Office of the Director of National Intelligence Washington, DC 20511 Mr. Steven Aftergood SEP f 9 2014 Federation of American Scientists 1725 DeSales Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 Reference: FOIA Request DF-2010-00031 Dear Mr. Aftergood: This is in response to your 23 December 2009 email to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) (Enclosure 1), in which you requested, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), copies of two ODNI SHARP (Summer Hard Problem Program) reports from July 2009. Your request was processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552, as amended. A thorough search of our records and databases located documents responsive to your request. ODNI reviewed one of the documents (Enclosure 2) and determined that material must be withheld pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions: - (b)(l), which protects properly classified information under Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(c); - (b )(3), which applies to information specifically exempt by statutes, specifically 50 U.S.C. 3024(i), which protects intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; and - (b)(5), which protects privileged interagency or Intra-Agency information. If you wish to appeal ODNI' s determination on this request, please explain the basis of your appeal and forward to the address below within 45 days of the date of this letter. Office of the Director of National Intelligence Information Management Office Washington D.C. 20511 The Department of Energy (DoE) also conducted a review on the material and determined that the document contained Restricted Data (RD), which has been redacted under Title 5, U.S.C. 552(b)(3) as containing information about weapon design. Enclosure 3 defines the justification for withholding this information, as well as instructions for submitting an appeal of the DOE determination. Please be advised that one document originated with another agency. Because we are unable to make determinations as to the releasability of other agencies' information, the document has been referred to the appropriate agency for review and direct response to you. If you have any questions regarding the denial of ODNI information, email our Requester Service Center at DNI-FOIA@dni.gov or call us at (703) 874-8500. Sincerely, ~~~~ -kv f~trifer Hudson {) if:)i;ector, Information Management Division ## Enclosures # Sharp.2009 Transforming Nuclear Attril:w.t'f~;J Culture, Community, ;.3nd;;t~:paljge ## Sec~; | (U) | EXECUTIVE | SUMMARY | 5 | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | (U) | | | | | EXECUTIVE | SUMMARY | _, | - 5 | | (U) | KEY | FINDINGS cceecrereireerarssnsnssansmssnrassasrsnsessnesssstasasassan | ssssrsessnsnnssassssessnssesssassesnsrsnsessssnast | | (U) | Developing | the | Culture eeecnen... | | (U) | Developing | and | Leveraging | | (U) | Developing | the | INfrastriiClure ecoevmenierrcraereseessesecrsterensnssssnesisassessssansansesssessaes | | (U) | Developing | the[____ | tructure | | (U) | | | | | KEY | | | | | FINDINGS ...... ........ ........ ........ | | | | | 6 | | | | | (U) | | | | | Developing the | | | | | Culture | | | | | 6 | | | | | (U) | | | | | Developing | and | Leveraging | | | People 7 | | | | | (U) | | | | | Developing the Infrastructure | | | | | 7 | | | | | (U) | | | | | Developing thec==:ptructure | | | | | | | | | | 8 | | | | | (U) | SCOPE | NOTE | 9 | | (U) | | | | | SCOPE | NOTE | - | _., | | (U) | INTRODUCTION | TO | THE | | (U) | | | | | INTRODUCTION | TO | mE | ARTICLES | | (U) | ASSUMPTIONS | 12 | | | (U) | | | | | ASSUMPTIONS | _.,, | - | | | ~ | | | | | ... | | | | | 11 | | | | | (U) | SPECTRUM | OF | THE | | (V) | | | | | SPECTRUM | OF | THE | THREAT | | - ,_ | | | | | ~-,."---13 | | | | | . | * | | | | ~ | | | | | (U) | NEED | TO | COMMUNICATE | | (U) | | | | | NEED | TO | COMMUNICATE | - | | i~~~- | | | | | | - | .. | | | 15 | | | | | !'!' | | | | | ':!i.1o~~ | | | | | (U) | COMMUNICATION | CONCEPTS | coveeeerrencememscscnscrnersserans | | (U) | | | | | COMMUNICATION CONCEPTS ....... - .... ..... - ........ | | | | | ~~:~::~15 | | | | | (U) | | | | | COMMUNICATING A TIRIBUTION ASSESSMENTS . . . | | | | | ~~~l~li~:~1~!~!i! | | | | | | | | | | I | | | | | 5 | | | | | (U) | COMMUNICATING | ATTRIBUTION | ASSESSMENTS | | (l!fr))rm.Lna1.1ch.m.msf..um..."..n _.mI | | | | | ( | 1 | | | | o) | ; | S | | | ~"'B!JC- | r::::::::;::::::::~~::::~:::::~;i::;1f~:::::::: | | | | i! | | | | | | . | | | | ~ | | | | | .. | | | | | ~l::;li~-J. | ~;r | | | | (U) | | | | | EXPRESSING UNCERTAINTIES IN | CRISES | - | | | !i:r.~ | | | | | | | | | | ~~i~t:L | | | | | | | | | | 19 | | | | | (U) | EXPRESSING | UNCERTAINTIES | IN | | B, | K | | | | (U) | A | PROPOSAL | FOR | | (U) | LESSONS | FROM | PREVIOUS | | (U) | | | | | A PROPOSAL FOR DEVELOPING STANDARDS | OF | UNCERTAINTY | | | ~i(;-i-HE'D.: | | | | | ... | | | | | :t | | | | | 20 | | | | | (U) | | | | | LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES ON UNCERTAINTY | .. | ,:: - | | | .'t | | | | | ::~t&!f: | | | | | | | | | | 23 | | | | | .::~~~~:;~ | ~~- | | | | (U) | ORGANICALLY | GROW | A | | (U) | | | | | ORGANICALLY | GROW | A LEXICON | | | ~~Ji*1~ | | | | | .. | .::.. | | | | ,~,~~ | | | | | | ...:.. | | | | 15 | | | | | (U) | SPLIT | SECOND | DECISION-MAKING: | | (U) | MITIGATING | THE | "CS1 | | (U) | LE/IC: | RisK | OF | | (U) | | | | | SPLIT | SECOND DECISION-MAKING: | | | | A:if!~w | E~;f.:ORCE;f(l!f,tf.ERSPECTIVE | | | | .. | ---- | 27 | | | . | " | | | | ~~:::~~;~~- | J~; | | | | . | | | | | ;t | . | | | | (U) | | | | | MITIGATING THE | "CSI | EFFECT | | | . | | | | | ~ | | | | | - | | | | | ~~::;i,,~ | | | | | ... | | | | | ,~:~: | | | | | | | | | | 21 | | | | | (U) | | | | | LEIIC: | RISK | OF BEING | WRONG | | :!'J,ti{i~;: | | | | | 28 | | | | | (U) | MINEFIELDS | AND | MIND | | (U) | | | | | MINEFIELDS | AND MIND | TRAPS | IN | | ~- | ~it!~:~ | | | | (U) | THE | ROAD | TO | | (U) | | | | | THE | ROAD | TO | HELL | | WIT~J~B~tiVE | | | | | COGNITIONS | .. - | 31 | | | (U) | ACCOUNTING FOR | | | | PSYCHOI.C!9.~~:f'-ND:~IAL | | | | | FACTORS THAT DEGRADE RESPONSE | OR | INHIBIT | | | INFORMATION SHARING | | | | | IN | LJANAJ:YSIS | ...... ........ ........ | | | 31 | | | | | (U) | | | | | Core Concepts in | Judgiijent,.,a'nd | | | | D~ion-Malcing | | | | | | | | | | 31 | | | | | ~~Ji.~~:::: | | | | | .. | | | | | ~::::::::.:::: | | | | | .. | | | | | :.:~.:::::::: | | | | | | | | | | ::::.::::.:.:::::!~ | | | | | (U),:Hnplicit.vs: | | | | | Explic1t~i}ion-Making | | | | | . | | | | | | | | | | 35 | | | | | ... | | | | | ,r!~~-~ | | | | | . | | | | | ~ | | | | | .. | | | | | ~ | | | | | ... | | | | | @}.The Haiiihis | of | | | | Bias.~lfeuristics, | | | | | and | | | | | Intuition 35 | | | | | | | | | | ~... | | | | | ,. | | | | | ? | | | | | . | " | | | | M:IJ.FJ.ie~:Yfre | | | | | Possessions' | 36 | | | | (U) | | | | | ';4ifc.~~ring | | | | | and | | | | | the Pressure to Round up the Usual Suspects | 36 | | | | ~ | Z~7~~~:~:.~~~::::::::i~ | | | | (U) | ACCOUNTING | FOR | PSYCHOLOGICAL,AND; | | INFORMATION | SHARING | IN | I___:I'ANA;,YSIS | | (U) | Core | Concepts | in | | (U) | Rationality: | Bounded | and | | (U) | Biases | and | Heuri$fics | | U | Baunded | Wzllpower | TR | | (U) | Boun | EESL | ..v.eeteesesemsessaeseesessnesssbuse | | (U): | 'Imphcmvs | Exphc'itfl?egz,flonMakmg | | | (l'{) | The | Hazara's | of | | - | (U)r'Bg!zefi | ATE | POSSESSIONS | | ) | Am:honng | and | the | | ) | How_,sWe | PErCeiVe | RiSK cccovvureemmsiineinisniinnssrer | | (U) | Hot | Cogggnon | | | (U) | Stress | Efi'ects | on | | (U) Stress | | | | | Effects | | | | | on Analysts | | | | | and | | | | | Policy-Malcers | | | | | | | | | | 38 | | | | | , | | | | | (U) | PERILS | AND | PITFALLS | | (U) | | | | | PERILS | AND PITFALLS | OF | GROUPS - _ _ | | (U) | | | | | SUCCESSFUL CULTURE IN | HIGH | STRESS, HIGH AMBIGUITY ENVIRONMENTS ... .... . | 41 | | (U) | | | | | Recommendationfor~re | | | | | - | 41 | | | | (U) | | | | | SOCIAL NETWORKS AND | | | | | TilE | | | | | 42 | | | | | (U) | | | | | GROUP | DYNAMICS AND | MA | ONS .. - ... - . ... ........ | | (U) | | | | | "Groupthink" | | | | | | | | | | 42. | | | | | (U) Stage | of | Development 43 | | | (U) | | | | | MEMBERSHIP | - - - .. | ; | .... .. ..... | | (U) | | | | | Multi-disciplinary | | | | | Advantage | | | | | 43 | | | | | (U) | SuccesSFUL | CULTURE | IN | | (U) | Recommendation | for | ulture | | (U) | SOCIAL | NETWORKS | AND | | (U) | GROUP | DYNAMICS | AND | | (U} | "Groupthink" | | vereeerser | | (U) | Stage | of | Development | | {U) | MEMBERSHIP... | reeeerecvernanaesesees | : | | ) | Mulhdzsctplmmy | Advanlage | e | | (U) | EXPERTISE: THE | GOOD, | THE | | (U) | The | All-Star | Problem. | | (U) | All | Expertise | is | | (U) | EXPERTISE: | THE | GooD, | | (U) The All-Star | | | | | Problem | | | | | 44 | | | | | . | | | | | (U) | | | | | All | Expertise is not the | | | | same., | | | | | 45 | | | | (U) WHAL iS EXPEIrISE? .......ooeeeanmeeeesiressraeasesersessassssamenssnsssstsstmsnssnssmsstastensmmmsessessssasnsanenn (U) Self-herding Cais? ........ouceirireecncenecsnssenessossssmonsasesssesssisasssessassssnssassssesssissens (U) ROLE OF NEGOTIATION ......c.coooenenmecesrerssssnseseemmmaseesesesesemsesessssemssssesesmmmsseesessessensesssersssmsesessesssermnossers ~ (U) THE CRITICAL ROLE OF EXERCISES AND TEAM-BUILDING ........ (U) Recognize the Need for Inoculation of Personnel and Information Networks Prior to Evenis.... (U)Establish Metrics to Ensure Effectiveness of Exercises and Training....... - (U)Preserve Splits that Present Differences of Opinion to Policy-M (U) COUNTER DEBILITATING EFFECTS OF HIGH STRESS ENVIRONMENT MONITORS (U) Emphasize Informatmn Sharing and Enhanced D Coardmanon ---------------------------------------------------- (U) What is Expertise? ........ 45 (U) Self-herding Cats? ........ 46 (U) ROLE OF NEGOTIATION ........ 47 (U) THE CRITICAL ROLE OF EXERCISES AND TEAM-BUILDING ........ 47 (U) Recognize the Need for 0Inoculation of Personnel and Information Networks Prior to Events .... 47 (U)Establish Metrics to Ensure Effectiveness of Exercises and Training ........ 48 (U)Preserve. Splits that Present Differences of *Opinion to* Policy-M~ ........ 48 (U) COUNTER DEBILITATING EFFECTS OF HIGH STRESS ENVIRONMENT L___j BY EMPLOYING STRESS MONITORS ........ 49 (U) Emphasize Information Sharing and *Enhanced* 0 Coordination ........ 49 (U) BRINGING THE RIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD (U) BRINGING THE RIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD ........ -------51 (U) UNDERSTANDING THE SENSITIVITIES AND CONSTRAINTS OF SENIOR POLICY-MAKERS (U) The Efilzz{wt as Consultant ........cuenevceneneenn, (U) The t Ask the Right Questions ........cousveene ------------ (U) UNDERSTANDING THE SENSITIVITIES AND CoNSTRAINTS OF SENIOR POLICY -MAKERS ........ 51 (U) The~yst as Cons~ltant ........ , ........ ; .... 51 ~ The tAsk the Ri ht lions ........ ::::::::~:::::::j~{~:::::::: ~~ L (U) Recognize t t essure or Imm iate rt- erm o ltical or *Policy* Responses'Will;:P,~o.:Pire,f!tly Proportional to the Magnitude of the Consequences Surroundmg an Event 22 (U) Recognize that Policy-Maker Tolerance of Risk (and willingness to accept varioiis;measures or estimates of certainty) Will Diminish as the Magnitude of Potermal Conseqqences (On Extl:er Action or Proportional to the Magnitude of *the Consequences Surrounding an Event ........* ,,Nl:"""'"~1~it:~,;F .... 55 (U) Recognize that Policy-Maker Tolerance of *Risk (and willingness to accept* iznO~;/!!f!OSUreT-6r estimates of certainty) Will Diminish as *the Magnitude* of Potentia~ Conseq'f~'es (O,tl~!.i!l!lf...Action or Inaction) Increases ........ f.,'!Jt: *........* :.i',-:~:~~:.; *........* :~~: ........ 55 (U) Not All Senior Policy-Makers Are the Same ........ > *........* .'~:;:;~: ........ ::: ........ 57 n 11 Th Co *A th b' ~;!. -~~tt~!:~ .. l!.-..,- 9 I'-'./ e ntract1on OJ. u only *pro* .em ........ ~.':+;;z.: ........ :~ . ;::: ........ 5 (U) Using the Right Kind of Expert Advisers to *Interoct With* P~f.if;fmaliefo~~ ........ /:'. ........ 60 "d'i't Inaction) Increases........ i (U) Not All Senior Policy-Makers Are the Same... (U) The Contraction of Authority problem... ) Usmg the Right Kind of Expert Advisers to Interact With Pah;:y-make : The Role of Blame Avoidance Strategies and How These May Comphcate,tke Atmbutzon Questxan Jor ........ (U) "Safety in Numbers?" The Hurricane Katrin& Rg;oblem i (U) The Surrounding Psychological Context for:bnd Pohcy-Maker in WMD Attribution........ (U) Terrorists are "Adaptive Enemies" Who w;ll try t ) "Muddy Ihe,'Waters " to Complicate the Attribution Process by Increasing Ambiguity w~-~~~~-~!.~~~~~.:7-~~~-~':;~~~e:...~~~-:::=~~~:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.~~~~~~.~~ (U) 'Sqfety m Numbers. The Hurncane Katrif!_lt;'IJt.iJ.~{em ...... ,:f::;:; ........ 62 (U) The *Surrounding Psychological* Context.fo~ Policj.~'in WMD Attribution ........ 62 (U) Terrorists are '"Adaptive Enemies" Wlfp;w;tl *try* trf.~ Muddy the;Waters" to Complicate the Attribution Process by *Increasing* .Ambiguity ........ :(::~:~~!:~i.:~~):~ ........ : ........ 63 (U) THE RIGHT STUFF: HARVESTING EXPER'f.i~.1~ ........ --........ __, __ , ........ --........ 65 (U) THE RIGHT STUFF: HARVESTING EXPER'I' SE 2, l E ........ (U) INTEGRATING EXPERTISE ' ....... (U) ANALYTIC ROTATIONS FOR CULTURAL AWARENESS X ------------ (U) INTEGRA TINO EXPERTISE ........ :~;;f;!t:< ........ , ........ 65 (U) ANALYTIC ROTATIONS FOR CULTURAL AW.~ESS,.;~: ........ 65 (U) DRA WINO ON THE "UN-cLEARED" Wo~::: ........ 68 (U) DRAWING ON THE "UN-CLEARED" WORH_I ------------ (U) RED TEAMS ARE Essmmm i, ------------ (U) EXERCISES AND TRAINING ..., 0. (U) COLLECTING AND PRESER\;ING?ERISHABLE INFORMATION ........ ~~~~~::s~~~=.:i=~~~::;:1~~~:~:::~~::::::::~: (U) COLLECTING AND ~ER~P'PERISHABLE INFORMATION ........ 70 ":fo;lo .:!.;;h =t~ (U) INFORMATION SHA'RING%MONG DlSPARATE KINGDOMS .'.,.- (U) INFORMATION SJI#fUNGl~~1'.~~msp ARA TE KINGDOMS .. --.. -........ ---... - ........ 71 ------ (U) THRO}\!JNQ,JliEJii!.:S.~H .... ~.~~::~.:. ........ : ........ 71 (U) C'.'~~Rni9its>w C6~~~~SE DATA AND AssESSMENTS ........ 72 ------ W) CAFI'URING Low CONFIDENQE DATA AND ASSESSMENTS (9)) CQNT]NUITYOF CONNECI'[.VITY (U)-L-,EvERAGnJG THE CATALYST PROJECT (W) lT{N'rEnEACEs THAT ENHANCE INTERACTION .. o --------- ()] DATA: SHARING VIA COMMON DATABASES........ccccovnisivrnens ) lNFORMA'flQN SHARING THROUGH SOCIAL NETWORKING TOOLS Sh:1t.;~;ii~~~~R~~~~:::::::: ;; (U) IT~ACES THAT ENHANCE INTERACTION ........ 73 (U) 0ATA~~~NO VIA COMMON DATABASES ........ 73 (U) INFORMATI9}:1~SHARINO THROUGH SOCIAL NETWORKING TOOLS ........ 73 !~;;~-- (U) THE MIXED 'REALITY PERSPECTIVE (U) THE M~p'REALITY PERSPECTIVE.-........ - ........ - ........ _ ........ 75 (U) INTELLIGENT AGENTS.....crovermeurssssasnsnsnsnes ------------ (U) OVERCOMING CLASSIFICATION BARRIERS (U) ENHANCING DATA MINING ........ ........ ........ (U) DYNAMIC ANALYSIS PROCESS FOR THE[ Il ----- (U) INTELLIGENT AGENTS ........ 76 (U) OVERCOMING CLASSIFICATION BARRIERS ........ 76 (U) ENHANCING DATA MINING ........ 