Education Program,"
+
+January 13, 1993 (hereby canceled)
+
+(b) Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "DoD Directives Review -
+
+
+Phase II," July 13, 2005
+
+(c) Sections 1901-1912 of Title 50, United States Code
+
+(d) DoD Directive 5124.02, "Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
+
+
+Readiness (USD(P&R))," February 11, 2006
+
+(e) "Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for Transfer of the National Security
+
+
+Education Program (NSEP) to the National Defense University (NDU),"
+
+
+October 28, 1998
+
+##
+
+
+1.  REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE This Instruction:
+1.1.  Reissues Reference (a) as a DoD Instruction according to the guidance in Reference (b)
+and implements the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense for administering the National Security Education Program (NSEP) according to References (c) and (d). 1.2.  Updates policy and assigns responsibilities for the conduct of the NSEP.  Continues the National Defense University's (NDU) responsibilities for administrative and logistical support to NSEP, as outlined in Reference (e), except to the extent otherwise set forth in this Instruction.
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE This Instruction applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").
+
+3.  POLICY It is DoD policy that:
+
+3.1. The Heads of the DoD Components develop programs to ensure NSEP graduates fulfill their service commitment under section 1902(b) of Reference (c).
+
+3.2. The NSEP:
+
+3.2.1.  Is an integral component of the DoD Language Transformation Plan and provides the Department of Defense and other Federal entities, as applicable, with personnel who possess high levels of proficiency in languages and foreign regional expertise critical to national security by:
+
+3.2.1.1.  Providing scholarships and fellowships under section 1902(a) of Reference
+(c) for students who are U.S. citizens, to pursue undergraduate and graduate study in domestic and foreign education systems to assist in meeting national security needs for professionals with in-depth knowledge of world languages and cultures.
+
+
+3.2.1.2.  Providing scholarships under section 1902(a) of Reference (c) to heritage community citizens who are U.S. citizens, and whose native language is critical to the national security of the United States, to pursue English language studies at institutions of higher education.
+
+
+3.2.1.3.  Awarding grants to institutions of higher education for programs in critical areas under section 1902(a)(1) of Reference (c) and under the National Flagship Language Initiative section 1902(i) of Reference (c), to implement a national system of programs to produce advanced language expertise critical to the national security of the United States.
+
+
+4.  RESPONSIBILITIES
+
+4.1.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) shall: 4.1.1.  Provide overall policy guidance for carrying out the responsibilities and duties of the Secretary of Defense under Reference (c), according to Reference (d).
+
+4.1.2.  Chair or designate a member of the Senior Executive Service or an individual of equivalent rank to represent the Secretary of Defense as Chair of the National Security Education Board (NSEB) under section 1903 of Reference (c).
+
+4.1.3.  Ensure appropriate resources are programmed for the NSEP and provide oversight for the administration of the NSEP. 4.1.4.  Determine under section 1902(a) of Reference (c), after consultation with NSEB, and in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), which countries, languages, and disciplines are critical and in which there are deficiencies knowledgeable personnel within Federal entities. 4.1.5.  Develop programs, processes, and policies to ensure NSEP graduates fulfill their service commitment through internships or employment in Federal service under Reference (c).
+
+
+4.2.  The USD(P) and the USD(I) annually shall provide the USD(P&R) information and guidance on NSEP program priorities, including identification and recommendations on critical countries, critical languages, and critical disciplines for program emphasis.
+
+4.3.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall direct the President, NDU, to: 4.3.1.  Provide program and budget management and other administrative, facility, and logistic support functions to NSEP operations, in accordance with Reference (e). 4.3.2.  Develop programs and processes to ensure NSEP graduates fulfill their government service commitment by providing internship or employment at NDU, as available. 4.3.3.  Provide fiscal management and oversight to ensure all funds provided for NSEP
+are separately and visibly accounted for in the DoD budget.
+
+5.  EFFECTIVE DATE This Instruction is effective immediately.

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+## Dod Instruction 2000.21 Dod Support To International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, And Nuclear (Cbrn) Incidents
+
+
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+
+Effective:
+April 5, 2016
+Change 1 Effective:
+May 8, 2017
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
+
+Reissues and cancels:
+DoD Instruction 2000.21, "Foreign Consequence Management (FCM)," March 10, 2006
+
+Approved by:
+Christine E. Wormuth, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+Change 1 Approved by:
+Dr. Lance Hampton, Director for Policy Executive Secretary
+
+Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5111.1 and the November 30,
+2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, this issuance establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DoD support to the U.S. Government (USG) response to international CBRN incidents.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 5
+2.1.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security
+(ASD(HD&GS)). ........ 5
+2.2.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. ....... 5 2.3.  Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. ........ 6 2.4.  Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. ........ 6 2.5.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)). ........ 6
+2.6.  ASD(M&RA). ........ 6
+2.7.  Director, DHA........ 6 2.8.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense
+Programs (ASD(NCB)). ........ 7
+2.9.  Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. ........ 7 2.10.  Director, Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency *Organization*. ........ 7 2.11.  Secretaries of the Military Departments. ........ 7 2.12.  CJCS. ........ 8 2.13.  CNGB. ........ 8 2.14.  GCCs. ........ 8 2.15.  Commander, U.S. Transportation Command. ........ 9
+GLOSSARY ........ 10
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 10 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 11
+REFERENCES ........ 12
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.  This Issuance:
+
+a.  Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+b.  Does not apply to:
+
+(1)  CBRN incidents within the United States.
+(2)  CBRN incidents that occur on overseas DoD installations and facilities for which DoD has primary responsibility for CBRN response under applicable host nation (HN)
+agreements or other international agreements or arrangements.
+
+(3)  Pandemic influenza or non-zoonotic animal-borne diseases for which other international or domestic plans exist.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+a.  When authorized by law, DoD will be prepared to conduct international CBRN-response
+(ICBRN-R) operations to:
+(1)  Protect U.S. citizens (including Military Service members and their dependents, DoD
+civilian employees and their dependents, and DoD contractor personnel) and allied and coalition nation personnel and citizens in the event that adversaries use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) overseas.
+
+(2)  Deter the use of WMD. (3)  Minimize the hazards and effects of CBRN incidents.
+(4)  Alleviate the effects of CBRN incidents that have resulted from a natural disaster or an act of man.
+b.  DoD recognizes that USG ICBRN-R operations may involve the use of military assets, and those assets may be the first and largest component of USG assistance.
+
+c.  The Department of State (DOS) is the lead federal agency (LFA) for implementing ICBRN-R operations, consistent with incident-specific guidance approved by the National Security Council Staff, unless otherwise directed by the President of the United States.  HN
+requests for assistance and USG offers of assistance or support will be processed through the LFA.
+
+d.  DoD recognizes that where DOS does not have an established diplomatic presence on foreign territory, the President may designate DoD as the LFA to respond to an international CBRN incident.
+
+e.  DoD support to USG ICBRN-R operations will integrate the principles, guidance, and considerations provided for in the USG ICBRN-R Protocol.
+
+f.  Primary responsibility for ICBRN-R resides with the HN, unless otherwise stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements.
+
+g.  Requests for DoD support from other federal departments and agencies are submitted to the OSD Executive Secretary through the appropriate DoD channels using the DoD request for assistance process.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities
+
+2.1.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND
+GLOBAL SECURITY (ASD(HD&GS)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the ASD(HD&GS):
+a.  Serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and USD(P)
+concerning the policy for DoD preparations for, and response to, an international CBRN incident in accordance with the USG ICBRN-R Protocol.
+
+b.  Develops, coordinates, and oversees DoD ICBRN-R policy, as appropriate.  The ASD(HD&GS) is the office of primary responsibility for the review and coordination of all CJCS plans, instructions, manuals, or portions thereof, related to DoD support to USG ICBRN-R operations.
+
+c.  Represents the SecDef outside of DoD and to other USG departments and agencies on all ICBRN-R policy matters.
+
+d.  Provides policy oversight for the planning and pre-positioning of DoD CBRN response assets for international events including, but not limited to, athletic events, summits, conferences, and special security events.
+
+e.  Serves as the principal coordinator for DoD ICBRN-R exercises with other USG
+departments and agencies.
+
+f.  Coordinates with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
+(ASD(M&RA)) and the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) to provide advice to the SecDef and USD(P) on Reserve Component forces for DoD support to USG ICBRN-R operations, in accordance with DoDD 2060.02, DoDD 5105.77, and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1235.12.
+
+2.2.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND
+LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict:
+a.  Serves as the principal advisor to the SecDef and the USD(P) on all DoD foreign disaster relief (FDR) efforts, and informs them of all DoD actions taken in response to foreign disasters, regardless of scope, in accordance with DoDD 5100.46.
+b.  Serves as the DoD lead for humanitarian activities in steady-state and crisis response, including the humanitarian assistance program, FDR, evacuations, and global health engagement in accordance with DoDD 5100.46, DoDD 3025.14, Joint Publication (JP) 3-29, and JP 3-68.
+
+c.  Guides and supports the ASD(HD&GS) on humanitarian assistance and FDR activities concurrent with any DoD support to USG ICBRN-R operations.
+
+2.3.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:
+a.  Advises, coordinates, and supports all intelligence, counter-intelligence, and security aspects for DoD support to USG ICBRN-R operations.
+
+b.  Oversees the assigned roles and responsibilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office to ensure that these agencies coordinate or collaborate with the HN intelligence agencies, as appropriate, to collect, analyze, and report all available intelligence applicable to CBRN incidents.
+
+2.4.  ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS.  The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs:
+a.  Coordinates public affairs matters within the DoD and with other federal departments and agencies.
+
+b.  Coordinates overall DoD communication strategy with DOS on DoD's support to USG
+ICBRN-R operations.
+
+c.  Reviews and approves geographic Combatant Commander (GCC)-proposed public affairs guidance in support of USG ICBRN-R operations in accordance with DoDI 5405.03.
+
+2.5.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS (ASD(HA)).
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)),the ASD(HA):
+a.  Serves as the principal advisor to the SecDef, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the USD(P&R) for clinical health care and health-surveillance aspects of CBRN medical defense programs, and deployment matters as they pertain to force health protection and readiness for DoD support to USG ICBRN-R operations.
+
+b.  Oversees the assigned responsibilities of the Director, Defense Health Agency (DHA).
+
+2.6.  ASD(M&RA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of USD(P&R), the ASD(M&RA) develops policy and coordinates for the use of the Reserve Components for DoD support to USG ICBRN-R operations in accordance with DoDI 1235.12 and the March 20, 2015, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum.
+
+2.7.  DIRECTOR, DHA.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R) and through the ASD(HA), the Director, DHA will perform assigned combat support agency responsibilities for DoD support to USG ICBRN-R operations.
+2.8.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
+BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS (ASD(NCB)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the ASD(NCB):
+a.  Serves as the principal advisor to the SecDef, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the USD(AT&L) on nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, and chemical, biological, and radiological defense to counter current and emerging WMD threats in accordance with DoDD 3150.08, and Sections 113, 125, 133, 138d, and 163 of Title 10, United States Code.
+
+b.  Provides technical expertise and assistance to the USD(AT&L) and the SecDef on ICBRN-R operations, including DoD-owned or -controlled CBRN materials.
+
+2.9.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L) and through the ASD(NCB), the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency:
+a.  Supports USG ICBRN-R operations in coordination with the appropriate Combatant Commands in accordance with DoDD 3150.08.
+
+b.  Establishes and maintains deployable CBRN-defense technical capabilities for advising and assisting the GCCs or the LFA in conducting USG ICBRN-R operations.
+
+c.  Operates and maintains a 24-hour/365-day CBRN defense technical reachback capability in support of DoD or USG ICBRN-R operations.
+
+2.10.  DIRECTOR, JOINT IMPROVISED-THREAT DEFEAT AGENCY
+ORGANIZATION.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), the Director, Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency *Organization*:
+a.  Provides counter-improvised-threat assistance and training for DoD ICBRN-R exercises, as requested by the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs).
+
+b.  Advises and supports ICBRN-R operational deployments of DoD elements in response to improvised-threat incidents, as requested by the CCDRs.
+
+c.  Establishes and maintains deployable capabilities for advising and assisting CCDRs in the event of a foreign improvised-threat incident.
+
+2.11.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments:
+a.  Organize, train, and equip the Military Services to support USG ICBRN-R operations.
+
+b.  When directed by the SecDef, provide forces to the GCCs to assist the LFA as part of
+USG ICBRN-R operations.
+
+## 2.12.  Cjcs.  The Cjcs:
+
+a.  Serves as the Principal Military Advisor to the SecDef and the President in preparing for and responding to international CBRN incidents.
+
+b.  Reviews all requests for assistance and provides recommendations and courses of action for DoD support to USG ICBRN-R operations.
+
+c.  Ensures integration of military planning to support DOS in preparing for USG ICBRN-R
+operations.
+
+d.  Develops U.S. military strategy, policy, CJCS publications and instructions, and joint doctrine supporting operational planning for DoD ICBRN-R operations.
+
+2.13.  CNGB.  When directed by the SecDef, the CNGB coordinates the alert and mobilization of designated National Guard forces to support DoD ICBRN-R operations.
+
+## 2.14.  Gccs.  The Gccs:
+
+a.  Retain overall responsibility for force protection of DoD facilities and personnel within their respective areas of responsibility during USG ICBRN-R operations, except for those DoD
+elements and personnel for whom the chief of mission has security responsibility in accordance with Section 4802(v) of Title 22, United States Code.
+
+b.  Conduct immediate ICBRN-R operations to save human lives as appropriate in accordance with Executive Order 12966.  When such authority is exercised, the GCC will inform the National Military Command Center and the chief of mission by the most expeditious means available.
+c.  Provide support to USG ICBRN-R operations, as requested by the LFA as approved by or directed by the SecDef.  If it is anticipated that the HN will request or accept USG CBRN
+response assistance, and that the DoD will be requested and authorized to provide assistance, the GCCs will undertake all planning actions to ensure the rapid execution of time-sensitive efforts as part of the USG response efforts.
+
+d.  Identify military resources to support USG ICBRN-R operations as required in accordance with the SecDef's Guidance for Employment of the Force and Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.
+
+e.  Develop and exercise plans to support USG ICBRN-R operations.
+
+(1)  ICBRN-R plans will include procedures for coordinating with the LFA.
+(2)  ICBRN-R exercises will be integrated into the Combatant Command's existing exercises, where appropriate, and conducted at a minimum once every 2 years.
+
+f.  Collaborate with DOS to establish partnerships, increase partner nation capacity through security cooperation programs, and improve interoperability through bi-lateral exercises.  GCC
+planning that considers partner nations' capabilities, regional response potential, and DoD ICBRN-R resource options can enable timely and effective ICBRN-R operations.
+
+2.15.  COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND.  The Commander, U.S.
+
+Transportation Command, provides transportation resources to support USG ICBRN-R
+operations, as directed by the SecDef.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+| ASD(HA)                     | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs                      |
+|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ASD(HD&GS)                  | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global         |
+| Security                    |                                                                        |
+| ASD(M&RA)                   | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs        |
+| ASD(NCB)                    | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and              |
+| Biological Defense Programs |                                                                        |
+|                             |                                                                        |
+| CBRN                        | chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear                          |
+| CCDR                        | Combatant Commander                                                    |
+| CJCS                        | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff                                  |
+| CNGB                        | Chief of the National Guard Bureau                                     |
+|                             |                                                                        |
+| DHA                         | Defense Health Agency                                                  |
+| DoDD                        | DoD Directive                                                          |
+| DoDI                        | DoD Instruction                                                        |
+| DOS                         | Department of State                                                    |
+|                             |                                                                        |
+| FDR                         | foreign disaster relief                                                |
+|                             |                                                                        |
+| GCC                         | Geographic Combatant Commander                                         |
+|                             |                                                                        |
+| HN                          | host nation                                                            |
+|                             |                                                                        |
+| ICBRN-R                     | international chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident |
+| response                    |                                                                        |
+|                             |                                                                        |
+| JP                          | Joint Publication                                                      |
+|                             |                                                                        |
+| LFA                         | lead federal agency                                                    |
+|                             |                                                                        |
+| SecDef                      | Secretary of Defense                                                   |
+|                             |                                                                        |
+| USD(AT&L)                   | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and            |
+| Logistics                   |                                                                        |
+| USD(P)                      | Under Secretary of Defense for Policy                                  |
+| USD(P&R)                    | Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness                 |
+| USG                         | United States Government                                               |
+|                             |                                                                        |
+| WMD                         | weapons of mass destruction                                            |
+
+G.2.  DEFINITIONS.  Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance.
+
+CBRN incident.  Defined in JP 1-02 *the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
+
+HN.  Defined in JP 1-02 *the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. ICBRN-R.  A USG activity that assists a foreign government in responding to the effects from an intentional, naturally occurring, or accidental CBRN incident on foreign territory to save and sustain lives, stabilize the situation, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs.  This term and its definition are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
+
+improvised threats.  Those supporting threat tactics, techniques, procedures and devices designed, fielded, or employed in any modality of conflict that adversely affects U.S. Joint Force protection or maneuverability.  The emphasis is on non-state actors, but not on those exclusively as determined by the CCDRs.
+LFA.  Defined in JP 1-02 *the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. United States.  Defined in Section 101 of Title 6, United States Code. WMD.  Defined in JP 1-02 *the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
+
+
+
+## References
+
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Delegations of Authority," November 30, 2006
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Re-designation of the Positions of Assistant
+Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management," March 20, 2015
+DoD Directive 2060.02, "Department of Defense (DoD) Combating Weapons of Mass
+Destruction (WMD) Policy." April 19, 2007 January 27, 2017
+DoD Directive 3025.14, "Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened
+Areas Abroad," February 26, 2013
+DoD Directive 3150.08, "DoD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents,"
+January 20, 2010
+DoD Directive 5100.46, "Foreign Disaster Relief," July 6, 2012
+DoD Directive 5105.77, "National Guard Bureau (NGB)," October 30, 2015 DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))," December 8, 1999
+DoD Instruction 1235.12, "Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)," February 4, 2010,
+as amended June 7, 2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5405.03, "Development, Submission, and Approval of Proposed Public Affairs
+Guidance (PPAG)," February 18, 2016
+Executive Order 12966, "Foreign Disaster Assistance," July 14, 1995 Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,"
+current edition'
+Joint Publication 3-29, "Foreign Humanitarian Assistance," January 3, 2014
+Joint Publication 3-68, "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations," November 18, 2015
+Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition
+Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Global Force Management Implementation Guidance,"
+current edition1
+Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Guidance for Employment of the Force," current edition2
+United States Code, Title 6, Section 101 United States Code, Title 10 United States Code, Title 22, Section 4802 United States Government International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
+Response Protocol, June 3, 20143

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+## Department Of Defense Instruction
+
+NUMBER 3002.02
+January 11, 2013
+Incorporating Change 1, Effective April 25, 2016
+
+
+## Subject: Personnel Recovery And 406 Mhz Search And Rescue (Sar) Emergency Beacons
+
+in the Department of Defense
+
+ References: (a) DoD Directive 3002.01E, "Personnel Recovery in the Department of
+Defense," April 16, 2009, *as amended*
+
+(b) DoD Instruction 3003.01, "DoD Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR),"
+September 26, 2011
+
+(c) DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)),"
+December 8, 1999
+
+(d) Parts 80.1061, 87.199, and 95.1402 of Title 47, Code of Federal Regulations
+
+(e) DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," September 26, 2012
+
+(fe) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Realignment of the Joint
+Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) Under the Department of the Air Force," November 25, 2011
+ 1.  PURPOSE.  This Instruction establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for use of DoD 406 megahertz (MHz) emergency beacons for SAR and personnel recovery missions in accordance with References (a), (b), and the authority in Reference (c). 2.  APPLICABILITY.  This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components") 3.  DEFINITIONS.  See Glossary. 4.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  DoD 406 MHz emergency beacons that are Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking
+(SARSAT) System compliant or type-approved shall be registered in the Joint SARSAT Electronic Tracking System (JSETS), a component of the Personnel Recovery Mission Software application suite, in support of the provisions of References (a) and (b) and this Instruction.
+
+b.  Operational use of DoD 406 MHz emergency beacons shall be limited to instances when DoD personnel are in an emergency situation or become isolated from friendly control.  All device testing and training that will emit a signal shall be limited and be coordinated in accordance with paragraph 4.e. of the Enclosure of this Instruction.
+
+c.  Registering DoD 406 MHz emergency beacons in JSETS, which results in a special registration in the U.S. 406 MHz Beacon Registration Database System administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), complies with Reference (d). Beacons registered in JSETS may be used across the full spectrum of DoD operations in personnel recovery and SAR. 5.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure. 6.  RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED.  *Cleared for public release.*  This Instruction is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. 7.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This Instruction: is effective January 11, 2013.
+
+a.  Is effective January 11, 2013.
+
+b.  Must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication in accordance with DoD Instruction 5025.01 (Reference (e)).  If not it will expire effective January 11, 2013 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website.
+
+James N. Miller
+
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Enclosure Responsibilities Glossary
+
+## Enclosure Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)).  The USD(P) shall:
+a.  Serve as the OSD Principal Staff Assistant for the Secretary of Defense on DoD 406 MHz emergency beacon use for SAR and personnel recovery.
+
+b.  Establish policy, assign responsibilities, and provide procedures on DoD 406 MHz emergency beacon use for SAR and personnel recovery. 2.  DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING PERSONNEL AFFAIRS (DASD(POW/MPA)) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD(SO/LIC)).  The DASD(POW/MPA) *ASD(SO/LIC)*, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), shall develop policy and provide oversight for DoD 406 MHz emergency beacon use for SAR and personnel recovery. 3.  HEADS OF THE DoD COMPONENTS.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
+a.  Coordinate the use of beacons for testing, maintenance, or exercises with the DoD point of contact (POC) established in paragraph 5.b. of this Enclosure.
+
+b.  Require component command and control systems to use JSETS as the sole source of DoD 406 MHz beacon registration information.  If the necessity exists for duplicative registration databases in the area of operation, request an exception from the POC established in paragraph 5.b. of this Enclosure.
+
+
+
+c.  Develop 406 MHz beacon testing, training, accounting, and reporting policies, in conjunction with the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA). 4.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments, in addition to the responsibilities in section 3 of this Enclosure, shall:
+a.  Establish guidance to minimize false alerts of DoD 406 MHz emergency beacons.
+
+
+b.  Require that all DoD 406 MHz emergency beacons are registered in JSETS.
+c.  Require commands that are issued DoD 406 MHz emergency beacons in an assigned,
+deployed, or temporary duty status within a geographic Combatant Command to update JSETS
+with arrival and departure dates in accordance with geographic Combatant Command theater entry requirements.
+
+d.  Require personnel to be properly and fully trained to use and register DoD 406 MHz emergency beacons, including false alert prevention.
+
+e.  Require that no beacon test, exercise, or any other non-emergency beacon activation be conducted unless coordinated with the DoD POC established pursuant to paragraph 5.b. of this Enclosure.
+
+f.  Provide adequate annual funding for timely acquisition, operation, maintenance, and updating of JSETS, so that JSETS costs are shared equally by the Military Departments. 5.  SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE.  The Secretary of the Air Force, in addition to the responsibilities in sections 3 and 4 of this Enclosure, shall:
+a.  Have primary Military Department responsibility for DoD 406 MHz emergency beacon use and operations along with JSETS-related activities as described in this Instruction.  In coordination with the CJCS, oversee the implementation and operation of JSETS to improve DoD 406 MHz beacon capabilities.
+
+b.  Designate a DoD POC to serve as the DoD representative to NOAA to coordinate DoD
+406 MHz emergency beacon registration and testing.
+
+c.  Ensure JSETS procedures and operations are properly coordinated with the Beacon Registration Database System administered by NOAA to fulfill the requirements of Reference (d).
+
+d.  Oversee necessary acquisitions, operations, maintenance, and updating of JSETS based on appropriate requirements that reflect input from the Combatant Commands regarding their anticipated needs and constraints.  Track 406 MHz emergency beacon and JSETS-related funding provided by other Military Departments, contracting support, and required programming activity or budgetary reports.
+
+e.  Establish a JSETS working group to address all problem reports, issues, change requests, engineering change proposals, development efforts, and funding efforts.
+
+f.  Pass 406 MHz emergency beacon alert notifications received from NOAA to the geographic Combatant Command personnel recovery Office of Responsibility affected. 6.  CJCS.  The CJCS, through JPRA in accordance with Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (fe)), shall:
+a.  Oversee the implementation and operation of JSETS to improve DoD 406 MHz beacon capabilities after coordinating with the Secretary of the Air Force.
+
+b.  Establish the training standard for all Military Departments regarding DoD 406 MHz emergency beacon use, registration, and exercising, with false alert prevention included as an integral part of this course syllabus.
+
+c.  Ensure that guidance regarding the proper usage of 406 MHz emergency beacons is published widely throughout DoD as part of existing joint education and training oversight responsibilities.
+
+d.  Convey any DoD 406 MHz beacon policy issues to USD(P) after coordinating with the DASD(POW/MPA) *ASD(SO/LIC)* and the Secretary of the Air Force. 7.  GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS.  The geographic Combatant Commanders shall establish procedural requirements and guidance within their area of responsibility to:
+a.  Accurately associate DoD 406 MHz emergency beacon identification information in JSETS with the current user, current unit, or current vehicle.
+
+b.  Prevent testing, exercises, or any other non-emergency beacon activation unless coordinated with the DoD POC designated in accordance with paragraph 5.b. of this Enclosure.
+
+c.  Ensure that JSETS is used as the sole information source to register and research individual beacon information, unless an exception has been granted under paragraph 3.b. of this Enclosure.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+AOR
+area of responsibility
+ASD(SO/LIC)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
+
+
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+COSPAS
+Cosmitscheskaja Sistema Poiska Awarinitsch Sudow (Russian: space system for search of vessels in distress)
+
+
+DASD(POW/MPA) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing
+Personnel Affairs
+
+
+JPRA
+Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
+JSETS
+Joint SARSAT Electronic Tracking System
+
+
+MHz
+megahertz
+
+
+NOAA
+National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
+
+
+POC
+point of contact
+
+
+SAR
+search and rescue
+SARSAT
+search and rescue satellite aided tracking
+
+
+USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+ These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Instruction. DoD 406 MHz emergency beacon.  A SARSAT-capable 406 MHz emergency locator beacon (i.e., personal locator beacon, emergency locator transmitter, emergency position indicating radio beacon) purchased for and utilized by DoD for use by DoD covered personnel for SAR and personnel recovery applications. false alert.  A COSPAS-SARSAT distress alert received by SAR authorities when no distress situation actually exists.

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+## Department Of Defense
+
+#
+
+## Instruction
+
+#
+
+NUMBER 3020.51
+June 23, 2011
+Incorporating Change 2, Effective July 9, 2020
+
+USD(I&S) SUBJECT: Intelligence Support to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP)
+
+References: See Enclosure 1
+1.  PURPOSE.  In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01 (Reference (a)) and pursuant to DoDD 3020.40 and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3020.45 (References (b) and (c)), this Instruction establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for intelligence support to the DCIP. 2.  APPLICABILITY.  This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), the Office of the Inspector General of the DoD, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components"). 3.  DEFINITIONS.  See Glossary. 4.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  The Defense Intelligence Enterprise (hereinafter referred to in this Instruction as "the Enterprise") shall provide timely intelligence and counterintelligence support to the DCIP.
+Responsibilities and procedures for counterintelligence support to the DCIP shall be executed in accordance with DoDI 5240.19 (Reference (d)).
+
+b.  Intelligence collection, processing, retention, and dissemination in support of the DCIP
+efforts shall be conducted in accordance with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework pursuant to Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 204 (Reference (e)).
+
+
+c.  DCIP-related threat assessments will be produced at the lowest possible classification level and made accessible to all DoD Components and DISLAs through existing Enterprise processes, procedures, systems, and architectures to the greatest extent possible.
+
+
+d.  DCIP-related threat assessments shall be shared with other Defense Intelligence and Counterintelligence Components, the national Intelligence Community (IC), other relevant Federal agencies, and civilian law enforcement officials, as appropriate, in accordance with the need to protect intelligence sources and methods and with the provisions of Director of Central Intelligence Directive 8/1 (Reference (f)) and ICD 501 (Reference (g)).  All sharing of information, data, research, and analysis shall adhere to the requirements and restrictions imposed by DoD 5400.11-R (Reference (h)), DoD Manual 5240.01 (Reference (i)), all other applicable DoD policies, Federal law, Presidential directives, Executive orders, and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issuances.
+
+
+
+e.  All intelligence and intelligence-related activities in support of the DCIP shall adhere to Federal law, Presidential directives, Executive orders, and DNI and DoD policies.  DoD personnel shall conduct authorized intelligence and intelligence-related activities in a manner that protects the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons.  All intelligence and intelligencerelated activities supporting the DCIP shall conform to DoDD 5240.01 (Reference (j)) and References (i) and (h).
+
+5.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 6.  PROCEDURES.  See Enclosure 3.
+
+7.  RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release.**  This Instruction is available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+8.  SUMMARY OF CHANGE 2.  This administrative change updates:
+a.  The title of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) in accordance with Public Law 116-92 (Reference (l)), also known as the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020."
+b.  Administrative changes in accordance with current standards of the Office of the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense.
+
+9.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This Instruction is effective June 23, 2011.
+
+
+Michael G. Vickers Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities
+
+3.  Procedures Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a)
+DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I&S)),"
+October 24, 2014, as amended
+(b)
+DoD Directive 3020.40, "Mission Assurance (MA)," November 29, 2016
+(c)
+DoD Instruction 3020.45, "Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management," April 21, 2008
+(d)
+DoD Instruction 5240.19, "Counterintelligence Support to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program," January 31, 2014, as amended
+(e)
+Intelligence Community Directive 204, "Roles and Responsibilities for the National
+Intelligence Priorities Framework," September 13, 2007
+(f)
+Director of Central Intelligence Directive 8/1, "Intelligence Community Policy on Intelligence Information Sharing," June 4, 2004
+(g)
+Intelligence Community Directive 501, "Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information Within the Intelligence Community," January 21, 2009
+(h)
+DoD 5400.11-R, "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 14, 2007
+(i)
+DoD Manual 5240.01, "Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities," August 8, 2016
+(j)
+DoD Directive 5240.01, "DoD Intelligence Activities," August 27, 2007, as amended
+(k)
+DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," March 18, 2008
+(l)
+Public Law 116-92, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020,"
+December 20, 2019
+
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  USD(I&S).  The USD(I&S), pursuant to References (a), (b), and (c), shall:
+a.  Establish policy for intelligence support to the DCIP.
+
+b.  Oversee policies, plans, and programs, to include policies and issuances of DoD
+Components, for intelligence support to the DCIP.
+
+c.  Oversee implementation of this Instruction and develop additional direction and guidance as necessary to provide intelligence support to the DCIP. 2.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA).  The Director, DIA, pursuant to DoDD 5105.21 (Reference (k)), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S), and in addition to the responsibilities in sections 9 and 10 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Pursuant to Reference (b), appoint the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officer (CIAO)
+for the Defense Infrastructure Intelligence Sector, under the authority of the Director, DIA, to be the primary intelligence advisor for the DCIP.  In this capacity, the Intelligence Sector CIAO shall:
+
+(1)  Plan, integrate, coordinate, direct, synchronize, and manage intelligence support to the DCIP.
+
+
+(2)  Represent the intelligence interests and equities of, and provide intelligence support to, the CIAOs of the Defense Infrastructure Defense Industrial Base (DIB), Financial Services, Health Affairs, and Personnel Sectors in all matters pertaining to the implementation and execution of this Instruction.
+
+b.  Establish and chair the DCIP intelligence working group (IWG).  (See Enclosure 3.)
+c.  Pursuant to U.S. laws and DoD issuances, and within the legal authority granted to the DoD and subject to limitations on collection, retention, and dissemination of information on U.S. persons, coordinate with other appropriate Federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, regarding intelligence matters on defense critical infrastructure (DCI), in accordance with References (c), (h), (i), and (j).
+
+d.  Triennially, or more frequently if required, and in accordance with the Director, DIA's all-source intelligence analysis responsibilities produce or direct the production of a global baseline assessment of the threats to DCI that address, at a minimum, those topic areas identified in paragraph 2.a of Enclosure 3 and subject to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) priorities.  Ensure triennial updates capture all relevant intelligence collected or produced since the previous assessment.  Make this assessment accessible to all DoD Components and DISLAs via existing intelligence channels.  Where such channels do not exist, the assessments will be disseminated under the provisions of subparagraph 2.a.(2) of this enclosure.
+
+
+e.  Within 90 days of the publication of a triennial DCIP threat assessment, identify all knowledge gaps and consolidate into a single DCIP intelligence collection requirement. Collection will be conducted in accordance with priorities established by the National Intelligence Priorities Framework.
+
+f.  Produce, triennially or more frequently if required, a defense critical infrastructure threat assessment (DCITA) for each defense critical asset (DCA) addressing, at a minimum, the topics identified in section 4 of Enclosure 3.  Where multiple DCAs are collocated on a single installation, a single installation baseline threat assessment may be produced, provided individual differences from the baseline are identified for each DCA, as appropriate.  Completed assessments will be provided to the appropriate Military Department, Defense Agency, or DISLA and the Office of the USD(P).
+
+g.  Within 90 days of the production of a DCITA for a DCA, identify all knowledge gaps for consolidation into a single DCIP intelligence collection requirement.  Collection will be conducted in accordance with priorities established by the National Intelligence Priorities Framework.
+
+h.  In response to a validated requirement for ad-hoc finished intelligence production, prepare or task the appropriate producer to prepare a finished intelligence assessment in response to the requirement.  Ensure that the major findings of this assessment are incorporated into all subsequent triennial updates, as appropriate.
+
+i.  Annually, or more frequently as required, issue a standing, all-source collection requirement to address the intelligence gaps identified by DoD Components, DISLAs, and intelligence production elements.
+
+3.  USD(P).  The USD(P) shall:
+a.  Provide a representative in observer status to the DCIP IWG.
+
+b.  Annually, or more frequently if required, provide the Director, DIA, through the USD(I&S), a statement of DoD priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) in support of the DCIP.
+
+c.  Consolidate DoD Component and DISLA requirements for ad-hoc intelligence production related to critical infrastructure responsibilities and provide them to the Director, DIA, through the USD(I&S).
+
+d.  Advise the Director, DIA, of policy, program, or process changes in the DCIP that may affect intelligence support.
+
+
+
+e.  Annually, or more frequently as required, provide the approved DCA list to the Director, DIA, through the USD(I&S).  This list shall be used for prioritizing intelligence support to the DCIP, subject to USD(P) priorities.
+
+
+f.  In coordination with the USD(I&S), the Military Departments, and the CJCS, using existing communications channels, assess and recommend improvements to ensure the timely dissemination of DCI-related threat warnings to DoD Components, DISLAs, and other authorized activities as appropriate.
+
+g.  In coordination with the USD(I&S), advise the Director, DIA, of policy, program, or process changes in the Defense Infrastructure Space Sector that may affect intelligence support.
+
+4.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND
+LOGISTICS (USD(AT&L)).  The USD(AT&L), in coordination with the USD(I&S), shall advise the Director, DIA, of policy, program, process, or operational changes in the DIB, logistics, public works, or transportation infrastructures that may affect intelligence support. 5.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA).  The Director, DLA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L) and in addition to the responsibilities in sections 9 and 10 of this enclosure, shall, through DLA's internal intelligence element, provide intelligence support to the CIAO of the Defense Infrastructure Logistics Sector. 6.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (USD(P&R)).  The USD(P&R), in coordination with the USD(I&S), shall advise the Director, DIA, of policy, program, process, or operational changes in the health affairs or personnel infrastructures that may affect intelligence support.
+
+7.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (USD(C)/CFO).  The USD(C)/CFO, in coordination with the USD(I&S), shall advise the Director, DIA, of policy, program, process, or operational changes in the financial services infrastructure that may affect intelligence support. 8.  DoD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (DOD CIO).  The DoD CIO, in coordination with the USD(I&S), shall advise the Director, DIA, of policy, program, process, or operational changes in the DoD information enterprise, which includes Global Information Grid (GIG) infrastructures that may affect intelligence support. 9.  HEADS OF THE DoD COMPONENTS AND DISLAs.  The Heads of the DoD Components and DISLAs, in support of their assigned critical infrastructure responsibilities, shall identify subjects for which ad-hoc intelligence production is required.  They shall provide such requirements to the USD(P) through appropriate reporting channels.
+
+10.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES, AND DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES.  Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Activities, in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Designate an office of primary responsibility (OPR) within their intelligence component to coordinate DCIP-related intelligence activities.
+
+b.  Provide representational membership to the DCIP IWG.  (See Enclosure 3.)
+
+
+c.  Provide PIRs related to warnings of impending threats to DCI to their organic or supporting intelligence element watch center.  These PIRs shall be provided annually, or more frequently as required, in conjunction with the most recent internal list of DCI.
+
+d.  Ensure staff elements responsible for critical infrastructure share DCI-related threats, indications, and warnings with the appropriate members of the DCIP community.
+
+11.  SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,  The Secretary of the Army, in addition to the responsibilities in sections 9 and 10 of this enclosure, shall direct the Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to provide intelligence support, through USACE's internal intelligence element, to the CIAO of the Defense Infrastructure Public Works Sector. 12.  CJCS.  The CJCS, in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Integrate intelligence support to the DCIP into joint planning, programs, systems, exercises, doctrine, strategies, policies, and architectures.
+
+b.  Incorporate DCIP-related threat scenarios requiring coordination with intelligence elements into joint training and exercises.
+
+13.  COMMANDERS OF THE CCMDS.  The Commanders of the CCMDs, through the CJCS as appropriate, and in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Designate an OPR within their intelligence component to coordinate DCIP-related intelligence activities.
+
+b.  Provide representational membership to the DCIP IWG.  (See Enclosure 3.)
+
+
+c.  Ensure that staff elements and components responsible for critical infrastructure share DCI-related threats, indications, and warnings with the appropriate members of the DCIP community.
+
+
+d.  Incorporate DCIP-related threat scenarios requiring coordination with intelligence elements into joint training and exercises.
+
+14.  COMMANDERS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC CCMDS.  The Commanders of the geographic CCMDs, through the CJCS as appropriate, and in addition to the responsibilities in sections 9 and 13 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Triennially or more frequently if required, and in accordance with the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program, produce an area of responsibility (AOR)-specific supplement to the DIA-produced, global baseline assessment of the threats to DCI that addresses, at a minimum, those topic areas identified in paragraph 3.a. of Enclosure 3, subject to the USD(P) priorities.  Ensure triennial updates capture all relevant intelligence collected or produced since the previous supplement.  Make these supplements accessible to all DoD Components and DISLAs via existing intelligence channels.  Where such channels do not exist, they will be disseminated under the provisions of subparagraph 2.a.(2) of this enclosure.
+
+b.  Within 90 days of the publication of the triennial, AOR-specific DCIP threat assessment supplement, identify all existing knowledge gaps and forward to the Director, DIA, for consolidation into a single DCIP intelligence collection requirement.
+
+c.  Address intelligence requirements and production responsibilities pertinent to critical infrastructure-related responsibilities in the intelligence support plan for their respective theater campaign plans.
+
+d.  Identify PIRs related to warnings of impending threats to DCI within their respective AORs, and ensure these PIRs are provided to their organic intelligence element watch center. These PIRs shall be provided annually, or more frequently as required, in conjunction with the most recent internal list of DCI. 15.  COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM).  The Commander, USSTRATCOM, in addition to the responsibilities in sections 9 and 13 of this enclosure, shall:
+
+a.  Through USSTRATCOM's internal intelligence element, provide intelligence support to
+the CIAO of the Defense Infrastructure Space Sector.
+ b.  Direct the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), to provide, through USCYBERCOM's internal intelligence element, intelligence support to the CIAO of the Defense Infrastructure GIG Sector and Defense Information Systems Agency.
+
+16.  COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USTRANSCOM).  The Commander, USTRANSCOM, in addition to the responsibilities in sections 9 and 13 of this enclosure, shall, through USTRANSCOM's internal intelligence element, provide intelligence support to the CIAO of the Defense Infrastructure Transportation Sector.
+
+## Enclosure 3 Procedures
+
+ 1.  DCIP IWG
+a.  The DCIP IWG shall consist of an executive steering panel and an action officer panel with membership consisting of military members or full-time or permanent part-time civilian employees.
+
+
+(1)  The executive steering panel shall consist of those general or flag officers or their equivalents appointed by the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Directors of Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities, and the Commanders of the CCMDs.
+
+
+(2)  The action officer panel shall consist of those representatives within the Enterprise and the internal intelligence elements of the CCMDs, the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities responsible for DCIP-related intelligence activities.
+Defense infrastructure sectors whose parent organizations lack an internal intelligence element shall be represented at the working group by the CIAO of the Intelligence Sector of the DCIP.
+
+b.  The executive steering panel will meet annually, or more frequently as required.
+
+c.  The action-officer panel will meet quarterly, or more frequently as required.
+
+d.  The DCIP IWG shall serve as the primary coordination mechanism for intelligence support to the DCIP.
+
+2.  GLOBAL BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF THE THREATS TO DCI
+
+a.  The DIA-produced triennial assessment of the threats to DCI shall include, at a minimum and subject to the USD(P) priorities:
+
+(1)  Foreign intelligence threat to DCI.
+
+
+
+(2)  Insider threat.
+
+(3)  Foreign nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological threat to DCI.
+
+(4)  Emerging technologies threat to DCI.
+
+(5)  Cyber threat to DCI.
+
+(6)  Foreign special operations forces threat to DCI.
+
+
+(7)  Global terrorism threat to DCI.
+
+(8)  Foreign threats to space-borne DCI.
+
+
+(9)  Hazards posed by epidemics and pandemics.
+
+b.  Production tasking in support of this assessment will be provided via Community On-Line Intelligence System for End Users (COLISEUM), or via such tasking mechanism in use within the Enterprise at that time, by the CIAO for the Intelligence Sector of the DCIP. 3.  AOR-SPECIFIC THREAT ASSESSMENT SUPPLEMENTS
+
+a.  The geographic CCMD-produced, AOR-specific supplement to the DIA-produced triennial DCIP threat assessment shall include, at a minimum and subject to USD(P) and Combatant Commander priorities:
+
+(1)  Regional terrorist threat to DCI.
+
+
+
+(2)  Conventional military threat to DCI as posed by those Priority 1, 2, or 3 countries as
+established by the National Intelligence Priorities Framework.
+
+(3)  Hazards posed to DCI from natural disasters common to the AOR.
+
+(4)  Host-nation government interference, as appropriate.
+
+(5)  Host-nation civil population events, such as protests, strikes, and unrest.
+
+(6)  Potential insider threats, such as the leaking of classified information.
+
+b.  Triennial updates will capture all relevant intelligence information collected or produced since the preceding supplement.
+
+c.  Production tasking in support of this assessment will be provided via COLISEUM, or via such tasking mechanism in use within the DIE at that time, by the CIAO for the Intelligence Sector of the DCIP.
+
+4.  DEFENSE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREAT ASSESSMENTS.  The DIA- produced triennial Defense Critical Infrastructure Threat Assessments shall address, at a minimum and subject to USD(P) priorities, the threats to each DCA individually arising from:
+a.  Intelligence collection.
+
+
+b.  Chemical weapon attacks.
+
+
+c.  Biological weapon attacks.
+d.  Nuclear weapon attacks.
+
+
+e.  Radiological weapon attacks.
+f.  Electromagnetic spectrum attacks.
+g.  Cyber attacks.
+h.  Kinetic attacks.
+
+
+GLOSSARY
+
+PART I.  ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AOR
+area of responsibility
+
+
+CCMD
+Combatant Command
+CIAO
+Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officer
+COLISEUM
+Community On-Line Intelligence System for End Users
+
+
+DCA
+defense critical asset
+DCI
+defense critical infrastructure
+DCIP
+Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
+DCITA
+defense critical infrastructure threat assessment
+DIA
+Defense Intelligence Agency
+DIB
+defense industrial base
+DISLA
+Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agent
+DLA
+Defense Logistics Agency
+DNI
+Director of National Intelligence
+DoD CIO
+DoD Chief Information Officer
+DoDD
+DoD Directive
+DoDI
+DoD Instruction
+
+
+GIG
+Global Information Grid
+
+
+IC
+Intelligence Community
+ICD
+Intelligence Community Directive
+IWG
+intelligence working group
+
+
+OPR
+office of primary responsibility
+
+
+PIR
+Priority Intelligence Requirement
+
+
+USCYBERCOM U.S. Cyber Command
+USD(AT&L)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+| USD(C)/CFO            | Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,    |
+|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Department Of Defense |                                                                      |
+| USD(I&S)              | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security             |
+
+USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+USD(P&R)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+
+
+USSTRATCOM
+U.S. Strategic Command
+USTRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command
+
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Instruction. ad-hoc intelligence production.  Production of finished, all-source intelligence outside the periodic, scheduled production established by this Instruction. COLISEUM.  An analysis requirements management tool used throughout the DIE for tasking and managing requirements for finished intelligence production. DCA.  Defined in Reference (b). DCI.  Defined in Reference (b). DCIP.  Defined in Reference (b). Defense CI Component.  Defined in Reference (a). Defense Intelligence Component.  Defined in Reference (a). Defense Intelligence Enterprise.  The intelligence combat support agencies, the intelligence elements of the Military Services and CCMDs, and DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security organizations (e.g., Defense Security Service). finished intelligence.  The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. intelligence collection requirement.  An established intelligence need, validated against the appropriate allocation of intelligence resources to fulfill the PIRs and other intelligence needs of an intelligence consumer. PIR.  A prioritized requirement a commander or decision maker has stated in the process of planning and decision making.  PIRs are used to determine and prioritize intelligence collection and analytic resources in support of the mission.

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+## Department Of Defense Instruction
+
+#
+
+## Usd(P) Subject:  Dod Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, And High-Yield Explosive (Cbrne) Preparedness Standards
+
+
+References:  See Enclosure 1 1.  PURPOSE.  This Instruction:
+a.  Establishes and implements policy and prescribes standards and procedures to achieve installation preparedness for CBRNE incidents consistent with the authorities in sections 2311- 2317 of title 50, United States Code (Reference (a)).
+
+
+
+b.  Designates the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
+Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) as the lead in synchronizing policy, guidance, and instruction related to the National Response Framework (Reference (b)), consistent with DoD Directive (DoDD) 5111.1 (Reference (c)) and DoDD 5111.13 (Reference (d)).
+
+c.  Incorporates and cancels DoD Instruction (DoDI) 2000.18 (Reference (e)) to align DoD
+CBRNE preparedness activities for prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Reference (f)); the National Preparedness Guidelines (Reference (g)); and associated Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) for Management of Domestic Incidents (Reference (h)); Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (Reference (i)); National Preparedness (Reference (j)); Biodefense for the 21st Century (Reference (k)); and Public Health and Medical Preparedness (Reference (l)).
+
+d.  Integrates and synchronizes DoD CBRNE preparedness activities with DoDI 6055.17
+(Reference (m)) and DoDI 6200.03 (Reference (n)).
+
+e.  Provides CBRNE-specific guidance and standards for DoD installations worldwide to use when preventing, protecting against, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from CBRNE incidents.
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY.  This Instruction applies to:
+
+a.  OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+(CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components") b.  All DoD installations worldwide, including Government-owned, contractor-operated facilities and non-DoD activities operating on DoD installations.
+
+c.  All DoD personnel, DoD family members, non-DoD tenants, transient U.S. Government personnel, and DoD contractors living or working on DoD installations worldwide.
+
+
+3.  DEFINITIONS.  See Glossary. 4.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  CBRNE incident prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery activities and capabilities within an all-hazards approach shall be integrated and synchronized as designated in References (d) and (f) through (m).
+
+b.  CBRNE incident prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery activities shall be coordinated with appropriate interagency partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), host nations (HNs), and State, local, and tribal governments. 5.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 6.  INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.  All CBRNE incident reports referred to in sections 3 and 6 of Enclosure 5 of this Instruction are exempt from licensing requirements in accordance with paragraph C4.4.7. of DoD 8910.1-M (Reference (o)). 7.  RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED.  This Instruction is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. 8.  EFFECTIVE DATE
+a.  This Instruction is effective May 18, 2012.
+
+b.  This Instruction must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication in accordance with DoD Instruction 5025.01 (Reference (p)).  If not, this Instruction will expire effective May 18, 2022 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website.
+
+James N. Miller
+
+Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+
+2.  Responsibilities
+
+3.  DoD Installation CBRNE Preparedness Standards
+4.  CBRNE Capabilities/Knowledge 5.  CBRNE Incident Reporting for DoD Installations
+Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a)
+Sections 2311-2317, title 50, United States Code
+
+(b)
+U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Response Framework," January 2008
+(c)
+DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))," December 8, 1999
+(d) DoD Directive 5111.13, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
+Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA))," January 16, 2009
+(e) DoD Instruction 2000.18, "Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological,
+Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines,"
+December 4, 2002 (hereby cancelled)
+(f)
+U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Incident Management System,"
+
+December 2008
+(g) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Preparedness Guidelines," September
+2007
+(h) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, "Management of Domestic Incidents,"
+February 28, 2003
+(i)
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, "Critical Infrastructure Identification,
+
+Prioritization, and Protection," December 17, 2003
+(j)
+Presidential Policy Directive 8, "National Preparedness," March 30, 2011
+(k) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10, "Biodefense for the 21st Century," April 28,
+2004
+(l)
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21, "Public Health and Medical Preparedness,"
+
+October 18, 2007
+(m) DoD Instruction 6055.17, "DoD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program,"
+January 13, 2009
+(n) DoD Instruction 6200.03, "Public Health Emergency Management Within the Department
+of Defense," March 5, 2010
+(o) DoD 8910.1-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of Information Requirements," June 30,
+1998
+(p) DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," October 28, 2007 (q) DoD Directive 3025.18, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)," December 29, 2010 (r)
+DoD Instruction 2000.16, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards," October 2, 2006
+(s)
+DoD Directive 3150.08, "DoD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents," January 20, 2010
+(t)
+National Fire Protection Association Consensus Standards (NFPA) 472, "Standard for
+Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction
+Incidents," current edition1
+(u) National Fire Protection Association Consensus Standards (NFPA) 473, "Standards for
+Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass
+Destruction Incidents," current edition2
+(v) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.03D, "Joint Reporting Structure Event
+and Incident List," September 7, 20103
+(w) Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition
+(x) National Military Strategy, February 8, 2011 (y) Executive Order 12196, "Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal
+Employees," February 26, 1980, as amended
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)).  The USD(P) shall:
+a.  Establish DoD-wide goals and objectives for installation CBRNE preparedness.
+
+b.  Coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on installation CBRNE preparedness matters of mutual interest and synchronize installation CBRNE preparedness activities in accordance with Reference (m).
+
+
+2.  ASD(HD&ASA).  The ASD(HD&ASA), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), shall:
+a.  Oversee policy and program planning in accordance with Reference (d) and DoDD
+3025.18 (Reference (q)).
+
+b.  Coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment (DUSD(I&E)), and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) on the development and maintenance of CBRNE policy, guidance, and instructions.
+
+c.  Prepare and maintain DoD issuances, as necessary, to verify that CBRNE preparedness policies and standards are synchronized within an all-hazards approach. d.  Advise the Secretary of Defense of any necessary changes to oversee the overall readiness of DoD installations to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from CBRNE incidents. 3.  USD(AT&L).  The USD(AT&L) shall:
+a.  Serve as a principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for DoD acquisition systems, research and development, advanced technology, developmental test and evaluation, production, logistics, installation management, military construction, procurement, and environmental security for all CBRNE matters. b.  Develop and provide guidance for the acquisition of CBRNE equipment and scalable dual-use technologies and capabilities for DoD installations that meet CBRNE preparedness requirements.
+
+4.  ASD(NCB).  The ASD(NCB), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), shall provide guidance and instruction to the DoD Components on incorporating installation CBRNE preparedness program elements into the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process. 5.  DUSD(I&E).  The DUSD(I&E), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), shall coordinate with the ASD(HD&ASA) to verify that CBRNE preparedness activities are consistent with the all-hazards approach in Reference (m). 6.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA).  The Director, DTRA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), through the ASD(NCB), shall:
+
+a.  Require that Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (JSIVAs) address CBRNE
+vulnerabilities and threats. b.  Revise, coordinate, publish, employ, and maintain criteria based on the standards in this Instruction and Reference (m) for the evaluation of capabilities for CBRNE preparedness activities. c.  Incorporate observations, after-action reports, and lessons learned from installation CBRNE assessments conducted by the Military Departments, DTRA, or installations as part of their vulnerability assessment process into the Joint Information System and the annual and semi-annual trends analysis. 7.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (USD(P&R)).  The USD(P&R) shall:
+a.  In accordance with Reference (n), establish and maintain DoD-wide medical and public health goals and objectives that support CBRNE preparedness activities and programs.
+
+b.  Provide medical and public health expertise for CBRNE incidents to the Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Working Group (WG) pursuant to Reference (m) and the Antiterrorism WG and Threat WG pursuant to DoDI 2000.16 (Reference (r)). c.  Facilitate information sharing among the Military Department Surgeons General, other military health system leaders, and working groups where CBRNE incident prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery are applicable. d.  Support the ASD(HD&ASA) in developing and maintaining medical and public health CBRNE preparedness requirements and providing assistance to civil authorities during contingencies.
+
+8.  USD(I).  The USD(I) shall:
+a.  Oversee and provide policy for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security DoD
+activities related to CBRNE preparedness activities and programs.
+
+
+b.  Assist the ASD(HD&ASA) in the development and maintenance of CBRNE policy, guidance, and instructions in accordance with section 2 of this enclosure. 9.  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (DoD CIO).  The DoD CIO shall work closely with the ASD(HD&ASA) and the DoD Components in the coordination, development, and implementation of command and control policies, requirements, plans, procedures, and standards specific to CBRNE events. 10.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:
+a.  Verify the integration and synchronization of CBRNE within the all-hazards approach for the DoD IEM Program and consistent with NIMS (References (m) and (f)). b.  Ensure that the roles, responsibilities, resources, and requirements in the DoD IEM
+Program described in Reference (m) are expanded to address a CBRNE incident. c.  Establish measures for the standards established in Enclosure 3 of this Instruction.
+Measures will be consistent with the policy, guidance, and instructions contained in References (d), (m), (n), (r), DoDD 3150.08 (Reference (s)), the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 472 (Reference (t)), NFPA Standard 473 (Reference (u)), CJCS Manual 3150.03D (Reference (v)), Joint Publication 1-02 (Reference (w)), and the CBRNE Capabilities/Knowledge Table in Enclosure 4 of this Instruction. d.  Understand status of forces agreements and other international agreements affecting CBRNE preparedness activities as well as HN CBRNE capabilities appropriate to each installation.
+
+
+
+e.  Require that installation exercise schedules incorporate CBRNE preparedness activities and capabilities in accordance with Reference (m).
+
+f.  Establish and facilitate training for CBRNE preparedness activities across the installation functions and activities.
+
+g.  Ensure officials responsible for installations implement and annually review, at a minimum, support agreements with State, local, and tribal governments and HNs to ensure CBRNE emergency response capabilities are integrated into installation CBRNE prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery plans.
+
+
+h.  Require that all-hazards emergency response procedures consider and address the unique characteristics of a CBRNE incident.  Program for the resources necessary to meet installation CBRNE emergency response needs.
+
+
+i.  Collect and prioritize installation CBRNE defense requirements along with other installation preparedness requirements.  Validate all requirements through Joint Capabilities Integrated Development Systems and submit through the respective Military Department budgetary process for funding.
+
+j.  Understand CBRNE support requirements for weapons of mass destruction and CBRNE-
+related consequence management and foreign consequence management missions.  These may include coordination and synchronization with HN or domestic local authorities, as well as theater opening requirements. 11.  CJCS.  The CJCS shall:
+a.  Prepare joint doctrine, develop assessment schedules in conjunction with JSIVAs, and assist the ASD(HD&ASA) in the development and maintenance of CBRNE preparedness policy, guidance, and instructions for DoD installations.
+
+b.  Oversee the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to address the development of CBRNE preparedness requirements on installations, including testing and evaluation of CBRNE equipment, such as commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and prototype products, to support the rapid acquisition and integration of state-of-the-art technology.
+
+c.  Require that the Chairman's Program Review and Program Analysis Assessment include a summary of CBRNE IEM requirements for installations as determined by the JROC and derived from the Combatant Commanders' (CCDRs) integrated priority lists.
+
+d.  Oversee the integration, synchronization, and coordination of CBRNE training, exercises, leader awareness, and planning within an all-hazards approach to support overall installation readiness. 12.  GEOGRAPHIC CCDRs.  The geographic CCDRs shall:
+
+a.  Ensure compliance with this Instruction.
+
+b.  Integrate CBRNE preparedness policies, plans, procedures, and guidelines with the requirements of the DoD IEM Program in accordance with References (m) and (n), and verify that they are supported by sufficient command and control capabilities and other equipment to ensure installation readiness for CBRNE incidents.
+
+c.  Integrate and synchronize CBRNE and IEM prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery activities in Reference (m), including Military Department installations, Reserve centers, and armories, as appropriate.
+
+
+d.  Advocate for Military Department or Component CBRNE requirements through the program objective memorandum process.
+
+e.  Report CBRNE incidents in accordance with guidance in Enclosure 5 of this Instruction, and ensure dissemination of appropriate information to State, local, and tribal governments.
+
+f.  Endorse and advocate for installation CBRNE training and exercise programs to validate consistency with the established knowledge areas listed in Enclosure 4 of this Instruction. g.  Integrate CBRNE and emergency management (EM) benchmarks into geographic CCDR
+Program Reviews or other program analysis assessments.
+
+
+h.  Understand status of forces agreements and other international agreements affecting CBRNE preparedness activities as well as HN CBRNE capabilities appropriate to each installation.
+
+## Enclosure 3 Dod Installation Cbrne Preparedness Standards
+
+ 1.  STANDARD 1:  CBRNE PLANNING.  The DoD Components shall incorporate planning for CBRNE incidents into the IEM Plan required by Reference (m) using Department of Homeland Security (DHS) planning scenarios.
+
+a.  The DoD Components shall identify processes, procedures, and actions specific to a CBRNE incident and develop appropriate support annexes to the IEM Plan, so that installation personnel, first responders and receivers, and the base populace are adequately prepared for a CBRNE incident.
+
+
+b.  The IEM Plan, with relevant CBRNE passive defense support annexes and hazardspecific appendixes, shall incorporate approved recommendations and findings from vulnerability, threat and hazard, and response capability assessments.
+
+c.  The IEM Plan shall note agreements established to support CBRNE incident response in relevant CBRNE support annexes and appendixes and in CBRNE standard operating procedures. Agreements should be reviewed annually, at a minimum, and updated as necessary.  The installation emergency manager shall maintain a copy of CBRNE support agreements.
+
+
+
+d.  Coordination shall take place with other installations and with Federal departments and agencies and in consultation with appropriate State, local, tribal, NGO, and HN officials (including emergency managers and public health officials) on CBRNE preparedness planning documents and efforts among the functional areas on an installation to facilitate interoperability.
+
+e.  In accordance with Reference (j), CBRNE planning should strengthen the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for those incidents that pose the greatest threat to the Nation. 2.  STANDARD 2:  CBRNE RISK MANAGEMENT
+a.  The installation's all-hazards risk management activities should include CBRNE risk management policies, processes, and procedures that require annual threat and hazard assessments, vulnerability assessments, and capability assessments pursuant to Reference (m).
+
+
+
+b.  CBRNE capability assessments must address the ability of the installation to:
+
+(1)  Employ equipment, resources, and capabilities residing on the installation to assist in the prevention, protection, and mitigation of, or to respond to and recover from a CBRNE incident.
+
+
+
+(2)  Implement memorandums of understanding (MOUs), memorandums of agreement
+(MOAs), and mutual aid agreements (MAAs) to request CBRNE equipment, resources, and capabilities from other installations, Federal departments and agencies, State, local, and tribal governments, or HNs.
+
+
+(3)  Promote asset visibility and enhance overall installation readiness through a review of credentialing and certification of personnel, equipment, resources, capabilities, training, and exercises in coordination with State, local, and tribal governments, or HNs.
+
+
+
+3.  STANDARD 3:  CBRNE TRAINING.  Installation commanders and their designated staff, individuals who may serve as incident commanders, technicians and specialists, operations personnel, responders, employees, and the base populace shall be provided CBRNE education and training as outlined in Enclosure 4 of this Instruction.  This training and education shall:
+a.  Identify an appropriate level of competency for installation commanders, technicians and specialists, operations personnel, and responders.
+
+b.  Enhance awareness and promote CBRNE preparedness of installation employees and the base populace.
+
+c.  Leverage training materials and opportunities provided by Federal departments and agencies, State, local, and tribal governments, or HNs.
+
+d.  Verify appropriate levels of credentialing and certification for first responders and receivers pursuant to Reference (m).
+
+e.  Encourage installation commanders to seek EM program certification as outlined in Reference (m). 4.  STANDARD 4:  CBRNE EXERCISES
+a.  Realistic CBRNE exercises appropriate to the installation's threats, mission, and vulnerabilities should be conducted in accordance with Reference (m).  In planning for CBRNE exercises, installations shall consider the national planning scenarios developed by DHS, which depict a diverse set of high-consequence threat scenarios.
+
+b.  CBRNE exercises shall include participants from all emergency support functions on the installation and, whenever possible, appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, NGOs, and HN participants.
+
+c.  Installation commanders shall align CBRNE exercise and training schedules with interagency partners and State and local preparedness programs to ensure maximum integration and coordination, when possible.  Installation commanders outside the United States shall align CBRNE exercises and training with the higher headquarters, HN, and Department of State exercise and training events.
+
+5.  STANDARD 5:  CBRNE CAPABILITIES.  A large-scale CBRNE incident can quickly exhaust installation equipment, resources, and capabilities, requiring support from other DoD installations, local, tribal, State, or Federal and HN consequence management capabilities.  The establishment of MOUs, MOAs, and MAAs during CBRNE preparedness activities is critical. Of equal importance are the identification, acquisition, and sustainment of a basic level of CBRNE capabilities geared toward preventing and protecting an installation from CBRNE incidents, as well as promoting mitigation, effective response, and efficient recovery.
+
+a.  All DoD installations shall have a CBRNE capability whether organic or provided through MOUs, MOAs, and MAAs with State, local, and tribal governments or HNs.  However, the type and level of CBRNE capability on an installation will vary based on priority, objective level of response capability, and the hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities identified during the risk management assessments.  Installations shall have, at a minimum, a baseline capability that is trained, planned, and exercised.  This baseline capability shall include interoperability with local and HN responders; awareness for the installation population; incident response and management tailored for command staff, law enforcement and security personnel, firefighters, specialized CBRNE responders, and medical personnel.  Capabilities beyond the baseline may include detection, protection, collection, decontamination, and collective protection (COLPRO).
+
+
+
+b.  The process for identifying what level of CBRNE capability is necessary for DoD
+installations will be determined by the appropriate Military Department; standardization of capabilities, however, is necessary for ensuring cost-effective, scalable, and dual-use capabilities that support both CBRNE and all-hazard prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery activities.  Military Departments must consider these categories when determining priority for the allocation of CBRNE capabilities:
+
+(1)  Installations and facilities critical to overall accomplishment of the National Military Strategy (NMS) (Reference (x)).  This includes installations that have one-of-a-kind strategic assets; major concentrations of forces; strategic lift assets; communications, command, control, and intelligence and or nuclear command, control, and communications critical assets and infrastructure; major ports of embarkation and debarkation; key logistic sites; mobilization sites; and those installations that support national strategic objectives essential to national security during times of war and national emergencies.
+
+
+(2)  Non-power projection installations or facilities that provide combat service support, such as supply depots, logistics centers, and other installations other than those within the parameters listed in subparagraph 5.b (1) of this enclosure, but are still assigned a mission directly related to accomplishment of the NMS.
+
+ (3)  Other installations or facilities that might provide or include research and development, acquisition, testing and evaluation, production, training, and administration.
+
+
+c.  DoD installations, regardless of size, shall have or have access to these non-material CBRNE capabilities:
+
+(1)  CBRNE planning templates and annexes that support Standard 1 as listed in section 1
+of this enclosure.
+
+
+
+ (2)  CBRNE training that supports CBRNE installation preparedness as listed in section 3
+of this enclosure.
+
+ (3)  MOU, MOA, and MAA templates that address CBRNE support requirements described in section 1 of this enclosure.
+
+d.  Installation commanders should consider these categories of Federal Government off-theshelf and COTS material capabilities in prioritizing and resourcing IEM capability shortfalls:
+ (1)  Personal protective equipment, including chemical protective clothing; encapsulating and overall style suits; self-contained breathing apparatus; personal dosimeters; closed-circuit and open-circuit, full-face air purifying respirators and powered air purifying respirators; chemical protective gloves and chemical protective boots; and protective headgear.  Equipment worn by first responders shall comply with Executive Order 12196 (Reference (y)), appropriate Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations, and appropriate National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health guidelines pertaining to hazardous material response.
+
+ (2)  Interoperable communication devices.
+
+ (3)  Hazard marking and controlling equipment for securing an appropriate perimeter around the CBRNE incident; establishing entry and exit control procedures; establishing traffic control points, sample collection and chain of custody rules, assessment and detection, evidence preservation, and maintenance of installation security.
+
+ (4)  Portable radiological, chemical, and biological detection capabilities to conduct surface and atmospheric monitoring and detection needed to determine the level and extent of chemical, biological, and radiological contamination, including personal dosimeters.
+
+ (5)  Decontamination for personnel, mission-essential equipment, and facilities.
+
+
+(6)  Medical countermeasures (MCM) for first responders and receivers.  If there is a medical treatment facility or pharmacy on the installation, an inventory of MCM should be stored there for optional distribution and storage requirements.  If not, then identify an alternate stockpile storage facility or site for distribution.
+
+ (7)  Casualty decontamination and containment to decontaminate and stabilize casualties
+
+for evacuation to higher-level medical care.
+ (8)  Mass public notification system.
+
+ (9)  Incident management software.
+
+ (10)  Decision support system to promote effective command, control, and communications management and decision-making activities.
+
+ (11)  Automated and networked chemical and biological detection combined with medical surveillance and interagency and international information on emerging patterns and trends.
+
+ (12)  Laboratory analysis for biological agent identification and diagnosis to support incident characterization.
+
+
+ (13)  Escape masks for critical and essential personnel (NFPA/NIOSH approved).
+
+ (14)  COLPRO for one-of-a-kind strategic assets (in coordination with DoD officials responsible for those assets, if applicable).
+
+ (15)  Fire and hazardous materials (HAZMAT) response capable of performing the following functions:  establishing command, control, communications, accountability; fire suppression, rescue, extrication; atmospheric monitoring and detection; environmental sampling to determine contaminant and level of contamination; triage; mass decontamination of ambulatory and non-ambulatory patients; and preserving evidence.
+
+ (16)  Public health and medical response capable of performing the following functions:
+mass casualty triage; treatment; quarantine; transport; psychological care for casualties; distribution and employment of supplies; distribution and administration of pharmaceuticals and vaccines; provision of alternate treatment facilities; mass casualty care; health risk communications and assessment; and restriction of movement procedures.
+
+ (17)  Medical surveillance, including monitoring, diagnosis, and analysis of clinical trends and pharmaceutical use.  When combined with fixed biological detection, medical surveillance and interagency and international information on emerging patterns and trends can identify a disease outbreak in time, potentially, to mitigate significant adverse effects of the disease.  Installations shall coordinate medical surveillance with State, local, tribal, and HN governments, when possible.
+
+e.  DoD installations shall verify, when possible, that installation CBRNE capabilities are interoperable with the capabilities of other installations, other Federal departments and agencies, and State, local, tribal, and HN governments.
+
+f.  Installation commanders and their designated staffs shall allocate appropriate funding for equipment and capability and manage the maintenance, sustainment, and accountability of CBRNE capabilities.
+
+## Enclosure 4 Cbrne Capabilities/Knowledge
+
+ 1.  The Table of this enclosure lists areas and levels of knowledge and awareness for an incident commander, installation commanders, incident response teams (IRT), including emergency medical services (EMS), emergency operations center (EOC), first responders, installation employees, and base populace.  These knowledge areas take into consideration OSHA regulations outlined in Reference (y) and NFPA standards in References (t) and (u). 2.  The 36 knowledge areas with associated levels of knowledge form the basis for planning, training, exercising, and assessing an installation's preparedness.  The levels of knowledge include:
+a.  Basic level:  Recommended minimum information the installation commander should provide to increase awareness.
+
+b.  Advanced:  Formal education and training pursuant to Reference (m).
+
+c.  Specialized:  Advanced level, as appropriate, and further education and training resulting in additional certification or credentialing. 3.  Incident managers and commanders, technicians and specialists, first responders and receivers will receive training consistent with the standards established in Reference (m).  In addition to the standards in Reference (m), designated installation personnel shall be knowledgeable in the 36 areas in accordance with the Table. 4.  Awareness competency levels are in accordance with Reference (m) and additional competency levels as designated in the Table.
+
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident Command
+Technician/ Specialist
+Operations
+Examples
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+
+IRT. Specialists, HAZMAT/ CBRNE Training, EMS/
+Advanced
+Medical Specialists
+Knowledge Areas 1
+Know/understand the potential for a CBRNE incident, including:
+a
+CBRNE weapons substances
+
+
+b
+Behavior of CBRNE agents
+
+
+c
+CBRNE agent terms
+
+
+d
+CBRNE toxicology terms
+
+
+e
+
+
+Hazards and risks associated with CBRNE agents
+f
+Likely locations for CBRNE agent incidents
+
+
+g
+Potential outcomes of
+CBRNE agent incident
+
+
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+Operations IRT, EMS, Firefighters and basic
+HAZMAT,
+EOC
+Spouses, Children, Dependents, and other
+family
+members
+First Responders- Initial Responders (i.e., Security
+Forces), 911 Operators/
+Dispatch
+Facility Workers, Medical Support, Janitors, Security Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+DoD or schools on installations
+(EMS- only)
+
+
+(EMS- only)
+
+
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas
+
+
+h
+
+
+o
+
+Indicators of possible criminal or terrorist activity involving weapons of mass destruction
+2
+
+
+Indicators, signs, and symptoms for exposure to CBRNE weapons substances
+3
+
+
+Questions to ask caller to elicit critical information regarding a CBRNE incident
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+(911 only)
+
+
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas 4
+
+
+Recognize unusual trends that may indicate CBRNE incidents
+5
+
+
+
+Understand relevant emergency management and CBRNE response plans, standard operating procedures, and role within each
+6
+
+
+
+Recognize and communicate the need for additional resources
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas 7
+
+
+
+Make proper notifications and communications of CBRNE incidents
+8
+Understand individual protection associated with a CBRNE incidents, such as:
+8.a .
+Self-protection measures
+
+
+8.b
+
+
+Properly employ assigned protective equipment
+8.c
+Select and use proper protective equipment
+
+
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas 9
+
+
+Protective measures and how to initiate actions to protect others and safeguard property
+10
+Procedures for the evacuation of personnel
+
+
+
+11
+
+
+Coordinate evacuation, mass care, and level of response with C3 capability
+12
+Understand and determine chemical, biological, radiological (CBR) decontamination procedures for:
+12. a
+Self
+
+
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas 12. b
+Victims
+
+
+12. c
+Site
+
+
+12. d
+Equipment
+
+
+12. e
+Mass casualties
+
+
+13
+
+
+Crime scene and evidence preservation procedures
+14
+
+
+Procedures and safety precautions for legal evidence collection
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+(police)
+
+
+(police)
+
+
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas 15
+
+
+Federal and other support infrastructures and how to access them
+16
+
+
+Understand the limitation of operating in protective clothing
+17
+
+
+Understand emergency and first aid procedures for exposure to CBRNE agents and principles of triage
+18
+
+
+Know how to perform hazard and risk assessment of CBRNE agents
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+(911 only)
+
+
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas 19
+Understand termination/ all clear procedures
+
+
+20
+Understand the Incident Command System (ICS)/NIMS, specifically:
+20. a
+Role/function within ICS/NIMS
+
+
+
+20. b
+Need to implement ICS/NIMS
+
+
+
+21
+
+
+Know how to perform CBRNE contamination control and containment operations, including for fatalities
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas 22
+
+
+Understand procedures and equipment for safe transport of contaminated items
+23
+
+
+Know the classification, detection, identification, and verification of CBRNE material using field survey instruments and equipment
+24
+
+
+Know methods for collection of solid, liquid, and gas samples
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas 25
+
+
+Know safe casualty extraction procedures and CBR MCM.
+26
+
+
+(Medical only)
+Know patient assessment and emergency medical treatment
+27
+
+
+(Medical only)
+Be familiar with public health and local EMS issues associated with any hazard or emergency condition, including CBRNE incidents
+(Medical only)
+28
+Know procedures for patient transport
+
+
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+
+(Medical only)
+
+
+(Medical only)
+
+
+(Medical only)
+
+
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas
+(Medical only)
+29
+Execute CBRNE triage and primary care
+
+
+30
+Perform casualty and fatality management
+
+
+31
+
+
+Perform team decontamination operations
+32
+
+
+Conduct sampling operations with presumptive level of detection, as appropriate
+33
+
+
+Coordinate with response partners for confirmatory testing capabilities
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+
+(Medical only)
+
+
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas 34
+
+
+Know laboratory identification and diagnosis for biological agents
+35
+Ability to develop an EM plan (including CBRNE response) in coordination with local, county, and State EM personnel, consisting of the following:
+a
+Mitigation
+
+
+o
+
+
+b
+Preparedness
+
+
+o
+
+
+c
+Response
+
+
+o
+
+
+d
+Short-term recovery
+
+
+o
+
+
+e
+Safe-haven management
+
+
+f
+
+
+o
+o
+
+Shelter-in-place for all buildings and resources - high density buildings
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+Performance Levels:    -basic        -advanced     -specialized
+Knowledge Level
+Incident
+Command
+Technician/
+Specialist
+Operations
+IRT.
+Examples
+Specialists,
+HAZMAT/
+CBRNE
+Training,
+
+EMS/
+Commander
+
+Installation
+Commander
+
+Advanced
+Medical
+Specialists
+Knowledge Areas g
+Evacuation routes
+
+
+o
+o
+o
+h
+Site safety and control
+
+
+36
+
+
+Ability to develop and exercise EM and CBRNE response plans
+Awareness
+First
+Responders
+Employees
+Populace
+First
+Responders-
+Initial
+Facility
+Workers,
+Medical
+Support,
+Janitors,
+Security
+Spouses,
+Children,
+Dependents, and
+Operations
+IRT, EMS,
+Firefighters
+and basic
+HAZMAT,
+Guards, Non-
+DoD tenants,
+other
+family
+EOC
+DoD or
+members
+Responders
+(i.e., Security
+Forces), 911
+Operators/
+Dispatch
+schools on
+installations
+
+## Enclosure 5 Cbrne Incident Reporting For Dod Installations
+
+
+
+1.  This enclosure provides guidance for reporting CBRNE incidents on or affecting DoD installations. 2.  Installation CBRNE reporting shall be consistent with Reference (v). 3.  All CBRNE incidents that affect installation personnel or mission-essential or critical functions or activities shall use the Operational Report 3 (OPREP-3) PINNACLE series of reports.  Military Departments shall continue to provide applicable feeder reporting as appropriate. 4.  In addition to current reporting procedures identified in References (m), (n), and (v), DoD installations and higher headquarters shall expand the scope of notification and details unique to CBRNE incidents. 5.  Notification of a CBRNE incident shall include appropriate domestic (local, State, and Federal) or foreign authorities.
+
+a.  Installation commanders shall ensure timely notification of local authorities in accordance with established agreements and protocols.
+
+b.  Higher headquarters shall verify that State authorities or HN representatives are notified, as appropriate, in accordance with MOAs, MOUs, and international agreements.  The appropriate U.S. chief of mission shall be notified of incidents on foreign territory.
+
+c.  The National Military Command Center shall distribute OPREP-3 PINNACLE reports to other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate. 6.  OPREP-3 reports for CBRNE incidents shall include:
+a.  Pre-incident indications or warnings.
+
+
+b.  Presumptive or definitive identification of the CBRNE substance.
+c.  Methods of hazard detection and verification.
+d.  Potential for further CBRNE substance dissemination and actions to limit effects.
+
+e.  Local authority notification status and response activities, including installation actions conducted under immediate response authority in accordance with Reference (q).
+
+f.  Potential requests for forces or requests for assistance and the timeframe when needed.
+
+
+g.  Effects on installation mission-essential or critical functions and activities.
+h.  Effects on personnel and equipment.
+ 7.  Installation personnel shall not share classified information outside DoD without proper authorization.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+ASD(HD&ASA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
+Security Affairs
+ASD(NCB)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
+
+
+CBR
+chemical, biological, radiological
+CBRNE
+chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive
+CCDR
+Combatant Commander
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+COLPRO
+collective protection
+COTS
+commercial-off-the-shelf
+
+
+DHS
+Department of Homeland Security
+DoD CIO
+Department of Defense Chief Information Officer
+DoDD
+Department of Defense Directive
+DoDI
+Department of Defense Instruction
+DTRA
+Defense Threat Reduction Agency
+DUSD(I&E)
+Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment
+
+
+EM
+emergency management
+EMS
+emergency medical services
+EOC
+emergency operations center
+
+
+HAZMAT
+hazardous materials
+HN
+host nation
+HSPD
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive
+
+
+ICS
+Incident Command System
+IEM
+installation emergency management
+IRT
+incident response team
+
+
+JROC
+Joint Requirements Oversight Council
+JSIVA
+Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments
+
+
+MAA
+mutual aid agreement
+MCM MOA
+medical countermeasures memorandum of agreement
+MOU
+memorandum of understanding
+
+
+NFPA
+National Fire Protection Association
+NGO
+non-governmental organization
+NIMS
+National Incident Management System
+| NMS                                         | National Military Strategy                                            |
+|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|                                             |                                                                       |
+| OPREP                                       | operational report                                                    |
+| OSHA                                        | Occupational Safety and Health Administration                         |
+|                                             |                                                                       |
+| USD(AT&L)                                   | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics |
+| USD(I)                                      |                                                                       |
+| USD(P)                                      |                                                                       |
+| Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence |                                                                       |
+| Under Secretary of Defense for Policy       |                                                                       |
+| USD(P&R)                                    | Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness                |
+|                                             |                                                                       |
+| WG                                          | working group                                                         |
+|                                             |                                                                       |
+|                                             |                                                                       |
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Instruction. all-hazards.  Defined in Reference (m).
+
+
+biological agent.  Defined in Reference (w). CBRNE incident.  Defined in Reference (w). CBRNE installation preparedness.  Activities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from CBRNE threats or hazards to military installations or facilities. COLPRO.  Defined in Reference (w).
+
+
+first receivers.  Defined in Reference (m). first responders.  Defined in Reference (m). HN.  Defined in Reference (w). installation.  Defined in Reference (m). installation commander.  The military officer appointed to command of an installation or other senior DoD official responsible for all operations performed by an installation. MAA.  Defined in Reference (m). NGO.  Defined in Reference (w). resilience.  The ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies.
+
+vulnerability assessment.  Defined in Reference (m). weapons of mass destruction.  Defined in Reference (w).

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+## Department Of Defense Instruction
+
+
+October 18, 2013
+
+USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: In-House Laboratory Independent Research (ILIR) Program
+
+References: See Enclosure 1
+1.  PURPOSE.  This instruction reissues DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3201.4 (Reference (a)) to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and prescribe procedures pursuant to DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.3, DoDI 3201.01, and DoDI 3210.1 (References (b), (c), and (d)) for implementation of the ILIR program at the DoD research and development (R&D) laboratories and centers in accordance with the authority in DoDD 5134.01 (Reference (e)). 2.  APPLICABILITY.  This instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and all other organizational entities within the DoD that operate R&D laboratories or centers (referred to collectively in this instruction as "the DoD Components"). 3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  Each DoD Component that operates an R&D laboratory or center will support an ILIR
+program.
+
+b.  Participating DoD Component R&D laboratories or centers will use ILIR funds to initiate and support efforts judged to be important or promising in the accomplishment of missions assigned to that laboratory or center.
+
+c.  Each R&D laboratory or center will have wide latitude in the use of ILIR funds, subject to the approval of overall funding levels, to enable performance of innovative, timely, and promising work without requiring formal and prior approval that might delay normal funding authorization.
+
+d.  ILIR funds will be used to support basic research efforts.  The programs will have as their primary goals the performance of highest quality research in support of laboratory missions and the enhancement of factors that contribute to recruitment and retention of outstanding scientists and engineers.  This effort is considered to be internal to the laboratory or center and is to be administered as outlined in the procedures found in Enclosure 3 of this instruction. 4.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 5.  PROCEDURES.  Detailed procedures are contained in Enclosure 3. 6.  INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.  The Annual Report of ILIR Programs, referred to in paragraph 2d of Enclosure 2 of this instruction, has been assigned report control symbol DD-AT&L(A)1931 in accordance with the procedures in Directive-type Memorandum 12-004 (Reference (f)) and DoD 8910.1-M (Reference (g)).
+
+
+7.  RELEASABILITY.  **Unlimited**.  This instruction is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. 8.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This instruction:
+a.  Is effective October 18, 2013.
+
+b.  Must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication to be considered current in accordance with DoDI 5025.01 (Reference (h)).
+
+c.  Will expire effective October 18, 2023 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website if it hasn't been reissued or cancelled in accordance with Reference (h).
+
+
+Frank Kendall
+
+
+Under Secretary of Defense for
+
+Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+ Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities
+
+3.  Procedures Glossary
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+ ENCLOSURE 1:  REFERENCES ........4 ENCLOSURE 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........5
+
+ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
+(ASD(R&E)) ........5
+DOD COMPONENT HEADS ........5 ENCLOSURE 3:  PROCEDURES ........6
+
+COMMANDING OFFICERS (COs), DIRECTORS, AND TECHNICAL DIRECTORS
+(TDs) OF LABORATORIES ........6
+PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING GUIDELINES ........6
+FUNDING AND EXECUTION GUIDELINES ........6 GLOSSARY ........8
+PART I:  ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........8 PART II:  DEFINITIONS ........8
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Instruction 3201.4, "In-House Laboratory Independent Research (ILIR) and
+Independent Exploratory Development (IED) Programs," October 8, 1993 (hereby cancelled)
+(b) DoD Directive 5134.3, "Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E),"
+November 3, 2003
+(c) DoD Instruction 3201.01, "Management of DoD Research and Development Laboratories,"
+January 3, 2006
+(d) DoD Instruction 3210.1, "Administration and Support of Basic Research by the Department
+of Defense," September 16, 2005
+(e) DoD Directive 5134.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
+Logistics," December 9, 2005, as amended
+(f)
+Directive-type Memorandum 12-004, "DoD Internal Information Collections," March 24,
+2012, as amended
+(g) DoD 8910.1-M, "Department of Defense Procedures for Management of Information
+Requirements," June 30, 1998
+(h) DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," September 26, 2012, as amended
+
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING (ASD(R&E)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the ASD(R&E) is responsible for the oversight, direction, execution, and review of the ILIR programs of the DoD Components. 2.  DOD COMPONENT HEADS.  The DoD Component heads:
+
+a.  Implement this instruction within their Component and establish Component-specific policy for the programs in accordance with References (b), (c), and (d).
+
+b.  Decide which laboratories and centers are to participate in the program and so inform the ASD(R&E).
+
+c.  Allocate funds to participating laboratories and centers from relevant program elements.
+
+d.  Establish an annual program review with ASD(R&E) in attendance that includes criteria for measuring and evaluating results to be reflected in an annual report of the program to ASD(R&E).
+
+e.  Budget sufficient funds to support the ILIR program.
+
+
+
+## Enclosure 3 Procedures
+
+ 1.  COMMANDING OFFICERS (COs), DIRECTORS, AND TECHNICAL DIRECTORS (TDs) OF LABORATORIES.  The COs, Directors, and TDs:
+a.  Review all qualified proposals for funding under the ILIR program and the results of each funded task.  After review, ensure that work unit summaries are submitted to the Defense Technical Information Center.
+
+b.  Make an annual presentation to the Component S&T Executive.
+
+
+
+2.  PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING GUIDELINES
+a.  All funds appropriated by the Congress for ILIR program elements will be made available at the laboratories or centers performing the work for those purposes and will not be used to support any other programs.
+
+b.  Those funds will not be subject to reallocation for other purposes by any command levels intervening between the DoD Component head and the laboratories or centers performing the work.  Furthermore, those command levels will not task the laboratory TD or CO to perform specific work with these funds.
+
+3.  FUNDING AND EXECUTION GUIDELINES
+a.  ILIR funds will be identified as a separate program element (line item) in the budget.
+
+
+
+b.  The TD or CO will maximize funding of ILIR up to the recommended target ceiling funding of 2.5 percent of the total 6.1 budget of each DoD Component and not be used to make up deficiencies in other assigned programs.
+
+c.  ILIR funds are intended for in-house efforts and will not be used for outside contracts.
+Exceptions are to be of modest magnitude and of exceptional content.  Moreover, they must be specifically justified and approved by the Component S&T Executive in terms of exceptional content, or as being in direct support of primary in-house ILIR projects, and must enhance factors that contribute to the recruitment and retention of outstanding scientists and engineers by the laboratory.
+
+d.  ILIR funds will not be used to purchase equipment unless such action is in direct support of active current ILIR programs.  As a target ceiling, the purchases will not exceed 30 percent of the program funding.
+
+
+
+e.  If a task begun under ILIR funding leads to continued efforts, it will be transferred to the regular research, development, test, and evaluation-sponsored program at the appropriate time and supported through the normal budget process.  No task will be supported by ILIR funds for more than a 3-year period.
+
+
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+ASD(R&E) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
+
+
+| CO    | commanding officer                       |
+|-------|------------------------------------------|
+|       |                                          |
+| DoDD  | DoD Directive                            |
+| DoDI  | DoD Instruction                          |
+|       |                                          |
+| ILIR  | In-House Laboratory Independent Research |
+|       |                                          |
+| R&D   | research and development                 |
+|       |                                          |
+| TD    | technical director                       |
+|       |                                          |
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+
+These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this instruction.
+
+
+basic research.  Systematic study directed toward greater knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena and of observable facts without specific applications towards processes or products in mind.  It includes all scientific study and experimentation directed toward increasing fundamental knowledge and understanding in those fields of the physical, engineering, environmental, and life sciences related to long-term national security needs.  It is farsighted high-payoff research that provides the basis for technological progress and subsequent exploratory and advanced developments in Defense-related technologies.  DoD Research is funded by budget category 6.1. R&D laboratory.  A facility or group of facilities owned, leased, or otherwise used by the DoD, a substantial purpose of which is the performance of research, development, or engineering by employees of the Department of Defense.  The term "laboratory" is used in this instruction to apply as well to Warfare Centers, Research Development and Engineering Centers, and other such entities.