77 (U) DYNAMIC ANALYSIS PROCESS FOR THE o ........ 77 (U) LEVERAGING LOCAL ASSETS (U) LEVERAGING LOCAL ASSETS ...... - ........ ~ ........ ~ ...... - ....... _ ........ __ ........ 79 (U) INCREASING EFFICIENCY .....ccostivenrunensaesnenerersnsssassesessssnsasnssssarens (U) TEAMING WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (U) INCREASING EFFICIENCY ........ : .... 79 (U) TEAMING WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ........ 79 (U) CAN OTHERS UNDERSTAND YOUR DATA? (U) CAN OTHERS UNDERSTAND VOUR DATA?-........ _ ........ 81 (U) MANAGING THE DATA ....vevreerneceeneremenassasssnnes (U) DATA CHARACTERIZATION AND ANALYSIS ........ (U) MANAGING THE DATA ........ 8 I (U). DATA CHARACTERIZATION AND ANALYSIS ........ 81 BY EMPLOYING STRESS ........ ........ AR AN #'.ln. ........ -------------------------- 63 -------- ........ (U) DATA MODELING AND VISUALIZATION... Lessssmsarescsssarsres 82 (U) USING METADATA TO FOSTER INFORMATION SHARING AMONG SEPARATE COMMUNITIES ........ovvereenn.. 83 (U) DATA MODELING AND VISUALIZATION ........ , .... : ........ 82 (U) USING METADATA TO FOSTER INFORMATION SHARING AMONG SEPARATE COMMUNITIES ........ 83 (U) HOW TO BEST USE TNF INFORMATION 85 (U) HOW TO BEST USE TNF INFORMATION ........ m._ ...... .-........ -------85 (U) MANAGING EXPECTATIONS: WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM TNF AND WHEN CAN WE EXPECT IT?........ 85 (U) Pre-Detonation vs. Post-Detonation terereretnesareerfesnestranesarabestearereeaeest s be s enanebasastensentans .86 (U) TNF Support 10 IND AUTTOULION. ........ceueeereeeverriserivenssnerisnsnssessassssvsrssssassssassasassesnsassssasasasnss 86 (U) TNF: Common MiSconceptions........ewveevuiuisnsesens esesecerasre e s e s ae s e sastnresanesrere 86 (U) TNF: Exercising t0 DiSpel the MYIRS ........c.ocioioimieirerreeressssisiscsssasseeiasnssassessnsnsessssassassmssssansn 87 (U) LIMITING BIAS IN TECHNICAL DATA INTERPRETATIONS . - 89 ) haring Information with the TNF Team........iceeoeectecinicceseeeeaeesassssnens 89 (U) Incorporating TNF Results into [ |ASSESSMENLS ........c..coviimirisiinisssnssisisssinsssessissssnssss 90 (U) MANAGING EXPECTATIONS: WHAT CAN WE ExPECT FROM TNF AND WHEN CAN WE EXPECT IT? ........ 85 (U) Pre-Detonation vs. Post-Detonation ........ 86 (U) TNF Support to IND Attribution ........ 86 (U) TNF: Common Misconceptions ........ 86 (U) *TNF: Exercising to Dispel the Myths* ........ 87 (U) LIMITING BIAS IN TECHNICAL DATA INTERPRETATIONS ........ 89 (U)l ~haring Information with the TNF Team ........ 89 (U) Incorporating TNF Results into *r=JAssessments* ........ 90 ## M) Putting It All Together: Proposed Function And Structurh I ~~-~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~:.~.~~-~~~~-~~~:~~~~-~~-~~~~~-~~::~7--91 | | | (U) | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | WHEN | TO INITIATE THE FORMAL PROCESS | | | ;~::.:.:;::, | | | | | 92 | | | ~~~ROPOSEoc:J;:event, from yield-device to minor contamination, the President's adv.i~ers::will c.9tne forward with a range of options, depending on the confidence of the judgme~~~lfl~Y recei\'e If the I ~sessment were weak or consisted of multiple hyp9~~s~, then queries certainly would follow on what additional information is necessary to iiciii~"ihe assessment. . ~ .. : (U) As a first step toward establishing a standardized method of expressing uncertainty, we recommend that be exposed tp the existing lexicons on uncertainty. This step can be followed by the group going through a process of identifying aset of standards of proof. These standards ofproofwould be defined to convey uncertainty and confidence consistent with the risks inherent in a plausible range of actions that the President's advisers might recommend. Representatives from the President's advisory entities should be part of this exercise. As with the judicial system, the resulting standards of proof would not define the policy response (or analogously, the sentence in a criminal case). The standards of proof would represent the fact the there is sufficient confidence in fmdings to support a full range of response options. The President and advisor entities will drive the actual response. (U) In response to an actual event, I I would evaluate the specific hypotheses, levels of confidence, and alternative interpretations presented by the aggregated LE, IC, and TNF assessments. If the findings are diverse in interpretation, the ~ould ask the community to iterate based on additional information accumulated over a finite period of time. (U) If a specific hypothesis is not strongly supported by the evidence and one or more alternatives are admissible, / /should have a practiced operational means for reaching some form of closure, if possible. This could take the form of a pro-side and con-side debate of the supporting evidence and the level of confidence associated with each hypothesis. The IC, LE, and TNF advisers would respond to information requests. If no refinement in fmdings is possible, then the policy community would be informed of the possibiij~es, associated confidence levels, and what information would be needed to resol~i;9f' significantly enhance the group's findings. .;:~;~;~!~;::-. .: (U) Whether analysis or information assessments originate from the LE;2it;:~~.'JNF .,,,,,. communities, each implicitly or explicitly works through q1,1~stions ~iii!cal to'~~~ssing confidence. In essence these questions are: :::'' ' '::~:::;.. :~' - What is known? - What is unknown? - What do we think? - Are there several hypotheses? .::::::::~~~~;:: .. .\i;=:=::..'" - Is there one hypothesis that is n;19~:c;omp~jllng than 'ihe others? - Are there dissenting or contrarY hypotheses? - What is the line of argUm.ent for or ag~z _ (U) Using the above as a standard forma(,.~:re~~l~~~~ings 4 I woul~help to convey levels of certainty. Hav\qgthe:3ii0ience's attention and the time to walk through these or equivalent questions :aiia;~s~iated discussions would be the most desirable situation. Uncertainty woul4 b.e:~ommunicated in plain English 'vice a "catch phrase" or statistical statement, in~r~Mion, P.r.ifudividual experience . .. ::; ~-;:;:=~==~~::: - . /~~~!~=:-. . -. (U) What ~e~~ ((U)j ## (U) Retommendations (U) Lessons from Previous Studies on Uncertainty (U) D published reports on conveying uncertainty;:~*~:has. .p. ~i~li'lar applicability to how might approach ~e problem of_de~elop~g:a meilf~8.f.expre~sinf. uncertamty. at report, "Uncertamty Commumcabon;,;ij~ues and GQOd Practtce" ts recommended as a starting point for develoP.ip.g;~~:fJ.t~tlioH::~l~xpressiltg uncertainty inc=] assessments. The report provides guidan~~:on coitpjriunicaiifi~:;yncertainties and draws upon insights from the literature, from an in!et.#.,ipnal ~;Cperts' wqr:Kshop on uncertainty communications, and from several uncemiiii~~~xperiments. Especially significant is that this report focuses on communication to non-teclli:HCitl audiences, with special attention to policy.: makers. -:::~j~~;/ (U) The report expresses severatpP.po~f;rinciples. First is understanding that the target audience may be under extr~J,riif'iWie qonstraints and generally will have non-technical backgrounds. These facts fq~tilate t~e overarching character of the communication, which consists of a primary l~x~r, ~Ji'~~~ -~~J6ottom line assessments are presented, and a secondary layer, where the detru!e.et:n ~blaine<~: an~d presented for ::p.;.cnmmal convtction, all wtthm 50 mmutes. In a stmdar fashton, ~ and supporting anillytical personnel may be confronted by unrealistic expectations from an alarmed public and an eager body of elected officials, all of whose concerns will be fueled by an aggressive media that may further fuel these misconceptions. In LE circles, this phenomenon is referred to as the "CSI Effect." It is important to convey to decision-makers that attribution and investigative speed often are constrained by the laws of science, in addition to adhering to prudent plaiming. 7 (U) Mitigating the "CSI Effect" (U) "Max Houck of West Virginia University complained of the 'CSI Effect' that has pushed expectations of crime scene inves~gations far beyond what is achievable."8 "Jurors now expect us to have a DNA test for just a~e_:~~~case. They expect us to have the most SEC~FORN . advanced technology possible, and they expect it to look like it does on television. "8 This same level of expectation will influence decision-makers evaluating nuclear attribution assessments. It is important for the contributors to to be cognizant of the unrealistic expectations of their customers, an!i develop ways to operate effectively in this environment. The LE community has experience that can be translated into the nuclear attribution environment. For example, here are some standard practices: - (U) Know your capabilities. Conduct a self assessment of your organization's capabilities. Evaluate your capabilities. Determine how much time you need to conduct the appropriate testing or assessment. - (U) Educate your partner( s) in an investigation on the capabilities and limi!&tigns of your organization. :;;.;.: (U)D customers may be reluctant to accept that attribution answers IJliJ.Y.~:=~~~is:~::::: unresolved for years, or possibly indefinitely. It is plausible that the re~i1ii"8t;~ asses~ment of all available evidence and sources may not result in a defi.nitive ~wer on th~~pei:petrator " :~> .. k .,'!, .. ~.. \~, and complicit actors. .-. :::!--.. .'' (U) LERC: Risk-of Being Wrong - (U) a~s~ upon collaborative or high-confidence intelligence, provide a clear analytical assessnie"#b~J?.ere the findings support a single outcome. Or, ~:::.' - (U) Provide an alternative analytical assessment to the majority opinion, based upon inferential analysis or intelligence that may presently weakly support an alternative scenario, so that this view will not be lost as new information is gathered. (U) The analyst/operator needs to be empowered to make decisions with a degree of built-in flexibility to enable, for example, the development of alternative assessments, and needs to be held accountable for his/her results. Simultaneously, the analyst/operator needs to be encouraged to think outside the box by operating without concern for punitive consequences. (U) Empowering Personnel ## (U) Minefields And Mind Traps In The Attribution Problem ( It is charged with providing the best possible attribution assessment, under tremendous pressure and in the face of uncertainty, to provide key decision-makers with information that is accurate, reliable, and actionable. In order to effectively and accurately perform under these conditions, there are a number of considerations from a social-psychological perspective that must be addressed. o~~ly spf:aking, in order to perform this most critical task, it will be es~~nti~ILI _ __j : ~ !~~~~~d h=~~~i~r~:::;~ ;:~:~~~U::;e::.:-I::r::;;rks .. :.:~.:::-::;;~~~~!;~;;,;.!~ - (U) Establish sound analytic processes, procedures, and methodologi~8-;:::!~:.. - (U) Develop the ability to craft and deliver message eff~qtively ;;;:;{ -:::;:;;/' - (U) Adapt to and function effectively in a crisis enviroiliilen~ : -:~::;;;. . -:. . . .:;~==~- ~ .. !~f.:;; .. ;: (U) The following articles discuss the importance of each 9f.:tb~~~~~!~J:.llel1~~ the potential obstacles to achieving success with each of them, and rr..plnmeridati~~s'for how to overcome, or at least minimize, these obstacl~~::~!~M~~~ilHl~~~~ by addressing each of the following main questions: ~/ ~:;:;=: :;;::::~-... 1. (U) How can attribution analysis b~:i~~~X.~ ;:;:: :3:: by taking into account various psychological or social factors? ';;~~:=:. 2. (U) What sensitivities or constraints on reai~i:if~:pt>licy-makers should I ~e aware of or sensitive to in order to improve .~-effecfiveness of our communications and the value of our attributions? . *::=* 3. (U) How can 1 lfu.nttt:~~;be~;r across the three attribution communities in terms of information sharing, Iatehttc6mm\inication, and coordination? ## (U) The Road To Hell Is Paved With Normative Cognitions (U) Accounting for Psychological and Social Factors that Degrade Response or Inhibit Information Sharing in c=JAnalysis (U) The judgments and decisions.ofth,__.------'-'-==--.:=-====:....=..-=:.;:; that influence everyday decision-making. ~~~=r.~======~~ :. ..:: -: .. :-: (U) Core Concepts in Judgment and Decision-Making ~:::;;;:::.. . (U) Given a choice between two or more options, whether related to min9.r:d.~cisig~zQ\":fhose of great import, like attribution analysis, how do we decide between th~;iiililifpJc;: opti()its and their relative merits? At some level, the decision-making gr;gcess aelte.~ strai'~tforward: I ' ;1 '!iJ ' we consider those facts that we feel are relevant, weigh them in .termso.~~tpportance, and reach a conclusion. In many ways, however, this is a "black bP.~~~procesS::i!!-:which the relevant facts get poured in and an answer emerges. In thi.!i~ktlfi~;we unpack the "black box" and describe some of its internal processes that re~:t!l~'m the erii~fg~nce of judgments and decisions. We will also explore the implic\ltiP.IJS oJ:ili-ese normative processes on the decisions and judgments of adversaries, I . -' - ~d p~lici.~:J~~~ers . . ~-:;:~ ;.:1!~ ~:::, , .. ,a .. ::~:;:-.. 3"' /" (U) Rationality: Bounded and Otherwise -:;::~;;{ (U) Part of the attributiqn analysis will involv~-~~~iiig the likelihood that a given group or individual would engage in actions of con,;9.!=rn ( e.g;=smuggling or selling nuclear materials, or carrying out an .attack of a given type). ;-Such an analysis often begins with observations as to whether it would be rational (ot;:fli~indiV:idual or group to engage in that behavior. Analysts must bear in mind that assuP.i"pti_oos of:rationality or irrationality can be hazardous. Assessments ofrationalicylifi_:atlonalitY~are generally made on the basis of the extent to which a given behavior is c~qsisterit~~~:s~tietal/cultural norms (related to religious beliefs, moral values, rep~&\~ce;:~~-), arises from a decision-making process that follows a logical syllogi~w(of.:i~;~~nsiSi~t;~igt what observers would view as providing favorable outcomes. (U)"ti~~~~z~~J=:f ass~; .rationality or irrationality are great, for the following reasons. First, analy~j~ of the behavior of others from one social or cultural perspective may be invalid if it does n6't!iake into account the social and cultural standards of the actor. Second, rationality in ;~frather than theoretical, terms is context-determined. The fact that a given behavior may be considered aberrant or irrational by the majority of people does not render it irrational on the part of the actor behaving within the context of the actor's experience. For example, individuals and groups can be behaving rationally even if the behavior is based upon misinformation or beliefs that are inconsistent with reality. (U) .Finally, utility-based approaches to rationality have been displaced by the concept of bounded rationality. 