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+##
+
+# Dod Instruction 3902.02 Special Operations Forces Foreign Language, Regional Expertise, And Culture Policy
+
+ Originating Component:
+Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Effective:
+August 17, 2023 Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Instruction 3305.06, "Special Operations Forces (SOF) Foreign
+Language Policy," November 19, 2008, as amended Approved by:
+Christopher Maier, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
+and Low Intensity Conflict Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5111.10, this issuance:
+- Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for determining special operations forces (SOF)
+foreign language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) capabilities and capacities.
+- Renumbers DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3305.06 to DoDI 3902.02 to properly align under "Special
+Operations" in accordance with the DoD Numbering System.
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 4
+2.1.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
+(ASD(SO/LIC))........ 4
+2.2.  USD(P&R). ........ 4 2.3.  Secretaries of the Military Departments. ........ 5 2.4.  Combatant Commanders With Geographic Areas of Responsibility. ........ 5 2.5.  Commander, USSOCOM. ........ 5
+GLOSSARY ........ 7
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 7 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 7
+REFERENCES ........ 8
+
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+a.  LREC capabilities are enduring SOF critical competencies.  Selected SOF organizations will optimize the development, maintenance, enhancement, and use of these LREC capabilities for effective conduct of core missions and activities to satisfy SOF requirements in accordance with DoDD 5160.41E.
+
+b.  LREC skill is either an explicit or implied component of SOF primary core activities for specified SOF organizations identified in Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Force Planning Guidance.  For these organizations, LREC skills are an element of readiness.
+
+c.  Foreign language skills may be a requirement for personnel assignment within SOF
+organizations.  Language-dependent and language-designated positions are identified on organizational documents and managed by the appropriate agency or Military Department in coordination with their personnel offices.
+
+
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities 2.1.  Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Special Operations And Low-Intensity Conflict (Asd(So/Lic)).
+
+The ASD(SO/LIC):
+a.  In accordance with DoDI 5111.10, coordinates with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to establish policy for SOF LREC requirements consistent with DoDD 5160.41E.
+
+b.  Monitors compliance with this issuance. c.  Coordinates with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on SOF foreign language skill proficiency bonuses.
+
+d.  Designates an individual to serve as a Senior Language Authority to represent SOF
+equities in the Defense LREC Program and participate in the Defense Language Steering Committee in accordance with DoDD 5160.41E.
+
+e.  Coordinates with the USD(P&R) for biennial capability-based reviews, to identify SOF-
+specific language capability needs based on the National Security Strategic Guidance and the National Defense Strategy.
+
+f.  Coordinates with the USD(P&R) on the DoD Strategic Language List, in accordance with DoDD 5160.41E.
+
+g.  Informs the Secretary of the Army, in their capacity as the DoD Executive Agent for the DoD Contract Linguist Program as delegated in DoDD 5160.41E, of all SOF-specific linguist contract support.
+
+## 2.2.  Usd(P&R). The Usd(P&R):
+
+a.  Coordinates with the ASD(SO/LIC) for SOF-specific policy changes to the DoD LREC
+Program.
+
+b.  Coordinates with the ASD(SO/LIC) for biennial capabilities-based reviews, in accordance with DoDD 5160.41E, to identify DoD language capability needs based on the National Security Strategic Guidance and the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy.
+
+c.  Coordinates with the ASD(SO/LIC) on updates to the DoD Strategic Language List.
+
+## 2.3.  Secretaries Of The Military Departments.
+
+The Secretaries of the Military Departments:
+a.  Coordinate with the ASD(SO/LIC), the Commander, USSOCOM, and the SOF Service component commanders to establish and maintain personnel programs and policies supporting the LREC capability of SOF personnel.
+
+b.  Ensure that assigned military personnel receive initial culture training in accordance with DoDI 5160.70.  Ensure successful completion of this training is annotated in individuals' personnel records to enable the verification of training status.
+
+c.  Coordinate with the ASD(SO/LIC) on SOF foreign language skill proficiency bonuses.
+
+## 2.4.  Combatant Commanders With Geographic Areas Of Responsibility.
+
+The Combatant Commanders with geographic areas of responsibility:
+a.  Ensure their assigned sub-unified special operations command identifies SOF LREC
+requirements that support operational needs and forwards the requirements to the Commander, USSOCOM, in accordance with DoDI 5160.70, CJCS Manual S-3130.03, CJCS
+Instruction 3126.01, and applicable USSOCOM policy.
+
+b.  Coordinate with the Commander, USSOCOM to establish and maintain personnel programs and policies supporting the recruiting, assignment, and professional development of LREC-qualified SOF personnel.  Assignments, training, and education will reflect continued development of expertise in a specific region and language.
+
+c.  Identify SOF LREC requirements and skill levels required to meet current and planned operational and security needs in coordination with commanders of the theater special operation commands, and report them to the Commander, USSOCOM biennially.  The biennial reports include:
+(1)  Foreign LREC requirements and skill levels necessary to support SOF missions and activities within the theater.
+
+(2)  LREC requirements for the conventional forces assigned to SOF organizations.
+
+## 2.5.  Commander, Ussocom.
+
+The Commander, USSOCOM:
+a.  Studies and validates SOF LREC requirements and skill levels to support operational requirements.
+
+b.  Forwards validated LREC requirements and skills identified for conventional forces which are organic to SOF organizations and necessary to support the operational needs of SOF organizations through the Service SOF components to the appropriate Military Departments for validation and integration into manning documents.
+
+c.  Programs resources to train SOF personnel to provide and maintain sufficient LREC-
+skilled SOF to satisfy constrained SOF LREC requirements.
+
+d.  Proposes, initiates, and maintains readiness reporting of the LREC capability of SOF
+organizations whose manning documents reflect SOF language requirements.
+
+e.  Reports SOF LREC skill requirements to the CJCS, in accordance with CJCS
+Instruction 3126.01.
+
+f.  Identifies specific SOF organizations for which LREC skill is a component of SOF
+primary core activities in the annual USSOCOM Force Planning Guidance.
+
+g.  Monitors the assignment of LREC-qualified SOF personnel and promotes assignments that capitalize on and enhance individual LREC expertise.
+
+h.  Plans, conducts, evaluates, and monitors exercises requiring SOF LREC use.
+
+i.  Ensures the commanders of the theater special operation commands include LREC
+capability requirements in Annexes A and E, Appendix 5 of their operation and concept plans in accordance with CJCS Manual S-3130.03, CJCS Instruction 3126.01, and USSOCOM Directive 350-17.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+ASD(SO/LIC)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+LREC
+language, regional expertise, and culture
+SOF
+special operations forces
+USD(P&R)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+USSOCOM
+United States Special Operations Command
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+This term and its definition are for the purpose of this issuance.
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+representative
+Defined in DoDD 5160.41E.
+
+
+## References
+
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3126.01, "Language, Regional Expertise, and
+Culture Capability Identification, Planning, and Sourcing," November 18, 2020
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual S-3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and
+Guidance1
+Commander, United States Special Operations Command, "Force Planning Guidance," current
+edition
+DoD Directive 5111.10, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
+Intensity Conflict," May 5, 2021
+DoD Directive, 5160.41E, "Defense Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC)
+Program," August 21. 2015, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5160.70, "Management of the Defense Language, Regional Expertise, and
+Culture (LREC) Program," December 30, 2016
+National Security Strategic Guidance Secretary of Defense "National Defense Strategy" current edition United States Special Operations Command Directive 350-17, "The Special Operations Forces Language Training Program Standards," April 22, 2019

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+## Dod Instruction 4120.15 Designating And Naming Military Aerospace Vehicles Originating Component: Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense For Acquisition And Sustainment
+
+ Effective:
+November 2, 2023 Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. Incorporates and Cancels: DoD Directive 4120.15, "Designating and Naming Military Aerospace
+Vehicles," November 29, 2004, as amended
+Cancels:
+DoD 4120.15-L, "Model Designation of Military Aerospace Vehicles,"
+May 12, 2004, as amended Approved by:
+William LaPlante, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive 5135.02, this issuance:
+- Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities to promote clarity and consistency throughout the
+DoD in referencing military aerospace vehicles.
+- Designates the Secretary of the Air Force as lead agent to ensure consistency and uniformity of
+compliance with this issuance.
+- Provides for consistent assignment of unique Mission-Design Series (MDS) designators to all
+military aerospace vehicles.
+- Authorizes:
+o Publication of DAFI 16-401/AR 70-50/NAVAIRINST 13100.16, which governs the designation and naming functions for military aerospace vehicles.
+
+o A DoD-wide list of approved MDS designators and popular names for military aerospace vehicles, maintained on the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)'s Common Access Cardenabled DoDTechipedia website (https://www.dodtechipedia.mil/dodwiki/display/MDS/MDS+- +Mission+Design+Series).
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 4
+2.1.  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S))........ 4 2.2.  Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. ........ 4 2.3.  Director, DTIC. ........ 4 2.4.  Secretary of the Air Force. ........ 4 2.5.  Affected DoD Component Heads and Principal Staff Assistants. ........ 5
+GLOSSARY ........ 6
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 6 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 6
+REFERENCES ........ 8
+
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard at all times, including when it is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security by agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+a.  Each military aerospace vehicle is assigned a unique MDS designator.  Only approved MDS designators and popular names are used in referencing these military aerospace vehicles in official documents and public statements.
+
+b.  The Secretary of the Air Force serves as lead agent to ensure consistency and uniformity of compliance with this issuance.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities
+
+2.1.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT
+(USD(A&S)). The USD(A&S):
+
+a.  Oversees implementation of this issuance.
+b.  Coordinates with the Secretary of the Air Force on MDS designator assignment and popular name usage.
+
+## 2.2.  Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense For Public Affairs.
+
+The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs ensures public suitability of popular names for each military aerospace vehicle before they are announced to the public.
+
+## 2.3.  Director, Dtic.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.5. and under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Director, DTIC, maintains the DoDTechipedia Website.
+
+## 2.4.  Secretary Of The Air Force.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.5., the Secretary of the Air Force:
+a.  As needed, revises and publishes DAFI 16-401/AR 70-50/NAVAIRINST 13100.16, which codifies designating and naming functions for military aerospace vehicles.  Coordinates revisions with the other DoD Component heads.
+
+b.  For military aerospace vehicles:
+(1)  Assigns MDS designators in coordination with the USD(A&S). (2)  Assigns popular names by:
+(a)  Determining popular name options with the DoD Component head concerned.
+(b)  Coordinating the proposed popular name(s) with the USD(A&S) and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs in accordance with Paragraph 2.2.
+
+(c)  Informing the DoD Component head of the MDS designator and popular name assignment.
+
+(3)  Maintains a list of approved MDS designators and names for military aerospace vehicles in a single DoD-wide list on DTIC's DoDTechipedia Website.  Updates the "MDS - Mission Design Series" listing monthly if official changes have occurred.
+
+## 2.5.  Affected Dod Component Heads And Principal Staff Assistants.
+
+The affected DoD Component heads and Principal Staff Assistants (as defined in the Glossary):
+a.  In coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and consistent with Paragraph 2.4.b.(2)
+and DAFI 16-401/AR 70-50/NAVAIRINST 13100.16, propose popular names for their military aerospace vehicles.
+
+b.  Forward suggested changes for DAFI 16-401/AR 70-50/NAVAIRINST 13100.16 and the DoD-wide MDS designator list to the Secretary of the Air Force to facilitate preparations, coordinations, and revisions, as appropriate.
+
+c.  Disseminate the link for DTIC's DoDTechipedia Website to Component personnel, as needed.
+
+d.  Coordinate with the Secretary of the Air Force before referencing, in official documents and public statements, military aerospace vehicles in the planning or predevelopment stages that do not have approved MDS designators or popular names.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+AR
+Army Regulation
+DAFI
+Department of the Air Force instruction
+DTIC
+Defense Technical Information Center
+MDS
+Mission-Design Series
+NAVAIRINST
+Naval Air Systems Command instruction
+USD(A&S)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+affected DoD Component heads and Principal Staff Assistants
+DoD Component heads and Principal Staff Assistants whose organization designs, develops, or purchases aerospace vehicles for the DoD.
+DoDTechipedia
+The DoD Common Access Card-enabled website that hosts the DoD list of approved MDS designators and popular names for military aerospace vehicles, DAFI 16-401/AR 70-50/NAVAIRINST
+13100.16, and other related materials.
+
+MDS
+The official designation for military aerospace vehicles used to represent a specific category of vehicles for operations, support, and documentation purposes.  The MDS system is comprised of two parts: a required MDS designator and an optional MDS popular
+name, e.g., "F-35A Lightning."
+
+MDS designator
+The MDS designator is an official DoD recognized alpha-numeric designation of a military aerospace vehicle.
+MDS popular name
+A plain language name applied to the MDS of certain military aerospace vehicles, which aids communications and media references.
+
+## Term Definition
+
+Aircraft, guided missiles, rockets, probes, boosters, and satellites.
+
+military aerospace vehicles
+
+## References
+
+DAFI 16-401/AR 70-50/NAVAIRINST 13100.16, "Designating and Naming Defense Military
+Aerospace Vehicles," November 3, 2020
+DoD Directive 5135.02, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+(USD(A&S))," July 15, 2020

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+## Dod Instruction 5000.89 Test And Evaluation
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
+Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
+Originating Component:
+November 19, 2020
+Effective:
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+Incorporates and Cancels: Enclosure 4 and Enclosure 5 of DoD Instruction 5000.02T, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," January 7, 2015, as amended
+
+Approved by:
+Michael J.K. Kratsios, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Research
+and Engineering
+Approved by:
+Robert F. Behler, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
+Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5137.02 and DoDD 5141.02, this issuance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for test and evaluation
+(T&E) programs across five of the six pathways of the adaptive acquisition framework: urgent capability acquisition, middle tier of acquisition (MTA), major capability acquisition, software acquisition, and defense business systems (DBS).  The sixth pathway, defense acquisition of services, does not require T&E policy and procedures.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 4
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 4 1.2.  Policy. ........ 4
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 5
+2.1.  Director of OT&E (DOT&E)........ 5 2.2.  USD(R&E). ........ 6
+SECTION 3:  T&E PROCEDURES ........ 7
+3.1.  Overview. ........ 7 3.2.  T&E Oversight List........ 11
+3.3.  T&E Management. ........ 12
+3.4.  T&E Program Planning........ 13 3.5.  Cybersecurity T&E. ........ 15 3.6.  Interoperability T&E. ........ 17 3.7.  Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) Compliance T&E. ........ 18
+SECTION 4:  ADAPTIVE ACQUISITION FRAMEWORK ........ 19
+4.1.  General Procedures. ........ 19 4.2.  T&E for Urgent Capability Acquisition Pathway. ........ 20 4.3.  T&E for MTA Pathway. ........ 21
+a.  Purpose and Applicability. ........ 21 b.  General Approach for Programs on T&E Oversight. ........ 21 c.  Test Strategy........ 22 d.  Ops Demo. ........ 22 e.  Reporting. ........ 23
+4.4.  T&E for Major Capability Acquisition Pathway. ........ 23 4.5.  T&E for Software Acquisition Pathway. ........ 24 4.6.  T&E for the DBS Pathway. ........ 26 4.7.  Companion Guide. ........ 26
+SECTION 5:  DT&E ........ 27
+5.1.  Overview. ........ 27 5.2.  DT&E Activities. ........ 27 5.3.  DT&E Execution, Evaluation, and Reporting. ........ 28
+a.  DT&E Execution. ........ 28 b.  DT&E Evaluation. ........ 29 c.  DT&E Reports and Data. ........ 29
+SECTION 6:  OT&E AND LFT&E ........ 30
+6.1.  Overview. ........ 30 6.2.  OT&E Activities. ........ 30
+a.  OAs. ........ 30 b.  RFPs. ........ 30 c.  OT&E for Reliability and Maintainability. ........ 31 d.  Operational Test Readiness........ 31 e.  Certifications. ........ 31
+6.3.  LFT&E. ........ 31 6.4.  Operational and Live Fire Execution. ........ 32
+a.  Planning Test Events. ........ 32
+b.  Conducting Test Events. ........ 34 c.  Data Management, Evaluation, and Reporting. ........ 35
+GLOSSARY ........ 36
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 36 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 37
+REFERENCES ........ 39
+
+## Figures
+
+Figure 1.  Integrated T&E Framework ........ 9
+Figure 2.  Adaptive Acquisition Framework ........ 20 Figure 3.  Operational or Major Live Fire Test Event: Planning, Approval, Execution, and Reporting........ 32
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+a. The DoD Components will:
+(1) Conduct developmental T&E (DT&E), operational T&E (OT&E), and live fire T&E
+(LFT&E) as part of an adequate T&E program.
+
+(2) Integrate test planning and test execution across stakeholders to facilitate an efficient use of data and resources.
+
+b. For non-major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and for programs not on T&E
+oversight, these guiding principles should be used as a best practice for an integrated and effective T&E strategy.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities 2.1.  Director Of Ot&E (Dot&E).
+
+Pursuant to Section 139, Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), the DOT&E is the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
+(USD(R&E)) on OT&E in the DoD, and the principal OT&E official within the senior management of the DoD.  The DOT&E:
+a. Prescribes policies and procedures for the conduct of OT&E and LFT&E for the DoD
+across the acquisition pathways.
+
+b. Monitors and reviews OT&E and LFT&E activities in the DoD. c. Oversees MDAPs or other programs designated by the Director.
+d. Determines specific OT&E and LFT&E policy and best practices for each of the acquisition pathways as applicable.
+
+e. Designates select programs for DOT&E operational and live fire oversight in accordance with Sections 139, 2366, 2399, and 2400 of Title 10, U.S.C., as applicable, and the criteria outlined in Paragraph 3.2 of this issuance.
+
+f. Publishes and manages the T&E oversight list, which identifies all programs under oversight for DT&E, OT&E, or LFT&E.
+
+g. Approves the OT&E and LFT&E planned activities in test and evaluation master plans
+(TEMPs), test strategies, or other overarching program test planning documents for programs on the T&E oversight list.
+h. Approves, in writing, the adequacy of operational test (OT) plans for those programs under DOT&E oversight before OT begins.
+
+i. Approves LFT&E strategies and waivers before LFT&E activities begin and in accordance with the timeline established in Section 2366 of Title 10 U.S.C.
+
+j. Determines the quantity of articles to be procured for OT for systems on the T&E
+oversight list.
+
+k. Evaluates and approves the use of production-representative articles for purposes of adequate and realistic initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) for programs under T&E
+oversight.
+
+l. Assesses the adequacy of OT&E and LFT&E performed by the Military Services and operational test agencies (OTAs) for programs under T&E oversight.
+
+m. Approves, in writing, the use of data collected outside an approved operational test plan
+(OTP) for use in operational evaluation for programs under T&E oversight.
+
+n. Submits independent OT&E and LFT&E reports to the OSD, Joint Staff, DoD
+Components, and congressional defense committees, as applicable.
+
+o. Submits a report after the conclusion of OT&E, as required by Section 2399 of Title 10, U.S.C., to the OSD, Joint Staff, DoD Components, and congressional defense committees before systems under T&E oversight may proceed to beyond low-rate initial production (LRIP).
+
+p. Submits an annual report summarizing the operational and live fire test and evaluation activities of the Department of Defense during the preceding fiscal year as required by Section 139(h) of Title 10, U.S.C.
+
+## 2.2.  Usd(R&E).
+
+Pursuant to Section 133a of Title 10, U.S.C. and DoDD 5137.02, the USD(R&E):
+a. Establishes policies and strategic guidance and leads defense research; engineering;
+developmental prototyping and experimentation; technology development, exploitation, transition, and transfer; DT&E; and manufacturing technology activities.
+
+b. Prepares Milestone B (MS B) and Milestone C (MS C) DT&E sufficiency assessments on those MDAPs where the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) is the milestone decision authority (MDA).
+
+c. Develops DT&E policy and ensures appropriate test facilities, test ranges, tools, and related modeling and simulation capabilities are maintained within the DoD.
+
+d. Serves as an advisor to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on matters within USD(R&E) authority and expertise to inform and influence requirements, concepts, capabilitiesbased assessments, and concepts of operations.
+
+e. Approves the DT&E plan within TEMPs and delegates approval authority, as appropriate. f. Develops governing policy and advances practices and workforce competencies for DT&E.
+
+## Section 3:  T&E Procedures 3.1.  Overview.
+
+a. The fundamental purpose of T&E is to enable the DoD to acquire systems that support the warfighter in accomplishing their mission.  To that end, T&E provides engineers and decisionmakers with knowledge to assist in managing risks; to measure technical progress; and to characterize operational effectiveness, operational suitability, interoperability, survivability (including cybersecurity), and lethality.  This is done by planning and executing a robust and rigorous T&E program.
+
+b. Integrated testing and independent evaluation are part of a larger continuum of T&E that includes DT&E (both contractor and government), OT&E, and LFT&E.  Integrated testing requires the collaborative planning and execution of test phases and events to provide shared data in support of independent analysis, evaluation, and reporting by all stakeholders.  Whenever feasible, the programs will conduct testing in an integrated fashion to permit all stakeholders to use data in support of their respective functions.
+c. Programs will incorporate integrated testing at the earliest opportunity when developing program strategies, plans with program protection, documentation, and T&E strategies or the TEMPs.  Developing and adopting integrated testing early in the process increases the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall T&E program.
+(1) If done correctly, integrated testing provides greater opportunity for early identification of concerns to improve the system design, and guides the system development during the engineering and manufacturing development phase.  Conducting critical test activities earlier will enable the discovery of problems that the program can fix while the system is still in development and avoid costly redesigns late in the acquisition life cycle.
+(2) Integrated testing and independent evaluation also encourage the sharing of all developmental test (DT), OT, and live fire test resources to accomplish the test program.  For programs informing decisions that are not addressed in Title 10, U.S.C., such as fielding, deployment, and low-rate production decisions, well planned and executed integrated testing may provide necessary data for an OTA to determine the system's operational effectiveness, suitability, and overall mission capability.
+(3) Integrated testing does not replace or eliminate the requirement for IOT&E, as a condition to proceed beyond LRIP for programs with beyond low-rate (i.e., full-rate) production decisions as required by Section 2399 of Title 10, U.S.C.
+d. To ensure T&E focuses on informing the program's decision-making process throughout the acquisition life cycle, the TEMP will include the program's key decision points and the T&E information needed to support them.  These decisions may be made by leaders ranging from the program manager (PM) to the MDA, and should represent major turning or decision points in the acquisition life cycle that need T&E information in order to make an informed decision.
+Examples include milestone decisions, key integration points, and technical readiness decisions.
+This information is captured in a table known as the Integrated Decision Support Key (IDSK).
+This table is developed by the PM by analyzing what is already known about the capability, what still needs to be known about the capability, and when it needs to be known.
+
+e. The PM:
+(1) Resources and executes the system's integrated test and independent evaluation program.
+
+(2) Identifies DT, OT, and LF data requirements necessary to support decisions, in consultation with the chief developmental tester (CDT), the chief engineer, and the OTA
+representative, and combines them into an IDSK.
+
+(3) Charters an integrated test planning group (i.e., the T&E Working-level Integrated Product Team (WIPT), also known as an integrated test team) early in the program.  It will consist of empowered representatives of test data producers and consumers (including all applicable stakeholders) to ensure collaboration and to develop a strategy for robust, efficient testing to support systems engineering, evaluations, and certifications throughout the acquisition life cycle.
+
+f. The T&E WIPT, chaired by the CDT:
+(1) Provides a forum for involvement by all key organizations in the T&E effort.
+(2) Develops the TEMP for the PM.  Requires all key stakeholders to be afforded an opportunity to contribute to TEMP development.
+
+(3) Includes representatives of test data stakeholders such as systems engineering, DT&E, OT&E, LFT&E, the user, product support, the intelligence community, and applicable certification authorities.
+
+(4) Supports the development and tracking of an integrated test program for DT, OT, LFT&E, and modeling and simulation to support evaluations.
+
+(5) Supports the development and maintenance of the integrated test schedule. (6) Identifies and provides a recommended corrective action or risk assessment.
+(7) Explores and facilitates opportunities to conduct integrated testing to meet DT, OT, and LFT&E objectives.
+
+g. The T&E WIPT requires test objectives to be understood, the testing to be conducted in an operational context to the maximum extent possible, and the resultant data to be relevant for use in independent evaluations and the rationale behind the requirements.  While using the T&E framework, as shown in Figure 1, it is critical that all stakeholders:
+(1) Understand the scope of the evaluations required.
+
+(2) Define, up front, the end state for evaluations.
+(3) Develop an integrated testing approach that generates the data required to conduct independent evaluations.
+h. The T&E WIPT will identify DT, OT, and LFT&E data requirements needed to inform critical acquisition and engineering decisions.  Once the T&E WIPT identifies the data requirements, the developmental and operational testers together will determine which data requirements can be satisfied through integrated testing and develop an integrated test matrix.
+
+(1) All stakeholders will use the IDSK to independently develop evaluation frameworks or strategies that will show the correlation and mapping between evaluation focus areas, critical decision points, and specific data requirements.
+(2) The CDT will develop the developmental evaluation framework (DEF) that focuses on the correlation between technical requirements, decision points, and data requirements.
+(3) The OTA representative will develop the operational evaluation framework (OEF)
+that focuses on the correlation between operational issues, decision points, and data requirements.  The linkage between the OEF and the DEF shows that technical requirements support operational capabilities.
+i. As part of the digital engineering strategy, models and data will be used to digitally represent the system in a mission context to conduct integrated T&E activities.  To the largest extent possible, programs will use an accessible digital ecosystem (e.g., high bandwidth network, computational architectures, multi-classification environment, enterprise resources, tools, and advanced technologies).  This environment must provide authoritative sources of models, data, and test artifacts (e.g., test cases, plans, deficiencies, and results) and provide digital technologies to automate, reuse, and auto-generate test artifacts to gain greater accuracy, precision, and efficiencies across integrated test resources.
+j. The T&W WIPT documents the configuration of the test asset and the actual test conditions under which each element of test data was obtained.  It indicates whether the test configuration represented operationally realistic or representative conditions.
+k. Before the start of testing for any acquisition path, the T&E WIPT will develop and document a TEMP or similar strategic document to capture DT, OT, and LFT&E requirements; the rationale for those requirements (e.g., Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and concept of operations (CONOPS)); and resources, to be approved by the DOT&E and USD(R&E), or their designee, as appropriate.  The TEMP, or similar strategic document for programs not under T&E oversight, is approved at the Service level.  At a minimum, the document details:
+
+(1) The resources and test support requirements needed for all test phases.
+(2) Developmental, operational, and live fire test objectives and test metrics.
+(3) Program schedule with T&E events and reporting requirements that incorporate
+report generation timelines.
+(4) Test phase objectives, including entrance and exit criteria and cybersecurity test
+objectives.
+(5) Program decisions and data requirements to support those decisions. (6) Data collection requirements.
+(7) Funding sources for all test resources.
+l. The PM will use the TEMP, test strategy, or other pathway-appropriate test strategy documentation as the planning and management tool for the integrated T&E program.  The test strategy documentation requires DoD Component approval.  Documentation for programs under USD(R&E) or DOT&E oversight will require USD(R&E), or their designee, and DOT&E approval respectively.  Documentation for programs not under T&E oversight is approved at the Service level.
+
+## 3.2.  T&E Oversight List.
+
+a. The DOT&E will manage the T&E oversight list used jointly by the USD(R&E) and DOT&E.  Programs on OT and LFT&E oversight include those programs that meet the statutory definition of MDAPs in Section 2430, Title 10, U.S.C., and those that are designated by the DOT&E for oversight pursuant to Paragraph (a)(2)(B) of Section 139, Title 10, U.S.C.  The DOT&E treats the latter programs as MDAPs for the purpose of OT and LFT&E oversight requirements, but not for any other purpose.
+b. The DOT&E may place any program or system on the T&E oversight list at any time by using the following criteria:
+(1) Program exceeds or has the potential to exceed the dollar value threshold for a major program, to include MDAPs, designated major subprograms, as well as highly classified programs and pre-MDAPs.
+(2) Program has a high level of congressional or DoD interest. (3) Weapons, equipment, or munitions that provide or enable a critical mission warfighting capability, or are a militarily significant change to a weapon system.
+
+c. The DOT&E will provide formal notification to a Military Service when a program is being added to the T&E oversight list.
+
+d. The DOT&E will monitor acquisition programs and consider the following to determine when programs should be removed from the T&E oversight list:
+(1) T&E (initial and follow-on OT&E or LFT&E) is complete and associated reporting to inform fielding and full-rate production (FRP) decisions is complete.
+
+(2) Program development has stabilized, and there are no significant upgrade activities.
+
+e. The DOT&E is the approval authority for the respective OT&E and LFT&E planned activities in TEMPs, test strategies, or other overarching program test planning documents for programs on the T&E oversight list.
+f. The USD(R&E) is the approval authority for the DT&E plan in the TEMP, test strategy, or other overarching program test planning documents for all acquisition category (ACAT) ID
+programs.  The USD(R&E) reviews and advises the MDA on the DT&E plan in the TEMP, test strategy, or other overarching program test planning documents for ACAT IB and IC programs.
+
+g. If an Under Secretary or Service Secretary has a significant objection to a fundamental aspect of the DT&E plan, he or she may raise this objection to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the form of a briefing.  The briefing serves to notify the Deputy of a dissenting view, not to preemptively halt the relevant decision or the program office's activities.  If warranted, the Deputy will intercede.  Briefing requests should be made well in advance of the approval of the TEMP.
+h. The T&E oversight list is unclassified.  The DOT&E maintains the T&E oversight list continuously at https://osd.deps.mil/org/dote-extranet/SitePages/Home.aspx (requires login with a common access card).  Classified and sensitive programs placed on T&E oversight will be identified directly to their MDAs.
+i. Force protection equipment (including non-lethal weapons) will be subject to oversight, as determined by the DOT&E.
+
+## 3.3.  T&E Management.
+
+a. As soon as practicable after the program office is established, the PM will designate a CDT.  The CDT will be responsible for coordinating the planning, management, and oversight of all DT&E (contractor and government) activities; overseeing the T&E activities of other participating government activities; and helping the PM make technically informed, objective judgments about contractor and government T&E planning and results.
+
+b. PMs will designate, as soon as practicable after the program office is established, a government test agency to serve as the lead DT&E organization.  For non-T&E oversight programs, a lead DT&E organization should be used, when feasible, and identified in the TEMP. The lead DT&E organization will be responsible for:
+
+(1) Providing technical expertise on T&E concerns to the CDT. (2) Conducting DT&E activities to support independent evaluations.
+(3) Conducting DT&E activities as directed by the CDT or his or her designee. (4) Supporting certification and accreditation activities when feasible.
+(5) Assisting the CDT in providing oversight of contractors.
+(6) Assisting the CDT in reaching technically informed, objective judgments about contractor and government T&E planning and results.
+c. For each program, a lead OTA, lead DT organization, and lead test organization (LTO)
+will be designated to plan and conduct OTs, DTs, and LFT&E; report results; and provide an independent and objective evaluation of operational effectiveness, operational suitability, survivability (including cybersecurity), or lethality.  They also conduct additional testing and evaluation, as required.
+
+d. A program may use several different acquisition pathways, such as the major capability acquisition pathway that has a component or subprogram being developed through the MTA pathway and a software capability developed using the software acquisition pathway.  As required in the particular pathway guidance, individual program planning documents will include a transition or integration plan that describes the T&E scope and resources following the transition.
+e. T&E program documentation that already exists in other acquisition documents may be referenced as appropriate in the DOT&E- or USD(R&E)-approved T&E document.  Once referenced, there is no requirement to repeat the language in the T&E program document.
+f. The PM and test agencies for T&E oversight programs will provide the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) with all reports, and the supporting data and metadata for the test events in those reports.  If there are limitations in the data or metadata that can be provided to DTIC, those limitations will be documented in the TEMP starting at MS B.
+g. Test agencies will provide the DoD Modeling and Simulation Coordination Office with a descriptive summary and metadata for all accredited unclassified models or simulations that can potentially be reused by other programs.
+
+h. The Secretaries of the Military Departments, in coordination with the DAE, the DOT&E, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, will establish a common set of data for each major weapon system type to be collected on damage incurred during combat operations.  These data will be stored in a single dedicated and accessible repository at the DTIC.
+
+The lessons learned from analyzing these data will be included, as appropriate, in both the capability requirements process and the acquisition process for new acquisitions, modifications, and upgrades.
+
+## 3.4.  T&E Program Planning.
+
+a. The following are key considerations in developing the TEMP or other test planning documentation:
+(1) The PM and the T&E WIPT will use the TEMP or other planning documentation starting at Milestone A or the decision point to enter the applicable acquisition pathway.  The PM and the T&E WIPT will prepare and update the planning documentation as needed to support acquisition milestones or decision points.  For FRP decision review, full deployment decision review, and thereafter, the MDA, the senior DoD Component leadership, or DOT&E
+(for programs on T&E oversight), may require planning documentation updates or addendums to address changes to planned or additional testing.
+
+(2) Draft TEMPs will be available to program stakeholders as early and as frequently as possible.  For oversight programs, TEMPs approved by the DoD Components will be submitted to the OSD for approval not later than 45 calendar days before the supported decision point.  The PMs will ensure programs containing Information Technology (IT) are properly deconflicted with those programs' post implementation review described in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.82. To support agile acquisition, the timeline for TEMP delivery may be tailored with mutual consent between the DOT&E, OTA, and program office.
+
+(3) A TEMP may be waived or other tailored test strategy documentation be specified for certain acquisition pathways.  In cases where a TEMP is not needed, early briefings to Service stakeholders (as well as the USD(R&E) and DOT&E for oversight programs) are required to facilitate cross-organizational alignment and subsequent approval of test planning documentation.
+b. The TEMP or other test strategy documentation will:
+(1) Contain an integrated test program summary and master schedule of all major test events or test phases to evaluate.  The schedule should include the key programmatic decision points supported by the planned testing.
+
+(a) Describe DT test events designed to evaluate performance interoperability, reliability, and cybersecurity.
+(b) Describe OT test events designed to evaluate operational effectiveness, operational suitability, survivability, and cybersecurity.
+
+(2) Include an event-driven testing schedule that will allow adequate time to support pretest predictions; testing; post-test analysis, evaluation, and reporting; reconciliation of predictive models; and adequate time to support execution of corrective actions in response to discovered deficiencies.  The schedule should allow sufficient time between DT&E and IOT&E for rework, reports, and analysis, and developmental testing of critical design changes.
+
+(3) Be a source document for the request for proposal (RFP). (4) Guide how contractor proposals will address program T&E needs, (e.g., test articles;
+T&E data rights; government access to the failure reporting; built-in test and embedded instrumentation data; government use of contractor-conducted T&E; government review and approval of contractor T&E plans; and government review of contractor evaluations).
+
+(5) Include a DEF, live fire strategy, and an OT concept or OEF.  The DEF, live fire strategy, and the OT concept identify the key data that will contribute to assessing whether the DoD is acquiring a system that supports the warfighter in accomplishing the mission.
+(a) Examples of DT measures of program progress include key performance parameters (KPPs), critical technical parameters, intelligence data requirements, key system attributes, interoperability requirements, cybersecurity requirements, reliability growth, maintainability attributes, and DT objectives.  In addition, the DEF will show the correlation and mapping between test events, key resources, and the decision supported.
+
+(b) The PM and T&E WIPT should use an IDSK to ensure that the critical operational issues are not evaluating the technical specifications of the system, but are unit focused and tied to unit mission accomplishment.
+
+(6) Identify how scientific test and analysis tools will be used to design an effective and efficient test program that will produce the required data to characterize system behavior and combat mission capability across an appropriately selected set of factors and conditions.
+
+(7) Require all test infrastructure and tools (e.g., models, simulations, automated tools, synthetic environments) supporting acquisition decisions to be verified, validated, and accredited
+(VV&A) by the intended user or appropriate agency.  Test infrastructure, tools, and the VV&A strategy and schedule, including the VV&A authority for each tool or test infrastructure asset, will be documented in the TEMP, or other test strategy documentation.  PMs will plan for the application and accreditation of any modeling and simulation tools supporting T&E.
+(8) Require complete resource estimates for T&E to include: test articles, test sites and instrumentation, test support equipment, threat representations and simulations, intelligence mission data, test targets and expendables, support for friendly and threat operational forces used in test, models and simulations, testbeds, joint mission environment, distributed test networks, funding, manpower and personnel, training, federal/State/local requirements, range requirements, and any special requirements (e.g., explosive ordnance disposal requirements or corrosion prevention and control).  Resources will be mapped against the IDSK and schedule to ensure adequacy and availability.
+
+(9) For MDAPs, pursuant to Section 839(b) of Public Law 115-91, the PM will develop a resource table listing the initial estimates for government T&E costs in three specific categories: DT&E, OT&E, and LFT&E.  This requirement also applies at each TEMP, or other test strategy documentation, update.
+
+c. Pursuant to Section 139, Title 10, U.S.C., the DOT&E will have prompt access to all data regarding modeling and simulation activity proposed to be used by Military Departments and Defense Agencies in support of operational or LFT&E of military capabilities.  This access will include data associated with VV&A activities.  The PM will allow prompt access, after a test event, to the USD(R&E) and DOT&E, all records and data (including classified and propriety information, and periodic and preliminary reports of test events).  Timelines for delivery for records, reports, and data will be coordinated among the stakeholders and documented in appropriate test documentation.
+
+## 3.5.  Cybersecurity T&E.
+
+a. Cybersecurity planning and execution occurs throughout the entire life cycle.  All DoD
+acquisition programs and systems (e.g., DBS, national security systems, weapon systems, nondevelopmental items), regardless of acquisition pathway, will execute the cybersecurity DT and OT iterative T&E process detailed in the DoD Cybersecurity T&E Guidebook throughout the program's life cycle, including new increments of capability.  The DoD Cybersecurity T&E Guidebook provides the latest in data-driven, mission-impact-based analysis and assessment methods for cybersecurity T&E and supports assessment of cybersecurity, survivability, and resilience within a mission context and encourages planning for tighter integration with traditional system T&E.
+b. The PMs will:
+(1) Develop a cybersecurity strategy as part of the program protection plan based on the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System or other system cybersecurity, survivability, and resilience requirements; known and postulated threats; derived system requirements; draft system performance specifications; and the intended operational use and environment.  The cybersecurity strategy will also incorporate the appropriate aspects of the risk management framework (RMF) process (governed by DoDI 8500.01 and DoDI 8510.01) that supports obtaining an authority to operate and other items as addressed in DoD cybersecurity policies.  The cybersecurity strategy should describe how the authority to operate decision will be informed by the cybersecurity testing specified in the DoD Cybersecurity T&E Guidebook. The cybersecurity strategy should leverage integrated contractor and government testing to evaluate the security of contractor and government development capabilities of the program's sub-components, components, and integrated components; and describe the dedicated government system vulnerability and threat-based cybersecurity testing to be conducted before program product acceptance.
+
+(2) Use the cybersecurity strategy as a source document to develop the TEMP, or other test strategy documentation.  The TEMP DEF and OEF will identify specific cybersecurity data required to address the various cybersecurity stakeholder needs (PM, engineers, RMF, DT testers, OTA), crosswalk the data to develop an integrated cybersecurity T&E strategy that efficiently obtains these data, and describe how key program decisions, including the authority to operate decision, will be informed by cybersecurity testing.
+
+(3) Determine the avenues and means by which the system and supporting infrastructure may be exploited for cyber-attack and use this information to design T&E activities and scenarios.  Conduct a mission-based cyber risk assessment (such as a cyber table top) to identify those elements and interfaces of the system that, based on criticality and vulnerability analysis, need specific attention in T&E events.
+
+(4) Plan to conduct contractor and government integrated tailored cooperative vulnerability identification (T&E activities to identify vulnerabilities and plan the means to mitigate or resolve them, including system scans, analysis, and architectural reviews.  These activities begin with prototypes.
+
+(5) Plan to conduct integrated tailored cybersecurity DT&E events using realistic threat exploitation techniques in representative operating environments and scenarios to exercise critical missions within a cyber-contested environment to identify any vulnerabilities and assess system cyber resilience.  Whenever possible, plan threat-based testing as part of integrated contractor and government T&E.
+
+c. The April 3, 2018 DOT&E Memorandum directs OTAs to perform a cybersecurity cooperative vulnerability and penetration assessment (CVPA) and an adversarial assessment (AA) of all acquisition programs.  The January 21, 2015 DOT&E Memorandum directs OTAs to modify their cybersecurity T&E processes as appropriate for DoD systems whose functions include financial or fiscal/business activities or the management of funds.  The January 21, 2015 DOT&E Memorandum also directs the OTAs to add cyber economic threat analysis, cyber economic scenario testing, and financial transaction analysis to their cybersecurity test planning for DBS.
+
+d. The DOT&E requires testing of cybersecurity during OT&E to include the representative users and an operationally representative environment.  This may include hardware; software (including embedded software and firmware); operators; maintainers; operational cyber and network defense; end users; network and system administrators; help desk; training; support documentation; tactics, techniques, and procedures; cyber threats; and other systems that input or exchange information with the system under test, as applicable.
+(1) The OTAs will evaluate cybersecurity in OT&E via two assessments: a cybersecurity CVPA and an AA.  The CVPA and AA should be designed to identify cyber vulnerabilities, examine attack paths, evaluate operational cyber defense capabilities, and establish the operational mission effects (e.g., loss of critical operational capability) in a cyber threat environment while conducting operational missions.
+(2) The OTA, with DOT&E review and approval, should integrate developmental and operational testing where possible to ensure sufficient data are obtained to meet OT&E objectives and measures.  The OTAs should review and consider data from DT events (such as the cooperative vulnerability identification and adversarial cybersecurity DT&E) and any integrated tests previously conducted.  CVPA and AA results used in conjunction with the other OT&E and LFT&E results will inform the overall evaluation of operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability.
+
+e. All programs should plan for periodic integrated government cybersecurity test events before beginning operational testing or initial production, with the goal of increasing efficiency and effectiveness of cybersecurity T&E.
+(1) Understanding that the objectives and knowledge requirements of DT&E and OT&E
+must be met, it is critical that the conditions of the test event and the maturity of the system under test are acceptable to both stakeholders.
+(2) The system under test must be mature enough to represent the production version.
+
+The test conditions should be realistic enough to adequately represent the operational environment, while still being flexible enough to allow a wide range of penetration and adversarial activities.  The goal is to maximize assessment of vulnerabilities, evaluate adversarial exploitability of those vulnerabilities, as well as evaluate recovery and restoral processes.
+(3) Testing must include evaluating appropriate defensive cyberspace operations in accordance with DoDI 8530.01.  The result of cybersecurity testing should be an understanding of mission critical cybersecurity vulnerabilities, each of which should then be eliminated before fielding the system.
+
+## 3.6.  Interoperability T&E.
+
+a. Interoperability testing is governed by DoDI 8330.01.  All programs or acquisition paths that exchange data with an organization or site external to their Service require an interoperability certification from the Joint Interoperability Test Command, and will need to incorporate interoperability into the DT and OT.
+
+b. IT interoperability should be evaluated early and with sufficient frequency throughout a system's life cycle to capture and assess changes affecting interoperability in a platform, joint, multinational, and interagency environment.  Interoperability T&E can be tailored for the characteristics of the capability being acquired in accordance with applicable acquisition pathway policy.  Interoperability certification must be granted before fielding of a new IT capability or upgrade to existing IT.
+
+c. Working with the DoD business, warfighting, intelligence, and enterprise information environment mission area owners (Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, and DoD Chief Information Officer) and the other DoD Component heads, the T&E WIPTs should require that capability-focused, architecture-based measures of performance and associated metrics are developed to support evaluations of IT interoperability throughout a system's life cycle and to ensure logistics assets are planned for within the T&E management plan.
+
+## 3.7.  Navigation Warfare (Navwar) Compliance T&E.
+
+a. In accordance with the national defense strategy and DoDD 4650.05, resilient positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information is essential to the execution and command and control of military missions and to the efficient operation of information networks necessary for continuous situational awareness by Combatant Commanders.  The DoD will employ NAVWAR capabilities to ensure a PNT advantage in support of military operations, and programs producing or using PNT information must be NAVWAR compliant.  NAVWAR compliance testing is governed by DoDI 4650.08.
+
+b. Each program or system producing or using PNT information must incorporate the system survivability KPP as defined in Paragraph 3.2.a. of DoDI 4650.08.
+
+c. For each program or system producing or using PNT information, the PM must conduct system T&E (e.g., real-world test; modeling and simulation; empirical analysis) sufficient to validate that all systems or platforms producing or using PNT information meet the system survivability KPP referred to in Paragraph 3.7.b.
+
+d. Pursuant to Section 1610 of Public Law 115-232, also known as "the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019," the PM will systematically collect PNT T&E data, lessons learned, and design solutions.  In accordance with DoDD 4650.05, the USD(R&E) and the DOT&E will share insights gained from such information with the DoD PNT Enterprise Oversight Council, as appropriate.
+
+## Section 4:  Adaptive Acquisition Framework 4.1.  General Procedures.
+
+a. Pursuant to DoDD 5000.01 and DoDI 5000.02T, the PM will develop an acquisition strategy for MDA approval that matches the acquisition pathway (see Figure 2) processes, reviews, documents, and metrics to the character and risk of the capability being acquired.
+
+b. Follow the overarching guidance in Paragraph 3.1 plus the pathway specific guidance in this section.
+
+c. As applicable within each pathway, and upon coordination with the DOT&E, the DOT&E
+approves, in writing, the adequacy of OT&E plans for all programs on the T&E oversight list, including, but not limited to, early operational assessments (EOAs), OAs,  IOT&E, and followon OT&E.  In accordance with Section 139 of Title 10, U.S.C., OTAs provide DOT&E plans to assess adequacy of data collection and analysis planning to support the DOT&E's independent assessment of a system's operational effectiveness, operational suitability, survivability (including cybersecurity), or lethality.
+
+## 4.2.  T&E For Urgent Capability Acquisition Pathway.
+
+a. The DOT&E will monitor all programs using the urgent capability pathway to determine placement under T&E oversight.  A TEMP is not normally required.  Designated programs for DOT&E operational and live fire oversight will adhere to the policies established by the DOT&E for oversight programs.  These include:
+(1) Approval by the DOT&E of OTPs and live fire test plans (LFTPs) at the production and development milestone.  The Military Services are required to deliver test plans to the DOT&E 60 days before the start of testing.
+
+(2) Approval by the DOT&E of post-deployment assessment plans at the production and deployment milestone.
+b. Programs not under T&E oversight are approved at the Service level; the program may require a rapid and focused operational assessment (OA) and live fire testing (if applicable) before deploying an urgent need solution.  The acquisition approach will identify any requirements to evaluate health, safety, or operational effectiveness, suitability, survivability, and lethality.
+
+c. As applicable, the DOT&E will submit independent OT and live fire reports to the Secretary of Defense, the USD(A&S), congressional defense committees, and Military Services. The Secretary of Defense may authorize certain programs to defer some testing until after fielding if he or she determines the testing would unnecessarily impede the deployment of the needed capability.  Testing should normally include user feedback to support design and operational use improvements and the PM's plans to correct identified deficiencies.
+
+## 4.3.  T&E For Mta Pathway. A. Purpose And Applicability.
+
+MTA programs include rapid prototyping and rapid fielding programs intended to complete in 2 to 5 years.  MTA programs may be placed on the T&E oversight list and remain subject to: the LFT&E requirements in Section 2366 of Title 10, U.S.C.; IOT&E requirements in Section 2399 of Title 10, U.S.C.; LRIP quantities described in Section 2400 of Title 10, U.S.C.; and cybersecurity test requirements described in the April 3, 2018 DOT&E Memorandum.  The DOT&E will determine whether to oversee an MTA program according to standards set in Paragraph 3.2.b. Memorandum.
+
+## B. General Approach For Programs On T&E Oversight.
+
+(1) The DOT&E supports both the intent of the MTA pathway and the statutory mandate that MTA programs demonstrate and evaluate operational performance.
+
+(2) DoDI 5000.80 requires both rapid prototyping and rapid fielding programs using the MTA pathway to develop a test strategy.  Programs under T&E oversight will submit this test strategy, to include plans for operational testing and operational demonstrations (ops demos), to the DOT&E for approval.  MTA ops demos offer a unique opportunity to "fly before you buy" by involving the operational user early in the acquisition process, before the initial production decision is made.  The lead OTA will incorporate operational user inputs and participation in program test strategies.  The DOT&E encourages tailoring MTA ops demos, and other T&E, to enable rapid fielding while maintaining acceptable risk to the warfighter.
+(3) The program's decision authority will designate a DoD Component OTA to serve as the lead OTA.  The PM will collaborate with the OTA and other stakeholders to develop a fully integrated test strategy.  The OTA will submit plans for ops demos to the DOT&E for approval before starting the test.  For programs conducting multiple ops demos, the DOT&E will tailor this approval process to ensure appropriate oversight of ops demos leading to fielding or transition to another pathway in order to minimize disrupting early testing.  The DOT&E, in collaboration with the PM or OTA, will set the timeline for submitting the test strategy and OTPs for approval.  The data from all ops demos should be made available to the OTAs, the DOT&E, and other stakeholders for use to scope and inform subsequent test events and decisions.
+
+(4) Early and continuous coordination and collaboration among the DOT&E, the PM, and the OTA will support faster reviews by the DOT&E.  The PM will ensure that the OTA and DOT&E has access to ops demos and other operational, live fire, and cybersecurity test events and data.  For rapid prototyping programs that will not field a significant residual operational capability to the deployed warfighter, the DOT&E will tailor the test plan approval process, which may include delegating approval authority, depending on the level of risk to the warfighter.
+
+## C. Test Strategy.
+
+(1) To develop the test strategy, the PM may follow the streamlined TEMP guide, if that facilitates their planning, or other planning guides pre-coordinated with the OTA and DOT&E, to tailor their particular strategy to the acquisition pathway and the expected operational environment.  The test strategy should present, within the context of the intended acquisition strategy, the acquisition decision that the testing will inform, program objectives and schedule including major test events and milestones, the evaluation framework, required test resources (facilities, ranges, tools, test articles, personnel, and funding), and technical or test limitations.
+(2) Rapid prototyping test strategies will set evaluation criteria and milestones for technology maturity and prototype performance, culminating in an ops demo of the fieldable prototype in an operational environment.  The test strategy will describe the testing that will produce the data necessary to measure technology maturity and prototype performance as well as a description of how the program will achieve a residual operational capability.  Evaluation criteria should include performance, safety, interoperability, reliability, and cybersecurity. Progressive operational and live-fire assessments of capabilities and limitations, based on data from incremental integrated test events during the prototype development program, should be included in the test strategy.
+(3) Rapid fielding test strategies will set evaluation criteria and milestones to demonstrate performance of the proposed products or technologies for current operational purposes.  Rapid fielding decisions should be based on integrated developmental and operational testing that demonstrates how the capability contributes to fulfilling the warfighter's mission or the CONOPS.  As rapid fielding programs will begin production within 6 months of program start, they typically will rely heavily on previous testing to support this accelerated timeline.  The test strategy will identify all prior testing used, and will specify the additional testing necessary to address differences between the tested prototype and the planned production configuration.
+
+## D. Ops Demo.
+
+(1) The ops demo will inform the decision whether to transition from a rapid prototyping effort, to a rapid fielding effort, to a follow-on program; or, in a rapid fielding program, to start initial production.
+
+(2) The lead OTA will work with the CDT to develop plans for testing.  In rapid prototyping, the OTA provides input to the DT plan for execution of the ops demo.  For rapid fielding, a test plan is developed.  The lead OTA will plan and conduct the ops demo as an OA, with representative units, missions, and environments.  Ops demos may consist of a series of incremental test events or separate "capstone" demonstration events based on program requirements.  All events should be conducted in an integrated fashion, supported by collaborative developer, program office, DT, and OT planning.
+
+(3) Ops demos should consider all aspects of system performance, including survivability and lethality if deemed critical to mission effectiveness or force protection.  During the demo, operational personnel will operate the system, with the minimum necessary level of contractor support.  Mission demonstrations should be designed as end-to-end missions to the maximum extent possible, to include planning, mission task execution, and post-mission activities, based on user-provided employment concepts and tactics.
+
+(4) The OTA must submit the ops demo plan leading to a fielding decision or transition to another pathway to the DOT&E for approval before testing begins.  The plan will adequately detail: system configuration; capabilities to be demonstrated; the operational units, users, mission, and environment; and the primary T&E data that will demonstrate the required capabilities.
+
+e. Reporting.
+
+(1) The OTA is responsible for producing an independent ops demo report that identifies the system's operational capabilities and limitations.
+(2) The ops demo report will be delivered to the decision authority to support the initial production decision: before a rapid prototyping program transitions to a follow-on program and before a rapid fielding program begins initial production.
+(3) The DOT&E will provide independent OT&E and LFT&E reports to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Military Services, and congressional defense committees as required.
+
+## 4.4.  T&E For Major Capability Acquisition Pathway.
+
+a. These acquisitions typically follow a structured analysis, design, develop, integrate, test, evaluate, produce, and support approach.  This process supports MDAPs, major systems, and other complex acquisitions.
+
+b. The USD(R&E) will prepare MS B and MS C DT&E sufficiency assessments on those MDAPs where the DAE is the MDA, in accordance with Section 838 of Public Law 115-91.  For programs where the Service or the Component acquisition executive is the MDA, see Paragraph
+5.3.b.(2) for additional details.
+
+c. For programs under T&E oversight, the DOT&E will provide the MDA with milestone assessments.  The DOT&E will submit a report to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees before programs under T&E oversight may proceed beyond LRIP, in accordance with Sections 2366 and 2399 of Title 10, U.S.C.  Programs on T&E oversight may not conduct operational testing until the DOT&E approves the adequacy of the plans in writing, in accordance with Section 2399(b)(1) of Title 10, U.S.C.
+d. Service OTAs will conduct OT on all programs to support development, fielding decisions, and warfighter understanding of capabilities and limitations.  Following initial fielding, any capability upgrades, alterations that materially change system performance, and alterations that pose substantial risk of degrading fielded military capabilities if they fail will be tested by the OTA.
+
+e. Unless specifically waived, the test-related documentation that is required for MDAP
+programs will be required for all programs on DOT&E oversight, including, but not limited to, submission of Defense Intelligence Agency or DoD Component validated on-line life-cycle threat reports, test strategies, TEMPs, OTPs, LFTPs, and reporting of test results.
+
+## 4.5.  T&E For Software Acquisition Pathway.
+
+a. The software pathway focuses on modern iterative software development techniques such as agile, lean, and development security operations, which promise faster delivery of working code to the user.  The goal of this software acquisition pathway is to achieve continuous integration and continuous delivery to the maximum extent possible.  Integrated testing, to include contractor testing, is a critical component needed to reach this goal.  Identifying integrated T&E and interoperability requirements early in test strategy development will enable streamlined integration, developmental and operational T&E, interoperability certification, and faster delivery to the field.  The program acquisition strategy must clearly identify T&E
+requirements that have been fully coordinated with the test community.
+
+b. The software pathway policy includes a requirement to create a test strategy.  The program CDT or T&E lead, in collaboration with the other T&E stakeholders, should develop the test strategy and discuss the approach to developing measurable criteria derived from requirements (e.g., user features, user stories, use cases).  The software pathway policy additionally requires the identification of test platforms and infrastructure be included in the acquisition strategy; the estimated T&E costs be included in the cost estimate; and the periodic delivery of the technical baseline to include scripts, tools, libraries, and other software executables necessary to test the software.  Taken as whole, the test strategy for software intensive systems should include:
+(1) Characterization of proposed test platforms and infrastructure, including automated testing tools and plans to accredit their use.
+
+(2) Estimated T&E costs (DT&E, OT&E, and LFT&E). (3) Description of the necessary contractor-developed artifacts (e.g., source code, test scripts), along with any relevant scheduling information, to support the efficient reuse in streamlining T&E.
+
+(4) System-level performance requirements, non-functional performance requirements, and the metrics to be used to verify that the system will meet both functional and non-functional performance requirements.
+
+(5) Key independent organizations, roles and responsibilities, and established agreements on how they will be integrated early into the developmental activities and throughout the system life cycle.
+
+(6) How automated testing, test tools, and system telemetry will support the product throughout its life cycle.
+
+c. The software acquisition pathway may also be applied to embedded systems.  In the case of embedded software systems, the T&E strategy requires the same six features described in Paragraph 4.5.b., plus additional features, including:
+(1) Approach, including resources, for testing the software in the context of the hardware with which it will eventually be integrated.  This should include information on resources such as model-based environments, digital twins, and simulations, as well as plans for tests on a production-representative system.
+
+(2) Identification of any safety critical risks, along with an approach to manage them.
+d. PMs are encouraged to automate and integrate DT and OT testing to the maximum extent possible in order to accelerate acquisition timelines when feasible.  This includes planning for and collecting test data from the contractor testing that can be used for evaluation.  Just as the software product is being developed incrementally and iteratively in this modern software development paradigm, so too should be the T&E activities and products, particularly the test report.  To maximize the benefit of early and automated data collection opportunities, the PM must collaborate with the T&E interfaces and work through the T&E processes defined for DT&E (see Section 5) and OT&E (see Section 6) to tailor a plan that will enable the effective and efficient execution of analysis and evaluation, as well as the determination of test adequacy.
+
+(1) Automated testing should be used at the unit level, for application programming interface and integration tests, and to the maximum extent possible for user acceptance and to evaluate mission effectiveness.
+(2) Automated testing tools and automated security tools should be accredited by an OTA as "fit for purpose."
+(3) Cybersecurity developmental and operational T&E assessments should consider, and reference, the DoD Cybersecurity T&E Guidebook to assist in the planning and execution of cybersecurity T&E activities needed beyond just the authority to operate (which is a necessary but not sufficient mechanism to assess cybersecurity).  Automation, organic to the software acquisition pathway, provides data collection opportunities to develop cybersecurity T&E assessments in an incremental and iterative fashion.
+
+(4) Information gleaned from automated tests, such as those detailed above, as well as other forms of tests, should be provided to the sponsor and user community for use in their periodic value assessments of the software product.
+
+(5) The requirement for a PM to implement continuous runtime monitoring of operational software in this software acquisition pathway provides new opportunities to support operational test data requirements throughout the system life cycle.
+
+## 4.6.  T&E For The Dbs Pathway.
+
+a. DBS are governed by DoDI 5000.75 and supplemented by this issuance relative to T&E.
+
+b. DBS PMs will develop a TEMP or other test strategy documentation.  The PM will describe the test strategy and essential elements of the TEMP in the DBS implementation plan.
+Specific T&E management content requirements in the implementation plan include:
+(1) Test events to collect data must be defined, scheduled, and resourced in the implementation plan, including a DEF matrix for DT events.
+
+(2) Cybersecurity operational T&E must also include a cyber economic vulnerability analysis as outlined in the September 14, 2010 and January 21, 2015 DOT&E Memoranda.  The MDA will not tailor cybersecurity T&E solely to meet authority to operate requirements.
+
+(3) T&E planning will include mission-oriented developmental T&E with actual operators performing end-to-end scenarios in a controlled environment to collect human-system interface data and reduce risk during operational testing.
+
+c. Business operations testing ensures the system is working properly before the go-live decision to support OT on the live environment.  Business operations testing employs actual users on the test environment performing end-to-end business transactions.
+
+d. The CDT should plan for interoperability DT early to ensure availability of other interfacing business system test environments.
+
+e. For programs on the T&E oversight list, the level of test and use of test data as well as dedicated OT events should be approved by the DOT&E using guidance provided in the September 14, 2010 DOT&E Memorandum.  DT&E will include interoperability testing with realistic simulations or test environments of interfacing systems with operationally representative data exchanges in a controlled environment.
+
+## 4.7.  Companion Guide.
+
+Additional information will be available to expand upon the T&E policy established in this issuance at the Adaptive Acquisition Framework page on the Defense Acquisition University Website at:  https://www.dau.edu/aaf/
+
+## Section 5:  Dt&E 5.1.  Overview.
+
+DT&E activities support data generation for independent evaluations.  They also provide program engineers and decision-makers with information to measure progress, identify problems, characterize system capabilities and limitations, and manage technical and programmatic risks.  PMs use DT&E activities to manage and reduce risks during development, verify that products are compliant with contractual and technical requirements, prepare for OT, and inform decision-makers throughout the program life cycle.  DT&E results verify exit criteria to ensure adequate progress before investment commitments or initiation of phases of the program, and as the basis for contract incentives.
+
+a. DT&E starts with capability requirements and continues through product development, delivery, and acceptance; transition to OT&E; production; and operations and support. Consideration of DT&E in the requirements and systems engineering processes ensures that capability requirements are measurable, testable, and achievable.  Identifying and correcting deficiencies early is less costly than discovering system deficiencies late in the acquisition process.
+
+b. The PM will take full advantage of DoD ranges, labs, and other resources.  Programs will use government T&E capabilities unless an exception can be justified as cost-effective to the government.  PMs will conduct a cost-benefit analysis for exceptions to this policy and obtain approval through the TEMP approval process before acquiring or using non-government, program-unique test facilities or resources.
+c. Systems have become more complex, and resource constraints often force tradeoffs in the type and scope of testing that can be performed.  The DT&E budget and schedule must allow testing that adequately verifies performance to contractual requirements in a controlled environment and to operational requirements.
+
+## 5.2.  Dt&E Activities.
+
+a. DT&E activities will start when requirements are being developed to ensure key technical requirements are measurable, testable, and achievable; as well as provide feedback that the system engineering process is performing adequately.
+
+b. A robust DT&E program will provide the data and assessments for independent evaluations and decision-making.  The DT&E program will:
+(1) Verify achievement of critical technical parameters and the ability to achieve KPPs.
+
+OT will use relevant DT data to assess progress toward achievement of critical operational issues.
+
+(2) Assess the system's ability to achieve the thresholds prescribed in the capabilities documents.
+
+(3) Assess system specification compliance.
+(4) Provide data to the PM to enable root cause determination of failures arising from tests and to identify corrective actions.
+
+(5) Validate system functionality in a mission context to assess readiness for OT.
+(6) Provide information for cost, performance, and schedule tradeoffs.
+(7) Report on the program's progress to plan for reliability growth and assess reliability and maintainability performance for use during milestone decisions.
+
+(8) Identify system capabilities, limitations, and deficiencies.
+(9) Assess system safety.
+(10) Assess compatibility with legacy systems.
+(11) Stress the system within the intended operationally relevant mission environment. (12) Support all appropriate certification processes.
+(13) Document achievement of contractual technical performance, and verify
+incremental improvements and system corrective actions.
+(14) Assess entry criteria for IOT&E and follow-on OT&E. (15) Provide DT&E data to validate parameters in models and simulations. (16) Assess the maturity of the chosen integrated technologies.
+(17) Include T&E activities to detect cyber vulnerabilities within custom and commodity hardware and software.
+
+(18) Support cybersecurity assessments and authorization, including RMF security controls.
+
+## 5.3.  Dt&E Execution, Evaluation, And Reporting. A. Dt&E Execution.
+
+The PM and test team will develop detailed test plans for each DT event identified in the TEMP.  The PM, in concert with the user and T&E community, will provide relevant safety documentation (e.g., occupational health risk acceptance) and required documentation (e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act and Executive Order 12114 documentation for the DT event, safety, and occupational health risk assessment) to testers before any test that may affect safety of personnel.  The PM will conduct test readiness reviews for those events identified in the TEMP, or other test strategy documentation.
+
+## B. Dt&E Evaluation. (1) Dt&E Program Assessments.
+
+For ACAT 1B/1C programs on the T&E oversight list for which USD(R&E) did not conduct a DT&E sufficiency assessment, the USD(R&E) will provide the MDA with a program assessment at the development RFP release decision point and MS B and C.  This will be updated to support the operational test readiness review or as requested by the MDA or PM.  The program assessment will be based on the completed DT&E and any operational T&E activities completed to date, and will address the adequacy of the program planning, the implications of testing results to date, and the risks to successfully meeting the goals of the remaining T&E events in the program.
+
+(2) DT&E Sufficiency Assessments.
+In accordance with Sections 2366b(c)(l) and 2366c(a)(4) of Title 10, U.S.C., when the USD(A&S) is the MDA, the USD(R&E) will conduct DT&E sufficiency assessments for MDAPs to be included in MS B and MS C brief summary reports provided to the congressional defense committees.  When the Service or the Component acquisition executive is the MDA, the senior official within the Military Department, Defense Agency, or DoD Field Activity with responsibility for DT will conduct DT&E sufficiency assessments for MDAPs to be included in MS B and MS C brief summary reports provided to the congressional defense committees.
+
+## C. Dt&E Reports And Data.
+
+(1) The USD(R&E) and the acquisition chain of command and their designated representatives will have full and prompt access to all ongoing developmental testing and integrated testing, and all DT and integrated test records and reports, including but not limited to: data from all tests, recurring test site status and execution reports, system logs, execution logs, test director notes, certifications, user and operator assessments, and surveys.  This applies to all government-accessible data including classified, unclassified, and competition sensitive or proprietary data.  Data may be preliminary and identified as such, when applicable.
+
+(2) The PM and test agencies for all T&E oversight programs will provide DTIC with all reports and the supporting data for the test events in those reports.
+
+(3) The DoD Components will collect and retain data from DT&E, integrated testing, and OT&E on the reliability and maintainability of ACAT I and II programs.
+
+## Section 6:  Ot&E And Lft&E 6.1.  Overview.
+
+a. The policies described in Paragraph 4.4 of this issuance applies as overarching guidance.
+
+b. For programs under T&E oversight, the DOT&E will provide the MDA with milestone assessments.  The DOT&E will submit a report to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees before programs under T&E oversight may proceed beyond LRIP, in accordance with Sections 2366 and 2399 of Title 10, U.S.C.  The report will state the opinion of the Director, as to:
+(1) Whether the test and evaluation performed were adequate.
+
+(2) Whether the results of such test and evaluation confirm that the items or components actually tested are effective and suitable for combat.
+
+## 6.2.  Ot&E Activities. A. Oas.
+
+(1) The lead OTA will prepare and report results of one or more EOAs as appropriate in support of one or more of the design phase life-cycle events (namely, the capability development document validation, the development RFP release decision point, or MS B).  An EOA is typically an assessment, conducted in accordance with an approved test plan, of the program's progress in identifying operational design constraints, developing system capabilities, and reducing program risks.  For programs that enter development at MS B, the lead OTA will (as appropriate) prepare and report EOA results after program initiation and before the critical design review.
+
+(2) The lead OTA conducts an OA in accordance with a test plan approved by the DOT&E for programs that are under T&E oversight.  OAs can include dedicated early operational testing, as well as developmental test results, provided they are conducted with operational realism.  As a general criterion for proceeding through MS C, the lead OTA will conduct and report results of at least one OA.  For an acquisition program using an incrementally deployed software program model, a risk-appropriate OA is usually required in support of every limited deployment.  An OT, usually an OA, is required before deployment of accelerated or urgent acquisition programs that are under T&E or LFT&E oversight.  The OTA may combine an OA with training events.  An OA may not be required for programs that enter the acquisition system at MS C.
+
+## B. Rfps.
+
+The Military Services will provide to the DOT&E and USD(R&E) an approved final draft TEMP or other test strategy documentation before release of RFPs for MS B and MS C.  To the maximum extent feasible, RFPs should be consistent with the OT program documented in the TEMP, or other test strategy documentation.
+
+## C. Ot&E For Reliability And Maintainability.
+
+The TEMP, or other test strategy documentation, will include a plan to allocate top-level reliability and maintainability requirements and rationale for the requirements that may be allocated down to the components and sub-components.  Reliability allocations may include hardware and software, and may include commercial and non-developmental items.
+
+## D. Operational Test Readiness.
+
+The DoD Components will each establish an operational test readiness review process to be executed before any OT.  Before IOT&E, the process will include a review of DT&E results; an assessment of the system's progress against the KPPs, key system attributes, and critical technical parameters in the TEMP, or other test strategy documentation; an analysis of identified technical risks to verify that those risks have been retired or reduced to the extent possible during DT&E or OT&E; a review of system certifications; and a review of the IOT&E entrance criteria specified in the TEMP, or other test strategy documentation.
+
+## E. Certifications.
+
+Testing in support of certifications should be planned in conjunction with all other testing.
+
+(1) The PM is responsible for determining what certifications are required, involving the representatives of applicable certifying authorities in the T&E WIPT, and satisfying the certification requirements.
+
+(2) The PM will provide the MDA, DOT&E, and the lead OTA with all data on certifications as requested.
+
+(3) In accordance with DoDI 8330.01, all program TEMPs must reflect interoperability and supportability requirements, and serve as the basis for interoperability assessments and certifications.  The preceding policies are summarized together with associated DOT&E guidance and TEMP outlines at: http://www.dote.osd.mil/temp-guidebook/index.html.
+
+## 6.3.  Lft&E.
+
+The following policy applies to all acquisition pathways as described in DoDI 5000.02T. Section 2366 of Title 10, U.S.C. mandates the LFT&E and formal LFT&E reporting for all covered systems, munition programs, missile programs, or covered product improvement programs as determined by the DOT&E.  The primary emphasis is on testing vulnerability with respect to potential user casualties and taking into equal consideration the susceptibility to attack and combat performance of the system.  The DOT&E will approve LFT&E strategies and LFT&E test plans (including survivability and lethality test plans) for covered systems as defined in Section 2366 of Title 10, U.S.C.  LFT&E strategies and test plans may be tailored in accordance with program objectives and selected acquisition strategies.  The DOT&E will approve the quantity of test articles procured for all LFT&E test events for any system under LFT&E oversight.
+
+## 6.4.  Operational And Live Fire Execution.
+
+The general process for planning, executing, and reporting on operational and live fire test events is shown in Figure 3.
+
+## A. Planning Test Events.
+
+(1) For all programs under T&E oversight, including accelerated acquisitions, the DOT&E will approve OTPs and LFTPs before the corresponding operational or major live fire test events in accordance with Section 2399, Title 10, U.S.C. and DoDD 5141.02.  The DOT&E will approve any LFTP for a major test event, such as full-up system-level test, total ship survivability trial, or full ship shock trials.  The major live fire test events will be identified in the TEMP (or LFT&E strategy or equivalent document).  An LTO develops test plans for both OT&E and LFT&E.
+(2) For programs under T&E oversight, the appropriate LTO will brief the DOT&E on T&E concepts for the OTP or the major LFT&E as early as possible and no less than 180 calendar days before the start of any such testing.  The DOT&E and DoD Component heads will be kept apprised of changes in test concept and progress on the OTP.  The lead OTA will deliver the DoD Component-approved OTP for DOT&E review no later than 60 calendar days before test start.  The LTO for major live fire events will deliver the DoD Component-approved LFTP for DOT&E review no later than 90 days before test start.  OTPs and major LFTPs will include the plans for data collection and management.  To support agile acquisition, the timetables for the test concept and OTP delivery may be tailored with mutual consent between the DOT&E, OTA, and program office; and should be negotiated via the program T&E WIPT.
+
+(3) In OT&E, typical users or units will operate and maintain the system or item under conditions simulating combat stress in accordance with Section 139, Title 10, U.S.C., and peacetime conditions, when applicable.  The lead OTA, in consultation with the user and the PM, will identify realistic operational scenarios based on the CONOPS and mission threads derived from the joint mission essential task list or DoD Component-specific mission essential task list.
+
+(4) Pursuant to Section 2399 of Title 10, U.S.C., persons employed by the contractor for the system being developed may only participate in OT&E of systems under T&E oversight to the extent they are planned to be involved in the operation, maintenance, and other support of the system when deployed in combat.
+
+(5) A contractor that has participated (or is participating) in the development, production, or testing of a system for a DoD Component (or for another contractor of the DoD) may not be involved in any way in establishing criteria for data collection, performance assessment, or evaluation activities for OT&E.  These limitations do not apply to a contractor that has participated in such development, production, or testing, solely in test or test support on behalf of the DoD.
+
+(6) IOT&E for all programs will use production or production-representative test articles that, at a minimum, will incorporate the same parts and software items to be used in LRIP articles.  Production-representative systems must meet the following criteria:
+(a) The hardware must be as defined by the system-level critical design review, functional configuration audit, and system verification review, including correction of appropriate major deficiencies identified during prior testing.  Software will be defined based on the implementation to date and the associated product roadmap.
+
+(b) For hardware acquisitions, production-representative articles should be assembled using the parts, tools, and manufacturing processes intended for use in FRP; utilize the intended production versions of software; and the operational logistics systems including mature drafts of maintenance manuals intended for use on the fielded system should be in place.  The manufacturing processes to be used in FRP should be adhered to as closely as possible, and PMs for programs under T&E oversight will provide the DOT&E a detailed description of any major manufacturing process changes.
+
+(c) For software acquisitions, a production-representative system consists of typical users performing operational tasks with the hardware and software intended for deployment, in an operationally realistic computing environment, with representative DoD information network operations and supporting cybersecurity capabilities.  All manuals, training, helpdesk, continuity of operations, system upgrades, and other life-cycle system support should be in place.
+
+(7) IOT&E will require more than an evaluation that is based exclusively on computer modeling, simulation, or an analysis of system requirements, engineering proposals, design specifications, or any other information contained in program documents in accordance with Sections 2399 and 2366 of Title 10, U.S.C.  IOT&E will feature end-to-end testing of system capabilities including all interrelated systems needed to employ and support those capabilities.
+
+(8) PMs for all programs (and particularly accelerated acquisitions) may, in coordination with the lead OTA, elect to perform integrated testing in conjunction with training, joint and operational exercises, or synchronized test events.  Such testing is efficient, but inherently increases the risk that a significant problem will not be discovered.  If no subsequent operational or live fire testing is conducted before initial fielding, then additional testing will typically be required after initial fielding.  When additional testing is required, the plan for the T&E and reporting of results will be included in the applicable TEMP or other test strategy documentation.
+
+## B. Conducting Test Events.
+
+(1) Test plans must consider the potential effects on personnel and the environment, in accordance with Sections 4321-4347 of Title 42, U.S.C., and Executive Order 12114.  The T&E community, working with the PM and the user community, will provide relevant safety documentation (to include formal environment, safety, and occupational health risk acceptance for the test event) to the developmental and operational testers before any test that may affect safety of personnel.
+
+(2) Barring significant unforeseen circumstances, all elements of an approved OTP or LFTP must be fully satisfied by the end of an operational or live fire test.  If an approved plan cannot be fully executed, DOT&E concurrence with any changes must be obtained before revised test events are executed.
+(a) Once testing has begun, deviations from approved elements of the test plan cannot be made without consultation with the OTA commander (for OTP), or appropriate LTO (for LFTP), and the concurrence of the DOT&E.
+(b) DOT&E concurrence is not required when a need to change the execution of an element of the test plan arises in real time as its execution is underway.  If DOT&E on-site representatives are not present and the test director concludes changes to the plan are warranted that would revise events yet to be conducted, the test director must contact the relevant DOT&E
+personnel to obtain concurrence with the proposed changes.  If it is not possible to contact DOT&E personnel in a timely manner, the test director can proceed with execution of the revised test event but must inform the DOT&E of the deviations from the test plan as soon as possible.
+
+(3) Additions to the approved test plan once the test is in execution will not occur without the concurrence of the OTA commander (for OTP), or appropriate LTO (for LFTP) and the DOT&E representative.  Revisions are to be documented and signed by the test director.
+
+(4) When the order of execution is identified in the TEMP, or other test strategy documentation, as affecting the analysis of the data, test plans should include details on the order of test event execution and test point data collection.
+
+(5) Operating instructions (e.g., tactics, techniques, and procedures; standard operating procedures; technical manuals; technical orders) should be considered for their effect on the test outcomes and included in OTPs when relevant.
+
+(6) Test plans must include the criteria to be used to make routine changes (e.g., delays for weather, test halts).
+
+(7) If required data for the test completion criteria are lost, corrupted, or not gathered, then the test is not complete unless the DOT&E waives the requirement.
+
+## C. Data Management, Evaluation, And Reporting.
+
+(1) The DOT&E, the PM, and their designated representatives who have been properly authorized access, will have full and prompt access to all records, reports, and data, including but not limited to data from tests, system logs, execution logs, test director notes, and user and operator assessments and surveys.  Data include, but are not limited to, classified, unclassified, and (when available) competition sensitive or proprietary data.  Data may be preliminary and will be identified as such.
+
+(2) OTAs and other T&E agencies will record every OT&E and LFT&E event in writing.  Full reports will often contain multiple test events and will be accomplished in the timeliest manner practicable.  Interim summaries or catalogues of individual events will be prepared as results become available.
+
+(3) Significant problems will be reported promptly by the acquisition decision authority to senior DoD leadership when those problems are identified.  OTAs will publish interim test event summaries as interim reports when the test events provide information of immediate importance to the program decision-makers.  This will occur particularly in support of accelerated acquisitions and time critical operational needs.  Such reports should provide the most complete assessment possible based on the available data and should not be delayed.  Such reports will be followed by the planned comprehensive reporting.
+
+(4) For T&E and LFT&E oversight programs, the Military Services will keep the DOT&E informed of available program assets, assessments, test results, and anticipated timelines for reporting throughout report preparation.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+AA
+adversarial assessment
+ACAT
+acquisition category
+CDT
+chief developmental tester
+CONOPS
+concept of operations
+CVPA
+cooperative vulnerability and penetration assessment
+DAE
+Defense Acquisition Executive
+DBS
+defense business system
+DEF
+developmental evaluation framework
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+DOT&E
+Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
+DT
+developmental test
+DT&E
+developmental test and evaluation
+DTIC
+Defense Technical Information Center
+EOA
+early operational assessment
+FRP
+full-rate production
+IDSK
+integrated decision support key
+IOT&E
+initial operational test and evaluation
+IT
+information technology
+KPP
+key performance parameter
+LFT&E
+live fire test and evaluation
+LFTP
+live fire test plan
+LRIP
+low-rate initial production
+LTO
+lead test organization
+MDA
+milestone decision authority
+MDAP
+Major Defense Acquisition Program
+MS B
+Milestone B
+MS C
+Milestone C
+MTA
+middle tier of acquisition
+NAVWAR
+navigation warfare
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+OA
+operational assessment
+OEF
+operational evaluation framework
+ops demo
+operational demonstration
+OT
+operational test
+OT&E
+operational test and evaluation
+OTA
+operational test agency
+OTP
+operational test plan
+PM
+program manager
+PNT
+positioning, navigation, and timing
+RFP
+request for proposal
+RMF
+Risk Management Framework
+T&E
+test and evaluation
+TEMP
+test and evaluation master plan
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+USD(A&S)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+USD(R&E)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
+VV&A
+verified, validated, and accredited
+WIPT
+Working-level Integrated Product Team
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+DEF
+Identifies key data that will contribute to assessing system performance, interoperability, cybersecurity, reliability, and maintainability; the DEF shows the correlation and mapping between technical requirements, decision points, and data requirements.
+IDSK
+A table that identifies DT, OT, and LF data requirements needed to
+inform critical acquisition and engineering decisions (e.g., milestone decisions, key integration points, and technical readiness decisions). OT&E and DT&E will use the IDSK to independently develop evaluation frameworks or strategies that will show the correlation and mapping between evaluation focus areas, critical decision points, and specific data requirements.
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+integrated testing
+A concept that capitalizes on the idea that test events can be planned
+and executed to provide data for developmental, operational, and live
+fire evaluations.
+modern software
+Practices (e.g., Lean, Agile, DevSecOps) that focus on rapid, iterative
+development
+development and delivery of software with active user engagements.
+practices
+Small cross-functional software development teams integrate
+planning, design, development, testing, security, delivery, and operations with continuous improvement to maximize automation and user value.
+OA
+A test event that is conducted before initial production units are available and incorporates substantial operational realism.
+OEF
+Summarizes the mission-focused evaluation methodology and
+supporting test strategy, including the essential mission and system capabilities that contribute to operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and survivability (including cybersecurity) or lethality.  It also aids integrated testing by identifying opportunities for using DT data for OT evaluation and using OT data in IT interoperability evaluation.
+ops demo
+An event that supports the production decisions by the decision authority.
+pedigree of data
+Accurately documenting the configuration of the test asset and the actual test conditions under which each element of test data were obtained.  It indicates whether the test configuration represented
+operationally realistic or representative conditions.
+TEMP
+A signed agreement among the USD(R&E) or their designee,
+DOT&E, senior DoD Component leadership, the lead DT&E organization, the lead OTA, the MDA, and the PM.
+T&E oversight list
+A list of programs under DT, OT, or LFT&E oversight.
+
+## References
+
+Director, Operational Test and Evaluation Memorandum, "Procedures for Operational Test and
+Evaluation of Cybersecurity in Acquisition Programs," April 3, 2018
+Director, Operational Test and Evaluation Memorandum, "Cyber Economic Vulnerability
+Assessments," January 21, 2015
+Director, Operational Test and Evaluation Memorandum, "Guidelines for Operational Test and
+Evaluation of Information and Business Systems," September 14, 2010
+DoD Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation Guidebook, April 3, 2018 DoD Directive 4650.05, "Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)," June 9, 2016, as
+amended
+DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System," September 9, 2020 DoD Directive 5137.02, "Under Secretary Of Defense for Research and Engineering
+(USD(R&E))," July 15, 2020
+DoD Directive 5141.02, "Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E),"
+February 2, 2009
+DoD Instruction 4650.08, "Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) and Navigation Warfare
+(NAVWAR)," December 27, 2018
+DoD Instruction 5000.02T, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," January 7, 2015, as
+amended
+DoD Instruction 5000.75, "Business Systems Requirements and Acquisition," February 2, 2017,
+as amended
+DoD Instruction 5000.80, "Operation of the Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA),"
+December 30, 2019
+DoD Instruction 5000.82, "Acquisition of Information Technology (IT)," April 21, 2020 DoD Instruction 8330.01, "Interoperability of Information Technology (IT), Including National
+Security Systems (NSS)," May 21, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8500.01, "Cybersecurity," March 14, 2014, as amended DoD Instruction 8510.01, "Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information
+Technology (IT)," March 12, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8530.01, "Cybersecurity Activities Support to DoD Information Network
+Operations," March 7, 2016, as amended
+Executive Order 12114, "Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions,"
+January 4, 1979
+Public Law, 91-190, "National Environmental Policy Act," January 1, 1970 Public Law, 115-91, Section 838, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,"
+December 12, 2017
+Public Law, 115-91, Section 839(b), "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,"
+December 12, 2017
+Public Law 115-232, Section 1610, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,"
+August 13, 2018
+United States Code, Title 10 United States Code, Title 42

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+## Department Of Defense Instruction
+
+NUMBER 5030.57
+December 5, 2011
+Incorporating Change 2, Effective October 29, 2020
+
+## Subject: Special Warnings To Mariners
+
+References: (a) DoD Directive 5030.57, "Special Warnings to Mariners," May 3, 1977
+(hereby cancelled)
+(b)
+DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), October 24, 2014, as amended
+(c)
+Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of State, Defense,
+Commerce and the Central Intelligence Agency with Respect to Special
+Warnings to Mariners, July 20, 19761
+(d)
+Public Law 116-92, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020," December 20, 2019
+1. PURPOSE.  This Instruction reissues Reference (a) as a DoD Instruction in accordance with the authority in Reference (b) to update established policy and assigned responsibilities concerning the warning to U.S. mariners of potential political or military hazards affecting U.S. shipping in accordance with Reference (c).
+
+2. APPLICABILITY.  This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components"). 3. DEFINITIONS.  See Glossary. 4. POLICY.  It is DoD policy that the implementation of DoD responsibilities for special warnings to U.S. mariners shall be in accordance with the guidelines and criteria set forth in Reference (c).
+
+1https://usdi.dtic.mil/usdi_docs/keyref/dcs/keydocs/2011/MOU%20-
+%20DoS%20DoD%20DoC%20CIA%20Special%20Warnings%20to%20Mariners.pdf
+5. RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure.
+
+6. RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release.**  This instruction is available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. 7. SUMMARY OF CHANGE 2.  This administrative change updates the title of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security in accordance with Public Law 116-92 (Reference (d)).
+
+8. EFFECTIVE DATE.  This Instruction is effective December 5, 2011.
+
+Michael G. Vickers Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Enclosure Responsibilities Glossary
+
+## Enclosure Responsibilities
+
+1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (USD(I&S)).  The USD(I&S) shall:
+
+a. Have overall responsibility for dissemination of special warnings to U.S. mariners.
+b. Represent the DoD in maintaining and updating Reference (c).
+2. DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (NGA).  The Director, NGA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S), shall:
+
+a. Expeditiously disseminate special warnings. b. Distribute copies of special warnings to interested agencies.
+c. Provide receipt of acknowledgement messages generated by special warnings to the Maritime Administration on a continual basis.
+
+## 3. Heads Of The Dod Components.  The Heads Of The Dod Components Shall:
+
+a. Ensure information germane to the safety of U.S. mariners is made available to the Department of State, NGA, and the National Maritime Intelligence Center by the most expeditious means.
+
+b. Ensure that communications related to the safety of U.S. mariners is prefaced with
+"Mariner Special Warning Information" to aid in alerting interested parties.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+NGA
+National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency USD(I&S) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Instruction.
+
+special warnings.  A limited series of urgent warnings approved by the Department of State and disseminated by the Director, NGA, which disseminate official U.S. Government proclamations
+
+
+affecting navigation and political or military incidents that could develop into direct threats to the safety of U.S. mariners. U.S. mariners.  Crewmembers of U.S. flagged merchant ships, U.S. effectively controlled merchant ships, research vessels, offshore oil rigs, fishing boats and yachts, and personnel on all U.S. naval ships, Army vessels, and other Government-owned ships having been issued a U.S. merchant mariner document and the Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping certificate issued by the U.S. Coast Guard.

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+## Dod Instruction 5200.48 Controlled Unclassified Information (Cui)
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
+
+Effective:
+March 6, 2020
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+Cancels:
+DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 4, "DoD Information Security Program: Controlled Unclassified Information," February 24, 2012, as amended
+
+Approved by:
+Joseph D. Kernan, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S))
+
+Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01 and the December 22,
+2010 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, this issuance:
+
+- Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for CUI throughout the DoD
+in accordance with Executive Order (E.O.) 13556; Part 2002 of Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR); and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Sections 252.204-7008 and 252.204-7012.
+- Establishes the official DoD CUI Registry.
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+ SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 4
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 4 1.2.  Policy. ........ 4
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 6
+2.1.  USD(I&S) ........ 6 2.2.  Director for Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security
+(DDI(CL&S)). ........ 6
+2.3.  Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DSCA). ........ 7 2.4.  Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense (CMO). ........ 8 2.5.  PFPA. ........ 8
+2.6.  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. ........ 8
+2.7.  USD(A&S). ........ 8 2.8.  USD(R&E). ........ 9 2.9.  DoD CIO. ........ 9 2.10.  OSD and DoD Component Heads. ........ 10 2.11.  Secretaries of the Military Departments. ........ 11 2.12.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ........ 11
+SECTION 3:  PROGRAMMATICS ........ 12
+3.1.  Background. ........ 12 3.2.  Legacy Information Requirements. ........ 12 3.3.  Handling Requirements. ........ 13 3.4.  Marking Requirements........ 14 3.5.  General DoD CUI Administrative Requirements. ........ 17 3.6.  General DoD CUI Procedures. ........ 17 3.7.  General DoD CUI Requirements. ........ 19 3.8.  OCA. ........ 23 3.9.  General Release and Disclosure Requirements. ........ 23 3.10.  General System and Network CUI Requirements. ........ 24
+
+## Section 4:  Dissemination, Decontrolling, And Destruction Of Cui ........ 27
+
+4.1.  General. ........ 27 4.2.  Dissemination Requirements for DoD CUI. ........ 28 4.3.  Legacy Distribution Statements. ........ 28 4.4.  Decontrolling. ........ 29 4.5.  Destruction. ........ 30
+SECTION 5:  APPLICATION OF DOD INDUSTRY ........ 31
+5.1.  General. ........ 31 5.2.  Misuse or UD of CUI. ........ 32 5.3.  Requirements for DoD Contractors. ........ 32
+GLOSSARY ........ 33
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 33 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 34
+REFERENCES ........ 38
+
+## Tables
+
+Table 1.  DoD CUI Registry Category Examples ........ 22 Table 2.  Dissemination Control and Distribution Statement Markings ........ 29 FIGURES Figure 1.  CUI Warning Box for Classified Material ........ 15 Figure 2.  CUI Designation Indicator for All Documents and Material ........ 16 Figure 3.  Notice and Consent........ 26
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+This issuance applies to:
+a.  Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (OIG DoD), the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+b.  Arrangements, agreements, contracts, and other transaction authority actions requiring access to CUI according to terms and conditions of such documents, as defined in Clause 2.101 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Section 2002.4 of Title 32, CFR, including, but not limited to, grants, licenses, certificates, memoranda of agreement/arrangement or understanding, and information-sharing agreements or arrangements.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+It is DoD policy that:
+a.  As part of the phased DoD CUI Program implementation process endorsed by the CUI
+Executive Agent (EA) pursuant to Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Memorandum dated August 21, 2019, the designation, handling, and decontrolling of CUI (including CUI identification, sharing, marking, safeguarding, storage, dissemination, destruction, and records management) will be conducted in accordance with this issuance and Sections 252.204-7008 and 252.204-7012 of the DFARS when applied by a contract to non-DoD systems.
+
+b.  All DoD CUI must be controlled until authorized for public release in accordance with DoD Instructions (DoDIs) 5230.09, 5230.29, and 5400.04, or DoD Manual (DoDM) 5400.07.
+Official DoD information that is not classified or controlled as CUI will also be reviewed prior to public release in accordance with DoDIs 5230.09 or5230.29.
+
+c.  Information will not be designated CUI in order to:
+
+(1)  Conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error. (2)  Prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency. (3)  Prevent open competition.
+(4)  Control information not requiring protection under a law, regulation, or governmentwide policy, unless approved by the CUI EA at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), through the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)).
+
+d.  In accordance with the DoD phased CUI Program implementation, all documents containing CUI must carry CUI markings in accordance with this issuance.
+e.  Although DoD Components are not required to use the terms "Basic" or "Specified" to characterize CUI at this time, DoD Components will apply:
+
+(1)  At least the minimum safeguards required to protect CUI.
+(2)  Terms and specific marking requirements will be promulgated by the USD(I&S) in future guidance.
+
+f.  Nothing in this issuance alters or supersedes the existing authorities of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) regarding CUI.
+
+g.  Nothing in this issuance will infringe on the OIG DoD's statutory independence and authority, as articulated in the Inspector General Act of 1978 in the Title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.) Appendix.  In the event of any conflict between this instruction and the OIG DoD's statutory independence and authority, the Inspector General Act of 1978 in the Title 5, U.S.C. Appendix takes precedence.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities 2.1.  Usd(I&S)
+
+The USD(I&S):
+a.  As the DoD Senior Agency Official for Security, establishes policy and oversees the DoD
+Information Security Program.
+
+b.  In coordination with the requesting DoD Component, submits changes to CUI categories on behalf of DoD Components to the CUI EA at NARA.
+
+c.  Provides reports to the CUI EA on the DoD CUI Program status, as described in Paragraph 3.6.c., in accordance with Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR.
+
+d.  Establishes protocol for resolving disputes about implementing or interpreting E.O.
+
+13556, Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR, the CUI Registry, and this issuance, within and between the DoD Components.
+
+e.  Coordinates with the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) on CUI waiver requests for DoD information systems (IS) and networks.
+
+f.  Coordinates with the CUI EA on DoD Component CUI waiver requests.
+
+## 2.2.  Director For Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, And Security (Ddi(Cl&S)).
+
+The DDI(CL&S):
+a.  Oversees and manages the DoD CUI Program.
+
+b.  Reviews and signs all reports and other correspondence related to the DoD CUI Program.
+c.  Coordinates with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)), Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), and the DoD Component heads to:
+(1)  Recommend changes to national CUI policy relating to identifying, safeguarding, disseminating, marking, storing, transmitting, reviewing, transporting, re-using, decontrolling, and destroying CUI, and responding to unauthorized disclosure (UD) of CUI.
+
+(2)  Review and provide guidance on DoD Component implementation policy and CUI-
+related matters.
+
+d.  Assists the USD(I&S)  with overseeing the CUI policy and program execution via the Defense Security Enterprise Executive Committee in accordance with DoDD 5200.43.
+
+e.  In coordination with the DoD CIO, USD(A&S), and USD(R&E), provides guidance on implementing uniform standards to display TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, and UNCLASSIFIED for CNSI and CUI controls and banners for DoD systems and networks.
+
+## 2.3.  Director, Defense Counterintelligence And Security Agency (Dsca).
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S) and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.10., the Director, DCSA:
+a.  Administers the DoD CUI Program for contractually established CUI requirements for contractors in classified contracts in accordance with the May 17, 2018 Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Memorandum.
+b.  Assesses contractor compliance with contractually established CUI system requirements
+in DoD classified contracts associated with the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) in accordance with Part 2003 of Title 32, CFR and National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-171 guidelines.
+c.  Establishes and maintains a process to notify the DoD CIO, USD(R&E), and USD(A&S)
+of threats related to CUI for further dissemination to DoD Components and contractors in accordance with the Section 252.204-7012 of the DFARS.
+
+d.  Provides, in coordination with the USD(I&S), security education, training, and awareness on the required topics identified in Section 2002.30 of Title 32, CFR, including protection and management of CUI, to DoD personnel and contractors through the Center for Development of Security Excellence (CDSE).
+
+e.  Provides security assistance and guidance to the DoD Components on the protection of CUI when DoD Components establish CUI requirements in DoD classified contracts for NISP
+contractors falling under DCSA security oversight.
+
+f.  Serves as the DoD-lead to report UDs of CUI, except for the reporting of cyber incidents in accordance with Section 252.204-7012 of the DFARS, associated with contractually established CUI system requirements in DoD classified contracts for NISP contractors falling under DCSA security oversight.
+
+g.  Coordinates with the DoD CIO to implement uniform security requirements when the IS
+or network security controls for unclassified and classified information are included in DoD classified contracts for NISP contractors falling under DCSA security oversight.
+
+h.  Consolidates DoD Component input on the oversight of CUI protection requirements  in DoD classified contracts for NISP contractors under DCSA security oversight, as required by Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Notice 2016-01.
+
+## 2.4.  Chief Management Officer Of The Department Of Defense (Cmo).
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.10., the CMO:
+a.  Serves as the subject matter expert on CUI containing personally identifiable information and its release in accordance with Subsection 552 of Chapter 5 of Title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.), also known as and referred to in this issuance as the "Freedom of Information Act
+(FOIA)," implemented through DoDD 5400.07 and DoDI 5400.11, and Subsection 552a of Chapter 5 of Title 5, U.S.C., also known and referred to in the issuance as the "Privacy Act of 1974."
+b.  Supports OSD with information security matters, as appropriate.
+
+## 2.5.  Pfpa.
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the CMO, through the Director for Administration and Organizational Policy, and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.10., the Director, PFPA:
+
+a.  Provides information security administrative support to OSD.
+b.  Provides information on OSD CUI Program status and other formally requested assistance to the USD(I&S) to support the CUI Program.
+
+c.  Conducts CUI staff assistance visits to OSD in the National Capital Region.
+
+## 2.6.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.10., the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
+a.  Establishes policy and procedures for disclosing DoD CUI to foreign governments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and international organizations based on formally signed agreements and arrangements between the parties.
+
+b.  Requires CUI to be identified in international agreements, arrangements, and contracts having licensing export controls for foreign partners.
+
+## 2.7.  Usd(A&S).
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.10., pursuant to Section 133b of Title 10, U.S.C., and in coordination with the USD(I&S), DoD CIO, and USD(R&E), the USD(A&S):
+a.  Maintains, in accordance with Section 252.204-7012 of the DFARS, DoD acquisition contracting processes, policies, and procedures for safeguarding DoD CUI in DoD procurement arrangements, agreements, and contracts, including other transaction authority actions.
+b.  Supports the development and implementation of a Federal Acquisition Regulation clause applying CUI requirements to defense contractors.
+
+## 2.8.  Usd(R&E).
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.10., pursuant to Section 133a of Title 10, U.S.C., and in coordination with USD(I&S), the USD(R&E):
+a.  Establishes DoD CUI processes, policies, and procedures for grants and cooperative research and development arrangements, agreements, and contracts involving controlled technical information (CTI).
+
+b.  Establishes a standard process to identify CTI; guidelines for sharing, marking, safeguarding, storing, disseminating, decontrolling, and destroying CTI; and CTI records management requirements contained in contracts, as appropriate.
+
+c.  Oversees and ensures DoD CUI guidelines and requirements for sharing, marking, safeguarding, storage, dissemination, decontrol, destruction, and records management of  all research, development, test, and evaluation information are properly executed for all DoD owned records.
+
+d.  In coordination with the USD(A&S), ensures:
+(1)  Contracts, arrangements, and agreements for research, development, testing, and evaluation identify CUI at the time of award.
+
+(2)  USD(R&E) international agreements, arrangements, and contracts with foreign partners identify CUI within the documents.
+(3) DoD Components concluding international agreements, arrangements, and contracts with foreign partners include U.S. Government-approved text on CUI.
+
+## 2.9.  Dod Cio.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.10., the DoD CIO:
+a.  Oversees CUI metadata tagging standards, consistent with federal data tagging approaches in accordance with the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, to implement the marking requirements in Paragraph 3.4.c. and in accordance with DoDI 8320.07.
+b.  Integrates CUI metadata tagging standards into DoD information technology content management tools to support discovery, access, auditing, safeguarding, and records management decisions regarding CUI (including monitoring CUI data for visibility, accessibility, trust, interoperability, and comprehension).
+
+c.  Provides policy and standards recommendations to the USD(I&S) on updates for the sharing, marking, safeguarding, storage, dissemination, decontrol, destruction, and records management of DoD CUI residing on both DoD and non-DoD IS in accordance with DoDI 8582.01.
+d.  Oversees Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Activities,  using the DoD Cyber Crime Center as the single DoD focal point for receiving and disseminating all cyber incident reports impacting unclassified networks of defense contractors.
+
+e.  Coordinates with the USD(I&S), USD(A&S), USD(R&E), and DoD Component heads to develop uniform security requirements for industry partners' IS and network security controls adequate for the type of CUI identified in the contract in accordance with Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR, Section 252.204-7012 of the DFARS, and NIST SP 800-171.
+f.  Coordinates with the Director, DCSA to implement uniform security requirements when IS or network security controls for unclassified and classified information are included in DoD
+classified contracts of NISP contractors falling under DCSA security oversight.
+
+g.  Coordinates with the USD(I&S) to:
+(1)  Implement information security policy standards for markings to display, CUI for DoD classified and unclassified systems and networks.
+(2)  Integrate training on safeguarding and handling CUI into updates to initial and annual cybersecurity awareness training.
+
+h.  Notifies the CUI EA in coordination with the USD(I&S) of CUI waivers impacting IS or networks in accordance with Title 32 of the CFR.
+
+i.  Oversees and ensures DoD Component- and National Archives-approved disposition authorities for CUI are implemented for DoD records and information.
+
+j.  Oversees and ensures the Director, DoD Cyber Crime Center:
+(1)  Manages and updates, as necessary and in coordination with DoD CIO, the policies in Section 236.4 of Title 32, CFR and Section 252.204-7012 of the DFARS.
+(2)  Maintains the website at https://dibnet.dod.mil to receive contractor mandatory incident reports in accordance with Paragraph 3.9.d(1).
+
+## 2.10.  Osd And Dod Component Heads.
+
+OSD and DoD Component heads:
+a.  Identify, program, and commit the necessary resources to implement CUI Program requirements as part of their overall information security programs.
+
+b.  Designate in writing (with copy to the USD(I&S)):
+(1)  A DoD Component senior agency official (CSAO) at the Senior Executive Service level or equivalent to implement their CUI Program and perform the duties in Paragraph 3.5.
+
+(2)  A DoD Component program manager (CPM) to manage their CUI Program.
+
+c.  Ensure their subordinate organizations comply with DoD CUI Program requirements. d.  Ensure their personnel receive initial and annual refresher CUI education and training, and maintain documentation of this training for audit purposes.
+e.  Report DoD Component training completion data to the USD(I&S) annually or as directed.
+
+f.  Provide an annual report to the USD(I&S) on CUI implementation status in accordance with Title 32, CFR, Part 2002.
+
+g.  Determine if any CUI documents or materials constitute permanently valuable records of the government, which require maintenance and disposal in accordance with DoDI 5015.02.
+
+h.  As the requiring activity, oversee CUI requirements for contractor implementation in partnership with the Defense Contract Management Agency, based on Defense Contract Management Agency responsibilities, or DCSA for cleared contractors in accordance with the NISP, as appropriate.
+
+i.  Ensure DoD Component- and National Archives-approved disposition authorities are implemented for DoD records and information regardless of classification.
+
+j.  Manage their CUI programs in accordance with guidelines prescribed in this DoD
+issuance.
+
+## 2.11.  Secretaries Of The Military Departments.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.10., the Secretaries of the Military Departments oversee the implementation of their CUI programs.
+
+## 2.12.  Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.10., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff oversees the implementation of the CUI programs in the Joint Staff organizations and Combatant Commands.
+
+## Section 3:  Programmatics 3.1.  Background.
+
+The CUI EA at NARA, through the Information Security and Oversight Office (ISOO), published and released Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR, which provides implementing requirements for E.O. 13556.
+
+a.  Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR established a CUI EA office under NARA's ISOO for implementing and overseeing the CUI Program.
+
+b.  Designed as a response to the information sharing challenges from inconsistent definitions and marking requirements applied to CUI, Part 2002 of Title 32 CFR standardized the definition of CUI and codified the identification, sharing, safeguarding, marking, storage, distribution, transmission, decontrol, destruction, training, monitoring, and reporting requirements across the Executive branch of government.
+
+c.  In accordance with Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR, CUI requires safeguarding or dissemination controls identified in a law, regulation, or government-wide policy for information that does not meet the requirements for classification in accordance with E.O. 13526.
+
+d.  Unlike classified information, an individual or organization generally does not need to demonstrate a need-to-know to access CUI, unless required by a law, regulation, or governmentwide policy, but must have a lawful governmental purpose for such access.  One example of a requirement for need-to-know established by law, regulation, or government-wide policy is Section 223.6 of Title 32, CFR, which requires a person to have a need-to-know to be granted access to  DoD Unclassified Nuclear Information (UCNI).
+
+## 3.2.  Legacy Information Requirements.
+
+This legacy information guidance applies to information contained across DoD in, among other documents, security classification guides (SCGs), various policies, and other legacy materials falling under the Science and Technology Information Program (DoDI 3200.12), in either electronic or hardcopy format.  The CUI Program does not require the redacting or re-marking of documents bearing legacy markings.  However, any new document created with information derived from legacy material must be marked as CUI if the information qualifies as CUI.
+
+a.  DoD legacy material will not be required to be re-marked or redacted while it remains under DoD control or is accessed online and downloaded for use within the DoD.  However, any such document or new derivative document must be marked as CUI if the information qualifies as CUI and the document is being shared outside DoD. DoD legacy marked information stored on a DoD access-controlled website or database does not need to be remarked as CUI, even if other agencies and contractors are granted access to such websites or databases.
+b.  DoD legacy information does not automatically become CUI.  It must be reviewed by the owner of the information to determine if it meets the CUI requirements.  If it is determined the specific legacy information meets the CUI requirements, it will be marked in accordance with this issuance and corresponding manual.
+
+c.  For federal systems, IS storing information identified as CUI must meet the minimum network security standard in Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR.  For nonfederal systems, IS must meet the standards in the NIST SP 800-171, when established by contract.
+
+d.  When DoD legacy information is incorporated into, or cited in, another document or material, it must be reviewed for CUI and marked in accordance with this issuance.
+
+## 3.3.  Handling Requirements.
+
+The DoD CUI Information Security Program will promote, to the maximum extent possible, information sharing, facilitate informed resource use, and simplify its management and implementation while maintaining required safeguarding and handling measures.
+
+a.  In accordance with DoDI 5230.09 and the August 14, 2014 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum:
+(1)  The DoD originator or authorized CUI holder must ensure a prepublication and security policy review is conducted, pursuant to the standard DoD Component process, before CUI is approved for public release, which includes publication to a publicly accessible website.
+
+(2)  Decontrolling and releasing CUI records will be executed by the originator of the information, the original classification authority (OCA) if identified in a security classification guide, or designated offices for decontrolling CUI pursuant to the procedures  for the review and release of information under the FOIA in accordance with the November 19, 2018 ISOO Notice. There are no specific timelines to decontrol CUI unless specifically required in a law, regulation, or government-wide policy.  Decontrol will occur when the CUI no longer requires safeguarding and will follow DoD records management procedures.
+
+b.  OCAs will determine if aggregated CUI under their control should be classified in accordance with Volume 1 of DoDM 5200.01 and will confirm the relevant SCGs address the compilation.
+c.  DoD information systems processing, storing, or transmitting CUI will be categorized at the "moderate" confidentiality impact level and follow the guidance in DoDIs 8500.01 and 8510.01.  Non-DoD information systems processing, storing, or transmitting CUI will provide adequate security, and the appropriate requirements must be incorporated into all contracts, grants, and other legal agreements with non-DoD entities in accordance with DoDI 8582.01.  See Section 5 of this issuance for more information on CUI and its application to industry.
+
+d.  The DoD CUI Registry provides an official list of the Indexes and Categories used to identify the various types of DoD CUI.  The DoD CUI Registry mirrors the National CUI Registry, but provides additional information on the relationships to DoD by aligning each Index and Category to DoD issuances.
+
+(1)  The official DoD CUI Registry of categories can be accessed on Intelink at https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ousdi/hcis/sec/icdirect/information/CUI/Forms/AllItems.aspx.
+(2)  The site will be updated as changes to the DoD CUI Registry are made based on official notification from the CUI EA through the CUI Registry Working Group; changes to law, regulation, or government-wide policy; or notification that the information no longer meets the requirements for CUI.
+
+## 3.4.  Marking Requirements.
+
+This paragraph covers the essential marking requirements for initial phased implementation of the DoD CUI Program.
+
+a.  At minimum, CUI markings for unclassified DoD documents will  include the acronym
+"CUI" in the banner and footer of the document.
+b.  If portion markings are selected, then all document subjects and titles, as well as individual
+sections, parts, paragraphs, or similar portions of a CUI document known to contain CUI, will be portion marked with "(CUI)."  Use of the unclassified marking "(U)" as a portion marking for unclassified information within CUI documents or materials is required.
+
+(1)  There is no requirement to add the "U," signifying unclassified, to the banner and footer as was required with the old FOUO marking (i.e., U//FOUO).
+
+(2)  Banners, footers, and portion marking will only be marked "Unclassified" or "(U)"
+for unclassified information in accordance with the June 4, 2019 ISOO letter.  If the document also contains CUI, it will be marked in accordance with Paragraph 3.4.a. and additional forthcoming guidance.
+
+c.  CUI markings in classified documents will appear in paragraphs or subparagraphs known to contain **only** CUI and must be portion marked with "(CUI)."  "CUI" will **not** appear in the banner or footer.
+
+(1)  There will be an acknowledgement added to the warning box on the first page of multi-page documents to alert readers to the presence of CUI in a classified DoD document, as shown in Figure 1.
+
+
+This content is classified at the [insert highest classification level of the source data] level and may contain elements of controlled unclassified information
+(CUI), unclassified, or information classified at a lower level than the overall classification displayed.  This content shall not be used as a source of derivative classification; refer instead to [cite specific reference, where possible, or state "the applicable classification guide(s)"].  It must be reviewed for both Classified National Security Information (CNSI) and CUI in accordance with DoDI 5230.09 prior to public release.  [Add a point of contact when needed.]
+
+
+(2)  Volume 2 of DoDM 5200.01 requires DoD intelligence producers to follow DNI
+formats for intelligence production under the authority of the DNI.  When DoD CUI is incorporated into a Digital Access Policy under the authority of the DNI, the information and the document will follow the Digital Access Policy standards established by the DNI.
+
+d.  The dissemination marking "not releasable to foreign nationals (NOFORN or NF)" is an intelligence control marking used to identify intelligence information an originator has determined meets the criteria of Intelligence Community Directive 710 and Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 403.1, which provides guidance for further dissemination control markings.  It must be applied to controlled unclassified intelligence information that is properly characterized as CUI with appropriate CUI markings.  CUI identified with this marking will not be provided, in any form, to foreign governments (including coalition partners), international organizations, foreign nationals, or other non-U.S. persons without the originator's approval in accordance with E.O.s 13526 and 13556.  If originator approval is required for further dissemination, the originator will mark the requirement on the information in accordance with Section 4.1(i)(1) of E.O. 13526.
+
+(1)  The application of the control marking "not releasable to foreign nationals"
+(NOFORN or NF) will only be applied, when warranted, to unclassified intelligence information properly categorized as CUI and reviewed by a Foreign Disclosure Officer to ensure there are no international agreements in place to prohibit its use and prohibiting sharing.
+(2)  The control marking NOFORN or NF will be applied to Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI), Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI), National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1), and cover and cover support information.  When warranted, it can be applied to unclassified information properly categorized as CUI having a licensing or export control requirement.  Before marking a document or material as NOFORN or NF, it will be reviewed by the Foreign Disclosure Officer to ensure there are no agreements in place to prohibit its use and sharing.
+(3)  The application of "Releasable to" ("REL TO") can only be applied, when warranted and consistent with relevant law, regulation, or government-wide policy or DoD policy, to information properly categorized as CUI with an export control or licensing requirement with a foreign disclosure agreement in place.
+
+(a)  Export-controlled CUI transfers to foreign persons must be in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act, International Traffic in Arms Regulations, Export Control Reform Act, Export Administration Regulations, and DoDI 2040.02.  In accordance with DoDDs 5230.11 and 5230.20, a positive foreign disclosure decision must be made before CUI is released to a foreign entity.
+(b)  DoD operational CUI (not related to intelligence) may be marked as REL TO.
+
+e.  All classified documents, including legacy documents will be reviewed for CUI and properly marked upon changes in the document's classification level, particularly if the documents  are to be completely declassified.
+
+f.  The first page or cover of any  document or material containing CUI, including a document with commingled classified information, will include a CUI designation indicator, as shown in Figure 2.  This CUI designation indicator is similar to the classification-marking block used for CNSI documents and materials.  Documents and materials containing CUI will require a generic "CUI" marking at the top and bottom of each page.
+
+(1)  In accordance with Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR, the CUI designation indicator must contain, at minimum, the name of the DoD Component determining that the information is CUI.
+If letterhead or another standard indicator of origination is used, this line may be omitted.
+
+(2)  The second line must identify the office making the determination. (3)  The third line must identify all types of CUI contained in the document.
+(4)  The fourth line must contain the distribution statement or the dissemination controls applicable to the document.
+
+(5)  The fifth line must contain the phone number or office mailbox for the originating DoD Component or authorized CUI holder.
+
+Controlled by:  [Name of DoD Component] (Only if not on letterhead) Controlled by:  [Name of Office] CUI Category:  (List category or categories of CUI)
+Distribution/Dissemination Control: POC:  [Phone or email address]
+
+
+
+g.  During DoD's initial phased implementation of the CUI Program, there is no required distinction that must be made between Basic and Specified CUI.  All DoD information will be protected in accordance with the requirements under the Basic level of safeguards and dissemination unless specifically identified otherwise in a law, regulation, or government-wide policy.  Forthcoming guidance will address the distinction between the two levels of CUI, including a list of which categories are Basic or Specified, what makes the category one or the other, and the unique requirements, to include markings, for each.
+
+## 3.5.  General Dod Cui Administrative Requirements.
+
+Each DoD Component head must appoint, in writing, a CSAO for the Information Security Program, who will:
+a.  Appoint, in writing, an official to serve as the CPM for CUI in accordance with ISSO
+Notice 2019-02.  To manage the DoD Component's overall execution of the CUI program, the CPM will:
+(1)  Coordinate directly with the USD(I&S) Information Security Directorate on CUI
+matters.
+
+(2)  Manage and oversee CUI implementation for the DoD Component.
+(3)  Inform the CSAO of concerns identified by subordinate elements.
+(4)  Report misuse, mishandling, or UD of CUI to the Unauthorized Disclosure Program Management Office.  In addition, notify the appropriate Military Department Counterintelligence Organization of all incidents.
+
+(5)  Submit the annual CUI Implementation Status Report to the DDI(CL&S) to evaluate the effectiveness, compliance, and efficiency of the DoD Component's implementation of CUI, in accordance with Paragraph 3.6.c.
+
+(6)  Resolve CUI challenges in accordance with E.O. 13556 and Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR.  Refer all unresolved challenges to the DDI(CL&S).
+
+b.  Serve as the primary point of contact for official correspondence, accountability reporting, and other matters of record between the DoD Component and the USD(I&S).
+
+## 3.6.  General Dod Cui Procedures.
+
+DoD CUI is clustered into organizational indexes (e.g., defense, privacy, proprietary) with associated categories, and is categorized by the DoD according to the specific law, regulation, or government-wide policy requiring control.  Unclassified information associated with a law, regulation, or government-wide policy and identified as needing safeguarding is considered CUI. It requires access control, handling, marking, dissemination controls, and other protective measures for safeguarding.
+
+a.  The authorized holder of a document or material is responsible for determining, at the time of creation, whether information in a document or material falls into a CUI category.  If so, the authorized holder is responsible for applying CUI markings and dissemination instructions accordingly.
+
+b.  In accordance with this issuance, every individual at every level, including DoD civilian and military personnel as well as contractors providing support to the DoD pursuant to contractual requirements, will comply with the requirements in Paragraph 3.6.f of this issuance for initial and annual refresher CUI training.
+
+c.  Each OSD and DoD Component will annually submit the CUI Implementation Status Report to the USD(I&S) for inclusion in the DoD CUI Program report to the CUI EA.  A copy of the report will be made available on Intelink at https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ousdi/hcis/sec/icdirect/information/CUI/Forms/AllItems.aspx. The CUI Implementation Status Report will at least include:
+
+(1)  Implementation activities.
+(2)  Training statistics.
+(3)  Incident management.
+(4)  Implementation and sustainment costs. (5)  Self-inspection activities.
+d.  DoD and OSD Components will submit an initial report on the implementation status of their CUI Programs.  Once established, DoD Component heads will conduct inspections of their programs, and the DoD Implementation Status Report will transition to an annual self-inspection report.
+e.  Some documents and materials containing CUI may constitute permanently valuable government records and will be maintained and disposed of in accordance with the NARA- approved record disposition schedules applicable to each DoD Component in accordance with DoDI 5015.02.  When other materials containing CUI no longer require safeguarding, they will be decontrolled and either retained, if a permanent record, or destroyed in accordance with Section 4 and ISOO Notice 2019-03.
+
+f.  Other Executive Branch Agencies in the U.S. Government have identified organizational indexes and CUI categories related to a law, regulation, or government-wide policy.  Some CUI indexes and categories are unique to specific organizations.  The Official CUI Registry is on the NARA Website at https://www.archives.gov/cui.  It identifies other CUI categories not specific to the Defense Index, but that may apply or relate to the Executive Branch.  Since various DoD Components interact and share inter-dependencies with other departments, agencies, and activities in the Executive Branch, it is important to know and understand these indexes and categories, along with their associated markings, in order to recognize other agencies' CUI and handle the information accordingly.  Of note, the CUI indexes and categories listed in the CUI Registry and DoD CUI Registry identify the safeguarding and dissemination requirements as identified by the related law, regulation, or government-wide policy.  Moreover, the CUI Registry is agile and subject to change based on changes in law, regulation, or government-wide policy.
+
+g.  In accordance with ISOO Notice 2016-01, CUI training standards must, at minimum:
+
+(1)  Identify individual responsibilities for protecting CUI.
+(2)  Identify the organizational index with CUI categories routinely handled by DoD
+personnel.
+
+(3)  Describe the CUI Registry, including purpose, structure, and location
+(http://www.archives.gov/cui).
+
+(4)  Describe the differences between CUI Basic and CUI Specified. (5)  Identify the offices or organizations with DoD CUI Program oversight responsibilities.
+
+(6)  Address CUI marking requirements as described in this issuance.
+
+(7)  Address the required physical safeguards and CUI protection methods as described in this issuance.
+
+(8)  Address the destruction requirements and methods as described in this issuance.
+(9)  Address the incident reporting procedures as described in this issuance.
+(10)  Address methods for properly disseminating CUI within the DoD and with external entities inside and outside of the Executive Branch.
+
+(11)  Address the methods for properly decontrolling CUI as described in this issuance.
+
+## 3.7.  General Dod Cui Requirements.
+
+This section specifies initial requirements for implementing, marking, and managing the CUI program.  Table 1 contains a sample list of the categories found in the DoD CUI Registry and Defense Index.  A complete list of CUI Indexes and Categories can be found on Intelink at https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ousdi/hcis/sec/icdirect/information/CUI/Forms/AllItems.aspx. Some significant points about DoD CUI include:
+
+a.  CUI does not include information lawfully and publicly available without restrictions.
+b.  CUI requires safeguarding measures identified by the CUI EA in Part 2002.14 of Title 32, CFR and, as necessary, in the law, regulation, or government-wide policy with which it is associated.  DoD CUI may be disseminated to DoD personnel to conduct official DoD and U.S. Government business in accordance with a law, regulation, or government-wide policy.
+
+(1)  No individual may have access to CUI information unless it is determined he or she has an authorized, lawful government purpose.
+(2)  The person with authorized possession, knowledge, or control of CUI will determine whether an individual has an authorized, lawful government purpose to access designated CUI.
+
+(3)  CUI information may be disseminated within the DoD Components and between DoD Component officials and DoD contractors, consultants, and grantees to conduct official business for the DoD, provided dissemination is consistent with controls imposed by a distribution statement or limited dissemination controls (LDC).
+
+(4)  CUI designated information may be disseminated to a foreign recipient in order to conduct official business for the DoD, provided the dissemination has been approved by a disclosure authority in accordance with Paragraph 3.4.c. and the CUI is appropriately marked as releasable to the intended foreign recipient.
+
+c.  CTI compiled or aggregated may become classified.  Such classified CTI is subject to the requirements of the National Industrial Security Program, which has different requirements than Section 252.204-7012 of the DFARS for unclassified CTI.
+
+(1)  CTI is to be marked with one of the Distribution Statements B through F, in accordance with DoDI 5230.24.
+(2)  Pursuant to section 252.204-7012 of the DFARS, scientific, technical, and engineering information beyond basic research(known as pre-applied research and development aligning with the Science, Technology, and Engineering Information Program policies, with military or space application subject to controls on the access, use, reproduction, modification, performance, transmission, display, release, disclosure, or dissemination) shall be treated as CUI. This type of information or data can become classified by compilation or aggregation and is subject to the National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1).  Examples include preliminary research and engineering data, engineering drawings, and associated specifications, lists, standards, process sheets, manuals, technical reports, technical orders, studies and analyses on topics requested by DoD Components, catalog-item identifications, data sets, and computer software with executable or source code.
+
+d.  As DoD programs transition through the acquisition life cycle, the CUI category or treatment of information may change.  In accordance with Title 32, CFR, if the safeguarding requirements for a CUI category or the original law, regulation, or government-wide policy changes, there will be a cascading effect requiring changes for the particular category.  These changes will be implemented as soon as possible.
+
+(1)  For example, in the acquisition area, a program will begin in the basic research and development phase.  Once this program milestone is achieved, the project could transition to the applied research and development or to the production phase.
+(2)  At this point, the original CUI must be reviewed for any necessary adjustments, including potential changes to the CUI designation, category, subcategory or type, or controls.
+
+e.  CUI will be identified in SCGs to ensure such information receives appropriate protection.
+If the SCG is canceled, a memorandum or other guidance document may be issued to identify CUI instead.
+
+f.  DoD is required to provide documents and records requested by members of the public, unless those records are exempt from disclosure in accordance with the procedures established by Part 286 of Title 32, CFR and DoDD 5400.07.
+g.  Other CUI category information may qualify for withholding from public release based on a specific FOIA exemption for the type of information in question.  Determining whether information meets the requirements for CUI shall be done separately and prior to identifying any potential FOIA exemptions.
+
+h.   CUI requiring distribution statements in accordance with DODI 5230.24 or the LDC
+identified in the related law, regulation, or government-wide policy, but does not qualify as classified information in accordance with E.O. 13526 or Chapter 14 of Title 42, U.S.C, (also known and referred to in this issuance as the "Atomic Energy Act of 1954"), will be implemented in accordance with this issuance.
+
+i.  Table 1 is an example of the format for the list of all DoD CUI Registry Categories aligned to the CUI National Registry published on Intelink at https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ousdi/hcis/sec/icdirect/information/CUI/Forms/AllItems.aspx.
+
+j.  Table 1 provides a sample of the cross-walk of the National CUI registry to the DoD
+issuance(s) related to the category.  The items in Table 1 identify the two unique types of data used by the Department of Energy, the DoD, and the DoD Components.  Both types satisfy the CUI requirements and are subject to safeguarding and limited distribution control, and are exempt from mandatory public disclosure in accordance with Exemption 3 of the FOIA.
+
+## Table 1.  Dod Cui Registry Category Examples
+
+| Category                                             | Proposed Defense Description    |
+|------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
+| Additional Information (How                          |                                 |
+| Used, Examples, etc.)                                |                                 |
+| Authority                                            | DoD Guidance                    |
+| Miscellaneous                                        |                                 |
+| Information                                          |                                 |
+|                                                      |                                 |
+| Data and information related to                      |                                 |
+| the safety of reactors and                           |                                 |
+| associated naval nuclear                             |                                 |
+| propulsion plants, the control of                    |                                 |
+| radiation and radioactivity                          |                                 |
+| associated with Defense naval                        |                                 |
+| nuclear propulsion activities                        |                                 |
+| containing prescriptive and                          |                                 |
+| enforcement standards and                            |                                 |
+| regulations for these areas as                       |                                 |
+| they affect the environment and                      |                                 |
+| the safety and health of                             |                                 |
+| workers, operators, and the                          |                                 |
+| general public.                                      |                                 |
+|                                                      |                                 |
+| NNPI                                                 |                                 |
+| Related to the safety of reactors and associated     |                                 |
+| naval nuclear propulsion plants, and control of      |                                 |
+| radiation and radioactivity associated with naval    |                                 |
+| nuclear propulsion activities, including prescribing |                                 |
+| and enforcing standards and regulations for these    |                                 |
+| areas as they affect the environment and the safety  |                                 |
+| and health of workers, operators, and the general    |                                 |
+| public.  This subcategory of Defense CUI relates     |                                 |
+| to the protection of information concerning nuclear  |                                 |
+| reactors, materials, or security and concerns the    |                                 |
+| safeguarding of nuclear reactors, materials, or      |                                 |
+| security.  Refer to Office of the Chief of Naval     |                                 |
+| Operations Instruction N9210.3, and CG-RN-1,         |                                 |
+| Revision 3, Department of Energy-DoD                 |                                 |
+| Classification Guide for the Naval Nuclear           |                                 |
+| Propulsion Program for guidance on determining       |                                 |
+| information as Unclassified Defense-NNPI.            |                                 |
+| Unclassified                                         |                                 |
+| Controlled                                           |                                 |
+| Nuclear                                              |                                 |
+| Information                                          |                                 |
+| - Defense                                            |                                 |
+| This type of Defense CUI may                         |                                 |
+| be designated UCNI by the                            |                                 |
+| Heads of the DoD Components                          |                                 |
+| and individuals delegated                            |                                 |
+| authority in accordance with                         |                                 |
+| DoDD 5210.83.  Some specific                         |                                 |
+| examples include: Security                           |                                 |
+| plans, procedures, and                               |                                 |
+| equipment used for the physical                      |                                 |
+| safeguarding of DoD SNM.                             |                                 |
+|                                                      |                                 |
+| Relating to Department of Defense special nuclear    |                                 |
+| material (SNM), equipment, and facilities, as        |                                 |
+| defined by Part 223 of Title 32, CFR.  This type of  |                                 |
+| Defense CUI is unclassified information about        |                                 |
+| SNM security measures, DoD SNM equipment,            |                                 |
+| DoD SNM facilities, or nuclear weapons in DoD        |                                 |
+| custody.  Information is designated DoD              |                                 |
+| unclassified controlled nuclear information          |                                 |
+| (UCNI) in accordance with DoDI 5210.83 only          |                                 |
+| when it is determined its UD could reasonably be     |                                 |
+| expected to have a significant adverse effect on the |                                 |
+| health and safety of the public or the common        |                                 |
+| defense and security by significantly increasing the |                                 |
+| likelihood of the illegal production of nuclear      |                                 |
+| weapons or the theft, diversion, or sabotage of      |                                 |
+| DoD SNM, DoD SNM equipment, DoD SNM                  |                                 |
+| facilities, or nuclear weapons in DoD custody.       |                                 |
+
+
+
+Section 2013
+of Title 42,
+U.S.C.; Section 2511 of Title 50, U.S.C.
+Chief of Naval
+Operations
+Instruction N9210.3, and CG-RN-1, Revision 3.
+Sanctions: Section
+2168 and 2168(b)
+of Title 42, U.S.C.
+The DoD NNPI is unique as it is exempt from mandatory public disclosure under Exemption 3 of
+the FOIA.
+
+DoDD 5210.83;
+DoDI 5210.83;
+Section 128(a) of Title 10, U.S.C.; Part 223 of Title 32, CFR
+The DoD UCNI is unique as it is exempt from mandatory public disclosure under Exemption 3 of the FOIA.
+
+k.  Restricted data or formerly restricted data are classified and shall not be commingled with CUI in an unclassified document.  For restricted data or formerly restricted data, follow the marking requirements in accordance with Volume 2 of DoDM 5200.01; Part 1045 of Title 10, CFR; and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
+
+l.  For DoD Geospatial intelligence information and data, the DoD will not apply the Geodetic Product Information (GPI) designation.  Instead, the DoD will continue to use the designation for "Limited Distribution" with the marking of "LIMDIS."  For all other DoD geospatial information and data, such as installation geospatial information and services (IGI&S) as defined by DoDI 8130.01, use the GPI category or other appropriate CUI category designations defined by this issuance.  The DoD will use the GPI designation for all of the non- Geospatial intelligence information and data.  Approved LDCs for the DoD are located on Intelink at https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ousdi/hcis/sec/icdirect/information/CUI/Forms/AllItems.aspx.
+
+m.  The request for a waiver for a particular CUI Program requirement will be handled in accordance with Volume 1 of DoDM 5200.01 for CNSI.
+n.   DoD Component heads shall produce annual self-inspection reports and general program status updates to fulfill ISOO monitoring and reporting requirements.
+
+## 3.8.  Oca.
+
+DoD OCAs will determine if CUI under their control, when compiled, is classified.  If so, the applicable SCGs must address the compilation.  Any time an OCA discovers that compiled or aggregated information is not properly classified on websites, folders, or documents, the OCA will:
+
+a.  Notify the organization using the compiled information to remove or protect the
+information.
+b.  Conduct a damage assessment.
+c.  Determine if the information still requires classified protection in its compiled form. If not, the OCA must document the revised aggregation or compilation determination by updating SCGs and providing the guide to all users in accordance with DoDM 5200.45.
+d.  If the information is determined not to be classified, it must be reviewed to identify if the information is CUI.
+
+e.  Since OCAs are the owners of the information under their authority, they are authorized to identify and mark such information as CUI.
+
+## 3.9.  General Release And Disclosure Requirements.
+
+a.  The release or disclosure to foreign governments, international organizations, coalitions, or allied personnel of CUI not controlled as NOFORN will be in accordance with a law, regulation, or government-wide policy.  Access to such CUI during official foreign national visits and assignments to DoD Components and cleared contractor facilities, when applied by contract, will be in accordance with DoDD 5230.20.
+
+b.  CUI not controlled as NOFORN may be released or disclosed to non-U.S. citizens employed by the DoD if:
+(1)  Access to such information is within the scope of their assigned duties. (2)  Access to such information would help accomplish a lawful and authorized DoD
+mission or purpose and would not be detrimental to the interests of the DoD or the U.S.
+
+Government.
+
+(3)  There are no contract restrictions prohibiting access to such information. (4)  Access to such information is in accordance with DoDIs 8500.01 and 5200.02 and export control regulations, as applicable.
+
+c.  The DoD Components' CSAOs and CPMs will establish procedures to ensure prompt and appropriate management action is taken in cases of CUI misuse, including UD of CUI, improper CUI designation and marking, violation of this issuance, and incidents potentially placing CUI at risk of UD.  Such actions will focus on correcting or eliminating the conditions contributing to the incident.
+
+d.  For UD of CUI, no formal security inquiry or investigation is required unless disciplinary action will be taken against the individual(s) responsible.  In such cases, a preliminary inquiry is appropriate.  UD of certain CUI, such as export controlled-technical data, may also result in potential civil and criminal sanctions against responsible persons based on the procedures codified in the relevant law, regulation, or government-wide policy.  The DoD Component originating the CUI will be informed of any UD.
+
+e.  Reporting or accounting for UD of CUI shall be done in accordance with Paragraph
+3.5.a(4), and the appropriate Military Department Counterintelligence Organization shall be notified of all incidents.
+
+## 3.10.  General System And Network Cui Requirements.
+
+In accordance with DoDIs 8500.01 and 8510.01, security controls for systems and networks are set to the level required by the safeguarding requirements for the data or information being processed, as identified in Federal Information Processing Standards 199 and 200.  For DoD
+CUI, the minimum security level will be moderate confidentiality in accordance with Part 2002
+of Title 32, CFR and NIST SP 800-171.
+
+a.  The USD(I&S) will notify and coordinate with the CUI EA regarding waiver requests involving CUI requirements prior to granting any such requests, including waiver requests related to IS.  The USD(I&S) must coordinate and collaborate with the DoD CIO to ensure the agency requesting the waiver has plans to appropriately safeguard and control CUI.  The request for a waiver for a CUI Program requirement shall be done in accordance with Volume 1 of DoDM 5200.01 for CNSI, as modified in the forthcoming manual supporting this instruction.
+b.  DoD personnel will not use unofficial or personal (e.g., .net; .com) e-mail accounts, messaging systems, or other non-DoD information systems, except approved or authorized government contractor systems, to conduct official business involving CUI.  This is necessary to ensure proper accountability for Federal records and to facilitate data spill remediation in accordance with Public Law 113-187 and the January 16, 2018 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum.
+
+c.  DoD information systems processing, storing, or transmitting CUI will be categorized at the moderate impact level, and follow the guidance in DoDIs 8500.01 and 8510.01.  Non-DoD
+information systems processing, storing, or transmitting CUI will provide adequate security, and the appropriate requirements must be incorporated into all contacts, grants, and other legal agreements with non-DoD entities in accordance with DoDI 8582.01.  The NIST SP 800-171 governs and protects CUI on non-Federal IS when applied by contract.
+
+d.  For systems, networks, and programs operating on the various domains, a splash screen warning and notice of consent, as shown in Figure 3, must be employed to alert users of CUI within the program.  This ensures proper safeguarding and dissemination controls are implemented in accordance with Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR and this issuance.
+
+"You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only.  By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions: -The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. -At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS.
+
+-Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose. -This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests--not for your personal benefit or privacy. -Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential.  See User Agreement for details."
+
+
+e.  Organizations will modify or install classification marking tools on UNCLASSIFIED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET network systems to account for CUI information and readily permit inclusion of CUI markings and designator indicators as required by Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR.
+
+## Section 4:  Dissemination, Decontrolling, And Destruction Of Cui 4.1.  General.
+
+Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR requires dissemination statements to be placed on classified and unclassified documents or other materials when CUI necessitates access restrictions, including those required by law, regulation, or government-wide policy.  These statements facilitate control, secondary sharing, decontrol, and release without the need to repeatedly obtain approval or authorization from the controlling DoD office.
+
+a.  Dissemination controls identify the audience  deemed to have a lawful government purpose to use the CUI and specify the rationale  for applying the controls by specific codes in accordance with DoDI 5230.24 and this issuance.
+
+b.  Agencies must promptly decontrol CUI properly determined  by the CUI owner to no longer require safeguarding or dissemination controls, unless doing so conflicts with the related law, regulation, or government-wide policy in accordance with DoDI 5230.09.
+
+c.  Decontrolling CUI through the public release process relieves authorized holders from requirements for handling information in accordance with the CUI Program.  A prepublication review must be conducted in accordance with DoDI 5230.09 before public release may be authorized.
+
+d.  In accordance with Part 2002.20 of Title 32, CFR, if the authorized holder of the CUI
+publicly releases the CUI in accordance with the designating agency's authorized procedures, this constitutes the decontrol of the document.
+
+e.  To ensure CUI protection, the following measures will be implemented:
+(1)  During working hours, steps will be taken to minimize the risk of access by unauthorized personnel, such as not reading, discussing, or leaving CUI information unattended where unauthorized personnel are present.  After working hours, CUI information will be stored in unlocked containers, desks, or cabinets if the government or government-contract building provides security for continuous monitoring of access.  If building security is not provided, the information will be stored in locked desks, file cabinets, bookcases, locked rooms, or similarly secured areas.  The concept of a controlled environment means there is sufficient internal security measures in place to prevent or detect unauthorized access to CUI.  For DoD, an open storage environment meets these requirements.
+(2)  CUI information and material may be transmitted via first class mail, parcel post, or, bulk shipments.  When practical, CUI information may be transmitted electronically (e.g., data, website, or e-mail), via approved secure communications systems or systems utilizing other protective measures such as Public Key Infrastructure or transport layer security (e.g., https). Avoid wireless telephone transmission of CUI when other options are available.  CUI transmission via facsimile machine is permitted; however, the sender is responsible for determining whether appropriate protection will be available at the receiving location before transmission (e.g., facsimile machine attended by a person authorized to receive CUI; facsimile machine located in a controlled government environment).
+
+## 4.2.  Dissemination Requirements For Dod Cui.
+
+a.  In accordance with this issuance, CUI access should be encouraged and permitted to the extent the access or dissemination:
+(1)  Complies with the law, regulation, or government-wide policy identifying the information as CUI.
+
+(2)  Furthers a lawful government purpose.
+
+(3)  Is not restricted by an authorized LDC established by the CUI EA. (4)  Is not otherwise prohibited by any other law, regulation, or government-wide policy.
+b.  Agencies may place limits on disseminating CUI for a lawful government purpose only using the dissemination controls listed in Table 2 or methods authorized by a specific law, regulation, or government-wide policy.
+
+c.  When handling other Executive Branch CUI, DoD personnel will follow their governance criteria for when the application of dissemination controls and its markings are allowed, and by whom, while ensuring the policy is in accordance with Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR.
+
+d.  LDCs or distribution statements cannot unnecessarily restrict CUI access.
+
+e.  Since DoD Components need to retain certain agency-specific CUI within their organizations, DoD Components may use  the limited dissemination controls to limit access to those on an accompanying dissemination list, as shown in Table 2.  For example, raw data, information, or products must be processed and analyzed before determining if further dissemination is required or permitted.  The Limited Dissemination Control List control will be used to address this need.  The LDC list is found on Intelink at https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ousdi/hcis/sec/icdirect/information/CUI/Forms/AllItems.aspx.
+
+## 4.3.  Legacy Distribution Statements.
+
+a.  Legacy CUI technical documents and materials requiring export control have used distribution statements in accordance with DoDI 5230.24 in order to address the shared responsibility between the DoD and its contractors to safeguard this information.  This was done for legacy CUI creation, transmission, receipt, storage, distribution, decontrol, and approved disposition authorities, including destruction.
+b.  As of the effective date of this issuance, DoD personnel will use LDCs for new CUI
+documents and materials except export controlled technical information, which must be marked with an export control warning in accordance with DoDI 5230.24, DoDD 5230.25, and Part 250 of Title 32, CFR.  The wording of the distribution statements may not be modified to specify additional distribution, such as distribution to foreign governments.  However, where other markings are authorized and used in accordance with associated law, regulation, or governmentwide policy (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization markings, REL TO), those markings may be used to further inform distribution decisions.  Therefore, "REL TO" is authorized for use with foreign nationals once the information distribution is properly coordinated with the foreign disclosure office.
+
+| NEW LDC                                        | ALIGNMENT TO CURRENT                            |
+|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
+| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENTS*                       |                                                 |
+| NONE - Publicly Releasable                     |                                                 |
+| AFTER                                          |                                                 |
+| Review                                         | DISTRO A                                        |
+| No Foreign Dissemination (NOFORN / NF)         |                                                 |
+|                                                |                                                 |
+| Federal Employees Only (FED ONLY)              | DISTRO B                                        |
+| DISTRO C                                       | Federal Employees and Contractors Only          |
+| (FEDCON)                                       |                                                 |
+| No Dissemination to Contractors (NOCON)        |                                                 |
+|                                                |                                                 |
+| Dissemination List Controlled (DL ONLY)        | DISTRO F                                        |
+|                                                |                                                 |
+| Authorized for Release to Certain Foreign      |                                                 |
+| Nationals Only (REL TO USA, LIST )             |                                                 |
+| Display Only (DISPLAY ONLY)                    |                                                 |
+|                                                |                                                 |
+| DISTRO E                                       | Dissemination List - (Include Separate List for |
+| Government Only)*                              |                                                 |
+| DISTRO D                                       | Dissemination List - (Include Separate List for |
+| Government and Contractors Only)*              |                                                 |
+| NONE                                           |                                                 |
+| DISTRO X:                                      |                                                 |
+| U.S. Government Agencies and private           |                                                 |
+| individuals or enterprises eligible to obtain  |                                                 |
+| export controlled technical data in accordance |                                                 |
+| with DoDD 5230.25.  DISTRO X was cancelled     |                                                 |
+| and superseded by DISTRO C.                    |                                                 |
+
+*The dissemination list  limits access to the specified individuals, groups, or agencies and must accompany the document c.  CUI export controlled technical information or other scientific, technical, and engineering information will still use distribution statements.  Export controlled information must also be marked with an export control warning as directed in DoDI 5230.24, DoDD 5230.25, and Part 250 of Title 32, CFR.
+
+## 4.4.  Decontrolling.
+
+Guidance for decontrolling CUI records, documents, and materials is provided in this issuance, or the CUI Registry for information categories not directly related to DoD CUI.
+
+a.  CUI documents and materials will be formally reviewed in accordance with DoDI
+5230.09 before being decontrolled or released to the public.
+b.  The originator or other competent authority (e.g., initial FOIA denial and appellate authorities) will terminate the CUI status of specific information when the information no longer requires protection from public disclosure.  When the CUI status of information is terminated in this manner, all known holders will be notified by email or other means.  Upon notification, holders will remove the CUI markings.  Holders will not need to retrieve records on file solely for this purpose.  Information with a terminated CUI status will not be publicly released without review and approval in accordance with DoDIs 5230.09, 5230.29, and 5400.04.
+
+## 4.5.  Destruction.
+
+Guidance for destroying CUI documents and materials is provided in this issuance, the CUI
+Registry, and ISOO Notice 2019-03.  CUI documents and materials will be formally reviewed in accordance with Paragraphs 4.5.a. and 4.5.b. before approved disposition authorities are applied, including destruction.  Media containing CUI must include decontrolling indicators.
+
+a.  Record and non-record copies of CUI documents will be disposed of in accordance with Chapter 33 of Title 44, U.S.C. and the DoD Components' records management directives.  When destroying CUI, including in electronic form, agencies must do so in a manner making it unreadable, indecipherable, and irrecoverable.  If the law, regulation, or government-wide policy specifies a method of destruction, agencies must use the method prescribed.
+b.  Record and non-record CUI documents may be destroyed by means approved for destroying classified information or by any other means making it unreadable, indecipherable, and unrecoverable the original information such as those identified in NIST SP 800-88 and in accordance with Section 2002.14 of Title 32, CFR.
+
+## Section 5:  Application Of Dod Industry 5.1.  General.
+
+There is a shared responsibility between the DoD and industry, when established by contract, grants, or other legal agreements or arrangements, in the identification, creation, sharing, marking, safeguarding, storage, dissemination, decontrol, disposition, destruction, and records management of CUI documents and materials.  It is essential to identify and apply the general dissemination principles and guidance as prescribed by the CUI EA in accordance with Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR.  Contracts containing CUI shared from DoD or generated, managed, or transmitted by the contractor via their information systems, will be in accordance with this issuance, which will be incorporated into each DoD contract.
+
+a.  The NIST SP 800-171 identifies the baseline CUI system security requirements for industry established by Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR.  Additionally, Section 252.204-7012 of the DFARS specifies a waiver process for defense contractors in accordance with NIST SP 800-171
+for contractor IT or networks.
+
+b.  CUI with the potential to impact national security (e.g., information related to critical programs and technology information) may require enhanced protection.  These enhanced measures would address both physical and logical procedures.  Enhanced protection methods for systems hosting CUI include:
+
+(1)  Access control (e.g., restricting both physical and logical access to the systems). (2)  Audit and accountability (e.g., review and monitor system usage). (3)  Configuration management (e.g., restrict system connection to only approved
+resources).
+(4)  Identification and authentication (e.g., control issuance of end-user certificates).
+(5)  Incident response (e.g., ensure corrective measures are implemented in a timely manner and validate effectiveness).
+
+(6)  System and communication protection (e.g., application of encryption for data at rest and restriction of connections to uncertified, unsecured, non-organizational systems). DoD Components may implement stricter CUI encryption requirements based on a law, regulation, or government-wide policy (DHA PI 8140, requires workforce encrypt emailed PHI).
+
+(7)  System and information integrity (e.g., provide network detection tools throughout
+the system to identify attempted intrusions).
+c.  Non-DoD IS processing, storing, or transmitting CUI will be safeguarded in accordance with contractual requirements identified for the particular CUI contained in the contract, DoDI 8582.01 and Section 252.204-7012 of the DFARS or their subsequent revisions.
+
+d.  When established by contract, contractors, sub-contractors, and consultants must comply with safeguarding requirements identified in the contract for all types of CUI.
+
+e.  The program office or requiring activity must identify DoD CUI at the time of contract award and, if necessary, provide guidance on information aggregation or compilation.  The program office or requiring activity must review recurring or renewed contracts for CUI to comply with this issuance.
+
+## 5.2.  Misuse Or Ud Of Cui.
+
+Safeguarding requirements and incident response measures for misuse or UD of CUI must be implemented across the DoD.  Senior leaders, contracting officers, commanders, and supervisors at all levels must consider and take appropriate administrative, legal, or other corrective or disciplinary action to address CUI misuse or UD commensurate with the appropriate law, regulation, or government-wide policy.
+
+## 5.3.  Requirements For Dod Contractors.
+
+This paragraph highlights requirements for DoD contractors.
+
+a.  Whenever DoD provides information to contractors, it must identify whether any of the information is CUI via the contracting vehicle, in whole or part, and mark such documents, material, or media in accordance with this issuance.
+
+b.  Whenever the DoD provides CUI to, or CUI is generated by, non-DoD entities, protective measures and dissemination controls, including those directed by relevant law, regulation, or government-wide policy, will be articulated in the contract, grant, or other legal agreement, as appropriate.
+c.  DoD contracts must require contractors to monitor CUI for aggregation and compilation based on the potential to generate classified information pursuant to security classification guidance addressing the accumulation of unclassified data or information.  DoD contracts shall require contractors to report the potential classification of aggregated or compiled CUI to a DoD representative.
+
+d.  DoD personnel and contractors, pursuant to mandatory DoD contract provisions, will submit unclassified DoD information for review and approval for release in accordance with the standard DoD Component processes and DoDI 5230.09.
+
+e.  All CUI records must follow the approved mandatory disposition authorities whenever the DoD provides CUI to, or CUI is generated by, non-DoD entities in accordance with Section 1220-1236 of Title 36, CFR, Section 3301a of Title 44, U.S.C., and this issuance.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+CFR
+Code of Federal Regulations
+CMO
+Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense
+CNSI
+classified national security information
+CPM
+Component program manager
+CSAO
+Component senior agency official
+CTI
+controlled technical information
+CUI
+controlled unclassified information
+
+DDI(CL&S)
+Director For Defense Intelligence (Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, And Security)
+DCSA
+Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency
+DFARS
+Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
+DNI
+Director of National Intelligence
+DoD CIO
+Department of Defense Chief Information Officer
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+DoDM
+DoD manual
+EA
+Executive Agent
+E.O.
+Executive order
+FOIA
+Freedom of Information Act
+GPI
+Geodetic Product Information
+ISOO
+Information Security Oversight Office
+IS
+information systems
+
+LDC
+limited dissemination controls
+
+NARA
+National Archives and Records Administration
+NISP
+National Industrial Security Program
+NIST SP
+National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication
+NNPI
+Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information
+NOFORN or NF
+not releasable to foreign nationals
+OCA
+original classification authority
+OIG DoD
+Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense
+PFPA
+Pentagon Force Protection Agency
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+
+REL TO
+releasable to
+
+SCG
+security classification guide
+SNM
+special nuclear material
+U
+Unclassified information
+UCNI
+unclassified controlled nuclear information
+UD
+unauthorized disclosure
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+USD(A&S)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+USD(I&S)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
+USD(R&E)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
+
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance. Referenced definitions related to CUI in Section 2002.4 of Title 32, CFR can be found at https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ousdi/hcis/sec/icdirect/information/CUI/Forms/AllItems.aspx.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+access
+The ability or opportunity to acquire, examine, or retrieve CUI.
+agency
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of 32 CFR
+aggregation
+The creation of classified information from the accumulation of unclassified data or information from several areas within a
+document. Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+agreements and arrangements
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+authorized CUI holder
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+classified information compilation
+The creation of classified information resulting from the accumulation of unclassified data or information from several documents.
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+contract
+Defined in Section 252.204- 2008 and 7012 of the FARS/DFARS.
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+controlled environment controls
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+CNSI
+Defined in E.O. 13526.
+CPM
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+CSAO
+An official designated, in writing, by a DoD Component head who is
+responsible to the agency head for implementing the CUI Program.
+Also known as CUI SAO as defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+
+CTI
+Defined in the DFARS 204.7301.
+CUI
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+CUI Basic
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR   (DoD is not using this structure in its initial implementation phase.)
+CUI category
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+CUI EA
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+CUI Indexes
+An organizational grouping of CUI categories as defined by the CUI EA. The term was created by the CUI EA to replace the notion of a
+sub-category which implies a hierarchy structure or importance.
+
+CUI misuse
+Use of CUI in a manner not in accordance with the policy contained in E.O. 13556; Part 2002 of Title 32, CFR; the CUI Registry; agency CUI policy; or the applicable LRGWP governing the information.
+CUI Program
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+CUI Registry
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+CUI Specified
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR (DoD is not using this structure in its initial implementation phase.)
+decontrol
+Defined in Section 2002.18 of Title 32, CFR.
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
+Defense Industrial
+Base disseminating
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+document
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+DoD personnel
+Defined in DoDI 5230.09.
+foreign entity
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+Defined in Section 1045 of Title 10, CFR.
+formerly restricted
+data handling
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+lawful government purpose LDC
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+legacy material
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+Limited Distribution
+A legacy CUI category used by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to identify a select group of sensitive, unclassified imagery or geospatial information and data created or distributed by National Geospatial Intelligence Agency or information, data, and products
+derived from such information (marked as LIMDIS and now referred to a GPI by CUI EA).
+
+logical access
+Electronic access controls authenticated through outside certificates accepted by the DoD to limit access to data files and systems only by vetted individuals.
+misuse
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+NNPI
+Information concerning the design, arrangement, development, testing, operation, administration, training, maintenance, and repair of the propulsion plants of naval nuclear powered ships and prototypes, including the associated nuclear support facilities. Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+non-Executive Branch entity
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+Defined in Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-130.
+personally
+identifiable information physical access
+All DoD and non-DoD personnel entering or exiting DoD facilities or installations that authenticated a physical access control system (PACS).
+portion
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+protection
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+
+public release
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+records
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+restricted data
+Defined in Part 1045 of Title 10, CFR.
+re-use
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+safeguarding
+Prescribed measures and controls that protect classified information and CUI.
+Senior Agency Official
+An official appointed by the Secretary of Defense to be responsible for direction, administration, and oversight of the DoD's Information
+Security Program, including classification, declassification, CUI, safeguarding, and security education and training programs, and for the efficient and effective implementation of the guidance in this issuance.
+
+SCG
+Security classification guidance issued by an OCA identifying the elements of information regarding a specific subject requiring classification, and establishes the level and duration of classification for each element.
+self-inspection
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+UD
+Defined in Section 2002.4 of Title 32 CFR
+unclassified
+Information not requiring control, but requiring review before public release.
+
+## References
+
+
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 1045 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 36 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Subparts 252.204-2008 and 7012, current edition
+
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Designation of Senior Agency Official for
+Controlled Unclassified Information," December 22, 2010
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified
+Information or Controlled Unclassified Information on DoD Information Systems," August
+14, 2014
+DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))," October 24,
+2014, as amended
+DoD Directive 5200.43, "Management of the Defense Security Enterprise," October 01, 2012, as
+amended
+DoD Directive 5230.11, "Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments
+and International Organizations (NDP-1)," June 16, 1992
+DoD Directive 5230.20, "Visits and Assignments of Foreign Nationals," June 22, 2005 DoD Directive 5400.07, "DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program," April 5, 2019 DoD Instruction 2040.02, "International Transfers of Technology, Articles, and Services,"
+March 27, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 3200.12, "DoD Scientific and Technical Information Program (STIP)," August
+22, 2013, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5015.02, "DoD Records Management Program," February 24, 2015, as
+amended
+DoD Instruction 5200.02, "DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP), Change 2," March 21, 2014,
+as amended
+DoD Instruction 5210.83, "DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI)," July 12,
+2012, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5230.09, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release," January 25, 2019 DoD Instruction 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents," August 23, 2012,
+as amended
+DoD Instruction 5230.29, "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public Release,"
+August 13, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5400.04, "Provision of Information to Congress," March 17, 2009 DoD Instruction 5400.11, "DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs," January 29, 2019 DoD Instruction 8320.07, "Implementing the Sharing of Data, Information, and Information
+Technology (IT) Services in the Department of Defense," August 03, 2015, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8500.01, "Cybersecurity," March 14, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8510.01, "Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information
+Technology (IT)," March 12, 2014, as amended
+DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Security Program: Overview,
+Classification, And Declassification," February 24, 2012, as amended
+DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 2, "DoD Information Security Program: Marking of
+Information," February 24, 2012, as amended
+DoD Manual 5200.45, "Instruction for Developing Security Classification Guides," April 02,
+2013, as amended
+DoD Manual 5400.07, "DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program," January 25, 2017 Executive Order 13526, "Classified National Security Information," December 29, 2009 Executive Order 13556, "Controlled Unclassified Information," November 04, 2010
+Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199, "Standards for Security
+Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems," February 2004
+Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 200, "Minimum Security Requirements
+for Federal Information and Information Systems," March 2006
+Information Security Oversight Office, "CUI Notice 2016-01: Implementation Guidance for the
+Controlled Unclassified Information Program," September 14, 2016
+Information Security Oversight Office, "CUI Notice: Decontrolling Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI ) in Response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request," November 19, 2018 Information Security Oversight Office, "CUI Notice 2019-01: Controlled Unclassified
+Information (CUI) Coversheets and Labels," February 22, 2019
+Information Security Oversight Office, "CUI Notice 2019-02: CUI Program Manage Position
+Description Template," May 13, 2019
+Information Security Oversight Office, "CUI Notice 2019-03: Destroying Controlled
+Unclassified Information (CUI)," July 15, 2019
+Information Security Oversight Office Response Letter to Under Secretary of Defense for
+Intelligence and Security, August 21, 2019
+Information Security Oversight Office Response Letter to Under Secretary of Defense for
+Intelligence, Subject: "Unclassified versus Uncontrolled Unclassified Information", June 4, 2019
+Intelligence Community Directive 710, "Classification Management and Control Markings
+System," June 21, 2013
+Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 403.1, "Criteria for Foreign Disclosure and release of
+Classified National Intelligence," June 21, 2013
+National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-171, "Protecting
+Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and Organizations," January 14, 2016, as amended
+National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-88, Revision 1,
+"Guidelines for Media Sanitization," February 5, 2015
+National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, December 19, 2012
+Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition
+Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction N9210.3, "Safeguarding of Naval Nuclear
+Propulsion Information (NNPI)," June 7, 2010
+Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-130, "Managing Information as a Strategic
+Resource," July 28, 2016
+OPNAVINST N9210.3, "Safeguarding of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI)", June
+07, 2010
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Memorandum, "Controlled Unclassified Information Implementation and Oversight for the Defense Industrial Base," May 17, 2018
+United States Code, Title 5
+United States Code, Title 10
+United States Code, Title 42, Chapter 14 (also known as the "Atomic Energy Act of 1954") United States Code, Title 44

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+## Dod Instruction 5205.83 Dod Insider Threat Management And Analysis Center (Ditmac)
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security March 30, 2017 October 29, 2020
+Effective:
+Change 1 Effective: Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division
+Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+Incorporates and Cancels: Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Memorandum,
+"Incubation of the DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center," December 12, 2014
+Approved by:
+Todd R. Lowery, Peforming the Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+Change 1 (Administrative)
+Approved by:
+Christopher R. Choate, Chief, Directives Division
+
+Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directives 5143.01 and 5205.16, this issuance:
+
+
+Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the DITMAC,
+which serves as the DoD's enterprise-level capability for insider threat information integration
+and management.
+
+Provides for the establishment and operation of an automation-assisted enterprise-level
+capability for managing and analyzing insider threat information across the law enforcement, personnel security, human resources, counterintelligence, physical security, network behavior
+monitoring, and cybersecurity activities of all the components of the Department of Defense, pursuant to Executive Order 13587.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 4
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 4 1.2.  Policy. ........ 4 1.3.  Summary of Change 1. ........ 4
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 5
+2.1.  Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)). ........ 5 2.2.  Director, Defense Security Service (DSS). ........ 5 2.3.  Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). ........ 6 2.4.  Director, Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). ........ 6
+2.5.  DoD CIO. ........ 6
+2.6.  Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). ........ 7 2.7.  DoD Component Heads. ........ 7
+SECTION 3:  DITMAC FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS ........ 8
+3.1.  General. ........ 8 3.2.  Director, DITMAC. ........ 8
+GLOSSARY ........ 10
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 10 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 10
+REFERENCES ........ 11
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information
+
+1.1.  APPLICABILITY.  This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the National Guard Bureau, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.  The Ditmac:
+
+a. Establishes and operates an automation-assisted enterprise-level capability for managing and analyzing insider threat information across the law enforcement, personnel security, human resources, counterintelligence, physical security, network behavior monitoring, and cybersecurity activities of all the components of the Department of Defense, pursuant to Executive Order 13587.
+
+b. In accordance with Executive Order 13587 and DoD Directive 5205.16, integrates and centrally analyzes key threat-related information on the threat that insiders may pose to DoD and U.S. Government installations, facilities, personnel, missions, or resources; including damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities.
+c. Will operate with the support of experts in counterintelligence, personnel security, law enforcement, human resources, physical security, network monitoring, cybersecurity, and privacy and civil liberties, and experts in information technology, large-scale data analysis, systems engineering, and program acquisition.
+d. Will operate at all times in compliance with all applicable laws, Executive Orders, regulations and DoD policy issuances, including those regarding whistleblower, civil liberties, and privacy protections.
+
+## 1.3.  Summary Of Change 1.
+
+a. This administrative change updates the title of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security in accordance with Public Law 116-92.
+
+b. Administrative changes in accordance with current standards of the Office of the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities
+
+2.1.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
+(USD(I&S)).  The USD(I&S), as the senior official and principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on the DoD Insider Threat Program develops policy and guidance governing the DoD Insider Threat Program and directs and facilitates the establishment of the DITMAC.
+2.2.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE (DSS).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S) and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.7, the Director, DSS:
+a. Establishes the operation of the DITMAC to:
+(1) Oversee the mitigation of insider threats as set forth in Paragraph1.2.b.
+
+(2) Assess enterprise-level risks, refer recommendations for action, synchronize responses, and oversee resolution of identified issues on the insider threats listed in Paragraph 1.2.b.
+
+(3) Develop enterprise-level risk criteria (thresholds) to facilitate Component reporting of potential threat information and assess the effectiveness of actions taken by Components to address, mitigate, or resolve insider threats as set forth in Paragraph 1.2.b.
+(4) Support the Office of the USD(I&S) in establishing standards to ensure that the DoD
+Insider Threat Program complies with applicable statutes, Executive Orders, and other National and DoD regulations and policies that specify insider threat program requirements.
+
+(5) Provide a single repository for enterprise-level DoD insider threat related information.
+
+(6) Promote collaboration and sharing of insider threat information among DoD
+Components.
+b. Appoints the Director, DITMAC.
+
+c. Collaborates with the Office of the USD(I&S) to further define DITMAC business and operational requirements, and the roles and responsibilities of DoD Components in supporting this activity.
+
+d. Collaborates with the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense (DoD CIO)
+to carry out the functions of the DITMAC as assigned in this Instruction and other applicable issuances, to develop DoD strategy for the operation and protection of DITMAC enterprise-level information technology deployed to support insider threat management.  This collaboration includes developing and publishing enterprise-wide architecture requirements and technical standards; operating and maintaining DITMAC systems; ensuring interoperability, collaboration, and interface between DoD and non-DoD entities; and making cost-effective investments in information system acquisition and sustainment necessary for DITMAC operations.
+
+e. Develops, maintains, implements, and administers security education, training products, and services related to deterring, detecting and mitigating insider threats across the industrial, information, personnel, and physical security disciplines, and other communities of practice as directed.
+
+f. Coordinates the release to cleared industry of information about potential threats that insiders may pose to cleared contractors, their employees, or their facilities.
+
+2.3.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S), and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.7, the Director, DIA, coordinates DIA activities supporting the DITMAC to identify potential insider threats present on the DoD Intelligence Information Systems domain and reports them to the appropriate DoD Component head and the Director, DITMAC.
+2.4.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER (DMDC).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness through the Director, Department of Defense Human Resources Activity, the Director, DMDC:
+a. Maintains data licenses and access to government and commercial databases on behalf of the enterprise, in support of DITMAC operations.
+
+b. Supports the DITMAC by optimizing the acquisition of and access to data sources for cross-DoD Component use for insider threat analysis.
+
+c. Supports various enterprise tools (e.g.; the Automated Continuous Evaluation System, the Case Adjudication Tracking System, the Defense Information System for Security, and the Identity Matching Engine for Security and Analysis), and coordinates with the Director, DITMAC, to help integrate relevant technical architecture across the DoD Components.
+
+## 2.5.  Dod Cio.  The Dod Cio:
+
+a. Establishes policies and develops DoD strategy to counter insider threats on the DoD
+Information Networks.
+
+b. Collaborates with the USD(I&S), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Director, DSS, to develop guidelines and procedures for implementing the requirements in the March 18, 2014 Secretary of Defense Memorandum.
+
+2.6.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the DoD CIO and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.7, the Director, DISA:
+a. Coordinates DISA activities to support interconnectivity between DITMAC information technology and DoD Component insider threat information systems.
+
+b. Identifies potential insider threats present on the segments of the non-secure internet protocol router network and secure internet protocol router network domains under DISA's authority and reports them to the appropriate DoD Component.
+
+## 2.7.  Dod Component Heads.  The Dod Component Heads:
+
+a. Share insider threat information with the Director, DITMAC, using Component insider threat analysis centers.
+
+b. Collaborate with the Director, DITMAC, to assign Component personnel as detailees, liaison officers, or personnel in joint-duty assignments (subject to availability and resourcing) to support the DITMAC.
+c. Deliver to the DITMAC post-processed results of information system monitoring, as appropriate, in accordance with thresholds published by the DITMAC.
+
+## Section 3:  Ditmac Functions And Operations
+
+3.1.  GENERAL.  The DITMAC provides DoD with an enterprise-level capability for insider threat information management.
+
+3.2.  DIRECTOR, DITMAC.  The Director, DITMAC, under the authority, direction and control of the Director, DSS:
+a. Oversees the management and analysis of insider threat information by a multidisciplinary team of DITMAC personnel that:
+
+(1) Assesses the information on potential insider threats as set forth in Paragraph 1.2.b.
+(2) Disseminates information on insider threats to DoD Components. (3) Provides information to DoD Components regarding insider threat program best
+practices.
+(4) Tracks responses by DoD Components to insider threats within a DoD enterpriselevel information management system.
+
+(5) Generates relevant metrics and reports to inform DoD Component leaders of reported and identified insider threats.
+
+b. Oversees efforts to decrease the insider threat to DoD and U.S. Government as set forth in Paragraph 1.2.b.
+
+c. Assesses the enterprise risk, refers recommendations for action, synchronizes responses, and oversees resolution of identified issues on threats that insiders may pose as set forth in Paragraph 1.2.b.
+d. Establishes risk thresholds and requirements for DoD Component reporting of potential insider threats to the DITMAC.
+
+e. Supports developing standards for actions and compiles results to evaluate those actions on threats that insiders may pose to DoD personnel, missions, and resources.
+
+f. Maintains a single DoD System of Records Notice for an enterprise-level capability for insider threat information management.
+
+g. Provides an enterprise-level capability for insider threat information management to assess information on potential insider threats.
+
+h. Shares adverse personnel security information with the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility for consideration in the clearance adjudication process, and with DoD Components that have an official interest in the information.
+
+i. Ensures the acquisition of, and access to, data sources for cross-DoD Component use for insider threat analysis in partnership with the DMDC.
+
+j. Handles personally identifiable information for U.S. persons in accordance with Section
+552a of Title 5, United States Code (also known as the "The Privacy Act of 1974"), DoD
+Instruction 5400.11, DoD 5400.11-R, and DoD Manual 5240.01.
+
+k. Handles protected health information in accordance with DoD Instruction 8580.02 and DoD Manual 6025.18.
+
+l. Ensures that DITMAC activities, including information sharing and collection, comply with DoD Instruction 5400.11.
+
+m. Ensures that all records are maintained and managed in accordance with National Archives and Records Administration-approved schedules to ensure proper maintenance, use, accessibility, and preservation, regardless of format or medium.
+
+n. Ensures that the collection of information for insider threat reports is performed in accordance with Volume 1 of DoD Manual 8910.01.
+
+## Glossary
+
+G.1.  ACRONYMS.
+
+| DIA      | Defense Intelligence Agency                              |
+|----------|----------------------------------------------------------|
+| DISA     | Defense Information Systems Agency                       |
+| DITMAC   | DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center        |
+| DMDC     | Defense Manpower Data Center                             |
+| DoD CIO  | Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense   |
+| DSS      | Defense Security Service                                 |
+| USD(I&S) | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security |
+
+G.2.  DEFINITIONS.  Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+DoD Component insider threat analysis centers.  A DoD Component's centralized capability or location where all insider threat-related information flows and is subsequently disseminated to the proper functional or operational entities (whether internal or external) for action or resolution.
+
+insider.  Defined in DoD Directive 5205.16. insider threat.  Defined in DoD Directive 5205.16
+
+## References
+
+DoD 5400.11-R, "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 14, 2007
+DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
+(USD(I&S))," October 24, 2014, as amended
+DoD Directive 5200.27, "Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not
+Affiliated with the Department of Defense," January 7, 1980
+DoD Directive 5205.16, "DoD Insider Threat Program," September 30, 2014, as amended DoD Instruction 5400.11, "DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs," January 29, 2019 DoD Instruction 8580.02, "Security of Individually Identifiable Health Information in DoD
+Health Care Programs," August 12, 2015
+DoD Manual 5240.01, "Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities,"
+August 8, 2016
+DoD Manual 6025.18, "Implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
+Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule in DoD Health Care Programs," March 13, 2019
+DoD Manual 8910.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Collections Manual: Procedures for DoD
+Internal Information Collections," June 30, 2014, as amended
+Executive Order 13587, "Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and
+the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information," October 7, 2011
+Public Law 116-92, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020,"
+December 20, 2019
+Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Final Recommendations of the Washington Navy Yard
+Shooting Internal and Independent Reviews," March 18, 2014
+United States Code, Title 5, Section 522a (also known as "The Privacy Act of 1974")