10 Taking into account that human beings have flawed memories and limited computational skills, Simon's theory \Vas based on the notion that -we use mental shortcuts and rules of thumb (see biases and heuristics, below) to allow us to compensate for our cognitive limitations. In developing the theory of bounded rationality, Simon described decision-making as a process of searching for alternative behaviors and choices that will ## Sec~Oforn result in the actor reaching his or her goals. It is a search process in which decision alternatives are discovered until a satisfactory alternative is found. Simon coined the term "satisficing" to describe this process: a choice that may not be optimal, but sufficiently fulfills the criteria necessary for reaching the actor's goals. This comes into play when judging the likelihood that a given party will become engaged in a certain activity. For example, an adversary faced with a range of options may choose one that may not appear optimal to those analyzing the behavior, but that sufficiently meets the adversary's criteria for some degree of success. (U) Biases and Heuristics . (U) AnalystsJ I those individuals and groups whose behavior they ~.ana,Iyzing, as well as those who will determine a course of action on the basis of the attribution" assessment, make decisions based on heuristics, or rules of thumb, and biases. 11 As noted;~~~xe, th~.se are the mental shortcuts related to bounded rationality. ..:::::::: :~:~*;;;: :::: SUIIIlll01ized by s.-m include the following:;:: ,~:;:"/' 5 '~:~~~iV . , /~~~;~ :' ".;_~~;~:~~ .. - )i.' ( o) Extremeness Aversion: Given a range of altemative~;fi;om which~t~f.'(~hoose, people avoid extremes, which give rise to compromise eff~~~-~:~af~~~~nsidered' to be extreme is influenced by the frame in which the alte~uvesf#:preseii~9. )?or example, in merchandise purchasing decisions, an individual pre~~~ witli:i\vo simii31-Xtems is more inclined to purchase the less expensive item ofthe'tw'i:::;ijo_wever, this individual will tend to choose the more expensive of these when presented witii~~;~ird similar item at an even higher price. The same behavior would be expected to bold ~e;:w.l;len individuals are presented with items related to courses of action or levels of ce~ty. "tit the context of attribution assessment, an outlier opinion offered by one member.~gitlie gro~p may lead others to agree to a position that is more extreme than th~!.1ni~!?ha~e initially chosen. (U) Hindsight Bias: If ap_.e~~p.{~c~~;there may be a tendency to believe that the event was inevitable. This in tl!m.::fiifltic;"ri.~~~tJi~extent to which the same event is viewed as likely to be repeated. This c!irr~pt relate~'"to the notion of "Black Swans," where low probability, high impact everi~:;iihreiro~~ct are believed to have been predictable. 12 Taleb argues that acts of terrorisfii, lik~'~iiifts in tll~~~liancial markets, are "Black Swans" that are in fact not . predl~~~-!~ ~~fhtust be aiiticipated. '"~~::!:~:,. (U) Opti~~~~~:~~~: Sunstein suggests that human beings tend to be optimistic. Individuals and groups inv:Qlved in attribution assessment, as a result of selection bias, are less likely to be prone to optimism. However, optimism bias may play a role in how an individual views the validity of his or her own decision-making methodologies and accuracy of his or her assessments and judgments. The most difficult assessment I ~ustomers to accept is that no answer may exist, which may conflict with an individual or group's optimistic bias. It also plays a role in bow the public perceives risk of harm from illness and disasters. (U) Overconfidence Bias: This refers to the phenomenon in which people, including almost all professionals, tend typically to have too much confidence in their own judgments, most likely due to insensitivity to the weakness of their underlying assumptions. 13 (U) Status Quo Bias: Human beings tend to favor the status quo and require considerable incentive to depart from it. This relates to choices involving changes in behavior, including changes in decision-making strategies. (U) Confirmation Bias: Believing is seeing. In addition to those discussed by Sunstein, confirmation bias is a major consideration I I The psychological research is replete with demonstrations that context attu trclmmg onectly influence how we perceive objects and events, from optical illusions to the behavior of individuals and nations. Modem geopolitics provides us with examples of leaders who interpreted events according to their preconceived beliefs about the groups or countries involved in those events, rather than upon actual data, e.g. the adamant belief by some adminis~tion officials that Iraq possessed WMD in spite oflimited certainty on the part of the IC . .(U) Confirmation bias, also known as ''belief perseverance" and "selective pe~~~~tion," is a concept that captures the fact that ~pie tend to select and interpret informatiobl~~-~-way that supports their existing worldview. 4 This concept applies to how thorougW,:x. a persQ.)t~ll read a report, i.e., a person who disagrees with the conclusion of a repo.rj;iiiliY:~nc,>t rea'd''it at all, may read it superficially, or conversely, may read it in ~~t dep~,Vt an eft6f,t~ find fault "thth l . -' ~. wt e cone us1ons. -. .;~. . :;~\:~,,. ' ,:- .<~; ~ -~. -~~: .. (U) 'The CSI Effect: An additional source of bias may aris~Jronf~?Spectations regarding the type and level of certainty of evidence provided by ana\Y..s~'io 1 r decision-makers, and the public. The criminal justice system h~,!?~!l,fn?ni~;Jhis issue lis jurors, having been exposed to modem television crime shows1,.oft~ff:~*pect ~fu!a~le evidence that will have been obtained, analyzed, and presented fQi;;:a critniAiii convictf8Ii; all within 50 minutes. "Jurors now expect us to have a DNAtfsf:i"ri~:j:us.t~bout ever case. They expect us to have the most advanced technology possible, and:tlt~t"expect it to look like it does on television." 7 ... ,. .. ~.'!~> (U) Similarly,! lthe decision-~:~er~-.~,.,_.. may have unrealistic expectations about the level.~~certainty of the information that analysts can provide, as well as the time fi)wi~~W. wiiich it can be provided. Each of the three communities contributing tq::th~-~sessptent process needs to be prepared to deal with this environment of unrealistic expW ~!k~stom~::jr-:~"-----------,lcontributing communities should establish ~.~app~~;:with'~~.~~lti~te customer. This will include establishing an agreed-upon _.::il'exicoti"~4;' ensurt(~fmessages are clearly understood. This will be especially critical .. -:~::;:*hen cainmunicatiil.g technical information to a decision-maker who has never been . ~;i{&~ed to such information. - (Ufliip;w_the capabilities of each analytic community. Each of the contributing comni~ities should conduct a self assessment of its capabilities and limitations. - (U) Educate the customer as to the capabilities and limitations of each contributing community. (U) The most difficult assessment I Customers to accept is that no answer may exist. The outcome from the assessment of all the evidence and sources may be that a defmitive answer is not achievable. ## (U) Heuristics (U) In addition to biases, decision-making is influenced by heuristics. Heuristics are "rules of thumb" that help speed the decision-making process based on past experience and ## Sec~/Noforn knowledge, both individual and institutional. They have been referred to as part of the "Adaptive Toolbox" of decision-making. 15 Sunstein describes the following heuristics: (U) Availability: When an incident involving risk is active in an individual's memory, as a result of either severity or length of time since t:b:e occurrence, there is a tendency to overestimate the probability ofthat risk being realized. Probability of risk estimates gradually decrease over time. For example, popular estimates of a terronst attack were extremely high immediately after 9/ll, but have decreased over time, regardless of the actual geopolitical situation. Similarly, estimates of the likelihood of a workplace violence incident increase when such an incident has occurred within a similar community. (U) Anchoring: Initial choices and probability judgments tend to serve as anc~ors _in the decision-making process, even if they were made on the basis of imperfect infpJ;rtiation . . . ~-. Anchoring will take place early in the thought process and is a very powerfuHout~~ ofl!ias in thinking and can thus prevent an accurate attribution. Anchoring pre':~~ us fro~ls.e,ing or accepting new information when it does not fit the world view we hc;>fd'(i~~-~~our '-"" preconceived notions of who did it, who supplied it). As a.r.~sult, it.~~:J!nportiffi~:l9at analysts and decision-makers be aware of the weighting of initial jtiElgments'ino(der to be able to more fully incorporate new intelligence into the decision-ma.IQrj~,JlroceS~;~::::- .,, .. _~ .. ~-.. . ...... (U) Case-based Decisions: When faced with alternative,.ctiJi~es :1~~~~ value, people tend to reason on the basis of prior cases (i.e., .~Q~.js tlll~iiJ.~w case siihilar to or different from a similar prior case that was analyzed)/Tiil&:f~p.ds tO:;ljjnit ~reativity and the ability to incorpomte novel information in the anaJtl.c proc~~- MoreaYff~, use of historical analogies (e.g., this will be another Vietnam or MWi'~~~-~e and anchor people into more rigid ways of analyzing data, resulting in significant distQ~~-~s and biasing. ~-::~:~::;; ~~~ _ .. :,;." i/ .. ~ (U) Bounded Willpower .;;:: (U) Bounded willpower is a c~ri~~t th~t recognizes human beings' desire for immediate gratification and reward. It ;SPe~~ to t!J.e issue of impulsiveness, which in the case of attribution analysis and. ~se$~ment can be thought of as a rush to judgment or premature closure. Once recogpi~ed, b()1W~~~illpower can be managed through a variety of mechanisms.,.iaciuQiiig,criticat"re~lew by colleagues and members of other groups, as well as other che~~;~.biilali&~s. in $e decision-making process. .. :~~::~ -~~:~;; ~~~~;~:~-~~ ## Ruj;;Ti~D~~Lf-Lnter;;~ (U) In addi~i6~:t~.bounded mtionality and bounded willpower, bounded self-interest is another factor"t;Jiat contributes to human behavior and disproves the notion that human beings pursue behaviors based purely on maximization of personal utility. People care about other people, and about causes and values, leading them to act in ways that may actually harm themselves as individuals, yet provide some other reward. This comes into play in at least two forms in the attribution analysis process. First, it applies to the analysis of the likely behavior of adversaries. Second, regarding the idea of attribution analysis as negotiation, whether an individual feels he or she is being treated fairly or unfairly in a bargaining process has an influence on the toughness of the stance that is taken by that individual in the ongoing bargaining process. As attribution analysis is a collaborative process, it sneaks to the importance of establishing a culture of openness, respect, and objectivityLI -----' (U) Implicit vs. Explicit Decision-Making (U) Analysts will make explicit decisions about what information is and is not important on the basis of their rofessional ex rtise. The decision as to the relative importance and mearung o a particu ar p1ece o 1 otmat10n reflects the professional judgment I I influenced by factors such as time pressure, severity of the threat, and recent social and political events, both foreign and domestic. These decisions, like explicit memories, can be explained by reference to specific data points and events (i.e., "I know that this is Cs-137 because the following analyses were run yielding the following results.") (U) Decision-making, like memory, also occurs at the implicit level. lmplicit:Ut~tpory, which is also called process memory, cannot be explained by reference to known sp~~i~~ prior experiences. Similarly, a host of other factors ofwhich the decision-maker is:n~t;~:Qpsci9usly aware can influence the decision-making process. These factors can be !JD..ig~e to ffi~;~;:;i~ individual, who is reacting almost instantaneously and in light of pas~ ~#~en~~~~s ~d information, heuristics/biases, and subtle clues of agreemeP.t;,or di~~~!.llent fiQ:@~others engaged in the group decision-making process. Psychologi'cid ~xperiiii~#-t$. haveshown that over time, gist information, i.e., a general sense of the meaning~~~!!: data"~;:i more persistent in memory and has a greater impact on behavio~;,t9an vew~tin:a, ihformation. For example, information that a particular radical group has.;9.tm involve~~fu. attempts to traffic nuclear materials (although has never done S'Hlis;c.~ssfiill&;) .. .will persist in memory far longer . - .... re .. .. .._. po than the details of the failed trafficking att~mpts:-;:::~:: ::~;:;;.. _,_.;:=:~.. ~:~:~ l:::!M (U) Implicit decision-making, like clirii~~f~~gqt~rit in medi~ine, is a form of intuition. Based on a combination of explicit knowledg~~4 gist memory, it provides an informational infrastructure for decision-making of which the'd6~i!!ion-maker may not even be aware. Tpese are essential tools and add to the q~ty of~&ision-making in repetitive situations (i.e., conditions or events with which t:IJ~:'decision-maker is familiar). However, when dealing with unique situation;;-ot:\Y.he~ifattempts are being made to deceive the decisionmaker, they may actually hi;tideJ;".accllf4te assessments. . . ~~~ .. ;:: (U) With regard to d!e:~~flu~~~i~~:~~ opinions of other members of a group deliberative process, in~ixip~al~~i:py in terms of their ability to perceive and the extent to which they are influens"by:\ij~. reacti~~pf.,others. This is influenced by individual personality factors and life e~~rienc~~~;Which irt'~tj;itfi may be tied to such specific individual factors as variations in the-:tiliib~~n.it}g"ofmirron\eurons in the brain. In addition to playing a role in anticipating the physical~~yiors of others, mirror neurons are believed to play a role in the capacity for empathy, oili~~.e known as the understanding of another person's emotional response to a given situation~:;in the high stress setting ofl kieliberative process, a presenting analyst can be'expected to be constantly reacting to the emotional cues of his or her audience. The ideal analyst would be one who has the capacity to incorporate both the data and more subtle cues provided from others, without his or her objective analytic capacities becoming overwhelmed. (U) The Hazards of Bias, Heuristics, and Intuition (U) Biases, heuristics, and intuition all have an impact on normative decision-making. As noted above, biases influence the manner and extent to which information is processed and treated. Heuristics have been referred to as part of the Adaptive Toolbox of decision-making and can speed the process and increase accuracy. They are especially helpful in situations where the problems and tasks are repetitive or do not vary widely, and where active attempts are not being made to deceive the analyst or decision-maker. Where such attempts are being made, as may be the case in events coming to the attention j lor where the problems being analyzed are unique, these factors can have a negative impact on the accuracy of decision-making. (U) The tasks of analysts serving j lwm be repetitive to some extent. This certainly will be true when it comes to analyzing forensic data. The attribution analysis itself, however, is less likely to be repetitive, especially in the case of major events. These events will be rare, but potentially devastating in their consequences. They fulfill the first two characteristics of Black Swans, and in hindsight many would attribute the third quality as well, that the occurrence was predictable. With low incidence phenomena, th,c;:re j~ considerable risk in resorting to shortcuts that derive their validity from the si@J;hity of current and past situations and the accuracy of the underlying data. In such sihl~~ons, the Adaptive Toolbox may become the "Maladaptive Toolbox," leading to f~.