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+## Dod Instruction 5210.65 Security Standards For Safeguarding Dod Chemical Agents
+
+
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+
+Effective:
+October 1, 2020
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Instruction 5210.65, "Security Standards for Safeguarding Chemical
+Agents" January 19, 2016, as amended
+
+Approved by:
+Ellen M. Lord, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+
+Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5135.02, this issuance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides guidance for:
+
+- The execution of the DoD Chemical Agent Security Program. - Security and personnel reliability programs for:
+o DoD chemical agents, consisting of Schedule 1 chemicals in DoD possession, as listed in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, also known and referred to in this issuance as the "Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);"
+o Non-traditional agents (NTA) as listed in the March 18, 2020 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) Memorandum; and
+o DoD munitions with a chemical fill at the chemical weapons storage facilities and their associated chemical weapons destruction facilities as declared in accordance with the CWC.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 4
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 4 1.2.  Policy. ........ 4 1.3.  Information Collections. ........ 5
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 6
+2.1.  ASD(NCB). ........ 6 2.2.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security. ........ 7 2.3.  Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. ........ 7 2.4.  DoD Component Heads. ........ 7 2.5.  Secretary of the Army. ........ 8
+SECTION 3:  DEVIATION PROGRAM (WAIVERS AND EXCEPTIONS) ........ 10
+SECTION 4:  SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND MEASURES ........ 11
+4.1.  General. ........ 11 4.2.  Physical Security Systems. ........ 11 4.3.  Security Forces........ 13 4.4.  Security Measures. ........ 14
+a.  Security Barriers........ 14 b.  Other Security Measures. ........ 14
+4.5.  Access Control. ........ 15 4.6.  DoD Chemical Agent Storage. ........ 17 4.7.  Inventory and Accountability. ........ 17 4.8.  Information and cyber Security. ........ 18 4.9.  Transportation. ........ 18
+SECTION 5: CPRP ........ 19
+5.1.  General. ........ 19 5.2.  Initial Certification. ........ 19 5.3.  Continuing Evaluation. ........ 21
+a.  CO Observation. ........ 22 b.  Individual and Peer Reporting ........ 22 c.  Supervisor and Security Manager Reporting ........ 22 d.  Drug Testing ........ 22 e.  PSI ........ 22 f.  Medical ........ 22
+5.4.  CPRP Denial or Termination Criteria. ........ 23 5.5.  Removal from CPRP Duties. ........ 23 5.6.  Recertification into the CPRP. ........ 24
+SECTION 6:  VISITORS ........ 25 SECTION 7:  REPORTS ........ 26
+7.1.  General. ........ 26 7.2.  DoD Component Reports to the ASD(NCB). ........ 26 7.3.  Records Retention. ........ 27
+SECTION 8:  ACQUISITION AND PROVISIONING OF DOD SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS AND NTA ........ 28
+8.1.  DPM. ........ 28
+8.2.  Acquisition by DoD Components. ........ 28
+a.  Work Performed at a DoD Chemical Agent Facility. ........ 28 b  Work Performed at a certified non-DoD Facility. ........ 29
+8.3.  Acquisition by Non-DoD Entities. ........ 29
+a.  Schedule 1 Chemicals Provided Under Authority of the Economy Act of 1932. ........ 30 b.  Schedule 1 Chemicals Provided Under Authority of Section 1034 of Public Law 110-
+181........ 31
+8.4.  Certification of Non-DoD Facilities. ........ 32 8.5.  Ultra-Dilute Solutions. ........ 32
+SECTION 9:  SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS AND NTA EXEMPTION LIMITS ........ 34
+9.1.  Chemical Agent Exemption Limits. ........ 34 9.2. Ultra-dilute solution guidelines........ 34
+9.3.  Accountability of Exempt Chemical Agent. ........ 34
+GLOSSARY ........ 36
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 36 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 37
+REFERENCES ........ 42 TABLES Table 1.  Ultra-Dilute Solution Guidelines........33
+Table 2.  DoD Chemical Agent Exemption Limits........34
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+a.  This issuance applies to:
+(1)  OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components") that possess DoD chemical agents used for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective (including training) purposes.
+
+(2)  DoD chemical weapons storage facilities and their associated chemical weapons destruction facilities as declared in accordance with the CWC.
+
+(3)  DoD organizations that provide technical escort of DoD chemical agents.
+
+b.  This issuance does not apply to:
+(1)  Recovered chemical warfare materiel.
+(2)  Chemical agent samples, wastes, or material recovered from former destruction, storage, or production facilities.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+It is DoD policy that:
+a.  The DoD will comply with the provisions of the CWC and DoDD 2060.01. b.  The DoD will mitigate, to an acceptable risk, threats to security of DoD chemical agents, including theft, loss, diversion, release, or unauthorized access, transfer, use, or production.
+
+(1)  Authorities and responsibilities of the DoD Component commanders and directors for security of DoD property are delineated in Paragraphs 3.2. and 3.4. above the signature of DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5200.08.
+(2)  Requirements in this issuance do not repeal the responsibility of commanders or directors to apply more stringent security standards during emergencies, increased threat level or high risk determinations, or as deemed necessary pursuant to Paragraph C1.2.4 of DoD 5200.08- R.
+
+c.  Movement of DoD chemical agents be kept to a minimum consistent with operational, research, training, teaching, safety, and security requirements.
+
+d.  The number of people authorized access to DoD chemical agents be kept to the minimum consistent with operational, safety, and security requirements.
+
+e.  Individuals with a need to access DoD chemical agents above the limits defined in Section 9 or listed in the March 18, 2020, ASD(NCB) Memorandum, will be screened for suitability and reliability using the chemical personnel reliability program (CPRP) process in Section 5.
+
+f.  Internal control material weaknesses be reported in compliance with DoDI 5010.40. g.  International technology transfer and export control requirements for DoD chemical agents be implemented in accordance with DoDI 2040.02 and other applicable authorities, including, including:  Section 2778 of Title 22, United States Code (U.S.C.), also known as the
+"Arms Export Control Act (AECA);" Chapter 58 in Parts 4801-4851 of Title 50, U.S.C., also known as the "Export Control Reform Act;" Parts 120-130 of Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), also known as the "International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)" and Parts 730-774 of Title 15, CFR, also known as the "Export Administration Regulations (EAR)."
+h.  DoD Schedule 1 chemicals and NTA may be provided to support DoD and approved non-
+DoD purposes as authorized by law, and only in quantities and concentrations allowed for such purposes.
+i.  Ricin and saxitoxin, regardless of amount, are subject to the inventory and accountability requirements of Paragraph 4.7.  Apply the acquisition and provisioning requirements of Section 8 when used for protective purposes.  All other safeguards will be in accordance with DoDI 5210.88.
+j.  Schedule 1 precursors, regardless of the amount, are subject to the inventory and accountability requirements of Paragraph 4.7. and the acquisition and provisioning requirements of Section 8.  Apply these requirements when used for protective purposes.  Schedule 1 precursors do not require the personnel reliability provisions of this issuance.  Establish sitespecific procedures to ensure that Schedule 1 precursors are prepared, handled, tracked, and stored safely, in a manner to preclude loss of the precursors and prevent access by unauthorized personnel.
+k.  DoD Components not impose more restrictive implementing requirements for security of DoD chemical agents than those defined in this issuance unless such implementing guidance is approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) or is implemented in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.b.(2).  DoD Components are authorized to prescribe procedures to provide clarity or operationalize guidance.
+
+## 1.3.  Information Collections.
+
+The annual CPRP report, referred to in Paragraphs 2.1.h., 2.4.g., and 7.2.a. has been assigned report control symbol DD-AT&L(A)2582 in accordance with the procedures in Volume 1 of DoD Manual (DoDM) 8910.01.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities
+
+2.1.  ASD(NCB).
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the ASD(NCB):
+a.  Establishes security standards for safeguarding DoD chemical agents and CPRP standards for individuals with access to DoD chemical agents.
+b.  Reviews all exceptions to this issuance for approval.  This authority will not be delegated.
+
+c.  Oversees the DoD chemical agent security program to confirm DoD Components maintain compliance with standards.
+
+d.  Coordinates with the Department of Commerce, as necessary, to establish procedures for DoD compliance with maximum allowable limits of Schedule 1 chemicals under the CWC that may be produced, used, or stored by DoD Components; establishes a system to ensure DoD does not exceed those limits.
+
+e.  Establishes quantities and concentrations of DoD Schedule 1 chemicals that warrant reduced security requirements.
+
+f.  Establishes procedures that define the request, approval, and management processes for the provision or transfer of DoD Schedule 1 chemicals and NTA between DoD Components and to non-DoD entities.
+
+g.  Approves DoD Schedule 1 chemical and NTA requests from non-DoD entities through interagency or other appropriate agreements.
+h.  Establishes procedures for annual DoD Component reporting of statistical data concerning the CPRP.
+
+i.  Establishes procedures for DoD Components to report DoD chemical agent accidents and incidents.
+
+j.  Provides relevant threat assessment updates to the DoD Components on receipt. k.  Develops and coordinates DoD chemical agent security classification guidance, as appropriate, and provides that guidance to the DoD Components to verify consistency in classification and dissemination of information.
+
+## 2.2.  Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Homeland Defense And Global Security.
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and consistent with DoDD 5111.13 and DoDD 2060.02, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security:
+a.  Coordinates on chemical policy and planning and represents the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on interagency chemical security committees and working groups.
+b.  Develops policy to support civil authorities for DoD preparedness, response and consequence management involving DoD chemical agents in accordance with the 2018 National Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
+c.  Reviews and provides recommendations to the ASD(NCB) on non-DoD requests for DoD
+Schedule 1 chemicals and NTA, as appropriate.
+
+## 2.3.  Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and in accordance with DoDD 5105.21, and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.4., the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, annually reviews and updates relevant threat capability assessments and provides them to the ASD(NCB).
+
+## 2.4.  Dod Component Heads.
+
+The DoD Component heads:
+a.  Assign responsibilities and provide commanders or directors guidance to comply with the requirements, measures, and standards in this issuance.
+b.  Establish a process for approval of waivers to this issuance and keep the ASD(NCB)
+informed of waiver approvals.
+
+c.  Plan and program fiscal and personnel resources necessary to implement the policy and requirements in this issuance.
+
+d.  Establish a process to certify that new DoD chemical agent facilities are compliant with this issuance, decertify facilities that are not compliant or no longer require certification, and notify the ASD(NCB) of the certification or decertification.
+
+e.  Require that DoD Schedule 1 chemical agents and facilities are registered according to federal, State, and local regulations, all CWC-related declarations are submitted through the DoD Treaty Manager, and activities regarding these DoD Schedule 1 chemical agents and relevant facilities are identified and addressed according to CWC provisions.
+
+f.  Require that each DoD chemical agent facility is supported by an appropriately appointed competent medical authority (CMA).
+g.  Submit annual statistical data concerning the CPRP to the ASD(NCB) in accordance with guidance from the ASD(NCB) and Paragraph 7.2.a.
+
+h.  Coordinate and approve, as part of pre-event planning, proposed public releases of information pertaining to DoD chemical agents with the Director, Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), pursuant to DoDI 5230.29.  Once the Director, WHS, has cleared information for public release, coordinate with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs before release, pursuant to DoDD 5122.05.  Coordinate information related to public safety as part of pre-event planning, but information release during an incident will not be delayed and will be in accordance with local agreements.  Notify Director, WHS, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs immediately when such information is released.
+
+i.  Maintain Schedule 1 chemical inventory and accountability in accordance with the CWC
+provisions, guidance from the DoD Inventory and Accountability Manager (DIAM), and this issuance.
+j.  Maintain NTA inventory and accountability in accordance with guidance from the DIAM
+and this issuance.
+
+k.  Request transfer and use of DoD chemical agents in accordance with the requirements in Section 8.
+
+l.  Ensure that DoD chemical agent facilities establish safety and security procedures commensurate with other regulations and the risks associated with the material for DoD Schedule 1 chemical and NTA levels below the exemption limits described in Section 9 or the March 18, 2020, ASD(NCB) Memorandum, respectively.
+
+m.  Establish inspection process for DoD chemical agent facilities.
+n.  Endorse deviation requests forwarded to the ASD(NCB). o.  Establish documentation requirements that are not addressed in this issuance.
+p.  Require that DoD Schedule 1 chemical agents and NTA facilities establish plans, procedures, and processes to secure, safeguard, or destroy DoD chemical agents in the event of emergency situations (e.g., natural disasters, fires, power outages, and general emergencies in DoD chemical agent facilities).
+
+## 2.5.  Secretary Of The Army.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.4., the Secretary of the Army:
+a.  Designates the DIAM and notifies the ASD(NCB) of the designation and any subsequent changes.  Ensures that the DIAM supports DoD management of DoD Schedule 1 chemicals and NTA by:
+(1)  Coordinating with DoD Component heads and the ASD(NCB) on DoD inventory reporting requirements for DoD Schedule 1 chemicals to maintain compliance with the CWC and Public Law 110-181.
+
+(2)  Coordinating with DoD Component heads and the ASD(NCB) on DoD inventory reporting requirements for NTA.
+
+(3)  Tracking and accounting for DoD Schedule 1 chemicals and NTA at each facility.
+
+(4)  Issuing guidance, as necessary, to DoD chemical agent facilities and non-DoD
+facilities to clarify policy for inventory and accountability procedures.
+
+(5)  Coordinating with ASD(NCB) on any issues that may impact the ability of the DoD
+to meet CWC requirements pertaining to Schedule 1 chemical provisioning or accountability.
+
+(6)  Maintaining a register of current and previous facility chemical agent accountability officers in accordance with record retention standards in Section 7.
+(7)  Providing information about DoD Schedule 1 chemical and NTA inventory and current and previous facility chemical agent accountability officers for DoD chemical agent facilities and non-DoD facilities to the ASD(NCB) upon request.
+
+b.  Operates the single small scale facility (SSSF) and the protective purposes production facility in accordance with the CWC, and provides Schedule 1 chemicals from the SSSF in accordance with Sections 8 and 9.
+
+c.  Designates the DoD Provisioning Manager (DPM).
+d.  Designates the Army Inspector General as the primary authority for conducting oversight inspections for DoD chemical agent facilities on behalf of the ASD(NCB).
+
+## Section 3:  Deviation Program (Waivers And Exceptions)
+
+3.1.  Deviations from the requirements of this issuance require an approved waiver or exception.
+Deviations are cases where the requirements of this issuance are not implemented.
+
+a.  The DoD Component head, or his or her designee, is the approval authority for waivers to this issuance.  A waiver may be approved for temporary relief from a specific requirement prescribed in this issuance, pending actions to conform to the requirement.  Such waivers will be approved for only as long as needed and will not exceed 1 year; an extension may be approved for no more than 1 additional year.  While a waiver is in effect, implement compensatory security measures as needed to mitigate any increase in risk or vulnerability to an acceptable level.  The DoD Component will notify the ASD(NCB) of approved waivers.
+
+b.  The ASD(NCB) is the approval authority for all exceptions to this issuance.  An exception may be approved for permanent relief from a specific requirement as prescribed in this issuance when there are unique circumstances at the DoD chemical agent facility that make conforming to the requirement impractical or an inappropriate use of resources.  Implement compensatory security measures to mitigate any increase in risk or vulnerability to an acceptable level. 3.2.  Forward requests for waivers and exceptions to this issuance through the chain of command to reach the DoD Component within 30 days of initiation.  Within 30 days of receipt, the DoD Component will review and respond to waiver requests or will forward exception requests to the ASD(NCB).  The ASD(NCB) will review exception requests and respond within 30 days of receipt.  Requests for deviations will include:
+a.  Any risks and vulnerabilities associated with granting the deviation, ensuring they are classified in accordance with current guidance.
+
+b.  Recommended compensatory security measures to mitigate any increased risk of vulnerability as a result of the deviation.
+
+c.  The projected duration of the deviation. d.  A complete and specific justification indicating why the deviation is required.
+e.  The projected costs associated with the recommended compensatory security measures.
+f.  A recommendation from the DoD Component head for requests forwarded to the ASD(NCB). 3.3.  Whenever deviation conditions or compensatory measures change, send a request for an amendment to, or cancellation of, the waiver or exception, to the office that granted approval of the original request. 3.4.  Physical security surveys, reports, and inspections will include a review of approved deviations to verify that conditions described in the request remain accurate and that compensatory measures are fully implemented.  The physical security survey or inspection report will include a comment regarding the actions taken as a result of that review.
+
+## Section 4:  Security Requirements And Measures 4.1.  General.
+
+This section details the security standards necessary to reduce the risk of compromising DoD chemical agent security and to safeguard DoD chemical agents from theft or unauthorized access.
+
+a.  Secure, store, and transport DoD chemical agents in accordance with DoDI 5200.08, DoD 5200.08-R, Volume 6 of Defense Explosives Safety Regulation 6055.09, and the security standards in this issuance.
+
+b.  Do not co-locate DoD chemical agents with unrelated arms or ammunition.
+c.  Report DoD chemical agent accidents and incidents as described in Section 7.
+d.  Security planning and execution will be in accordance with DoDI 5200.08 and based on the standards identified in this issuance and a site-specific risk assessment of the facility.  Use an appropriate risk management process in accordance with DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 2, to assess the threat and vulnerabilities and provide the facility commander or director with courses of action to mitigate the vulnerabilities or accept the risk.
+
+e.  The commander or director of a DoD chemical agent facility will conduct and document an initial site-specific risk assessment, then review and update it annually or as a new vulnerability or threat becomes known.  The risk assessment will consider the current threat assessment, physical surveys, and antiterrorism standards from DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 2.  For DoD chemical munition facilities, the risk assessment will consider the results of security force training exercises.
+
+## 4.2.  Physical Security Systems.
+
+a.  The DoD chemical agent facility commander or director will establish a reliable security system and process that provides the capability to detect, assess, deter, communicate, delay, and respond to unauthorized attempts to access DoD chemical agents.  Security requirements for non- DoD facilities that are provided DoD Schedule 1 chemicals and NTA will be delineated in specific provisioning agreements in accordance with Section 8.
+
+b.  Commanders or directors of DoD chemical agent facilities will develop a physical security plan to mitigate vulnerabilities or accept a risk in accordance with DoDI 5200.08.
+
+(1)  The physical security plan will be based on a systematic approach in which threats are identified and defined, vulnerabilities are assessed, and a risk management process is applied. Acceptable risk will be determined using a risk-based process executed at the DoD chemical agent facility level, in coordination with the installation staff, and approved by the facility's most senior commander or director.
+(2)  If the DoD chemical agent facility is a tenant on a military installation, the physical security plan for the facility will be integrated into the host installation plan.  The DoD chemical agent facility commander or director will identify any off-installation support requirements to the installation commander, who will incorporate those requirements into any installation agreements coordinated with off-installation agencies.
+
+(3)  The organization responsible for executing armed responses at DoD chemical agent facilities (when required by a site-specific risk assessment) will develop response plans in coordination with the supported chemical agent facility to implement acceptable support levels.
+(4)  The DoD chemical agent facility commander or director will review the physical security plan annually and revise as necessary.  The plan will address or establish:
+(a)  Controls used to secure the DoD chemical agents from misuse, theft, loss, and unauthorized access or removal from areas approved for storage or use.
+
+(b)  Designation of chemical exclusion areas (CEAs) and controls for access to DoD
+chemical agents requiring access under the two-person rule; designation of chemical restricted areas (CRAs) for DoD chemical agents not requiring the two-person rule.
+
+(c)  Procedures to appropriately secure information in accordance with Paragraph 4.8.
+
+(d)  Initial and annual personnel trainings regarding procedures for securing DoD
+chemical agents, security and positive control of keys, changing access permissions or locks following staff changes, reporting and removing unauthorized individuals, access control and records requirements, and inventory control and other appropriate security measures.  Additional trainings must also be provided whenever the entity significantly amends its security, incident response, or chemical safety plans.
+
+(e)  Procedures, reporting requirements, and administrative actions for lost or compromised keys, keycards, passwords, combinations, and security incidents and violations, including alteration of inventory records.
+
+(f)  Procedures to mitigate the presence of suspicious or unauthorized persons or activities that may potentially or actually attempt to misuse or remove DoD chemical agents.
+
+(g)  Procedures on how to identify and report suspicious packages before they are brought into or removed from DoD chemical agent storage or work area.
+
+(h)  Delineation of the roles and responsibilities for security management, including designation of a security officer to manage the facility's DoD chemical agent security program.
+
+(i)  Procedures for management of access controls (e.g., keys, keycards, common access card, access logs, biometrics and other access control measures).  This may be accomplished by directly controlling or interacting with a service provider (e.g., a guard company).
+
+(j)  Designation of personnel to manage the facility's intrusion detection system
+(IDS), including personnel with the IDS alarm code and criteria for changing it.
+
+(k)  Procedures to test the IDS and manage its configuration.
+(l)  Procedures to respond to an access control failure, IDS failure, or nuisance alarm. (m)  Procedures to screen visitors in accordance with Section 6.
+(n)  Procedures to document security awareness training for all employees in the CPRP.  This will include annual insider threat awareness briefings, pursuant to DoDD 5205.16 on how to identify and report suspicious behaviors that occur inside the facility.
+
+(o)  Requirements and procedures for all professionals involved in DoD chemical agent safety and security at a facility to share relevant information and coordinate efforts.  The facility's safety and security professionals will meet on a regular or defined basis.  This may be annually in conjunction with the physical security plan review, after a security incident, when there is a significant facility change that affects security, or in response to a threat.
+
+## 4.3.  Security Forces.
+
+a.  In accordance with DoDI 5200.08 and DoDD 5210.56, installation commanders will issue the necessary regulations to protect and secure property and places in their command.
+
+b.  There will be a sufficient security force available at all times to respond rapidly to unauthorized access (attempted or actual).
+
+c.  The DoD chemical agent facility commander or director and the installation commander will determine the required response time for the security forces (from notification to arrival at the first security barrier) based on the site-specific risk assessment.  The security barriers must be sufficient to delay unauthorized access until the security force arrives.
+
+d.  Security force members will conduct and participate in realistic response force and site defense force training exercises of likely and plausible threat scenarios at a frequency determined by the DoD Component.  The training will be tailored to each DoD chemical agent facility based on the site-specific risk assessment conducted at the facility.
+
+e.  Security forces will develop plans to recover DoD chemical agents in the event of their loss.
+(1)  Plans will include personnel to be used (e.g., military, civilian law enforcement, government police or guards), rules of force or engagement, and incident reporting requirements. The installation commander responsible for recovery forces is responsible for the recovery plan and for civilian agency agreements and integration of installation recovery personnel with civilian law enforcement personnel.
+(2)  These plans will be exercised and evaluated at least annually with security forces and civilian law enforcement (if available) and other appropriate responders (e.g., fire department) to determine the effectiveness of the plan and capabilities of recovery forces.  Conduct plan updates and training when execution indicates the need or in accordance with DoD Component guidance.
+
+## 4.4.  Security Measures. A.  Security Barriers.
+
+DoD chemical agent facilities must have security barriers that both deter intrusion and deny access to areas containing DoD chemical agents by unapproved personnel.  Barriers may consist of physical obstacles (e.g., perimeter fences, walls, locked doors, security windows), trained personnel (e.g., security guards, laboratory personnel, or escorts), or a combination of both, to provide a continuous ring of security or layering that provides security in depth.
+(1)  Enclose CEA at DoD chemical munition facilities by perimeter fencing to clearly delineate the area and to direct personnel to a specific entry point.  The perimeter fencing will consist of two fences separated by not less than 30 feet or more than 150 feet (approximately 9 to 45 m).  Clear zones, free of all obstacles, topographical features, and vegetation exceeding 8 inches (20.3 cm) high will extend at least 30 feet (9.1 m) inside the inner perimeter fence, between the fences, and at least 30 feet (9.1 m) outside the outer perimeter fence.
+
+(2)  Barriers may be designated personnel.  These personnel must be trained and dedicated to the task of controlling access to or safeguarding DoD chemical agents when those agents are outside of a security container (e.g., outside secure storage in a training area).
+
+## B.  Other Security Measures.
+
+Perimeter security lighting, IDS, and cameras may be used to monitor access, but are not considered security barriers because they cannot, by themselves, prevent access.
+
+## (1)  Perimeter Security Lighting.
+
+DoD chemical munition facilities with perimeter fencing and IDS requirements will also be equipped with perimeter lighting in accordance with component prescribed standards. Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and training facilities will determine perimeter lighting needs based on site-specific risk assessments.
+
+(2)  IDS.
+
+Equip the IDS with monitoring capability (e.g., tamper alarms or serialized seals) to detect and report access (actual or attempted) to security monitoring or control systems, IDS equipment, junction boxes, or communication lines.  Install a perimeter IDS on the chemical limited area (CLA) perimeter of DoD chemical munition facilities.
+
+(a)  DoD chemical agent facilities may consider using IDS based on a site-specific risk assessment.  However, interior IDS will be installed on entry and exit doors of rooms containing DoD chemical agents stored in CEAs.
+(b)  DoD chemical munition facilities must be protected by an IDS unless the area is physically occupied.  Configure the IDS to detect and report unauthorized access (actual or attempted) and meet the physical security standards in Volume 3 of DoDM 5200.01.
+
+(3)  Cameras.
+Cameras can be used to monitor barriers or for other risk mitigation based on site-specific risk assessments.
+
+## 4.5.  Access Control.
+
+a.  Personnel must be enrolled in the CPRP by the CO for unescorted access to DoD chemical agents not exempted in accordance with Section 9.  For access to DoD chemical munitions, sites will apply the two-person rule as defined in this issuance.  The two-person rule as defined in this issuance does not apply when accessing DoD Schedule 1 chemicals or NTA used in RDT&E or training facilities unless need is justified by a site-specific risk assessment.
+b.  Visitors requiring access to DoD chemical agents will follow the procedures in Section 6. c.  The access control system will include provisions for the safeguarding of animals exposed to DoD chemical agents.
+
+d.  The DoD chemical agent facility personnel will maintain a register (automated or manual)
+to record the entrance and exit of visitors to CLAs or CRAs.  The register will reflect the individual's name, entrance and exit time and date, and escort's name (if an escort is required).
+
+e.  The DoD chemical agent facility personnel will modify the access control system when an individual's access authorization changes.
+
+f.  Secure CEAs by at least two reliable security access control devices (e.g., card access system, key pads, cipher locks, mechanical locking device, biometrics) when cleared and authorized individuals are not present.  A separate mechanical locking device must be present if an automated entry control system (AECS) is used.
+
+g.  Implement smart card technology in accordance with DoDI 8520.02.
+h.  All individuals approved for access to CEAs and DoD chemical agents must wear visible identification (ID) badges in front between the neck and waist that include, at least, a photograph, the wearer's name, and an expiration date.
+i.  The DoD chemical agent facility will implement a duress system to enable authorized personnel to covertly communicate an adverse situation.
+
+j.  An AECS may be used to control access instead of visual control if it meets the criteria stated in this issuance.  The AECS will authenticate the individual's ID and verify the person's authority to enter the area through two separate methods that may include ID badges, cards, a personal identification number (PIN) entry device, or biometric device.
+(1)  An AECS ID badge or key card will use embedded sensors, integrated circuits, magnetic strips, or other means of encoding data that identifies the facility and the individual to whom the card is issued in accordance with DoDI 8520.02.
+(2)  Personal identity verification via biometrics devices may be used to validate the individual requesting access by one or more unique personal characteristics.  Personal characteristics may include fingerprints, hand geometry, handwriting, retina scans, or voice recognition.
+
+(3)  Configure the AECS to maintain system integrity and to preclude compromise of electronic access data.  The AECS will operate on a closed computer network specifically designed and established for the AECS.  Data input to the system will require the badge custodian to have log-in and password privileges.
+
+(4)  A PIN may be required if smart card technology is used.  The PIN will be separately entered into the system by each individual using a keypad device and will consist of four or more digits, randomly selected, with no known or logical association with the individual.  Change the PIN if it is believed to be compromised.
+
+(5)  The AECS will authenticate the individual's authorization to enter CEAs with inputs from the ID badge or card, the personal identity verification device, or a keypad with an electronic database of individuals authorized to enter the area.  A paper-entry access control roster will be maintained in the event of a system failure or as an alternative.
+
+(6)  Protection from tampering, destruction, or access control system failure will be established and maintained for all devices or equipment that constitutes the access control system.  The protections can include welding door hinges and pins, eliminating exposed screw heads, ensuring that doors and walls delay access or IDS to detect unauthorized entry.  These emergency systems will allow time for response forces to arrive as discussed in Paragraph 4.4.b. Protection will address covert entry into CEAs and CLAs through electrical, communications, or heating, ventilation, and air conditioning distribution and maintenance areas.
+
+(7)  Security and communications devices located outside the entrance to a CRA will be in protected areas or have tamper resistant enclosures.  They will be securely fastened to the wall or other permanent structure to prevent unauthorized access through breaching of attachment mechanisms (e.g., screws, pins, bolts).  Control panels located within a CRA will require only a minimal degree of physical security protection sufficient to preclude unauthorized access to the mechanism.
+
+(8)  Design and install keypad devices so that an unauthorized person in the immediate vicinity cannot observe the selection of input numbers.
+
+(9)  Electric strikes used in access control systems will be heavy duty, industrial grade.
+
+## 4.6.  Dod Chemical Agent Storage.
+
+a.  All DoD chemical agents designated as requiring two-person rule will be stored in secured containers or other approved storage devices within CEAs.  This material will be secured in a manner that provides two CPRP-certified person integrity to verify movement into or out of storage.
+
+b.  For DoD Schedule 1 chemicals and NTA not identified in a site-specific risk assessment as requiring management under the two-person rule, movement into or out of storage requires the presence of a witness to validate the action.  DoD chemical agents that are maintained in a DoD chemical agent use room will be secured by a DoD-certified locking mechanism prescribed by the DoD Component when the containers are not under direct supervision and control of authorized personnel.
+
+c.  Establish procedures for package and material controls, end-of-day security checks, afterduty access controls, and access records.
+
+d.  DoD chemical agents must be clearly marked and labeled to ensure proper handling and protection
+
+## 4.7.  Inventory And Accountability.
+
+a.  Each commander or director of a DoD chemical agent facility will designate the facility chemical agent accountability officer(s) and provide a copy of the designation to the DIAM.  The facility chemical agent accountability officer(s) will provide inventory reports, as required, through the chain of command to the DIAM.
+
+b.  The DIAM, on behalf of the ASD(NCB), will provide guidance to the DoD Components regarding DoD Schedule 1 chemical and NTA inventory report formats (including appropriate forms for agent transfer and inventory accounting) and on segregation of duties.  This guidance will include timelines for submission of the reports.
+
+c.  Each DoD Component will prepare semiannual inventory reports for DoD Schedule 1
+chemical agent facilities and supported non-DoD facilities (including government, industry, academic, and contractor facilities) that possess, acquire, produce, consume, store, transfer, or dispose of accountable Schedule 1 chemicals in accordance with the CWC provisions, DoDD 2060.01, and DoDM 4160.21, Volume 1.
+d.  The DIAM will review the Schedule 1 chemical inventory reports and provide a consolidated report to the ASD(NCB) by March 1 and September 1.  The consolidated report will identify the aggregate amount, by DoD Schedule 1 chemical agent, maintained at each DoD chemical agent facility and non-DoD facility.  Immediately report to the ASD(NCB) if at any time, the DIAM becomes aware that DoD is within 90 percent of or has exceeded its allowance of CWC Schedule 1 chemicals.
+
+e.  Each DoD Component will prepare an annual inventory report on all facilities that possess, acquire, produce, consume, store, transfer, or dispose of NTA regulated by this issuance.
+
+## 4.8.  Information And Cyber Security.
+
+a.  Protect DoD information systems and DoD information in electronic format in accordance with DoDI 8500.01 and comply with DoDI 8510.01.
+
+b.  Public release of information will be in accordance with DoDI 5230.29 and DoDD 5230.09.
+
+## 4.9.  Transportation.
+
+a.  The transportation of DoD chemical agents will be in accordance with Chapter 204 of Part II of Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9-R and Sections 1512 and 1512a of Title 50, U.S.C.
+b.  Packages or containers containing DoD chemical agents will not be left unattended or unsecured while awaiting transportation.
+
+c.  During the planning and preparation stages of transportation of DoD chemical agents off the confines of a military installation or certified non-DoD laboratory, a current risk assessment will be made including known threats and hazards.  Planning for the move will include appropriate security measures in accordance with DoDD 5210.56, the mode of shipment in accordance with Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9-R, the availability of security resources, and the source and availability of emergency assistance.  Take all reasonable precautions for the safety and security of personnel and the security of DoD chemical agents.
+
+d.  Any accidents or incidents involving the transportation of DoD chemical agents will follow the reporting procedures in Section 7.  Further, the DoD chemical agent facility responsible for the shipment of DoD chemical agents is required to coordinate any DoD-specific requirements with the carrier.
+
+
+
+## Section 5: Cprp 5.1.  General.
+
+a.  The purpose of the CPRP is to certify that each individual who is authorized unescorted access to the non-exempt amounts of DoD Schedule 1 chemicals and NTA meets high standards of integrity, trust, and personal reliability.
+
+b.  In most cases, the government reviewing official (REV) is the commander or director.
+However, the commander or director may designate a REV, as appropriate.  The REV designates the certifying official (CO) and monitors the CPRP administered by the CO.  The intent is for the REV to monitor certification decisions of the CO, to oversee the status and quality of the program, and to overturn CO decisions if procedures have been unfairly, inconsistently, or incorrectly applied.  The CO is responsible for determining an individual's eligibility for CPRP certification.
+
+c.  For non-DoD facilities, the CPRP will be administered by a government REV appointed by the DPM.  The REV will retain all inherently government decisions and functions including direct approval of CPRP enrollment and removal, and oversight of the status and quality of the program.  The non-DoD facility leadership will nominate a contractor CO and CMA in writing for approval by the DPM.  The contractor CO will be responsible for all initial decisions and administrative actions related to screening, continuing evaluation and other actions to support approval of final determinations by the REV.  Further guidance may be included in the specific provisioning agreement.
+d.  Other personnel may be designated at DoD chemical agent facilities to assist in program management based on DoD Component implementing guidance.
+e.  Foreign nationals who receive escorted access to DoD Schedule 1 chemicals or NTA
+during training visits, assignments or exchanges, as specifically authorized by the facility commander or director and REV (if designated), will be processed in accordance with DoDI 2040.02; Parts 730-774 of Title 15, CFR; Parts 120-130 of Title 22, CFR; DoDD 5230.20; DoDM 5200.02; and DoDI 5200.02.
+
+## 5.2.  Initial Certification.
+
+a.  The CO will require that initial screening for CPRP certification includes:
+
+(1)  Initial Interview.
+The CO or other designated individual will conduct a personal interview with each CPRP
+candidate for individuals to acknowledge their understanding of Section 552(a) of Title 5, U.S.C., also known as the "Privacy Act of 1974," as amended; DoDI 5400.11; Public Law 104- 191, also known as the "Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act;" and component privacy program specifics.  The interviewer will discuss the screening process with the individual as well as any relevant information as described in Paragraph 5.4.  Advise individuals that they must report any factors that could adversely impact their ability to perform CPRP duties, and that failure to report this information may result in denial of CPRP certification.
+
+## (2)  Personnel Security Investigation (Psi).
+
+(a)  DoD chemical agent facilities.
+Government employees and contractors must have a valid eligibility to access information classified at SECRET or higher.
+
+(b)  Non-DoD facilities.
+A current and favorably adjudicated PSI is not required for the Provisioning Program, but may be used if available.  In the absence of a PSI, the non-DoD facility CO will ensure appropriate background and credential checks are completed in accordance with Part 27 of Title 6, CFR, also known as the "Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards," as amended, screening requirements and as specified in the provisioning agreement.
+
+(c)  Dossier Review.
+Although not a requirement of the program, DoD chemical agent facilities may opt to review the most recent PSI of any individual in, or being considered for, the program.
+
+(d)  Foreign Nationals.
+Process foreign nationals with requirements for access to DoD chemical agents in accordance with DoDD 5230.20, and DoDM 5200.02.
+
+(e)  Escorted Access.
+COs, with RO concurrence, may approve escorted access to DoD chemical agents pending completion of the PSI.  The investigation must have been opened and all other CPRP requirements have been completed and favorably reviewed.
+
+## (3)  Medical Evaluation.
+
+(a)  The CO must be confident that the individual is medically, physically, and mentally competent, alert and dependable, and is not a threat for inadvertent or purposeful compromise of the DoD chemical agent program or mission.  To that end, a CMA must provide the CO an evaluation of the individual's medical and physical competence and mental stability to perform duties requiring CPRP certification.
+(b)  When a sexual assault victim elects restricted reporting in accordance with DoDI 6495.02, or the sexual assault victim is not eligible for restricted reporting and intends that the sexual assault remain confidential, the victim is required to advise the CMA of any factors that could have an adverse impact on performance, reliability, or safety while performing CPRP duties.  The CMA will inform the CO if there are factors adversely impacting the individual's CPRP eligibility without revealing that the person is a victim of sexual assault.
+
+(4)  Drug and Substance Abuse Testing.
+Test all candidates for CPRP positions for drug and substance abuse and results reported to the CO before being certified into the CPRP pursuant to DoDI 1010.09 and DoDI 1010.01.
+
+(5)  Personnel Record Review.
+The CO will review the individual's available personnel records.  If records are not accessible the CO will coordinate with the appropriate supervisor, personnel manager, or other designated assistant or specialist to review the record and report any positive or negative factors that reflect on the individual's ability to perform CPRP duties.
+
+(6)  Position Qualification.
+The CO will consult with the supervisor or hiring manager to verify that the individual has the appropriate professional or technical proficiency, skills and abilities to qualify for the position.
+
+(7)  Final Interview.
+The CO will:
+(a)  Conduct a personal interview with each CPRP candidate just prior to final certification determination.
+
+(b)  Discuss any relevant information identified during the screening with the individual.
+
+(c)  Discuss the individual's responsibilities under continuing evaluation.
+
+b.  If the CO determines that the individual will be certified into the CPRP, the eligible individual will sign an agreement affirming his or her responsibility to abide by the requirements for maintaining CPRP certification.
+
+c.  If the CO determines that the individual does not meet the requirements for the CPRP, the CO will stop the screening process and deny CPRP certification.  DoD Component guidance will establish documentation requirements.
+
+## 5.3.  Continuing Evaluation.
+
+Individuals certified under the CPRP are observed on a regular basis by peers, supervisors, and CPRP officials to determine if their behavior and performance meet all of the requirements of the program.
+
+a.  CO Observation.
+
+COs will:
+(1)  Observe the behavior and performance of individuals certified under the CPRP on a regular basis.
+
+(2)  Consult with other CPRP officials and supervisors, as appropriate.
+
+b.  Individual and Peer Reporting.
+Individuals certified in the CPRP are responsible for monitoring themselves and their CPRP-
+certified peers.  Individuals and peers must report factors to the supervisor, CO, or CMA that could adversely impact the individual's ability to perform CPRP duties.  Failure to discharge these responsibilities may cast doubt on an individual's reliability.
+
+c.  Supervisor and Security Manager Reporting.
+These officials must notify the CO of factors that could adversely impact the individual's ability or reliability to perform CPRP duties.
+
+d.  Drug Testing.
+Designate positions requiring CPRP certification for random testing.  Report verified positive test results to the CO and result in termination (for cause).
+
+## E.  Psi.
+
+Individuals will complete periodic reinvestigations in accordance with DoDM 5200.02.  An unfavorably-adjudicated reinvestigation that renders an individual ineligible for a security clearance will result in termination (for cause).  Reinvestigations of non-DoD CPRP personnel may be conducted consistent with Chemical Facility Anti-terrorism Standards and provisioning agreement as with certification requirements in Paragraph 5.2.b.  Reinvestigations for continuing evaluation may be conducted consistent with Part 27 of Title 6, CFR, required for security clearance eligibility.  Provide results of investigations and checks along with CO recommendations to the REV for approval or denial of CPRP certification or retention.
+
+## F.  Medical.
+
+(1)  Health records will include an individual's assignment to a position requiring CPRP
+certification to determine the proper treatment, review, and reporting of medical limitation and duration recommendations to the CO.  Medical records will document relevant medical information that raises concerns about the individual's medical and physical competence and mental stability to perform duties requiring CPRP certification, the CMA's recommendations on that information, and the evidence of transmission to the CO.
+
+(2)  The individual will report any medical evaluation, treatment, or medication to the CMA in accordance with DoD Component guidance to determine if there is any effect on the individual's ability to perform CPRP duties.
+(3)  When a sexual assault victim elects restricted reporting pursuant to DoDI 6495.02 or intends that the sexual assault remain confidential, the victim is required to advise the CMA of any factors that could have an adverse impact on performance, reliability, or safety while performing CPRP duties.  The CMA will inform the CO if there are factors adversely impacting the individual's CPRP status and if the person in question should be temporarily suspended without revealing that the person is a victim of sexual assault.
+(4)  When a sexual assault victim does not elect restricted reporting, the individual will report any factors that could adversely impact his or her ability to perform CPRP duties to the appropriate authority and then to the CO.  The victim is required to advise the CMA of any factors that could have an adverse impact on performance, reliability, or safety while performing CPRP duties.  The CMA will inform the CO if there are factors adversely impacting the individual's CPRP status and that the person in question should be temporarily suspended.
+
+## 5.4.  Cprp Denial Or Termination Criteria.
+
+Individuals are denied certification, or terminated from the CPRP if they:
+
+a.  Do not meet the criteria established in Security Executive Agent Directive 4.
+b.  Have medical, physical, or mental conditions that will have negative effects on CPRP
+duty performance.
+
+c.  Have a positive drug test result. d.  Fail to report any factors that could adversely affect their ability to perform CPRP duties. e.  Fail to obtain or retain a favorably-adjudicated PSI.
+f.  Are determined to be unsuitable or unreliable by the CO.
+
+## 5.5.  Removal From Cprp Duties.
+
+a.  A CO may impose an administrative restriction or medical restriction on an individual when the individual is affected by short term conditions that may have a temporary effect on CPRP duty performance but do not raise concerns about the individual's suitability or reliability. Restriction will not be used for conditions that warrant CPRP denial or termination.  When an individual is no longer required to perform CPRP duties, the CO will administratively terminate the individual from the CPRP.  DoD Components may establish guidelines for duration limitations on restriction and suspension actions, and requirements for review and update of those actions.
+
+b.  When the CO receives information relative to the termination criteria in Paragraph 5.4., he or she will immediately suspend the individual while determining whether the facts warrant termination (for cause).  When suspended, the individual may not perform duties requiring CPRP certification.  Forward information relevant to the individual's security clearance eligibility through the security manager to the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility.
+
+(1)  Within 15 workdays of the suspension, the CO will provide the individual, in writing, the reason(s) for suspension.  Individuals suspended will remain under continuous evaluation for CPRP purposes until terminated or reinstated into the CPRP.
+
+(2)  The individual will have 10 workdays from the date of receipt of the written notification to provide a response to the CO, if desired.
+
+(3)  Prior to terminating the individual from the CPRP for cause, the CO will consult with the REV to confirm that the procedures have been fairly, consistently, and correctly applied. This consultation will include review of the individual's response to the CO, if provided.
+
+c.  COs will verify that termination actions are accurately recorded in the affected individual's personnel record.
+
+## 5.6.  Recertification Into The Cprp.
+
+a.  An individual denied certification or terminated for cause from CPRP may submit a request for recertification to the CO.  The request will explain the causes that led to the previous denial or termination and provide substantive evidence that those causes no longer exist.
+
+b.  The CO and the REV must approve a recertification request before the individual is processed for a new initial screening.  An individual may be approved for recertification by the REV, but may still be denied CPRP certification based on the new initial screening.
+
+## Section 6:  Visitors
+
+6.1.  All DoD chemical agent facilities will develop procedures for visitor entrance as part of the facility security plan.  The plan will include procedures for:
+
+a.  Determining who is eligible to escort.
+b.  Allowing for routine cleaning, maintenance, repairs, or other activities not related to DoD
+chemical agents.
+
+c.  Identifying designated points of entry and exit where search of visitor property and vehicles is required including parameters for that search.
+
+d.  Identifying the security requirements for visitor entry to areas where DoD chemical agents are used or stored and documenting that the visitor was told of the requirements. 6.2.  Personnel who are not CPRP-certified may have access to DoD chemical agents with the approval of the facility commander or director when escorted by a CPRP-certified individual as long as the visitor has an appropriate background investigation completed or in progress.  For facilities requiring the two-person rule, the escort will require two CPRP-certified persons in accordance with the two-person rule. 6.3.  The facility commander or director may permit unescorted entry into the CLA if DoD chemical agent containers are secured in accordance with Section 4.  These personnel must have a need for entry, and have the appropriate personnel security investigation in accordance with local requirements.  CPRP certification is not required.  An individual granted unescorted entry to the CLA under this provision can serve as an escort for individual(s) who have not been granted unescorted access.
+
+6.4.  Foreign visitor requirements are in Paragraph 5.1.e.
+
+## Section 7:  Reports 7.1.  General.
+
+a.  DoD facilities will report DoD chemical agent accidents and incidents through command channels in accordance with DoD Component procedures to the ASD(NCB) or designee.  (Non- DoD facilities will report chemical accidents and incidents in accordance with their provisioning agreement.)  Report:
+(1)  The theft, loss, recovery, suspected theft, wrongful disposition, and unauthorized use or destruction of DoD chemical agents.
+
+(2)  Attempts to steal or divert DoD chemical agents outside of physical security controls.
+
+(3)  Actual or attempted unauthorized access at a DoD chemical agent facility. (4)  Actual or attempted unauthorized access at a non-DoD facility subject to a provisioning agreement with the DoD.
+
+(5)  Significant or disabling damage to, explosion, or force majeure at a DoD chemical agent facility.
+
+(6)  Release of DoD Schedule 1 chemicals or NTA external to the containment laboratory and into the ambient air or environment.
+
+(7)  Accidents in which there was direct evidence of an occupational exposure to DoD
+Schedule 1 chemicals or NTA, injury, or death.
+(8)  Other DoD chemical agent incidents not identified in Paragraphs 7.1.a.(1) through
+7.1.a.(7) that the facility commander or director determines to be of immediate concern to DoD based upon the nature, gravity, and potential for adverse publicity or potential consequences of the incident.
+
+b.  The individual or facility will notify the appropriate federal, State, or local agencies of the theft, loss, or release of DoD chemical agents.
+
+## 7.2.  Dod Component Reports To The Asd(Ncb).
+
+The DoD Components will:
+
+a.  Provide a CPRP status report no later than February 15 each year.  The report will:
+(1)  State the DoD chemical agent facility submitting the report. (2)  Indicate the year for which the information is being reported.
+(3)  List the total number of personnel (separated into military, DoD civilian, and contractor employees) at each DoD chemical agent facility actually certified into the CPRP as of December 31.
+(4)  List the total number of personnel (separated into military, DoD civilian, and contractor employees) at each DoD chemical agent facility denied certification, terminated administratively, and terminated for cause during the calendar year.
+(5)  List the number of terminations categorized by primary reason for termination meeting the CPRP denial or termination criteria in Paragraph 5.4., or administrative termination in accordance with Paragraph 5.5.
+(6)  Include any comments noting trends or other relevant factors to assist future historical analysis.
+
+b.  Provide an executive summary of significant findings associated with department level inspections at DoD chemical agent facilities.
+
+c.  Provide an annual assessment of the health of the program.
+
+## 7.3.  Records Retention.
+
+a.  In accordance with DoD Component guidance, DoD chemical agent facilities will maintain the following records and reports:
+(1)  Security incident reports, site-specific risk assessments, and record of site-specific risk assessment annual review.
+
+(2)  Inspection and exercise records and reports.
+(3)  Corrective action reports from external inspections.
+(4)  Training records for each individual with access to chemical agents and each escorted individual that includes name of individual, date of training, description of training provided, and the means used to verify the individual understood the training.
+
+(5)  Schedule 1 chemical and NTA inventory reports in accordance with Paragraph 4.8. (6)  Transportation records and delivery receipts.
+
+b.  Maintain all records and reports associated with this issuance for at least 3 years (unless a longer period is specified by another governing regulation such as Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9-R) and then handled according to appropriate DoD Component instructions.
+
+## Section 8:  Acquisition And Provisioning Of Dod Schedule 1 Chemicals And Nta 8.1.  Dpm.
+
+The DPM is designated by the Secretary of the Army to manage and execute the DoD Schedule 1 chemical provisioning program on behalf of the ASD(NCB).  The DPM certifies and decertifies non-DoD facilities to receive and use DoD Schedule 1 chemicals and NTA on behalf of DoD and non-DoD customers.  The DPM will also develop, maintain, oversee, and enforce provisioning and other support agreements that establish safety, security, accountability, personnel reliability, inspection and funding requirements for non-DoD laboratories certified to use DoD Schedule 1 chemicals and NTA for DoD and non-DoD work.
+
+## 8.2.  Acquisition By Dod Components.
+
+DoD Components may obtain Schedule 1 chemicals from SSSF for permissible purposes other than protective, as defined in the CWC, for work to be conducted at a DoD or a certified non- DoD facility that meets the requirements of this issuance.  For permissible purposes other than protective, DoD Components may also synthesize Schedule 1 chemicals at a DoD facility or obtain it from other sources in quantities permitted by the CWC.  DoD Components may authorize appropriate facilities to synthesize or obtain NTA for DoD RDT&E work.
+
+## A.  Work Performed At A Dod Chemical Agent Facility.
+
+(1)  Schedule 1 chemicals purchased from the SSSF.
+(a)  Requests for Schedule 1 chemicals by DoD components other than the Army for work to be done at a non-Army DoD facility will require approval of the ASD(NCB).  The non- Army DoD component will:
+
+1.  Reimburse the Army for all costs associated with production, transport, and
+transfer of the Schedule 1 chemicals.
+
+2.  Assume ownership of the agent upon transfer from SSSF.
+(b)  The DIAM will review and concur or non-concur with the request for Schedule 1
+chemicals.
+
+(c)  The DoD chemical agent facility performing the work will meet the requirements of this issuance, including accountability and disposition of the Schedule 1 chemicals in accordance with this issuance and guidance provided by the DIAM.
+
+(2)  DoD Chemical Agent Synthesized at a DoD Facility.
+Synthesis of DoD chemical agent requires the concurrence of the DIAM and the approval of Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 (Attn: DAMO-SSD),
+400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0400.  Synthesis of more than 100 grams aggregate of Schedule 1 chemicals at a facility will require declaration in accordance with the CWC, and a request must be submitted to DAMO-SSD at least 240 days prior to the first synthesis.  DAMO- SSD will notify the ASD(NCB) when such approval is given.
+
+b.  Work Performed at a certified non-DoD Facility.
+
+For protective purposes work, the certified non-DoD facility must obtain the Schedule 1
+chemicals from SSSF.  For other permissible purposes, the non-DoD facility may obtain the Schedule 1 chemicals from SSSF, synthesize it, or obtain it from other sources.
+
+(1)  Schedule 1 chemicals Purchased from the SSSF.
+The performing non-DoD facility must be approved for receipt of Schedule 1 chemicals from SSSF by the ASD(NCB) and certified by the DPM consistent with Paragraph 8.3.  The facility will meet the requirements of this issuance, including accountability and disposition of the Schedule 1 chemicals in accordance with this issuance and guidance provided by the DIAM.
+
+(a)  The DIAM will review and concur or non-concur with the request for Schedule 1
+chemicals.
+
+(b)  If the Schedule 1 chemicals are to be transported from SSSF to the non-DoD
+facility specifically for a project sponsored by an Army entity, the Army will retain ownership of the Schedule 1 chemicals.
+
+(c)  If the Schedule 1 chemicals are to be transported from SSSF to the non-DoD
+facility specifically for a project sponsored by another U.S. Government agency (e.g. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, etc.), the agency will:
+1.  Obtain approval from Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 (Attn: DAMO-SSD), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0400.
+
+2.  Reimburse the Army for all costs associated with production, transport, and transfer of the Schedule 1 chemicals.
+
+(2)  Schedule 1 chemicals from Sources Other than SSSF.
+If the Schedule 1 chemicals to be used are synthesized by the facility or obtained from sources other than SSSF for other than protective purposes, the facility will follow applicable Department of Commerce requirements.
+
+## 8.3.  Acquisition By Non-Dod Entities.
+
+All non-DoD entities may obtain Schedule 1 chemicals from SSSF for work to be conducted at a certified non-DoD facility.  They may also have work done at a DoD facility that meets the requirements of this issuance without assuming ownership or control of the DoD chemical agent. Non-DoD federal entities may obtain Schedule 1 chemicals from the SSSF for any permissible purpose (i.e., protective or other) as defined in the CWC, in accordance with the authority of Section 1535 of Title 31, U.S.C., also known and referred to in this issuance as the "Economy Act of 1932."  Non-federal entities may only obtain Schedule 1 chemicals from the SSSF for protective purposes under the authority of Section 1034 of Public Law 110-181.  Non-SSSF
+Schedule 1 chemicals in the possession of non-DoD entities falls under the purview of Department of Commerce.
+
+## A.  Schedule 1 Chemicals Provided Under Authority Of The Economy Act Of 1932.
+
+(1)  Requests for Schedule 1 chemicals by non-DoD federal entities for work to be done at a certified non-DoD facility will require approval by the ASD(NCB). Submit requests to the DPM and include:
+
+(a)  Requesting entity's name, mailing address, and a point of contact.
+(b)  Type and estimated quantity of Schedule 1 chemicals requested.
+(c)  Estimated period of time Schedule 1 chemicals are to be used and proposed disposition of agent remaining at the end of the project (e.g., store for future work, transfer to another approved federal entity project, or destroy).
+
+(d)  Description of the project for which the Schedule 1 chemicals will be used. (e)  The funding agency and point of contact; fund citation; and a payment provision.
+(f)  A statement identifying that "the [requesting entity] will reimburse the DoD for the goods and services provided, including direct costs (manufacturing and shipping of the Schedule 1 chemicals) and indirect costs (including overhead) directly benefiting the [requesting entity]".
+
+(2)  The DPM will:
+(a)  Coordinate the request with the DIAM to confirm availability of the Schedule 1
+chemicals for the period requested while ensuring that future DoD needs can be accommodated within the limits imposed by the CWC.
+
+(b)  Assess the reasonableness of the quantity and type of Schedule 1 chemicals requested for the proposed project.
+
+(c)  If the DPM intends to recommend approval of the Schedule 1 chemical request, draft an interagency agreement for the provisioning of the Schedule 1 chemicals with the requesting non-DoD federal entity consistent with DoDI 4000.19 and the Economy Act.  The agreement will address any non-DoD federal entity's responsibilities for Schedule 1 chemical safeguarding, accountability, liability, reporting, and reimbursement.  Forward the agreement with the recommendation for approval to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense (ASD(NCB)), 3050 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-3050 for final decision and signature.
+
+(d)  If the DPM intends to recommend denial of the Schedule 1 chemical request, forward the rationale for denial to the ASD(NCB) for final decision.
+
+(3)  Upon approval of the request, the non-DoD federal entity will reimburse DoD for all costs associated with production, transport, and transfer of the agent.
+
+b.  Schedule 1 Chemicals Provided Under Authority of Section 1034 of Public Law 110-
+181.
+
+(1)  Certified non-federal facilities are authorized to maintain stocks of Schedule 1
+chemicals to be used on approved protective purposes projects for customers from the State, local, or private sectors.
+
+(a)  Certified non-federal facilities will forecast the amount of Schedule 1 chemicals required to meet mission requirements and send the agent request to the DPM.
+
+(b)  The DPM will coordinate with the DIAM to determine availability of the Schedule 1 chemicals and negotiate a provisioning agreement to address the certified non-federal facility's responsibilities for safeguarding, accountability, liability, reporting, and reimbursement of the Schedule 1 chemicals.
+
+(2)  Requests from State, local, or private entities for work to be done at a certified nonfederal facility will require approval by the ASD(NCB).  Submit requests to the DPM and include:
+(a)  Requesting entity's name, mailing address, and a point-of contact. (b)  Description of the project for which the agent will be used in sufficient detail to determine that the work is for protective purposes as defined in the CWC.
+
+(c)  Identification of any foreign nationals associated with the work to be performed.
+
+(3)  The DPM will:
+(a)  Coordinate the request with the DoD certified non-federal facility to confirm availability of the Schedule 1 chemicals requested.
+
+(b)  Coordinate with the Treaty Implementation Manager for review to ensure that only protective purposes work is proposed.
+(c)  Assess the reasonableness of the quantity and agent type requested for the intended activity.
+
+(d)  Verify licenses in accordance with Parts 730-774 of Title 15, CFR, and Parts 120-
+130 of Title 22, CFR, with either the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Defense or the Defense Technology Security Agency for any foreign nationals identified in the request.
+
+(e) Recommend approval or denial of the requested agent work, with appropriate rationale, to the ASD(NCB) for final decision.
+
+(4)  Upon ASD(NCB) approval of the request:
+(a)  Office of the ASD(NCB) will notify the requestor and the performing certified non-federal facility of the approval through the DPM.
+
+(b)  DPM will coordinate with the certified non-federal facility to track the status and completion of all projects using DoD Schedule 1 chemicals performed under this action.
+
+## 8.4.  Certification Of Non-Dod Facilities.
+
+a.  Non-DoD facilities may only obtain Schedule 1 chemicals from SSSF if they have been certified by DoD for receipt of agent.  The facility must have a current provisioning agreement with the DPM in place.
+
+b.  New facilities will submit their request for certification to the DPM.
+c.  DPM will certify the facility (as appropriate), in coordination with the ASD(NCB), based on a standards document addressing security, personnel reliability, safety, and accountability requirements applicable to non-DoD facilities.  The certification standard should also address applicable DoD trade security control requirements in DoDI 2030.08.  DPM will notify DAMO- SSD of approved provisioning agreements.
+
+d.  The DPM will establish an annual inspection program to ensure that certified facilities continue to meet standards established by the agreement.  The inspection team will report results to the DPM who will follow up with the site to ensure corrective actions are taken appropriately, keeping the ASD(NCB) informed of unresolved issues.
+
+## 8.5.  Ultra-Dilute Solutions.
+
+These consist of extremely dilute solutions of Schedule 1 chemicals containing no more than the concentrations and quantities of agent necessary for laboratory calibration. Concentrations at or below the exempt concentrations in Table 1. minimize the hazards associated with transfer outside DoD with reasonably limited safety and security concerns.  However, some potential dermal or eye effects are still possible without proper protection.
+
+a.  Submit requests for ultra-dilute chemical solutions through the DPM for approval by the ASD(NCB) or his designee.
+
+b.  Facilities approved to receive ultra-dilute chemical solutions from DoD will assume liability, accountability, custody, and ownership upon accepting transfer of the agents.  The organization will provide DoD with a list of officials and facilities authorized to accept shipment of ultra-dilute chemical solutions.
+
+c.  In consultation with both the ASD(NCB) and the DPM, and before receipt of initial shipments of ultra-dilute chemical solutions, the requesting organization will:
+(1)  Establish programs and standards to maintain continuous oversight of laboratories, facilities, and entities transporting, receiving, storing, using, and disposing of ultra-dilute chemical solutions.
+
+(2)  Establish and maintain safety, security (including personnel suitability), training, and accountability programs and standards covering the transport, receipt, storage, use, and disposal of ultra-dilute chemical solutions.  Areas covered will include, at a minimum, safety (containment, air monitoring and ventilation, personnel protective equipment, decontamination, and medical treatment), security (physical security, access controls, personnel suitability, and export controls and foreign national considerations), accountability, emergency response, medical treatment and decontamination, event reporting, training of personnel, and facility certification and decertification.
+
+(3)  For initial shipment of ultra-dilute chemical solutions, the requesting organization will provide written certification to the DPM that the laboratory or facility meets the standards established in Paragraphs 8.5.c.(1) and (2) before the shipment is made. Subsequently, requests for re-supply of ultra-dilute chemical solutions will state that the laboratory remains certified and include a certification that the previously supplied ultra-dilute chemical solutions were properly expended and documented in the facility accountability records. Entities will notify the DPM in writing when and if a laboratory or facility loses its certification.
+
+d.  Transfer ultra-dilute chemical solutions to approved facilities utilizing the same procedures for transporting and shipping chemical agent at these concentrations to DoD facilities, in accordance with Parts 100-185 of Title 49, CFR.
+
+e.  Facilities will not transfer ultra-dilute chemical solutions to another owner without DoD
+approval.
+
+f.  Submit ultra-dilute facility certifications and notifications to the DPM who will provide the appropriate documentation to the ASD(NCB).
+
+## 9.1.  Chemical Agent Exemption Limits.
+
+a.  An individual's access to quantities of DoD Schedule 1 chemicals at or below the levels in Table 2 do not require the security and personnel reliability provisions of this issuance.  The facility must have procedures in place to ensure agent quantities remain at or below exempt levels, and to mitigate the safety and security risks associated with attended and unattended operations.  These quantities of DoD Schedule 1 chemicals **will not** be inferred to be "safe," as inherent toxic effects are still associated with them.  They will require safety procedures normally afforded to similar hazardous material.  These exemptions were based on the July 3, 1980 McNamara et al. and August 7, 2019 Kellogg papers.
+
+b.  For DoD designated chemical defense training operations, DoD Schedule 1 chemical agent or NTA that has been expended by CPRP-certified agent handlers no longer requires the CPRP provisions of this issuance.  The destruction of the DoD Schedule 1 chemical agent or NTA is certified by CPRP-certified agent handlers via (written) accountability documentation maintained by the facility chemical agent accountable officer.
+
+## 9.2. Ultra-Dilute Solution Guidelines.
+
+These are extremely dilute solutions containing no more than the maximum concentrations in Table 1 (per primary container). Values are based on consideration of the agent drinking water standards, the severity of systemic (nerve agent), dermal and ocular effects associated with single-incident contact as described in TB MED 577/NAVMED P-5010-10/AFMAN 48-138 and U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine Report No. 47- EM-5863-04. Hazards associated with solutions that are at or below Table 1 can be controlled with reasonable safety precautions.
+
+
+Agent
+Concentration
+G-type
+1000 g/L
+V-type
+100 g/L
+H-type
+2400 g/L
+L-type
+100 g/L
+
+9.3.  ACCOUNTABILITY OF EXEMPT CHEMICAL AGENT.  Any amount of neat DoD
+chemical agent requires application of accountability procedures described in this issuance and any guidance provided by the DIAM.  Any existing NTA exemptions are discussed in the March 18, 2020 ASD(NCB) Memorandum.  DoD Schedule 1 chemical agents in solution below the quantities in Table 2 (per primary container) are not reportable to the DIAM.  Site-specific accountability procedures will ensure Table 2 quantities are not exceeded during exempt operations.
+
+1
+Maximum Quantity of Chemical
+Chemical
+Agent in Solution
+G-type (GB)
+20 mg
+V-type  (VX)
+10 mg
+H-type (HD)
+100 mg
+L-type (L)
+50 mg
+1Schedule 1 chemical agent used in calculating limit is
+listed in parentheses.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+
+
+AECS
+automated entry control system
+ASD(NCB)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
+AFMAN
+Air Force manual
+
+
+CEA
+chemical exclusion area
+CFR
+Code of Federal Regulations
+CLA
+chemical limited area
+CMA
+competent medical authority
+CO
+certifying official
+CPRP
+chemical personnel reliability program
+CRA
+chemical restricted area
+CWC
+Chemical Weapons Convention
+
+
+DASD(CBD)
+Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense
+DIAM
+DoD Inventory and Accountability Manager
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+DoDM
+DoD manual
+DPM
+DoD provisioning manager
+
+
+ID
+identification
+IDS
+intrusion detection system
+
+
+NAVMED P
+Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery publication
+NTA
+non-traditional agents
+
+
+PIN
+personal identification number
+PSI
+personnel security investigation
+
+
+RDT&E
+research, development, test and evaluation
+REV
+reviewing official
+
+
+SSSF
+single small scale facility
+
+
+TB Med
+Army Technical Bulletin Medical
+
+
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+WHS
+Washington Headquarters Services
+
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+
+
+administrative restriction.
+Restriction of individuals from CPRP duties when the ability to maintain continuing evaluation is questionable.  For example, the
+certified individual will be absent from CPRP duties for a significant
+period of time.  Administrative restriction is not an assessment of unreliability.
+
+
+administrative termination.
+Removal of reliable individuals from the program when they are leaving the position or no longer require access to DoD chemical agents or perform CPRP duties.
+
+
+access.
+An individual will be deemed to have access to DoD chemical agents at any point in time if the individual has possession of DoD chemical agents (e.g., ability to carry, use, or manipulate).
+
+
+CEA.
+The CEA for a chemical munitions area will be the outer portions of doors, walls, floors, and ceiling of a storage structure (e.g., igloo) declared under the CWC inside which access to DoD chemical agents is possible. The space in which the DoD chemical agent is stored (e.g., container, hood, vault) is designated as the CEA when the site-specific risk assessment at the RDT&E laboratory or training facility determines that access under the two-person rule is required.
+
+
+CLA.
+An area surrounding one or more exclusion areas in a chemical munitions facility with a designated access point where access requirements and a need and authority for entry will be determined (unescorted or escorted entry), and personnel are screened in accordance with DoD Component guidance.
+
+
+CMA.
+A healthcare provider who is trained and appointed in accordance with procedures established by the DoD Component to review medical conditions and treatment to provide recommendations to the CO on an individual's suitability and reliability for personnel
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+
+
+reliability program duties.  The CMA is a physician, nurse practitioner (who is either licensed for independent practice or
+supervised by a physician licensed for independent practice), or physician assistant (if supervised by a physician licensed for independent practice).
+
+
+CO.
+The person responsible for determining individual's ability to be CPRP certified and ensuring the CPRP member is continually monitored.  Responsibilities include implementing, administering, and managing the CPRP, and supporting the REV and facility commander or director.  Unless the CO requires access to DoD
+chemical agents, the CO is not required to be in the CPRP.
+
+
+continuing evaluation.
+The process by which CPRP-certified individuals are observed for compliance with reliability standards.  This ongoing process and management function considers duty performance, physical and psychological fitness, on- and off-duty behavior, and reliability on a continuing basis.
+
+
+CRA.
+A storage or use room for DoD Schedule 1 chemicals and NTA that does not require access under the two-person rule.  Access to a CRA
+is limited to authorized personnel.  Personnel not in the CPRP will be escorted by a CPRP-certified individual within CRAs when agent is
+present.
+
+
+denial.
+An action taken based on the receipt of disqualifying information to stop the CPRP screening process for individuals being considered for CPRP certification.
+
+
+DoD chemical agent facility.
+DoD facilities that produce, store, use, destroy, or transfer DoD chemical agents.  A DoD chemical agent facility is the building where DoD chemical agents are used or stored.
+
+
+DoD chemical agents. Term used to refer collectively to Schedule 1 chemicals in DoD
+possession, as listed in the CWC; NTA in DoD possession, as listed in the March 18, 2020 ASD(NCB) Memorandum; or DoD munitions with a chemical fill at the chemical weapons storage facilities and their associated chemical weapons destruction facilities as declared in accordance with the CWC.  This term does not include chemical agents synthesized by a non-DoD facility or purchased by a non-DoD facility from a non-DoD source.
+
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+DoD chemical
+munitions.
+Term used to refer collectively to munitions that contain toxic chemicals that were intended to produce lethal or damaging effects to
+human beings.  Excluded are munitions containing riot control agents, chemical herbicides, smoke and other obscuration materials.
+
+
+drug or substance abuse.
+The wrongful use, possession, or distribution of a controlled substance, prescription medication, over-the-counter medication, or intoxicating substance (other than alcohol).  "Wrongful" means without legal justification or excuse, and includes use contrary to the directions of the manufacturer or prescribing healthcare provider, and use of any intoxicating substance not intended for human intake.
+
+
+An individual designated by the facility commander or director to have authority and responsibility for DoD chemical agent inventory and accountability.
+facility chemical
+agent accountability officer.
+
+
+IDS.
+A system of sensor devices which trigger an alarm when a security breach occurs, notifying the appropriate response force which has the capability to respond to the alarm and assess and confront a threat.
+
+
+medical restriction.
+Restriction of individuals from CPRP duties when performance may be impaired by a temporary medical condition (including medication for the condition) or psychological condition (such as short-term
+stress).  Medical restriction is a precaution based on the possibility of
+duty impairment and not an assessment of unreliability.
+
+
+NTA.
+Defined in the March 18, 2020 ASD(NCB) Memorandum.
+
+
+provisioning agreement.
+An agreement under which a DoD organization may provide DoD
+Schedule 1 chemicals to other federal agencies, DoD contractors, or other non-federal entities for purposes authorized by law and regulation.  It includes the purpose of the provisioning, statutory and regulatory authority for the provisioning, responsibilities of the parties, procedures, funding, and terms and conditions for the certification of the recipient organization, the transfer of the agents to the recipient organization, the use of the agents by the recipient organization, and the return of any residual agent upon completion of the authorized use.  A provisioning agreement may be a separate document or its substance may be incorporated in another document such as an inter-agency agreement, a memorandum of agreement, or a contract clause.
+
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+random drug and
+substance abuse testing.
+A program where each member of the testing population has an equal chance of being selected.  Random testing may include either testing
+of designated individuals occupying a specified area, element, or position, or testing of those individuals based on a neutral criterion, such as a digit of the social security number.
+
+
+REV.
+A DoD chemical agent facility official whose duties include monitoring the suitability assessment program and reviewing warranted suitability actions.
+
+
+risk assessment.
+The process of systematically identifying, assessing, and managing
+risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that
+balance risk cost with mission benefits as described in DoDI O-
+2000.16.  The end product of the risk assessment is the identification
+and assessment of areas and assets that are vulnerable to the
+identified threat attack means or to the identified hazard.  From the assessment of risk based upon the three critical components of risk management (threat assessment, criticality assessment, and vulnerability assessment), the commander must determine which assets require the most protection and where future expenditures are required to minimize risk of attack or exposure to a hazard or lessen
+the severity of the outcome of an attack or of a hazard.
+
+
+suspension.
+An action taken to temporarily remove an individual from the CPRP when the CO has information that could be expected to affect an individual's job performance or reliability.
+
+
+termination (for
+cause).
+Removal of individuals who were previously screened, determined reliable, and certified capable of performing duties involving access
+to DoD chemical agents from the CPRP based on receipt of
+disqualifying information.
+
+
+two-person rule.
+An access restriction to prevent lone access to DoD chemical agents. At least two CPRP-certified people equally qualified in the task being
+performed and capable of detecting unauthorized or incorrect acts are
+required for access.
+
+
+visitor.
+A person (e.g., regular visitor, recurrent visitor, maintenance and other non-scientific support visitor, or first responder/emergency personnel) who is not authorized unescorted access to DoD chemical agents.
+
+## Term Definition
+
+vulnerability.
+A situation or circumstance, which, if left unchanged, may result in the loss of or damage to the DoD chemical agents or the DoD
+chemical agent facility.
+
+
+## References
+
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
+Memorandum, "Non-Traditional Agents Addressed in DoD Instruction 5210.65", date March 18, 2020, as amended
+B. McNamara, T. Simmons, D. Stitcher, R. Sawdaye, C. Drasser, and J. Perry, "Ad Hoc Position
+Paper on Surety Material Quantities," U.S. Army Armament Research and Development
+Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; July 3, 1980.  HDIAC Accession No. HD-
+225652
+C. Kellogg, "Rationale for Definition of Dilute Chemical Agents", U.S. Army Materiel
+Command, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL; August 7, 2019
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 6, Part 27 (also known as the "Chemical Facility Anti-
+Terrorism Standards" as amended)
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 15, Parts 730-774 (also known as the "Export Administration
+Regulations (EAR)", as amended)
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 22, Parts 120-130 (also known as the "International Traffic in
+Arms Regulations (ITAR)", as amended)
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Parts 100-185
+Defense Explosives Safety Regulation 6055.09, Volume 6, "DoD Ammunition and Explosives
+Safety Standards: Contingency Operations, Toxic Chemical Munitions and Agents, and Risk-
+Based Siting," February 29, 2008, as amended
+Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9-R, Part II, "Cargo Movement," current edition
+DoD 5200.08-R, "Physical Security Program," April 9, 2007, as amended DoD Directive 2060.01, "Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements,"
+January 9, 2001, as amended
+DoD Directive 2060.02, "DoD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy,"
+January 27, 2017
+DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," March 18, 2008
+DoD Directive 5111.13, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
+Security (ASD(HD&GS))," March 23, 2018
+DoD Directive 5122.05, "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA))",
+August 7, 2017
+DoD Directive 5135.02, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+(USD(A&S)), July 15, 2020
+DoD Directive 5205.16, "The DoD Insider Threat Program," September 30, 2014, as amended DoD Directive 5210.56, "Arming and the Use of Force," November 18, 2016 DoD Directive 5230.09, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release," August 22, 2008,
+
+as amended
+DoD Directive 5230.20, "Visits and Assignments of Foreign Nationals," June 22, 2005
+DoD Instruction 1010.01, "Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program (MPDATP),"
+September 13, 2012, as amended
+DoD Instruction 1010.09, "DoD Civilian Employee Drug-Free Workplace Program," June 22,
+2012, as amended
+DoD Instruction 2030.08, "Implementation of Trade Security Controls (TSCs) for Transfers of
+DoD Personal Property to Parties Outside DoD Control," February 19, 2015
+DoD Instruction 2040.02, "International Transfers of Technology, Articles, and Services,"
+March 27, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," April 25, 2013, as amended DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013
+DoD Instruction 5200.02, "DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP)," March 21, 2014, as
+amended
+DoD Instruction 5200.08, "Security of DoD Installations and Resources and the DoD Physical
+Security Review Board (PSRB)," December 10, 2005, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5210.88, "Security Standards for Safeguarding Biological Select Agents and
+Toxins (BSAT)," January 19, 2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5230.29, "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public Release,"
+August 13, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5400.11, "DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs," January 29, 2019 DoD Instruction 6495.02, "Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program
+Procedures," March 28, 2013, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8500.01, "Cybersecurity," March 14, 2014 DoD Instruction 8510.01, "Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information
+Technology (IT)," March 12, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8520.02, "Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling,"
+May 24, 2011
+DoD Instruction O-2000.16, Volume 2, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation:
+DoD Force Protection Condition (FPCON) System," November 17, 2016, as amended
+DoD Manual 4160.21, Volume 1, "Defense Materiel Disposition: Disposal Guidance and
+Procedures," October 22, 2015, as amended
+DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, "DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified
+Information," February 24, 2012, as amended
+DoD Manual 5200.02, "Procedures for the DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP)," April 3,
+2017
+DoD Manual 8910.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Collections Manual:  Procedures for DoD
+Internal Information Collections," June 30, 2014, as amended
+DoD Security Classification Guide for Non-Traditional Agent Defense-Secret, as amended1
+National Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2018
+
+
+Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), "Convention on the Prohibition
+of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
+Destruction," April 29, 19972
+Public Law 104-191, "Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,"
+August 21, 1996
+Public Law 110-181, Section 1034, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,"
+January 28, 2008
+Security Executive Agent Directive 4, "National Security Adjudicative Guidelines," June 8, 2017
+TB MED577/NAVMED P-5010-10/AFMAN 48-138, "Sanitary Control and Surveillance of
+Field Water Supplies," May 1, 2010
+United States Code, Title 5, Section 552(a) (also known as the "Privacy Act of 1974," as
+amended)
+United States Code, Title 22, Section 2778 (also known as the "Arms Export Control Act
+(AECA)")
+United States Code, Title 31
+United States Code, Title 50 U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine Report No. 47-EM-5863-04,
+"Acute Toxicity Estimation and Operational Risk Management of Chemical Warfare Agent Exposures," May 2004