~,,foncl~iR~: reached with high confidence due to the explicit and implicit knowledg~:ffia'~~~.!?-~es wiih expertise, overconfidence bias, and confirmation bias. Thi.s, is partie:(J.J*ly prot?ler;natic where the perpetrator has taken steps to deceive investigat -~~;: _ .. :::.: .. ...... ~~ ...... ... . :::: .... (U) Beliefs *Are* Possessions,/;.)_:::~ ~ (U) One challenge to tl1t:.k~ias ~::~la~d to eiili~r the correctness of prior policy approaches or interpretatio~~~:}fthe'rii~J!yations of potential perpetrators), or (2) the prior institutional apprqhes thS:tiprevio~l};,iliave been adopted to deal with the problem or issue (optimistic bias-~::r~J~ted;fri previous'sOPs or the historical manner in which the relevant organizations have ini~~~~d or handled these issues). Once beliefs have been adopted by policy-makers or implemen~~~Y.-organiZ;ations, they become possessions to cherish, protect against change, and adhere to -~~en in the face of considerable evidence of failure or inadequacy vis-a-vis the problem. For.a'ttribution, it is important for policy-makers and organizations to avoid the trap of having these prior beliefs function unduly as anchors that prevent alternative or competing analysis from being considered. This is especially important, given the high policy consequences likely to flow from any assignment of WMD attribution. (U) Anchoring and the Pressure to Round up the Usual Suspects (U) There will almost certainly be a disconnect between the speed at which the national leadership must respond to the policy/political environment and the slower pace at which forensic evidence, technical analysis, and law enforcement investigations can proceed. This gives rise to an anchoring problem (i.e. a tendency to anchor on the usual suspects in ## Se~Orn attributing responsibility for an event). Given the magnitude of the likely national response roany substantial WMD event, those involved in the attribution process need to be cautious of leaping to conclus~ons ahead of the evidence, based on the emotions of the moment and the general tendency of people under stress to rely more on biases and available simplifying heuristics (such as stereotypes, ideology, pre-conceived belief structures, etc.) Two examples of this are provided by the Oklahoma City Bombing and tile Centennial Park Bombing at the Atlanta Olympics. In the former, there was a rush to judgment that the perpetrator was a Middle Eastern male. In the latter, a security guard was falsely targeted as the perpetrator because he fit a supposed profile of those who would engage in such acts. (U) Moreover, given the tendency toward anchoring and reliance upol simnlifvinsz heuristics, especially during times of heightened stress and crisis, it is important_ ~o ensure that its ongoing presentation of the evidence does not unduly bias policy-mak~t:.s{ This is particularly important because the evidence may be relatively incomplete duriii~~~ tim~ rra.ne when some retaliatory decisions of great consequence may be um:!~t:.SY,ruiid~~ti,9# :~~~,~-:01:~-' ~~-'! (U) In addition, related to this anchoring problem is the r~9~nition.~,lr----1~~ysis should avoid assuming or describing terror groups or nationalleadeis from'hos~te8' as being crazy or irrational, since this is almost invariably inaccurate (b~.~ on o'ifr~9\Vfi affect or emotion) and distorts our own analysis of their current an~ ::::: - (U) In many ofthe contexts in which~will activa!~~:e;sp~~t~l!' cas~~ of postdetonation or large-scale RDD incidelits,tliee'motions gf.~ruysts ail~:JX}licy-makers alike will no doubt be running high. Hot cognition.(~f{e~t or:~ptions) ha8.an immense potential for distorting our perceptions of the enviro,P.riiiririi!i~ ho~~-w~i:i.nt~rpret information. It leads us to more extreme judgments of info~fi~n, perijilps far trey:(;ii.d what they warrant. And it may lead us to fill in the gaps of missing "o(w~jgiious information with emotional filler that could seriously distort our assessments. Higli::4~grees of affect are well-known for creating a polarizing effect on judgments and perception5;:~M!~g them toward whatever emotion (positive or negative) that exists until thex.~ach ~b'far ends of the continuum. The emotional response from the public anq._pss community boundaries, the dangers of .. , ........ group think and other maladaptive group dyii~fS, and the natural limitations of experts. Furthermore, it will also provide a number of ree:6b:\QJendations for overcoming these challenges. ..::!: :~::'' ... ::::!~'" .: -~ :;~:::~:::~: :::: (U) Successful Culture in Jlig~~:stre~s, ffigh Ambiguity Environments (U) Whilellfae:~ c~~i~~ge~.:iP integrating members from many different organizati~r~s:and c6~Qii1ties, it has the advantage of being a newly created group, unencum~r.~.,\yit\1:~~;.9wn historleal baggage. There is an opportunity to be successful and effecti':'~;.froili;~$? start;~~W.l~_!ng a culture robust enough to cope with its inherent challenges. Crea,Wjg ash~ group ia:entity which members value and relate to, with a base of healthy, appib'pij~~ ~Btms for behavior and interaction enabled by inclusive social networks, will position"itl~~ll. 18 .. ~ ,;. .. (U) Reco~'l~donforOculture (U) We reconiinend actively promoting the following elements to help navigate the minefield of group interaction, and regularly evaluating the group and its members. - Open communication and information sharing - Minimal in-group status distinctions - Inclusiveness (permeable boundaries for belonging, especially with regard to analytic aspects) - Trust in intentions - Common group identity - Shared sense of goals and mission - Role of devil's advocate or red teaming - Understanding the strengths and limitations of expertise (link to expertise section) - Healthy interactive strategies, such as negotiation (link to negotiation section) (U) Rather than conceiving itself as a team or group with specific members called in during a crisis, I I can think of itself as the core, or hub, of a larger connected community of analysts, law enforcement, and more. Success in reaching this goal will require strong leadership that sets an example of cooperation, information sharing, and openness to new ideas and sources of information for the rest of the organization. These behaviors can be incentivized by making them part of the metric for professional success. . .. . (U) Group Dynamics and Malfuncti~Q'$::: , (U) Another factor is the pot~~ti~{!for ~~up dynamics or malfunctions to undercut ~ performance. During disc~ir wjlfassessmeiits be made on the basis of incomplete or partial information. The normal f)~~ that groups go through in terms of developing working or personal relationship~~:;iQ.:g~tting to know one another so that disagreements can be expressed comfortably, ~~fin obtaining an adequate understanding of the lay of the land (regarding the SOPs of the organizations involved, where information or expertise is housed, etc.), have time to be ironed out. It is unfortunate that in a crisis, groups- especially newly-fofl?led groups or ones that seldom interact- do not have the opportunity to establish these links. This can lead to a substantial number of group malfunctions, problems of communication, and difficulties of interaction, not only within the groups themselves, but in communications with other groups as well. (U) "Groupthink" (U) A large body of academic research, including the well-known book by lrvinf Janis, "Groupthink" 19 and the Hart, Sundelius, and Stem, eds., "Beyond Groupthink"2 , has (U) Stllge of Development .. . .. . (U) The stage of group development is a factor that has significant impact up4~:tfie performance of groups during crises. For example, Stem noted the problem of'N"~);v~Gro.up Syndrome during the Bay of Pigs for President Kennedy, and how the o~~~t.?,fthe"i'ii.~~~:after only a few months in office had not allowed the national security grouR;llie'~~ideni"reJied upon to adequately form or establish their footing. As a r~y]t, ther~(}Y,~ limi";~;pebate, largely uncritical acceptance of the intelligence and plannirig presented: bY. the OIA and JCS, and an overall group process that would lead to what Janis latei:4~_scrib~:~:a policy fiasco. A more established advisory group surrounded Kennedy l.~;:yiori~:;J~ter .. 1t had developed working relationships and knew: the "lay of the land." It~as not as'v.\i}iierable to the same new group problems and handled the Cuban ~i~!-!~ Gti~~~W an exeriiplary fashion. For the c=J it is critical that the attribution com~t;niliity~i~ws the:grql,lp as one that is well established, familiar, unified, exerc.ises roJltinely, aiiil has str~ng communication systems in place. In the midst of a WMD crisis, if~ld~~-yitili that thes~ things are established beforehand, simply because there will be noi:im~.~o learn it on the fly. '!':~.::.;;:.~.... . ... e::~::~ ' ~::: ~ ~ (U) Membership -:~}= (U) The issue of group membet'shlj;(~~~ the participants are within the group) is also potentially significant fo .. rCJ.-! ,Lea~ __ ng aside the technical skills or expertise that members might require in the Va.9.P.psc.=Jgr9!J.Ps, there are basic issues of group dynamics to consider when these,ptayers CQll)e:t.()gether to address the WMD attribution problem. For example, i~ }.J,~.~ee~~;w.i,qely demo'iiStrated in social psychology literature that the status of . individ~:~i)~~;pieniti~~~J?l!!-YS a major role in determining which participants will dominate the d!~.~ssion84;!ind whe"tlr~"Fthe group is able to think outside of the box on issues. Ideally, groupS\;~9.~14.-Iiot be top tieavy with only one or two high status individuals, since this tends to reduce::tJi~:.participation of lower status group members, especially if their contributions or views confli~;~).tpthe standard view held by the high status individuals. Also, if high status individuals are:;piirticipating in these groups, it is recommended that there be balance from different orgamzations/institutions in order to prevent premature closure of discussions. (U) Multi-disciplinuy Advantllge (U) In terms of the classic groupthink malfunctions (i.e., those arising from highly cohesive, insular groups under high stress/high stakes decision contexts); it is possible that the multidisciplinary/multi-organizational composition of I I may reduce some of its vulnerability to these problems. By its very nature,i I will be a less insular group, although efforts should be undertaken weii ahead o tts acftvation to ensure the kind of communication and building of healthy cross-organizational relationships that would better integrate the more insular, individual communities that comprise I I. What is important, however, is to not overreact to the fears of groupthink in ways that would ## Se~ undermine effective intergrrup crrdination in a crisis. For example, a phrase commonly heard during discussions of functions and organiZation is the idea of keeping the TNF analysts isolated from the IC or law enforcement efforts in order to maintain their objectivity. Yet given the overriding needs for information sharing and coordination that a real-life WMD incident would demand, this would be counterproductive. (U) Indeed, the challenges of coordination, information sharing, cooperation across these three communities cannot be overstated, and if not facilitated will result in serious inefficiencies, lack of coordination, and breakdowns of communications that could be seriously detrimental to the 0 mission. So for example, while on one level it might make sense to maintain separation to reduce biases being introduced into the TNF from the IC or law enforcement efforts, this potential problem would be outweighed by the probl~ms posed by lack of communication and coordination, and by the benefits that would b~i9.ti~ined by enhancing these elements. In addition, the multi-organizational composition I I also should help to reduce the problems of anticipatory compliance -a group .~l:!lfunctl~~;:.i whereby group members try to please an external leader in advance by pi\T1iij:i{g what"''" information or feedback they would like to hear, rather t~ ~hat th~:~yidence::~\lpports. =:=~ .: ::~t:::.. . . :~: ~::... .... -.-~"-... (U) Expertise: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly ... ' :::;:;:;.. ~:::. (U) Also important to consider is the impact of perceive.4 ~~pertis~:~i:tliin groups of decision- makers. As a rule, experts (or those group merol>.~~ pei'~iye to be experts) tend to have far greater influence on group discu5sions, fnupiilifisW.~s an(i'i!!.e.rnatives, etc. than do non- experts (or those who perceive themselx~~~~'? be le.slexpert)>!~s a result, group process can become skewed towards the views of oni:Y=~:J:e.w .. eiperts, and potentially valuable dissenting or alternative views from other group memb~~~ be self-censored. Within such groups, a serious consequence of this dynamic is the shorti!~iJ"~}liting of more involved debates over evidence, reduction in the variety of input _P,mvid~$ffor group discussions, and premature closure of debate. /:;= . (U) Fori ~.O~;.~:;oups operating within the IC, LE, and TNF communities, it is important to asstgn.~_r~.team toAhallenge the expert assumptions and to encourage a wide consideration ~f ~piiori~f:~!~-~!>;P'nor to closure. One solution to consider is the notion of having a :~p_llec~9F:~:within the group whose primary role is to speak individually with other m~nib~~!i9 eiici~~~ws_and perceptions which can later be presented to the group as altema.tive hypqtheses. Ati:esipert opinion should be carefully labeled and considered, and shouici:~:9eP.ciident upori"ihe scenario at hand. One's area of expertise may not align with the actuiit:ev.~nt itself, since domains of expertise may be specific. The value added by having spe'Ciii~:~xpertise, however, is the ability to rapidly synthesize information into meaningful ch\!riiCs, recognize patterns in large sets of data, process information faster, and identify incongruent data .. (U) Studies have shown that small city or rural fire station commanders with twelve years of experience were less expert than those with onl~ two years experience but who worked inner cities with multiple four-alarm fires per month. 