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+## Dod Instruction 5210.88 Security Standards For Safeguarding Biological Select Agents And Toxins
+
+
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+
+Effective:
+May 26, 2020
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Instruction 5210.88, "Security Standards for Safeguarding Biological
+Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT)," January 19, 2016, as amended
+
+Approved by:
+Ellen M. Lord, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+
+Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.01, the July 13, 2018
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, and DoDD 5101.20E, this issuance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides guidance for:
+
+- The execution of the DoD BSAT biosafety and biosecurity programs.
+- DoD BSAT security programs and personnel reliability program for Tier 1 BSAT, as defined by Part
+73 of Title 42, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR); Part 331 of Title 7, CFR; and Part 121 of Title 9, CFR, collectively referred to in this issuance as the "select agent regulations" (SAR).
+- Conformance to Executive Order 13546.
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+ SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 4
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 4 1.2.  Policy. ........ 4 1.3.  Information Collections. ........ 6
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 7
+2.1.  ASD(NCB). ........ 7 2.2.  ASD(HD&GS). ........ 7 2.3.  Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. ........ 8 2.4.  DoD Component Heads. ........ 8 2.5.  Secretary of the Army. ........ 9
+SECTION 3:  DEVIATION PROGRAM (WAIVERS AND EXCEPTIONS) ........ 11
+SECTION 4:  SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND MEASURES ........ 13
+4.1.  General. ........ 13 4.2.  Physical Security Systems. ........ 13 4.3.  Security Forces........ 15 4.4.  Security Measures. ........ 16
+a.  Security Barriers........ 16 b.  Other Security Measures. ........ 16
+4.5.  Access Control. ........ 17 4.6.  BSAT Storage. ........ 18 4.7.  Inventory and Accountability. ........ 19 4.8.  Information and Cyber Security........ 19 4.9.  Transportation. ........ 20 4.10.  Transfer of DoD BSAT. ........ 20
+SECTION 5:  BPRP ........ 22
+5.1.  General. ........ 22 5.2.  Initial Certification. ........ 22 5.3.  Continuing Evaluation. ........ 24
+a.  CO Observation. ........ 24 b.  Individual and Peer Reporting. ........ 25 c.  Supervisor and Security Manager Reporting. ........ 25 d.  Drug Testing. ........ 25 e.  PSL. ........ 25 f.  Medical. ........ 25
+5.4.  BPRP Denial or Termination Criteria. ........ 26 5.5.  Removal from BPRP Duties. ........ 26 5.6.  Recertification into the BPRP. ........ 27
+SECTION 6:  VISITORS ........ 28
+6.1.  No Access to BSAT. ........ 28 6.2.  Access to BSAT. ........ 28 6.3.  Foreign Visitors. ........ 28
+SECTION 7:  REPORTS ........ 29
+7.1.  General. ........ 29
+7.2.  DoD Component Reports to the ASD(NCB). ........ 30 7.3.  Records Retention. ........ 30
+GLOSSARY ........ 32
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 32 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 33
+REFERENCES ........ 37
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+This issuance:
+a.  Applies to:
+(1)  OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD that are registered with the Federal Select Agent Program
+(FSAP) (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+(2)  DoD entities located overseas that may possess or use Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) but are not subject to the select agent regulations (SAR) and Sections 201231 of Public Law 107-188.  These DoD entities will comply with the requirements of the SAR to the maximum extent possible.  If implementation of specific provisions is not feasible, the entity will document alternative provisions based on host nation and sponsor requirements (whichever is most stringent) and site-specific risk assessments.
+
+(3)  Contracts that contain requirements for access to BSAT by contract personnel working in DoD Component entities.
+
+b.  Does not apply to:
+(1)  Infectious agents and toxins not included as BSAT in the SAR.  The appropriate safeguards for non-BSAT agents and toxins are in DoD Manual (DoDM) 6055.18.
+(2)  Non-DoD entities that receive transfers of DoD BSAT.  It is recommended that DoD
+contracts include clauses requiring the contract laboratory to provide FSAP inspection results and agreement to maintain compliance with all FSAP regulatory requirements.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+a.  DoD must comply with the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction and Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2060.01.
+
+b.  DoD entities using, possessing, transferring, or receiving BSAT must register with the FSAP in accordance with the SAR.
+
+c.  DoD Components must mitigate, to an acceptable risk, threats to security of BSAT, including theft, loss, diversion, release, or unauthorized access, transfer, use, or production, in accordance with this issuance.
+
+(1)  Authorities and responsibilities of the DoD Component commanders and directors for security of DoD property are delineated in Paragraphs 3.2 and 3.4 above the signature of DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5200.08.
+
+(2)  Requirements in this issuance do not repeal the responsibility of commanders or directors to apply more stringent security standards during emergencies, increased threat level or high risk determinations, or as deemed necessary pursuant to Paragraph C1.2.4 of DoD 5200.08-R.
+
+d.  DoD Components must keep to the minimum:
+(1)  The movement of BSAT consistent with operational, research, training, teaching, safety, and security requirements.
+
+(2)  The number of people authorized access to BSAT consistent with operational, safety, and security requirements.
+
+e.  DoD Components must screen individuals with a need to access BSAT through the security risk assessment (SRA) process as described in the SAR.  Individuals who need unescorted access to Tier 1 BSAT or whose duties afford unescorted access to registered spaces (e.g., storage and work areas, storage containers, and equipment) containing Tier 1 BSAT even if it is not accessible will be screened through both the SRA process and the biological personnel reliability program (BPRP) process.
+
+f.  DoD Components must report internal control material weaknesses in compliance with DoDI 5010.40.
+
+g.  DoD Components must implement international technology transfer and export control requirements for BSAT in accordance with DoDI 2040.02 and other applicable authorities, including:  Section 2778 of Title 22, United States Code (also known as the "Arms Export Control Act (AECA)"); Chapter 58 in Parts 4801-4851 of Title 50, United States Code, also known as the "Export Control Reform Act"; Parts 120-130 of Title 22, CFR (also known as the "International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)"); and Parts 730-774 of Title 15, CFR (also known as the "Export Administration Regulations (EAR)").
+
+h.  Ricin and saxitoxin, regardless of the amount, are subject to accountability, use, and production restrictions in accordance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the "Chemical Weapons Convention") as Schedule 1 chemicals, and the semi-annual reporting requirements in accordance with DoDI 5210.65.  Chemical Weapons Convention production and acquisition requirements will be followed when ricin or saxitoxin are used for protective purposes.  Entities possessing ricin and saxitoxin in quantities greater than BSAT threshold amounts must also comply with this issuance for all other purposes.
+
+i.  DoD Components will not impose more restrictive implementing requirements for security of BSAT than those in this issuance unless such implementing guidance is approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) or is implemented in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.c(2).  In implementation of this issuance, to provide clarity or operationalize guidance, DoD Components are authorized to prescribe procedures.
+
+## 1.3.  Information Collections.
+
+The annual BPRP report, referred to in Paragraphs 2.1.d., 2.4.g., and 7.2.a. has been assigned report control symbol DD-AT&L(A)2582 in accordance with the procedures in Volume 1 of DoDM 8910.01.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities 2.1.  Asd(Ncb).
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the ASD(NCB):
+a.  Establishes security standards for safeguarding DoD BSAT and BPRP standards for individuals with access to DoD Tier 1 BSAT.
+
+b.  Reviews all exceptions to this issuance for approval.  Through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD(HD&GS)) acting as the DoD's liaison to the National Security Council (NSC) staff on matters regarding relevant National security policy, coordinates with the NSC staff, as appropriate, for issues that exceed the SAR.
+This authority will not be delegated.
+
+c.  Oversees the BSAT biosecurity program to confirm DoD Components maintain compliance with standards.
+
+d.  Establishes procedures for annual DoD Component reporting of statistical data concerning BPRP.
+
+e.  Establishes procedures for DoD Components to report BSAT security incidents and mishaps.
+
+f.  Provides relevant threat assessment updates to the DoD Components on receipt. g.  Develops and coordinates BSAT security classification guidance, as appropriate, and provides that guidance to the DoD Components to verify consistency in classification and dissemination of information.
+
+## 2.2.  Asd(Hd&Gs).
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and consistent with DoDD 5111.13 and DoDD 2060.02, the ASD(HD&GS):
+a.  Acting as the DoD's liaison to the NSC staff on matters regarding relevant national security policy, coordinates with the NSC staff, as appropriate, for issues that exceed the SAR.
+b.  Coordinates on biosecurity policy and planning and represents the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on interagency biosecurity committees and working groups.
+
+c.  Develops policy to support civil authorities for DoD preparedness, response, and consequence management involving DoD BSAT in accordance with the 2018 National Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
+
+d.  Receives and coordinates with the ASD(NCB) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs on BSAT incidents that cause a public health emergency within DoD, or may cause a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).
+
+## 2.3.  Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in accordance with DoDD 5105.21, and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.4., the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, annually reviews and updates relevant threat capability assessments and provides them to the ASD(NCB).
+
+## 2.4.  Dod Component Heads.
+
+The DoD Component heads:
+a.  Assign responsibilities and provide commanders or directors guidance to comply with the requirements, measures, and standards in this issuance and the SAR.
+
+b.  Establish a process for approval of waivers to this issuance and keep the ASD(NCB) and the DoD Executive Agent for BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity informed of waiver approvals.
+
+c.  Plan and program fiscal and personnel resources necessary to implement the policy and requirements in this issuance.
+
+d.  Notify the ASD(NCB), through the DoD Executive Agent for BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity:
+(1)  Before registering any new DoD BSAT entity with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) or with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).
+(2)  Following removal of such registration.
+
+e.  Require that BSAT entities are registered according to federal, territorial, State, and local regulations.
+
+f.  Require that each BSAT entity is supported by an appropriately appointed competent medical authority (CMA).
+
+g.  Submit annual statistical data concerning the BPRP to the ASD(NCB) in accordance with guidance from the ASD(NCB) and Paragraph 7.2.a.
+
+h.  Coordinate with the DoD Executive Agent for BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity and approve, as part of pre-event planning, proposed public releases of information pertaining to BSAT.
+
+i.  Comply with the secure DoD BSAT database procedures established by the ASD(NCB)
+and the DoD Executive Agent for BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity.
+
+j.  Endorse deviation requests forwarded through the DoD Executive Agent for BSAT
+Biosafety and Biosecurity to the ASD(NCB).
+
+## 2.5.  Secretary Of The Army.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.4., the Secretary of the Army:
+a.  Serves as the DoD Executive Agent for the DoD BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Programs as designated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.  He or she is responsible for the technical review, inspection, and harmonization of biosafety and biosecurity protocols and procedures across DoD laboratories that handle BSAT, as well as the tasking authority of all DoD Components for this purpose.
+
+b.  Establishes and maintains a secure database of all DoD BSAT at DoD BSAT entities and a register of current and previous responsible officials (ROs) and alternate responsible officials
+(AROs).
+
+c.  Coordinates with the CDC and APHIS FSAP proponent offices and serves as the DoD
+point of contact with the CDC and APHIS regulatory oversight offices.  In this capacity, the Secretary of the Army:
+(1)  Stays current on changes to the SAR, including the listing of agents or toxins designated as BSAT and Tier 1 BSAT and provides guidance to DoD Components accordingly.
+
+(2)  Coordinates with the CDC and APHIS on incidents covered by this issuance.
+
+d.  Coordinates with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the ASD(HD&GS), and the ASD(NCB) on an incident that causes a public health emergency within DoD, or causes, or could cause, a PHEIC, and before public affairs announcements are released.
+
+e.  Coordinates with the Director, Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), pursuant to DoDI 5230.29.
+
+(1)  Once the Director, WHS, has cleared information for public release, the Secretary of the Army coordinates:
+(a)  With the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs before release, pursuant to DoDD 5122.05.
+
+(b)  Information related to public safety as part of pre-event planning.  Information released during an incident will not be delayed and will be in accordance with local agreements.
+
+(2)  The Secretary of the Army notifies the Director, WHS, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs immediately when such information is released.
+
+f.  Establishes an inspection process for BSAT entities that maximizes conducting inspections jointly with those scheduled and conducted by APHIS or the CDC.  The DoD Joint inspection team, led by the Department of the Army Inspector General and composed of subject matter experts from the Army, Air Force, and Navy, is intended to harmonize inspections across the DoD.
+g.  Establishes documentation requirements that are not addressed in this issuance. h.  Requires that DoD BSAT entities establish plans, procedures, and processes to secure, safeguard, or destroy DoD BSAT in the event of emergency situations (e.g., natural disasters, fires, power outages, and general emergencies in DoD BSAT facilities).
+
+## Section 3:  Deviation Program (Waivers And Exceptions)
+
+3.1.  Deviations from the requirements of this issuance require an approved waiver or exception.
+Deviations include cases where the requirements of this issuance are not implemented, and cases that result in more restrictive countermeasures than addressed in this issuance.
+
+a.  The DoD Component head, or his or her designee, is the approval authority for waivers to this issuance.  A waiver may be approved for temporary relief from a specific requirement prescribed in this issuance, pending actions to conform to the requirement.  Such waivers will be approved for only as long as needed and will not exceed 1 year; an extension may be approved for no more than 1 additional year.  While a waiver is in effect, compensatory security measures will be implemented as needed to mitigate any increase in risk or vulnerability to an acceptable level.  The DoD Component will notify the DoD Executive Agent for BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity and the ASD(NCB) of approved waivers.
+
+b.  The ASD(NCB) is the approval authority for all exceptions to this issuance.  An exception may be approved for permanent relief from a specific requirement as prescribed in this issuance when there are unique circumstances applicable to the BSAT entity that make conforming to the requirement impractical or an inappropriate use of resources.  Compensatory security measures will be implemented to mitigate any increase in risk or vulnerability to an acceptable level.  The ASD(NCB) may be required to coordinate through the ASD(HD&GS) for National Security Council approval if these measures exceed SAR requirements. 3.2.  Requests for waivers and exceptions from this issuance will be forwarded through the chain of command to reach the DoD Component within 30 days of initiation.  Within 30 days of receipt, the DoD Component will review and respond to waiver requests or will forward exception requests through the DoD Executive Agent for BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity to the ASD(NCB).  The ASD(NCB) will review exception requests and respond within 30 days of receipt.  Requests for deviations will include:
+
+a.  Any risks and vulnerabilities associated with granting the deviation, ensuring they are
+classified in accordance with current guidance.
+b.  Recommended compensatory security measures to mitigate any increased risk or
+vulnerability as a result of the deviation.
+c.  The projected duration of the deviation.
+d.  A complete and specific justification indicating why the deviation is required. e.  The projected costs associated with the recommended compensatory security measures.
+f.  A recommendation from the DoD Executive Agent for the DoD BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Programs for requests forwarded to the ASD(NCB).
+
+3.3.  Whenever deviation conditions or compensatory measures change, a request for an amendment to, or cancellation of, the waiver or exception will be sent to the office that granted approval of the original request.
+
+3.4.  Physical security surveys, reports, and inspections will include a review of approved deviations to verify that conditions described in the request remain accurate and that compensatory measures are implemented fully.  The physical security survey or inspection report will include a comment regarding the actions taken as a result of that review.
+
+## Section 4:  Security Requirements And Measures 4.1.  General.
+
+This section details the security standards necessary to reduce the risk of compromising BSAT
+security and to safeguard BSAT from theft or unauthorized access.
+
+a.  Storage and work sites will be in BSAT registered spaces.  BSAT will be secured, stored, and transported to meet the physical security requirements pursuant to DoDI 5200.08, DoDM 6055.18, Volume 6 of Defense Explosives Safety Regulation 6055.09, and the security standards in this issuance.
+
+b.  BSAT accidents or incidents will be reported in accordance with the SAR and as described in Section 7.
+
+c.  Security planning and execution will be in accordance with DoDI 5200.08 and based on the standards identified in this issuance and a site-specific risk assessment of the entity.  An appropriate risk management process will be used, in accordance with Volume 2 of DoDI O-
+2000.16, to assess the threat and vulnerabilities and provide the RO and entity commander or director with courses of action to mitigate the vulnerabilities or accept the risk.
+
+d.  The commander or director of a DoD BSAT entity will conduct and document an initial site-specific risk assessment at each DoD BSAT entity, then review and update it annually or as a new vulnerability or threat becomes known.  The risk assessment will consider the current threat assessment, physical surveys, and antiterrorism standards from Volume 2 of DoDI O-
+2000.16.
+
+## 4.2.  Physical Security Systems.
+
+a.  The DoD BSAT entity commander or director will establish a reliable security system and process that provides the capability to detect, assess, deter, communicate, delay, and respond to unauthorized attempts to access BSAT.
+
+b.  Commanders or directors and ROs of BSAT entities will develop a physical security plan to mitigate vulnerabilities or accept a risk in accordance with the SAR, DoDI 5200.08, and DoD 5200.08-R.
+
+(1)  The physical security plan will be based on a systematic approach where threats are identified and defined, vulnerabilities are assessed, and a risk management process is applied. Acceptable risk will be determined using a risk-based process in coordination with the installation staff and approved by the entity's most senior commander or director.
+
+(2)  If the entity is a tenant on a military installation, the physical security plan for BSAT
+will be integrated into the host installation plan.  The BSAT entity commander or director will identify any off-installation support requirements to the installation commander, who will incorporate those requirements into any installation agreements coordinated with off-installation agencies.
+
+(3)  The organization responsible for executing armed responses at BSAT entities (when required by a site-specific risk assessment) will develop response plans in coordination with the supported entity to implement acceptable support levels in accordance with the SAR.
+
+(4)  The RO and entity commander or director will review the security plan annually and revise as necessary in accordance with the SAR.  The plan will address or establish:
+(a)  The physical security plan that will address the controls used to secure the BSAT
+from misuse, theft, loss, and unauthorized access or removal from the BSAT registered space.
+
+(b)  Control of access for BSAT registered spaces.
+(c)  Procedures to appropriately secure information in accordance with Paragraph 4.8.
+(d)  Initial and annual personnel trainings regarding procedures for securing BSAT
+registered spaces, security and positive control of keys, changing access permissions or locks following staff changes, reporting and removing unauthorized individuals, access control and records requirements, inventory control, and other appropriate security measures.  Additional trainings must also be provided whenever the entity significantly amends its security, incident response, or biosafety plans.
+
+(e)  Procedures, reporting requirements, and administrative actions for lost or compromised keys, keycards, passwords, combinations, and security incidents and violations that cause a public health emergency within DoD, incidents and violations that could cause, or do cause, a PHEIC, and those security incidents and violations that involve alteration of inventory records.
+
+(f)  Procedures to mitigate the presence of suspicious or unauthorized persons or activities that may potentially or actually attempt to misuse or remove BSAT.
+
+(g)  Procedures on how to identify and report suspicious packages before they are brought into or removed from a BSAT storage or work area.
+
+(h)  Procedures for management control of closed circuit television recording or surveillance, if used by an entity to address a risk or vulnerability.
+
+(i)  Contingency plans for unexpected shipments.
+
+(5)  Tier 1 BSAT entities will have the following enhancements to their security plan:
+(a)  Delineation of the roles and responsibilities for security management, including designation of a security officer to manage the entity's BSAT security program.
+
+(b)  Procedures for management of access controls (e.g., keys, keycards, common access card, access logs, biometrics, and other access control measures).  This may be accomplished by controlling or interacting directly with a service provider (e.g., a guard company).
+
+(c)  Designation of personnel to manage the entity's intrusion detection system (IDS), including personnel with the IDS alarm code and criteria for changing it.
+
+(d)  Procedures to test the IDS and manage its configuration.
+(e)  Procedures to respond to an access control failure, IDS failure, or nuisance alarm.
+(f)  Procedures to screen visitors in accordance with Section 6.
+(g)  Procedures to document security awareness training for all employees listed on the entity's approved registration.  This will include annual insider threat awareness briefings on how to identify and report suspicious behaviors that occur inside the laboratory or storage area, pursuant to DoDD 5205.16.
+
+(h)  Requirements and procedures for all professionals involved in BSAT safety and security at an entity to share relevant information with the RO to coordinate their efforts pursuant to the SAR.  The entity's RO, safety, and security professionals will meet on a regular or defined basis.  This may be annually in conjunction with the physical security plan review, after a security incident, when there is a significant entity change that affects security, or in response to a threat.
+
+4.3.  SECURITY FORCES.a.  In accordance with DoDI 5200.08 and DoDD 5210.56, installation commanders will issue the necessary regulations to protect and secure property and places within their command.
+
+b.  There will be a sufficient security force available at all times to respond rapidly to unauthorized access (attempted or actual) and prevent the unauthorized removal of BSAT or data.
+
+c.  The RO, entity commander or director, and the installation commander will determine the required response time for the security forces (from notification to arrival at the outermost security barrier) based on the site-specific risk assessment.  For entities holding Tier 1 BSAT, this includes the time period that physical security measures delay potential unauthorized attempted access.  If the response time exceeds 15 minutes, the security barriers must be sufficient to delay unauthorized access until the security force arrives.
+
+d.  Security force members will participate in appropriate, realistic, site defense force training exercises at a frequency determined by the DoD Component in accordance with the SAR.  The training will be tailored to each BSAT entity based on the site-specific risk assessment conducted at the site.
+
+
+
+## 4.4.  Security Measures. A.  Security Barriers.
+
+BSAT entities must have security barriers that both deter intrusion and deny access to areas containing DoD BSAT by unapproved personnel.  Barriers may consist of physical obstacles
+(e.g., perimeter fences, walls, locked doors, security windows), trained personnel (e.g., security guards, laboratory personnel, or escorts), or a combination of both to provide a continuous ring of security or layering that provides security in depth.
+
+(1)  BSAT entities that are not registered for Tier 1 BSAT require at least one security barrier.
+
+(2)  Entities registered for Tier 1 BSAT require three physical security barriers, counted from the Tier 1 BSAT outward.  Pursuant to Part 73 of Title 42, CFR, if trained personnel are designated as one of the three barriers, they must be dedicated to that task.  These physical barriers must be identified on the entity's registration and discussed in the physical security plan (sections 5A and 6A of APHIS/CDC Form 1, "Application for Registration for Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins," available from https://www.selectagents.gov).
+
+## B.  Other Security Measures.
+
+Perimeter security lighting, IDS, and cameras may be used to monitor access, but are not considered security barriers because they cannot prevent access by themselves.
+
+(1)  Perimeter Security Lighting.
+BSAT entities will determine perimeter lighting needs based on site-specific risk assessments.
+
+(2)  IDS.
+The IDS will be equipped with monitoring capability (e.g., tamper alarms or serialized seals) to detect and report attempted or unauthorized penetration to security monitoring or control systems, IDS equipment, junction boxes, or communication lines.
+
+(a)  For BSAT registered spaces, an entity may consider using IDS based on a sitespecific risk assessment.
+
+(b)  All areas that reasonably afford access to a Tier 1 BSAT registered suite or room must be protected by an IDS unless the registered area is physically occupied.  The IDS will be configured to detect and report unauthorized access (actual or attempted) and meet the physical security standards in DoDM 5200.01.
+
+(3)  Cameras.
+Cameras can be used to monitor barriers or for other risk mitigation based on site-specific risk assessments.
+
+## 4.5.  Access Control.
+
+a.  Only individuals who successfully complete an SRA and obtain approval from the FSAP
+are authorized access to BSAT.
+
+b.  Personnel granted access to Tier 1 BSAT must be enrolled in the BPRP by the certifying official (CO), with final approval by the RO.  Access to laboratory and storage facilities containing Tier 1 BSAT outside of normal business hours must be limited only to those specifically approved by the RO or designee.
+
+c.  Visitors requiring access to BSAT, Tier 1 BSAT, or BSAT registered spaces will follow the procedures in Section 6.
+
+d.  The access control system will include provisions for the safeguarding of animals and plants exposed to or infected with BSAT in accordance with the SAR.
+
+e.  Each individual authorized access to BSAT will have a unique means of accessing the agent pursuant to the SAR.  The BSAT entity personnel will maintain a register (automated or manual) to record the entrance and exit of visitors to the BSAT registered space.  The register will reflect the individual's name, entrance and exit time and date, and escort's name, if required.
+
+f.  The DoD BSAT entity personnel will modify the access control system when an individual's access authorization changes.
+g.  Smart card technology will be implemented in accordance with DoDI 8520.02. h.  All individuals approved for access to BSAT registered spaces and BSAT must wear visible identification (ID) badges in front, between the neck and waist that include, at least, a photograph, the wearer's name, and an expiration date.  Visitors will be clearly identified as having escorted or unescorted access.  Entity administrators are encouraged to use easily recognizable marks on the ID badges to indicate access to sensitive and secure areas.  Visible ID badges are not required when working in appropriate protective clothing or in Biosafety Level-3
+or -4 containment suites.
+
+i.  The DoD BSAT entity will implement a duress system to enable authorized personnel to covertly communicate an adverse situation.
+
+j.  An automated entry control system (AECS) may be used to control access instead of visual control if it meets the criteria stated in this issuance.  The AECS will authenticate the individual's ID and verify the person's authority to enter the area through two separate methods that may include ID badges, cards, a personal ID number (PIN) entry device, or biometric device.
+
+(1)  An AECS ID badge or key card will use embedded sensors, integrated circuits, magnetic strips, or other means of encoding data that identifies the entity and the individual to whom the card is issued in accordance with DoDI 8520.02.
+
+(2)  Personal identity verification via biometrics devices may be used to validate the individual requesting access by one or more unique personal characteristics.  Personal characteristics may include fingerprints, hand geometry, handwriting, retina scans, or voice recognition.
+
+(3)  The AECS will be configured to maintain system integrity and to preclude compromise of electronic access data.  The AECS will operate on a closed computer network specifically designed and established for the AECS.  Data input to the system will require the badge custodian to have log-in and password privileges.
+
+(4)  A PIN may be required if smart card technology is used.  The PIN will be entered into the system separately by each individual using a keypad device and will consist of four or more digits, selected randomly, with no known or logical association with the individual.  The PIN will be changed if it is believed to be compromised.
+
+(5)  The AECS will authenticate the individual's authorization to enter BSAT registered spaces with inputs from the ID badge or card, the personal identity verification device, or a keypad with an electronic database of individuals authorized to enter the area.  A paper-entry access control roster will be maintained in the event of a system failure or as an alternative.
+
+(6)  Protection from tampering, destruction, or access control system failure will be established and maintained for all devices or equipment that constitutes the access control system.  The protections can include welding door hinges and pins, eliminating exposed screw heads, ensuring that doors and walls delay access, or IDS to detect unauthorized entry.  These emergency systems will allow time for response forces to arrive as discussed in Paragraph 4.4.b. Protection will address covert entry into BSAT registered spaces through electrical, communications, or heating, ventilation, and air conditioning distribution and maintenance areas.
+(7)  Security and communications devices located outside the entrance to a BSAT
+registered space will be in protected areas or have tamper resistant enclosures.  They will be securely fastened to the wall or other permanent structure to prevent unauthorized access through breaching of attachment mechanisms (e.g., screws, pins, bolts).  Control panels located within a BSAT registered space will require only a minimal degree of physical security protection sufficient to preclude unauthorized access to the mechanism.
+
+(8)  Keypad devices will be designed and installed so that an unauthorized person in the immediate vicinity cannot observe the selection of input numbers.
+(9)  Electric strikes used in access control systems will be heavy duty, industrial grade.
+
+## 4.6.  Bsat Storage.
+
+a.  When not in use, all BSAT will be stored in refrigerators, freezers, or other approved storage devices secured against unauthorized access (e.g., card access system and lock boxes) in secured BSAT registered spaces.
+
+b.  Procedures will be established for package and material controls, end-of-day security checks, after-duty access controls, and access records.
+
+## 4.7.  Inventory And Accountability.
+
+a.  The DoD BSAT database will be used to inventory and account for all BSAT at DoD
+BSAT entities registered with the FSAP.  Each BSAT registered individual or entity must maintain a current and accurate inventory.  The DoD Executive Agent for the DoD BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Programs is the authority for managing the format and content of the DoD BSAT database in accordance with DoDD 5101.20E.
+
+(1)  The inventory and accountability records will include specific details about the current inventory of BSAT pursuant to the SAR.
+
+(2)  Inventory audits will be conducted in accordance with guidance in the SAR.
+
+b.  BSAT disposal will be in accordance with guidance in the SAR, DoDM 6055.18, and all applicable federal, State, territorial, and local regulations.
+
+## 4.8.  Information And Cyber Security.
+
+a.  DoD information systems and DoD information in electronic format:
+(1)  Will be protected in accordance with DoDI 8500.01.
+(2)  Must comply with DoDI 8510.01.
+b.  Classified or controlled unclassified information (in electronic or hardcopy format) will be handled and protected in accordance with Volumes 3 and 4 of DoDM 5200.01.  If the contract requires access to classified information, a DD Form 254, "DoD Contract Security Classification Specification," must be completed with the contract and include applicable classification guidance in accordance with DoDM 5220.22, Volume 2.
+
+c.  The SAR requires safeguarding BSAT security information.  The minimum requirements are:
+
+(1)  Inventory access logs.
+(2)  Passwords.
+(3)  Entry access logbooks.
+(4)  Rosters of individuals approved for access to BSAT.
+(5)  Access control systems.
+(6)  Security system infrastructure (e.g., floor plans, on-site guard, closed-circuit television, and IDS).
+
+(7)  Security plans.
+(8)  Incident response plans.
+d.  Public release of information will be in accordance with DoDI 5230.09 and DoDI 5230.29.
+
+e.  The DoD BSAT database administrators at all levels will have an approved SRA or a SECRET clearance.  Each entity's RO or ARO controls access to detailed quantitative entity records.  Unless specifically authorized by an entity RO or ARO, the Military Department or Service representatives are authorized access to their Military Department or Service-specific entity qualitative records, and OSD representatives are authorized access to all DoD entity qualitative records.  Requests for Military Department or Service or OSD access will be sent to the DoD Executive Agent for the DoD BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Programs.
+
+## 4.9.  Transportation.
+
+The transportation of BSAT will be in accordance with the SAR, Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9-R, 50 USC 1512a, 50 USC 1512, and any applicable federal, State, territorial, and local regulations.
+
+## 4.10.  Transfer Of Dod Bsat.
+
+a.  The DoD Components may transfer DoD BSAT to other FSAP BSAT entities that are registered for that specific BSAT.  The receiving entity will assume responsibility for the BSAT
+in accordance with the SAR.
+
+b.  DoD Components will not provide BSAT to non-U.S. Government overseas facilities or to foreign entities unless the transfer is consistent with U.S. export control laws and regulations and DoDI 2040.02.
+c.  The DoD Components will not provide DoD BSAT to non-U.S. governmental overseas facilities unless approved by the DoD Executive Agent for the DoD BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Programs with subsequent notification to the ASD(NCB).
+
+(1)  Requests will identify:
+(a)  Recipient information. (b)  Name and quantity of the requested BSAT.
+(c)  Purpose for which the BSAT will be used.
+(d)  Rationale for providing BSAT.
+(e)  Authority under which the transfer (export) will take place, for example, an international cooperative agreement, or an export license, DoD exemption, DoD or U.S. Government exemption, DoD or U.S. Government exception, or other authorization.
+(2)  Approval will identify security measures and requirements for the recipients and comply with applicable U.S. and international laws and regulations, as appropriate.
+
+d.  If the transfer of BSAT to a non-U.S. Government overseas facility or a foreign entity takes place outside the auspices of an international agreement, the DoD Executive Agent for the DoD BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Programs must ensure that the DoD Component has identified plans to comply with applicable DoD trade security controls in DoDI 2030.08, notably the requirement to assess the BSAT recipient.
+
+## Section 5:  Bprp 5.1.  General.
+
+a.  The purpose of the BPRP is to certify that each individual who is authorized access to Tier 1 BSAT meets high standards of integrity, trust, and personal reliability.
+b.  In most cases, the government reviewing official (REV) is the commander or director.
+However, the commander or director may designate an REV, as appropriate.
+
+(1)  The REV designates the CO, monitors the BPRP administered by the CO, and reviews and approves suitability actions in accordance with the guidance implemented by the DoD Component.  The intent is for the REV to monitor certification decisions of the CO;
+oversee the status and quality of the program; and overturn CO decisions if procedures are unfairly, inconsistently, or incorrectly applied.
+
+(2)  The commander or director also designates the RO, who will report directly to the FSAP in coordination with the entity commander or director.  The RO is responsible for determining an individual's eligibility for access to BSAT.
+
+c.  The BPRP requirements for Tier 1 BSAT are in addition to the SAR requirements for all BSAT, which includes an SRA and RO approval of an individual's access to BSAT.  The CO is responsible for determining an individual's BPRP access eligibility to Tier 1 BSAT; however, both the CO and RO must concur for an individual to have access to Tier 1 BSAT.
+
+d.  Other personnel may be designated at DoD facilities to assist in program management based on DoD Component implementing guidance.
+
+e.  Foreign nationals who receive escorted access to Tier 1 BSAT during training, visits, assignments, or exchanges, as specifically authorized by the RO and the entity commander or director and REV (if designated), will be processed in accordance with the SAR, DoDI 2040.02, DoDD 5230.20, DoDM 5200.02, and DoDI 5200.02.
+
+f.  In DoD overseas facilities for both BSAT and Tier 1 BSAT, positions that are usually filled by DoD civilians or military personnel may be filled by local nationals as vetted by the local embassy and supported by a site-specific risk assessment.  Employment of the individual in these positions requires the facility commander or director approval, and must be conducted with authorization, or license, license exception, or exemption in accordance with U.S. export control laws and regulations pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Control Reform Act, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and the Export Administration Regulations.
+
+## 5.2.  Initial Certification.
+
+a.  The CO will require that initial screening for BPRP certification includes:
+
+(1)  Initial Interview.
+The CO or other designated individual will conduct a personal interview with each BPRP
+candidate for individuals to acknowledge their understanding of Section 552(a) of Title 5, U.S.C. (also known as the "Privacy Act of 1974," as amended), DoD Instruction 5400.11, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and component privacy program specifics.  The interviewer will discuss the screening process with the individual, as well as any relevant information as described in Paragraph 5.4.  Individuals will be advised that they must report any factors that could adversely impact their ability to perform BPRP duties, and that failure to report this information may result in denial of BPRP certification.
+
+(2)  Personnel Security Investigation (PSI).
+(a)  Clearance Eligibility.
+For those requiring access to Tier 1 BSAT, individuals must have a valid eligibility to access information classified at SECRET or higher.
+
+(b)  Dossier Review.
+Although not a requirement of the program, sites may opt to review the most recent PSI of any individual in, or being considered for, the program.
+
+(c)  Foreign Nationals.
+Process foreign nationals with requirements for access to Tier 1 BSAT in accordance with DoDD 5230.20 and DoDM 5200.02.
+
+(d)  Escorted Access.
+COs, with RO concurrence, may approve escorted access to Tier 1 BSAT pending completion of the PSI.  The investigation must have been opened and all other BPRP requirements have been completed and reviewed favorably.
+
+(3)  Medical Evaluation.
+(a)  The CO must be confident that the individual is medically, physically, and mentally competent, alert, and dependable, and is not a threat for inadvertent or purposeful compromise of the Tier 1 BSAT program or mission.  To that end, a CMA must provide the CO an evaluation of the individual's medical and physical competence and mental stability to perform duties requiring BPRP certification.
+
+(b)  When a sexual assault victim elects restricted reporting in accordance with DoDI 6495.02, or the sexual assault victim is not eligible for restricted reporting and intends that the sexual assault remain confidential, the victim is required to advise the CMA of any factors that could have an adverse impact on performance, reliability, or safety while performing BPRP duties.  The CMA will inform the CO if there are factors adversely impacting the individual's BPRP eligibility without revealing that the person is a victim of sexual assault.
+
+(4)  Drug and Substance Abuse Testing.
+All candidates for BPRP positions will be tested for drug and substance abuse and results reported to the CO before being certified into the BPRP pursuant to DoDI 1010.09 and DoDI
+1010.01.
+
+(5)  Personnel Record Review.
+The CO will review the individual's available personnel records.  If records are not accessible, the CO will coordinate with the appropriate supervisor, personnel manager, or other designated assistant or specialist to review the record and report any positive or negative factors that reflect on the individual's ability to perform BPRP duties.
+
+(6)  Position Qualification.
+The CO will consult with the supervisor or hiring manager to verify that the individual has the appropriate professional or technical proficiency, skills, and abilities to qualify for the position.
+
+(7)  Final Review.
+The CO will:
+(a)  Conduct a personal interview with each BPRP candidate just prior to final certification determination.
+
+(b)  Discuss any relevant information identified during the screening with the individual.
+
+(c)  Discuss the individual's responsibilities under continuing evaluation.
+
+b.  If the CO determines the individual is eligible for certification into the BPRP, the CO will notify the RO.  The eligible individual will sign an agreement affirming his or her responsibility to abide by the requirements for maintaining BPRP certification.
+c.  If the CO determines that the individual does not meet the requirements for the BPRP, the CO will stop the screening process and deny BPRP certification.  DoD Component guidance will establish documentation requirements.
+
+## 5.3.  Continuing Evaluation.
+
+Individuals certified under the BPRP are observed on a regular basis by peers, supervisors, and BPRP officials to determine if their behavior and performance meet all of the requirements of the program.
+
+a.  CO Observation.
+
+COs will:
+(a)  Observe the behavior and performance of individuals certified under the BPRP on a regular basis.
+
+(b)  Consult with other BPRP officials and supervisors, as appropriate.
+
+b.  Individual and Peer Reporting.
+Individuals certified in the BPRP are responsible for monitoring themselves and their BPRP-
+certified peers.  Individuals and peers must report factors to the supervisor, CO, or CMA that could adversely impact the individual's ability to perform BPRP duties.  Failure to discharge these responsibilities may cast doubt on an individual's reliability.
+
+c.  Supervisor and Security Manager Reporting.
+Supervisors and security managers must notify the CO of factors that could adversely impact the individual's ability to perform BPRP duties.
+
+d.  Drug Testing.
+Positions requiring BPRP certification will be designated for random testing.  Verified positive test results will be reported to the CO and result in termination (for cause).
+
+## E.  Psl.
+
+Individuals will complete periodic reinvestigations in accordance with DoDM 5200.02.  An unfavorably-adjudicated reinvestigation that renders an individual ineligible for a security clearance will result in termination (for cause).
+
+## F.  Medical.
+
+(1)  Health records will include an individual's assignment to a position requiring BPRP
+certification to determine the proper treatment, review, and reporting of relevant medical limitation and duration recommendations to the CO.  Medical records will document relevant medical information that raises concerns about the individual's medical and physical competence and mental stability to perform duties requiring BPRP certification, the CMA's recommendations on that information, and the evidence of transmission to the CO.
+
+(2)  The individual will report any medical evaluation, treatment, or medication to the CMA in accordance with DoD Component guidance to determine if there is any effect on the individual's ability to perform BPRP duties.
+(3)  When a sexual assault victim elects restricted reporting pursuant to DoDI 6495.02 or is not eligible for restricted reporting and intends that the sexual assault remain confidential, the victim is required to advise the CMA of any factors that could have an adverse impact on performance, reliability, or safety while performing BPRP duties.  The CMA will inform the CO
+if there are factors adversely impacting the individual's BPRP status and if the person in question should be temporarily suspended without revealing that the person is a victim of sexual assault.
+(4)  When a sexual assault victim does not elect restricted reporting, the individual will report any factors that could adversely impact his or her ability to perform BPRP duties to the appropriate authority and then to the CO.  The victim is required to advise the CMA of any factors that could have an adverse impact on performance, reliability, or safety while performing BPRP duties.  The CMA will inform the CO if there are factors adversely impacting the individual's BPRP status and that the person in question should be temporarily suspended.
+
+## 5.4.  Bprp Denial Or Termination Criteria.
+
+Individuals will be denied BPRP certification, or terminated from the BPRP, if they:
+
+a.  Do not meet the criteria established in the Security Executive Agent Directive 4.
+b.  Have medical, physical, or mental conditions that will have negative effects on BPRP
+duty performance.
+
+c.  Have a positive drug test result.
+d.  Fail to report any factors that could adversely affect their ability to perform BPRP duties.
+e.  Fail to obtain or retain a favorably-adjudicated PSI.
+f.  Are determined to be unsuitable or unreliable by the CO.
+
+## 5.5.  Removal From Bprp Duties.
+
+a.  A CO may impose an administrative restriction or medical restriction on an individual when the individual is affected by short-term conditions that may have a temporary effect on BPRP duty performance but do not raise concerns about the individual's suitability or reliability. Restriction will not be used for conditions that warrant BPRP denial or termination.  When an individual is no longer required to perform BPRP duties, the CO will administratively terminate the individual from the BPRP.  DoD Components may establish guidelines for duration limitations on restriction and suspension actions, and requirements for review and update of those actions.
+
+b.  When the CO receives information relative to the termination criteria in Paragraph 5.4., he or she will immediately suspend the individual while determining whether the facts warrant termination (for cause) and consulting with the RO.  When suspended, the individual may not perform duties requiring BPRP certification.  In addition, the individual will not have access to non-Tier 1 BSAT unless the RO has reviewed the circumstances of the suspension and documented the decision that access to non-Tier 1 BSAT is warranted.  Information relevant to the individual's security clearance eligibility will be forwarded through the security manager to the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility.
+
+(1)  Within 15 workdays of the suspension, the CO will provide the individual, in writing, the reason or reasons for suspension.  Individuals suspended will remain under continuous evaluation for BPRP purposes until terminated or reinstated into the BPRP.
+
+(2)  The individual will have 10 work days from the date of receipt of the written notification to provide a response to the CO, if desired.
+
+(3)  Prior to terminating the individual from the BPRP for cause, the CO will consult with the RO and the REV to confirm that the procedures have been fairly, consistently, and correctly applied.  This consultation will include review of the individual's response to the CO, if provided.
+
+c.  COs will verify that termination actions are recorded in the affected individual's personnel record accurately.  The RO must notify CDC or APHIS immediately when an individual's access to the select agents or toxins is terminated by the entity and the reasons.
+
+## 5.6.  Recertification Into The Bprp.
+
+a.  An individual denied certification or terminated for cause from BPRP may submit a request for recertification to the CO.  The request will explain the causes that led to the previous denial or termination and provide substantive evidence that those causes no longer exist.
+
+b.  The CO and the REV must approve a recertification request before the individual is processed for a new initial screening.  An individual may be approved for recertification by the REV but may still be denied BPRP certification based on the new initial screening.
+
+## Section 6:  Visitors 6.1.  No Access To Bsat.
+
+All DoD entities required to register pursuant to the SAR must develop procedures, based on their site-specific risk assessment, for escorting individuals who do not have approval from CDC or APHIS to access BSAT but require entry into BSAT registered spaces.  Escort procedures will be developed as part of each entity's physical security plan and will include:
+a.  Citations of appropriate sections of the SAR and associated guidance documents that allow individuals not approved for access to conduct routine cleaning, maintenance, repairs, or other activities not related to BSAT only when continuously escorted by an individual if the potential for access to select agents or toxins exists.
+
+b.  Visitor entry procedures as prescribed in the SAR and associated guidance documents for entities possessing Tier 1 BSAT.
+
+c.  Citations of appropriate sections of the SAR for providing visitors with information and training on biocontainment, biosafety, security (including security awareness), and incident response.
+
+d.  Citations of appropriate sections of the SAR for RO requirement to maintain a record of the training provided to each escorted individual.
+
+e.  The entity commander or director, in consultation with the RO, permitting unescorted entry to a BSAT registered space if BSAT are secured in accordance with Section 4 to prohibit access to BSAT by this individual.
+
+## 6.2.  Access To Bsat.
+
+The visitor must be listed on the host entity's registration, have an approved SRA, and have received appropriate training on biocontainment, biosafety, security (including security awareness), and incident response.  Visitors requiring access to Tier 1 BSAT must either be enrolled in the host entity's BPRP or have a BPRP suitability memorandum from the home entity outlining pre-access suitability assessment and ongoing suitability monitoring requirements and verifying all pre-access checks have been accomplished.  They must also be enrolled in an occupational health program.  The entity commander or director, in consultation with the RO, may permit unescorted visitor access to BSAT.
+
+## 6.3.  Foreign Visitors.
+
+Additional foreign visitor requirements are located in Paragraph 5.1.e.
+
+## Section 7:  Reports 7.1.  General.
+
+a.  An individual or entity must immediately notify the appropriate lead regulatory agency, the CDC or the APHIS, by telephone, fax, or e-mail, if the RO has a reasonable suspicion that a theft, loss, release, or occupational exposure has occurred.  Thefts or losses must be reported even if BSAT is subsequently recovered or the responsible parties are identified.  This call can also serve as an opportunity to receive guidance from regulatory authorities if there is doubt that a report is required.  Additional information will be submitted as it becomes known, but no later than 24 hours after the incident.
+
+b.  Within 7 days, the entity must submit a complete APHIS/CDC Form 3, "Report of Theft, Loss or Release of Select Agents or Toxins," available at https://www.selectagents.gov, to the agency with which it is registered, the CDC, or the APHIS.
+
+c.  The individual or entity will notify the appropriate federal, State, or local agencies of the theft, loss, or release of BSAT.  Entities with Tier 1 BSAT must comply with the Federal Bureau of Investigation notification process for reporting thefts or suspicious activities that may be criminal in nature.
+
+d.  The individual or entity must notify the DoD chain of command immediately in accordance with DoDI 6200.03 when a BSAT incident occurs that causes a public health emergency in DoD or could cause or a PHEIC.
+
+e.  DoD Entities will report BSAT mishaps and incidents through command channels in accordance with DoD Component procedures through the BSAT Biorisk Program Office to the ASD(NCB) or designee.  The following will be reported:
+(1)  The theft, loss, recovery, suspected theft, wrongful disposition, and unauthorized use or destruction of DoD BSAT.
+
+(2)  Attempts to steal or divert DoD BSAT outside of physical security controls. (3)  Actual or attempted unauthorized access at a DoD BSAT entity. (4)  Significant or disabling damage to, explosion, or force majeure at a DoD BSAT
+entity.
+(5)  Release of a DoD BSAT external to the containment laboratory and into the ambient
+air or environment.
+(6)  Mishaps in which there was direct evidence of an occupational exposure to DoD
+BSAT.
+
+(7)  Mishaps where there is exposure, injury, or death.
+
+(8)  Other DoD BSAT incidents not identified in Paragraphs 7.1.d.(1) through 7.1.d.(7)
+that the entity commander or director determines to be of immediate concern to DoD based upon the nature, gravity, and potential for adverse publicity or potential consequences of the incident.
+
+## 7.2.  Dod Component Reports To The Asd(Ncb).
+
+The DoD Components will:
+a.  Provide a BPRP status report by February 15 each year.  The report will:
+
+(1)  State the DoD BSAT entity submitting the report.
+(2)  Indicate the year for which the information is being reported.
+(3)  List the total number of personnel (separated into military, DoD civilian, and contractor employees) at each DoD BSAT entity actually certified into the BPRP as of December 31.
+
+(4)  List the total number of personnel (separated into military, DoD civilian, and contractor employees) at each DoD BSAT entity denied certification, terminated administratively, and terminated for cause during the calendar year.
+
+(5)  List the number of terminations categorized by primary reason for termination meeting the BPRP denial or termination criteria or administrative termination per Paragraphs 5.4.
+
+and 5.5.
+
+(6)  Include any comments noting trends or other relevant factors to assist future historical analysis.
+
+b.  Provide an executive summary of significant findings associated with the Departmentlevel inspections at BSAT facilities.
+
+c.  Provide an annual assessment of the health of the program.
+
+## 7.3.  Records Retention.
+
+a.  In accordance with DoD Component guidance, DoD BSAT facilities will maintain:
+(1)  Security incident reports, site-specific risk assessments, and record of site-specific risk assessment annual reviews.
+
+(2)  Inspection and exercise records and reports.
+(3)  Corrective action reports from external inspections.
+(4)  Training records for each individual with access to BSAT and each escorted individual that includes name of individual, date of training, description of training provided, and the means used to verify the individual understood the training.
+
+b.  All records and reports associated with this issuance will be maintained for at least 3 years and then handled according to appropriate DoD Component instructions.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+AECS
+automated entry control system
+APHIS
+Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service
+ARO
+alternate responsible official
+ASD(HD&GS)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security
+ASD(NCB)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
+Defense Programs
+
+BPRP
+biological personnel reliability program
+BSAT
+biological select agents and toxins
+CDC
+Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
+CFR
+Code of Federal Regulations
+CMA
+competent medical authority
+CO
+certifying official
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+DoDM
+DoD manual
+FSAP
+Federal Select Agent Program
+ID
+identification
+IDS
+intrusion detection system
+NSC
+National Security Council
+PHEIC
+public health emergency of international concern
+PIN
+personal identification number
+PSI
+personnel security investigation
+REV
+reviewing official
+RO
+responsible official
+SAR
+select agent regulations
+SRA
+security risk assessment
+WHS
+Washington Headquarters Services
+
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+administrative
+When the ability to maintain continuing evaluation is questionable,
+restriction
+the CO may administratively restrict such individuals from BPRP duties for the duration of an extended absence.  Administrative restriction is not an assessment of unreliability.
+administrative
+Removal of reliable individuals from the program when they are
+termination
+leaving the position or no longer require access to BSAT or perform
+BPRP duties.
+
+access
+An individual will be deemed to have access to a DoD BSAT at any point in time if the individual has possession of a DoD BSAT (e.g., ability to carry, use, or manipulate) or the ability to gain possession of a DoD BSAT.
+
+ARO
+An individual designated by the entity commander or director, approved by the CDC or APHIS for access to BSAT, and with the authority and responsibility to act on behalf of the entity and ensure compliance with the SAR in the absence of the RO.  Enrollment in the BPRP is not required unless the ARO will have access to Tier 1 BSAT.
+badge custodian
+Individual responsible for controlling and issuing AECS ID badges
+or key cards.
+biological agents and
+Defined in Section 178 of Title 18, United States Code.
+toxins BSAT
+All of the biological agents or toxins listed in the SAR.  They have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, animal and plant health, or animal and plant products and whose possession, use, and transfer are regulated by the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Agriculture under the SAR.
+BSAT registered
+Space registered with the FSAP for BSAT.
+space CMA
+A healthcare provider who is trained and appointed in accordance with procedures established by the DoD Component to review medical conditions and treatment to provide recommendations to the CO on an individual's suitability and reliability for personnel
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+reliability program duties.  The CMA is a physician, nurse practitioner (who is either licensed for independent practice or
+supervised by a physician licensed for independent practice), or physician assistant (if supervised by a physician licensed for independent practice).
+CO
+The person responsible for determining an individual's ability to be BPRP-certified and ensuring the BPRP member is continuously monitored.  Responsibilities also include implementing, administering, and managing the BPRP, and supporting the entity commander or director, REV, RO, and ARO.  Unless the CO requires
+access to BSAT, the CO is not required to have an SRA or be
+enrolled in the BPRP.
+continuing
+The process by which BPRP-certified individuals are observed for
+evaluation
+compliance with reliability standards.  This is an ongoing process and management function that considers duty performance, physical and psychological fitness, on- and off-duty behavior, and reliability on a continuing basis.
+denial
+An action taken based on the receipt of disqualifying information to stop the BPRP screening process for an individual being considered for duties involving access to Tier 1 BSAT.
+drug and substance
+The wrongful use, possession, or distribution of a controlled
+abuse
+substance, prescription medication, over-the-counter medication, or intoxicating substance (other than alcohol).  "Wrongful" means without legal justification or excuse, and includes use contrary to the directions of the manufacturer or prescribing healthcare provider, and
+use of any intoxicating substance not intended for human intake.
+
+entity
+Any government agency (federal, State, or local), academic institution, corporation, company, partnership, society, association, firm, sole proprietorship, or other legal entity registered with the FSAP.
+IDS
+A system of sensor devices that trigger an alarm when a security breach occurs, notifying the appropriate response force who have the capability to respond to the alarm and assess or confront a threat.
+medical restriction
+When performance of BPRP duties may be impaired by a temporary medical condition (including medication for the condition) or psychological condition (such as short-term stress), the CO may
+determine the individual should be restricted from performing those
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+BPRP duties.  Medical restriction is a precaution based on the possibility of duty impairment and not an assessment of unreliability.
+
+REV
+An entity official whose duties include monitoring the suitability assessment program and reviewing warranted suitability actions.
+risk assessment
+The process of systematically identifying, assessing, and managing risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits as described in DoDI O- 2000.16.  The end product of risk assessment is the identification and assessment of areas and assets that are vulnerable to the identified
+threat attack means or to the identified hazard.  From the assessment
+of risk based upon the three critical components of risk management (threat assessment, criticality assessment, and vulnerability assessment), the commander must determine which assets require the most protection and where future expenditures are required to minimize risk of attack or exposure to a hazard or lessen the severity
+of the outcome of an attack or of a hazard.
+
+RO
+An individual designated by the entity commander or director and approved by the CDC or APHIS for access to BSAT.  The RO has the authority and responsibility to act on behalf of the entity and ensure compliance with the SAR.  Enrollment in the BPRP is not required unless the RO will have access to Tier 1 BSAT.
+SRA
+Electronic records check performed by the Criminal Justice Information Service to determine if an individual who has been
+identified by a BSAT entity as having a legitimate need to access BSAT exhibits one of the statutory restrictors which would either prohibit or restrict access.
+
+suspension
+An action taken to temporarily remove an individual from the BPRP when the CO has information that could be expected to affect an individual's job performance or reliability.
+termination (for cause)
+An action, based on the receipt of disqualifying information, to remove an individual from the BPRP who was previously screened,
+determined reliable, and certified capable of performing duties involving access to Tier 1 BSAT.
+
+Tier 1 BSAT
+A subset of the BSAT listed in the SAR, they present the greatest risk of deliberate misuse with the most significant potential for mass
+casualties or devastating effects to the economy, critical
+infrastructure, or public confidence.
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+
+visitor
+A person (e.g., regular, recurrent, maintenance and other nonscientific support, or first responder/emergency personnel) who is not authorized unescorted access to BSAT.
+vulnerability
+A situation or circumstance that, if left unchanged, may result in the loss of or damage to the BSAT or the BSAT facility.
+
+
+## References
+
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 7, Part 331
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 9, Part 121
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 15, Parts 730-774 (also known as the "Export Administration Regulations (EAR)," as amended)
+
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 22, Parts 120-130 (also known as the "International Traffic in
+Arms Regulations (ITAR)," as amended)
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 42, Part 73
+"Convention on the Prohibition on the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
+Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction (BWC)," March
+26, 19751
+"Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
+Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction." April 29, 19972
+Defense Explosives Safety Regulation 6055.09, Volume 6, "DoD Ammunition and Explosives
+Safety Standards: Contingency Operations, Toxic Chemical Munitions and Agents, and Risk- Based Siting," February 29, 2008, as amended
+Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR) 4500.9-R, "Defense Transportation Regulation, Part
+II, Cargo Movement, Chapter 204, Hazardous Material," May 2014, as amended
+Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness &
+Response, "(U/FOUO) Operational Framework to Promote Rapid Access to Biological
+Material Related to non-Influenza Pathogens with the Potential to Cause a Public Health
+Emergency of International Concern and Facilitate its Sharing Among U.S. Federal
+Departments and Agencies," July 3, 20193
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Establishment of the Office of the Under Secretary
+of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment," July 13, 2018
+DoD 5200.08-R, "Physical Security Program," April 9, 2007, as amended DoD Directive 2060.01, "Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements,"
+January 9, 2001, as amended
+DoD Directive 2060.02, "DoD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy,"
+January 27, 2017
+DoD Directive 5101.20E, "DoD Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) Biosafety and
+Biosecurity Program," January 25, 2019
+DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," March 18, 2008
+
+
+DoD Directive 5111.13, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
+security (ASD(HD&GS))," March 23, 2018
+DoD Directive 5122.05, "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)),"
+August 7, 2017
+DoD Directive 5134.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+(USD(AT&L))," December 9, 2005, as amended
+DoD Directive 5205.16, "The DoD Insider Threat Program," September 30, 2014, as amended DoD Directive 5210.56, "Arming and the Use of Force," November 18, 2016 DoD Directive 5230.20, "Visits and Assignments of Foreign Nationals," June 22, 2005 DoD Instruction 1010.01, "Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program (MPDATP),"
+September 13, 2012, as amended
+DoD Instruction 1010.09, "DoD Civilian Employee Drug-Free Workplace Program," June 22,
+2012, as amended
+DoD Instruction O-2000.16, Volume 2, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation:
+DoD Force Protection Condition (FPCON) System," November 17, 2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 2030.08, "Implementation of Trade Security Controls (TSCs) for Transfers of
+DoD Personal Property to Parties Outside DoD Control," February 19, 2015, as amended
+DoD Instruction 2040.02, "International Transfers of Technology, Articles, and Services,"
+March 27, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013
+DoD Instruction 5200.02, "DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP)," March 21, 2014, as
+amended
+DoD Instruction 5200.08, "Security of DoD Installations and Resources and the DoD Physical
+Security Review Board (PSRB)," December 10, 2005, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5210.65, "Security Standards for Safeguarding Chemical Agents," January 19,
+2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5230.09, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release," January 25, 2019
+DoD Instruction 5230.29, "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public Release,"
+August 13, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5400.11, "DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs," January 29, 2019 DoD Instruction 6200.03, "Public Health Emergency Management Within the Department of
+Defense," March 28, 2019
+DoD Instruction 6495.02, "Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program
+Procedures," March 28, 2013, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8500.01, "Cybersecurity," March 14, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8510.01, "Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information
+Technology (IT)," March 12, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8520.02, "Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling," May
+24, 2011
+DoD Manual 5200.01, Volumes 1 - 4, "DoD Information Security Program," February 24, 2012,
+as amended
+DoD Manual 5200.02, "Procedures for the DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP)," April 3,
+2017
+DoD Manual 5220.22, Volume 2, "National Industrial Security Program:  Industrial Security
+Procedures for Government Activities," August 1, 2018
+DoD Manual 6055.18, "Safety Standards for Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories,"
+May 11, 2010, as amended
+DoD Manual 8910.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Collections Manual:  Procedures for DoD
+Internal Information Collections," June 30, 2014, as amended
+Executive Order 13546, "Optimizing the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the
+United States," July 2, 2010
+National Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 1, 2018
+Public Law 107-188, Sections 201231, "Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Response and
+Preparedness Act of 2002," June 12, 2002
+Security Executive Agent Directive 4, "National Security Adjudicative Guidelines," June 8, 2017 United States Code, Title 5, Section 552(a) (also known as the "Privacy Act of 1974," as
+amended)
+United States Code, Title 18 United States Code, Title 22, Section 2778 (also known as the "Arms Export Control Act
+(AECA)")
+United States Code, Title 50, Chapter 58, 4801-4851 (also known as the "Export Control Reform
+Act")
+United States Government Framework for the Rapid Sharing of Biological Material Related to
+non-Influenza Pathogens with the Potential to Cause a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, July 3, 2019

markdown/dod/i5210_91.md

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+## Department Of Defense Instruction
+
+# Number 5210.91 August 12, 2010 Incorporating Change 2, Effective March 30, 2020
+
+## Usd(I&S) Subject: Polygraph And Credibility Assessment (Pca) Procedures
+
+References: See Enclosure 1
+
+## 1. Purpose.  This Instruction:
+
+a. Incorporates and cancels DoD 5210.48-R (Reference (a)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Memorandum (Reference (b)), and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence and Security) Memorandum (Reference (c)).
+
+b. Establishes and implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures governing the use of polygraph and other approved credibility assessment tools in accordance with the guidance in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5210.48 (Reference (d)) and the authority in DoDD 5143.01 (Reference (e)). 2. APPLICABILITY.  This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD
+Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").
+
+## 3. Definitions.  See Glossary.
+
+4. POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a. Polygraph examinations be conducted pursuant to section 1564a of title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (f)).  Personnel who refuse to take or are unable to successfully complete the polygraph examination may be denied access to information identified in Reference (f).
+
+b. DoD Components shall have written PCA procedures.
+c. DoD Components shall follow the PCA quality control (QC) and quality assurance (QA)
+standards established in this Instruction.
+
+d. Only properly trained personnel shall conduct PCA examinations.
+e. The Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS) shall not be used to test U.S. persons.  This does not apply to PCASS examinations conducted for training.
+
+## 5. Responsibilities.  See Enclosure 2.
+
+6. PROCEDURES.  See Enclosures 3 through 9.
+
+7. RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED.  This Instruction is approved for public release and is available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. 8. SUMMARY OF CHANGE 2.  The change to this issuance updates organizational titles and references and removes expiration language in accordance with current Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense direction. 9. EFFECTIVE DATE.  This Instruction is effective August 12, 2010.
+
+Enclosures
+1. References 2. Responsibilities 3. PCA Program 4. Polygraph Examinations 5. PCASS Examinations 6. Selection and Training of Polygraph Examiners and PCASS Operators 7. QC and QA of PCA Programs 8. RDT&E of PCA Technologies 9. Information Requirements
+Glossary
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+ENCLOSURE 1:  REFERENCES ........5
+ENCLOSURE 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........6
+UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
+(USD(I&S))........6
+DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
+(DUSD(I&S)) ........6
+DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA) ........6 HEADS OF THE DoD COMPONENTS ........7
+ENCLOSURE 3:  PCA PROGRAM ........9
+ESTABLISHING A PCA PROGRAM ........9
+GENERAL PROGRAM PROCEDURES ........9
+NON-DUTY EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS ........11 NCCA ........11
+ENCLOSURE 4:  POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS ........13
+TYPES AND AUTHORIZED USES OF THE POLYGRAPH ........13
+Issue-Based Examinations ........13 PSS Examinations ........14 ESS Examinations ........15
+CSP Examinations ........15 Examinations Conducted Outside the Department of Defense ........16
+PSS PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES ........17
+CSP AND ESS EXAMINATION QUESTIONS ........17
+CSP Questions ........17 ESS Questions ........18
+CONDUCT OF A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION ........18
+Pretest ........18
+Data Collection ........19 Test Data Analysis ........20
+Post-Test ........20
+POLYGRAPH LIMITATIONS ........20 REFUSAL TO TAKE OR COMPLETE A PSS ........21 FAILURE TO RESOLVE A PSS ........21 APPEALS ........21 POLYGRAPH CM AWARENESS AND POLYGRAPH ANTI-CM PROCEDURES ........22
+NCCA Training Requirements, CM Awareness, and Reporting Procedures ........22
+Reporting CM ........22
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+(a)
+DoD 5210.48-R, "Department of Defense Polygraph Program," January 9, 1985 (hereby cancelled)
+(b)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Memorandum, "Operational Approval of the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS)," October 29, 2007 (hereby cancelled)
+(c)
+Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence and Security) Memorandum,
+"Interim Policy for Polygraph Anti-Countermeasures Procedures," March 27, 2006 (hereby cancelled)
+(d)
+DoD Directive 5210.48, "Credibility Assessment (CA) Program," April 24, 2015, as
+amended
+(e)
+DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))," October 24, 2014, as amended
+(f)
+Section 1564a of title 10, United States Code
+(g)
+DoD Instruction 5400.11, "DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs," January 29, 2019
+(h)
+DoD 5400.11-R, "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 14, 2007
+(i)
+Chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code
+(j)
+Executive Order 13467, "Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government
+Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information," June 30, 2008
+(k)
+DoD Manual 5200.01, "Information Security Program," February 24, 2012, as amended
+(l)
+DoD Manual 5200.02, "Procedures for the DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP)," April
+3, 2017
+(m) Section 435b of title 50, United States Code (n)
+DoD Instruction 3216.02, "Protection of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical
+Standards in DoD-Supported Research," November 8, 2011, as amended
+(o)
+DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003, as amended
+(p)
+DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework,"
+January 23, 2020
+(q)
+DoD Instruction 5000.02T, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," January 7, 2015, as amended
+(r)
+Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information," April 17, 1995, as
+amended
+(s)
+DoD Instruction 5015.02, "DoD Records Management Program," February 24, 2015, as
+amended
+(t)
+Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Report Number 05-INTEL-
+18, "Review of the Actions Taken to Deter, Detect, and Investigate the Espionage Activities of Ana Belen Montes (U)," June 16, 2005
+(u)
+DoD Manual 5240.01, "Procedures Governing The Conduct Of DoD Intelligence
+Activities," August 8, 2016
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (USD(I&S)).  The USD(I&S) shall:
+a. Serve as the OSD Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense regarding the DoD PCA Program.
+
+b. Approve DoD Components permitted to have PCA programs.
+c. Approve those PCA technologies authorized for use within the Department of Defense.
+d. Approve requests to augment counterintelligence (CI)-scope polygraph (CSP)
+examinations with the question areas of the expanded-scope screening (ESS) examination for initial applicants to designated positions. 2. DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (DUSD(I&S)).  The DUSD(I&S), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S), shall:
+
+a. Develop and recommend PCA policy. b. Provide PCA policy oversight.
+3. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA).  The Director, DIA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S), shall:
+
+a. Oversee the DoD PCA Program. b. Appoint a DoD PCA program manager. c. Chair the PCA Program Executive Committee.
+d. Manage the National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA) and the DoD PCA
+RDT&E.
+e. Establish standards for PCASS equipment, software, techniques, procedures, training, certification, examinations, and record keeping.
+
+f. Convene annual meetings with DoD PCA program and non-DoD Federal PCA program representatives to discuss research, training standards or instructions, and modifications or amendments to QA standards.
+
+g. Schedule QA inspections of the DoD Components.
+h. Conduct PCA program planning and strategic forecasting of DoD PCA program requirements.
+
+i. Request and review after-action reports and lessons learned relating to PCA training, equipment, methodology, and support to DoD-wide PCA missions.
+
+j. Develop, collect, and analyze PCA performance measurements. k. Approve modifications to PCASS equipment and software.
+l. Approve field testing of PCA technologies in accordance with Enclosure 8.
+m. Coordinate with the Joint Staff and the DoD Components to recommend the organization of joint or DoD interagency elements to accomplish priority PCA requirements.  As necessary:
+(1) Recommend the assignment of lead responsibilities for on-site coordination in a joint operating environment.
+(2) Exercise CI mission tasking authority for PCA examinations.
+
+4. HEADS OF THE DoD COMPONENTS APPROVED TO CONDUCT PCA EXAMINATIONS.  The Heads of the DoD Components approved to conduct PCA examinations, listed in Enclosure 1 of Reference (d) and hereafter referred to as "PCA DoD Components", shall:
+
+a. Appoint a PCA manager before program implementation.  The PCA manager shall:
+(1) Coordinate Component PCA activities. (2) Participate in PCA committees and working groups. (3) Support PCA data collection for ongoing research and validation efforts.
+b. Appoint officials to approve requests for PCA examinations in accordance with Enclosure 3.
+
+c. Develop written PCA procedures in coordination with NCCA.
+d. Coordinate with DIA before researching, acquiring, evaluating, testing, or using new PCA
+technologies.
+
+e. Develop record-keeping procedures in accordance with DIA guidance and Enclosure 9.
+f. Account for PCA equipment.
+g. Train and certify polygraph examiners, PCASS operators, and supervisors in accordance with DIA guidance.
+
+h. Designate positions requiring a personnel security screening (PSS) polygraph as part of determining initial or continuing eligibility for access to Top Secret information, special access program (SAP), or other sensitive intelligence or operational information.
+
+## Enclosure 3 Pca Program 1. Establishing A Pca Program
+
+a. Only the polygraph and the PCASS are approved PCA technologies for operational use.
+
+PCASS may only be used in accordance with Enclosure 5 of this Instruction.
+b. DoD Components with PCA programs shall:
+(1) Appoint, in writing, officials in the grade of O-5, civilian equivalent, or above to approve requests for polygraph examinations.
+(2) Appoint, in writing, an official of appropriate rank and responsibility to approve requests for PCASS examinations.
+(3) Have appointed officials contact PCA subject matter experts for advice when determining the appropriateness and scope of individual examinations.
+
+(4) Appoint a manager with appropriate technical expertise to provide technical oversight of examiners and the QC process.
+
+(5) Coordinate with NCCA to receive an initial 6-month QA program review after establishing a PCA program.
+
+c. DoD Components shall establish, suspend, or reactivate a PCASS program in accordance with Enclosure 5.
+
+## 2. General Program Procedures
+
+a. Only the DoD Components identified in Enclosure 1 of Reference (d), or subsequently approved by the USD(I&S), may conduct PCA examinations.
+
+b. The DoD Components shall use PCA technologies only for their intended purposes, consistent with authorized missions and standardized practices, and only by those trained in NCCA -approved courses as identified in this Instruction.
+
+c. Certified personnel and interns shall conduct PCA exams after completing NCCA -
+approved training.  Interns shall conduct exams under the supervision of certified personnel.
+
+d. DoD Components without an authorized PCA program may request PCA support through the DoD PCA program manager from one of the organizations listed in Enclosure 1 of Reference (d).
+
+e. Examinee privacy shall be protected in accordance with DoD Instruction 5400.11
+(Reference (g)), DoD 5400.11-R (Reference (h)), and, as appropriate, section 1564a of title 10, U.S.C. (Reference (f)).
+
+f. Polygraph and PCASS examinations require the consent of the examinee.  The examinee may withdraw consent and terminate the examination at any time during any phase of the examination.  Polygraph examinations require consent in writing in accordance with subparagraph 4.a.(1) of Enclosure 4.
+
+g. PCA examinations are a supplement to, not a substitute for, other methods of screening or investigation.  No unfavorable administrative action (to include access, employment, assignment, and detail determinations) shall be taken solely on the basis of either a refusal to undergo a PSS examination or an unresolved PSS examination, except as provided in sections 6 and 7 of Enclosure 4.
+
+h. Before a polygraph examination is administered, other investigative activity shall be completed when practical.  This does not apply when the examination is administered as part of a PSS examination.
+
+i. The polygraph is the only authorized PCA technology for screening of U.S. persons.  This does not apply to approved research and testing of PCA technologies.
+
+j. All PCA examinations shall undergo a QC review according to Enclosure 7.  Where operational exigencies preclude an immediate or timely QC review, DoD Components shall conduct the review as soon as practical and provide an official notification of the results to the requestor.
+k. DoD Components shall comply with polygraph countermeasure (CM) detection awareness training requirements and anti-CM procedures in accordance with section 7 of Enclosure 4.
+l. DoD Components authorized to conduct PCA examinations shall write internal PCA
+policies and procedures consistent with Reference (a) and this Instruction.  The policies and procedures shall address:
+
+(1) Approval authorities. (2) Categories and types of authorized examinations.
+(3) Polygraph examiner and/or PCASS operator selection, supervision, certification, and decertification.
+
+(4) Standards for protecting examinee privacy and rights.
+(5) Exam requests and approvals, including procedures for conveying approval to deployed examiners.
+
+(6) Procedures to assess and determine whether an individual is medically, psychologically, and emotionally fit to undergo an examination.
+
+(7) Exam refusals, terminations, and uncooperative examinees. (8) Unresolved examinations. (9) CM awareness, detection, counter-CM, and anti-CM. (10) Investigative referrals. (11) QC and oversight. (12) Records maintenance.
+
+## 3. Non-Duty Employment And Public Demonstrations
+
+a. DoD polygraph examiners and PCASS operators shall neither perform examinations nor participate in PCA-related activities in connection with non-duty employment.  DoD
+Components authorized to conduct PCA examinations may grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis, when there is no conflict of interest.  The provisions of this paragraph do not apply to polygraph examiners and PCASS operators of the Reserve Components, except while they are on military duty.
+
+b. Subject to DoD Component approval, certified polygraph examiners and PCASS
+operators may participate in public demonstrations of PCA equipment outside the Department of Defense, inclusive of State, local, and foreign governments where appropriate, and when the demonstration:
+
+(1) Is of the instrument's basic capabilities. (2) Is a mock test that does not include an attempt to interpret a test result. (3) Does not make unfounded claims of application or reliability.
+4. NCCA.  NCCA shall:
+a. Research and evaluate polygraph, PCASS, and other potential PCA technologies, techniques, and procedures.
+
+b. Provide an annual PCA RDT&E report to the DUSD(I&S) and the Heads of the DoD
+Components.
+
+c. Recommend operational use of new PCA technology after the accuracy is supported by validated independent research, field testing, and lessons learned.
+d. Conduct QA inspections of DoD PCA programs through the Quality Assurance Program
+(QAP).
+
+e. Develop, provide, or approve PCA training, continuing education, and examination procedures.
+
+f. Assist the DoD Components in developing procedures and internal controls to implement PCASS programs.
+
+g. Incorporate PCASS program reviews into the QA inspection schedule.  Conduct a PCASS
+program review within 6 months after a DoD Component establishes a PCASS program and conduct biennial oversight inspections thereafter.
+
+h. Provide status reports and updates regarding QA inspection findings and non-compliance of DoD Components through the Director, DIA, to the DUSD(I&S).
+
+i. Research and assist in the validation of PCA techniques, instrumentation, and technologies before recommending operational deployment.
+
+j. Conduct polygraph CM research and anti-CM training to identify polygraph CM trends and signatures.  Investigate procedures, techniques, and technology to develop anti-CM and counter-CM to improve the effectiveness of polygraph training.
+
+k. Provide PCA threat analysis and strategic support to CI and human intelligence
+(HUMINT) activities as directed by DIA.
+
+l. Provide PCA education and technical assistance to State and local agencies as permitted by the DoD mission in accordance with Reference (f).
+
+## Enclosure 4 Polygraph Examinations
+
+1. TYPES AND AUTHORIZED USES OF THE POLYGRAPH.  This enclosure applies only to polygraph examinations.  The Table reflects the two major types of polygraph examinations, issue-based and PSS, and typical categories for each.
+
+| Issue-Based Examinations                              | Narrowly focused on specific issues or allegations:    |
+|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
+| - Criminal investigations                             |                                                        |
+| - CI investigations and operations                    |                                                        |
+| - Counterterrorism (CT) investigations and operations |                                                        |
+| - Personnel security investigations (PSI)             |                                                        |
+| - Foreign intelligence operations                     |                                                        |
+| - Asset validation (source testing)                   |                                                        |
+| - Exculpation of alleged wrongdoing, fault, or guilt  |                                                        |
+| PSS - 2 types:                                        | Not predicated on a specific issue or allegation:      |
+| - CSP examinations                                    | - Designated intelligence positions                    |
+| - ESS examinations                                    | - SAP                                                  |
+| - Adjudicative resolution of foreign relationships    |                                                        |
+| - Accelerated sensitive compartmented information     |                                                        |
+| (SCI) access                                          |                                                        |
+| - Classified access for foreign nationals             |                                                        |
+
+a. Issue-Based Examinations.  Issue-based polygraph examinations are predicated upon an allegation or a specific issue under investigation.  They may also include examinations to vet sources or verify specific information.  The following categories of examinations are typical:
+(1) Criminal Investigations.  Authorized in a criminal investigation when:
+(a) The crime involves an offense punishable pursuant to Federal law, including Chapter 47 of Reference (i) (also known and hereafter referred to as "The Uniform Code of Military Justice" (UCMJ)), by confinement for a term of 1 year or more.
+
+(b) The person being considered for examination has been interviewed and there is reasonable belief that the person has knowledge of or was involved in the matter under investigation.
+(c) Investigation by other means has been as thorough as circumstances permit.
+
+(d) The development of information by means of a polygraph examination is essential to the conduct of the investigation.
+
+(2) CI Investigations.  Authorized in a CI investigation when:
+(a) There is a suspected unauthorized disclosure of defense information, national intelligence, or indications of treason, spying, espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism.
+
+(b) The person being considered for examination has been interviewed and there is reasonable belief that the person has knowledge of or was involved in the matter under investigation.
+
+(c) Investigation by other means has been as thorough as circumstances permit. (d) The development of information by means of a polygraph examination is essential to the conduct of the investigation.
+
+(3) PSI.  Authorized to resolve credible derogatory information developed in connection with a PSI or to aid in the related adjudication.
+
+(4) Foreign Intelligence and CI Operations.  Authorized to determine the suitability, reliability, or credibility of persons who are used as, proposed for use as, or who purport to be agents, sources, or operatives in a foreign intelligence or CI activity.
+
+(5) Exculpation of Alleged Wrongdoing, Fault, or Guilt.  When requested by the subject of a criminal or CI investigation and when the examination is essential to a just and equitable resolution of a serious allegation.
+
+b. PSS Examinations.  PSS examinations are used to assist in determining an individual's eligibility for sensitive duties or positions as established by the Heads of the DoD Components to cover detailees and incumbent employees in designated positions.
+(1) The relevant question areas for the two types of PSS examinations, CSP and ESS, are identified in section 3 of this enclosure.
+
+(2) PSS examination shall be limited to the CSP question areas listed in section 3 of this enclosure.
+
+(3) The USD(I&S), as the oversight authority PCA programs within the Department of Defense, must approve the use of ESS examinations in accordance with section 1564a of Reference (f) and subparagraph 1.c.(2) of this enclosure.
+(4) In accordance with Executive Order 13467 (Reference (j)), DoD Components shall ensure reciprocal recognition of PSS examinations, consistent with any additional guidance from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on reciprocity for personnel mobility within the intelligence community (IC) or relevant question areas for PSS examinations.
+
+(5) When a PSS examination is required for assignment or detail of DoD personnel
+(military or civilian) to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), other intelligence community element, or other Federal agency, the scope of the PSS examination shall be limited to CI-scope topics.
+
+## C. Ess Examinations
+
+(1) ESS examinations to support the comprehensive evaluation of employee fitness and eligibility for access to classified information, or unescorted access to controlled spaces where sensitive cryptologic information is produced, processed, or stored, shall be in accordance with section 1564a of Reference (f).
+
+(2) The USD(I&S) approves other exceptions to conduct ESS examinations.  The exception shall be limited to circumstances where additional requirements are necessary to address significant needs unique to the DoD Component or to protect national security. Accordingly, where appropriate and in accordance with the criteria specified in section 1564a of Reference (f) and Reference (j), and consistent with guidance from the DNI, DoD Components may request approval to administer ESS examinations for designated applicant or contractor positions that merit additional scrutiny beyond CSP.  The request shall provide the:
+
+(a) Categories of personnel asked to undergo the ESS examination during the PSS. (b) Perceived value of employing the ESS examination over the CSP examination.
+(c) Adjudicative standards and predicted rates of non-selection based on ESS
+examinations.
+
+d. CSP Examinations.  In accordance with section 1564a of Reference (f), the Head of a DoD Component may require persons to take a CSP examination to assist in determining initial eligibility, and periodically thereafter, on a random basis, for continued eligibility for access to information, or for employment or assignment or detail decisions that are contingent on such access.  CSP examinations may be used to determine eligibility for access to:
+(1) Top Secret Information.  The Head of a DoD Component may require CSP
+examinations for persons who occupy designated positions that involve the creation, use, or handling of Top Secret information.
+(2) SAP Information.  The Head of a DoD Component may require CSP examinations for persons who occupy designated positions that involve the creation, use, or handling of classified information protected under a SAP program.
+
+(3) Sensitive Intelligence or Operational Activities.  The Head of a DoD Component may require CSP examinations for persons who occupy designated positions that involve the creation, use, or handling of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence or operational activities.  Prior to initiating such a requirement, the Head of the DoD Component shall make a determination that unauthorized disclosure of the information in question could reasonably be expected to:
+(a) Jeopardize human life or safety.
+
+(b) Result in the loss of unique or uniquely productive intelligence sources or methods vital to U.S. security.
+
+(c) Compromise technologies, operational plans, or security procedures vital to the strategic advantage of the United States and its allies.
+
+(4) Classified Information By Foreign Nationals.  Used to determine the eligibility of foreign nationals to gain and continue access to specific classified information in accordance with DoD Manual 5200.01 (Reference (k)).
+
+(5) SCI Information Through An Accelerated Process.  Authorized for exceptional cases when operational exigencies require an individual's immediate use before completing the individual's PSI.  The following conditions shall apply:
+(a) The examination is necessary for national interests to expedite the individual's access.
+
+(b) The examinee has undergone a security interview and officials have completed all records checks according to DoD Manual 5200.02 (Reference (l)) and no derogatory information was discovered.
+
+(c) The individual's organization has initiated a single-scope background investigation.
+
+(d) The examination is limited to the CSP topics listed in section 3 of this enclosure, except when the USD(I&S) has approved the ESS examination.
+
+(e) The individual has agreed to undergo the CSP examination to expedite accelerated SCI access.
+
+## E. Examinations Conducted Outside The Department Of Defense
+
+(1) Polygraph support to non-DoD organizations shall be reported to the DoD PCA
+program manager.
+
+(2) DoD polygraph examiners shall not conduct polygraph examinations outside of their DoD employment except as noted in section 3 of Enclosure 3.
+
+2. PSS PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES.  The Heads of DoD Components approved to conduct PSS examinations or establish PSS programs to screen designated personnel shall establish written procedures to:
+a. Designate positions and specific duties that may subject employees to an initial PSS
+examination, periodic PSS examinations, and random selection for PSS examinations as conditions of access.
+
+b. Conduct objective QC reviews of all PSS examinations.
+c. Provide post-exam surveys to obtain feedback from personnel who undergo a PSS
+examination.
+
+d. Establish reasonable time limits on individual PSS examination sessions, including the number of test series within a single test session and extended test sessions.
+
+e. Submit investigative and security referrals of admissions or reportable information.
+f. Establish thresholds and an evaluation process for reporting non-relevant information or spontaneous admissions of a serious criminal nature to appropriate authorities.
+g. Adjudicate refusals, terminated exams, and unresolved exams (including those in which the examinee was deemed uncooperative during the examination process).
+
+h. Exempt or postpone examinations when individuals are considered medically, psychologically, or emotionally unfit to undergo an examination.
+
+i. Record PSS examinations by audio or video means.
+j. Enter PSS examinations into the Joint Personnel Adjudication System, a CI information system, or other appropriate DoD databases.
+
+k. Develop the scope of the relevant question areas for PSS examinations and polygraph policies consistent with this Instruction, or guidance from the DNI in accordance with section 435b of title 50, U.S.C. (Reference (m)).
+
+## 3. Csp And Ess Examination Questions
+
+a. CSP Questions.  When the scope of a polygraph examination is limited to CSP coverage, relevant questions shall address the topical areas in subparagraphs 3.a.(1) through 3.a.(5) of this enclosure.  The relevant CI questions may be modified to isolate or resolve any of the following relevant topic areas.
+
+(1) Involvement with a Foreign Intelligence and Security Service (FISS) and/or Spying or Espionage Activities Against the United States.  Scoping will include whether the examinee has had unauthorized involvement with a FISS or has engaged in spying or espionage; has knowledge of anyone engaged in spying or espionage; has ever been approached, trained, or tasked to engage in spying or espionage; or has failed to report anyone engaged in spying or espionage against the United States.
+
+(2) Involvement in Terrorism Against the United States.  Scoping will include whether the examinee has had any involvement in acts of violence for political purposes; has supported acts of terrorism in any way; knows of anyone involved in or planning acts of terrorism against the United States; has ever been approached, trained, or tasked to commit acts of terrorism against the United States; or has failed to report anyone engaged in terrorism against the United States.
+
+(3) Involvement in Sabotage Against the United States.  Scoping will include whether the examinee has ever damaged or destroyed any U.S. Government information or defense system.  Specifically included in this scoping is whether the examinee has deliberately placed malware in or otherwise manipulated a Government computer system without proper authorization.
+
+(4) Mishandling of Classified Information.  Scoping will include whether the examinee has deliberately removed classified material or information from approved facilities without proper authorization, has deliberately provided classified information or material to any unauthorized person, or has stored classified information or material outside of approved Government facilities.
+
+(5) Unauthorized Foreign Contacts.  Scoping will include unreported contact with foreign nationals in accordance with individual DoD Component reporting requirements and secret, hidden, or covert contact with any foreign government representative.  It is appropriate in pretest discussion to develop the nature of any foreign contact to determine the appropriate scope and wording.
+
+b. ESS Questions.  The ESS polygraph examination includes the CSP questions in paragraph
+3.a. of this enclosure and the following question areas:
+
+(1) Falsification of security questionnaires and forms. (2) Involvement in serious criminal conduct. (3) Illegal drug involvement.
+4. CONDUCT OF A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION.  A polygraph examination normally includes the following procedures:
+a. Pretest.  Before collecting physiological data during a polygraph examination, the polygraph examiner shall:
+(1) Obtain consent from the examinee.  Written consent is required for all polygraph examinations, except for foreign national screening, HUMINT operations, and CI operations.
+(2) Interview the examinee, collect basic data, and assess the examinee's suitability and condition to undergo an examination.  During the interview, the examiner shall inform the examinee:
+(a) Of the characteristics and nature of the polygraph instrument and examination, including explaining the operation of the instrument and the procedures during the examination.
+(b) Whether the examination will be observed or recorded through a two-way mirror, camera, video, voice recording, or other devices.
+
+(c) Of the examinee's privilege against self-incrimination as provided by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution or, if the person to be examined is a Military Service member, in accordance with the UCMJ, when required by law.
+
+(d) Of the examinee's right to consult with legal counsel and that legal counsel may be available for consultation, as required by law.
+(e) That the examinee may, upon his or her volition or at the advice of counsel, terminate the examination at any time.
+
+(3) Thoroughly explain and review all test questions prior to the collection of test charts. (4) Ensure that polygraph examination questions have relevance to the matter at issue, except for technical questions necessary to the polygraph test format and methodology. Technical questions shall be constructed to avoid those that are embarrassing, degrading, or unnecessarily intrusive.
+(5) Ensure that, when using an interpreter during an examination, the technical report shall list the examination questions with their English translation.
+
+b. Data Collection.  When collecting physiological data during a polygraph examination, the polygraph examiner shall:
+(1) Use data collection procedures in accordance with NCCA curriculum and this Instruction.
+
+(2) Submit all physiological data recorded during the polygraph examination for QC
+review.
+
+(3) Ask the relevant questions an appropriate number of times, consistent with the NCCA curriculum associated with that particular polygraph questioning format to render a decision.
+c. Test Data Analysis.  When analyzing the data collected during a polygraph examination, the polygraph examiner shall:
+(1) Conduct test data analysis procedures only in accordance with NCCA curriculum for the specific questioning formats and test methodologies used for technical evaluation of physiological responses.
+
+(2) Render only the following technical opinions for a specific test series, or as an overall examination result:
+
+(a) No Deception Indicated (NDI). (b) Deception Indicated (DI). (c) No Opinion (NO). (d) No Significant Response (NSR). (e) Significant Response (SR).
+(3) These technical opinions may also reflect any relevant admissions made during the examination.  For example, NDI, following a pre-test admission, is a more descriptive technical description of the overall examination result.
+d. Post-Test.  After collection and analysis of the test data, the polygraph examiner shall:
+(1) Interview the examinee regarding unresolved questions.  This interview begins immediately following the analysis of the test data for that test series.
+
+(2) If the follow-up interview does not reflect progress toward resolution, the examiner should discontinue additional testing unless there is a reasonable expectation that further testing will result in progress toward resolution of the relevant issues.
+
+(3) The examiner's organization shall refer refusals and unresolved polygraph examinations to the appropriate authority in accordance with DoD Component internal procedures.  The polygraph results may be used as an investigative lead.
+
+(4) When CI, law enforcement (LE), or security information is developed during the course of a polygraph examination, the information shall be reported to the appropriate organization.
+
+## 5. Polygraph Limitations
+
+a. A polygraph examiner shall not administer an examination for reasons other than those given to the examinee.
+
+b. An issue-based polygraph examination shall not be conducted before the examinee has been previously interviewed and given the opportunity to address the relevant issues.  The examinee should not be subjected to prolonged interrogation immediately prior to the polygraph.
+
+c. Questions probing a person's religious, racial, or political beliefs and lawful affiliations that are not related directly to the investigation are prohibited.
+d. The polygraph examiner's field analysis of polygraph data does not constitute an official result.  The result is official only after the QC authority examines the data and renders a final opinion.
+
+6. REFUSAL TO TAKE OR COMPLETE A PSS.  DoD-affiliated personnel who refuse to take or complete a polygraph examination, and are in positions designated as requiring a PSS polygraph examination as part of determining initial eligibility for access to Top Secret, SAP, or other sensitive intelligence or operational information or for initial assignment or detail to the CIA or other IC elements, may be denied access, assignment, or detail. 7. FAILURE TO RESOLVE A PSS.  DoD-affiliated personnel in positions cited in section 6 of this enclosure who are unable to resolve all relevant questions of a PSS shall be so advised.  The results of the examination shall be forwarded to the requesting agency.
+
+a. If, after reviewing the examination results, the requesting agency determines that they raise a significant question relevant to the individual's eligibility for a security clearance or continued access, the individual shall be given an opportunity to undergo additional examination.
+
+b. If the additional examination fails to resolve all relevant questions, the Head of the DoD
+Component may initiate a CI investigation in accordance with DoD policy.
+
+c. Additionally, the Head of the relevant DoD Component may temporarily suspend an individual's access to controlled information and deny the individual assignment or detail that is contingent on such access, based upon a written finding that, considering the results of the examination and the extreme sensitivity of the classified information involved, access under the circumstances poses an unacceptable risk to the national security.  Such temporary suspension of access may not form the part of any basis for an adverse administrative action or an adverse personnel action.
+
+d. The individual shall be advised in writing of the determination, that the determination may be appealed to the Head of the relevant DoD Component, and that his or her final determination is conclusive.
+
+## 8. Appeals
+
+a. Examinees shall file appeals within 30 days of notification by the determining authority.
+
+b. Copies of the determination as well as the determining authority's notification to the subject may be retained only in the immediate office of the determining authority and in the security office of the DoD Component responsible for controlling access to the information in question.
+
+## 9. Polygraph Cm Awareness And Anti-Cm Procedures A. Ncca Training Requirements, Cm Awareness, And Reporting Procedures
+
+(1) NCCA shall:
+(a) Conduct polygraph CM research to identify CM trends and CM signatures. (b) Aggressively pursue CM lessons learned and investigate procedures, techniques, and technology to develop anti-CM and counter-CM to improve the effectiveness of polygraph examiner training.
+
+(2) Initial polygraph instruction at NCCA shall include a minimum of 14 hours of polygraph CM awareness and CM detection training.
+(a) Within 2 years of graduation from initial polygraph training, examiners shall attend a comprehensive 40-hour polygraph CM awareness and CM detection course sponsored by NCCA.
+(b) Thereafter, examiners shall attend a minimum of 4 hours of NCCA -approved refresher CM awareness and CM detection instruction every 2 years.
+
+(3) DoD polygraph programs shall incorporate anti-CM advisements into pretest procedures.
+
+(4) All polygraph examinations shall include the use of a movement sensor device.
+
+## B. Reporting Cm
+
+(1) Confirmed polygraph CM cases shall be forwarded to NCCA for ongoing CM
+awareness and detection training and research.
+(2) NCCA may assist the Department of Defense and participating Federal PCA
+programs in analyzing cases where polygraph CM are suspected through technical means, such as a movement sensor, or observation of significantly-timed, recurring patterns that have a signature pattern in the physiological data associated with known polygraph CM.
+
+(3) Examinations with suspected, persistent, or confirmed CM efforts may be referred to the appropriate CI investigative authority.
+
+## Enclosure 5 Pcass Examinations 1. Application And Restrictions
+
+a. The PCASS shall only be used as a field-expedient tool to screen persons of interest for intelligence and security purposes.
+
+b. PCASS instruments, techniques, procedures, and certification shall be employed and administered only as prescribed by the Director, DIA, and this Instruction.
+
+c. PCASS examination results shall not be the sole means to validate information of intelligence value.
+
+d. The PCASS shall not be used to test U.S. persons.  This does not apply to PCASS
+examinations conducted for training purposes.
+
+e. PCASS software shall not be modified, copied, or transferred to a non-PCASS system.
+
+## 2. Requirements For Establishing A Pcass Program.  When Establishing A Pcass Program, The Dod Components Shall:
+
+a. Coordinate with NCCA to develop comprehensive written procedures for effective management and oversight.
+
+b. Before PCASS program implementation, appoint a PCASS manager to coordinate and deconflict DoD Component PCASS activities; participate in PCASS committees and working groups; and facilitate PCASS data collection in support of ongoing research and validation efforts.
+
+c. Delegate in writing, to appropriate officials, the authority to approve PCASS examinations in accordance with Enclosure 3.
+
+d. Establish adequate record-keeping procedures in accordance with standards established by the Director, DIA.
+
+e. Establish procedures for accountability of PCASS-related equipment. f. In coordination with NCCA, establish procedures and processes to monitor the training and certification of PCASS operators and supervisors.
+
+g. Within 6 months of establishing a PCASS program and at least biennially thereafter, coordinate with NCCA to receive a QAP program review.
+
+3. SUSPENSION AND REACTIVATION OF A PCASS PROGRAM.  Upon the completion of a deployment, or the temporary or indefinite cessation of operational PCASS requirements, an organization under the authority of a DoD Component shall:
+
+a. Notify NCCA of the suspension of a PCASS operator or PCASS program.
+b. Officially record the temporary suspension or cessation of the PCASS program, including notifying all affected PCASS operators of their inactive status.
+
+c. Prepare a comprehensive report on all PCASS exams conducted, and ensure the full transfer of all exam data and records to the organization's parent DoD Component or other appropriately designated organization.
+
+d. Safeguard or transfer all PCASS equipment and software to prevent the unauthorized use of the systems, except as necessary for training of PCASS operators, when re-deployment and reactivation of the organization's PCASS program is confirmed.
+
+e. Ensure the responsibilities for any outstanding PCASS program inspection requirements, in accordance with Enclosure 7, may be effectively satisfied.
+
+f. Coordinate with the NCCA to gain approval of an adequate refresher training program to re-activate a PCASS program that has been suspended for 1 year or more.
+
+## 4. Pcass Procedures
+
+a. Only certified personnel may conduct PCASS examinations.
+b. Every PCASS examination must employ a NCCA -approved protocol for conducting the test, in accordance guidelines from NCCA or DIA.
+
+c. The PCASS operator must obtain the examinee's voluntary consent before conducting an examination.
+
+d. The PCASS operator shall prepare an examination report for each PCASS examination conducted.
+
+e. All PCASS examinations and the corresponding report shall undergo a supervisory QC
+review.
+
+## Enclosure 6 Selection And Training Of Polygraph Examiners And Pcass Operators
+
+1. GENERAL.  NCCA shall:
+
+a. Establish training standards for polygraph examiners and PCASS operators.
+b. Establish and manage training programs for polygraph examiners and PCASS operators.
+c. Approve non- NCCA PCA training and PCA-related continuing education credit for certification purposes.
+
+## 2. Selection Of Polygraph Examiners And Pcass Operators
+
+a. Polygraph Examiners.  A DoD polygraph examiner shall be:
+
+(1) A U.S. citizen. (2) At least 25 years old.  The Director, DIA, may grant a waiver to this requirement.
+(3) A person who has at least 2 years of investigative experience.  The Director, DIA, may grant a waiver to this requirement.
+
+(4) Eligible for a Top Secret clearance. (5) Interviewed and judged suitable for the position. (6) A person who has successfully completed a CSP examination.
+b. PCASS Operators.  The DoD Components shall coordinate with NCCA to establish minimum standards for selection of PCASS operators.
+
+## 3. Training And Certification Of Polygraph Examiners And Pcass Operators A. Polygraph Examiners
+
+(1) A polygraph examiner candidate must graduate from the NCCA Psychophysiological Detection of Deception (PDD) training program.
+
+(2) A person certified as a polygraph examiner by a DoD Component or participating Federal agency as of the effective date of this Instruction may continue in that capacity.
+Components may accept the certification status of an examiner transferring from another Federal agency.
+(3) The internship period for a polygraph intern examiner shall begin after completion of the NCCA PDD Program and shall continue for a minimum of 6 months.
+
+(4) During the internship period, the intern shall demonstrate proficiency by conducting at least 25 polygraph examinations under the supervision of a certified DoD polygraph examiner and demonstrate an adequate level of proficiency as determined by the certifying official.
+
+(5) A DoD polygraph examiner shall receive 80 hours of NCCA -approved continuing education every 2 years in accordance with NCCA cycles.  DoD Components who are unable to meet the continuing education requirements because of operational circumstances related to deployments shall coordinate in advance with NCCA to obtain a reasonable extension on the 2-
+year continuing education cycle.
+(6) DoD Components shall require a polygraph examiner to conduct a minimum of 18
+polygraph examinations in each 6-month period to maintain proficiency, and administratively suspend the certification of examiners who are assigned to other duties.
+(a) The DoD Components may exempt from this requirement examiners who instruct, provide QC oversight, or manage examiners.
+
+(b) Polygraph examiners who fail to satisfy proficiency standards or maintain the established continuing education requirements shall have their certificates suspended or revoked.
+
+(c) A DoD Component may reissue a suspended polygraph examiner's certification after refresher training or after the examiner has demonstrated an acceptable standard of proficiency.
+
+(d) DoD Components shall establish recertification procedures for previously certified examiners.  Personnel seeking recertification must have been certified by a DoD Component or participating Federal agency within 10 years of application for recertification or attend the NCCA PDD Program.
+(7) Examiners who demonstrate proficiency at meeting and maintaining qualifications and education requirements shall be certified by their DoD Component.  The certification of an examiner shall be evidenced by the issuance of a DoD Component certificate.
+
+## B. Pcass Operators
+
+(1) PCASS operators shall complete a NCCA -approved course of instruction and be able to properly use the PCASS device and competently execute the appropriate PCASS testing protocols.
+
+(2) Following NCCA -approved training, PCASS certification requires an internship period, under the mentorship of a certified PCASS operator, of at least 25 examinations.  PCASS operators shall serve a probationary period supervised by a certified operator or NCCA instructor.
+(3) At a minimum, the intern's first 10 PCASS examinations require on-site monitoring, followed by real-time audio monitoring of the next 15 examinations.
+
+(4) PCASS operators shall conduct a minimum of 18 PCASS examinations in each 6-
+month period to maintain proficiency, and demonstrate an adequate level of proficiency as determined by the certifying official.
+
+(a) The DoD Components may exempt PCASS operators from this requirement who instruct, provide QC oversight, or manage other operators.
+
+(b) PCASS operators who fail to satisfy proficiency standards or maintain the established continuing education requirements shall have their certificates suspended or revoked.
+
+(c) A DoD Component may reissue a suspended PCASS certification after refresher training or after the operator has demonstrated an acceptable standard of proficiency.
+
+(5) Operators who demonstrate proficiency at meeting and maintaining qualifications and training requirements shall be certified by their DoD Component.  The certification of a PCASS operator shall be evidenced by the issuance of a DoD Component certificate.
+
+## Enclosure 7 Qc And Qa Of Pca Programs 1. Qc.  The Dod Components Shall:
+
+a. Establish QC procedures for their PCA programs that are as centralized as possible, to ensure uniform implementation and timely feedback on examinations.
+
+b. Certify polygraph examiners and PCASS operators to perform duties as QC supervisors for the particular PCA activities within the DoD Component.  Ensure that QC supervisors, within their respective polygraph or PCASS function:
+(1) Exercise technical authority over polygraph examiners or PCASS operators to note procedural deficiencies or, when necessary, direct a re-examination if they do not concur with the examiner's field opinion.
+
+(2) Review reports, technical documents, and charts to ensure examinations are:
+
+(a) Conducted in accordance with standards established by NCCA. (b) Properly constructed with well-formulated questions.
+(c) Properly evaluated at the field level.
+(d) Thoroughly documented with accurate and complete reporting, including translation of the exam questions and other documents prepared by an interpreter.
+
+c. Not permit the field opinion of a polygraph examiner or a PCASS operator to be considered as a final result until the examination has been subjected to a thorough QC review and authenticated.
+
+## 2. Qa
+
+a. NCCA shall maintain QA to inspect DoD PCA programs, and participating Federal PCA
+programs, in accordance with section 5 of Enclosure 2.
+(1) The inspections shall evaluate the ethical, professional, and technical standards in accordance with QA standards established for that PCA technology.
+
+(2) A QA inspection may be expanded only upon a request from the inspected PCA
+program.  The scope of an expanded inspection shall be agreed upon before a QA inspection begins.
+
+(3) PCA inspections involve an on-site inspection of an organization's QC program.  The on-site inspection includes a review of a random sample of PCA examinations.
+
+b. NCCA may provide PCA technical assistance to:
+(1) The DoD Components and other Federal agencies upon request. (2) State and local agencies with the approval of the DoD PCA program manager.
+
+## Enclosure 8 Rdt&E Of Pca Technologies 1. General
+
+a. NCCA is the focal point for RDT&E of PCA methodologies, technologies, and equipment.  The DoD Components shall coordinate their RDT&E proposals and PCA research with NCCA before acquiring experimental PCA equipment.
+
+b. Routine statistics or analysis of the contents of PCA data, including outcomes and trends, do not constitute research for the purposes of this Instruction.
+
+c. PCA RDT&E shall be conducted in accordance with DoD Instruction 3216.02 (Reference
+(n)), DoDD 5000.01 (Reference (o)), DoD Instruction 5000.02 (Reference (p)), DoD Instruction 5000.02T (Reference (q)), and other applicable defense, joint, and Military Service acquisition guidance.
+
+## 2. Pca Studies And Research
+
+a. NCCA shall conduct ongoing evaluations of the validity of PCA technologies and techniques used by the Department of Defense.
+
+b. NCCA shall conduct studies and research on new or developing PCA methodologies, technologies, and equipment.
+
+c. DoD Components shall coordinate their PCA studies and research with NCCA. d. As approved by the Director, DIA, NCCA may collaborate with a vendor to evaluate the vendor's PCA technology.
+
+(1) Where practical, NCCA will seek the vendor's advance agreement regarding the parameters of the evaluation, including the release and dissemination of the findings and observations.
+
+(2) When evaluating a commercial PCA technology, NCCA shall request the vendor provide information supporting research, pertinent reliability, and validation data to establish the scientific basis for the technology.
+
+## 3. Rdt&E Reporting
+
+a. The Director, DIA, shall submit an annual PCA RDT&E report to the DUSD(I&S) and the Heads of the DoD Components by January 31.  The report shall include:
+
+(1) PCA research priorities and NCCA funding objectives. (2) Summaries of completed PCA projects.
+(3) Progress reports on PCA initiatives within the Department of Defense.
+b. DoD Components involved with the conduct of PCA-related research activities shall periodically report the status or results of such activities to NCCA.
+
+4. FIELD TESTING.  The Director, DIA, approves field testing of PCA technologies and/or equipment.  The Director shall consider the following before field testing:
+a. Evidence that the technology or method underwent a scientifically controlled laboratory evaluation and demonstrated validity, reliability, and utility for a specified field application.
+
+b. Specific objectives and parameters regarding the scope and duration of the laboratory and field testing.
+
+c. The method for calculating decision accuracy, validity, and reliability.
+d. Protocols for safety, privacy, and protection of civil liberties, as appropriate.
+e. The research organization's supervision and oversight procedures. f. Plans for follow-up or concurrent scientifically-controlled laboratory evaluation.
+g. Appropriate limitations to ensure operational decisions are not made based on uncorroborated outcomes of PCA examinations during field testing. 5. OPERATIONAL USE.  This section provides conditions that shall be met before operational use of PCA technologies and/or equipment.
+
+a. NCCA shall confirm that the accuracy of the proposed PCA technology and/or equipment is supported by validated independent research, field testing, and lessons learned from the field testing.
+b. After appropriate validation, the Director, DIA, shall request USD(I&S) approval to authorize the operational use of new PCA technologies as an aid to decision making.
+
+c. The USD(I&S) may also require:
+(1) An implementation plan providing a commander's advisement on using the results to aid in decision making, training standards, oversight responsibilities, records maintenance, and other considerations.
+
+(2) Reports from multiple scientific evaluations. (3) After-action reports and consolidated data from field users.
+(4) Accuracy rates, confidence intervals, validity, and reliability within acceptable standards for the application for which they will be used.
+
+## Enclosure 9 Information Requirements 1. Privacy And Information Protection
+
+a. The Department of Defense shall balance the need to collect, maintain, use, or disseminate personal information in discharging its statutory responsibilities against the right of the individual to be protected against unwarranted invasion of privacy in accordance with References (g) and (h).
+
+b. Classified information shall be protected in accordance with Reference (k).
+c. DoD personnel shall not disseminate classified information to another agency without the consent of the originating agency in accordance with Executive Order 12958 (Reference (r)). For the purposes of Reference (r), the Department of Defense is considered one agency.
+
+d. PCA examinations may only be conducted for authorized missions and PCA data used for authorized purposes. 2. POLYGRAPH RECORDS.  DoD Components shall enter polygraph examinations and results into an official record.  Polygraph records are typically divided into two categories, the Report of Examination and the Technical Report.
+
+a. The Report of Examination shall include:
+
+(1) Identity of the examinee and/or case file number. (2) Identity of the polygraph examiner or PCASS operator. (3) Requestor and approval authority for the examination. (4) Type of PCA examination. (5) Relevant questions and PCA results. (6) Name and organization of the reviewers who provided the QC opinion.
+(7) Identity of the interpreter, if used, and translations of the test questions.
+(8) Pretest or post-test admissions if obtained in the PCA examination process. (9) Date and time of the PCA examination.
+b. The technical report shall include:
+(1) Recordings of physiological test data.
+(2) Identity of the examinee and the purpose for which the examination was conducted. (3) Test questions and results, including relevant admissions. (4) Examiner notes and observations. (5) QC observations and instructions.
+(6) If an interpreter is used, the report shall include a translation of test questions.
+3. RETENTION AND DISSEMINATION.   DoD Components authorized to conduct PCA examinations shall collect, use, maintain, and disseminate polygraph records under an appropriate system of record notice (SORN) established in accordance with References (g) and (h) and DoDD 5015.02 (Reference (s)).
+
+a. The organization that conducted the examination shall:
+(1) Provide the customer with the Report of Examination once the QC review is complete.
+
+(2) File the Report of Examination in accordance with the DoD Component's records disposition schedule.
+
+(3) Destroy the non-record Report of Examination within 3 months from the investigation's date of completion.
+
+(4) Retain the Technical Report for a minimum of 35 years in accordance with the Inspector General Report, 05-INTEL-19, (Reference (t)).
+
+b. The customer may retain copies of the Report of Examination as part of an investigative case file or clearance adjudication records in accordance with the required retention policies of these records.
+
+c. Personal data identifying the examinee may be removed before CM cases are provided to NCCA.
+
+d. For reporting purposes, a polygraph examination is considered to have taken place when at least one of the examination phases has been initiated.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+| CI                                                                        | counterintelligence                                 |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
+| CIA                                                                       | Central Intelligence Agency                         |
+| CM                                                                        | countermeasures                                     |
+| CSP                                                                       | counterintelligence-scope polygraph                 |
+| CT                                                                        | counterterrorism                                    |
+| DI                                                                        | deception indicated                                 |
+| DIA                                                                       | Defense Intelligence Agency                         |
+| DNI                                                                       | Director of National Intelligence                   |
+| DoDD                                                                      | DoD directive                                       |
+| DUSD(I&S) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security |                                                     |
+| ESS                                                                       | expanded-scope screening                            |
+| FISS                                                                      | foreign intelligence and security service           |
+| HUMINT                                                                    | human intelligence                                  |
+| IC                                                                        | intelligence community                              |
+| LE                                                                        | law enforcement                                     |
+| NCCA                                                                      | National Center for Credibility Assessment          |
+| NDI                                                                       | no deception indicated                              |
+| NO                                                                        | no opinion                                          |
+| NSA                                                                       | National Security Agency                            |
+| NSR                                                                       | no specific response                                |
+| PCA                                                                       | polygraph and credibility assessment                |
+| PCASS                                                                     | Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System |
+| PDD                                                                       | psychophysiological detection of deception          |
+| PSI                                                                       | personnel security investigation                    |
+| PSS                                                                       | personnel security screening                        |
+| QA                                                                        | quality assurance                                   |
+| QAP                                                                       | Quality Assurance Program                           |
+| QC                                                                        | quality control                                     |
+| RDT&E                                                                     | research, development, testing, and evaluation      |
+| SAP          | special access program                      |
+|--------------|---------------------------------------------|
+| SCI          | sensitive compartmented information         |
+| SR           | specific response                           |
+| U.S.C.       | United States Code                          |
+| USD(I&S)     | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence |
+|              |                                             |
+| and Security |                                             |
+|              |                                             |
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Instruction. anti-CM.  Procedures routinely included in the examination protocol to deter or neutralize CM. certification.  A formal and structured process to ensure that polygraph examiners and PCASS operators meet and maintain all necessary qualifications; receive the required formal instruction, training, and mentorship; and demonstrate technical proficiency to conduct PCA examinations on behalf of their DoD Component. chart.  The electronic display or analog recording of physiological data collected during an examination that is analyzed in the assessment of an individual's truthfulness. CM. Those strategies employed by examinees to affect PCA testing by the intentional application of physical, mental, pharmacological, or behavioral tactics. counter-CM.  Procedures invoked to defeat or confirm the presence of suspected CM. CSP.  A screening polygraph examination that uses relevant questions limited to prescribed CI issues. DI. An unfavorable opinion regarding the outcome of an issue-based polygraph examination based upon test data analysis for at least one relevant question in a completed test series.
+
+ESS.   An examination that includes the questions from a CSP polygraph and questions related to falsification of security forms, involvement with illegal drugs, and criminal activity.  Previously known as full-scope polygraph. field testing.  The data collection and evaluation of PCA technologies under real-world conditions.  Field testing and controlled laboratory testing have different goals, strengths, and limitations, but each contributes essential information to form decisions to grant operational approval.  See also "laboratory testing" and "operational use."
+laboratory testing.  The examination, observation, and evaluation of PCA technologies under controlled conditions.  See also "field testing" and "operational use."
+NDI.  A favorable opinion regarding the outcome of an issue-based polygraph examination based upon test data analysis for all the relevant questions in a completed test series. NO.  An opinion regarding the outcome of a polygraph or PCASS test series, or overall examination result, when there is insufficient physiological data for conclusive test data analysis. For statistical purposes, a case may be considered as a NO when an examinee withdraws consent to undergo testing before physiological data can be obtained. NSR.  A favorable opinion regarding the outcome of a security screening polygraph or PCASS examination based upon test data analysis for all the relevant questions in a completed test series. operational use.  The real-world deployment of PCA technologies or equipment.  See also "field testing" and "laboratory testing." PCA.  The overarching term covering programs, research, training, and procedures that employ technologies to assess an individual's truthfulness with the aid of technical devices that measure physiological data or behavioral activity. PCASS instrument.  A diagnostic instrument used during an interview capable of monitoring, recording, and/or measuring electrodermal and vasomotor activity.  The PCASS instrument uses an algorithm to evaluate the physiological responses recorded by the two components. polygraph examination.  Defined in Reference (a). polygraph instrument.  A diagnostic instrument to measure and record respiration, electrodermal, blood volume, and heart rate responses to verbal or visual stimuli. PSS.  Examinations administered to assist in determining initial eligibility or continued access to sensitive duties or information. QA.  An oversight process conducted by NCCA designed to maintain ethical, professional, and technical standards consistent with this Instruction.
+QC.  A detailed review of individual PCA examinations to ensure each was conducted within standards prescribed by NCCA and this Instruction. relevant question.  A question pertaining directly to the matter for which the examinee is being tested. response.  The physiological change to the applied stimulus. SR.  An unfavorable opinion regarding the outcome of a security screening polygraph or PCASS examination based upon test data analysis for at least one relevant question in a completed test series.
+technical authority.  The ability of a PCA supervisor to require polygraph examiners and/or PCASS operators to correct deficiencies and/or direct additional testing noted in a PCA examination prior to an agency opinion being provided.
+
+technical questions.  All non-relevant test questions asked during the data collection phase of the examination. technical report.  The notes, pretest preparations and forms, question lists, test data analysis materials, QC critiques, comments, and documents the polygraph examiner or PCASS operator uses to prepare the official examination report. test data analysis.  The analysis of the physiological data recorded during the examination.
+
+test series.  One or more charts covering the same test issues to provide sufficient test data analysis to render a decision regarding the examinee's truthfulness. unresolved polygraph examinations.  A point at which physiological test data is insufficient, or a review of the available test data analysis indicates one or more relevant questions areas do not merit a favorable opinion of either NSR or NDI. U. S. persons.   Defined in DoD Manual 5240.01 (Reference (u)).

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+## Department Of Defense Instruction
+
+#
+
+
+NUMBER 5230.27
+November 18, 2016
+Incorporating Change 1, September 15, 2017
+
+USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: Presentation of DoD-Related Scientific and Technical Papers at Meetings
+
+References: See Enclosure 1 1.  PURPOSE.  This instruction:
+a.  Reissues DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5230.27 (Reference (a)) in accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.01 (Reference (b)) and pursuant to section 133 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (c)) to establish policy, assign responsibilities, prescribe procedures, and provide guidance for consideration of national security concerns in the dissemination of scientific and technical information in the possession or under the control of DoD at meetings and conferences. b.  Supports current policies that:
+(1)  Establish procedures for classified meetings and requirements for review of scientific and technical papers.
+
+(2)  Provide guidance for reviewing and presenting papers containing technical data and technology.
+
+(3)  Establish procedures for obtaining DoD advice on independently produced scientific and technical papers.
+
+(4)  Provide criteria for identifying fundamental research activities performed under contract or grant that are excluded from review requirements. 2.  APPLICABILITY.  This instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this instruction as the "DoD Components"). 3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  The presentation of scientific and technical information generated by or for DoD at technical meetings is encouraged and must be consistent with U.S. law and the requirements of national security. b.  Scientific and technical meetings and conferences may be conducted by DoD
+Components, and Component personnel may attend and participate in scientific and technical meetings and conferences that are of demonstrable value to the DoD.  Such activities must be in compliance with section 3-211 of DoD 5500.7-R (Reference (d)). c.  The publication and public presentation of unclassified fundamental DoD research results that are not otherwise restricted is permitted as directed by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) Memorandum (Reference (e)). d.  Information provided at meetings must be released in a manner consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements for protecting the information.  Such requirements include, but are not limited to, protection of classified, controlled unclassified, unclassified export-controlled, proprietary, privacy, and foreign government-provided information. e.  Presenters ensure that the policies and procedures in this instruction are implemented to protect the privacy of individuals in the use and dissemination of personally identifiable information as required by DoDD 5400.11 and DoD 5400.11-R (References (f) and (g)). f.  Electronic copies of sensitive scientific and technical papers are subject to all applicable security requirements specified in DoDI 8500.01E and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6510.01F (References (h) and (i)). g.  DoD employee and contractor papers intended for presentation at scientific and technical meetings and conferences will receive timely reviews.
+
+(1)  If warranted and authorized by contract in the case of contractor employees, limitations will be prescribed on these presentations.
+
+(2)  Dissemination restrictions will only be applied to information requiring protection in the interest of national security or other statutory or regulatory provisions, including but not limited to References (f) and (g), DoDI 5230.24, DoDD 5205.02, DoDI 5200.39, DoDI 2040.02, DoDD 5230.11, Executive Orders 13526 and 13556, and parts 203, 227, and 252 of Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (References (j) through (q)). h.  Release of classified or controlled unclassified DoD information to foreign representatives may be approved when:
+(1)  It promotes U.S. national security and is in accordance with References (m) and (n), and U.S. export control laws and regulations, including section 2778 of Title 22, U.S.C. (also known as the "Arms Export Control Act"); chapter 35 of Title 50, U.S.C. (also known as the "International Emergency Economic Powers Act"); parts 120-130 of Title 22, CFR (also known as "International Traffic in Arms Regulations"); and parts 730-774 of Title 15, CFR (also known as "Export Administration Regulations" (References (r) through (u)).
+
+(2)  Release of information to advance the interests of an international military agreement or understanding in accordance with DoD foreign disclosure policies will be consistent with the scope and terms of the applicable security agreement.
+
+(3)  A foreign disclosure review has been completed before release. i.  The DoD will not interfere with the planning and organizing of meetings sponsored and conducted by non-government organizations.  The type and level of DoD participation in these meetings will be determined based on benefit to DoD provided that the meetings are conducted consistent with U.S. laws and the requirements of national security. 4.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 5.  PROCEDURES.  See Enclosure 3.
+
+6.  RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release**.  This instruction is available on the DoD
+Issuances *Directives Division* Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives .
+http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/ 7.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This instruction is effective November 18, 2016.
+
+Frank Kendall Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities
+
+3.  Procedures Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Instruction 5230.27, "Presentation of DoD-Related Scientific and Technical Papers at
+Meetings," October 6, 1987 (hereby cancelled)
+(b) DoD Directive 5134.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
+Logistics (USD(AT&L))," December 9, 2005, as amended
+(c) Section 133 of Title 10, United States Code, as amended
+(d) DoD 5500.07-R, "Joint Ethics Regulation (JER)," August 30, 1993, as amended
+(e) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum,
+"Fundamental Research," May 24, 20101
+(f)
+DoD Directive 5400.11, "DoD Privacy Program," October 29, 2014
+(g) DoD 5400.11-R, "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 14, 2007 (h) DoD Instruction 8500.01, "Cybersecurity," March 14, 2014
+(i)
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6510.01F, "Information Assurance (IA)
+and Support to Computer Network Defense (CND)," February 9, 2011
+(j)
+DoD Instruction 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents,"
+
+August 23, 2012, as amended
+(k) DoD Manual 5205.02, "DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manual,"
+November 3, 2008
+(l)
+DoD Instruction 5200.39, "Critical Program Information (CPI) Identification and
+Protection within Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation," May 28, 2015
+(m) DoD Instruction 2040.02, "International Transfers of Technology, Articles, and Services,"
+March 27, 2014
+(n) DoD Directive 5230.11, "Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign
+Governments and International Organizations," June 16, 1992
+(o) Executive Order 13526, "Classified National Security Information," December 29, 2009
+(p) Executive Order 13556, "Controlled Unclassified Information," November 4, 2010 (q) Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations
+(r)
+Title 22, section 2778, United States Code (also known as the Arms Export Control Act, as
+amended)
+(s)
+Title 50, chapter 35, United States Code (also known as the International Emergency
+Economic Powers Act, as amended)
+(t)
+Parts 120-130 of Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations (also known as International Traffic
+in Arms Regulations)
+(u) Parts 730-774 of Title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (also known as Export
+Administration Regulations)
+(v) DoD Directive 5400.07, "DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program,"
+
+January 2, 2008
+(w) DoD Manual 5200.01, "DoD Information Security Program," February 24, 2012, as
+amended
+(x) DoD Directive 5230.25, "Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data from Public
+Disclosure," November 6, 1984, as amended
+(y) DoD Instruction 5230.29, "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public
+Release," August 13, 2014
+(z) DoD 5220.22-M, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual," February 28,
+2006, as amended
+(aa) DoD Directive 5230.20, "Visits and Assignments of Foreign Nationals," June 22, 2005
+(ab) DoD Directive 5230.09, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release,"
+
+August 22, 2008, as amended
+(ac) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Memorandum, "Security and Policy Reviews
+of Articles, Manuscripts, Books and Other Media Prior to Public Release," April, 26, 20112
+(ad) Section 209 of Title 18, United States Code
+(ae) Section 2635.807 of Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (af) DoD Instruction 3200.12, "DoD Scientific and Technical Information Program (STIP),"
+August 22, 2013
+(ag) Title 17, United States Code
+(ah) DoD Instruction 5015.02, "DoD Records Management Program," February 24, 2015
+(ai) Office of Management and Budget Memorandum, "Social Media, Web-Based Interactive
+Technologies, and the Paperwork Reduction Act," April 7, 2010
+(aj) DoD Instruction 3200.20, "Scientific and Engineering Integrity," July 26, 2012
+(ak) DoD Instruction 8550.01, "DoD Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities,"
+
+September 11, 2012
+(al) DoD 7000.14-R, "Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations (FMRs),"
+Volumes 1-15, date varies per volume
+(am) National Security Decision Directive 189, "National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific,
+Technical, and Engineering Information," September 21, 19853
+
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  USD(AT&L).  The USD(AT&L) has overall responsibility for the implementation of this instruction and designates an office to:
+a.  Administer and monitor compliance with this instruction.
+
+b.  When necessary, provide technical assistance to DoD Components in determining sufficiency of protection of unclassified technical information for presentation at meetings.
+
+
+c.  On request, provide information and advice regarding controls on unclassified DoD
+information to scientific and engineering societies and professional associations.
+
+
+d.  Develop and distribute guidance to the DoD Components for implementing this instruction. 2.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)).  The USD(P):
+a.  Prepares and issues, as required, policy guidance regarding the export, disclosure, and security controls for information within the scope of this instruction.
+
+b.  Establishes and monitors compliance with policies and procedures for foreign disclosure of classified information at meetings.
+
+3.  DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER (DCMO).  The DCMO:
+a.  Monitors the implementation of provisions of this instruction pertaining to DoDD 5400.07
+(Reference (v)).
+
+b.  Provides such other assistance as may be necessary for compliance with this instruction. 4.  DoD COMPONENT HEADS.  The DoD Component heads:
+a.  Review scientific and technical papers and presentations.
+
+
+b.  Review and approve requests for hosting meetings outside the United States.  Ensure that the meetings comply with the procedures in this instruction. c.  Review and approve requests to attend and participate in meetings hosted by non-U.S.
+
+entities or attended by foreign nationals.
+
+## Enclosure 3 Procedures
+
+ 1.  GENERAL.  Meetings and conferences organized by DoD Components, DoD contractors, scientific and engineering societies, and professional associations can enhance the value of research and development sponsored by the Federal Government.  In such cases, full cooperation of all involved parties will obtain maximum benefits.
+
+a.  Every effort should be made to develop presentations appropriate for delivery to the widest audience consistent with the interests of national security.
+
+
+
+b.  In general, national security concerns related to the disclosure of DoD scientific and technical information at meetings are influenced by two mutually dependent factors:  the sensitivity of the material to be presented and the identity of proposed material recipients.
+
+c.  These considerations and their impact on proposed meetings can be evaluated only through consultation among authors, meeting and conference organizers, and officials responsible for reviewing and authorizing release of DoD information.
+
+d.  The purpose of this consultation is to ascertain which combination of factors will support the most productive exchange of information consistent with U.S. law, Reference (d), and national security requirements.
+
+2.  INFORMATION TO BE PRESENTED.  Possibilities range from completely unclassified publicly releasable through classified information.  Specific types of data, including but not limited to controlled unclassified information, proprietary data, export-controlled technical data and technology, privacy information, and foreign government-provided data have an impact on meeting organization.
+
+a.  Classified and classified export-controlled information may be presented only at meetings organized in accordance with section 16, Enclosure 2, Volume 3 of DoD Manual 5200.01 (Reference (w)).
+
+
+b.  Unclassified export-controlled technical data and technology may be presented only in sessions where recipients are eligible to receive such data as established by DoDD 5230.25 (Reference (x)), consistent with Reference (m) and pursuant to a license, exception, exemption or other export authorization in accordance with U.S. export control laws and regulations (e.g., References (r), (s), (t), and (u)).
+
+
+c.  Presentation of proprietary information, privacy data, and foreign government information requires an approval in writing by the cognizant party controlling that information.
+
+3.  LOCATION OF MEETINGS AND ACCESS CONTROLS.  Location of and access to meetings are dependent on the type of material presented.
+
+a.  Papers that have been appropriately reviewed and cleared for public release in accordance with DoDI 5230.29 (Reference (y)) may be presented at any location and before any audience.
+
+b.  Criteria established in Reference (x) for releasing unclassified documents containing unclassified export-controlled technical data and technology are also applicable to presentations containing such data.  Unclassified export-controlled technical data and technology may be released to:
+
+(1)  U.S. and Canadian government officials, with the understanding that the information is to be used for official government purposes only.  Technical data and technology that falls outside the exemptions for export to Canada in U.S. export regulations may not be transferred without a valid license, exception, exemption, or other export authorization in accordance with U.S. export control laws and regulations (e.g., References (r), (s), (t), and (u)).
+
+
+(2)  U.S. and Canadian citizens and resident aliens when disclosure is subject to the terms of a current DD Form 2345, "Militarily Critical Technical Data Agreement."
+
+(3)  Foreign nationals and U.S. citizens acting as representatives of foreign interests where disclosure is made pursuant to a license, exception, exemption, or other export authorization in accordance with U.S. export control laws and regulations (e.g., References (r),
+(s), (t), and (u)).
+
+
+
+c.  Non-government organizations that organize meetings in the United States at which unclassified export-controlled technical data and technology are to be presented must ensure compliance with the requirements of References (t), (u), and (x).  Physical access to the presentations must be limited to those eligible to receive such data, as described in paragraph 3b of this enclosure.
+
+d.  Meetings sponsored by a U.S. Government (USG) agency at which unclassified exportcontrolled technical data and technology are to be presented may be held in any location in the United States.  Control of physical access to the sessions will be provided by a USG employee or a representative agent specifically tasked by DoD for that duty.  Access will be limited to those eligible for export-controlled information.
+
+e.  Pursuant to section 125.4 and other relevant requirements of Reference (t), or in accordance with relevant exceptions in the Reference (u), presentation of unclassified exportcontrolled technical data and technology, in meetings held outside the United States may be permitted on a case-by-case basis after review by officials authorized to do so by the USD(AT&L), through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, or DoD Component heads.
+
+
+f.  Private or professional organizations may be unwilling or unable to provide required access controls to presentations of DoD-related scientific and technical papers.  In such cases, DoD Components may conduct controlled access meetings that correlate in location and topic.
+
+
+g.  Classified information may be presented only at meetings held in a secure government or cleared contractor facility, unless a waiver has been granted in accordance with Volume 3 of Reference (w).  Personnel access controls for classified meetings are also specified in Volume 3
+of Reference (w).
+
+4.  FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVE ACCESS TO MEETINGS
+a.  For classified meetings sponsored by DoD and conducted at a contractor facility, guidelines for foreign participation are established in Reference (n), DoD 5220.22-M, and DoDD
+5230.20 (References (z) and (aa)).  Guidelines for the reporting of foreign participation in classified meetings are contained in Volume 3 of Reference (w).
+
+b.  For unclassified meetings sponsored and conducted by organizations other than DoD, the sole responsibility of determining whether foreign access is appropriate rests with the DoD sponsor.  The level and type of DoD participation in the meeting will take into account the presence of foreign nationals, if any.
+
+c.  In order to advance the interests of an international military agreement or project arrangement, DoD may approve the release of unclassified USG information, with the approval of the originating agency, to foreign representatives at unclassified, restricted-access meetings sponsored and conducted by non-government societies and associations.
+
+
+(1)  Release in such cases by DoD will be pursuant to a license, exception, exemption, or other export authorization in accordance with U.S. export control laws and regulations (e.g., References (r), (s), (t), and (u)).
+
+
+(2)  DoD sponsorship is for the sole purpose of granting access to DoD-sponsored technical information.
+
+
+(3)  When societies or associations agree to DoD sponsorship of foreign attendance under these circumstances, the visit request procedures established in Reference (aa) must be used to obtain and process requests from foreign representatives for sponsorship, and to inform the requester and the meeting sponsor of the decision to release the information and conditions pertaining to such release.
+
+5.  SUBMITTING PRESENTATIONS FOR REVIEW
+a.  All current DoD personnel, including those from DoD laboratories, must ensure that proposed presentations are reviewed for dissemination restrictions described in paragraph 3g(2) above the signature of this instruction by a competent authority and marked in accordance with Volumes 1 and 4 of Reference (w).  DoD contractors are required to submit proposed presentations for review if that is a specific contractual requirement.
+
+b.  Authors of works that include scientific and technical information generated by or for DoD are advised to consult section 4 above the signature of DoDD 5230.09 (Reference (ab)), Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Memorandum (Reference (ac)), and the provisions of section 8 of this enclosure.
+
+6.  CLEARANCE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.  A review of all DoD information for public release is required by Reference (ab).  Papers resulting from unclassified fundamental research are exempt from prepublication controls and this review requirement, except as required, by applicable Federal statutes, regulations, or Executive orders.
+
+
+
+a.  Proposed papers and presentations will be reviewed to:
+
+
+
+(1)  Determine what information, if any, in the submitted paper and abstract is:
+
+(a)  Subject to security classification. (b)  Subject to withholding from public disclosure in accordance with Reference (x). (c)  Otherwise restricted by statute, regulation, or DoD policy.
+
+(2)  Recommend specific changes, if any, to allow the paper to be presented.
+
+(3)  Indicate on the document its releasability in original and amended versions.
+
+
+(4)  Provide information on appeal procedures to be followed if requested clearance is denied.
+
+b.  Reviews will be completed as speedily as possible after receipt of the document by an appropriate public clearance authority.  If a review cannot be completed in a timely manner, an explanation will be provided.  Every effort will be made to complete the review within the timeline indicated in Reference (y).
+
+7.  HONORARIUMS.  Pursuant to section 209 of Title 18, U.S.C. and section 2635.807 of Title 5, CFR (References (ad) and (ae)) and Reference (d), military and civilian employees cannot accept an honorarium of any kind if they are acting in their official capacity.  Speakers offered an honorarium must consult with legal counsel.
+
+8.  VOLUNTARY SUBMISSIONS
+a.  Authors or organizations not subject to mandatory reviews may submit their papers to DoD activities to obtain advice on national security concerns.  Resources permitting, DoD public release activities will arrange review of the papers or presentations and inform the author that DoD:
+
+(1)  Has no objection to public presentation; or
+
+(2)  Advises presentation in a public forum would not be in the interest of national security, and provide appropriate reasons for the determination.
+
+b.  The determination in paragraph 8a(2) of this enclosure does not legally bar presentation.
+It is an advisory statement that, for the presentation concerned, DoD is not providing an approval for public release.
+
+c.  A "no objection to public presentation" in paragraph 8.a.(1) of this enclosure satisfies the requirements for government review pursuant to Reference (y).  The determination in paragraph 8a(2) of this enclosure does not preclude recourse by the author through normal Department of State export license procedures.
+
+9.  SUBMISSION PROCEDURES
+a.  Authors must submit the full text or abstract of a paper for review before submitting it to meeting or conference organizers.  Abstract clearance does not satisfy any requirement for clearance of the full paper.  Requests for review will identify the meeting or conference sponsors, site, and access restrictions specified by the session organizers, and will state whether the paper is for presentation at a session that is to be unclassified with unlimited access, unclassified with limited access, or classified.  Level of classification and access restrictions will be specified, where appropriate.
+
+b.  Papers will be submitted for public or foreign disclosure clearance in sufficient time to allow DoD to meet the review targets in enclosure 3 of Reference (y).  This includes submitting far enough in advance to allow adequate time for the presentation to reach the appropriate review authority and be reviewed.  Presentation notes will be reviewed if provided; otherwise only the presentation slides will be reviewed for public release.
+
+c.  When submitting the full text of the paper or presentation to the meeting or conference program committee, authors should state that their papers or presentations have been approved for presentation at the meeting and specify the security level and degree of access control required.  When submitting abstracts that have been cleared for release, authors should indicate when and what kind of approval is expected on the paper or presentation in its final form.
+
+
+d.  In accordance with DoDI 3200.12 (Reference (af)), electronic copies of proceedings or reprints of papers sponsored by DoD for all scientific and technical meetings will be provided for secondary distribution to:
+Defense Technical Information Center Attn:  Information Collection Division
+8725 John J. Kingman Road Fort Belvoir, VA  22060-6218
+
+http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/submit/
+10.  PUBLICATION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PAPERS.  Conference and journal publications require consideration of whether or not copyright protection subsists in the work because publishers protect their publications and often require the transfer of copyright from the authors.
+
+a.  Pursuant to section 105 of Title 17, U.S.C. (Reference (ag)), copyright protection is not available for any USG work in the United States.
+
+b.  A USG work may be submitted for publication with the following notice:  "This material is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States."
+c.  If the work to be published is a joint work (i.e., a work that was prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole), a non-government employee author (e.g., a contractor author) owning the copyright in the joint work may be requested to license or assign the copyright to the publisher.  A USG author has no copyright in the work to transfer.
+
+11.  SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION USING INTERNET-BASED CAPABILITIES
+a.  Internet-based capabilities include publicly accessible information capabilities and applications available across the Internet in locations not owned, operated, or controlled by DoD
+or the Federal Government.  They include collaborative tools, such as social networking services, social media, user-generated content, social software, web-based e-mail, instant messaging, and discussion forums.
+
+b.  Official or authorized users of Internet-based capabilities must be aware of the potential record value of their content, including content originating outside the agency, as directed in DoDI 5015.02 (Reference (ah)).
+
+c.  Users of Internet-based capabilities must comply with policy on information collection from the public, soliciting official public comment, linking and disclaimer of endorsement, and personally identifiable information as specified in Office of Management and Budget Memorandum (Reference (ai)).
+
+
+
+d.  In accordance with DoDI 3200.20 (Reference (aj)), participants are required to maximize the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information and services provided to the public.
+
+e.  When accessing Internet-based capabilities using DoD resources in an authorized personal or unofficial capacity, participants will clearly state they are providing their own personal opinion and not that of the DoD Component, DoD, or the government.
+
+f.  Participation in collaborative tools is subject to the provisions of this instruction and DoDI
+8550.01 (Reference (ak)).
+
+g.  DoD scientific and technical information must not be posted on the Internet without appropriate prior review in accordance with this instruction, Reference (ak), and other applicable policies and regulations.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+ CFR
+Code of Federal Regulations
+
+
+DCMO
+Deputy Chief Management Officer
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+
+
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+USG
+U.S. Government
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+ Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this instruction. fundamental research.  Defined in DoD 7000 14-R (Reference (al)).
+
+Contracted fundamental research includes research performed under grants and contracts that are funded by Budget Activity 1 ("Basic Research") identified in Volume 2A, Chapter 1 of Reference (al), whether performed by universities or industry or  funded by Budget Activity 2
+("Applied Research") and performed on-campus at a university.  The research will not be considered fundamental in those rare and exceptional circumstances where the Budget Activity 2 -funded effort presents a high likelihood of disclosing performance characteristics of military systems or manufacturing technologies that are unique and critical to defense, and where agreement on restrictions have been recorded in the contract or grant.
+
+Program managers must identify any fundamental research effort before issuance of solicitations and subsequent award of contracts or grants for fundamental research.  This will enable contracting and grants officers to use solicitation provisions and clauses applicable only to fundamental research.  Solicitations, including broad agency announcements, should indicate that such research is expected to be fundamental in nature as defined in National Security Decision Directive 189 (Reference (an)).  Any other restrictions on publication of fundamental research findings, security review procedures, and other required actions must be explicitly included in contract clauses or grant terms and conditions, and such inclusions must be fully consistent with the restrictions contained in the corresponding solicitation. DoD personnel.  All civilian officers and employees, including special government employees, of all DoD Components, all active duty officers (commissioned and warrant) and enlisted members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and Reserve and National Guard personnel when acting in, or representing, their military capacity. export-controlled technical data.  Defined in part 120.10 of Reference (t) export-controlled technology.  Defined in part 772.1 of Reference (u) foreign national or foreign representative.  Defined in part 120.16 of Reference (t). USG work.  Defined in section 101 of Reference (ag).

markdown/dod/i5240_04.md

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+## Department Of Defense Instruction
+
+#
+
+NUMBER 5240.04
+April 1, 2016
+Incorporating Change 2, Effective September 18, 2020
+
+
+## Usd(I&S)
+
+ SUBJECT: Counterintelligence (CI) Investigations
+
+References: See Enclosure 1 1.  PURPOSE.  This instruction:
+a.  Reissues DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5240.04 (Reference (a)) to implement policy, assign responsibilities, and provide procedures for conducting CI investigations in accordance with DoD Directive 5240.02 and DoD Directive 5143.01 (References (b) and (c)).
+
+b.  Defines full-field CI investigations and preliminary CI investigations under the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) .
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY.  This instruction:
+a.  Applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this instruction as the "DoD Components").
+
+b.  Does not apply to the conduct of CI inquiries described in DoDI O-5240.10 (Reference
+(d)). 3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that CI investigations be conducted in accordance with Reference (b) and only be conducted by the Military Department counterintelligence organizations (MDCOs) identified in the Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense (Reference (e)) and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense (Reference (f)) or their successor agreements.
+
+4.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 5.  PROCEDURES.  See Enclosure 3. 6.  INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS a.  The incident reports for the FBI, referred to in paragraph 4d(1) of Enclosure 2 of this instruction, do not require either licensing with a report control symbol in accordance with Volume 1 of DoD Manual 8910.01 (Reference (g)) or licensing with an Office of Management and Budget control number in accordance with Volume 2 of DoD Manual 8910.01 (Reference (h)).
+
+
+b.  The information on U.S. persons, referred to in paragraph 1a of Enclosure 3 of this instruction, does not require licensing with a report control symbol in accordance with Reference (g) or licensing with an Office of Management and Budget control number in accordance with Reference (h). c.  The CI investigative information and Table 1 of Enclosure 3, referred to in paragraphs 1d and 1e, do not require either licensing with a report control symbol in accordance with Reference (g) or licensing with an Office of Management and Budget control number in accordance with Reference (h).
+
+7.  RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release**.  This instruction is available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. 8.  SUMMARY OF CHANGE 2.  This administrative change updates the title of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the USD(I&S) in accordance with Public Law 116-92 (Reference (i)).
+
+Marcel Lettre Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+9.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This instruction is effective April 1, 2016. Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities
+
+3.  Procedures Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Instruction 5240.04, "Counterintelligence Investigations," February 2, 2009, as
+amended (hereby cancelled)
+(b) DoD Directive 5240.02, "Counterintelligence (CI)," March 17, 2015, as amended (c) DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
+(USD(I&S))," October 24, 2014, as amended
+(d) DoD Instruction O-5240.10, "Counterintelligence (CI) in the DoD Components,"
+ April 27, 2020
+(e) Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense,
+"Agreement Governing the Conduct of Defense Department Counterintelligence Activities
+in Conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation," April 5, 19791
+(f)
+Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Defense, "Coordination of Counterintelligence Matters Between FBI and
+DoD," June 20, 19961
+(g) DoD Manual 8910.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Collections Manual:  Procedures for
+DoD Internal Information Collections," June 30, 2014, as amended
+(h) DoD Manual 8910.01, Volume 2, "DoD Information Collections Manual:  Procedures for
+DoD Public Information Collections," June 30, 2014, as amended
+(i)
+Public Law 116-92, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020," December 20, 2019
+(j)
+Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Memorandum, "Early Detection of Espionage and Other Intelligence Activities Through Identification and Referral of
+Anomalies," August 23, 19961
+(k) Chapter 47 of Title 10, United States Code (l)
+Title 50, United States Code
+(m) Section 533 of Title 28, United States Code (n) DoD Instruction 5400.15, "Guidance on Obtaining Information from Financial
+Institutions," December 2, 2004, as amended
+(o) Section 3414 of Title 12, United States Code
+(p) Section 1681v of Title 15, United States Code (q) DoD Manual 5240.01, "Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence
+Activities," August 8, 2016
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE (INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY) (DDI(I&S)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S), the DDI(I&S):
+a.  Oversees DoD CI investigative activities.
+
+
+b.  Develops and recommends CI investigations policy.
+c.  Participates in DoD and national-level CI investigations forums.
+
+
+d.  Serves as the OSD staff point of contact for CI investigations-related issues. 2.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S), the Director, DIA:
+a.  Reviews CI investigations that are forwarded by the MDCOs in accordance with Reference (b).  Coordinates with the MDCOs to deconflict those CI investigations that overlap Service boundaries.
+
+b.  Identifies, evaluates, and recommends investigative actions to be taken concerning anomalies according to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Memorandum (Reference (j)).
+
+c.  Serves as the focal point and central repository for DoD unknown subject CI leads, reports, and information.  When a DoD unknown subject lead is not specific to a DoD Component:
+
+(1)  DIA determines DoD Component affiliation and then refers the matter to the appropriate MDCO or the FBI.
+
+
+(2)  DIA provides all original documentation, results of all inquiries, files, leads, and all other relevant information to the appropriate MDCO or the FBI.
+
+d.  Analyzes CI investigations to report trends, anomalies, and other matters of CI interest to the MDCOs and the USD(I&S).
+
+e.  Coordinates requests for review of CI inquiries when an MDCO or the FBI declines to investigate in accordance with Reference (d).
+
+f.  In coordination with Secretaries of the Military Departments, notifies the USD(I&S) and other senior DoD officials, as appropriate, of potential damage to DoD or national security that could result from the compromise of classified, sensitive, or proprietary information identified during a CI investigation.
+
+g.  In coordination with the MDCOs, develops, provides, and validates advanced and other specialized CI investigative training, to include procedures for requesting customer and institution financial transaction information.
+
+h.  Participates in DoD and national-level CI investigative forums.
+
+i.  Notifies the appropriate MDCO when making a referral to the FBI that involves a Military Department affiliated member, or a person or activity associated with a DoD Component supported by an MDCO in accordance with Reference (d).
+
+
+3.  DoD COMPONENT HEADS.  The DoD Component heads may request a USD(I&S) review when an MDCO or the FBI chooses not to conduct a CI investigation based on a referral and the DoD Component disagrees with that decision.  Such requests will be submitted in writing through the Director, DIA, and the DDI(I&S) to the USD(I&S).  CI referrals the FBI chooses not to investigate may be referred to an MDCO for investigation. 4.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 3 of this enclosure, the Secretaries of the Military Departments:
+a.  Conduct preliminary and full-field CI investigations within their departments in accordance with Reference (b).  This includes investigations of active and reserve military personnel, DoD civilians, and other DoD-affiliated personnel in accordance with References (e), (f), and Chapter 47 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (k)).
+
+b.  Designate organizations within their departments that are authorized to conduct CI
+investigations consistent with References (e) and (f) or their successor agreements.
+
+c.  Manage and oversee the use of CI resources funded for CI investigations.
+
+d.  Through the MDCOs:
+
+
+(1)  Report to the FBI those incidents meeting the criteria of section 3381 of Title 50, U.S.C. (Reference (l)) and refer CI investigative matters to the FBI in accordance with References (e), (f), and section 533 of Title 28, U.S.C. (Reference (m)).
+
+
+(2)  Ensure all personnel assigned to CI investigative duties have successfully completed formal CI training in accordance with Reference (b).
+
+
+(3)  Brief appropriate command officials on CI investigations that require determinations on continuing access to classified information and other personnel security actions.
+
+
+
+(4)  Within 14 calendar days after receiving a CI referral from a DoD Component, respond to the referring component with a determination to either accept or decline the CI referral for investigation.
+
+
+
+(5)  Keep the Combatant Commanders and the DoD Component heads informed of CI
+investigations taking place within their respective areas of responsibility or affecting their interests and assist in periodic command briefings concerning these investigations in accordance with Reference (d).
+
+
+(6)  Submit requests for financial information to support CI investigations in accordance with DoDI 5400.15 (Reference (n)); section 3414 of Title 12, U.S.C. (Reference (o)); section 1681v of Title 15, U.S.C. (Reference (p)); and section 3162 of Reference (l).
+
+
+
+(7)  Obtain legal reviews of requests for financial information before submission to financial institutions and obtain legal reviews of financial institution responses to ensure they are within the scope of the request.
+
+
+(8)  Maintain an annual tabulation of the occasions in which access procedures for financial records were used in accordance with References (l), (n), (o), and (p).  Use the Table 2 format in Enclosure 3 of this instruction.
+
+
+(9)  Provide the Director, DIA:
+
+
+
+(a)  Copies of all DoD unknown subject leads received from non-DoD agencies.
+
+
+(b)  CI investigative reporting in accordance with Reference (b).
+
+
+(10)  Return to DIA all original documentation, results of all inquiries, files, leads, and all other relevant information provided by DIA to the department if a DoD unknown subject investigation is unable to identify the subject.
+
+
+ENCLOSURE 3
+
+PROCEDURES 1.  CI INVESTIGATIONS
+a.  Information on U.S. persons will be collected, retained, and disseminated in accordance with DoD Manual 5240.01 (Reference (q)).
+
+b.  CI investigations are managed and reported in the USD(I&S)-approved information systems in accordance with Reference (b).
+
+
+c.  When a DoD Component objects to a CI investigation due to operational or other reasons, the MDCO element leading the investigation will attempt to resolve the objection at the local level.  If the objection cannot be resolved at a local level, the objection will be addressed through the appropriate Military Department channels.  Outside of the investigating MDCO, only the Secretary of a Military Department may suspend or terminate a CI investigation.
+
+
+(1)  When the MDCO receives a request to suspend or terminate an investigation, the Secretary of the Military Department concerned will decide promptly whether the investigation will be suspended or terminated.  The investigation will not be suspended while awaiting the Secretary's decision, except as directed by the Secretary.
+
+
+(2)  The Secretaries of the Military Departments will promptly notify the USD(I&S) of the facts and their decision in each instance.
+
+d.  The DoD Components will report, in a timely manner, to DIA, the opening of each new CI investigation and continue reporting until the investigation is closed.
+
+e.  When an MDCO opens a CI investigation as defined in the Glossary, the MDCO will provide DIA with the CI investigative information identified in Table 1 of this enclosure.
+
+
+Number
+Entry
+Description
+1
+Organization or Agency
+Enter the organization or agency's name or identifier.  Include the names of the points-of contact at the organization to include telephone numbers and email addresses.
+2
+File Number:
+Use the organization or agency identifying number such as a file or case control number.
+3
+Agency/FBI Project Code
+Use when applicable.
+4
+Date Opened:
+The date the case was opened written as MM/DD/YYYY.
+
+Number
+Entry
+Description
+5
+Investigative Status
+Is the case open or closed?
+6
+Event or Incident Date
+The date written as MM/DD/YYYY.  If no exact date, write any part known or inclusive period MM/YYYY to MM/YYYY.
+7
+Incident Location
+Provide as much detail as available. Provide the name and location of the affected DoD facility or
+installation.
+8
+Affected DoD Facility or Installation
+9
+Affected DoD
+Contractor
+As appropriate, provide the name and location of the affected
+DoD contractor.
+10
+Subject
+As applicable and if known.  Provide the individual's full
+identification to include name, home address, and citizenship. Provide their relation to DoD to include service, rank/rate/grade, job title, and assigned duties.  Include the
+individual's DoD status e.g., active-duty military, reserve, DoD
+civilian, DoD contractor, family member, etc.
+11
+Clearance and access
+Subject's security clearance level and access.  The actual level
+of subject's access to classified information and a description of
+the program, weapons system, technology involved.  Identify
+the classified computer systems to which the individual had access.
+12
+Special Access Program (SAP)
+A statement as to whether subject is or is not briefed into or has had access to a SAP.  Provide a generic description or unclassified pseudonym of the SAP.  If subject is not identified, provide a statement as to whether a SAP is involved. The name of the known or suspected foreign intelligence entity
+involved or associated with the case.
+13
+Foreign Intelligence Entity
+14
+Allegation
+This is the summary of the event, incident, or offense.
+15
+Details
+Detailed narrative of the facts.
+16
+Update
+As necessary, a narrative of information developed since the
+last report.  Little or no change should be reported as "nothing significant to report."  The result of the investigation will be included in the final report.
+
+ 2.  INVESTIGATIVE REQUESTS FOR FINANCIAL INFORMATION.  By February 15 of each year, the Secretaries of the Military Departments will compile and maintain the number of requests for financial information submitted pursuant to section 3162 of Reference (l), Reference (o), and Reference (p) for the previous calendar year.  As shown in Table 2 of this enclosure, each request will be classified as a "CI request" and/or "terrorism-related request".  The information will made available to the USD(I&S) upon request.
+
+
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+12
+U.S.C.
+3414
+15
+U.S.C.
+1681u
+50
+U.S.C.
+3162
+CI
+requests
+Terrorism related requests
+Number of people on whom requests were issued
+Number of investigations in which requests were issued
+Number of people on whom requests were issued who were not DoD- affiliated
+
+Explanation: Column 1:  Total number of requests issued pursuant to Reference (o). Column 2:  Total number of requests issued pursuant to Reference (p). Column 3:  Total number of requests issued pursuant to section 3162 of Reference (l).
+Column 4:  Total number of CI requests from columns 1-3. Column 5:  Total number of terrorism requests from columns 1-3. Column 6:  Self-explanatory. Column 7:  Self-explanatory. Column 8:  Explain in footnotes as necessary.
+
+
+## Glossary
+
+
+PART I.  ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
+
+CI
+counterintelligence
+
+
+DIA
+Defense Intelligence Agency
+DDI(I&S)
+Director for Defense Intelligence (Intelligence and Security)
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+
+
+FBI
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+
+
+MDCO
+Military Department counterintelligence organization
+
+
+SAP
+Special Access Program
+
+
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+USD(I&S) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
+
+
+PART II.  DEFINITIONS
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this instruction.
+
+
+anomalies.  Foreign power activities or knowledge, inconsistent with the expected norms, that suggest prior foreign knowledge of U.S. national security information, processed, or capabilities. CI investigations.  Formal investigative activities undertaken to determine whether a particular person is acting for or on behalf of, or an event is related to, a foreign power engaged in spying or committing espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversion, assassinations, or international terrorist activities, and to determine actions required to neutralize such acts.
+
+full-field CI investigation.  An investigation in which there is a reasonable belief a member of the U.S. military; a civilian employee or contractor of DoD; or an individual having access to DoD installations, personnel or information, is engaged in spying or has committed or attempted to commit espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversion, assassination, or international terrorist activity or otherwise poses a threat to national security.
+
+preliminary CI investigation.  An investigation that does not meet the reasonable belief standard of a full-field CI investigation but requires an examination of the facts to determine if a full-field CI investigation is required.  A preliminary CI investigation must be completed within 6 months of its initiation. DoD unknown subject.  The subject of a CI investigation whose identity has not been determined. U.S. person.  Defined in Reference (q).

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+# Department Of Defense
+
+## Instruction
+
+# Number 5240.10 October 5, 2011 Incorporating Change 1, Effective October 15, 2013
+
+
+USD(I) SUBJECT: Counterintelligence (CI) in the Combatant Commands and Other DoD Components
+
+References:  See Enclosure 1 1.  PURPOSE.  This Instruction:
+
+
+a.  Reissues DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5240.10 (Reference (a)) in accordance with the authority in DoDD 5143.01 (Reference (b)) to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and provide procedures for CI activities in the DoD Components in accordance with DoD Directive
+(DoDD) O-5240.02 (Reference (c)).
+
+b.  Establishes supporting Military Department CI Organizations (MDCOs) (formerly known as "CI Lead Agencies").  MDCOs provide CI support, as required, to the headquarters of the DoD Components in accordance with this Instruction.
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY.  This Instruction applies to the OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG, DoD), the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components"). 3.  DEFINITIONS.  See Glossary. 4.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  Authorized CI activities shall be conducted in the DoD Components as part of an integrated DoD and national effort in accordance with Reference (c).
+
+b.  CI investigations shall only be conducted by the MDCOs and in accordance with DoDI
+5240.04 (Reference (d)). c.  All DoD personnel conducting CI activities shall attend formal CI training approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, or their designees.
+
+5.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 6.  PROCEDURES.  See Enclosure 3. 7.  INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.  The information requirement contained in this Instruction is exempt from licensing in accordance with paragraphs C4.4.1., C4.4.7., and C4.4.8.
+
+of DoD 8910.1-M (Reference (e)). 8.  RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED.  This Instruction is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. 9.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This Instruction: is effective upon its publication to the DoD Issuances Website.
+
+a.  Is effective October 5, 2011.
+
+
+  b.  Must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication to be
+considered current in accordance with DoD Instruction 5025.01 (Reference (ae)).
+
+
+   c.  Will expire effective October 5, 2021 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website if
+it hasn't been reissued or cancelled in accordance with Reference (ae).
+
+
+
+Enclosures
+
+1.  References 2.  Responsibilities
+3.  Procedures
+4.  CI Activities
+Glossary
+
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Instruction 5240.10, "Counterintelligence Support to the Combatant Commands and
+the Defense Agencies," May 14, 2004 (hereby cancelled)
+(b) DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)),"
+November 23, 2005
+(c) DoD Directive O-5240.02, "Counterintelligence," December 20, 2007*, as amended*
+(d) DoD Instruction 5240.04, "Counterintelligence (CI) Investigations," February 2, 2009 (e) DoD 8910.1-M "Department of Defense Procedures for Management of Information
+Requirements," June 30, 1998
+(f)
+DoD Instruction O-5100.93, "Defense Counterintelligence (CI) and Human Intelligence
+(HUMINT) Center (DCHC)," August 13, 2010
+(g) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," July 30, 2008, as amended (h) DoD Directive 5240.01, "DoD Intelligence Activities," August 27, 2007*, as amended*
+(i)
+DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components
+
+That Affect United States Persons," December 1982
+(j)
+DoD Directive 5210.48, "Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Program," January 25,
+2007*, as amended*
+(k) DoD Instruction 5210.91, "Polygraph and Credibility Assessment (PCA) Procedures,"
+August 12, 2010
+(l)
+Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense,
+
+"Agreement Governing the Conduct of Defense Department Counterintelligence Activities
+
+in Conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation," April 5, 1979
+(m) Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
+Department of Defense, "Coordination of Counterintelligence Matters Between FBI and
+
+DoD," June 20, 1996
+(n) DoD Instruction 5240.05, "Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Program,"
+
+February 22, 2006
+(o) DoD S-5240.05-M-1, "*The* Conduct of Technical Surveillance Countermeasures, Volume
+1," April 30, 2007
+(p) DoD S-5240.05-M-2, "*The* Conduct of Technical Surveillance Countermeasures, Volume
+2," November 13, 2007
+(q) DoD Directive 5240.06, "Counterintelligence Awareness and Reporting (CIAR)," May 17,
+2011*, as amended*
+(r)
+DoD Instruction C-5240.08, "Counterintelligence *(CI)* Security Classification *Guide*,"
+
+December 7, 2005 *November 28, 2011*
+(s)
+DoD Instruction *Manual* S-5240.09-M, "Offensive Counterintelligence Operations (OFCO)
+and Security Classification Guide (U)," October 29, 2008 January 13, 2011
+(t)
+DoD S-5240.09-M, "Offensive Counterintelligence Operations Procedures and Security
+
+Classification Guide (U)," January 13, 2011
+(u) DoD Instruction S-5240.15, "Force Protection Response Group (FPRG) (U),"
+October 20, 2010
+(v) DoD Instruction 5240.16, "DoD Counterintelligence Functional Services," May 21, 2005
+August 27, 2012
+(w) DoD Instruction S-5240.17, "Counterintelligence Collection," January 12, 2009
+(x) DoD Instruction 5240.18, "Counterintelligence (CI) Analysis and Production,"
+
+November 17, 2009
+(y) DoD Instruction 5240.19, "Counterintelligence Support to the Defense Critical
+Infrastructure Program," August 27, 2007*, as amended*
+(z) DoD Instruction O-5240.21, "Counterintelligence (CI) Inquiries," May 14, 2009
+(aa) DoD Instruction 5240.22, "Counterintelligence Support to Force Protection," September
+24, 2009
+(ab) DoD Instruction S-5240.23, "Counterintelligence (CI) Activities in Cyberspace (U),"
+December 13, 2010
+(ac) DoD Instruction O-5240.24, "Counterintelligence (CI) Activities Supporting Research,
+Development, and Acquisition (RDA)," June 8, 2011
+(ad) Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition
+(ae) DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," September 26, 2012, as amended
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  USD(I).  The USD(I) shall:
+a.  Serve as the OSD Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense regarding CI in the DoD Components. b.  Act as the final decision authority on CI issues that cannot be resolved by the DoD
+Components.
+
+
+2.  DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (DUSD(I&S)).  The DUSD(I&S), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), shall:
+a.  Develop and recommend policy for CI activities in the DoD Components. b.  Serve as the OSD staff point of contact for issues related to CI activities in the DoD
+Components. c.  Conduct CI policy oversight. 3.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA).  The Director, DIA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), and in accordance with the requirements of Reference (c) and DoD Instruction O-5100.93 (Reference (f)) shall:
+a.  pProvide for centralized management of CI in accordance with DoDI O-5100.93
+(Reference (f)).
+
+4.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND HUMINT CENTER (DCHC). The Director, DCHC, under the authority, direction, and control of the Director, DIA, and in accordance with the requirements of References (c) and (f), shall:
+
+a b.  Integrate and prioritize DoD Component and supporting MDCOs resource requirements. b c.  Advocate for funding to obtain required CI resources for DoD Component and supporting MDCOs as part of the annual budget build. c d.  Produce Defense CI Enterprise Functional Support Plans in accordance with the Joint Staff-led intelligence planning process, in direct support of Combatant Command adaptive planning requirements.
+
+d e.  Develop and provide training, through the Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy, to DoD Component personnel on the skills required to conduct authorized CI activities. e. f   Manage the process to identify and share CI lessons learned, best practices, and new CI
+approaches with the DoD Components in accordance with References (c) and (f).
+
+5 4.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:
+a.  Provide CI support, as required, to the DoD Components, as designated in Enclosure 3.
+
+b.  Nominate personnel with CI experience to serve as Command CI Coordinating Authority
+(CCICA) (formerly the CI Staff Officer) and assign selected personnel to the designated Combatant Commands and Joint Staff for duty. c.  Nominate personnel with CI experience to serve on the CCICA staff as required by the joint manning document or by mutual agreement with the Combatant Commands. d.  Inform the DoD Components of planned or ongoing CI activities taking place within a command's area of responsibility (AOR) or affecting a DoD Component's interests in accordance with Reference (c). e.  Assist in developing a written agreement with the supported DoD Components that describes the MDCO CI support. f.  Provide assessments on the foreign intelligence entity (FIE) threat to the supported DoD
+Components. g.  Ensure that funding and resources are adequate to support the resource requirements of the DoD Components for which they are the MDCO.
+
+6 5.  DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF, THE IG, DoD, AND DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES.  The Director of the Joint Staff, the IG, DoD, and Directors of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities shall:
+a.  Develop a CI capability to conduct authorized CI activities or rely on the supporting MDCO as designated in Enclosure 3.
+
+b.  Designate an office of primary responsibility to coordinate CI support from the MDCOs and those CI activities conducted internally as specified by this Instruction. c.  Establish a written agreement with the supporting MDCO that describes ongoing and continued CI support the MDCO shall provide. d.  Annually, or as directed by emerging operational needs, identify, prioritize, and forward resource requirements to the Director, DCHC DIA.
+
+e.  Ensure that effective measures exist to compartmentalize and protect sensitive CI
+investigative or operations information and techniques that are in support of the DoD Components. 7 6.  COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS.  The Commanders of the Combatant Commands, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate, shall:
+a.  Develop a CI capability to conduct authorized CI activities or rely on the supporting MDCO as designated in Enclosure 3.
+
+
+b.  Select Military Department-nominated personnel to serve as the CCICA and conduct and exercise staff coordination authority over CI activities in accordance with Reference (c). c.  Establish a written agreement with the supporting MDCO that describes the ongoing and continued CI support MDCO shall provide.
+
+d.  Annually, or as directed by emerging operational needs, identify, prioritize, and disseminate resource requirements for the individual Combatant Command headquarters to the Joint Staff with copies provided to the Director, DCHC DIA, and the MDCOs. e.  Ensure that effective measures exist to compartmentalize and protect sensitive CI
+investigative or operations information and techniques which are in support of the Combatant Command.
+
+## Enclosure 3 Procedures
+
+ 1.  IG, DoD, THE JOINT STAFF, DEFENSE AGENCIES, AND FIELD ACTIVITIES.  The Office of the IG, DoD, Joint Staff, Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Activities may coordinate with their designated supporting MDCO about CI support to geographically separate agency or activity sub-elements being accomplished by the MDCO supporting those locations.
+
+a.  Such coordination ensures that all of an agency's or activity's sub-elements receive CI
+support from an appropriate local MDCO.
+
+
+b.  The physical location of the agency or activity sub-element generally determines which MDCO provides the CI support.
+
+c.  A written agreement between the agency or activity sub-element and the local MDCO
+shall describe the CI support.
+
+2.  CCICA.  The CCICA shall:
+a.  Be the senior CI advisor and subject matter expert to the Combatant Command.  The CCICA shall be in the military grade of 05 or 06, or civilian equivalent, and have CI experience.
+
+
+b.  Develop and implement the Combatant Commands' and Joint Staff's CI strategy and plans; integrate CI into Combatant Command and Joint Staff  planning, operations, exercises, and other activities; identify and forward Command resource requirements; coordinate CI
+support as needed by the Command; and oversee CI activities supporting the Combatant Command headquarters staff and geographically separated elements.
+
+
+c.  Provide for staff supervision, awareness, deconfliction, and coordination of CI activities and policies within the Combatant Command AOR.
+
+
+d.  Identify and provide Combatant Command resource requirements to the Director, DCHC
+DIA.
+
+3.  SUPPORTING MDCOs AND THEIR SUPPORTED DoD COMPONENTS.  Tables 1 through 3 list the supporting MDCO and their supported DoD Components.  Defense Agencies not listed in Table 1 have a CI capability to conduct authorized CI activities and do not rely on a designated MDCO for CI support.
+
+##
+
+
+Supporting MDCO
+Defense Agency Headquarters and OSD
+Army Counterintelligence
+Defense Commissary Agency Defense Contract Management Agency Defense Contract Audit Agency Defense Logistics Agency Defense Information Systems Agency
+Naval Criminal Investigative Service
+Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Defense Finance and Accounting Service
+Air Force Office of Special Investigations
+OSD Staff
+Pentagon Force Protection Agency
+Defense Security Cooperation Agency IG, DoD
+
+##
+
+| Supporting MDCO                            | Combatant Command Headquarters     |
+|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
+| Army Counterintelligence                   | U.S. Africa Command                |
+| U.S. European Command                      |                                    |
+| U.S. Southern Command                      |                                    |
+| Naval Criminal Investigative Service       | U.S. Joint Forces Command          |
+| The Joint Staff                            |                                    |
+| U.S. Pacific Command                       |                                    |
+| Air Force Office of Special Investigations | U.S. Central Command               |
+| U.S. Northern Command                      |                                    |
+| U.S. Special Operations Command            |                                    |
+| U.S. Strategic Command                     |                                    |
+| U.S. Transportation Command                |                                    |
+|                                            |                                    |
+|                                            |                                    |
+
+Supporting MDCO
+DoD Field Activity Headquarters
+Army Counterintelligence
+Defense Media Activity Defense Technical Information Center
+Naval Criminal Investigative Service
+Washington Headquarters Service DoD Test Resource Management Center
+Office of Economic Adjustment DoD Education Activity TRICARE Management Activity
+DoD Human Resources Activity
+
+##
+
+| Air Force Office of Special Investigations    |
+|-----------------------------------------------|
+| Office                                        |
+| Defense Technology Security Administration    |
+|                                               |
+
+## Enclosure 4 Ci Activities
+
+ 1.  GENERAL
+a.  This enclosure provides a brief roadmap to other CI issuances of importance to CI
+activities in DoD.
+
+b.  Reference (c) is the base Directive that provides policy on CI activities in DoD and is supported by additional CI Instructions and Manuals.
+
+
+c.  CI activities are carried out pursuant to the authorities and restrictions of the U.S.
+
+Constitution, applicable law, Executive Order 12333 (Reference (g)), DoDD 5240.01 (Reference
+(h)), and DoD 5240.1-R (Reference (i)). 2.  SUPPORTING INFORMATION
+a.  Credibility Assessment (CA).  Authorized CA activities are conducted in accordance with DoDD 5210.48 (Reference (j)) and DoDI 5210.91 (Reference (k)).  CA is the use of polygraph and non-polygraph techniques and procedures to assess truthfulness.  Not all DoD Components are authorized to conduct CA activities.
+
+b.  CI Investigations.  In addition to Reference (d), the MDCOs conduct CI investigations in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense (Reference (l)) and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the FBI and the Department of Defense (Reference (m)).
+
+c.  Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM).  Authorized TSCM activities are conducted in accordance with DoDI 5240.05 (Reference (n)), DoD S-5240.05-M-1 (Reference
+(o)), and DoD S-5240.05-M-2 (Reference (p)).  Not all DoD Components are authorized to conduct TSCM activities.
+
+d.  CI Awareness and Reporting (CIAR).  Training on CIAR is conducted in accordance with DoDD 5240.06 (Reference (q)).  It is preferable that a CI-experienced person conduct CIAR training in a classroom environment.  However, other CIAR-knowledgeable individuals and other media may be used to conduct the training with the condition that the organizational CI element or supporting MDCO reviews the training materials.
+
+e.  CI Security Classification Guide.  CI information is classified in accordance with DoDI C-
+5240.08 (Reference (r)).  Additional questions regarding the classification of CI information may be forwarded to the CI Directorate, DUSD(I&S).
+
+
+f.  Offensive Counterintelligence Operations (OFCO).  Only authorized organizations may conduct OFCO in accordance with this Instruction and DoDI S-5240.09 (Reference (s)).
+Procedures for OFCO and an OFCO-specific security classification guide are provided in DoD S-5240.09-M (Reference (t)).
+
+g.  Force Protection Response Group (FPRG).  DoD Components may request FPRG support in accordance with DoDI S-5240.15 (Reference (u)).  DoD Components may request the FPRG mission to support the Component's force protection requirements.
+
+
+h.  CI Functional Services.  CI activities that support the CI functions are found in DoDI
+5240.16 (Reference (v)).  The agreements identified in Enclosure 2 of this Instruction are between each supported DoD Component and the supporting MDCO.  The agreements describe which organization conducts what activities.  DoD Components without a supporting MDCO
+shall conduct authorized CI activities in accordance with applicable DoD policy.
+
+i.  CI Collection.  CI collection is conducted in accordance with DoDI S-5240.17 (Reference
+(w)).  CI collection requirements are responsive to a commander's or director's intelligence requirements.  DoD Components submit their CI collection requirements to DIA for validation. Most DoD Components are limited in their authority to conduct CI collection and shall do so only after coordinating with their supporting MDCO and in accordance with Reference (w).
+
+j.  CI Analysis and Production.  CI analysis and production is generally driven by the CI
+collection requirements described in paragraph 2.i. of this enclosure and in accordance with DoDI 5240.18 (Reference (x)).  While many DoD Components do not conduct CI analysis and production, all DoD Components provide feedback on CI analytical products.  Feedback is provided in coordination with the generating production element.
+
+k.  Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP).  CI support to the DCIP is conducted in accordance with DoDI 5240.19 (Reference (y)).  The reference describes the DCIP CI support structure and includes the CI support to DCIP functions and activities.
+
+l.  CI Inquiries.  The Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Activities may conduct CI inquiries, but only by appropriately trained personnel and in accordance with DoDI O-5240.21 (Reference (z)).  The reference describes the authorized activities of a CI inquiry, the prohibited techniques, and follow-up activities.
+
+m.  Force Protection (FP).  CI support to FP is incorporated in DoD Component FP programs in accordance with DoDI 5240.22 (Reference (aa)).  The reference briefly describes CI and joint terrorism task forces, FPRG support, contingency contracting, and the force protection detachments.
+
+n.  Cyberspace.  CI activities in cyberspace seek to counter FIEs operating in cyberspace and cause those entities to act in observable or exploitable ways.  CI activities in cyberspace are coordinated and conducted in accordance with DoDI S-5240.23 (Reference (ab)), which states that CI activities in cyberspace shall be conducted by technically trained and certified personnel and in accordance with applicable law and policy.
+
+o.  Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA).  CI activities supporting RDA are in accordance with DoDI O-5240.24 (Reference (ac)), which describes the support CI provides to RDA programs in an effort to detect, assess, exploit, penetrate, degrade, counter, or neutralize the FIE threat.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+| AOR       | area of responsibility                                    |
+|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
+|           |                                                           |
+| CA        | credibility assessment                                    |
+| CCICA     | Command Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority        |
+| CI        | counterintelligence                                       |
+| CIAR      | counterintelligence awareness and reporting               |
+|           |                                                           |
+| DIA       | Defense Intelligence Agency                               |
+| DCHC      | Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center |
+| DCHE      | DoD Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Enterprise |
+| DCIP      | Defense Critical Infrastructure Program                   |
+| DoDD      | DoD Directive                                             |
+| DoDI      | DoD Instruction                                           |
+| DUSD(I&S) | Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and    |
+| Security  |                                                           |
+|           |                                                           |
+| FIE       | foreign intelligence entity                               |
+| FP        | force protection                                          |
+| FPRG      | Force Protection Response Group                           |
+|           |                                                           |
+| IG        | ,                                                         |
+|           |                                                           |
+| MDCO      | Military Department Counterintelligence Organization      |
+|           |                                                           |
+| OFCO      | offensive counterintelligence operations                  |
+|           |                                                           |
+| RDA       | research, development, and acquisition                    |
+|           |                                                           |
+| TSCM      | technical surveillance countermeasures                    |
+|           |                                                           |
+| USD(I)    | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence               |
+|           |                                                           |
+|           |                                                           |
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this instruction.
+
+
+CI.  Defined in Reference (g). CI activities.  Defined in Reference (b). CCICA.  The senior command representative to conduct and exercise staff coordination authority over CI activities.  Develops and implements the Combatant Command's CI strategy and plans, serves as the focal point for CI issues impacting the command, identifies command resource requirements, and coordinates CI support to the command.  Formerly known as "CI Staff Officer."  Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Publication 1-02 (Reference (ad)).
+
+
+MDCO.  Elements of the Military Departments authorized to conduct CI investigations, i.e., Army CI, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.  Formerly known as "CI Lead Agencies."  Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Reference (ad). OFCO.  Defined in Reference (s).