1 This point also relates to 'the status issue, since participants with experience also may be perceived to have expertise by groups, when these may well be different things. (U). The AU-Star Problem (U) A related problem for group dynamics and composition lc__ ___ _,lis the "All-Star" problem. It has been observed in a number of professional level sporting events, that all-star teams - that is, teams created by joining the most exceptional players from across the league - rarely produce the best team overall. While their members have exceptional skills and are tremendous athletes individually, these all-star teams typically do not perform as well as expected, or nor do individual all-stars perform as well as they performed on their originating team. (U) I lwe need to consider mechanisms for melding a genuine team out of a group of experts from different domains, with different organil'Jltional backgrounds, different cultures, different lexicons, and so on. Can we foster healthy, well-functioning social networks to enable efficient communication, work flow, and trust in a crisis? How should we assess success? This suggests that criteria for team membership should be a ~~~~e of expertise and the ability to work effectively with others. More often than not,::f;;p~itive group chemistry trumps individual dynamics. On the other hand, it may be possible;(<;:~. on the side of expertise, so long as there is a skilled leader who can manage the .P.=~ ~~~;:~: . ~~ :f~~~ (U) Mitigate maladaptive group dynamics. k:-. -:;;;:;;,_ ... - ~;;~!;~'=; ~ ..~;. ':;"" - (U) Avoid over worry about groupthink, but also avoiq.j!J.sulat.ji:y,,ofpei'spectives. Consider membership criteria to create a balance witbiii"the gn)iip~{aeross status, expertise, etc.) and recognize problems ~~S?f-~~ed,~iiji:~ewly forfued groups. - (U) Recognize the need for inoculatiol}.:ofpers~!ptl ana:i:9f-9~tion networks prior to events and meet regularly for joint ~~~f.sises ro.:J;uild the ~hitionships/experience necessary before a real crisis. -:~;:;::. _/,' - (U) Preserve splits involving differencesi8fiqpinion in reporting to consumers and emphasize information sharing and enhancMt:=J coordina .. ti_on_._--, - (U) Counter debilitating effects of a ~j~ stre~s-~environmen~ I by employing stress monitors. . . .. ..{:: - ~elect a mixture of e.?C-Pe~:Witli' differing competencies (both task and general) for L__j subgroups to enh~cc:.:flexibijity in dealing with ambiguous environments and coordination across_t]le ~communities . . :)~~~ ~:~:::::::~:;:::;-~ ## (U) Bringing The Right Broomstick To The Wizard (U) This article focuses upon key elements of the senior policy-maker environment and how these may pose challenges I lin effectively communicating its attribution assessments. These elements include: how senior consumers may view threats and risk, differences in accessibility to inner circles, the right kinds of experts to communicate with them, and the importance of making I Ia key information hub for decision-makers. (U) Understanding the Sensitivities and Constraints of Senior Policy-Makers (U) One of the key challenges! ~ill be to not only produce the highest quality attribution assessments, but also to understand that the consumers of its informati.Qn (senior policy-makers) will be deal in with olitical issues and perspectives that may:ij~ye significant impact upon ow its assessments are used. I 1. I lit must unders at not a 1 policy-makers use information and:advici;ih~~thc; same ways. To maintain effective communication or input into the polj~ypf~_~S, it"fs' essential j I to understand hQw policy-makers di!f~r frolll:iP.9~ .. anothei-;jipd how they d . . . . .... .; ..... 'to' respon to cnsts sttuabons. . ~;~~:;;~ .. , .-~~=j~. . ~:.::~~~:y~ (U) We also must consider the state-of-mind of the decisio11-~.ii~J5(~ well~ the analyst providing data and assessments to the decision-maker) .~'!.~~~uent io:~;;lilgh consequence event such as a nuclear detonation. They wilL~::11.g!tated;;~9rried atiout family and friends, and may well be in a vengeful state-of-m~9~~iti:~s9 coni~k:~~z-~ould a decision-~aker be willing to react with punitive actions, ey.~il:oifthe c~inty ofPl'e attributions or clarity of the evidence may not be there? Will their'sti.fi~'J::.otproof change? Will the psychology associated with the event and the pressures fo~:~~tion reduce the decision-maker's standard of proof and his or her demanded level of certaincy:t~;QJ.e'assessment process? We need to also consider the public demand for the govei'I}P[lent to:;tiike action in the aftermath of a catastrophic event. This can cause tretp.~iiaous pressure to shorten timelines, and lower the threshold for action. It could.b"e:JjiUdeiii to define certainty thresholds in advance of an event to help circumvent these ph~o,:nena. :. !~ .. ::"' . :: (U it is important to undersla!l9:,~!=ver.ali~~~ues regaroing the sensitivities and constraints that are likely to apply to seni?f.:-P9li6~f:Fers::~~P.~,the activation ofj j .. ~;::~;~=:~. )!:- ~~=~~~ (DJ Th~t::JAnalyst as Consultant (U>I dependent on a host of other factors and constraints. Information must be actively incorporated into the mind. New information has to be assimilated into a person's preexisting ## Secre~ context, or state of information about the world. "Meaning construction" takes place when this new information can connect with what is already understood. Our ability to absorb new information is limited. People selectively attend to new information that connects, and may be oblivious to the rest.27 Emotional states, such as stress and anxiety, as well as the degree of cognitive openness, can limit one's ability to wrestle with new information, especially if it conflicts with previously held beliefs. (U) In the non-routine, hard problem world! I, information seeking will be part of a process. The early stages of information seeking are likely to show a marked lack of clarity and precision because the specifics of the problem are still imperfectly understood. Confusion, uncertainty, doubt and frustration are natural, and a desire to just drop it and move on to some other aspect of the problem needs to be tempered with realistic expectations of how information seeking actually works. ;!~;;{'' .. ~;:::;:;:~ ~ . (U) Later, as new information gathering starts and understanding of the P.IY.~!em ifiiP.~9~bs, one may experience relief and satisfaction that the needed information ~h:g'~~J? . suppllea. Conversely, one may experience disappointment that no re~Qlution ~~r{be aclil~v~ even though the information need is clear and focused. :::-; !; '~;::~:.. ?: . . ..... _ ~ . .,.. . (U) Paradoxically, only after you know your answer are y~~=~~~~~;Y?-.kn~~;t~ur question. 3:~,~~- .- -~~~:~~;:~~ (U) Performing a Reality Check on Information.;Seekiri'g:;g;., ,; (U) From the perspective ofthe analyst .. ,,,.,,.,,,... , I I there is a compleme~~-'-: - .,...,,.;:p-~--cob:-:1:-em". ;-7\. --=Th=-e-p-ro""=)j"'=le_m_ma_y_tr_a_n_sn-=-o-rm---:fr=-o-m----::''what do I need to know to take action" into ;wlia(~(!<;,>.~s;my client really need me to provide?" By taking the perspective of analyst as consultantl:J:t;~ill require more than simply answering the questions that were asked. Optimal performance:l~:!aformation seeking in this context has to be oriented around knowing the mind oftheclieni::: .. ~;~'~ . - (U) What is the goal ~r:fii~;!;c~~der's intent?" Questions may be tailored to address what they p~cejVe cari:be answered, instead of stating their actual goal. - (U) What is the.;qtfxr:~tion Pr::~:js ace~pioo would obviously temper how policy-makers would view the degree o{,~nty'fli~y wouia:~re:"ll'ave more closed advisory systems populated by advisers who sb~re simiJ~iJ>elieti~~:views as the leader (and have less diversity of view as a result). Histb'ric exailip\~s.-~f such American Presidentswould include PresidentS Truman, Johnson, Reagaq;~:~p G.'W.:!~.gsh. More sensitive leaders (who show more differentiation in their ~~~jro~~JJ-! seeing the world in shades of gray and many perspectives instead of in absQ,lp~es) tend "titb.ave more open advisory systems, gather information from m1!.~~;~~r~~:d~~~r.se sources (that both supports and contradicts their own views), and pop':l~atethejt.~~visoi:t~Y.~tems with a diverse group of advisers who do not share common vie~~:9.r positipiis. HistciBe examples here would include Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, GHW":B4J:l,_<;::,liiiton, and Obama. .. :~~-:-: (U) This distinction between sensitive and le;~:~~~j~ive styles is important for I I if the consumer is a more sensitive type of l~per, I . I will be operating in an environment more conducive for communicating inf9tJiiation to senior levels (since these styles are more active in gathering informatio9.f~~jce from a broad array of sources), have more open advisory systems, and compfise .a.Ctors;.who monitor their surrounding environments. As a result, the contraction o,f..~u$.~rity pro' "''" f. (U) Another challenge is fmding the right kind of messeng~f"'of.;~p.ndui(iiot only for communicating the basic attribution information t~.senior pi)l~~y-mal(~i];:out also for facilitating the ongoing back-and-forth interaction required! jtO,~~sist iri'coordinating the IC, Law Enforcement, and TNF communities in ongoing a@.f2:1:ltion taS~s:' It requires that the ~ght type o~ ex~ert advi~e~s) is still involv~d w~thin ~!f.t.innt;(~~~~le w~o can_ convey the avatlable techntcal mformatton I m a ttm~ly~and effecft~fashton wtthout distortion. Assuring the presence ofsuch an ~~~!1;W9u(4;~1Jow policymakers the best handle on the moment pos~;ble "(8$~;-W,ell aS'~l!ge the expectations of policy-makers), given the available attripjju~m infdffuation sO:jllat this sometimes technical data can be given its proper context in-'or:f:p:rotocols for identifying this individual in advance so that there is no discmmect be~~en pojicy-makers and the best the technical community I I have to offer dutirfg:;im intense, fast-moving crisis . .. ~:; .. ::;::::~> :::.r (U) Given that many senior .pol~~~rna.!cers lack technical backgrounds (having business or political backgrounds i~~t~4)~it is imPortant o be "bilingual," in the sense that they ar~ ,~iinv~~~;~d.imderstand the politicaVpolicy environment (and problems) faF~.d by;(ljc;;.White House, as well as the technical, scientific side of the attribution equation,fo~~C:f:.tiponi I. This would greatly facilitate a bridging of the gap betw~!~j:{those"W.Iiose foc~;(ilnd comfort zones) are in the policy realm and those who come from'ii~:i!t~re ~~i~ntific or technical community. Clearly, in a nuclear (or other WMD) attributlciii!setting, it is of critical importance to reduce the chances of miscommunication or any lack orP.~~!-~i.9n in the communication or understanding 1 !data by policy-makers. ~-:::~=-. . (U) *The Role* of Blam~ce Strategies and How These May Complicate the Attribution QuestionL_J (U) Whether it be the IC, the TNF, or law enforcement communities, or the senior policy-makers themselves - during a WMD incident, there will be a sensitivity and awareness regarding the potential political, institutional, or career damage that would result from attribution failures (for example, technical mistakes, incorrect interpretations of intelligence, or failure to pursue certain leads) and a desire to avoid divert -or even direct -blame were they to occur. Similarly, policymakers themselves will be highly sensitive to the political damage that would result from policy mistakes (for example, mistaken attributions of blame resulting from retaliating against the wrong party, negative reaction to policy actions (even if the correct perpetrator was identified), failure to take action in the face of evidence later judged to be sufficient. :: . . / (U) The higher the potential or real consequences of the crisis incident, the greater the resultant emphasis upon blame avoidance strategies becomes -which in extreme circumstances could severely hamper trust and communication between the three communities An excellent illustration of this area of research in crisis management that focuses not only upon crisis response, but also the management of response and its aftermath from a blame avoidance standpoint (both for institutions and policy-makers) is found in the book "Crisis and After: The Politics oflnvestigation, Accountability, and Learning." 29 (U) Because of blame avoidance, policy-makers (or institutions j /)~;~~~!_fmq themselves seeing to selectively process information during the attributig!M~!ldeavorj~f,.9r example, assume hypothetically that policy-makers had a desire to adv#ce'~:Rortanrj:}eac~ talks or maintain cooperation with another country in a polj~y area Qfgfeat irii';;9rtance to the United States, and an attribution assessment arose that potei1tially lihki6~1-:that nation to a domestic WMD incident. Depending on the severity of the incJ~~pt, on~:%.9y.ld imagine in certain contexts policy-makers desiring to search the avail~~>Je' errQf.:pars iir'the attribution evidence to introduce doubt (much like a competent def~rise attorneyJ.~:,'fhis introduces 'politics' into the way in which attribution ev~~V~~. is . \ii~}Y.~d by poll~y-makers, and certainly skews it in directions unrelated tC?,:th~'C:]foc~~P.~ ~\J.e IC, legal, or technical analysis. . ... :{h:.. .~;t . }~;: (U) Similarly, ifa particularly horrendous WMP., attack occurred and there was a lack of clear evidence linking a perpetrator to the crime, there:~C?gld be immense pressure on policymakers to avoid being blamed by the publi~;.for d().iifg nothing in response to the crime and to "round up the usual suspects," so as to g!'Yii" the public the perception of decisive, strong action. This gambit could res9.lt:;w;!poli"<:y-makers taking actions against parties based upon I !attributions that h~d vt;cy lovy levels of certainty by selectively using bits of the evidence to point the finger:in-tbe desi:fed direction. In fact, there are almost endless scenarios for how th!? ijiiioe;~Y,~iPM~~ game might be played or what confounding effects it could have,_~g~~ ~~CJ.ttriotifion effo~. ~is observation is not me~t to denigrate any party, b~t;me~IY.. to recl)gntze that the attributiOn process wtll not be conducted .... ~ "- ... . ... .. . . ... in a v~:ffilm, an~that pcili~~s- sometimes not directly related to the issue at hand- might playa=:ffit~ in btiw policy-iiiakers actually will interpret or make use of any attribution data I I ~:-::~. (U) Because~:ijighly charged and ambiguous environment is likely to result from the circumstances~urrounding the activation ~ 1. and the political consequences of the attributions themselves and the policies or actions that senior policy-makers may take as a result, it makes sense to focus upon building sound, pre-existing relationships among the relevant actors within the CJ community and its key representatives t<_> senior policy levels. Only levels of trust built on longstanding relationships among the parties, as well as knowledge and awareness of the technical capabilities (and analytic processes engaged in) by the CJcommunity on the part of policy-makers, will help prevent dysfunctions in performance during an event -where all the parties have to feel assured that they will not be "thrown under the bus" by the others. ## (U) "Safety In Numbers?" The Hurricane Katrina Problem (U) How many people died in Katrina? Early on, estimates flowed in from a variety of sources; hospitals, morgues, law enforcement, emergency management bodies, news services, unofficial Katrina web sites, and more. Some groups tried to aggregate data obtained from others, counting the same cases again and again. There were complexities in determining what constituted the categories defining how the person was killed. Individuals who drowned in the flood, or were crushed by debris were certainly included within those categories, but it is unclear how those who may have been killed in a car crash during evacuation, or succumbed to their preexisting medical conditions in the high-stress environment were categorized and counted. :~~.. _.,;~ (U) In an environment of information overload and time pressure, keeping on~~s;i~ye on the ball versus constantly playing information catch-up, is a challenge. Dependence:9]l..Jnm:"an memory for keeping track of information (for example, to pull threads or,:f~ll9w them~~)', especially given the acknowledged limitations of human memory anq c~gt;"liiY,M,iases;is destined to be inadequate, if not fail outright. From the teclm.ologic~:;I}~rspediW;<:tbe concept of an information clearinghouse is a step in the rigtli dix:~ctioii;i~!.JJ.an actual analytic ;::~:~:::::.:::ili~pro==~~\~::!