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+## Dod Instruction 5525.01 Foreign Criminal And Civil Jurisdiction
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense May 31, 2019
+Effective: Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+Reissues and Cancels:
+
+DoD Directive 5525.1, "Status of Forces Policy and Information," August 7, 1979
+
+Paul C. Ney, Jr., General Counsel of the Department of Defense
+Approved by:
+Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive 5145.01, this issuance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures concerning trial by foreign criminal courts of, treatment in foreign prisons of, and the payment of counsel fees in certain criminal and civil cases for DoD personnel.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3 1.3.  Information Collections. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 5
+2.1.  Secretaries of the Military Departments. ........ 5 2.2.  Geographic Combatant Commanders. ........ 5
+SECTION 3:  DCO PROCEDURES ........ 6
+3.1.  Formal Invocation. ........ 6
+3.2.  Service Members Confined in Foreign Penal Institutions. ........ 6
+3.3.  Non-military DoD Personnel in Foreign Penal Institutions. ........ 6 3.4.  Reporting to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC DoD). ........ 6 3.5.  International Agreements. ........ 6
+SECTION 4:  PROCEDURES ........ 7
+4.1.  Country Law Studies........ 7 4.2.  Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction Cases Involving Service Members. ........ 8 4.3.  Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction Cases Involving Non-Military DoD Personnel ........ 9 4.4.  Trial Observers and Trial Observers' Reports. ........ 10 4.5.  Counsel Fees and Related Assistance For DoD Personnel Subject to the Uniform Code
+of Military Justice (UCMJ). ........ 11
+4.6.  Counsel Fees and Related Assistance for DoD Personnel or Department of Homeland
+Security Personnel Not Subject to the UCMJ. ........ 13
+4.7.  Treatment of Service Members Confined in Foreign Penal Institutions. ........ 13 4.8.  Treatment of Non-Military DoD Personnel Confined in Foreign Penal Institutions...... 15 4.9.  Discharge. ........ 15 4.10.  Information Policy. ........ 16
+SECTION 5:  FAIR TRIAL GUARANTEES ........ 17
+5.1.  Country Law Studies Preparations........ 17 5.2.  DCO Determinations. ........ 18
+GLOSSARY ........ 19
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 19 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 19
+REFERENCES ........ 20
+
+## Tables
+
+Table 1.  Guide for the Preparation of Country Laws ........ 17
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information
+
+1.1.  APPLICABILITY.  This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard at all times, including when it is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security by agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+a. It is DoD policy to apply, when practicable, procedures similar to those called for in the U.S. Senate Resolution of Ratification, with reservations, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement, in all areas outside the United States where DoD
+personnel are present in connection with official duties, even in those areas where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement is not applicable.
+
+b. DoD will, for DoD personnel present in all areas outside the United States in connection with official duties:
+(1) Maximize the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over such DoD personnel to the extent permissible under applicable status of forces agreements or other forms of jurisdiction arrangements.
+(2) Protect, to the maximum extent possible, the rights of such DoD personnel who may be subject to criminal trial by foreign courts and imprisonment in foreign prisons.
+
+(3) If arrested, secure, where possible, the release of such DoD personnel to the custody of U.S. authorities pending completion of all foreign judicial proceedings.
+
+c. Trial by foreign criminal courts, treatment in foreign prisons, and payment of counsel fees in certain criminal and civil cases for command-sponsored and non-command-sponsored dependents of Service members and non-military DoD personnel outside the United States will follow the requirements in Part 151 of Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
+
+## 1.3.  Information Collections.
+
+a. The collection and study of relevant laws and legal procedures in effect for a foreign country, referred to in Paragraph 4.1., are exempt from licensing requirements in accordance with Paragraph 1.b.(15), Enclosure 3 of Volume 1 of DoD Manual 8910.01.
+b. The Trial Observers' Formal Reports, referred to in Paragraph 4.4., are exempt from licensing requirements in accordance with Paragraph 1.b.(1), Enclosure 3 of Volume 1 of DoD Manual 8910.01.
+c. The reports of individuals confined in foreign penal institutions, referred to in Paragraph 4.7., are exempt from licensing requirements in accordance with Paragraph 1.b.(1), Enclosure 3 of Volume 1 of DoD Manual 8910.01.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities
+
+2.1.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments provide for attorney's fees in appropriate cases, and ensure awareness of laws and customs of the host country for DoD personnel assigned to foreign areas, and in accordance with Part 151 of Title 32, CFR, for their dependents.
+2.2.  GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS.  For each country in their respective assigned areas of responsibility, the geographic Combatant Commanders will:
+a. Ensure the adequacy of regulations that establish an information and education policy on the laws and customs of the host country for DoD personnel assigned to the geographic Combatant Commander's area of responsibility.
+
+b. Prepare a study of the relevant laws and legal procedures in effect for each foreign country in their area of responsibility where DoD personnel or their dependents are regularly stationed or are subject to its criminal jurisdiction, as outlined in Paragraph 4.1.
+
+c. Designate a commanding officer (referred to in this issuance as a "designated commanding officer" (DCO)) as described in the U.S. Senate Resolution of Ratification, with reservations, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement.
+
+d. Ensure command implementation of the procedures in this issuance and Part 151 of Title 32, CFR.
+
+e. Oversee the DCO in fulfilling the DCO's responsibilities, in accordance with Section 3 of this issuance and Part 151 of Title 32, CFR.
+
+## Section 3:  Dco Procedures
+
+3.1.  FORMAL INVOCATION.  The DCOs are responsible for formal invocation of procedures, where applicable, consistent with the U.S. Senate Resolution of Ratification, with reservations, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement, in each foreign country where DoD personnel are present.
+3.2.  SERVICE MEMBERS CONFINED IN FOREIGN PENAL INSTITUTIONS.  The DCOs ensure that Service members confined in foreign penal institutions are visited in accordance with Paragraphs 4.7.b. through 4.7.f.
+
+3.3.  NON-MILITARY DOD PERSONNEL IN FOREIGN PENAL INSTITUTIONS.  In cooperation with the appropriate U.S. chief of mission (COM), in coordination with the senior defense official/defense attache (SDO/DATT), and to the maximum extent possible, the DCOs ensure non-military DoD personnel receive the same treatment, rights, and support as Service members when in the custody of foreign authorities, or when confined (pre-trial and post-trial) in foreign penal institutions.  DCOs will work with the appropriate U.S. COM, in coordination with the SDO/DATT, to make appropriate diplomatic contacts for non-military DoD personnel who are not U.S. nationals.
+
+3.4.  REPORTING TO THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
+DEFENSE (GC DOD).  The DCOs will report informally and immediately about important new cases or important developments in pending cases, including, but not limited to, instances of denial of the procedural safeguards under any applicable agreement; deficiency in the treatment or conditions of confinement in foreign penal institutions; and arbitrary denial of permission to visit DoD personnel.  Such reports are made to:
+
+a. The GC DoD. b. The applicable geographic Combatant Commander.
+c. The general counsel (GC) and the judge advocate general (JAG) of the respective Military Department, or if the case involves the Marine Corps or the Coast Guard:
+(1) Marine Corps.  To the GC of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
+
+(2) Coast Guard.  To the JAG of the Coast Guard.
+
+3.5.  INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.  The DCOs will take additional steps that may be authorized or required under relevant international agreements with the host nation to implement the policy of this issuance.
+
+## Section 4:  Procedures 4.1.  Country Law Studies.
+
+a. Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) will prepare a study of the relevant laws and legal procedures in effect for each foreign country in their area of responsibility where DoD personnel or their dependents are regularly stationed or are subject to its criminal jurisdiction. The GCCs will update these studies as reasonably required to ensure they reflect developments in the country's law.  Each study must include, at a minimum:
+(1) A general review of the relevant substantive and procedural criminal laws of the foreign country.
+
+(2) A comparison of such laws with the procedural safeguards of a fair trial in the federal courts of the United States, as described in Section 5.
+
+b. Whenever a country law study is prepared, the GCC must forward copies to:
+(1) GC DoD. (2) The Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
+(3) The GCs and the JAGs of the Military Departments and to:
+(a) Marine Corps.  The GC of the Navy and the SJA to the Commandant of the
+Marine Corps.
+(b) Coast Guard.  The JAG of the Coast Guard.
+c. There is no standard format or length for a country law study.
+(1) Principal emphasis should be on those safeguards that are of such a fundamental nature as to be guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States in all criminal trials in federal courts of the United States.
+(2) See Section 5 for safeguards considered particularly important.
+
+d. GCCs should consider developing a by-country list of relevant source materials, statutes, and websites to help with developing a country law study, should the need arise.
+
+e. If the authorities of a foreign country intend to try DoD personnel or their dependents, but there is no existing country law study on that foreign country, the GCC concerned will examine the foreign country's laws with particular reference to the procedural safeguards contained in Section 5.
+
+4.2.  FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION CASES INVOLVING SERVICE
+MEMBERS.  Commanders exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over Service members will make consistent efforts with appropriate officials of a foreign country to maximize U.S. jurisdiction to the extent practicable and consistent with applicable agreements.
+a. In cases where it appears probable that the release of jurisdiction over Service members will not be obtained, and the accused may not obtain a fair trial, the commander exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the accused must:
+
+(1) Promptly communicate directly with the DCO, reporting the full facts of the case.
+(2) Provide the DCO with a recommendation as to whether to request jurisdiction formally.
+
+b. The DCO will determine, in light of legal procedures in effect in that country, whether the accused is likely to receive a fair trial.
+(1) A trial will not be considered unfair merely because it is not conducted in a manner identical to trials held in the United States.
+(2) In determining whether a trial will be unfair, due regard must be given to those U.S.
+
+trial rights, listed in Section 5, that are relevant to the facts and circumstances of the trial in question.
+
+c. If the DCO determines there is risk of an unfair trial, he or she will decide, after consultation with the U.S. COM, in coordination with the SDO/DATT, whether to submit a request through diplomatic channels for the host nation to waive its jurisdiction.
+(1) The objective in each case is to maximize U.S. court-martial jurisdiction over Service members or to see that Service members obtain a fair trial in the host country under all circumstances.
+(2) If the DCO decides to submit a request for the host nation to waive its jurisdiction, the recommendation will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense (with an advance copy to the GC DoD), through the geographic Combatant Commander, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Military Department concerned or the Secretary of Homeland Security.  Copies of the recommendation must be provided to:
+
+(a) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
+(b) The JAG of the accused's Military Department or, in the case of the Marine Corps or Coast Guard:
+
+1. Marine Corps.  To the GC of the Navy and the SJA to the Commandant of the
+Marine Corps.
+2. Coast Guard.  To the JAG of the Coast Guard.
+(c) The Office of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
+
+4.3.  FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION CASES INVOLVING NON-MILITARY
+DOD PERSONNEL  When it appears that foreign authorities may exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-military DoD personnel:
+a. The DCO may request that local foreign authorities waive the exercise of host nation criminal jurisdiction if, after a careful consideration of all the circumstances, he or she determines that suitable action can be taken under existing U.S. laws or administrative regulations.
+
+b. If it appears possible that the accused may not obtain a fair trial, the commander exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the command to which such non-military DoD
+personnel are attached or with which they are associated will communicate directly with the DCO, reporting the full facts of the case.  The DCO will:
+(1) Determine, in the light of legal procedures in effect in that country, if there is a risk that the accused will not receive a fair trial.
+
+(2) If such a risk exists, decide, after consultation with the U.S. COM, in coordination with the SDO/DATT, whether to:
+(a) Submit, through diplomatic channels, a request to foreign authorities for assurances of a fair trial; or
+(b) In appropriate circumstances, request that the foreign authorities waive the exercise of jurisdiction over the accused.
+c. The DCO will submit the recommendation determined in Paragraph 4.3.b.(2) through the geographic Combatant Commander and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (with an advance copy to the GC DoD).  Copies must be provided to:
+
+(a) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
+(b) The JAG of the accused's Military Department or, in the case of the Marine Corps or Coast Guard:
+
+1. Marine Corps.  To the GC of the Navy and the SJA to the Commandant of the
+Marine Corps.
+2. Coast Guard.  To the JAG of the Coast Guard.
+(c) The Office of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
+
+## 4.4.  Trial Observers And Trial Observers' Reports.
+
+a. The DCO must maintain and submit, to the U.S. COM, in coordination with the SDO/DATT, a list of qualified people to serve as U.S. observers at trials before courts of the receiving country.
+(1) Nominees must be lawyers and must be selected for maturity of judgment.  The requirement that nominees must be lawyers may be waived in cases of minor offenses; incidents that result in serious personal injury or that would normally result in sentences of confinement, whether or not suspended, will not be considered minor offenses.
+
+(2) The list should include representatives of all Military Services whose members are stationed in that country to enable the U.S. COM, in coordination with the SDO/DATT, to appoint an observer from the same Military Service as the accused, whenever possible.
+b. Trial observers must attend and prepare formal reports in all cases of trials of DoD
+personnel by foreign courts or tribunals, except for minor offenses.  In cases of minor offenses, the observer will attend the trial at the discretion of the DCO, but will not be required to make a formal report.
+
+(1) Unless directed by the DCO, trial observers are not required to attend all preliminary proceedings, such as scheduling hearings, but will attend the trial on the merits and other preand post-trial proceedings where significant procedural or substantive matters are decided.
+
+(2) Trial observer reports need not be classified, but must be treated as "FOR OFFICIAL
+USE ONLY" documents, in accordance with Volume 4 of DoD Manual 5200.01.
+
+(3) Trial observers will forward their reports to the DCO.  The DCO will forward those reports, intact, along with any appropriate comments from the DCO, to the geographic Combatant Commander, the U.S. COM, and to the GC and the JAG of the accused's Military Department, or in the case of the Marine Corps or Coast Guard:
+(a) Marine Corps.  To the GC of the Navy and the SJA to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
+
+(b) Coast Guard.  To the JAG of the Coast Guard.
+
+(4) These reports must be forwarded immediately upon the completion of the trial in the lower court, and will not be delayed because of the possibility of a new trial, rehearing, or appeal.
+(5) Trial observers must forward reports of a new trial, rehearing, or appeal in the same manner as the original trial observer reports.
+c. The trial observer report must contain a factual description or summary of the trial proceedings.  It should enable those reading the report to make an informed judgment if:
+(1) There was any failure to comply with the procedural safeguards secured by a pertinent status of forces agreement.
+
+(2) The accused received a fair trial under all the circumstances.  The report must specify the conclusions of the trial observer with respect to Paragraph 4.4.c.(1), and must state in detail the basis for the conclusions.
+d. The trial observer must fulfill duties regarding the dependents of DoD personnel established by Part 151 of Title 32, CFR.
+
+e. The DCO, upon receipt of a trial observer report, will be responsible for determining if:
+(1) There was any failure to comply with the procedural safeguards secured by the pertinent status of forces agreement.
+
+(2) The accused received a fair trial under all the circumstances.  Due regard should be given to those fair trial rights listed in Section 5 that are relevant to the particular facts and circumstances of the trial.  A trial will not be determined to be unfair merely because it is not conducted in a manner identical to trials held in the United States.
+
+(a) If the DCO believes that the procedural safeguards specified in pertinent agreements were denied or that the trial was otherwise unfair, the DCO will submit a recommendation as to appropriate action to rectify the trial deficiencies and otherwise to protect the rights or interests of the accused.  This recommendation must include a statement of efforts taken or to be taken at the local level to protect the rights of the accused.
+
+(b) The DCO will submit the recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, through the geographic Combatant Commander concerned, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Military Department concerned or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with an advance copy to the GC DoD).  Copies must be provided to:
+
+1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
+2. The JAG of the accused's Military Department or, in the case of the Marine
+Corps or Coast Guard:
+a. Marine Corps.  To the GC of the Navy and the SJA to the Commandant of
+the Marine Corps.
+b. Coast Guard.  To the JAG of the Coast Guard.
+3. The Office of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+of a Military Department or the Secretary of Homeland Security may employ counsel and pay counsel and other fees and costs for those subject to Chapter 47 of Title 10, United States Code
+(U.S.C.), known in this issuance as the UCMJ, and who must appear before a foreign judicial tribunal or administrative agency, in accordance with Section 1037 of Title 10, U.S.C.  The Secretary concerned may authorize the payment of such fees under the following circumstances:
+a. Criminal Cases.  Requests for the provision of counsel fees and payment of expenses in criminal cases may be approved in pre-trial, trial, appellate, and post-trial proceedings in any criminal case where:
+(1) The criminal act occurred in the performance of official duty; (2) The sentence that is normally imposed includes confinement, whether or not such sentence is suspended;
+(3) Capital punishment might be imposed;
+(4) An appeal is made from any proceeding in which there appears to have been a denial of the substantial rights of the accused;
+(5) Conviction of the alleged offense could later form the basis for administrative discharge proceedings for misconduct as a result of civil court disposition; or
+(6) The case, although not within the criteria established in Paragraphs 5.a.(1) through
+5.a.(5), is considered to have significant impact on U.S. interests, including upon the relations of the Military Services with the host country.
+
+b. Civil Cases.  Requests for provision of counsel fees and payment of expenses in civil cases may be granted in trial and appellate proceedings in civil cases where:
+(1) The act complained of occurred in the performance of official duty by eligible DoD
+personnel, or was directed against eligible DoD personnel engaged in the performance of official duty; or
+(2) The case is considered to have a significant impact on the relations of the DoD or the Military Services with the host country; or in cases brought against eligible DoD personnel (and in exceptional cases, by such personnel) if the case is considered to involve any other U.S. interest.
+
+## C. Funding Restrictions.
+
+(1) No funds will be provided in accordance with this instruction in cases where the U.S.
+
+Government is - in actuality or in legal effect - the plaintiff or the defendant; all such cases will be referred to the Department of Justice, Office of Foreign Litigation.  No funds will be provided under this instruction, in accordance with Section 1037 of Title 10, United States Code, in cases where the Service member is a plaintiff without prior authorization of the Secretary of the Military Department concerned or the Secretary of Homeland Security.
+
+(a) The provisions of Paragraph 4.5.c.(1) are applicable to proceedings with civil aspects that are brought by eligible personnel as criminal cases in accordance with local law.
+
+(b) Funds for the posting of bail or bond to secure the release of personnel from confinement will be used as provided by applicable Service regulations.
+
+(2) As provided for in Section 1037 of Title 10, U.S.C., no funds will be provided under Paragraph 4.5.b. to a plaintiff who, if successful, would receive an award, in whole or in part, from the United States.
+
+(3) As provided for in Section 1037 of Title 10, U.S.C., a person on whose behalf a payment is made under this provision is not liable to reimburse the United States for that payment, unless he or she is responsible for the forfeiture of bail provided for him or her under this provision.
+
+4.6.  COUNSEL FEES AND RELATED ASSISTANCE FOR DOD PERSONNEL OR
+DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PERSONNEL NOT SUBJECT TO THE
+UCMJ.  In cases of exceptional interest to the Military Departments or the Department of Homeland Security involving DoD personnel or Department of Homeland Security personnel not subject to the UCMJ, the Secretary concerned may approve, in accordance with Section 1037 of Title 10, U.S.C., the provision of counsel fees and payment of expenses under the same conditions and circumstances outlined in Paragraph 4.5.
+
+## 4.7.  Treatment Of Service Members Confined In Foreign Penal Institutions.
+
+a. To the maximum extent practicable and subject to the laws and regulations of the country concerned and the provisions of any applicable agreement, the DoD will seek to maintain custody of an accused, or endeavor to secure the release of an accused to the custody of U.S. authorities, pending completion of all foreign judicial proceedings, including appeals.  The DoD
+seeks to ensure that Service members:
+
+(1) When in the custody of foreign authorities, are fairly treated at all times.
+(2) When confined (pretrial and post-trial) in foreign penal institutions, are treated appropriately and are entitled to all the rights, privileges, and protections of personnel confined in U.S. military facilities.  Such rights, privileges, and protections are identified in this issuance and in Military Department or Department of Homeland Security directives and regulations, and include, but are not limited to, legal assistance, visitation, medical attention, food, bedding, clothing, and health and comfort supplies.
+
+b. Service members confined in foreign penal institutions must be visited at least every
+30 days, at which time the conditions of confinement and other matters relating to their health and welfare must be observed.  The Military Departments, and the Department of Homeland Security by agreement, must maintain current records of these visits as reports by their respective commands.  Records of each visit, which must be maintained consistent with DoD Instructions 5400.11 and 5015.02, should contain:
+
+(1) Names of personnel conducting the visit and date of the visit.
+(2) Name of each prisoner visited, DoD identification number, and sentence.
+
+(3) Name and location of the prison.
+(4) Treatment of the individual prisoner by the prison warden and other personnel
+(include a short description of the rehabilitation program, if any, as applied to the prisoner).
+
+(5) Conditions existing in the prison, such as light, heat, sanitation, food, recreation, and religious accommodations.
+
+(6) Change in the status of the prisoner or conditions of confinement, including any transfer to another institution.
+
+(7) Condition of the prisoner (e.g., physical and mental).
+
+(8) Assistance given to the prisoner (e.g., legal, medical, food, bedding, clothing, and health and comfort supplies).
+
+(9) Action taken to have any deficiencies corrected, either by the local commander or through the U.S COM in coordination with the SDO/DATT.
+
+(10) Designation of the command responsible for the prisoner's welfare and reporting of visits.
+
+(11) Information as to discharge of a prisoner from the Military Service or termination of confinement.
+
+c. When it is impracticable for the individual's commanding officer or unit representative to make visits, the DCO should arrange for another entity to be responsible for such visits or request, in coordination with the SDO/DATT, that the appropriate U.S. COM assume such responsibility.
+(1) When necessary, a medical officer should participate in the visits and record the results of medical examinations.
+(2) If reasonable requests for permission to visit Service members are arbitrarily denied, or it is determined that the individual is being mistreated or that the conditions of custody or confinement are substandard, the case should be reported to the U.S. COM concerned, in coordination with the SDO/DATT, for appropriate action.
+
+d. When a DCO has arranged with the appropriate U.S. COM to assume responsibility for such visits, and when it is the practice of the U.S. COM to make such visits less frequently than once every 30 days, the DCO must inform the immediate higher headquarters in the individual's Service chain of command.
+
+(1) The DCO must:
+(a) Report all circumstances and conditions of confinement.
+(b) Provide a description of arrangements made regarding visitation, and the frequency of such visits.
+
+(c) Request a waiver of the 30-day requirement in Paragraph 4.7.b. from the higher headquarters commander.
+
+(2) The higher headquarters commander will determine, with advice from his or her SJA, whether the proposed arrangement affords sufficient protection for the individual in accordance with the guidance prescribed in this instruction, and whether to waive the 30-day requirement.
+
+(3) An informational copy of the waiver request and responsive correspondence must be provided to the relevant Military Department Secretary or the Secretary of Homeland Security, to the responsible geographic Combatant Commander, to the GC DoD, and to the relevant U.S.
+
+COM.
+
+e. To the extent possible, military commanders should seek to develop arrangements with local authorities whereby U.S. military authorities may be permitted to provide Service members who are confined in foreign institutions with the treatment, rights, privileges, and protections similar to those accorded such personnel confined in U.S. military facilities.  The details of such arrangements should be submitted to the JAG of the accused's Military Department or, in the case of the Marine Corps or the Coast Guard:
+
+(1) Marine Corps.  To the SJA to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. (2) Coast Guard.  To the JAG of the Coast Guard.
+f. Military commanders will arrange with appropriate foreign authorities for Service members to be turned over to U.S. military authorities when they are released from confinement. In appropriate cases, military authorities should ask the U.S. COM, in coordination with the SDO/DATT, to provide updates on the anticipated date of the release of such persons from foreign authorities.
+
+4.8.  TREATMENT OF NON-MILITARY DOD PERSONNEL CONFINED IN FOREIGN
+PENAL INSTITUTIONS.  In cooperation with the appropriate U.S. COM, in coordination with the SDO/DATT, and to the maximum extent possible, the DCO will ensure that non-military DoD personnel receive the same treatment, rights, and support as would be extended to Service members when in the custody of foreign authorities, or when confined (pretrial and post-trial) in foreign penal institutions.  The DCO will work with the appropriate U.S. COM, in coordination with the SDO/DATT, to make appropriate diplomatic contacts for the categories of personnel described in this section who are not U.S. nationals.
+
+4.9.  DISCHARGE.  The Military Services will not approve administrative discharge of Service members from the Military Service concerned while the member is confined in a foreign prison.
+a. The Military Service concerned will only approve a discharge when the accused Service member completes the term of imprisonment and returns to the United States.
+b. In exceptional cases, the Military Department Secretary concerned may authorize such discharges before the term of imprisonment is complete.
+
+4.10.  INFORMATION POLICY.  The general public and the Congress must be provided promptly with the maximum information concerning status of forces matters that are consistent with the national interest.  Information will be coordinated with the appropriate offices and provided to the public and the Congress in accordance with established procedures, including those in DoD Directives 5122.05, 5400.07, and 5400.11, and DoD Instruction 5400.04.
+
+## Section 5:  Fair Trial Guarantees
+
+5.1.  COUNTRY LAW STUDIES PREPARATIONS.  The list at Table 1 serves as a guide for the preparation of country law studies prescribed by Paragraph 4.1.a.
+Criminal statute alleged to be violated must set specific and definite standards of guilt. Accused will not be prosecuted under an *ex post facto* law. Accused will not be punished by bills of attainder.
+
+Accused must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and have a reasonable time to prepare a defense. Accused is entitled to have the assistance of defense counsel. Accused is entitled to be present at the trial. Accused is entitled to confront hostile witnesses. Accused is entitled to have a compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses. Use of evidence against the accused obtained through unreasonable search or seizure or other illegal means is prohibited. Burden of proof is on the government in all criminal trials. Accused is entitled to be tried by an impartial court. Accused may not be compelled to be a witness against him or herself; and will be protected from the use of a confession obtained by torture, threats, violence, or the exertion of any improper influence. Accused will not be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. Accused is entitled to be tried without unreasonable (prejudicial) delay. Accused is entitled to a competent interpreter when the accused does not understand the language in which the trial is conducted and does not have counsel proficient in the language both of the court and of the accused. Accused is entitled to a public trial. Accused may not be subjected to consecutive trials for the same offense in a manner indicative of fundamental unfairness.
+
+5.2.  DCO DETERMINATIONS.  This list also serves as a guide for the DCO in making determinations in accordance with the procedures in Paragraphs 4.2. through 4.4. and guidance in Part 151 of Title 32, CFR.  This list is not exhaustive; when evaluating foreign trial processes, DCOs should consider other factors that could result in a violation of due process of law in federal court proceedings in the United States.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+| CFR      | Code of Federal Regulations                  |
+|----------|----------------------------------------------|
+| COM      | chief of mission                             |
+| DCO      | designated commanding officer                |
+| GC       | general counsel                              |
+| GC DoD   | General Counsel of the Department of Defense |
+| GCC      | geographic Commandant Command                |
+| JAG      | judge advocate general                       |
+| SDO/DATT | senior defense official/defense attache      |
+| SJA      | staff judge advocate                         |
+| U.S.C.   | United States Code                           |
+| UCMJ     | Uniform Code of Military Justice             |
+
+G.2.  DEFINITIONS.  These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+area outside the United States.  Any area outside the United States and its territories and possessions, the northern Mariana Islands, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
+
+DCO.  The military officer who is designated by the appropriate geographic Combatant Commander to fulfill the duties outlined in this instruction.
+
+non-military DoD personnel.  Nationals and non-nationals of the United States who are serving with or accompanying the Military Services in an area outside the United States.
+DoD personnel.  Service members and non-military DoD personnel, when those personnel are in an area outside the United States in connection with official duties.  Service members and nonmilitary DoD personnel serving under a U.S. COM are not considered to be "DoD personnel" as defined in this instruction.
+
+Service.  Includes all Armed Forces, including the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S.
+
+Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard.
+
+## References
+
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32
+DoD Directive 5122.05, "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)),"
+August 7, 2017
+DoD Directive 5145.01, "General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC DoD),"
+December 2, 2013, as amended
+DoD Directive 5400.07, "DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program," April 5, 2019
+DoD Instruction 5015.02, "DoD Records Management Program," February 24, 2015, as
+amended
+DoD Instruction 5400.04, "Provision of Information to Congress," March 17, 2009
+DoD Instruction 5400.11, "DoD Privacy Program," January 29, 2019
+DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 4, "DoD Information Security Program: Controlled Unclassified
+Information (CUI)," February 24, 2012, as amended
+DoD Manual 8910.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Collections Manual:  Procedures for DoD
+Internal Information Collections," June 30, 2014, as amended
+United States Code, Title 10 U.S. Senate Resolution of Ratification, With Reservations, to the North Atlantic Treaty
+Organization Status of Forces Agreement, as agreed to by the Senate on July 15, 19531

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+## Dod Instruction 6055.15 Dod Laser Protection Program For Military Lasers
+
+ Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Effective:
+August 25, 2023 Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Instruction 6055.15, "DoD Laser Protection Program,"
+May 4, 2007, as amended Incorporates and Cancels: Directive-type Memorandum 19-013, "Managing Risk from
+Electromagnetic Field Radiation Emitters and Lasers," December 27, 2019, as amended Approved by:
+Gilbert R. Cisneros, Jr., Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+ Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5124.02 and the April 10, 2019
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, this issuance:
+
+- Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures in support of DoD Instruction
+(DoDI) 6055.01 to protect the health and safety of DoD personnel and the public from the operation of military lasers.
+- Establishes the DoD Laser Systems Safety Working Group (LSSWG), the DoD Laser Safety Event
+Hotline, and the Laser Accident and Incident Registry.
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3 1.3.  Information Collections. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 4
+2.1.  Assistant Secretary of Defense For Readiness (ASD(R))........ 4 2.2.  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. ........ 4 2.3.  Under Secretary of Defense for research and Engineering. ........ 4 2.4.  DoD Component Heads. ........ 4 2.5.  Secretaries of the Military Departments. ........ 5 2.6.  Secretary of the Air Force. ........ 6
+SECTION 3:  DOD COMPONENT PROCEDURES ........ 7
+3.1.  General. ........ 7
+a.  Military Department LSRA. ........ 7 b.  Military Department LSRC. ........ 7 c.  Military Department LSRRA. ........ 8
+3.2.  Regulatory Requirements for Lasers and FDA Military Exemption. ........ 8
+a.  Background. ........ 8 b.  Lasers Complying with the Requirements of the FLLPS. ........ 9 c.  Lasers Exempted under the FDA Military Exemption. ........ 9 d.  Lasers Operating with an FDA Variance. ........ 10
+3.3.  Acquisition. ........ 11 3.4.  Training. ........ 20 3.5.  Exposure and Medical Surveillance. ........ 20 3.6.  Laser Safety Event Reporting. ........ 21 3.7.  Inventory Control. ........ 21 3.8.  Controlling Exposures. ........ 22 3.9.  Laser Risk Management for Military-Specific Lasers. ........ 22
+3.10.  Laser Risk Management for Lasers Compliant with the FLPPS or Using an FDA
+Variance. ........ 24
+SECTION 4:  DOD LSSWG FUNCTIONS ........ 27 SECTION 5:  DOD LASER SAFETY EVENT HOTLINE FUNCTIONS ........ 28 GLOSSARY ........ 29
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 29 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 29
+REFERENCES ........ 32
+
+Figure 1.  DoD Exemption Notification for Fielding or Fielded Systems (Template) ........ 13 Figure 2.  DoD Exemption Notification for T&E Systems (Template) ........ 18
+
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+This issuance:
+a.  Applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+b.  Applies to the acquisition, procurement, and use of DoD military-specific lasers that qualify for military exemption from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (i.e., FDA Exemption Number 76EL-01DOD, also known and referred to in this issuance as the "FDA
+military exemption," established in the FDA "Letter of Exemption from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for DoD Exemption from Provisions of 21 CFR 1040," referred to in this issuance as the "FDA military exemption letter.")
+c.  Does not apply to:
+(1)  Laser systems or personnel associated with lasers used for industrial, medical, or dental applications that do not qualify for exemptions specified in the FDA military exemption letter.
+
+(2)  Human effects from laser radiation exposure associated with the development of nonlethal weapons as described in DoDI 3200.19.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+The DoD will:
+a.  Protect DoD personnel and the public from the risk of death, injury, or illness or property damage from the use of military lasers.
+
+b.  Safeguard defense systems, infrastructure, property, and the environment from accidental harm while executing its mission requirements in support of national defense.
+
+## 1.3.  Information Collections.
+
+The laser incident and mishap response report, referred to in Paragraph 3.6., does not require licensing with a report control symbol in accordance with Paragraphs 1.b.(4) and 1.b.(5) of Enclosure 3 in Volume 1 of DoD Manual (DoDM) 8910.01.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities 2.1.  Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Readiness (Asd(R)).
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the ASD(R):
+a.  Oversees the implementation of this issuance and represents the Secretary of Defense on both internal and interagency laser safety and health matters.
+
+b.  Represents DoD safety and occupational health interests to Federal agencies.  The ASD(R) is the sole interface with the FDA for DoD policy issues.
+
+c.  Establishes the DoD LSSWG to provide guidance and recommend policy on laser safety and health matters within the DoD.  The functions of the DoD LSSWG are described in Section 4.
+
+## 2.2.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Acquisition And Sustainment.
+
+The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment establishes DoD acquisition and sustainment policies for laser equipment and laser systems, including supply chain management.
+
+## 2.3.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Research And Engineering.
+
+The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering establishes DoD developmental testing and evaluation policies and capabilities across the Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) in accordance with DoDD 3200.11, including a risk management approach to address the uncertainties associated with developmental test and evaluation (T&E).
+
+## 2.4.  Dod Component Heads.
+
+The DoD Component heads:
+a.  Establish and maintain laser health and safety protection programs for their respective Components, in accordance with DoDI 6055.01 and Section 3 of this issuance.
+
+b.  Include laser injury prevention, collateral damage prevention, laser safety education, and laser incident and mishap reporting procedures during all routine laser safety training events.
+
+c.  Appoint functional area experts for laser health and safety issues to the DoD LSSWG. d.  Establish laser system-specific health and safety programs to protect personnel and equipment.
+
+e.  Conduct range safety reviews for laser use on DoD ranges.
+f.  Identify laser workers and perform occupational medical surveillance of these workers in accordance with DoDM 6055.05.
+
+## 2.5.  Secretaries Of The Military Departments.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.4., the Secretaries of the Military Departments:
+a.  Develop, test, and use laser systems to the extent practicable, that comply with Sections 1040.10 and 1040.11 and Part 1002 of Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), collectively referred to in this issuance as the Federal Laser Product Performance Standards (FLPPS), consistent with the guidance in Paragraph 2.5.b.
+
+b.  Authorize use of the FDA military exemption and implement alternate control measures in accordance with Military Standard MIL-STD-1425A or other Military Service-specific requirements to mitigate risks of laser use for military-specific laser systems that cannot comply with all FLPPS due to operational mission requirements.  Use of this exemption is limited to the exemption of the provisions in the FLPPS, excluding Section 1002.20 of Title 21, CFR.
+
+c.  Establish and maintain a records repository, to include copies of all DoD exemption notification letters (ENLs), as documentation of those DoD laser systems that qualify for the FDA military exemption as specified within the FDA military exemption letter.  Additionally, include copies of all applicable FDA variances in this records repository.
+
+d.  Establish and maintain an inventory of all Class IIIb and Class IV lasers and all lasers covered by an FDA exemption or variance, regardless of class.
+
+e.  Establish Military Department-specific laser safety review processes to:
+(1)  Conduct laser safety reviews of all military-specific lasers, including those with an FDA-issued variance or exemption, that, when used as designed, could expose people to laser radiation in excess of established maximum permissible exposures (MPEs) or visual interference levels as defined in American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Z136.1 and ANSI Z136.6. The laser safety reviews will include considerations for safe use and an assessment of regulatory and policy compliance.
+
+(2)  Conduct a laser safety review in accordance with DoDI 5000.69, when two or more Military Departments plan to acquire the same laser system.
+
+f.  Designate laser safety review authorities (LSRAs), laser safety review coordinators
+(LSRCs), and laser safety range review assessors (LSRRAs).
+
+
+
+## 2.6.  Secretary Of The Air Force.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraphs 2.4. and 2.5., the Secretary of the Air Force establishes, administers, and maintains the DoD Laser Safety Event Hotline at commercial 800-
+473-3549 or Defense Switched Network (DSN) 312-798-3764 to:
+a.  Provide 24-hour consultation assistance on health effects and treatment in the event of an injury or suspected injury to DoD personnel from lasers.
+
+b.  Serve as a centralized repository for the recording of laser safety event reports.  Section 5
+describes functions of the DoD Laser Safety Event Hotline.
+
+## Section 3:  Dod Component Procedures 3.1.  General.
+
+The DoD Components implement these procedures within their Component, as appropriate.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments will assign the following officials to assist in implementing these procedures.
+
+## A.  Military Department Lsra.
+
+The LSRA is the approval authority for use of the FDA military exemption for that Military Department.  For prototype laser units delivered to an LSRC for the purposes of laser hazard evaluation (LHE) and standards compliance verification, the LSRC can act as the exemption approval authority.
+
+(1)  In accordance with the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, military acquisition program decision authority resides in the associated acquisition program office or superior acquisition authority.  Being an LSRA creates no acquisition authority.  The LSRA can provide laser safety advice and recommendations.  The LSRA has authority for stipulating laser use requirements (how, where, and by whom lasers are used).
+
+(2)  The LSRA will:
+(a)  Make sure that any exemption request is processed and issued in accordance with Paragraph 3.3. of this issuance, the FLPPS, Military Standard MIL-STD-1425A, and applicable Military Department policy and guidance.
+
+(b)  Maintain the repository described in Paragraph 2.5.c.
+
+(c)  Maintain the inventory described in Paragraph 2.5.d.  This inventory will include laser systems throughout the acquisition lifecycle.
+
+(d)  Determine the effectiveness of safety mitigations for the acquisition and use of laser products and use the subject matter expertise of the LSRC described in Paragraph 3.1.b. and LSRRA described in Paragraph 3.1.c. to provide or verify independent range and laser hazard parameters.
+
+## B.  Military Department Lsrc.
+
+The LSRC provides independent subject matter expertise to the LSRA for the review and evaluation of laser hazard parameters as part of the LHE.  Additionally, the Military Department LSRCs coordinate evaluations of laser systems to be used by more than one Military Department and share information in accordance with DoDI 5000.69.
+
+
+## C.  Military Department Lsrra.
+
+The LSRRA is the designated independent range review authority with the subject matter expertise to assess the safe use of lasers on ranges.  The LSRRA will:
+(1)  Consider guidance from Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-828C and other appropriate laser range evaluation and assessment tools in accordance with Military Department-specific laser safety program policy and procedures.
+
+(2)  Use laser safety data provided by the LSRC when assessing ranges.
+
+(3)  Provide a laser range safety assessment report to the cognizant range certification authority.  The assessment will include risks and possible remediation, including appropriate protections, mitigations, and precautions.
+
+(4)  Advise the LSRA on the safe use of lasers on ranges and recommend appropriate limitations and controls for such use.
+
+## 3.2.  Regulatory Requirements For Lasers And Fda Military Exemption. A.  Background.
+
+(1)  The Electronic Product Radiation Control provisions of Chapter 9 of Title 21, United States Code, also known as the "Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act," gives the FDA the authority to regulate lasers in the United States, regardless of application.  Part of this established regulatory process requires the manufacturer of the laser to report the laser product to the FDA and self-certify the laser product's compliance with the provisions of the FLPPS.
+
+(2)  The FDA issues variances to laser product manufacturers to permit them to deviate from certain regulatory requirements within the FLPPS.  Any such variance includes conditions of applicability and alternate controls or limits of distribution.  The DoD, either directly or via designated LSRAs, may add additional requirements, but cannot authorize alternate controls from those designated by the FDA within the variance.
+
+(3)  The FDA also has the authority to issue exemptions.  As with FDA variances, exemptions contain conditions of applicability.  In support of DoD military operations, the DoD may use laser devices that cannot meet all the requirements of the FLPPS due to mission requirements.  For this reason, the FDA allows for the exemption from certain portions of the FLPPS for the DoD.  This exemption, commonly referred to as the "FDA military exemption letter," was granted to the DoD for laser products procured for combat or combat training or that are classified for reasons of national security.  Additional details are provided in FDA Laser Notice Number 52.
+
+(4)  The FDA military exemption letter specifies limitations on the use of the FDA
+military exemption.  Additionally, any laser using the exemption must meet all requirements of the FLPPS except for those specific requirements that would preclude DoD's mission requirements.
+
+(a)  The FDA military exemption letter requires that exempted lasers be labeled as exempted and that an inventory of exempted lasers be maintained and made available to the FDA upon request.
+
+(b)  As a condition of the FDA military exemption, the FDA directs the DoD to establish, maintain, and oversee the use of alternate control measures and their effectiveness to ensure an appropriate level of safety.  This means that when the DoD plans to obtain a laser product from a vendor, the vendor cannot deliver the laser product under the FDA military exemption until they receive permission to do so by the DoD procuring agent in the form of an FDA military exemption notification.  See Figures 1 or 2 for exemption notification templates available for use by procuring agents.
+
+(5)  The FDA military exemption letter provides a pathway for a laser to be delivered from a vendor to DoD.  Use of the FDA military exemption notification described in Paragraph 3.2.a.(4) is limited only to vendors that deliver laser products to DoD.  If the vendor is a system or device importer or reseller and not the laser product manufacturer as determined by the FDA, then that vendor is responsible to coordinate with the laser product manufacturer to verify that all FDA regulatory requirements are satisfied.
+
+## B.  Lasers Complying With The Requirements Of The Fllps.
+
+Those lasers registered and meeting the requirements of the FLPPS will be reviewed by the LSRA; however, the LSRA cannot approve or accept alternate control measures that would invalidate compliance with FLPPS.  The LSRA may provide guidance, recommendations, or requirements appropriate for the safe use of the laser concerned.
+
+## C.  Lasers Exempted Under The Fda Military Exemption.
+
+(1)  The FDA military exemption is applied to laser products used exclusively by DoD
+Components for combat or combat training, or if the laser product's operational capabilities or vulnerabilities are classified in the interest of national security.
+
+(2)  The FDA military exemption cannot be used if the intended use for the laser does not require any deviations from the FLPPS.
+
+(3)  Common uses of the FDA military exemption include the need to use muted colored labels on laser products, the need to redact data on the laser product's label due to security classification, or a lack of a startup delay for high-powered, covert, tactical laser applications.
+
+(4)  The LSRA has the authority and responsibility to determine the appropriate circumstances where the use of the FDA military exemption is appropriate and to require appropriate control measures to enhance safety during laser use.
+
+(5)  Exempted laser products will:
+(a)  Comply with all provisions of the FLPPS, where practical, as determined by the LSRA.
+
+(b)  Meet the requirements of the Military Standard MIL-STD-1425A or alternate Military Department-specific requirements as approved by the LSRA.
+
+(6)  In the rare case where it is not possible to meet the standards described in Paragraphs 3.2.c.(5)(a) and 3.2.c.(5)(b) of this issuance, the LSRA will develop risk management procedures in accordance with DoDI 5000.02.  The LSRA will apply and document controls and other hazard mitigations in accordance with Military Standard MIL-STD-882E and provide mitigation control recommendations to the acquisition program manager and user representative.
+
+d.  Lasers Operating with an FDA Variance.
+
+(1)  Those laser products that cannot meet all the requirements of the FLPPS, and do not qualify for the FDA military exemption, will only be accepted for use by the DoD after completion of one of the following actions:
+(a)  The laser product is made compliant with the FLPPS; or
+(b)  The laser product's manufacturer first obtains a variance from the FDA as described in Paragraph 3.2.a.(2).
+
+(2)  If the FDA issues a variance to a manufacturer for a laser product, that variance is contingent upon any restrictions or limitations determined by the FDA in that variance.  The LSRA can require additional controls, restrictions, limitations, and safety mitigations as they deem necessary, but cannot authorize procurement or use of alternate controls from the requirements issued by the FDA in the variance.
+
+(3)  If the controls required by the FDA variance cannot be met due to operational mission needs, a new or updated variance or FDA military exemption would need to be obtained. The LSRC and LSRA can provide additional information for the appropriate use of an FDA variance for military use.
+
+(4)  Laser products with FDA variances will:
+(a)  Comply with all requirements of the FLPPS, where applicable, as determined by the LSRA.
+
+(b)  Meet the requirements and restrictions of the FDA variance and any additional requirements determined by the LSRA or Military Department-specific policy or authority, as applicable.
+
+
+
+## 3.3.  Acquisition.
+
+a.  All lasers acquired will have FDA registration, an FDA approved variance, or a military exemption.  All lasers acquired within the scope of this issuance will be assessed for compliance with the provisions of the FLPPS by the LRSA or LSRC.
+
+b.  Requiring activities will work with supporting contracting activities to ensure solicitations and contracts clearly contain any necessary regulatory requirements for variance or exemption as described in Paragraph 3.2. to ensure offerors understand the requirement.
+
+c.  Any solicitation for a laser product will state if only FDA registered, or FDA variance approved laser products are acceptable or if the LSRA will entertain granting a military exemption.  In the case of the later, the solicitation shall clearly state what additional documentation the offeror must provide to enable the LSRA to make a decision; the solicitation shall also state whether the offeror can be determined acceptable if the LSRA decides not to grant an exemption.  The contracting activity will require any offeror proposing a laser product with either FDA registration of an FDA approved variance to provide, as part of the offeror's offer, the FDA accession number or FDA variance unique to the model of the laser product being offered.
+
+d.  For laser products having an FDA approved variance, the offeror will follow any of the FDA's restrictions or limitations as described within the variance.
+
+(1)  For lasers utilizing an FDA approved variance, the LSRC should perform an LHE to independently determine or verify laser hazard parameters before testing, fielding, training, operations, or other use by the DoD.
+
+(2)  LSRA involvement for lasers utilizing an FDA approved variance will be in accordance with Paragraph 3.9.f. of this issuance and Military Department-specific policy.
+
+Developmental T&E laser products that transition to operational or other non-developmental status will comply with Military Department-specific fielding approval processes and requirements.
+
+e.  Copies of accepted FDA military ENLs will be retained by the LSRA and the associated requiring activity.
+
+(1)  If the LSRA, with advice from the LSRC, approves of the use of the FDA military exemption, the LSRA will issue an exemption notification to the requiring activity who will provide that to the contracting office for transmittal to the offeror.  The template formats in Figures 1 and 2 should be used in the exemption notification to the manufacturer.
+
+(2)  The scope of applicability for the exemption should be limited to the maximum extent practicable.
+
+(3)  The DoD exemption notification for fielding or fielding systems template, as shown in Figure 1, will be used for those laser systems to be fielded or delivered for operational testing or training.  The following describes the assignment of the exemption notification identifier to include serializing the FDA military ENLs.
+
+(a)  Military ENLs are required to contain a unique 22-character exemption notification identifier code (ENIC) assigned by the LSRC (i.e., "ABBBBCCCCDDDDEEE").  The following defines the format required for this code and provides an example:
+1.  A, Notification Type: either "P" for provisional or "F" for fielded.
+Provisional ENLs are limited to prototype, demonstration, or test systems. The "Fielded" notification type can apply to laser systems that are farther along in their development process and are not expected to have significant changes in the future.  For example, few changes that would affect the exemption would be expected for systems in low-rate initial production or operational T&E, even though they are not fielded systems.
+
+2.  "BBBB" is the date the ENL is issued (YYMMDD).
+
+3.  "CCCC" is the date the ENL expires (YYMMDD).  If the ENL does not have an expiration date, this should be "000000".  After this date, the manufacturer is no longer permitted to deliver laser products by reference of this ENL.  This has no bearing on the user.
+
+4.  "DDDD" is the unit identification code for the unit of assignment of the person signing the ENL.
+
+5.  "EEE" is a three-character unique code (at the discretion of the issuer).
+This may be the organizational code, or any other code that ensures that the overall ENIC is truly unique.
+6.  For example, if Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, Unit Identification Code N00178, issued an ENIC for a laser system on March 18, 2021 that is valid for 3 years, and where this laser will be used for testing purposes only, the ENIC could be: ENIC: P210318240318N00178G73.  In this example, the ENIC issuer decided to use an organizational code for the last three characters.  If they issued another exemption notification on the same day, they would be required to use a different three-character code or to use a different date on the ENL.
+
+(b)  In accordance with Paragraph 3.3., FDA military ENLs to manufacturers or importers of T&E and fielded systems should be written using the templates in Figures 1 and 2. A template is available from the appropriate LSRC and LSRA.
+
+(4)  For those laser prototypes or laser devices under development that do not have all the information required for the fielding systems, the template in Figure 2 should be used.
+
+(a)  This template will include as much information as is available.
+(b)  Military ENICs are required for use on this template.  Developing and serializing the ENIC will follow the same procedure as described in Paragraph 3.3.e.(3)(a).
+
+
+
+(5)  For those laser systems and devices delivered to an LSRC for the purposes of LHE
+and standards compliance verification, notification for authorization to use the exemption will be temporary and limited.
+
+f.  Military-specific lasers within the Defense Logistics Agency supply system will additionally be reviewed for compliance with DoDI 5000.69 before assigning a national stock number as specified in Volume 2 of DoDM 4140.01 and DoDM 4100.39.
+
+g.  Military-specific laser systems that follow non-traditional acquisition processes (e.g., rapid acquisitions, middle-tier acquisitions) may apply Department-specific approval processes in accordance with Paragraph 3.3.f.(2) of this issuance.
+
+h.  DoD acquisition program offices will develop requirements and sources of supply and bring new items into the DoD inventory in accordance with the procedures in Volume 1 of DoDM 4140.01.  The DoD acquisition program offices will not authorize deviations from an FDA variance.  If additional capabilities are necessary beyond the variance, the program office may discuss with the LSRA the possibility of granting an exemption.
+
+## 3.4.  Training.
+
+a.  Laser safety training will be provided for:
+(1)  Laser safety officers who are responsible for administrating laser safety programs.
+
+(2)  Personnel that may be exposed to laser hazards before operations that may result in exposure over the MPE.  Training will include specific laser hazard information and operational and safety procedures commensurate with both duties and potential risk.
+
+(3)  Personnel who operate or maintain Class IIIb and Class IV lasers and others that may be at risk of being exposed to laser energy greater than the MPE.  This training should be completed annually.
+
+b.  Laser safety training will include, at a minimum:
+(1)  Potential hazards associated with exposure to the laser beam.
+(2)  Laser product safety information to include laser classification, hazard distances, optical density requirements for laser eye protection, control measures to mitigate hazards, and laser incident reporting requirements and procedures.
+
+c.  The LSRA or LSRC may provide additional training and guidance that may include Military Department or Military Service-specific training policy, guidance, and commercial standards.
+
+## 3.5.  Exposure And Medical Surveillance.
+
+a.  Workers who use lasers must be identified as required by DoDM 6055.05.  All laser exposures and exposure controls will be documented in the DoD Occupational and Environmental Health Readiness System-Industrial Hygiene information management system in accordance with DoDI 6055.05.
+
+b.  Occupational medical surveillance for laser workers must be performed in accordance with DoDM 6055.05.
+
+c.  In addition to the reporting procedures described in Paragraph 3.6. of this issuance, DoD
+personnel who experience a laser exposure by way of laser misuse causing intentional or unintentional exposures (e.g., unknowing aircraft illumination) should follow the reporting procedures of DoDI 6055.07 for those exposures resulting in an occupational injury as determined by a licensed occupational medicine or other qualified health care provider.
+
+## 3.6.  Laser Safety Event Reporting.
+
+a.  Laser events (e.g., incidents and mishaps) involving DoD personnel or air, ground, and naval assets must be reported in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3320.02E.
+
+b.  If a suspected overexposure occurs, the DoD Laser Safety Event Hotline will be contacted immediately.
+c.  All laser events (i.e., mishaps and incidents) must be reported to the DoD Laser Safety Event Hotline.  The DoD Component representative making the report will provide all information and comply with all response actions as directed by the operator of the DoD Laser Safety Event Hotline.  These reports do not replace established safety investigation procedures conducted pursuant to DoDI 6055.07 or Component-specific notification procedures.  Section 5
+includes additional information for the DoD Laser Safety Event Hotline.
+
+## 3.7.  Inventory Control.
+
+a.  All procedures for materiel management of lasers must be implemented in accordance with DoD supply chain policy and procedures as described in DoDIs 4140.01 and 4160.28; Volumes 1 and 10 of DoDM 4140.01; Volume 1 and 4 of DoDM 4160.21; and Volume 1 of DoDM 4160.28.
+
+b.  Inventory control provisions established in the FLPPS must be satisfied for non-exempted laser products.
+
+c.  DoD-exempted laser products must be properly accounted for, labeled, and ultimately disposed of in accordance with the FDA military exemption letter; DoDIs 4140.01 and 4160.28; Volume 6 of DoDM 4140.01; Volumes 1 and 4 of DoDM 4160.21; Volume 1 of DoDM
+4160.28; and Military Standard MIL-STD-1425A.
+
+d.  Laser products with an FDA variance must be properly accounted for, labeled, and ultimately disposed of in accordance with the stipulations of the FDA variance.
+
+e.  DoD-exempted lasers must be reused or transferred in accordance with DoDIs 2030.08,
+4140.01, and 4160.28; Volumes 6, 8, and 11 of DoDM 4140.01; Volumes 1 and 4 of DoDM 4160.21; Volume 1 of DoDM 4160.28; and Military Department-specific policy.
+
+f.  If the procurement activity, LSRA, or LSRC determines that a transfer of an FDA-
+exempted laser is outside the scope of the DoD exemption notification, a new DoD exemption notification is required, and the source of the transfer is responsible to complete the exemption notification.  The procurement activity will consult with the LSRA or LSRC if additional clarification is required.
+
+g.  The Military Departments will maintain inventory records indefinitely for lasers that are transferred, demilitarized by destruction, or brought into FLPPS compliance.
+
+## 3.8.  Controlling Exposures.
+
+a.  LSRAs will establish thresholds for acceptable risk of exposure to levels above MPE.  In areas where the risk of laser radiation exposure exceeds the acceptable risk thresholds as established by the LSRA, control procedures will be established.  This requirement excludes combat areas of operation.  In combat areas of operation, laser product operators and those known to be in a potential overexposure situation will be trained to recognize the hazards and to employ appropriate protective measures.
+
+b.  Engineering controls will be used, where feasible, to mitigate risk posed by laser radiation.  Administrative controls and, if necessary, personal protective equipment can be used in accordance with Military Standard MIL-STD-1425A with additional guidance available in Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-828C and ANSI Z136.6 when engineering controls result in remaining, unacceptable, residual risk.
+
+c.  Range safety policies and procedures will be established for the use of lasers and laser systems where testing, training, or operational use could expose non-participants to harmful emissions.  The established policies and procedures following the guidance in Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-828C and ANSI Z136.6 will ensure proper control of laser emissions and use of barriers for limiting exposure to harmful laser radiation, such that the risk of harm to people, property, and infrastructure is maintained at or below the established acceptable risk thresholds.
+
+## 3.9.  Laser Risk Management For Military-Specific Lasers.
+
+a.  The LSRA will perform a laser hazard analysis (LHA) for compliance with provisions of the FLPPS before laser use.  For FDA-exempted lasers, the LSRA will conduct the LHA considering compliance with Military Standard MIL-STD-1425A.
+
+b.  T&E laser use includes experiments, tests, prototypes, and demonstrations of laser use involving DoD personnel or where the T&E activity is performed on DoD-controlled property (e.g., DoD training ranges).  The proponents for T&E laser use will:
+
+(1)  Determine the scale and scope (i.e., operating conditions) of the laser activity.
+(2)  Use safety practices and follow guidance as described in ANSI Z136.6, Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-828C, and follow applicable policies of the Military Department with jurisdiction over the operation of the range.
+
+c.  Non-T&E laser use on DoD ranges includes training and operation of non-developmental, fielded laser equipment and laser systems involving DoD personnel.  The proponent(s) for non- T&E laser use will:
+
+(1)  Determine the scale and scope of the laser activity.
+(2)  Use safety practices as described in ANSI Z136.6 and Military Handbook MIL-
+HDBK-828C in addition to the applicable policies and guidance of the Military Department with jurisdiction over the operation of the range.
+
+d.  If the laser use activity meets the definition of "outdoor," as defined in the Glossary:
+
+(1)  The procuring activity will submit the laser system to the LSRC for an LHE.
+(2)  The procuring activity will formally request a review by the LSRA.
+(3)  LSRA will perform an LHA utilizing the completed LHE provided by the LSRC and activity-specific laser use information provided by the proponent.  Information from the LSRRA may be included, as needed.
+
+(4)  LSRA will approve or disapprove the activity based on the efficacy of laser risk mitigation to personnel, property, and the environment.  The LSRA may include limiting parameters for use, as they deem appropriate.
+
+(5)  If the activity is not approved, the LSRA will provide justification for the disapproval; the proponent will alter the laser use or laser safety mitigations to satisfy the LSRA's objections; and the process will revert to Paragraph 3.9.b.(1).
+
+(6)  The procuring activity will formally request additional review(s) by the LSRA and/or the LSRC if any changes occur that extend beyond the scope of the LSRA's approval.
+
+e.  For laser use before operational use and fielding:
+
+(1)  The procuring activity will submit the laser system to the LSRC for an LHE.
+(2)  The procuring activity will formally request a review by the LSRA.
+(3)  The LSRA will perform an LHA utilizing the completed LHE provided by the LSRC
+and considering all potential operations provided by the proponent(s).  This includes maintenance, operational use, and training.
+
+(4)  The LSRA will approve or disapprove operational use and fielding of the laser product based on the efficacy of laser risk mitigation to personnel, property, and the environment.  If the LSRA does not approve the operational use and fielding of the laser product, they will provide to the procuring activity:
+
+(a)  Justification for the disapproval. (b)  Risk mitigation recommendations.
+(5)  The procuring activity, when practicable, implements LHA recommendations.  When implementation of designated mitigations is not practicable due to established mission requirements, the procuring activity will provide the LSRA with a rationale.  The rationale will be endorsed by the appropriate risk acceptance authority associated with the risk level pursuant to DoDI 5000.02.
+
+(6)  The procuring activity will request additional review(s) by the LSRA when all risk mitigation concerns have been addressed, whether by implementation or rationale.
+
+(7)  The LSRA will provide final concurrence or non-concurrence for operational use and fielding based on the controls implemented or rationale provided by the procuring activity.  If the LSRA does not concur, they will provide justification for their non-concurrence and will provide additional or alternate risk mitigation recommendations to the procuring activity.
+
+f.  For Military Department-specific laser products within programs that utilize the adaptive acquisition framework (AAF) in accordance with DoDI 5000.02, the procuring activities:
+(1)  Solicit the LSRC for guidance and recommendations to support system safety in accordance with Military Standard MIL-STD-882E.
+
+(2)  Perform LHA throughout the AAF and document the findings.
+(3)  Minimize or eliminate safety risk associated with the use of the laser system.
+g.  For systems within the AAF when it is not possible to comply with the requirements in Paragraph 3.9. because of military operational necessity, these risk management procedures will be followed:
+(1)  For laser systems in research, development, test, and evaluation processes, follow the requirements of DoDIs 5000.02 and 5000.69, Military Standards MIL-STD-882E and MIL-
+STD- 1425A, and Paragraph 3.9.b. of this issuance, as applicable.
+
+(2)  For systems used in training, operations, and other activities not under the configuration control of an acquisition program office, the requirements of Paragraph 8.a.(3) of Enclosure 3 of DoDI 6055.01 for risk management under conditions of military necessity will be followed.  When the design or operation of the system changes or when a change occurs in the decision-making authority, risk management for these systems will be reevaluated.
+
+(3)  For systems in development or use by multiple DoD Components, the lead Component will coordinate a joint risk assessment through the DoD LSSWG.
+
+## 3.10.  Laser Risk Management For Lasers Compliant With The Flpps Or Using An Fda Variance.
+
+a.  The LSRA will perform an LHA to determine compliance with provisions of the FLPPS
+before use.  For lasers with an FDA variance, the LHA will consider compliance with the requirements and limits of the variance and any additional designated DoD safety mitigations.
+
+b.  The proponents for T&E laser use will:
+(1)  Determine the scale and scope (i.e., operating conditions) of the laser activity.
+
+(2)  Use safety practices and follow guidance as described in ANSI Z136.6 and Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-828C, and follow applicable policies of the Military Department with jurisdiction over the operation of the range.
+
+c.  In addition to any requirements or limitations of an FDA variance (if applicable), the proponent(s) for non-T&E laser use will:
+(1)  Determine the scale and scope of the laser activity.
+
+(2)  Use safety practices as described in ANSI Z136.6 and Military Handbook MIL-
+HDBK-828C in addition to the applicable policies and guidance of the Military Department with jurisdiction over the operation of the range.
+
+d.  If the laser use activity meets the definition of "outdoor," as defined in the Glossary:
+(1)  The procuring activity will submit the laser system to the LSRC for an LHE.
+(2)  The procuring activity will formally request a review by the LSRA.
+(3)  The LSRA will perform an LHA utilizing the completed LHE provided by the LSRC
+and activity-specific laser use information provided by the proponent.  Information from the LSRRA may be included, as needed.
+
+(4)  The LSRA will approve or disapprove the activity based on the efficacy of laser risk mitigation to personnel, property, and the environment and the restrictions of an FDA variance (if applicable).  The LSRA may include additional limiting parameters for use, as they deem appropriate.
+
+(5)  If the activity is not approved, the LSRA will provide justification for the disapproval; the proponent will alter the laser or laser safety mitigations to satisfy the LSRA's objections; and the process reverts to Paragraph 3.10.b.(1).
+
+(6)  The procuring activity will formally request additional review(s) by the LSRA and/or the LSRC if any changes occur that extend beyond the scope of the LSRA's approval.
+
+e.  For laser use before operational use and fielding:
+(1)  The procuring activity will submit the laser system to the LSRC for an LHE.  If the laser is using an FDA variance, the LHE will include verification of compliance of any requirements or limitations of that variance.
+
+(2)  The procuring activity will formally request an LSRA review. (3)  The LSRA will perform an LHA utilizing the completed LHE provided by the LSRC
+and considering all activity-specific laser use information provided by the proponent.
+
+(4)  The LSRA will approve or disapprove of the laser use activity based on the efficacy of laser risk mitigation to personnel, property, and the environment and consistent with any requirements of an FDA variance (if applicable).  The LSRA may include additional limiting restrictions for use, as they deem necessary, but may not authorize deviations from requirements of any applicable FDA variance.
+
+(5)  If the activity is not approved, the LSRA will provide justification for the disapproval.  The proponent will alter the laser or laser safety mitigations to satisfy the LSRA's objections and will request additional review(s) by the LSRA or the LSRC, if necessary, based on these modifications.
+
+(6)  The procuring activity will formally request additional review(s) by the LSRA or the LSRC if any changes are made that extend beyond scope of LSRA approval.
+
+f.  For systems in development or use by multiple DoD Components, the lead Component will coordinate a joint risk assessment through the DoD LSSWG.
+
+## Section 4:  Dod Lsswg Functions
+
+The DoD LSSWG will:
+
+a.  Provide laser safety and health technical advice to the ASD(R).
+b.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the ASD(R), develop procedures to further define membership and operation.
+
+c.  Include representatives from the Office of the ASD(R) and the DoD Components.  All members of the LSSWG will be full-time Federal civilian employees, permanent part-time federal civilian employees, or Service members on active duty.
+
+d.  Include subject matter experts for laser safety and health effects, risk management, laser use, acquisition, systems safety, laser range safety, and individuals representing the laser system review and approval processes.
+
+e.  Establish guidelines to govern the operation of the DoD LSSWG and procedures for selecting and rotating the chair.
+
+f.  Meet at the call of the chair to share information, discuss items of mutual interest, and recommend policies and guidance to the ASD(R).
+
+g.  Establish and maintain an evaluation subgroup from within the DoD LSSWG to:
+(1)  Recommend multi-Service laser safety review processes, in accordance with DoDI 5000.69, to conduct a safety review of all military-specific laser systems with potential for use by more than one DoD Component.
+
+(2)  Facilitate a forum for discussion and review of DoD Component measurement protocols and hazard assessment reporting.
+
+(3)  Share assessments with the affected DoD Components when an assessment may be used by more than one DoD Component.
+
+h.  Report on the DoD LSSWG work plan to the ASD(R), as directed.
+
+## Section 5:  Dod Laser Safety Event Hotline Functions
+
+The DoD Laser Safety Event Hotline will:
+a.  Provide consultation assistance in the event of an injury or suspected injury to DoD
+personnel from lasers.
+
+b.  Coordinate the completion of incident and mishap event reports.
+(1)  Report forms may be completed using a webbased reporting form.  The Laser Safety Event Hotline will provide the link to the form if requested.
+
+(2)  If the event reporter cannot complete the form online, they may e-mail the completed event report to the esoh.service.center@us.af.mil or call 1-800-473-3549 for assistance with completing the form.
+
+c.  Establish, administer, and maintain a laser event registry for DoD Components in accordance with Section 552a of Title 5, United States Code, also known as the "Privacy Act of 1974," as implemented through DoDI 5400.11 and DoD 5400.11-R.
+
+d.  Send event information to applicable LSRAs, removing any personally identifiable information and any protected health information.
+
+e.  Provide data and analysis to DoD entities for laser event prevention, safety, and treatments.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+AAF
+adaptive acquisition framework
+ANSI
+American National Standards Institute
+ASD(R)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness
+CFR
+Code of Federal Regulations
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+DoDM
+DoD manual
+DSN
+Defense Switched Network
+ENIC
+exemption notification identifier code
+ENL
+exemption notification letter
+FDA
+Food and Drug Administration
+FLPPS
+Federal Laser Product Performance Standard
+LHA
+laser hazard analysis
+LHE
+laser hazard evaluation
+LSRA
+laser safety review authority
+LSRC
+laser safety review coordinator
+LSRRA
+laser safety range review assessor
+LSSWG
+Laser Systems Safety Working Group
+MPE
+maximum permissible exposure
+MRTFB
+Major Range and Test Facility Base
+T&E
+test and evaluation
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+acquisition
+Defined in Subpart 2.1 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
+Class IIIb laser
+Defined in Section 1040.10 of Title 21, CFR. Defined in Section 1040.10 of Title 21, CFR.
+Class IV laser TERM
+DEFINITION
+DoD-exempted lasers
+Laser products specifically exempted from certain provisions of the FLPPS by appropriate DoD authorities in accordance with the FDA
+military exemption letter, due to incompatibility with mission requirements.  To be eligible to use the exemption, the laser system must be a military-specific laser or a surveying, leveling, and alignment laser that meets the criteria as defined in FDA Laser Notice No. 58 or meets all three of these criteria:
+
+It is owned and used exclusively by DoD. It is designed for use in combat, combat training, or is classified in
+the interest of national security. It is unable to comply with all the provisions of the FLPPS due to mission requirements.
+
+harm
+An unwanted consequence to people, material, or the environment. Harm can be transient, temporary, or permanent.
+incident
+An undesired occurrence that happens unexpectedly or unintentionally, that does not result in harm.
+injury
+Bodily harm.  Injury can lead to ancillary damage or additional injury.
+laser safety review
+An assessment of risk versus reward for use of a laser product performed by the procuring activity.  The SLSRC and SLSRA can provide guidance when performing this assessment.
+laser safety event
+An occurrence of an incident or mishap that resulted in an injury or
+could have resulted in injury.
+LHA
+An independent analysis performed by a designated LSRA, or other designated organization such as the LSRC, of hazards and risks associated with the use of a laser system.  An LHA typically includes parameters from an LHE along with consideration for where, when, and who will be using the laser and who could be exposed.  The LHA also considers proposed control measures to determine the efficacy of the overall laser safety risk mitigation plan.  Additionally, the LHA provides guidance for safe use of the laser.
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+LHE
+An independent evaluation of laser safety parameters, to include hazard classification, protection distances, and optical density requirements for laser eye protection.
+LSRA
+The Military Department agency, organization, committee, or board designated by appropriate authority to determine the efficacy of proposed safety mitigations for the acquisition or use of laser products.  This determination considers safety and regulatory
+compliance as well as design, integration, and user interface of the laser or laser system.  Military Department-specific policy may delegate this function as appropriate.
+
+LSRC
+The Military Department agency designated by the appropriate authority to independently perform laser hazard evaluation.
+LSRRA
+The Military Department agency designated by the appropriate authority to conduct range safety review for laser use on ranges.
+military-specific laser
+A laser or laser product developed for, delivered to, sold to, or used by a DoD Component for a function other than medical, industrial, or administrative purposes (e.g., classroom laser pointers, printers).
+mishap
+An unplanned event or series of events that results in:  damage to DoD property; occupational illness to DoD personnel; injury to onor off-duty DoD military personnel; injury to on-duty DoD civilian personnel; or damage to public or private property, or injury or illness to non-DoD personnel, caused by DoD activities.
+
+MPE
+The level of laser radiation to which a person may be exposed
+without known hazardous effects or adverse biological changes in the
+eye or skin in accordance with ANSI Z136.1.
+outdoor
+A location for a laser where the insertion of a mirror into the output beam path could create a specular reflection that extends indefinitely.
+overexposure
+An exposure that exceeds the applicable MPE or visual interference level.
+variance
+A formal document issued by the FDA to a laser product manufacturer that allows for non-compliance with certain portions of
+the FLPPS.  Variances typically provide limitations and requirements
+for alternate control measures to effectuate a similar level of safety.
+
+## References
+
+American National Standards Institute Standard Z136.1, "American National Standard for Safe
+Use of Lasers," current edition1
+American National Standards Institute Standard Z136.6, "American National Standard for Safe
+Use of Lasers Outdoors," current edition1
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3320.02E, "Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution
+(JSIR) Procedures," current edition
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 21 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Safety and Occupational Health Policy Oversight
+Functions," April 10, 2019
+DoD 5400.11-R, "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 14, 2007
+DoD Directive 3200.11, "Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB)," December 27, 2007,
+as amended
+DoD Directive 5124.02, "Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,"
+June 23, 2008
+DoD Instruction 2030.08, "Implementation of Trade Security Controls (TSCs) for Transfers of
+DoD Personal Property to Parties Outside DoD Control," February 19, 2015, as amended
+DoD Instruction 3200.19, "Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Human Effects Characterization,"
+May 17, 2012, as amended
+DoD Instruction 4140.01, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy,"  March 6, 2019 DoD Instruction 4160.28, "DoD Demilitarization Program," November 30, 2022 DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework,"
+January 23, 2020, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5000.69, "Joint Services Weapon and Laser System Safety Review Processes,"
+August 10, 2023
+DoD Instruction 5400.11, "DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs" January 29, 2019,
+as amended
+DoD Instruction 6055.01, "DoD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program,"
+October 14, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 6055.05, "Occupational and Environmental Health (OEH),"
+November 11, 2008, as amended
+DoD Instruction 6055.07, "Mishap Notification, Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping,"
+June 6, 2011, as amended
+DoD Manual 4100.39, "Federal Logistics Information System (FLIS) Procedures,"
+March 8, 2017, as amended
+DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 1, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures:
+Operational Requirements," December 13, 2018
+DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 2, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures:
+Demand and Supply Planning," November 9, 2018
+DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 6, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures:
+Materiel Returns, Retention, and Disposition," March 8, 2017, as amended
+DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 8, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures:
+Materiel Data Management and Exchange," February 10, 2014, as amended
+DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 10, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures:
+Supply Chain Inventory Reporting and Metrics," March 9, 2017, as amended
+DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 11, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures:
+Inventory Accountability and Special Management and Handling," March 8, 2017, as amended
+DoD Manual 4160.21, Volume 1, "Defense Materiel Disposition Manual:  Disposal Guidance
+and Procedures," October 22, 2015, as amended
+DoD Manual 4160.21, Volume 4, "Defense Materiel Disposition:  Instructions for Hazardous
+Property and Other Special Processing Materiel," October 22, 2015, as amended
+DoD Manual 4160.28, Volume 1, "Defense Demilitarization:  Program Administration,"
+August 9, 2017, as amended
+DoD Manual 6055.05, "Occupational Medical Examinations:  Medical Surveillance and Medical
+Qualification," July 27, 2022
+DoD Manual 8910.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Collections Manual:  Procedures for DoD
+Internal Information Collections," June 30, 2014, as amended
+Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 2.1, current edition Food and Drug Administration, "Letter of Exemption from the Food and Drug Administration
+(FDA) for DoD Exemption from Provisions of 21 CFR 1040," July 29, 19762
+Food and Drug Administration Laser Notice No. 52, "Guidance on the Department of Defense
+Exemption from the FDA Performance Standard for Laser Products; Guidance for Industry
+and FDA," July 12, 20023
+Food and Drug Administration Laser Notice No. 58, "Surveying, Leveling, and Alignment Laser
+Products:  Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff," January 31,
+20234
+Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-828C, "Department of Defense Handbook:  Range Laser
+Safety," March 31, 2017, as amended
+Military Standard MIL-STD-882E, "Department of Defense Standard Practice:  System Safety,"
+May 11, 2012
+Military Standard MIL-STD-1425A, "Department of Defense Design Criteria Standard:  Safety
+Design Requirements for Military Lasers and Associated Support Equipment,"
+August 30, 1991, as amended
+
+## United States Code, Title 5, Section 552A (Also Known As The "Privacy Act Of 1974")
+
+United States Code, Title 10 United States Code, Title 21, Chapter 9 (also known as the "Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act")

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+## Department Of Defense Instruction
+
+
+
+USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: Installation Geospatial Information and Services (IGI&S)
+
+References: See Enclosure 1
+1.  PURPOSE.  In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.01 (Reference (a)), this instruction establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides governance procedures for IGI&S, pursuant to DoDD 5105.60 (Reference (b)), Executive Order 12906
+(Reference (c)), and DoDD 8000.01 (Reference (d)). 2.  APPLICABILITY
+a.  This instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this instruction as the "DoD Components").
+
+
+
+b.  Nothing in this instruction alters or supersedes the existing authorities and policies of the Director of National Intelligence regarding geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). 3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  The new capability of IGI&S will apply to the management of DoD installations and environment to support military readiness in the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components with regard to facility construction, sustainment, and modernization, including the operation and sustainment of military test and training ranges.
+
+b.  All current and planned investments in IGI&S data, information, and information technology (IT) will:
+
+(1)  Conform to the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA).
+
+
+
+(2)  Align with core business mission requirements.
+
+
+(3)  Be made visible, accessible, understandable, trusted, and interoperable throughout their lifecycles for all authorized users in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8320.02 (Reference (e)).
+
+
+
+c.  IGI&S standards will harmonize the geospatial concepts, to the greatest extent practicable, with the components of the Geospatial Intelligence Structure Implementation Profile (GSIP) and will be integrated into the GSIP where beneficial.
+
+d.  IGI&S capabilities will be available when and where needed in support of the functions and policy described in this instruction, DoD's overarching goals, and the national security of the United States.
+
+4.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2.
+
+5.  PROCEDURES.  Enclosure 3 describes the Installation Geospatial Information and Services Governance Group (IGG).  Enclosure 4 lists guidance for the energy, installations, and environment (EI&E) geospatial information officer (GIO). 6.  INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.  The common installation picture (CIP) data, referred to in paragraph 7c of Enclosure 2 of this instruction, has been assigned report control symbol DD-AT&L(A)2572 in accordance with the procedures in Volume 1 of DoD
+Manual 8910.01 (Reference (f)).
+
+7.  RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release**.  This instruction is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
+
+8.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This instruction is effective April 9, 2015.
+
+
+Frank Kendall
+
+
+Under Secretary of Defense for
+
+Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+
+2.  Responsibilities
+
+3.  IGI&S Governance Group
+
+4.  EI&E GIO
+Glossary
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+ ENCLOSURE 1:  REFERENCES ........4 ENCLOSURE 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........6
+
+UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND
+LOGISTICS (USD(AT&L)) ........6
+ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS, AND
+ENVIRONMENT (ASD(EI&E))........6
+UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)) ........7
+DIRECTOR, NGA ........7
+DoD COMPONENT HEADS........8
+SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DIRECTOR, WHS ........8
+SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ........9 SECRETARY OF THE NAVY ........9 ENCLOSURE 3:  IGG ........10 ENCLOSURE 4:  EI&E GIO ........12 GLOSSARY ........13
+PART I:  ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........13
+PART II:  DEFINITIONS ........14
+
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Directive 5134.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
+Logistics," December 9, 2005, as amended
+(b) DoD Directive 5105.60, "National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)," July 29, 2009
+(c) Executive Order 12906, "Coordinating Geographic Data Acquisition and Access:  The
+National Spatial Data Infrastructure," April 11, 1994
+(d) DoD Directive 8000.01, "Management of the Department of Defense Information
+Enterprise," February 10, 2009
+(e) DoD Instruction 8320.02, "Sharing Data, Information, and Information Technology (IT)
+Services in the Department of Defense," August 5, 2013
+(f)
+DoD Manual 8910.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Collections:  Procedures for DoD
+Internal Information Collections," June 30, 2014
+(g) DoD Instruction 3115.15, "Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)," December 6, 2011 (h) Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-16, "Coordination of Geographic
+Information and Related Spatial Data Activities," August 19, 2002, as revised
+(i)
+DoD Directive 5205.02E, "DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program," June 20, 2012
+(j)
+DoD Instruction 5030.59, "National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) LIMITED
+DISTRIBUTION Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)," March 10, 2015
+(k) DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 4, "DoD Information Security Program:  Controlled
+Unclassified Information (CUI)," February 24, 2012
+(l)
+DoD Instruction 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents," August 23,
+2012
+(m) DoD Directive 3200.15, "Sustaining Access to the Live Training and Test Domain,"
+December 18, 2013
+(n) DoD Instruction 8330.01, "Interoperability of Information Technology (IT), Including
+National Security Systems (NSS)," May 21, 2014
+(o) DoD Instruction 4165.14, "Real Property Inventory (RPI) and Forecasting," January 17,
+2014
+(p) DoD Instruction 3200.16, "Operational Range Clearance," July 13, 2005 (q) Presidential Policy Directive No. 21, "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,"
+February 12, 2013
+(r)
+DoD Directive 3020.40, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure,"
+January 14, 2010, as amended
+(s)
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "DoD Mission Assurance Strategy," May 7,
+2012
+(t)
+DoD Instruction 4715.03, "Natural Resources Conservation Program," March 18, 2011
+(u) DoD Instruction 4715.16, "Cultural Resource Management," September 18, 2008 (v) DoD Instruction 4715.14, "Operational Range Assessments," November 30, 2005 (w) DoD Manual 4715.20, "Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP)
+Management," March 9, 2012
+(x) DoD Instruction 6055.07, "Mishap Notification, Investigation, Reporting, and Record
+Keeping," June 6, 2011
+(y) DoD 6055.09-M, Volume 1, "DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards:  General
+Explosives Safety Information and Requirements," February 29, 2008, as amended
+(z) DoD Instruction 6055.17, "DoD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program,"
+January 13, 2009, as amended
+(aa) DoD Instruction 4165.57, "Air Installations Compatible Use Zones (AICUZ)," May 2,
+2011, as amended
+(ab) DoD Directive 4715.11, "Environmental and Explosives Safety Management on
+Operational Ranges within the United States," May 10, 2004
+(ac) DoD Directive 4715.12, "Environmental and Explosives Safety Management on
+Operational Ranges Outside the United States," July 12, 2004
+(ad) DoD Instruction 3030.3, "Joint Land Use Study (JLUS) Program," July 13, 2004
+(ae) Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, "Installation Master Planning," May 15, 2012
+(af) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3901.01D, "Requirements for Geospatial
+Information and Services," March 29, 2013
+(ag) DoD 8320.02-G, "Guidance for Implementing Net-Centric Data Sharing," April 12, 2006
+(ah) DoD Chief Information Officer Memorandum, "Department of Defense Information
+Enterprise Architecture," Version 2.0, August 10, 2012
+(ai) DoD Directive 8320.03, "Unique Identification (UID) Standards for a Net-Centric
+Department of Defense," March 23, 2007
+(aj) DoD Directive 8570.01, "Information Assurance (IA) Training, Certification, and
+Workforce Management," August 15, 2004
+(ak) Committee on National Security Systems Instruction Number 4009, "National Information
+Assurance Glossary," April 26, 2010
+(al) Title 10, United States Code
+(am) Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition
+(an) Joint Publication 3-34, "Joint Engineer Operations," current edition
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS (USD(AT&L)).  In coordination with the DoD GEOINT Manager, the USD(AT&L) has overall responsibility for IGI&S.  The USD(AT&L):
+a.  Exercises oversight of IGI&S policy, standards, and investments.
+
+b.  Oversees the IGI&S-related activities of DoD Components and ensures alignment of IGI&S activities with GEOINT standards and operations in accordance with DoDI 3115.15
+(Reference (g)).
+
+2.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT (ASD(EI&E)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), the ASD(EI&E):
+a.  Provides oversight and establishes uniform processes for the use of geospatial information and services (GI&S) pertaining to management of DoD installations, facilities, and test and training ranges.
+
+b.  Provides guidance to meet federal agency obligations in accordance with Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-16 (Reference (h)).
+
+c.  Establishes an IGG to develop coordinated and integrated approaches for IGI&S across DoD, ensuring IGI&S capabilities are interoperable across the DoD information enterprise.
+
+d.  Develops, manages, and publishes IGI&S standards.  IGI&S standards will be coordinated through the Geospatial Intelligence Standards Working Group (GWG), which will in turn facilitate validation and publication of the standards through the DoD Intelligence Community
+(IC) Joint Enterprise Standards Committee (JESC) processes into the DoD IC Enterprise Standards Baseline (ESB).
+
+e.  Under the direction of the DoD GEOINT Manager, develops guidance for handling controlled unclassified IGI&S under the control and possession of the DoD in compliance with DoDD 5205.02E (Reference (i)), DoDI 5030.59 (Reference (j)), Volume 4 of DoD Manual (DoDM) 5200.01 (Reference (k)), and DoDI 5230.24 (Reference (l)).
+
+f.  Designates a GIO to lead the IGG and establish procedures to implement this instruction.
+
+3.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (USD(P&R)).  The USD(P&R) ensures that military trainers use IGI&S capabilities to support military readiness activities on training ranges in coordination with the USD(AT&L), consistent with DoDD 3200.15 (Reference (m)).
+
+4.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)).  The USD(I):
+a.  Implements the provisions of this instruction across the intelligence domain.
+
+b.  Provides guidance to the DoD Components regarding implementation of Reference (k).
+
+5.  DIRECTOR, NGA.  As the DoD GEOINT Manager and under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), the Director, NGA:
+
+
+a.  Facilitates use and discovery of IGI&S across the National System for Geospatial Intelligence, and facilitates IGG efforts to make IGI&S data and metadata visible and accessible (to the maximum extent allowed by law or DoD policy) across the federal data sharing environment, to include the Geospatial Platform. b.  Coordinates IGI&S standards through the GWG.
+
+c.  Provides guidance to the DoD Components regarding implementation of DoDI 8330.01
+(Reference (n)).
+
+6.  DoD COMPONENT HEADS.  The DoD Component heads:
+a.  Assign responsibilities and establish procedures within their Component to implement the data collection, guidelines, and procedures specified by this instruction.
+
+b.  Ensure that all business systems, geospatial data assets, information, and IT services pertaining to installations and environment in the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components are in compliance with relevant standards, the interoperability guidance established by the ASD(EI&E), and this instruction.
+
+
+c.  Coordinate with the EI&E GIO when proposing or overseeing new IGI&S-related activities or programs.
+
+d.  Coordinate all requirements for IGI&S through the Military Departments or Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), as appropriate, that have authority for the acquisition, management, and disposition of the real property assets to which the IGI&S applies.
+
+e.  Participate in the IGG and IGI&S community of interest (COI) as described in Enclosure
+3 of this instruction.
+
+7.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DIRECTOR, WHS.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 6 of this enclosure, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Director, WHS:
+
+a.  Designate IGI&S elements within their respective organizations to coordinate IGI&S
+capabilities and facilitate integration of IGI&S activities and organizational functions across the DoD business enterprise.
+
+b.  For each installation, establish a trusted authoritative data source (ADS) for all geospatial data and products produced, acquired, or maintained to fulfill EI&E missions.
+
+
+(1)  This IGI&S ADS will include, but is not limited to, the CIP and all geospatial data or products derived to satisfy the requirements in References (o) through (ae) (e.g., geospatial data or products from integrated natural resource management plans, installation master plans, military munitions response site maps, explosives safety site plans, air installations compatible use zones studies, and joint land use studies).
+
+
+(2)  The IGI&S ADS will provide mechanisms for this data to be made visible, accessible, understandable, trusted, and interoperable throughout their lifecycles for all authorized users (to the maximum extent allowed by law or DoD policy) at the headquarters level as well as across the federal data sharing environment, including the Geospatial Platform.
+
+c.  Provide for the creation, maintenance, storage, and secure sharing of CIP data in accordance with Enclosure 3 of this instruction.  In addition:
+
+(1)  Provide for the creation and maintenance of geospatial data describing the location and extent of all DoD real property as required by DoDI 4165.14 (Reference (o)) and DoDD 3200.16 (Reference (p)).
+
+
+(2)  Provide for the creation and maintenance of geospatial data describing the location and extent of infrastructure data as required by Presidential Policy Directive No. 21 (Reference (q)), DoDD 3020.40 (Reference (r)), and the DoD Mission Assurance Strategy (Reference (s)).
+
+
+(3)  Provide for the creation and maintenance of:
+
+
+(a)  Geospatial data describing the location of natural and cultural resources as required by DoDI 4715.03 (Reference (t)) and DoDI 4715.16 (Reference (u)).
+
+
+
+(b)  Environmental geospatial data as required by DoDI 4715.14 (Reference (v)) and DoDM 4715.20 (Reference (w)).
+
+
+
+(c)  Safety geospatial data as required by DoDI 6055.07 (Reference (x)), Volume 1 of DoD 6055.09-M (Reference (y)), DoDI 6055.17 (Reference (z)), DoDI 4165.57 (Reference (aa)), DoDD 4715.11 (Reference (ab)), and DoDD 4715.12 (Reference (ac)).
+
+
+
+(d)  Installation master planning geospatial information as required by DoDI 3030.3
+(Reference (ad)) and Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01 (Reference (ae)).
+
+d.  Ensure that IGI&S requirements are coordinated with their respective GI&S officers and departmental requirements officers, as appropriate, in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3901.01D (Reference (af)).
+
+8.  SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.  In addition to the responsibilities in sections 6 and 7 of this enclosure, the Secretary of the Army:
+a.  Provides technical development, change management, general support, and implementation support for IGI&S standards, which will be a function supporting the IGG.
+
+
+
+b.  Ensures that the IGI&S requirements of the United States Army Corps of Engineers civil works program are met, and that these requirements are fully represented in the IGG. 9.  SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.  In addition to the responsibilities in sections 6 and 7 of this enclosure, the Secretary of the Navy ensures the IGI&S requirements of the Marine Corps are met, and that these requirements are fully represented in the IGG.
+
+## Enclosure 3 Igg
+
+ The IGG will:
+a.  Be composed of the these core members.  Additional members will be designated by the ASD(EI&E) as necessary to support the policy of this instruction.  Core members include:
+
+(1)  The ASD(EI&E) (chair).
+
+
+
+(2)  The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
+
+
+(3)  The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
+
+(4)  The Director, WHS.
+
+(5)  The Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
+
+(6)  The DoD GEOINT Manager, who will be an advisory member.
+
+b.  Review the IGI&S segments of the BEA and the EI&E Functional Business Strategy, and recommend courses of action to the ASD(EI&E).
+
+c.  Function as a standards consensus body for IGI&S.  Recommend additions or changes to IGI&S standards for validation through the GWG and submission to the DoD IC JESC for final approval and inclusion into the DoD IC ESB.  Coordinate and facilitate standards implementation.
+
+d.  Establish guidelines to reduce duplicate investments, enable interoperability of IGI&S
+capabilities, and ensure that IGI&S data has the quality necessary for effective enterprise-wide decision making.
+
+e.  Establish guidelines for IGI&S portfolio management to ensure that existing and future EI&E functional business mission spatial information resources are identified, qualified, catalogued, and made visible and accessible to authorized DoD users by creating and associating metadata, including discovery metadata in accordance with Reference (h).
+
+f.  Recommend to the ASD(EI&E) for approval a set of EI&E geospatial information and services that comprise a CIP, as well as collection, storage, and dissemination procedures.  The CIP will include a geospatial feature representing each DoD real property asset as required by Reference (o).
+
+
+g.  Develop mechanisms to make IGI&S data and metadata visible and accessible (to the maximum extent allowed by law or DoD policy) across the federal data sharing environment in accordance with Reference (h).  This includes the Geospatial Platform.
+
+
+h.  Function as the IGI&S COI, pursuant to DoD 8320.02-G (Reference (ag)).  The IGI&S
+COI will develop community practices that focus all IGI&S capabilities on the EI&E responsibilities and functions defined in Reference (a) and the specific geospatial information requirements established in References (o) through (ae).
+
+## Enclosure 4 Ei&E Gio
+
+ The EI&E GIO:
+a.  Under the direction of the DoD GEOINT Manager, represents DoD to other federal agencies and in federal forums related to IGI&S and IGI&S standards, such as the Federal Geographic Data Committee established pursuant to Reference (h).
+
+b.  Serves as the principal liaison to the DoD GEOINT Manager on all matters pertaining to IGI&S, including the coordination of IGI&S and GEOINT standards.
+
+
+
+c.  Chairs the IGG and provides the technical support to execute IGG functions and procedures.
+
+d.  Maintains and issues the CIP, including applicable data standards, business rules, and metrics to assess the quality and completeness of data submitted.
+
+e.  Provides the CIP for planning, programming, analysis, mission assurance, DoD enterprise decision making, responding to queries from the public, government entities, and nongovernmental organizations, and for other reporting purposes.
+
+f.  Responds, as required, to IGI&S-related requirements to support OSD, to include analysis, production, requests for technical information, and data dissemination.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+ADS
+authoritative data source
+ASD(EI&E)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment
+
+
+BEA
+Business Enterprise Architecture
+
+
+CIP
+common installation picture
+COI
+community of interest
+
+
+DoDD
+DoD Directive
+DoDI
+DoD Instruction
+DoDM
+DoD Manual
+
+
+GEOINT
+geospatial intelligence
+GI&S
+geospatial information and services
+GIO
+geospatial information officer
+GSIP
+Geospatial Intelligence Structure Implementation Profile
+
+
+EI&E
+energy, installations, and environment
+IC IGG
+intelligence community installation geospatial information and services governance group
+IGI&S
+installation geospatial information and services
+IT
+information technology
+
+
+NGA
+National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
+
+
+USD(AT&L)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+USD(I)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+
+
+WHS
+Washington Headquarters Services
+
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+ These terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this instruction.
+
+accessible.  Defined in DoD Chief Information Officer memorandum (Reference (ah)). ADS.  Defined in DoDD 8320.03 (Reference (ai)). authorized user.  Defined in DoDD 8570.01 (Reference (aj)). BEA.  Enterprise architecture for the DoD Business Mission Area that reflects DoD business transformation priorities; the business capabilities required to support those priorities; and the combinations of enterprise systems and initiatives that enable those capabilities.
+
+
+CIP.  The distinct, minimum set of geospatial features and imagery necessary to provide a foundational map depicting DoD installations and sites as defined in Reference (o).  The purpose of the CIP is to provide a readily available, standardized map background to serve as the basis for planning and execution of EI&E responsibilities and functions. COI.  A collaborative group of users who exchange information in pursuit of their shared goals, interests, missions, or business processes, and who therefore must have a shared vocabulary for the information they exchange.  The group exchanges information within and between systems to include security domains. data.  Defined in Committee on National Security Systems Instruction Number 4009 (Reference (ak)). DoD Information Technology Standards Registry.  A DoD registry consisting of citations of IT standards approved through a consensus process across DoD and the IC through the DoD IC JESC.  The objective is to obtain maximum achievable interoperability and supportability among DoD and IC systems. geospatial information.  Defined in sections 455(c) and 467 of Title 10, United States Code (Reference (al)). GI&S.  Defined in Joint Publication 1-02 (Reference (am)). GEOINT.  The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth.  GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. geospatial feature.  Defined in Reference (o). Geospatial Platform.  A shared technology environment that provides access to trusted geospatial data, services, and applications for use by government agencies and their partners to meet mission needs.  As an Office of Management and Budget Shared Services initiative, one of the major goals of the Geospatial Platform is to enable agencies to easily and inexpensively publish their spatial data, analytical tools, and applications within a shared commodity cloud-computing environment.  In partnership with data.gov, the Geospatial Platform provides search and discovery capabilities for geospatial data and services of the Federal Government as well as data and services made available by State, regional, local, and tribal governmental partners.
+
+
+IGI&S.  The subset of GI&S activities that apply to the management of DoD installations and environment to support military readiness in the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components with regard to facility construction, sustainment, and modernization, including the operation and sustainment of military test and training ranges, and which support DoD business enterprise priorities as defined in the DoD BEA.  IGI&S supports and is enabled by geospatial engineering and general engineering as defined in Joint Publication 3-34 (Reference (an)).
+
+installation.  Defined in Reference (o). interoperability.  The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide data, information, materiel, and services to and accept the same from other systems, units, or forces and to use the data, information, materiel, and services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. IT and National Security Systems interoperability includes both the technical exchange of information and the end-to-end operational effectiveness of that exchange of information as required for mission accomplishment.  More than just information exchange, it includes systems, processes, procedures, organizations, and missions over the lifecycle and must be balanced with information assurance. metadata.  Information describing the characteristics of data, data or information about data, or descriptive information about an entity's data, data activities, systems, and holdings.  For example, discovery metadata allows data assets to be found using enterprise search capabilities. Metadata can be structural (specifying the format structure), semantic (specifying the meaning), or descriptive (providing amplifying or interpretive information) for data, information, or IT services. range.  Defined in section 101 (e)(1) of Reference (al). secure sharing.  The dissemination of information to intended recipients while proactively implementing management, policy, procedural, and technical controls to prevent access to the information by unauthorized persons. trusted.  Defined in Reference (ah). understandable.  Defined in Reference (ah). visible.  Defined in Reference (ah).