~~-wuups Mil need a common framework, or a set of COmm9A:P.r!>..CeSs~~ir work, to help clarify that they are focused on the right things, and t~.afgaps~~~ beifi!ff]:~.~d. It will be extremely important to remain focused on the key .p:qin.ts: ;~::~ ~Y - (U) What do we know? . -::;;;:;:-.-.. / . - (U) What do we need to know, but do=ii~g- _ - (U) Can we fill in the gaps? How? -:::::::: ... ;::~ .. :~-. (U) This will require more than.P.~rson~_l~discipli~e. Under pressure, procedures, processes, tools, group norms, and commbti;~ituational awareness will be critical I l Having a scorecard to fill out may h~lp_pr~vid some critical structure and focus in constructing an assessment. I ~ I Clarifying these goals/tasks will help to clarify ~~ttC flow/p(Qcesses/procedures, as well as help to define an appropriate analytic lll')~jJ1(Qm)itt~QI.J.. environment. . .. :;~:.:~.;~~=-=~~ ==~ .. ::::~ ~~:~;: ;~;;t:: .... (U)""Tii~:~wr.ounding Psy~hological Context for JL._ __ _jiPolicy-Maker in WMD AttribuiiOfi:!t ~ ..... .. :::::~"'. ~~~ ## (U) *Te"Orists Are "Adaptive Enemies"Jlfbo* Wilit~ To "M';;Fid/The Waters" To Complicate The Attribution Process By Jncreasing)Ifiiii'Fg!Liij!}' . -::)~ .. -:~ ..... In addition, inf~r;mation;,tliat evolves may have been purposefully Ld=is-t-ort....,--ed~b-y-t,--he-o-ppo-s-:iti-:. o..Jn, which mig~J;:irilslead 'investigators and conceal information about perpetrators and their actions._.t'T:~ftarists should be considered the ultimate iil adaptive enemies, who in the event o,fa WMD "ipcident will inflict damage (both physical and psychological), as well-~ g#tsuppofi:and admiration among their followers. In many scenarios we would ~nyis'iori'l ~ I terrorists likely will have a great interest in confusing 3.!1.~~::: .. :~ ~ "!~=" (~The key question is what can be done to dramatically increa!'l.~~ c~iikI (U) In this example, a senior LE analyst is chosen to serve in a rotational assignment at DOE. Following this tour, the analyst returns toLE-related duty. After a set period of time, the . SECRE~ORN analyst serv.es another rotational tour in an applicable IC organization, returning to his or her ~ffice with experience in both DOE and IC communities and better able to support L_jsues. (U) C.~cting and Preserving Perishable lnformtltion (U//FO 0) The information age has enabled a high percentage of citizens witJl in~tantaneous communi tions coupled with sound and photographic recording capabilities.;:O.able News Network (CNN) has exploited this new capability with their "!-Reports" in wlii(;li;:lilPyon~ who sees something of interest can submit it for CNN's broadcast consideration. Sfdri.e~that would otherwise be a mere verbal or written description are now docum~~~f~4UP. picblr~s and sound by the omnipresent public. ._.;. }:;{ :::=:::: ~-;- . . ........ ... ~ (U) In the case of a nuclear event, it is likely that individual Pri:~~~e citii~~~::~ili' have ima es stored on cell phones or digital cameras that could help the.attfiouti~n question. should make arrangements in advance of any actual emerg~:~cy th~FW.~mld give e pu tc a way to send information to government serve~,f.o.r.an~y.j:~ .. During.iio emergency, the public could be advised via public announc.effi~riftPi::globiii::text message, of the way to submit photos and other information theY.;~ave tha:i:~ould sh~~~light on the event. Technology now allows users effortle~IY:tb':;inct~de the date;. time, and GPS location in pictures. Experience with the Space Shuttl~:t"9l1,1lllbia crash debris recovery effort or the Hurricane Katrina response indicates a hugely.sXiPP.l!thetic public anxious to contribute in response to a national emergency/disaster:.::Ysing:ifils capability requires some advance planning, however. --...-. :;::::== (U/~UO) A second sourcc{~ij;irish!ible data is security cameras, traffic cameras, and clos~ddrcuit televisio~ {~X~T.V). If ~:;nuclear/radiological attribution event were to occur within a metropolitaQ a;iea of:i:be:C.oii'iinental United States (CONUS), a collection and review ofC9,TY da~~~ould beiieiii:.an investigation to determine the who, what, where, and when aspcrs::q:the cas:~:-~. Throughout most major metropolitan areas there are a multitude of publi~.~~d pri\ii((e CCTV:~sfems. Most CCTV systems are designed to regularly delete old footig~;~m !}i~lr memory systems. The value of CCTV information became clear following the bomoipg;pfthe London subway system on July 7, 2005. The subsequent investigation revealed sU'J;.~iA~ce footage of the suicide bombers parking their vehicle at the Edgeware Road subway~t~tion and entering the station. From the surveillance footage, the bombers were identified; greatly aiding the investigation and leading to discovery of the planning process for the bombing. (U//FduO) A system should be implemented that will preserve all relevant CCTV footage at the very ~tset of a nuclear/radiological attribution event to aid the investigation. The CONOPS should incorporate a process whereby I Foordinates with the Department of Justice to ensure that a formal request for the preservation of records and other evidence pursuant to 18 USC. 2703(f) pending further legal process is issued and/or the establishment of an agreement network through Interagency Governmental Agreements "(IGA). ## (U) Information Sharing Among Disparate Kingdoms (U//FO~O) Successful attribution depends on pulling together data from a broad range of governmental and non-governmental sources and applying the skills of analysts working across a variety of disCiplines and locations. A nuclear emergency would require that this work occur at unprecedented speed. More than any event we can envision, a nuclear emergency inside the United States would require that knowledge flow rapidly between the relevant responders. Current limits to information sharing exist for good reasons, including the need to protect sources, the need to avoid tainting legal prosecution, and the need to protect rights to privacy. These. reasons will remain important in a nuclear emergency, but c_annot be allowed to impede the higher priority of protecting thousands or mi:!f.~~~ of human ::&'0) By its nature, the normal method for cross-agency and diS!aJ!,~;~~~:is largel;~erial and often hierarchical process. This normal way of doi~!{b~~~ss is.'too slow and exclusive to bring the full capacity of the distributed law. enforct}fu,~nt, int~U~~ence, and technical communities to bear on the problem in the quick~St mtmn~;:~;~~;~ nucl~ar emergency, we will need these three communities (IC, LE, ang~":f,NF) toti~~cmt from each others' knowledge as fast as technology allows. We must prpar~~:i:f. tools~d approaches now, that when activated for a nuclear emergency, allow;.iei~vant j;ij~e~ to share knowledge at the speed of technology, not the speed ofbqr.~~q!;rac}i::~;::. .: (U) Capturing Low *Confidence Data and* Assessm~nts (VI IF~) It is important that we protect against the loss of "low confidence" data and assessments that are easily overlooked in a crisis. Individual organizations may tend to dismiss low confidence data as "low value" data and not pass it up the chain or share it with the rest of the community. Taken as a whole, however, the collective picture,drawn by integrating all of the data- including low confidence data- may open up new;~~i.~nues of investigation or lend support to alternate hypothesis. Understandable organizati9P,~l aversion to risk should not be allowed to be an impediment to integrating this dat~.~.t:eal tlffi:~;!J!~o a single environment where it can be aggregated with other information lP:iifJiC:.~~ibly prbvide . ' ~ ~-" ~. additional value. However, once the augmentation group i~fonned.!!AcJ connec~~~i;-it is essential that low confidence data, with proper caveats, be :;;c>ntinua:ily:]}iitegra~d;~into the assessment process. :::::.. :::;;:::/ ... " =::::;:.. .~~:' ... ... '""'~ ...... ~. ~ :~~. .. ::~:=~-" . (U) Continuity of Connectivity .. .. .;:;::::~. /. (U) The connective process should be ~i~b~!~~~~~i~:~~-~.Jow level with regular alerts and exercises to test connectivity, trans~!i.~tcx~~&y the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS).34 The goal of PONI is'fiij(;~~!lild and sustain a networked community of young nuclear experts from military, miii~~-~.}aboratories, industry, academia, and policy communities." PONI hosts four major corifeiences where young experts across the community present their ideas on issues ranging.from US nuclear weapons stockpile issues, foreign nuclear programs, to technical nuclear forensics and attribution. PONI also hosts smaller events with guest speakers and maintains an online blog. (U) Due to the public nature ofPONI, there is limited involvement with the Intelligence Community. All discussions at the conferences are held at the unclassified level. PONI, however, serves as an inspiration and a possible forum to model after for the USG nuclear community. The proposed USG nuclear network will provide intelligence analysts with similar opportunities at the appropriate classification levels. ## (U) Recommendations - (U} Develop a nuclear analyst social network, where nuclear analysts from the intelligence, law enforcement, and nuclear forensic communities could participate. Rather than a workjng group, this is a support network designed to bridge the expertise and age gap within the nuclear community. This could lead to the development of local "chapters" throughout the US or subculture to the analytical community. - (U) Create a "virtual community" of nuclear experts by leveraging emergent social networking technology. Regularly scheduled informal chat sessions can be held on the appropriate computer systems. The only limitation in this scenario would be access to appropriate classified computer networks and systems. o (U) Such a community could include the use of classified or unclassified networks to conduct meetings using privately hosted sites sucl\,as ~econd Life. o (U) Classified seminars, briefings, and exchanges could be orgpj:lj~ed using A- Space or other social networking tools. ; ::::::.. - o (U) Virtual world platforms, such as Second Life, could b~,;q<;lapted'ilr~:P.Qrted to SECRET networks or JWICS to conduct simulations ~t'ili~:~JiJ:Ssifiealevel. .::::: .l~t-. -:~:~~::/ ## (U) Bridging The Nuclear Expertise Generation Gap :~:~. -:::~---.'" )~::~~==~- __.::"' . .:.-..... (U) There is a recognized and widening experience and,ag~~~ap ~~~en' senior and junior analysts in the federal government, a gap that.iS.-P.l!J.St e\:iitJ~P! and critical within the nuclear community. .;~::.:~.~ ~~=~~~=~~=: t,::;~:;:~ ... ; . ~ :~::: :~::: ~,:~~=~. (U) The number of radiochemistry pr()giifrii:s:{t~dikfio chenitsts in United States National laboratories and universities has dramatically~id~Jined over the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified people into this-~ii;tj:~al field is a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and credible nuclear_fQrensich)rogram."35 - -~., :i:'" - r .=.r:.~ (U) Senior analysts who are ~~Pii;i~nc~1' in communicating technical information to senior policy-makers are retiring. Tbi;;:is a sk;illlearned through experience and lost to the next generation of analysts as.,seliior.analysls retire. ~. ~=:~~~~ .. ~:;==~~:;:::~~:: (U) Recom!IJ.~!':datiO'fi_S;., - OJ)'llil#~~ a pf~~-where junior analysts shadow senior analysts at high-level .. ;:~Hnitiativ~~l : Ito provide the next generation of analysts the experience - '::;fu;~e-~~liiping and'~i-esenting assessments to senior customers. - (tJl:~.p a regular basis, provide information to junior analysts on current assessments, techlii~V~telligence gaps facing the community, and lessons learned from recent assessriieiiis . .. - (U) Initiate training programs to instruct junior analysts in the tradecraft of writing ahd briefing senior customers. o (U) This could include training with Toastmasters, or other public speaking groups. o (U) Specialized training to teach junior analysts to write effectively on nuclear issues. - (U) Initiate a training program, similar to an existing IC initiative, where junior analysts work and interact with scientists and analysts at the National laboratories. - (U) Establish a formal nuclear mentoring program that pairs junior analysts with nuclear experts both inside and outside the US Government that includes formal/ informal training programs and si~sits. ## Secre~Forn (U) Communicate Today; Still Communicating Tomorrow (U) As discussed in the Communications Section of this report, a common lexicon is required to ensure key attribution conclusions are properly formulated and communicated. The entire nuclear community will benefit from a common lexicon to communicate conclusions and associated uncertainty. A nuclear community network will foster the sustainment and adaptation of the nuclear lexicon for future generations, ensuring continuity of operations as the attribution community grows and matures (see the article "(U) ORGANICALLY GROW A LEXICON" for details on developing a nuClear attribution lexicon). ## ( U) Recommendation - (U) In addition to the recommended monthly secure web-based, yjrtQally-liti{{!:t:;miniexercises, encourage the virtual coordination of analytic produc~Hiii=fi!l,~ tecilliology, such as Intellipedia, "table top" exercises using virtual worldS',~~ihcorpof.itfug mixed reality features in crowd-sourcing interpretations, Jith tpe o~o~~~f;J~ucle~ community to foster sustainment and adaptation of the nuclear attril>iltion lexi'cant ;::::= , ... ;:~:~!!~::::~. .:: ## (U) When Reauty Costs Too Much, Go Vi~~L:... ./~~{., _;:: .-/~.~-;;~;=:~:~:~: . ':::;~::;;:.: (U) Conducting nuclear terrorism exe~j-~.9an beZ~kpensive:.