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@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+## Instruction
+
+
+ASD(NII)/DoD CIO SUBJECT: Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Capabilities for Support of Stabilization and Reconstruction, Disaster Relief, and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations References: See Enclosure 1
+1.  PURPOSE.  This Instruction:
+
+a.  Implements policy within the Department of Defense for providing ICT capabilities and associated unclassified data and voice services in support of stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance in accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5144.1 (Reference (a)).
+
+b.  Provides guidance and assigns responsibilities for support of stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations according to the Guidance for Employment of the Force (Reference (b)). c.  Provides guidance on the provisioning of military ICT and associated data and voice services, spectrum allocation, and DoD funding support according to DoDD 3000.05 (Reference (c)) and in support of DoD functions specified in the National Security Presidential Directive 44 (Reference (d)).
+
+
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY.  This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").
+
+3.  DEFINITIONS.  Terms used in this Instruction are defined in DoDD 8320.02 (Reference (e))
+and this Instruction's Glossary.
+
+4.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy (References (b), (c), and (d)) that:
+
+a.  To the extent authorized by law, and subject to applicable statutory and regulatory restrictions and limitations, information-sharing activities that facilitate coordination and cooperation between DoD and non-DoD partners will be established to enable common understanding of the stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance environment; and to support an integrated Whole-of-Government response capability. b.  In response to Combatant Command-defined and Joint Staff-validated requirements, the Department of Defense or Military Department Headquarters may resource ICT capabilities to share spectrum or bandwidth, and to provide associated ICT infrastructure services needed as further defined below.
+
+
+
+(1)  The Military Departments and Defense Agencies may provide and provision ICT
+capabilities and associated unclassified data and voice services for U.S. task forces to support civil-military partners in stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance when it is determined to be in the best interest of the DoD mission, and when the access is not in conflict with host-nation post, telephone, and telegraph ordinances.
+
+
+(2)  Extension of bandwidth to or sharing of existing available bandwidth with civilmilitary partners is permitted to enable connection to or provision of Internet service and voice capability.
+
+
+
+(3)  Where circumstances require temporary cellular network services to be installed for DoD elements, these services may be extended for interim use by non-DoD partners until local services are re-established.
+
+
+(4)  The Military Departments and Defense Agencies will ensure that ICT wireless equipment complies with existing domestic, regional, and international frequency spectrum allocations and regulations for interference free operations.
+
+c.  The Department of Defense may provide ICT capabilities and associated data and voice services capabilities to the Department of State, when requested to do so under section 1207 of Public Law (Pub. L.) 109-163, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 (Reference (f)); section 1210 of Pub. L. 110-181, the NDAA for FY 2008 (Reference (g)); and section 1207 of Pub. L. 110-417, the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY 2009 (Reference
+(h)) to facilitate the provision by the Secretary of State for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.  Any services, defense articles, or funds provided or transferred to the Department of State that are used to provide reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country shall be subject to the authorities and limitations in Pub. L. 87-195, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Reference (i)); Pub. L. 90-629, the Arms Export Control Act (Reference (j)); or any law making appropriations to carry out such acts.
+
+5.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2.
+
+
+6.  RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED.  This Instruction is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web Site at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
+
+7.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This Instruction is effective immediately.
+
+
+
+ Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities
+
+Glossary
+
+
+ENCLOSURE 1
+
+REFERENCES (a) DoD Directive 5144.1, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
+Integration/DoD Chief Information Officer (ASD(NII)/DoD CIO)," May 2, 2005
+(b) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, "Guidance for Employment of
+the Force," May 20081
+(c) DoD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
+Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," November 28, 2005
+(d) National Security Presidential Directive-44, "Management of Interagency Efforts
+Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," December 7, 2005
+(e) DoD Directive 8320.02, "Data Sharing in a Net-Centric Department of Defense,"
+December 2, 2004
+(f)
+Section 1207 of Public Law 109-163, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
+2006," January 6, 2006, as amended
+(g) Section 1210 of Public Law 110-181, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
+2008," January 28, 2008
+(h) Section 1207 of Public Law 110-417, "Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act
+for Fiscal Year 2009," October 14, 2008
+(i)
+Public Law 87-195, "Foreign Assistance Act of 1961," as amended
+(j)
+Public Law 90-629, "Arms Export Control Act," as amended
+(k) DoD 8320.02-G, "Guidance for Implementing Net-Centric Data Sharing," April 12, 2006 (l)
+DoD Office of the Chief Information Officer, "DoD Information Sharing Strategy,"
+
+May 4, 2007
+(m) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02A, "Joint Doctrine Development
+System," March 31, 2007
+(n) Joint Publication 3-0, "Joint Operations," September 17, 2006
+ENCLOSURE 2
+
+RESPONSIBILITIES 1.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION/DoD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (ASD(NII)/DoD CIO).  The ASD(NII)/DoD CIO shall:
+a.  In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM), and in accordance with Reference (e) and related guidance in DoD 8320.02-G (Reference (k)), identify and coordinate agreement to use a core set of standards for unclassified information exchange and applications.  This core set of standards will be used among the DoD Components, U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and members of the private sector to facilitate the sharing and integrating of stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance information across various portal instantiations.
+
+b.  In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Program Manager for Information Sharing Environment, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), develop core elements for identity authentication and access management policies that support flexible, responsive information sharing with civil-military partners in the stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance environment.
+
+c.  In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CDRUSJFCOM, and the heads of the commands, Services, and agencies (C/S/As), develop the detailed requirements and strategy for the ICT capabilities and associated data and voice services necessary to support stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance according to Reference (c) and in support of DoD functions specified in Reference (d).
+
+
+d.  Establish Web-service specifications to drive net-centric development of functionality for SSTR operations built on DoD Core Enterprise Service standards pursuant to requirements in the DoD Information Sharing Strategy (Reference (l)).
+
+
+
+2.  DIRECTOR, DISA.  The Director, DISA, under the authority, direction, and control of ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, shall:
+a.  Assist the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, Military Departments and Defense Agencies in developing an identity and access management policy that supports information sharing with civil-military partners in the stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance environments.
+
+b.  Assist the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the heads of the C/S/As in developing the detailed requirements for the ICT capabilities and associated data and voice services necessary to support stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance according to Reference (c) and in support of DoD functions specified in Reference (d).
+
+
+3.  USD(P).  The USD(P) shall:
+
+a.  In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Under Secretary of Intelligence (USD(I)), the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identify and propose revisions to the policies and processes that create impediments to information sharing with civil-military partners and foreign governments.
+
+b.  Coordinate with the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO on the development of core elements for identity authentication, and access management policies that support flexible, responsive information sharing. c.  Coordinate with the USD(AT&L) and CDRUSJFCOM (through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) on the development of a formal approach to ensure information-sharing activities (policies, procedures, and technologies) that support stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance missions are systematically integrated into appropriate joint experiments, demonstrations, and exercises.
+
+4.  USD(I).  The USD(I) shall, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders, establish an information request process to obtain releasable and suitable intelligence products for stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance, and ensure the procedure for dissemination to non-DoD partners is known within the Department.
+
+
+
+5.  USD(AT&L).  The USD(AT&L) shall:
+
+a.  In coordination with the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, provide oversight for the acquisition of information and communications technologies, services, and capabilities that could be viable candidates for transitioning as enduring (stay-behind) infrastructure to host-nation military or government organizations continuing to support stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian-civic assistance activities.
+
+b.  Streamline acquisition processes for obtaining leased services on short notice for the ICT
+identified in paragraph 4.a. of this enclosure.
+
+c.  Ensure logistics support policies and procedures are in place to support the ICT identified in paragraph 4.a. of this enclosure.
+
+d.  If requested, and to the extent authorized by law, ensure U.S. commanders deployed in foreign countries are able to secure contract support rapidly, and migrate the same capability to host-nation military or government organizations identified for gaining responsibility of the transferred ICT.
+
+6.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
+(USD(P&R)).  The USD(P&R) shall:
+
+a.  Develop a strategy to incorporate incentives into existing Government and military personnel processes and systems for improving information sharing policies, procedures, and technologies.
+
+b.  In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, develop information sharing education and training materials to support stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian-civic assistance. 7.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND THE COMMANDER, U.S.
+
+SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (CDRUSSOCOM).  The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the CDRUSSOCOM, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(P), shall:
+a.  Ensure information-sharing technologies and techniques curricula for stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance are incorporated into individual and unit training programs and Service schools.
+
+b.  As applicable, ensure ICT support requests from non-DoD entities are endorsed or sponsored by a DoD organization.
+
+c.  Develop and execute an implementation plan that ensures units conducting SSTR and/or humanitarian assistance and/or disaster relief missions are trained and have the capabilities to share information and situational awareness with civil-military partners when authorized, and to extend bandwidth and services to a partner-accessible network. d.  Establish the procedure for validating the operational requirement of DoD-provided ICT
+support to civil-military partners' stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance missions.  The Military Departments will resource within budget and funding ceilings specified in other budget guidance documents.
+
+8.  CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
+a.  In accordance with CJCS Instruction 5120.02A (Reference (m)) and appropriate information-sharing policies, develop and/or enhance joint doctrine on information sharing in order to support joint operations, education, and training for stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian-civic assistance activities.
+
+
+b.  Assist the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO to develop an identity and access management policy that supports information sharing with civil-military partners in the stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance environment.
+
+
+c.  In coordination with the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, the CDRUSJFCOM, and the heads of the C/S/As, develop the detailed concept of operations (CONOPS), capabilities-based assessment, and requirements for the ICT capabilities and associated data and voice services necessary to support stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance according to Reference (c) and in support of DoD functions specified in the Reference (d).
+
+d.  Ensure that insights gained from Service, combined, joint, and coalition exercises, demonstrations, experiments, and operations are included in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System analysis to facilitate improvements in ICT interoperability and supportability.
+
+e.  Where appropriate and authorized by law, validate the requirements and coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for resourcing of DoD-provided ICT support to civil-military partners' stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief,  and humanitarian and civic assistance missions.  Combatant Commanders and joint task force commanders will resource within budget and funding ceilings specified in other budget guidance documents.
+
+9.  COMMANDERS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS.  The Commanders of the Geographic Combatant Commands, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:
+
+a.  Identify the unclassified information exchange and communications requirements for stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance among the DoD Components, U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, IOs, NGOs, and members of the private sector involved in stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance.
+
+b.  As applicable, ensure ICT support requests from non-DoD entities are endorsed or sponsored by a DoD organization. c.  Develop the CONOPS for stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance communications, and create employment plans.
+
+d.  Coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for validating the operational requirement of DoD-provided ICT support to civil-military partners' stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance missions.  Combatant Commanders and joint task force commanders will resource within budget and funding ceilings specified in other budget guidance documents.
+
+10.  CDRUSJFCOM.  The CDRUSJFCOM, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:
+a.  In coordination with the USD(P) and the USD(AT&L), develop a formal approach to ensure information-sharing activities (policies, procedures, and technologies) are systematically integrated into appropriate joint experiments, demonstrations, and exercises that support stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance activities.
+
+b.  In coordination with the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, establish a set of standards for unclassified information exchange and communications among the DoD Components, and recommend adoption of those standards by other U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, IOs, NGOs, and members of the private sector involved in stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian-civic assistance missions.  To mitigate the possibility of developing separate standards and equipment sets for missions inside and outside the continental United States (CONUS/OCONUS), coordinate with the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to capitalize on their use with homeland defense/civil support (HD/CS) missions.
+
+c.  In coordination with the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO and the heads of the C/S/As, develop the capabilities based assessment and requirements for the ICT capabilities and associated data and voice services necessary to support stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian and civic assistance according to Reference (c) and in support of DoD functions specified in Reference (d).
+
+
+11.  CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU (NGB).  The Chief, NGB, shall:
+
+a.  In coordination with the USD(P), USD(AT&L), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CDRUSJFCOM, develop a formal approach to ensure information sharing activities (policies, procedures, and technologies) are systematically integrated into appropriate joint experiments, demonstrations, and exercises that support stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian-civic assistance activities.
+
+b.  In coordination with the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CDRUSJFCOM, help to establish a set of standards for unclassified information exchange and communications among the DoD Components, U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, IOs, NGOs, and members of the private sector involved in stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, and humanitarian-civic assistance missions that can also support validated domestic incident response capabilities.
+
+c.  In coordination with the CDRUSJFCOM, mitigate the possibility of developing separate standards and equipment sets for CONUS/OCONUS missions, and to capitalize on their dual use with HD/CS missions.
+
+GLOSSARY
+PART I.  ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
+
+
+ASD(NII)/DoD CIO
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
+Integration/DoD Chief Information Officer
+
+
+CJCS C/S/As
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff commands, Services, and agencies
+CDRUSJFCOM
+Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command
+CDRUSSOCOM
+Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
+CONOPS
+concept of operations
+CONUS
+continental United States
+
+
+DoDD
+DoD Directive
+
+
+FY
+fiscal year
+
+
+HD/CS
+homeland defense/civil support
+
+
+ICT
+information and communications technology
+IO
+international organizations
+
+
+NDAA
+National Defense Authorization Act
+NGB
+National Guard Bureau
+NGO
+nongovernmental organization
+
+
+OCONUS
+outside the continental United States
+
+
+Pub. L.
+Public Law
+
+
+SSTR
+stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
+
+
+USD(AT&L)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
+Logistics
+USD(I)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+USD(P&R)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+
+
+PART II.  DEFINITIONS Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Instruction.
+
+
+civil-military partners.  U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional IOs, U.S. and foreign NGOs, and private sector individuals and for-profit companies ("private sector") working in partnership with U.S. and allied military forces.
+
+military ICT.  Information systems and communications equipment, primarily commercial-offthe-shelf based, that have been purchased by DoD Components to supplement command and control systems and DoD business process systems; in particular, those that facilitate coordination and cooperation with non-DoD entities.  Within the scope of this Instruction, controlled cryptologic items are not to be included as potential technologies that may used in a stay-behind equipment pool for non-DoD entities.
+
+
+military support to SSTR.  DoD activities that support U.S. Government plans for SSTR
+operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.
+
+
+stability operations.  Defined in Joint Publication 3-0 (Reference (n)).

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+## Dod Manual 5200.08 Volume 3 Physical Security Program:  Access To Dod Installations
+
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
+
+
+Effective:
+January 2, 2019
+Change 1 Effective:
+September 18, 2020
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division
+Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+
+Incorporates and Cancels: Directive Type Memorandum 09-012, "Interim Policy Guidance
+for DoD Physical Access Control," December 8, 2009
+
+
+
+Approved by:
+Joseph D. Kernan, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+Change 1 (Administrative) Approved by:
+Christopher R. Choate, Chief, Directives Division
+
+
+Purpose: This manual is composed of several volumes, each containing its own purpose.  In accordance with DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01 and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5200.08:
+- The manual implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for managing and executing the DoD Physical Security Program.
+- This volume assigns responsibilities and prescribes procedures for controlling physical access to DoD installations consistent with Section 1069 of Public Law 110-181 and Section 1086 of Public Law 114-92 by establishing:
+o Standards and methods for verifying the identity of and protocols for determining the fitness of individuals entering DoD installations.
+
+o Three types of access to DoD installations: unescorted, trusted traveler, and escorted. o Three types of installations for the purposes of controlling access to DoD installations:
+electronic physical access control system (ePACS)-enabled DoD installations with Identity
+Matching Engine for Security and Analysis (IMESA) functionality, ePACS-enabled DoD
+installations without IMESA functionality, and non-ePACS-enabled DoD installations.
+- This volume supersedes any conflicting portion of DoD 5200.08-R pertaining to installation
+access and emergency planning.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 4
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 4 1.2.  Policy. ........ 4 1.3.  Summary of Change 1. ........ 5
+SECTION 2: RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 6
+2.1.  Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)). ........ 6 2.2.  Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). ........ 6 2.3.  USD(P&R). ........ 6 2.4.  DoD Component Heads With Authority, Direction or Control Over Installations. ........ 7
+SECTION 3:  REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCESS TO A DOD INSTALLATION ........ 9
+3.1.  Requirements Based on Type of Access. ........ 9
+3.2.  Establishing Identity For Unescorted Access. ........ 9 3.3.  Establishing Fitness For Unescorted Access. ........ 10 3.4.  Establishing Purpose For Access. ........ 12 3.5.  Requirements For Special Events and Emergencies. ........ 13 3.6.  Related Measures. ........ 13 3.7.  Additional Requirements. ........ 14
+SECTION 4: PROCEDURES FOR GRANTING ACCESS TO A DOD INSTALLATION ........ 15
+4.1.  Granting Escorted Access. ........ 15 4.2.  Granting Trusted Traveler Access. ........ 15 4.3.  Granting Unescorted Access. ........ 17 4.4.  VCP. ........ 17 4.5.  Enrollment........ 19 4.6.  Access Control Process. ........ 21 4.7.  Automatic Enrollment at the ACP. ........ 22 4.8.  ePACS Failure Contingencies........ 23
+SECTION 5: ACCEPTABLE FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION ........ 24
+5.1.  Acceptable Credentials. ........ 24 5.2.  Source Identity Documents. ........ 27 5.3.  Verification Of Credentials. ........ 28
+SECTION 6: IMPLEMENTATION ........ 30
+6.1.  Component Implementing Policies. ........ 30 6.2.  Allowable Deviations........ 31 6.3.  Component Policy for Acceptable Purposes........ 31
+GLOSSARY ........ 32
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 32 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 33
+REFERENCES ........ 36 TABLES Table 1.  Summary of Credential Acceptability, Enrollability, and Requirements Established ... 26 Table 2.  Verification Method by Credential and Type of Installation ........ 28 Table 3.  Verification Methods ........ 29
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+a.  This issuance applies to:
+(1)  The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+(2)  The **grounds** of DoD installations and facilities on DoD-owned or DoD-leased land that have a perimeter barrier (such as a fenceline or wall), access control point (ACP), and a method for processing visitors (collectively referred to as "installations").  Heads of DoD Components may extend applicability to the grounds of facilities under their authority, direction, and control, including grounds of DoD installations without a perimeter barrier, ACP, or method for processing visitors, or any portion of grounds outside the United States if permitted by applicable host-nation agreements, status of forces agreements, or other requirements.
+
+(3)  DoD installations located within the United States (including the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Guam).  Heads of DoD Components may extend applicability to installations in foreign countries if permitted by applicable host-nation agreements, status of forces agreements, or other requirements.
+
+b.  This issuance does not apply to:
+
+(1)  Individual buildings on or off DoD installations.
+(2)  Space in leased buildings or leased offices; space managed and operated by other federal agencies; or contractor facilities.
+
+(3)  Installations, or portions of installations, that house non-DoD facilities exclusively.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.  It Is Dod Policy That:
+
+a.  In accordance with DoDI 5200.08, DoD installations, property, and personnel must be protected.  Commanders have authority to take reasonably necessary and lawful measures to protect installation property and personnel, but that authority must not be exercised in an arbitrary, unpredictable, or discriminatory manner.  Removal or denial actions must be based on reasonable grounds and be judiciously applied.
+b.  In accordance with DoDI 5400.11, personally identifiable information collected, used, maintained, or disseminated in the execution of this issuance will be appropriately maintained and safeguarded to prevent its unauthorized access, use, disclosure, or loss.  The collection, use, maintenance, and dissemination of personally identifiable information must comply with the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a, DoDD 5200.27, DoDI 5400.11, DoD 5400.11-R, DoDI 5505.17, DoDI 5400.16, and Volume 4 of DoD Manual (DoDM) 5200.01.
+
+## 1.3.  Summary Of Change 1.  This Administrative Change Updates:
+
+a.  The title of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security in accordance with Public Law 116-92.
+
+b.  Administrative changes in accordance with current standards of the Office of the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense.
+
+## Section 2: Responsibilities
+
+2.1.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
+(USD(I&S)).  The USD(I&S):
+a.  Establishes physical security access control standards, procedures, and guidance consistent with this issuance, DoDD 5143.01, DoDI 5200.08, approved federal standards, and applicable laws.
+
+b.  Coordinates with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)):
+(1)  To provide oversight of the development of interfaces associated with controlling physical access.
+
+(2)  To develop technical and interface requirements for identification card issuance, revocation notification, and system interoperability with ePACSs.
+
+c.  Identifies authoritative government databases required for initial checks to establish historic fitness and for recurring checks to maintain current fitness, as described in Section 3.
+
+d.  Establishes processes for establishing the identity of individuals seeking access, as described in Section 5, by verifying credentials and verifying the cardholder is the individual to whom the credential was issued.
+
+e.  Reviews and adjudicates requests for un-manned vehicular access points, as described in Section 4.
+
+2.2.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S), and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.4, the Director, DIA, provides threat information required for risk assessments by DoD Component heads and installation commanders.
+
+## 2.3.  Usd(P&R).  The Usd(P&R):
+
+a.  Designs and maintains the IMESA, the Interoperability Layer Service (IoLS), successor, and other systems necessary to implement this issuance.
+
+b.  Ensures such systems are designed and maintained in compliance with applicable law, federal regulations, and DoD policy including, but not limited to:
+(1)  Section 552a of Title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.); and Chapter 35, Subchapter I of Title 44, U.S.C., regarding the collection and retention of information on and from U.S. citizens.
+(2)  DoDD 5200.27 regarding the acquisition of information on persons not affiliated with DoD.
+
+c.  Establishes, and, as funds are available for such purposes, executes a plan to integrate IMESA with ePACS at all DoD installations.
+
+d.  Coordinates with the USD(I&S) and the DoD Component heads, as appropriate, regarding the authoritative government databases that such systems shall check for historic and current fitness and other applicable reporting requirements.
+
+2.4.  DOD COMPONENT HEADS WITH AUTHORITY, DIRECTION OR CONTROL
+OVER INSTALLATIONS.  DoD Component heads with authority, direction, or control over installations:
+a.  Establish DoD Component-level policies for installation access control that contain, at a minimum, the items listed in Paragraph 6.1.
+
+b.  Implement procedures for all populations to gain access to component installations.
+(1)  Such procedures will establish a uniform process to establish identity, fitness, and purpose for gaining access to component installations and be implemented consistently and predictably.
+(2)  All other physical security measures are subject to randomization and unpredictability requirements for security purposes, but shall not be arbitrary or discriminatory.
+
+c.  Field ePACS at all component installations.
+(1)  New ePACS and ePACS undergoing significant upgrade (valued at more than
+50 percent of replacement cost) must interface with IMESA via the IoLS and read, enroll, and electronically verify all listed credentials as described in Section 5.
+(2)  All ePACS must comply with 5 U.S.C. 552a, DoDI 8910.01, DoDI 5400.16, DoDI
+5400.11, and DoD 5400.11-R.
+
+d.  Implement at all component installations:
+(1)  A training program for perimeter security personnel, including at both the ACP and visitor control center (VCC), on the requirements, processes, and prohibitions described in this issuance and the appropriate DoD Component policy.
+
+(2)  A redress and appeal process for individuals denied unescorted access.
+
+(3)  Credential requirements, fitness disqualifications, Privacy Act statement, and redress and appeal processes, ensuring they are clearly and conspicuously posted at the VCC and on the installation website if one exists.
+
+(4)  A determination of the acceptable purposes for accessing the installation, in accordance with this volume, applicable Federal, State and local laws, DoD policy, and DoD Component policies.
+
+(5)  Coordination with local first responders to establish appropriate standard operating procedures for facilitating access to first responders during emergencies, in accordance with Paragraph 3.5 of this issuance.
+
+(6)  Alternate means to process visitors through the visitor control process (VCP) when the VCC is closed.
+
+e.  Adjudicate requests for deviations listed in Section 6 for installations under their authority, direction, and control, and review each approved deviation annually to assess associated risks.  The only allowable deviations are listed in Section 6.
+
+(1)  DoD Component heads will notify the Office of the USD(I&S) Director of Counterintelligence and Security within 30 days of approved deviations.
+(2)  Requests and approvals must address any residual risks associated with the deviations.
+f.  May delegate the approval authority for deviations listed in Section 6 only to one of the following officials within their respective Departments:
+(1)  Within the Department of the Navy, to the Under Secretary of the Navy, to the Chief of Naval Operations, or to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
+
+(2)  Within the Department of the Army, to the Under Secretary of the Army or to the Chief of Staff of the Army.
+
+(3)  Within the Department of the Air Force, to the Under Secretary of the Air Force or to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
+
+(4)  Within the Defense Logistics Agency, to the Deputy Director of the Defense Logistics Agency.
+
+g.  Fund the operation, maintenance, and enhancement of IMESA with additional government data sources.
+
+## Section 3:  Requirements For Access To A Dod Installation
+
+3.1.  REQUIREMENTS BASED ON TYPE OF ACCESS.  There are three types of access to a DoD installation:  unescorted, trusted traveler and escorted.  Each type of access has a specific set of requirements which must be implemented consistently, uniformly, and predictably to facilitate entry by authorized personnel.
+a.  Unescorted Access.  Unescorted access requires individuals to establish their identity, be determined fit for access, and establish an acceptable purpose for presence on the installation, except only under the following circumstances:
+
+(1)  Special events and emergencies, in accordance with Paragraph 3.5 of this issuance.
+(2)  Portions of installations consisting of large unoccupied, undeveloped space, if permitted under DoD Component policy.  This exception is not considered a deviation.
+
+(3)  Installations with a mission that requires open, unimpeded access to the public, when approved as a deviation in accordance with Paragraphs 2.4.e, 2.4.f, and 6.2 of this issuance.
+
+(4)  A minor under the age of 18 who does not have an acceptable credential and is accompanied by a parent or guardian who is age 18 or older and who has been granted unescorted access.  This exception is not considered a deviation.
+
+b.  Trusted Traveler Access.  Trusted traveler programs allow authorized individuals who have been granted unescorted access, based on low- or medium-risk verified credentials as defined in Table 3, to simultaneously vouch for co-travelers (in the same vehicle or on foot) and enable those co-travelers to obtain trusted traveler access.  Trusted traveler access, if permitted at the installation by this volume and DoD Component and installation-level policy, requires individuals to have an acceptable purpose for their presence on the installation and be capable of establishing their identity and being determined fit for access upon demand by installation security personnel.  Individuals may be required to establish their identity in accordance with Paragraph 3.2 based on DoD Component and installation-level policy. .
+
+c.  Escorted Access.  Individuals unable to meet the identity or fitness requirements for trusted traveler or unescorted access may be granted escorted access, in accordance with DoD Component and installation-level policy. Escorted access requires individuals to establish an acceptable purpose for their presence on the installation.
+
+3.2.  ESTABLISHING IDENTITY FOR UNESCORTED ACCESS.  Identity is established either by presenting one "acceptable credential" or by presenting an acceptable combination of
+"source identity documents."  Acceptable credentials and source identity documents are listed in Section 5 of this issuance.
+
+a.  Acceptable credentials and source identity documents must:
+(1)  Be original and current (unexpired).
+(2)  Not contain the markings "Not Valid for Federal Purposes,"  "Not For Use as Federal Identification," "Federal Limits May Apply," or any other similar phrase.
+(3)  In the case of a driver's license or non-driver's identification card issued by a State, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia, be compliant with the REAL ID Act of 2005.
+
+b.  Individuals holding more than one acceptable credential must use the credential most accurately depicting the capacity in which the individual is acting for the specific visit to the installation, in accordance with Volume 1 of DoDM 1000.13.
+c.  DoD Component heads and installation commanders will not require more than one acceptable credential to establish identity as a standard access control process.  Intermittent requirements to present additional credentials as a random antiterrorism measure are considered part of an installation's antiterrorism program, not access control.
+
+d.  DoD Component heads and installation commanders will accept all types of credentials listed in Section 5 as acceptable for their type of installation.  Installation commanders with unique mission requirements may refuse to accept one or more of the credentials listed in Section 5 as acceptable for their type of installation when approved as a deviation in accordance with Paragraphs 2.4.e, 2.4.f, and 6.2 of this issuance, consistent with applicable laws.
+
+3.3.  ESTABLISHING FITNESS FOR UNESCORTED ACCESS.  Fitness for access has two elements:  historic fitness and current fitness.
+
+a.  Historic fitness is established, at a specific point in time, only by means of a review of the individual's prior criminal history through a check of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Interstate Identification Index, and relevant government databases and Service criminal justice information systems.  The requirement to establish historic fitness for unescorted access may be met by either:
+(1)  Establishing historic fitness at the time of access through an on-the-spot review and adjudication conducted by government personnel at an installation or at a centralized processing location.
+
+(2)  Proving that historic fitness was previously established by any one of the following:
+(a)  The acceptable credential used to establish identity, if listed as establishing historic fitness in Section 5 of this issuance;
+(b)  A previously conducted review and adjudication at an installation if followed, immediately and without lapse, by enrollment in IMESA for continuous vetting;
+(c)  The DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility, or predecessor organization, determination that the individual eligible for access to classified information, so long as that eligibility remains in scope;
+(d)  A favorably adjudicated Tier 1 or higher background investigation performed by the DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility or other Federal agency that remains in scope; or
+(e)  Other means established by DoD Component-level policy.
+
+b.  Current fitness is established, on a recurring and continuing basis, only through a review
+(either on-the-spot at the VCC or nightly through IMESA) of an individual's current derogatory information through a check of authoritative government sources (real-time or most recent file from such source).  The review includes:
+(1)  Terrorism lists, such as the NCIC Known and Appropriately Suspected Terrorist file and the Terrorism Screening Database.
+
+(2)  Felony wants and warrants, such as those listed in the NCIC Wanted Persons File.
+(3)  Barment order lists, such as relevant Service criminal justice information systems. (4)  Other relevant government databases that may be available such as:
+(a)  Other NCIC files (including the National Sex Offender Registry); (b)  Criminal justice or immigration databases; or (c)  Other appropriate biometric or biographic government databases.
+c.  Until a DoD standard for historic and current fitness is established, DoD Components may establish their own fitness adjudication criteria, subject to the following constraints:
+(1)  Granting unescorted access to an individual listed on any U.S. Government terrorism watchlist is prohibited, except as provided for in law, executive order, or DoD policy to further counterintelligence or counterterrorism purposes, or in accordance with Annex D to the Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Defense.
+
+(2)  Granting unescorted access to an individual with a felony want or warrant is prohibited.
+
+(3)  Installation commanders must conspicuously post their established adjudication criteria and redress and appeal process for those negatively adjudicated.
+
+(4)  DoD Components may grant unescorted access to a convicted felon, in accordance with applicable Federal, State, and local laws, after considering appropriate mitigating factors such as the nature and seriousness of the offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, recency and frequency of the offense, the individual's age and maturity at the time of the offense, the individual's effort toward rehabilitation, and other factors.
+
+(5)  DoD Components may grant unescorted access to individuals **without** U.S.
+
+citizenship based on the installation's characteristics or mission.  In situations where an installation requires U.S. citizenship for unescorted access due to characteristics or mission, acceptable proof of citizenship can be demonstrated with any **one** of the following:
+
+(a)  An unexpired U.S. passport or passport card.
+(b)  An original or certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by a State, territory,
+possession, or the District of Columbia bearing a raised seal.
+(c)  A certificate of naturalization (Form N-550 or N-570).
+(d)  A Consular Record of Birth Abroad. (e)  Other documents as established by DoD Component-level policy.
+(6)  An individual with dual U.S. citizenship will be treated the same as an individual with only U.S. citizenship.  Presentation of any one of the documents listed in Paragraph 3.3(c)(5) is sufficient to prove U.S. citizenship.
+
+3.4.  ESTABLISHING PURPOSE FOR ACCESS.  All individuals must have an acceptable purpose for presence on the installation.
+
+a.  Purpose is established by:
+(1)  The acceptable credential presented if listed as establishing purpose in Section 5.
+
+(2)  Documentation including, but not limited to, bills of lading or event tickets.
+Documentation may be hardcopy or electronic.
+
+(3)  Trusted DoD systems such as, but not limited to, the Carrier Appointment System. (4)  Lists including, but not limited to, guest lists, transportation officer delivery/pickup lists, or appointment lists.
+
+(5)  Verbal discussion with the individual seeking access. (6)  By other means defined by DoD Component and installation-level policy.
+b.  Purposes acceptable for access to an installation:
+(1)  Are defined by DoD Component and installation-level policy.
+(2)  Will be based on the specific characteristics of each installation. (3)  May vary based on the:
+(a)  Time of day. (b)  Day of week.
+(c)  Specific ACP on the installation through which access is being sought. (d)  Current force protection condition at which the installation is operating.
+(e)  Individual's mission essential or emergency response designation. (f)  Other appropriate factors.
+c.  Certain purposes may only be valid for specific identities (e.g., a name on appointment list is only a valid purpose if the individual has established their identity, as described in Paragraph
+3.2, and that identity matches the entry on the list).
+
+3.5.  REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL EVENTS AND EMERGENCIES.  After performing a risk assessment, DoD Component heads may grant a temporary waiver to one or more of the requirements outlined in Paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 of this issuance for special events or in case of an emergency on the installation.  DoD Component heads may delegate this authority, in accordance with DoD Component policy, no lower than O-7 or civilian equivalent. Temporary waivers issued under this paragraph are not considered deviations.
+
+a.  The requirements must be met to the extent feasible.
+b.  Installation commanders must manage increased risk associated with waiving these requirements.  Measures must be taken to ensure that individuals who have been granted access to the installation for the special event do not have access to other parts of the installation not associated with the event.  The special event itself constitutes the acceptable purpose required by paragraph 3.4.
+c.  Installation commanders will coordinate with local first responder organizations, including law enforcement and fire and medical response organizations, to develop procedures for facilitating access during emergency response events.
+(1)  Through such procedures, installation commanders may establish appropriate criteria to waive the requirements outlined in Paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 for first responders to emergency response events.  The emergency response event itself constitutes the acceptable purpose required by Paragraph 3.4.
+
+(2)  Access control personnel granting access to first responders during an emergency should direct first responders to check in with the on-scene incident commander to coordinate their activities and prevent mistaken identities that could hinder a coordinated response to the emergency.
+
+3.6.  RELATED MEASURES.  Random antiterrorism measures may be applied in addition to the access control process pursuant to Volumes 1 and 2 of DoDI O-2000.16.  DoD Components are authorized to inspect the vehicle, parcels, and belongings of an individual seeking installation access.
+3.7.  ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.  When approved as a deviation in accordance with Paragraphs 2.4.e, 2.4.f, and 6.2, installation commanders with unique mission requirements may establish more restrictive access control requirements.  Examples of such situations include, but are not limited to, installations where access requires an active security clearance or very highprofile DoD installations, such as the Pentagon Reservation.
+
+## Section 4: Procedures For Granting Access To A Dod Installation 4.1.  Granting Escorted Access.
+
+a.  Individuals unable to meet the requirements of Paragraphs 3.2 or 3.3 may be granted escorted access to the installation, in accordance with DoD Component and installation-level policies.
+b.  Escorts must be provided by the organization or individual responsible for sponsoring, or otherwise associated with the individual's visit, and must remain within reasonable visual contact of the individual(s) they are escorting.
+
+c.  Escorts must report any conduct by the escorted individual that causes a risk to the safety, security, or efficiency of the installation or its occupants in accordance with installation procedure.  Failure to comply with escort duties may result in the temporary or permanent loss of escort privileges.
+
+d.  Escorts functioning in their personal capacity or neglectfully functioning in their official capacity may be personally accountable for the conduct of the individual(s) they are escorting in accordance with installation security policies.
+
+e.  Escorts must be U.S. citizens, have a DoD affiliation, and themselves be granted unescorted access in accordance with this volume.
+
+f.  DoD Component and installation-level policies will determine the number of people an individual may escort and may require specific training or additional qualifications to serve as an escort.
+
+## 4.2.  Granting Trusted Traveler Access.
+
+a.  Trusted traveler programs may not be established at non-ePACS-enabled DoD
+installations, with the sole exception of U.S. uniformed military personnel entering the installation in formation.  Procedures for trusted traveler access for uniformed U.S. military personnel in formation will be established by the DoD Component heads.
+
+b.  A trusted traveler program may be established by commanders of ePACS-enabled DoD
+installations, with or without IMESA functionality, in accordance with DoD Component-level policies.
+(1)  The authorized individual must have sufficient knowledge of the co-travelers to legitimately vouch for their identity, fitness, and purpose.  Individuals may be personally accountable for the conduct of those co-travelers in accordance with installation security policies.  DoD Component and installation-level policies may require the authorized individual to accompany the co-traveler until he or she departs the installation.
+
+(2)  Co-travelers, except uniformed U.S. military personnel co-travelers entering the installation in formation, may be required to establish their identity by presenting an acceptable credential, in accordance with DoD Component and installation-level policies.
+
+(3)  DoD Component and installation-level policies will determine the number of cotravelers that an authorized individual may vouch for at any time.
+
+(4)  DoD Component and installation-level policies will determine the specific populations of individuals authorized to vouch for co-travelers under the trusted traveler program, except that individuals without both U.S. citizenship and a DoD affiliation are not permitted to do so.
+
+(5)  At least one individual must satisfy the requirements outlined in Paragraphs 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 and be granted unescorted access to be permitted to vouch for co-travelers.
+(6)  Except as provided for in this volume, procedures for trusted traveler programs are established and implemented locally, and may vary from installation to installation.
+
+(7)  Trusted traveler programs are permitted only at force protection conditions NORMAL, ALPHA, and BRAVO, and may be further restricted by the DoD Component head.
+
+(8)  Trusted traveler programs must be suspended in the event of an ePACS failure except:
+(a)  For uniformed military personnel returning in formation.
+
+(b)  For the period of time that a suspension would cause a bona fide traffic safety risk, as determined by the installation commander, on a road not owned or managed by DoD.
+
+(c)  When doing so would significantly degrade the installation's mission capability as determined, contemporaneously with the ePACS failure, by a commander of at least the grade O-8 and with notification to the Office of the USD(I&S) Director of Counterintelligence and Security within five days.  Such determinations may not be made in advance of an ePACS failure or established generally in policy.
+(9)  In accordance with Component and installation-level policies, when an installation's trusted traveler program is suspended due to an ePACS failure, co-travelers may be:
+(a)  Granted unescorted access in accordance with Section 4.3 by presenting an acceptable credential listed in Section 5.3 as establishing identity, fitness, and purpose;
+(b)  Granted escorted access in accordance with Section 4.1 by presenting any acceptable credential; or
+(c)  Processed through the VCP as a visitor in accordance with Section 4.4.
+
+
+4.3.  GRANTING UNESCORTED ACCESS.  DoD Component heads may only grant unescorted access only to individuals who satisfy the unescorted access requirements outlined in Section 3.  In addition, with respect to such individuals, DoD Component heads may:
+
+a.  Grant **recurring** unescorted access:
+(1)  To ePACS-enabled DoD installations with IMESA functionality to only those individuals who are currently enrolled in both IMESA and the local installation ePACS.
+(2)  To ePACS-enabled DoD installations without IMESA functionality to only those individuals who are currently enrolled in the local installation ePACS.
+
+(3)  To non-ePACS-enabled DoD installations to only those individuals presenting a DoD
+Common Access Card (CAC); DoD Uniformed Services Identification card (USID); or Non-
+CAC Local or Regional DoD Credential (LRC) valid for that particular installation.
+
+b.  May grant **short-term** (7 days or less) unescorted access to only those individuals who meet the requirements outlined in Section 3 but do not meet the requirements for recurring unescorted access as described in Paragraph 4.3(a) if such individuals successfully complete the VCP as described in Paragraph 4.4 of this issuance.
+
+c.  Process individuals who meet the requirements for recurring unescorted access as described in Paragraph 4.3(a) through the access control process at the ACP, in accordance with Paragraph 4.6 of this issuance.
+
+d.  Process individuals who do not meet the requirements for recurring unescorted access as described in Paragraph 4.3(a) through:
+
+(1)  Automatic enrollment in accordance with Paragraph 4.7, if eligible; or (2)  The VCP at the VCC in accordance with Paragraph 4.4 of this issuance.
+e.  May conduct the VCP at the ACP rather than the VCC as long as doing so does not adversely impact the throughput of the ACP or the safety of the ACP personnel.  The VCP at the ACP must be the functional equivalent to the VCP at the VCC.
+
+## 4.4.  Vcp.
+
+a.  Visitors.  Visitors are defined based on the type of installation:
+(1)  At ePACS-enabled DoD installations with IMESA functionality, a visitor is any individual who is not eligible for automatic enrollment under Paragraph 4.7 and:
+
+(a)  Is not enrolled in IMESA and the local installation ePACS; or (b)  Whose enrollment in IMESA or the local installation ePACS has expired.
+(2)  At ePACS-enabled DoD installations without IMESA functionality, a visitor is any individual who is not eligible for automatic enrollment under Paragraph 4.7 and:
+
+(a)  Is not enrolled in the local installation ePACS; or
+(b)  Whose enrollment in the local installation ePACS has expired.
+(3)  At non-ePACS-enabled DoD installations, a visitor is any individual who does not hold a CAC, USID, or non-CAC LRC issued by the local installation or region.
+
+b.  VCP Procedures.  DoD Components will establish VCP procedures.
+(1)  Such VCP procedures must satisfy all the requirements outlined in Section 3 by:
+(a)  Establishing identity, using either an acceptable credential or an acceptable combination of source identity documents as described in Section 5.
+(b)  Establishing historic fitness, either by performing an on-the-spot review as described in Paragraph 3.3.a.(1) or by proving that historic fitness was previously established as described in Paragraph 3.3.a.(2).
+
+(c)  Establishing current fitness.
+
+(d)  Establishing an acceptable purpose for presence on the installation, either by means of the credential the individual uses to establish their identity simultaneously establishing an acceptable purpose or by any other means described in Paragraph 3.4.
+
+(2)  During the VCP, the procedures will require that:
+(a)  All acceptable credentials and source identity documents will be visually inspected front and back for signs of alteration or counterfeit, and verified as described in Paragraph 5.3.
+(b)  Acceptable credentials and source identity documents that appear questionable
+(e.g., damaged laminates, evidence of tampering) or altered will not be accepted.
+ (3)  The procedures will require that, upon successful completion of the VCP:
+(a)  Visitors with an enrollable acceptable credential at an ePACS-enabled DoD
+installation, with or without IMESA functionality, will be enrolled in accordance with Paragraph 4.5 of this issuance.
+
+(b)  All other visitors will be issued a pass or credential in accordance with Paragraphs 4.4.c or 4.4.d.
+
+c.  Short-Term Visitor Passes.  Visitors who successfully complete the VCP with an acceptable purpose and a duration shorter than 8 days, but who are ineligible for enrollment pursuant to Paragraph 4.5, will be issued either a:
+(1)  Short-term personalized paper or plastic pass.  The personalized pass will, at a minimum, list the visitor's name and the dates for which the pass is valid for access.  The pass will be valid for the shorter of the visitor's established acceptable purpose, the maximum duration allowed by DoD Component-level policy, or seven days; or
+(2)  Reusable un-personalized pass.  Procedures must be in place to enforce the collection of reusable un-personalized passes as visitors exit to prevent reuse.  Any such procedures that entail the collection and holding of personally identifiable information (to include holding credentials) will be compliant with DoDI 5400.11 and Section 552a of Title 5 U.S.C.
+
+d.  Long-Term Visitor Credentials.  If permitted by DoD Component policy, non-CAC
+LRC may be issued to individuals who successfully complete the VCP with an acceptable purpose with a duration longer than 7 days and who do not possess an enrollable acceptable credential.  These non-CAC LRCs will:
+(1)  Bear the individual's name, photo, and dates valid. (2)  Be valid for the duration of their established acceptable purpose, the maximum duration allowed by DoD Component policy, or one year, whichever is shorter.
+
+(3)  Be enrolled in the local installation ePACS when issued at an ePACS-enabled DoD
+installation with or without IMESA functionality.
+
+(4)  Be enrolled in IMESA when issued at an ePACS-enabled DoD installation with IMESA functionality.
+
+(5)  Not be used to circumvent the Tier 1 background investigation and CAC issuance requirements for individuals eligible for a CAC under Volume 1 of DoDM 1000.13.
+
+## E.  Vcp Completion With Redress And Appeal.
+
+(1)  An individual who completes the VCP through redress will be handled as any other visitor.
+(2)  An individual who completes the VCP through appeal will:
+
+(a)  Have their enrollment designated as completed through appeal.
+(b)  Be ineligible for reciprocal acceptance of their enrollment and fitness
+determination at other DoD installations.
+(c)  Be ineligible for automatic enrollment in the ePACS of other DoD installations in
+accordance with Paragraph 4.7.
+4.5.  ENROLLMENT.  All eligible individuals will be enrolled by adding their identity to the local installation ePACS and, at ePACS-enabled DoD installations with IMESA functionality, to IMESA, and linking each individual's identity to the acceptable credential used for enrollment.
+
+## A.  Eligibility For Enrollment.  Enrollment Is:
+
+(1)  Available to individuals seeking recurring access who successfully complete the VCP
+and establish their identity by means of an enrollable acceptable credential as listed in Section 5
+of this issuance.
+
+(2)  Unavailable to individuals who establish their identity using a non-enrollable acceptable credential or any acceptable combination of source identity documents as listed in Section 5, or who fail to complete the VCP.
+
+(3)  Unavailable to all individuals at non-ePACS-enabled DoD installations. (4)  Not to be used to circumvent the Tier 1 background investigation and CAC issuance requirements for individuals eligible for a CAC under Volume 1 of DoDM 1000.13.
+
+## B.  Enrollment Reciprocity.  An Enrollment Conducted At Another Dod Installation:
+
+(1)  Will not be accepted as proof of historic fitness if the enrollment was conducted at an ePACS-enabled installation without IMESA functionality.
+
+(2)  Will be accepted as proof of historic fitness if the enrollment was conducted at another ePACS-enabled installation with IMESA functionality within the same DoD
+Component.
+
+(3)  May be accepted as proof of historic fitness if the enrollment was conducted at another ePACS-enabled installation with IMESA functionality within a different DoD Component, subject to DoD Component policy.
+
+## C.  Enrollment Validity And Expiration.  Enrollment Will Be Valid:
+
+(1)  At ePACS-enabled DoD installations with IMESA functionality, for 3 years from the date of enrollment in IMESA, until the expiration date on the enrollable acceptable credential used to establish identity, or until 1 year without a visit to a DoD installation, whichever comes first.  Upon the expiration of an individual's enrollment in IMESA, the expiration will be propagated to the ePACS at all ePACS-enabled DoD installations with IMESA functionality.
+
+(2)  At ePACS-enabled DoD installation without IMESA functionality, for 1 year from the date of enrollment in the local installation ePACS, until the expiration on the enrollable acceptable credential used to establish identity, or until 3 months without a visit to the installation, whichever comes first.
+
+d.  Declined Enrollment.  An individual who is eligible to enroll but declines or refuses to enroll and subsequently returns to the installation at a later date will be processed as any other unenrolled individual.
+
+
+## 4.6.  Access Control Process.
+
+a.  ePACS-Enabled DoD installations with IMESA Functionality.  At ePACS-enabled DoD installations with IMESA functionality, DoD Components will process, directly at the ACP, individuals who have previously enrolled in IMESA and the local installation ePACS and who present the same enrollable acceptable credential that was used to enroll.
+(1)  If an individual completes the access control process by means of an acceptable credential that does not itself establish purpose, that individual must establish purpose at the ACP before being granted access.
+
+(2)  The requirements for gaining unescorted access are fully satisfied.
+
+b.  ePACS-Enabled DoD installations without IMESA Functionality.  At ePACS-enabled DoD installations without IMESA functionality, DoD Components will process, directly at the ACP, individuals who have previously enrolled in the local installation ePACS and who present the same enrollable acceptable credential that was used to enroll.
+
+(1)  Only a CAC, USID, or non-CAC LRC issued by the local installation or region may be used to enroll at ePACS-enabled DoD installations without IMESA functionality.  The access control process will only be completed using an acceptable credential that itself establishes purpose.  Individuals with other acceptable credentials must be processed through the VCP at the VCC.
+
+(2)  The requirements for gaining unescorted access are **partially** satisfied: however, current fitness cannot be established because the local installation ePACS does not interface with IMESA.  The residual risk associated with not establishing current fitness must be addressed in the request for ePACS deviation described in Paragraphs 2.4.e, 2.4.f, and 6.2 of this issuance.
+
+c.  Non-ePACS-Enabled DoD installations.  At non-ePACS-enabled DoD installations, DoD components will process individuals who present a CAC, USID, or non-CAC LRC issued by the local installation or region at the VCC or ACP if permitted by DoD Component and installation-level policies.
+(1)  The CAC, USID, and non-CAC LRC issued by the local installation or region all establish purpose.  The access control process will only be completed using an acceptable credential that itself establishes purpose.  Individuals with other acceptable credentials must be processed through the VCP at the VCC.
+
+(2)  The requirements for gaining unescorted access are **partially** satisfied: however, current fitness cannot be established because the local installation ePACS does not interface with IMESA.  The residual risk associated with not establishing current fitness must be addressed in the request for ePACS deviation described in Paragraphs 2.4.e, 2.4.f, and 6.2 of this issuance.
+
+d.  Un-manned Pedestrian ACP.  At ePACS-enabled DoD installations with IMESA
+functionality, DoD Components may implement un-manned (also known as un-attended) ACPs for pedestrian use only.  ACPs with a single onsite attendant servicing multiple lanes are not considered un-manned ACPs.  Un-manned ACPs are subject to the following requirements:
+(1)  Only a CAC, USID, and non-CAC LRC that has already been enrolled at the installation may be accepted at un-manned ACPs.
+
+(2)  Two-factor authentication is required at all times.  The second factor may be either personal identification number or biometric, in accordance with DoD Component policy.
+
+(3)  The un-manned ACP must:
+(a)  Be covered by surveillance cameras that are recorded and monitored, either manually or by automated (e.g. motion detection) means, at all times.  Recordings will be kept consistent with applicable records schedules and no less than 30 days.
+
+(b)  Prevent vehicular access.
+(c)  Include a mechanism to prevent the entry of more than one person in a single attempt.
+
+(d)  Include tamper alarms, monitored at all times, with a response force capable of reaching the un-manned ACP within 15 minutes of alarm.
+
+e.  DoD Approval Required for Un-manned Vehicle ACP.  DoD Component proposals for un-manned ACPs that allow vehicular access must be submitted to the USD(I&S) for consideration.  ACPs with at least one on-site attendant servicing multiple lanes are not considered un-manned.
+
+## 4.7.  Automatic Enrollment At The Acp.
+
+a.  At ePACS-enabled DoD installations with IMESA functionality, in lieu of undergoing the VCP at the VCC:
+(1)  Individuals establishing their identity by means of a CAC, USID, or non-CAC LRC
+should be automatically enrolled in IMESA and the local installation ePACS by presenting their CAC or USID at the ACP;
+(2)  Individuals establishing their identity by means of any other enrollable acceptable credential who have previously enrolled in IMESA at another installation should be automatically enrolled in the local installation ePACS by presenting, directly at the ACP, the same acceptable credential used previously for enrollment in IMESA.
+
+b.  At ePACS-enabled DoD installations without IMESA functionality, individuals establishing their identity by means of a CAC or USID should be automatically enrolled in the local installation ePACS by presenting their CAC or USID at the ACP in lieu of undergoing the VCP at the VCC.
+c.  Installations with unique mission requirements may choose not to implement automatic enrollment and instead require individuals who have not previously enrolled at that installation to be processed through the VCC at their first visit and enrolled for subsequent visits.  This is not considered a deviation.
+
+4.8.  EPACS FAILURE CONTINGENCIES.  DoD Components will establish procedures for ePACS-enabled DoD installations, with and without IMESA functionality, for installation access control in the event of an ePACS failure.  Procedures should include visual inspection at the ACP of DoD-issued credentials and processing through the VCP of holders of other credentials; visual inspection of all credentials; and other applicable procedures to account for the specific characteristics of the installation, risk assessments, and DoD Component and installation-level policies.
+
+## Section 5: Acceptable Forms Of Identification
+
+5.1.  ACCEPTABLE CREDENTIALS.  All credentials must be verified in accordance with the methods defined in Paragraph 5.3.  Any time the credential is physically handled it will be visually inspected, front and back, for signs of alteration or counterfeit.  Credentials that appear questionable (e.g., damaged laminates, evidence of tampering) or altered will not be accepted for any purpose.
+a.  Credentials Acceptable at non-ePACS-Enabled DoD installations.  Non-ePACS-
+enabled DoD installations, absent an approved deviation, will accept:
+(1)  DoD CAC.  The CAC simultaneously establishes identity, historic fitness, and purpose.
+
+(2)  DoD USID.  The USID establishes identity and generally establishes purpose.
+However, DoD Component and installation-level policy, pursuant to paragraph 3.4.b, may require additional information or documentation to establish an acceptable purpose for access to installations that do not serve benefit populations (such as, but not limited to, retirees and dependents); no deviation is required for such policies.
+
+(3)  Non-CAC LRC issued by the **local** installation or region.  These credentials simultaneously establish identity, historic fitness, and purpose.
+
+(4)  REAL ID-compliant driver's license or non-driver's identification card issued by a State, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia.  These credentials establish only identity.
+
+(5)  Enhanced driver's license issued by a State, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia.  These credentials establish only identity.
+
+(6)  U.S. passport or passport card.  These credentials establish only identity. (7)  Foreign passport bearing an unexpired immigrant or non-immigrant visa or entry stamp.  These credentials establish only identity.
+
+(8)  Any other government-issued credential bearing a photograph and deemed acceptable by the DoD Component head and consistent with applicable laws.
+b.  Credentials Acceptable at ePACS-Enabled DoD installations without IMESA
+Functionality.  ePACS-enabled DoD installations without IMESA functionality, absent an approved deviation, will accept:
+(1)  DoD CAC.  The CAC simultaneously establishes identity, historic fitness, and purpose.
+
+(2)  DoD USID.  The USID establishes identity and generally establishes purpose.
+However, DoD Component and installation-level policy, pursuant to paragraph 3.4.b., may require additional information or documentation to establish an acceptable purpose for access to installations that do not serve benefit populations (such as, but not limited to, retirees and dependents); no deviation is required for such policies.
+(3)  Non-CAC LRC issued by the **local** installation or region.  These credentials simultaneously establish identity, historic fitness, and purpose.
+
+(4)  REAL ID-compliant driver's license or non-driver's identification card issued by a State, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia.  These credentials establish only identity.
+
+(5)  Enhanced driver's license issued by a State, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia.  These credentials establish only identity.
+
+(6)  U.S. passport or passport card.  These credentials establish only identity.
+
+(7)  Foreign passport bearing an unexpired immigrant or non-immigrant visa or entry stamp.  These credentials establish only identity.
+
+(8)  Any other U.S. Federal, State, territory, possession, or District of Columbia Government-issued credential bearing a photograph, including credentials from other paragraphs in this section, deemed acceptable by the DoD Component head and consistent with applicable laws.
+c.  Credentials Acceptable at ePACS-Enabled DoD installations with IMESA
+Functionality.  ePACS-enabled DoD installations with IMESA functionality, absent an approved deviation, will accept:
+(1)  The credentials listed in Paragraph 5.1.b of this issuance.
+
+(2)  Non-CAC LRC issued by **another** ePACS-enabled installation or region with IMESA functionality.  These credentials simultaneously establish identity and historic fitness.
+
+(3)  Federal Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card.  The PIV simultaneously establishes identity and historic fitness.
+
+(4)  Veteran's Health Identification Card (VHIC).  The VHIC simultaneously establishes identity and, if the installation has a medical treatment facility, purpose.  The VHIC also establishes purpose for individuals accompanying the cardholder.
+
+(5)  Non-federal personal identity verification-interoperable (PIV-I) card.  The PIV-I
+establishes only identity.
+
+(6)  Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC).  The TWIC establishes only identity.
+(7)  Any other U.S. Federal, State, territory, possession, or District of Columbia Government-issued credential bearing a photograph, including credentials from other paragraphs in this section that are deemed acceptable by the DoD Component head and consistent with applicable laws.
+
+d.  Summary of Acceptable Credentials.  Table 1 contains the acceptable credential information from Paragraphs 5.1.a through 5.1.c in tabular form.
+
+Established
+
+non-ePACS-
+enabled
+If Acceptable,
+Establishes:
+ePACS-
+enabled without IMESA
+ePACS-
+enabled with IMESA
+Acceptable Credential
+Acceptable
+Enrollable
+Acceptable
+Enrollable
+Acceptable
+Enrollable
+Identity
+Historic
+Fitness
+Purpose
+CAC
+X
+
+X
+X
+X
+X
+X
+X
+X
+USID
+X
+
+X
+X
+X
+X
+X
+
+X2
+X
+
+X
+X
+X
+X
+X
+X
+X
+Non-CAC Local or Regional
+DoD Credential issued by
+the **local** installation or
+region
+
+
+X
+X
+X
+X
+
+Non-CAC Local or Regional
+DoD Credential issued by
+another installation or
+region
+X
+
+X
+
+X
+X
+X
+
+
+REAL ID-compliant driver's
+license, enhanced driver's license, or nondriver's identification card issued by a State,
+territory, possession, or
+the District of Columbia
+U.S. or Foreign Passport or
+Passport Card
+X
+
+X
+
+X
+
+X
+
+
+TWIC
+
+
+X
+X
+X
+
+
+VHIC
+
+
+X
+X
+X
+
+X1
+Federal PIV
+
+
+X
+X
+X
+X
+
+Non-Federal PIV-I
+
+
+X
+X
+X
+
+
+1  The VHIC establishes purpose only at installations that have a medical treatment facility, and
+establishes purpose both for the cardholder and for the cardholder's accompanying caregiver.
+
+2  The USID generally establishes purpose, but may be deemed as not establishing purpose at morerestricted installations that do not serve retirees or dependents.
+
+5.2.  SOURCE IDENTITY DOCUMENTS.  All source identity documents must be visually inspected for known security features, as applicable, and for signs of alteration or counterfeit. Electronic verification is not required for source identity documents, but may be performed if it is available.  Unless otherwise specified in this section, source identity documents establish only identity.
+a.  Combinations Accepted at all Installations.  DoD Components will accept the following combinations of source identity documents at all types of DoD installations:
+(1)  TWIC used in conjunction with a driver's license issued by a State, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia that is not REAL ID-compliant bearing the same name and similar photograph.  In this situation:
+(a)  The TWIC is the credential used to establish identity for the purpose of access control.
+(b)  The non-REAL ID-compliant driver's license is used to establish identity for the purpose of force protection.
+(2)  VHIC used in conjunction with a driver's license issued by a State, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia that is not REAL ID-compliant bearing the same name and similar photograph.  In this situation:
+(a)  The VHIC is the credential used to establish identity for the purpose of access control.
+(b)  The non-REAL ID-compliant driver's license is used to establish identity for the purpose of force protection.
+(3)  Original or certified true copy of a birth certificate bearing a raised seal, social security card, and driver's license issued by a State, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia that is not REAL ID-compliant.  All three documents must bear the same name or a former name as documented on acceptable name change documentation such as a court order, marriage certificate, or divorce decree.  In this situation:
+(a)  The birth certificate and social security card are used to establish identity for the purpose of access control.
+(b)  The non-REAL ID-compliant driver's license is used to establish identity for the purpose of force protection.
+
+b.  Component-defined Combinations.  DoD Component policy will establish other acceptable source identity documents, and the combinations in which they will be accepted.  The combinations of source identity documents must reasonably approximate the rigor associated with obtaining a State or Federal photo ID, and provide a reasonable assurance in the identity established.
+5.3.  VERIFICATION OF CREDENTIALS.  All credentials will be verified in accordance with Tables 2 and 3 based on the credential being used, the type of installation, and whether verification is taking place during the VCP (that is, at the VCC during enrollment) or during the access control process (that is, at the gate at time of access).
+a.  PIV and PIV-I Credentials.  Public key infrastructure verifications of Federal PIV
+credentials and Non-Federal PIV-I credentials will be in accordance with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information Processing Standard 201-2, NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-116, NIST SP 800-73-4, and NIST SP 800-96, and may be performed directly or via the IoLS.
+
+b.  TWIC Credentials.  Public key infrastructure verifications of TWIC credentials will be in accordance with Section 101 of Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, and may be performed directly or via the IOLS.
+
+|                                                                                                                    | During the Visitor Control Process    |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
+| (i.e., at the VCC for enrollment)                                                                                  |                                       |
+| During the Access Control Process                                                                                  |                                       |
+| (i.e., at the ACP for access each time)                                                                            |                                       |
+| ePACS-                                                                                                             |                                       |
+| enabled                                                                                                            |                                       |
+| with                                                                                                               |                                       |
+| IMESA                                                                                                              |                                       |
+| Non-ePACS-                                                                                                         |                                       |
+| enabled                                                                                                            |                                       |
+| ePACS-                                                                                                             |                                       |
+| enabled                                                                                                            |                                       |
+| without                                                                                                            |                                       |
+| IMESA                                                                                                              |                                       |
+| ePACS-                                                                                                             |                                       |
+| enabled                                                                                                            |                                       |
+| with                                                                                                               |                                       |
+| IMESA                                                                                                              |                                       |
+| Credential                                                                                                         | Non-ePACS-                            |
+| enabled                                                                                                            |                                       |
+| ePACS-                                                                                                             |                                       |
+| enabled                                                                                                            |                                       |
+| without                                                                                                            |                                       |
+| IMESA                                                                                                              |                                       |
+| CAC                                                                                                                | A                                     |
+| *                                                                                                                  |                                       |
+|                                                                                                                    | B2 or E2                              |
+| *                                                                                                                  |                                       |
+|                                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| USID                                                                                                               | A                                     |
+| Non-CAC Local                                                                                                      |                                       |
+| or Regional                                                                                                        |                                       |
+| DoD Credential                                                                                                     |                                       |
+| A                                                                                                                  | A                                     |
+| A                                                                                                                  | A                                     |
+|                                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| B1                                                                                                                 |                                       |
+| REAL ID-                                                                                                           |                                       |
+| compliant                                                                                                          |                                       |
+| driver's license,                                                                                                  |                                       |
+| enhanced                                                                                                           |                                       |
+| driver's license,                                                                                                  |                                       |
+| or non-driver's                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| identification                                                                                                     |                                       |
+| card                                                                                                               |                                       |
+| U.S. or Foreign                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| Passport or                                                                                                        |                                       |
+| Passport Card                                                                                                      |                                       |
+| A                                                                                                                  | A                                     |
+|                                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| TWIC                                                                                                               |                                       |
+|                                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| D                                                                                                                  |                                       |
+|                                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| C or E                                                                                                             |                                       |
+| VHIC                                                                                                               |                                       |
+|                                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| B1                                                                                                                 |                                       |
+|                                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| B1                                                                                                                 |                                       |
+| Federal PIV                                                                                                        |                                       |
+|                                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| D                                                                                                                  |                                       |
+|                                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| C or E                                                                                                             |                                       |
+| Non-Federal PIV-I                                                                                                  |                                       |
+|                                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| D                                                                                                                  |                                       |
+|                                                                                                                    |                                       |
+| C or E                                                                                                             |                                       |
+| * If intermittently required due to throughput, traffic, or other circumstances, U.S. citizen CACs (indicated by a |                                       |
+| white or green stripe) may be primarily verified visually, with electronic verification performed on a random      |                                       |
+| sampling of CACs.  Non-U.S. citizen CACs (indicated by a blue stripe)                                              |                                       |
+| must                                                                                                               |                                       |
+| be scanned at ACPs.                                                                                                |                                       |
+| Blank cells indicate that credential is not acceptable in that situation.                                          |                                       |
+| Method                                              | Verify the Credential                      |
+|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
+| Visually.                                           | By comparing the individual presenting the |
+| credential with the photo printed on the card.      |                                            |
+| A                                                   |                                            |
+| (high                                               |                                            |
+| risk)                                               |                                            |
+| B1                                                  |                                            |
+| (medium                                             |                                            |
+| risk)                                               |                                            |
+| By reading an identifier from a barcode and         |                                            |
+| verifying that identifier against a local           |                                            |
+| authoritative system capable of tracking            |                                            |
+| revocations at the installation level, such as the  |                                            |
+| local ePACS.                                        |                                            |
+| B2                                                  |                                            |
+| (low risk)                                          |                                            |
+| By reading an identifier from a barcode and         |                                            |
+| verifying that identifier against an                |                                            |
+| interconnected authoritative system capable of      |                                            |
+| tracking revocations at the enterprise level,       |                                            |
+| such as DEERS.                                      |                                            |
+| C                                                   |                                            |
+| (low risk)                                          |                                            |
+| By performing a full public key infrastructure      |                                            |
+| authentication against either the Card              |                                            |
+| Authentication function or the PIV                  |                                            |
+| Authentication function, including verifying        |                                            |
+| including the signature, trust chain, expiration    |                                            |
+| dates, policy under which it was issued, and        |                                            |
+| continued validity of the certificate against a     |                                            |
+| certificate revocation list or Open Certificate     |                                            |
+| Status Protocol responder.                          |                                            |
+| D                                                   |                                            |
+| (low risk)                                          |                                            |
+| By performing a full public key infrastructure      |                                            |
+| authentication against either the Card              |                                            |
+| Authentication function or the PIV                  |                                            |
+| Authentication function, including verifying        |                                            |
+| including the signature, trust chain, expiration    |                                            |
+| dates, policy under which it was issued, and        |                                            |
+| continued validity of the certificate against a     |                                            |
+| certificate revocation list or Open Certificate     |                                            |
+| Status Protocol responder.                          |                                            |
+| E1                                                  |                                            |
+| (medium                                             |                                            |
+| risk)                                               |                                            |
+| By reading an identifier such as the Card           |                                            |
+| Holder Unique Identifier or Globally Unique         |                                            |
+| Identifier, and verifying that identifier against a |                                            |
+| local authoritative system capable of tracking      |                                            |
+| revocations at the installation level, such as the  |                                            |
+| local ePACS.                                        |                                            |
+| E2                                                  |                                            |
+| (low risk)                                          |                                            |
+| By reading an identifier such as the Card           |                                            |
+| Holder Unique Identifier or Globally Unique         |                                            |
+| Identifier and verifying that identifier against    |                                            |
+| an interconnected authoritative system capable      |                                            |
+| of tracking revocations at the enterprise level,    |                                            |
+| such as the Federal Bridge.                         |                                            |
+|                                                     |                                            |
+By comparing the individual presenting the credential with the photo stored in an authoritative system, such as the local ePACS or Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting
+System (DEERS).
+By comparing the individual presenting the credential with the photo stored in an authoritative system, such as the local ePACS or DEERS.
+By comparing the individual presenting the credential with the photo stored in an authoritative system, such as the local ePACS or DEERS. By using a credential verification process that requires card activation (such as PIV Authentication); comparing the individual presenting the credential against the signed digital photo stored on the card provided the signature on the digital photo is verified; or comparing the individual against the signed biometric object stored on the card provided the signature on the biometric object is verified. By comparing the individual presenting the
+credential with the photo stored in an authoritative system, such as the local ePACS or DEERS.
+By comparing the individual presenting the credential with the photo stored in an authoritative system, such as the local ePACS
+or DEERS.
+
+## Section 6: Implementation
+
+6.1.  COMPONENT IMPLEMENTING POLICIES.  The implementing policies issued by DoD Component heads will include, at a minimum:
+a.  Fitness criteria for unescorted access in accordance with Paragraph 3.3, until a DoD
+standard for fitness is defined.
+
+b.  Source identity documents (and their acceptable combinations) and any other acceptable credentials which may be used to establish identity in accordance with Paragraph 3.2 and Section 5.
+
+c.  Any additional means which may be used to establish historic fitness or U.S. citizenship, both in accordance with Paragraph 3.3.
+
+d.  Procedures and parameters for applying this issuance to installations with large unoccupied, undeveloped space in accordance with Paragraph 3.1.
+
+e.  Permissibility and criteria for acceptance of inter-component enrollments. f.  Acceptable purposes for presence on the installation in accordance with Paragraphs 3.4
+and 6.3.
+
+g.  Procedures and requirements for handling special events and emergencies in accordance with Paragraph 3.5.
+
+h.  Permissibility of trusted traveler programs, and any other criteria, in addition to U.S.
+
+citizenship and DoD affiliation, used to authorize individuals to vouch for individuals seeking trusted traveler access, and under which parameters such access will be permitted in accordance with Paragraph 4.2.
+
+i.  ePACS failure contingency plans.
+
+j.  Escort parameters, including but not limited to classes of individuals permitted to escort, training required to escort (initial and recurring), and number of visitors per escort.
+
+k.  Specific procedures for processing visitors, also known as the VCP, that meet the requirements in Section 3.
+
+l.  Specific procedures for controlling access, also known as the access control process, that meet the requirements in Section 3 and Paragraph 4.6.
+m.  The maximum permitted duration for short-term visitor passes and the permissibility of and maximum permitted duration of long-term visitor passes, in accordance with Paragraph 4.4.
+
+n.  The requirements for gaining escorted access, and procedures for handling visitors who do not meet the requirements for unescorted access.
+
+o.  Variances from DoD Component-level policy available to installation commanders in Paragraphs 6.1.f through 6.1.n of this issuance.  Variances from DoD Component-level policy are not permitted for Paragraphs 6.1.a through 6.1.e.
+
+6.2.  ALLOWABLE DEVIATIONS.  When approved in accordance with Paragraph 2.4.e and
+2.4.f, deviations may only include:
+a.  Absence of an ePACS or use of an ePACS that is not compliant with Paragraph 2.4.c.(1)
+due to unique mission as deemed by the DoD Component head (including a mission that requires the installation to be open to the public).
+
+b.  Precluding the use of one or more of the credentials listed in Section 5 as acceptable for their type of installation due to unique mission requirements in accordance with Paragraph 3.2.
+
+c.  More restrictive access control requirements in accordance with Paragraph 3.7.
+
+6.3.  COMPONENT POLICY FOR ACCEPTABLE PURPOSES.   DoD Component-level policy will determine whether the following are acceptable purposes for access to DoD Component installations (this list is not exhaustive and only includes certain circumstances that are to be expressly addressed in DoD Component policy.)
+a.  An employee, contractor, or volunteer of the American Red Cross providing a service on the installation that has been requested by the installation commander.
+
+b.  An employee, contractor, or volunteer of the United Services Organization, Incorporated providing a service on the installation that has been requested by the installation commander.
+
+c.  A driver for a transportation network company or other personnel transportation company picking up or a dropping off a passenger from or to a barracks, housing, lodging, hospital, or community area.  Both the driver and passenger must be granted unescorted access to the installation, in accordance with Section 3 of this issuance.  In these situations:
+(1)  The driver's acceptable purpose is providing transportation to the passenger.  The driver's access shall be temporary and limited in scope and time to what is necessary to fulfill this acceptable purpose.
+(2)  The passenger must have their own acceptable purpose in accordance with Paragraph
+3.4 of this issuance.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+| ACP      | access control point                                       |
+|----------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+|          |                                                            |
+| CAC      | common access card                                         |
+|          |                                                            |
+| DEERS    | Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System            |
+| DIA      | Defense Intelligence Agency                                |
+| DoDD     | DoD directive                                              |
+| DoDI     | DoD instruction                                            |
+| DoDM     | DoD manual                                                 |
+|          |                                                            |
+| ePACS    | electronic physical access control system                  |
+|          |                                                            |
+| IMESA    | Identity Matching Engine for Security and Analysis         |
+| IoLS     | Interoperability Layer Service                             |
+|          |                                                            |
+| NCIC     | National Crime Information Center                          |
+| NIST     | National Institute for Standards and Technology            |
+|          |                                                            |
+| PIV      | federal Personal Identity Verification                     |
+| PIV-I    | non-federal Personal Identity Verification - Interoperable |
+|          |                                                            |
+| SP       | special publication                                        |
+|          |                                                            |
+| TWIC     | Transportation Worker Identification Card                  |
+|          |                                                            |
+| U.S.C.   | United States Code                                         |
+| USD(I&S) | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security   |
+| USD(P&R) | Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness     |
+| USID     | Uniformed Services Identification card                     |
+|          |                                                            |
+| VHIC     | Veteran Health Identification Card                         |
+| VCC      | visitor control center                                     |
+| VCP      | visitor control process                                    |
+|          |                                                            |
+
+G.2.  DEFINITIONS.  Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+acceptable credential.  A credential that, depending on the type of installation, must be accepted as proof of identity, historic fitness, or purpose, in accordance with Section 5.1.
+
+ACP.  Identified gap in an installation's perimeter security for pedestrian and/or vehicular access.  Often called an entry control point or simply "gate."  Includes commercial vehicle inspection points.
+
+appeal.  A process for an individual with accurately identified derogatory information that prevents individuals from establishing either historic or current fitness to seek an exception due to their specific circumstances, allowing them to be granted unescorted access.
+
+automatic enrollment.  A process by which certain individuals may be enrolled in an installation ePACS and, if the installation has IMESA functionality, in IMESA, without undergoing the VCP or being processed at the VCC.
+
+credential.  A form of identification that, on its own, associates a specific person with their specific identity, biographic, and, in some cases, biometric information.  For example, a driver's license.  A document that contains identity information but cannot be associated with a specific person (for example, if it has no photograph or biometric information) is not a credential, but may be a source identity document.
+
+current fitness.  A determination that an individual has no pending criminal cases or actions against him or her and is not listed on any U.S. Government terrorism lists that would indicate that such individual may pose a risk to the safety, security, and efficiency of the installation or its occupants.
+
+deviation.  A divergence from a requirement or procedure that is not intended to be temporary or corrected.
+derogatory information.  Information that reflects on the integrity or character of an individual that indicates that such an individual may pose a risk to the good order, discipline, morale, or safety of a DoD installation or the resources or personnel on that installation.  Examples include, but are not limited to, aspects of an individual's criminal history or current status as wanted or as a known or appropriately suspected terrorist.
+
+DoD affiliation.  The status of being officially attached or connected to DoD by means of employment (either as a DoD civilian or military), contract (as a DoD contractor or subcontractor), government support agreements pursuant to DoDI 4000.19, or statutorily provided benefit (as a military retiree or dependent).
+electronically verify.  The process of confirming, by cryptographic means or querying the original issuer, that a presented credential is authentic (not counterfeit) and still valid (not revoked, cancelled, or otherwise reported lost, stolen, or compromised).
+enrollment.  A process that allows individuals who anticipate a subsequent visit to the installation to persist their established fitness, but not purpose, facilitating future entry.
+enrollment reciprocity.  The acceptance of an enrollment conducted at another DoD installation as proof of an individual's established fitness, but not purpose.
+
+enrollable credential.  A type of credential that includes a machine-readable identifier that can be scanned, understood, and processed by an ePACS.
+ePACS.  An information technology system that provides a "grant" or "deny" decision or recommendation based on a presented identification card, optional additional authentication factors such as a PIN or biometric input, an identity database, and one or more business rules that determines which individuals are authorized access.
+
+escorted access.  A type of access where an individual must be appropriately accompanied at all times to ensure that the escorted individual does not cause unacceptable risk to the safety, security, or efficiency of an installation or its occupants.
+
+fitness.  A determination based on historic and current information that an individual is likely not a risk to the safety, security, and efficiency of an installation or its occupants.
+
+historic fitness.  A determination that an individual's criminal history reflects a level of character and personal conduct that does not pose a risk to the safety, security, and efficiency of an installation or its occupants.
+
+limited access control requirements.  Situations where physical access is either limited to small numbers of individuals who are generally known to each other, or to rare and occasional periods. For example: a location with ten assigned employees and infrequent visitors, or a radio transmission tower that operates unmanned except for monthly maintenance periods.
+
+installation.  The grounds of, but not buildings on, a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under DoD jurisdiction, including any leased facility, that is located within any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or Guam that have a perimeter barrier (such as a fenceline or wall), one or more access control points (sometimes called entry control points), and a method for processing visitors.  Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, or flood control projects.
+
+personnel transportation company.  An entity that provides transportation of individuals, rather than of material, as a for-hire service. Examples include but are not limited to taxi cabs, limousine services, and bus companies.
+
+purpose.  An individual's reason for seeking access to an installation.
+
+source identity document.  A document that establishes that specific identity exists, though it does not associate that identity with a specific person.  For example, a birth certificate or social security card.  These documents may be used in conjunction with others to associate a specific person with a specific identity.
+redress.  A process for an individual to deconflict his or her identity with that of another individual with whom they are frequently or easily mistaken (such as two individuals with similar names or similar identifiers, one with a criminal history and one without).  Redress can be accomplished by providing additional biographic information to distinguish between the identities (such as a date of birth or social security number) or biometric information (such as fingerprints).  Redress allows the proper identity to be evaluated for fitness.
+
+special event.  Planned time-bound activities (either one-time or recurring) that by their nature have a number of non-installation-assigned individuals attending, and are often characterized by a desire for mass public participation by individuals not otherwise eligible for recurring access to the installation.  Examples include, but are not limited to, graduations, sporting events such as military academy football games, conferences, and public exhibitions.
+
+temporary waiver.  A suspension, for a short, well-defined time period, of a requirement or procedure with the intention of reinstating it at the end of that time period.
+
+transportation network company.  An entity outside of the Department of Defense that provides a commercial transportation service to a rider, including a company that uses a digital network to connect riders to drivers for the purpose of providing transportation.
+
+trusted traveler access.  A type of access where an individual is granted entry to the installation based on another authorized person's verification of their identity, fitness, and purpose.
+
+unescorted access.  A type of access where an individual is able to travel unaccompanied on an installation USID.  Sometimes called the TESLIN or the Dependent or Retiree ID Card.  Includes the DD
+Form 2 (Retired, Reserve, and Reserve Retired versions), DD Form 1173 and 1173-1, DD Form 2765, and the DoD Civilian Retiree Card as described by DoDI 1000.13 and Volumes 1 and 2 of DoDM 1000.13.
+
+## References
+
+Code of Federal Regulation, Title 33
+DoD 5400.11-R, "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 14, 2007
+DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
+(USD(I&S))," October 24, 2014, as amended
+DoD Directive 5200.27, "Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not
+Affiliated with the Department of Defense," January 7, 1980
+DoD Instruction 5400.11, "DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs," January 29, 2019 DoD Instruction 1000.13, "Identification (ID) Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services,
+Their Dependents, and Other Eligible Individuals," January 23, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction O-2000.16, Volume 1, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation:
+DoD AT Standards, November 17, 2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction O-2000.16, Volume 2, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation:
+DoD Force Protection Condition (FPCON) System, November 17, 2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," April 25, 2013, as amended DoD Instruction 5200.08, "Security of DoD Installations and Resources and the DoD Physical
+Security Review Board," December 10, 2005, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5400.16, "DoD Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) Guidance," July 14, 2015, as
+amended
+DoD Instruction 5505.17, "Collection, Maintenance, Use, and Dissemination of Personally
+Identifiable Information and Law Enforcement Information by DoD Law Enforcement Activities," December 19, 2012, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8910.01, "Information Collection and Reporting," May 19, 2014, as amended
+DoD Manual 1000.13, Volume 1, "DoD Identification (ID) Cards: Identification (ID) Card Life-
+Cycle," January 23, 2014, as amended
+DoD Manual 1000.13, Volume 2, "DoD Identification (ID) Cards: Benefits for Members of the
+Uniformed Services, Their Dependents and Other Eligible Individuals," January 23, 2014, as
+amended
+DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 4, "DoD Information Security Program: Controlled Unclassified
+Information," February 24, 2012, as amended
+Federal Information Processing Standard 201-2, "Personal Identity Verification of Employees
+and Contractors," August 2013
+Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
+Department of Defense, Annex D, "Terrorist Screening Information Sharing," February 22, 2012
+National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-73-4, "Interfaces for
+Personal Identity Verification," May 2015
+National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-96, "PIV Card to Reader
+Interoperability Guidelines," September 2006
+National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-116, "A
+Recommendation for the use of PIV Credentials in Physical Access Control Systems," November 2008
+Public Law 109-13, Title II, "Improved Security for Drivers' Licenses and Personal
+Identification Cards," May 11, 2005 (also known as "the REAL ID Act of 2005")
+Public Law 110-181, Section 1069, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,"
+January 28, 2008
+Public Law 114-92, Section 1086, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,"
+November 25, 2015
+Public Law 116-92, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020,"
+December 20, 2019
+United States Code, Title 5, Section 552a (also known as "the Privacy Act")
+United States Code, Title 44, Chapter 35, Subchapter I (also known as "the Paperwork Reduction
+Act")