~fiTo mitigate the costs it may be possible to modify or adapt commercial so'~Ar,e'to allow nuclear analysts a new way of participating in exercises related to nuclear afii!ibution. Platforms such as Second Life or a , modified "first person shooter'' video game col'ii(t:~e..used for scripted exercises. Analysts at remote sites around the world could log in.:t:P a secfue network and interact with their peers in a variety of nuclear forensic scenarios ~p~ii' as: - A pre-detonation sear~li~f;nu~f~ar materials smuggled into the US. - Post-detonation gath,~ri!llof it\rormation leading to an attribution assessment. - Operations at a,;~~(.opc;:~~i,ns center" where inputs from the field and requirement~;;f.tom seme~::,pte _to ihe exercise as time permits. What would be very interesting ~~;~o use ~~~i~~ inchia~::a;"red team" in the exercise who could respond to the IC's moves:Th~y coum::~~ge their actions depending on what the "blue team" did, providing for a more ~e~Jt~tic sceiijio instead of a planned out one. .;::::. :;;~:;::.. . .: - )~~=} ~ ~-:~~~;;~" ~~=~====~=:~~-~ :--~~.;; .. :-. . (U) Competition is Good .. -- :::. . ::;::;~.. . (U) Including competitive aspects to vi;1i~~~~~!ci~~~: will a~~~::rate creation and sustainment of a secure on-line attribution co~\Jpity. Analogous to "fantasy baseball," virtu~l attribution "teams" comprising individual~~~rii different agencies, offices, and programs and would compete against eac~:i>ther 9\:iddressing attribution-relevant topics. Each virtual team could have a !I!~~ o(!Nf', IC, and LE expertise rather than only one discipline (e.g., a LE-only.m~mS'ers team). The composite mix of the teams coupled with the competitive environmenf wpuid fo~ter and accelerate 1) lexicon and semantics development between ~q ~!lg ~ (see (U) ORGANICALLY GROW A LEXICON), 2) sharpen members' a9~~yticafii(~~Yaft with sustained exposure to different perspectives, 3)' foster coll!<&f~J~!!Dq;te~work habits that would morph into effective best practices during actual n.tJCI"eai;~~butioti:~"Y~t\ts . . /:{~::;;,_ _,}~; ':~~::; (U) Outlci~l(. , ~::~: .... (U) Success ~~~~~tiding the ~f the future will require cooperation from all organizations involved and a commitmen~owing and maintaining the next generation of nuclear experts needed to take the L_jnto the future. For each recommendation chosen for implementation, we recommend a high level "Champion" be identified to shepherd the process into reality. ## Recommendations - The USG must start building a stronger nuclear community, not just as it applies to the attribution problem, in order to ensure sustainmept of current capabilities into the future. ## (U) Suggestions: Required Resources (~F) There are a::{k fun~~~~~~ assumptions that can frame the debate. ## (U) Appendix A: Index Of Recommendations And Findings (U) Recommendations (Not in any order) (U~buOl'~------------------------------~1 (U) Applying Catalyst to Nuclear Attribution . =' ;:=:;:;::.. )' An information technology (IT) solution- .b~&i;est suited, as community members are geographically disperseo. [(U)"OR:?~CALL Y GROW A LEXICON] .-------'';..;.;::!i.l:: ;~l:/ - (U) Information Technology (IT) is integral! l~ft"c?.tt, as if facilitates communication and ultimately enables effective,I;Pid timely ~itlysis. In order to leverage the benefits of the IT availab,I~j : ~,it will beimportant to plan and coordinate these tools before the s~ofaqj~~ercise:~f.;~actual crisis. [(U) INFORMATION SHARING ~9NG J?-jSPARAtE' KINGDOMS] - (U) r--1oformation sharing ~houi(J::t,!lkt(place within a common computer system inte~cleared to the highest practi~=Jc;vels. However, given proprietary data among organizations, the NCTC should.iii!,Y,~,a key to databases with assigned points of contact, through which aceess ~q:~divi~iial databases may be enabled. The chosen II computer infrastni~ .. W!e ~~gfiid be configured as soon as possible, and all c=J 'riieiiiliers should be Jl,pi'fti~!:Yet thoroughly familiarized, trained, and exercised on ~ese systems, appli~~~Qns, an(! protocols. [(U) INFORMATION SHARING AMONG DISP.AR.t\:;{E KINGDOMS] On the topic of Collaboration: - (U) Collaboration teams sho~ld be identified and begin working together to establish effective working relationships prior to an actual nuclear related event. [(U) INFORMATION SHARING AMONG DISPARATE KINGDOMS] - (U) It also is recommended that collaboration should not extend down to the those involved with basic generation of data in order to prevent initial bias or cause data generation to be diverted away from what may be eventually proved to be valuable information. [(U) INFORMATION SHARING AMONGDISPARATE KINGDOMS] - (U) Have working groups meet often and practice not only on exercises but real world events. THE RIGHT STUFF: HARVESTING EXPERTISE On the topip;.of;:rraiiii"g.and Ex~~cises: ':::::@ Thti:increased:frequency interactions among the communities could take the form 6~P.t!lritltly or bi-monthly secure, web-based, virtually-linked mini-exercises on a parti~\llar facet of the attribution process to calibrate the communities with the spedfi~::wnns and their meaning. [(U) ORGANICALLY GROW A LEXICON] - (U) T~~-inini-exercises should be brief (e.g., -2 hours) to foster and stage development and acceptance of a common lexicon and to minimize disruptions to ongoing mission areas. [(U) ORGANICALLY GROW A LEXICON] ] - (U) Explicitly train c=:Jmembers on issues of biases, heuristics, intuition, bounded rationality, etc. [(U) THE ROAD TO HELL IS PAVED WITH NORMATIVE COGNITIONS] - (U) Members ofthec==]should be selected based upon criteria that include the ability to be aware of, and counterbalance, the influence of heuristics and internal biases. [(U) THE ROAD TO HELL IS PAVED WITH NORMATIVE COGNITIONS] - (U) Include elements and activities invoking biases and cognitive mind traps that undercut attribution analysis into ormal exercises- (to be included in quarterly simulations or other exercises forD[(U) THE ROAD TO HELL IS PAVED WITH NORMATIVE COGNITIONS] On the topic of A voiding Analytic Minefields - Do not lose objectivity by deviating from the establishe(j investigative plan. [(U) SPLIT SECOND DECISION-MAKING: A LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE] - (U) Lower level employees should be empowered to make certain decisions and be held accountable for them or without concern for negative consequences/punishment. [(U) SPLIT SECOND DECISION-MAKING: A LAW ENFORC~~~T PERSPECTIVE] . :;~;:;:: -:,.:!-: ... '!' - (U) Build into the decision-making process critical review by collea~es -~l~::.A members of other groups, as well as other checks and balances,:i6.-;niiig~te nis'h.to judgment (bounded willpower). [(U) THE ROAD T~ HE~t~:!$ PA ~~::WITH NORMATIVE COGNITIONS] :.: . ' ::::~::.. . ~ - (U) Cr~ate s~ctures and processes to enablerl~~~f~~~~~::~~:lf~to wh~te~er degree IS poss1ble) from the effects of extrem~ot co891fion) on 1ts attnbution efforts. [(U) THE ROAD TO HELL.lS:;~;A VE~D;~WITH N6RMATIVE COGNITIONS] .: .:.:.;.;.. . .;.;;:.. . _,:::~~;- ~=~~: "'-!:~;~~.~; - (U) Th~ lhould develop fu~~\!~.i~gate maladaptive group dynamics. [(U) PERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROW!~] - (U) Thec:J;hould avoid over worry iih!>:iWgroupthink, but avoid insularity of perspectives, consider membershiP.:~riteria=;io create balance within group (across status, expertise, etc.), aq~_recQgpl~e problems associated with new groups. [(U) PERILS AND PITF'~~$";0fGROUPSJ - (U) The c=:J shoulg ~'Ogniz~ the need for inoculation of personal and information networks prior J~;ev~~ ~4:w'eet regularly for joint exercises to build the relationship~~.J.~perience~~~ssary before a real crisis. [(U) PERILS AND Pllf:~L$~QJ.i!.pROUPSJ - . .Jtrj''n~O sli~~!~,p~es~rve spli_ts" invo.lving differences of opinion i~ re~orting to .:::~:::~pnsull!~ ana eny>haslze anformabon shanng and enhancedc::::Jcoordanabon. [(U) . ::e~RJI;S AND PITFALLS OF GROUPS] - (ti}:~.~ CJ should counter the debilitating effects of a high stress environment on C=JB.~~niploying stress monitors. [(U) PERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROUPS] - (U) Th_e'l=J should select a mixture of experts with differing competencies (both task and general) for c=:Fbgroups to enhance flexibility in dealing with ambiguous environments and coordination across the three communities. [(U) PERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROUPS] ## Best Practices Recommended ~ I - (U) Assimilating, analyzing, consolidating, summarizing, and reporting nuclear forensics information must be a two-pronged iterative process- continua.lly building the case and succinctly reporting findings. Employ dynamic analysis methods that weigh hypotheses against evidence. As time permits, use data modeling and visualization tools to gain deeper insights and accentuate reporting. [(U) CAN OTHERS UNDERSTAND YOUR DATA?] - (U) Leveraging metadata successes implemented by other communities. Use of metadata would facilitate and accelerate effective sharing of data and information among the nuclear attribution communities as designed and developed to meet each community's needs. [(U) Using Metadata to Foster Information Sharing Among Separate Communities] - The Administration might r~uest authorization/appropriation of anc=J>perational fund, to be available if/when_ ~s formally mobilized during a Level One or Two Threat. [(U) SUGGESTIONS: REQUIRED RESOURCES] - (U) The c=J:eeds to recognize that pressure for immediate responses will be directly proportional to the magnitude of the consequences surrounding an e:vent. Through exercises, the c==lhould educate senior consumers about the reality that technical analysis, crime scene investigations, or IC efforts are likely to lag behind their more rapid desire for actionable information. [(U) BRINGING ~RIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD] :- ;::::;:.. - - (U) The c::::::J needs to recognize how consequences affect risk ~g!~.l)ce of:R9];icymakers. [(U) BRINGING THE RIGHT BROOMSTICK ~9.~niEi:}.Y,!ZARD] - (U) ~ell must calibrate co~uni~tions with.i~~nior c~R.~ers b~~d'upon the way dttterefitleaders structure thetr advtsory systems [(Y} BRIN.~P'li9THE - .~ ,.,.., ~ ~ 4 RIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD] ;:~;;:;~,,. ::: - (U) Thec=Jneeds to understand that people res~rid to'~'S~W?!:l~J:s'~frisk based upon whether these are presented in the domain of gaiAs::or losses.l(V) BRINGING THE RIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE_,"WJ~~j;:;:~:::~.. .- - (U) The r--lneeds to recognize t}}it if ati;pJjution iitf9f!liation being presented to senior p~makers diverges fOO~;~eir P.(~:.Cxisting?deeply held b~liefs, more evidence will be required to gain tfie~;~~ehtion [(U) BRINGING THE RIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD[:~;:~ . - (U) For the II to get the right answer,:~~ey 'must learn how to ask the right questions. Deallng with the factQ~:around'information seeking will be critical to the c:=::Jand its supportingJ~:x~rs.;:f.liey shoUld consider: Education on the information seeking process, to a~oi'd';$rrupon pitfalls and overcome natural frustrations, and be able to optimize theif Qwn beh~viors; creating social norms that accept imperfect knowledge am~~g ni~m~~~~;:l!fid reward outreach to acquire the right knowledge and expertise; g~W.yg into'~tli~;~:mind of the client" and incorporating interactive strategies to ~e.ep;Jpformation seeking focused. [(U) BRINGING THE RIGHT .JJROO~TicKi:'!(}.-:THE WIZARD] .~;:::;:J:he c::J should i15e the "right" kind of expert advisers to interact with policy- ' ;~-~-"[(U) BRINGING THE RIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD] - M:ftt:qmote a healthy culture: Thec==:J as a new organization, can seize the oppo~f;y to explicitly shape an organizational culture designed to optimize functiqnlng and mitigate or eliminate the effects of known negative factors. This culture could include behavioral norms and attitudes such as: open communication and information sharing, minimal in-group status distinctions, inclusiveness (permeable boundaries for belonging, especially with regard to analytic aspects, trust in intentions, common group identity, shared sense of goals and mission, role of devil's advocate or red teaming, understanding the strengths and limitations of expertise (link to expertise section), and healthy interactive strategies, such as negotiation (link to negotiation section). Consultation from occupational health professionals should be obtained regarding mitigation of the physiological aspects of stress. [(U) PERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROUPS] - (U) Maintain and grow social networks: Well-connected and well-structured social networks, among their many benefits, improve performance in groups facing complex problems. c=]members must maintain and leverage their existing networks while building new relationships both within and across group boundaries. Regular, formal assessments on network structure and individual position and performance within the network, using methods from social network analysis, will provide a means to evaluate the current functional status and suggest areas for improvement. [ (U) PERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROUPS] . - (U) The rl needs to manage expertise effectively. Expertise, while often critical, can be a doii6\e-edged sword in groups, genr 1ic4 rigidity, and excessive deference. To leverage expertise effectively, the should consider: o (U) 1. Selecting for fluid expertise in its mem rs, and encouraging and teaching fluid expertise methods to the group. o (U) 2. Incentivizing collaborative, instead of allstar behavior.,~ ExP.ertise alone is not sufficient. Metrics for individual success should include!~-~perative behavior and information sharing. Provide actionable feedbacK' icl'!iJ.ldivic:juals, such as a personal social network analysis. . .-::> =t~~,,;:: o (U) 3. Building ~decentralized social networks fodiittif.ination si'i&ing across the entire L_j Measure and evalua!~. these 9fg~izati6iiitJ::social . .. .~..... .. ;!! .. ::;-:-.:.~ ,,.~ networks, and take steps to Improve them asdeficiencies::are observed. Share results. .:::;:... -:~:::;-:. o (U) 4. Institutionalizing these practices and.metrl'~~it~,.sha~'ilie culture. [(U) PERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROu:rsf' ::::;:: ## (U) Appendix B: Attribution Terms A (U) Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS) - A mass spectrometry techilique that uses a high-energy particle accelerator to measure rare isotopes. The technique was originally developed to measure 14C in small samples. Recently, AMS has been applied to measuring uranium and plutonium. Like other forms of mass spectrometry, AMS requires extensive chemistry to dissolve the sample and to separate and purify the element for aq~ly~is. AMS instrumentation is large, complex, and expensive, and is found in only a smalf~q(itnber of laboratories around the world. AMS excels at measuring exceedingly small isoiiift~-~atio), beryllium metal will generate neutrons, whi~h c:w"initi~te a chain reaction in a critical mass of fissile material. .. : .~ .. : .. (U) Beta Detector - ~~=o/~i~!=~~::aes of radiation detectors that detect and measure beta particles emitt~d fn;.Wradioactfve'isotopes. The detector types include solid-state detectors, gas proPQrtfo~t:.9eie"&Ats, Geiger counters, liquid scintillation detectors, and solid scint~l,l~tion d~(~tors. fii:~:most sensitive beta detectors can detect activities of 0.1 dpm or le~s::::::::.,. ./' ,. . :~::~:~ .... ; .... (U) Beta -~~):uc:le Radiation - An electron that has been emitted from a nucleus. A beta particle typi~itY,;:li~s an energy between 0.001 and 4 MeV. Its penetration in material is short, but nuclio, which can be used in neutron initiators for nuclear weapons. (U) Boosting - The use of a DT reaction to produce 14 MeV neutrons to enhance the fission in a nuclear weapon. Boosting can greatly enhance the efficiency of a fission weapon. (U) Boron (B) - A chemical element that has a high cross-section for absorbing neutrons. Boron is used as a neutron absorber in control rods to control nuclear reactors. ## Se~Rn S~ (U) Bulk Analysis - The analysis of macroscopic amounts of material to determine the concentrations of elements and isotopes in that sample. (U) Burn up - A term used to characterize the extent of use of nuclear reactor fuel. Bum up is a measure of how much of the fissile isotope (usually 235U) has been consumed in nuclear fuel. Typical units are megawatt days per ton of uranium fuel. c :; ..... , .:;::~!:: .... (U) Cadmium (Cd) - A chemical element that has a high cross section ~QJ;.~psorhi~g:~-;) neutrons. Cadmium is used as a neutron absorber in control rods to ~~~~6"l"I\~~~~-r~actors. (U) Carbon Composite - A material consisting of carbon fiBer "clciffii~~impre~ii~d with epoxy resin. Carbon composites have high strength and light W,~jght, an"tirprut;"easily be shaped prior to the application and setting of the epoxy. The.iDe'cfilWicallilid manufacturing properties are highly useful for gas centrifuge manufac~~?-Carb~&'~niposites also are used extensively in aircraft and missiles. . . .::.. ,.;~;;::;:., .: . 1"-"."':..~ . .. ~ ..... (U) Centrifuge- A rotating vessel that<;;~:,. u~~~}or the-~t~h~ent of uranium. A device that applies centripetal force to a sampie;~~~ly:Via motor-diiven rotary motion of the sample. There are many different kinds of e~mfuges, often for specialized purposes in research laboratories, medical labs, and material:i~~~h. (See also gas centrifuges). . -=~ .... :::" .. (U) Ceramic- A hard, pottery-like ma~~6iii with a high resistance to heat (e.g., oxides or carbides of metals). Fuels fo~:Pil.~!~i'~actors operating at high temperatures are often ceramics (e.g., ura!lium dio~idc::, .. uraniym carbide). :"~ .-:. .~: (U) Characterization;~~~aegfl~catiofi::of material and device properties. This information is vital to perftion~ij.~;9f neutrons is just balanced out by the production of new neutrons by fissi9ii:';Th~. criticli:f mass depends on the type of fissile isotope, its chemical form, ge_Qmetricat:-rangerrt~t, . and density; the amount of material needed is decreased if the rr.iiiterial i~"b~@.P.resse,d'!' Nuclear power reactors need to operate at criticality to produce electrici&. Nuct~;weapons are based on highly supercritical designs. .,- ' -::::.11:;:-, .. :-: ~--=~ ...... , .. -. '" .. :~~~-~ .. ~. (U) Curie (Ci) -A unit of radioactive decay ~~.j~ .. ba!,!~4;~~ the acti*iiY of one gram of radium. 1 Ci equals 3.7 X 1010 Bq or decaysp~t~~prid or'~~22 X 1012 dpm. ,.;~~:{;:;.. )? ')~;;- . ~~:=:=:-~y D .. -~==~~j_~.~~--~~:,/ . ,. .... ;::====: (U) Daughter Isotope - A Jlaj~~~~i~e;,isotope (called the parent isotope) decays into another isotope which is .called .fu~ d.a:uibter i~9tope or decay product The daughter isotope can be either stable or radio,;t~Hve, d~9!~g on the parent isotope. (U) Dec~y~~iti$,~~~~~~~.~us .=formation of one nuclide into a different nuclide: Decay may inyolve tnetemission~~ofalpha particles, beta particles, positrons, or gamma rays from the nuct6\isbbe ca~b.tre of elegtrons by the nuclear, or fission of the nucleus. A decay process is charact~~~(by a half-life (i.e. the time for half of the atoms of a radioisotope to undergo decay). Ai<>~ealled "radioactive disintegration." ~-:~:~:,;. ... .;!' -.-.. ~ (U) Decay Pr.iduct- The outcome of radioactive decay. See daughter isotope. (U) DeUberate Signature - A signature, such as the isotopic composition of HEO that is controlled and specified. Deliberate signatures are essentially product specifications. (U) Depleted Uranium, D-38,or DU- Uranium with a concentration of 235U smaller than that found in nature (0.72% atom%). It is largely obtained as a by-product or "tails" of the uranium enrichment process or obtained from spent (used) fuel elements. This material has low specific radioactivity and poses no significant risk to human health. It often is found in aircraft as counterweights and in boats as ballast material. It is also used in anti-tank or armor-piercing ammunition to enhance penetration. (U) Detonator - A device that initiates the detonation of a charge of high explosive by subjecting it to percussion by a shock wave. (U) Deuterium (D) -An isotope of hydrogen in which the nucleus has one proton and one neutron (nonnal hydrogen has no neutrons). Deuterium is useful as a neutron moderator (in the form of heavy water) and has nuclear properties that are useful for thermonuclear or fusion reactions. (U) Discovery Class - A term that describes at what stage a nuclear or radiological event was discovered. The underlying assumption is that the unfolding of an event consists of a sequence of processes that lead from the planning to the execution of an even~,. ._ :ii~,.~.:: (U) Dirty Bomb - An explosive device that is intended to spread radioactive ~$!i~l fr~m the detonation of conventional explosive . See also "Radiological Dispe~!!lJ.Jevice.;~~D)." ~~=~ ~-~-::;;~~=~.. ~- .. (U) Dose- A general term for the amount of radiation abs~IY.ed ove~ll;~period'~fj~~iJ;ne. ~:~~. .~ ~!~~::~.... !~- (U) dpm (decays per minute)- A convenient unit ofradioactiY":~-decaY::t:j;;dpfu equals 13 I! -~~ - 4!1Jr 0.0167 Bq or 4.50 x 10 Ci. ..:-;/ .:~:;::.. ..-. . .: .. ~--.~ ':~~~;~~~~; (U) DT Reaction - A thermonuclear or fusion r~tion:~(\yeen the J:lydrogen isotopes deuterium (D) and tritium tiipfrared wavelengths. The data are analyzed by performing a Fourier T~f9.hn, wii(~'h is a ~eiliatical process to convert intensity as a function of the int~ci;~w.~te!~position to'mtensity as a function of energy (i.e., inverse wavelength). FTIR becamef~~~tile with the advent of modem computers and computational algorithms. FTIR is useful fd~~~.11JY3ing a variety of materials in solid, liquid, and gaseous form. ==~~r;- (U) Fuel Eleni~~t - A rod, tube, plate, or other mechanical shape or form into which nuclear fuel is fabricated for use in a nuclear reactor. (U) Fuel Fabrication Plant - A facility where the nuclear material, such as enriched or natural uranium, is fabricated into a ceramic material called uranium dioxide in a form suitable for use as fuel in a nuclear reactor. (U) Fuel-~ade Plutonium - Plutonium produced in nuclear reactors that has between 7% and 19% Pu relative to other isotopes of plutonium. (U) Fuel Pellets - Typically, sintered (or fused) and ground cylinders of uranium dioxide, about 112 inch long and of various diameters, are stacked in tubes to form the fuel pins or rod. (U) Fusion- The opposite of fission, in which two light nuclei atoms- typically deuterium and/or tritium- combine to form a heavier nucleus with the release of a substantial amount of energy. Extremely high temperatures, resulting in highly energetic, fast-moving nuclei, are required to initiate fusion reactions. ' (b) (3) per DOE SRD, TCG-NAS-2 Topic 506.4 (U) Gamma Ray Emitter- A material that emits garrupji.:f.a~:(:~:~~!ler; photons). 60Co . is a strong gamma ray emitter. . ,,_.;:.. _X;~::::-. _.. (U) Gamma Ray Radiation - Also call~9i:~=lli~tor s~~jtHi~-energy electromagnetic radiation emitted by nuclei during nucl~af:~~'?ti_!>rlS or radioactive decay. Many radioactive isotopes emit gamma rays and these gammatitY:~,have specific energies that are characteristic to the specific isotope and decay scheme. Gatillif~~t:_ays have high energy (generally 30 KeV to many MeV) and a short wave length. Sltjelding;iigainst gamma radiation requires thick layers of dense material, such as lead. Q.afuma rays are potentially lethal to humans, depending on the intensity of.9leT~UX. : .. - _f. -. (U) Gamma Spectrom.':_t.ri~ . .A.detec,t}on system that measures the energy of gamma rays emitted by a radioac!i~~.>samp~~:=:Th~igamma ray energy and intensity is used to identify the radioactive isotope .and. the amount of the isotope in the sample. The detector types include solid-sta~:;d~t~tptS: "glis~P.roportional detectors, and solid scintillation detectors. The most COtnn:19P'type bf~solid-sta~~d'~tector uses a large, high purity, single crystal of germanium (also=~liJ!~~ IWGe). A soii'il scintillation detector often uses large crystals of sodium iodide. The mosf~~~itive gamma spectrometer can detect activities of 0.1 dpm or less. !";:;!::,... . (U) Gas Ce~t6fuge - A uranium enrichment process that uses rapidly rotating cylinders (gas centrifuges, also called rotors) to enrich 23Su. Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas is fed into a gas centrifuge and rotated at high speed. The centrifugal forces produced by the rotation cause the heavier 238U to migrate toward the outside of the rotor and the lighter 235U to migrate towards the center. Gas removed from the center is slightly enriched in 235U and gas removed from near the outside of the rotor is slightly depleted in 235U. The separation efficiency is increased by a relatively slow axial countercurrent flow of gas within the centrifuge. The countercurrent flow process produces further enrichment by concentrating enriched gas at one end and depleted gas at the other. Feed UF6 is introduced near the middle of the rotor, and enriched and depleted uF' are removed near the ends. The separation capacity of a single rotor increases with the length of the rotorand the rotor wall speed (i.e. with increasiD.g rotation rate). Consequently, centrifuges consisting of long, high-speed ## Secre~Rn rotors are the goal of centrifuge development programs, subject to materials and mechanical constraints. A typical gas centrifuge plant can have thousands of rotors, connected in series. Gas centrifuges must be constructed of very strong materials, such as carbon fiber or highstrength aluminum or steel alloys. The gas centrifuge process is much more energy efficient than gaseous diffusion. (U) Gaseous Diffusion - This isotope separation process is based on the fact that the lighter isotopes of 23SU gas diffuse through a porous barrier at a faster rate than the heavier isotopes. This method requires large plants and enormous amounts of electrical power. China, France, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States have used this isotope separation process. (U) Gas Proportional Detector - A radiation detector that detects beta particles o.r gamma rays by the ionization they produce in a gas. Gas proportional detectors can ~~~~re the energy of the gamma ray and are used in gamma spectrometry. The most sen8itiY.~;.gas . proportion detectors can detect activities ofO.I dpm or less. ,::;. -:::;~;;.;,;; (U) Geiger Counter - A radiation detector that can detect beta partic1et:~~~~fnma ;~;s. The Geiger counter is widely used for radiation detection trl~asureni~if~~(qr he~ifu. physics and radiation safety. ;;!:::. '::!;~:;~< .. : .. :..:~~.. . : .. ,.- (U) Glow Discharge Mass Spectrometry (GD-MS) - :fu ~i~w d~~~lifg~ ~s spectrometry (GD-MS), the sample serves as the cathode o~~,gJ.ow ~~~~!lfge (argon is usually the support gas). The sample i~ sputtered by argon io:J?,~;iftiCi::ij~.spurti~r~~t~~.utrals from the sample diffuse into the plasma. In the plasma, tlt~t.:~eutral~{~ ionize~l'ieither by electron impact or, more typically, by collision with metaSt3.Bi~:M:g~n:=iitoms (penning ionization). GD-MS can be an effective technique for directly measuii'Q~tbulk samples, such as dirt. GD-MS is highly quantitative, suffering from very few matrix eff~~~-.-Jtcan be fused as a sensitive survey tool with detection limits ranging from less th~;11 ppiY:i&'a few ppm, depending on the element. However, it lacks the precision associat~5f!\Vith railiochemistry, TIMS, or ICP-MS. It also can provide misleading result.~.~f~~;~om~'heterogeneous samples, since the sampled volume is small, and there is no sampl~'hopJoge:Q.ization provided by dissolution or a similar process . . .~. ==~ ... ~--~ .~:: (U) Graphite - A forni:o'f catb,o.~.;:Effiiphite is used as a neutron moderator in some nuclear reactors. Such react~~. can ~-()ifii'atural uranium and are useful for producing weaponsgrade pl~~ffi~} M~~~t-~he_ US weapons-grade plutonium was produced in graphitemode~~ed reac(Qrs at th~~WSDepartment of Energy's Hanford Site in Washington state. _ _..:::;:~:i:;,, . ::-- y (U) Greeg:~~t- Green Salt is the term used to describe uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) which is a green ccy~f@!:W~.solid compound of uranium. UF4 is generally an intermediate in the conversion of\lilihium hexafluoride (UF6) to either uranium oxides (U30s or U02) or uranium metal~' It is formed by the reaction ofUF6 with hydrogen gas in a vertical tube-type reactor or by the action of hydrogen fluoride (HF) on uranium dioxide. ## H (U) Half-life - The amount of time needed for half of the atoms of a radioactive material to disintegrate or decay. (U) Health Physics - The science concerned with recognitioD, evaluation, and control of health hazards resulting from ionized radiation. (U) Heavy Water - A form of water in which the hydrogen has been replaced by deuterium. Heavy water is used as a neutron moderator in some nuclear reactors. Such reactors can run on natural uranium and are useful for producing weapons-grade plutonium, Some of the US weapons-grade plutonium (and most of the tritium) was produced in heavy-water-moderated reactors at the US Department of Energy's Savannah River Site in South Carolina. (U) Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) - Uranium that contains 20 _atom% or more 23SU. (U) High Explosives (HE) - Energetic materials that consist of chemical com~Qtiiids or mixtures of compounds that when properly initiated evolve large volumes of ilfs:IA:!i short period of time and produce_ a high pressure shock wave that is capable o(~~!J:erixl8;P.r:.;;; compressing surrounding media. Examples of HE compounds suitable:fdt'ii'ti~I~ar w~apons include: :~:: /~~i:.. -;~:!:1~;:::: (U) HMX (cyclotetramethylenetetranitroramine) :~:::.. -::::~;;;_:,.< ~ ~~(~~~':a~:!;~~~:::::;nne) ,:;:;./:: . :;:~~~~~~~)-... /- (U) TA TB (triamino-trinitrobenzene) .;.::.. _:-'-::;~:_;_::.... " (U) TNT (trinitrotoluene) . /;,:::::.~:.;:_: (U) Tetrya (trinitrophenylmethylnitr~w~) ... ,. -\!::=- .. il.. ..:. ._,.. ' .. ~~::;:~:~ .. -~- (U) All of these HE compounds consist of org@)~ compounds with attached nitrogen oxide (or "nitro" groups), which are responsible for tfie;~~.P.~osive character of these compounds. For nuclear weapon applications, these (or:~imilaii:C!ompounds are usually blended with inert binders (such as plastic) to obtain a phY.~!.tkl fom1ofthe HE compound that can be molded or machined into the desired shaP,:;:;:::. :: ... - . .. ~~ . ;i _'! l (U) HPGe Detector - A,.~,.ef g~ ray detector that uses a large crystal of high purity germanium to detect g!ilffina'~Y,~.:":HPGe detectors can measure the energy of the gamma ray and are used.i.t! g~,spectroliie-fiY. HPGe detectors must be cooled to cryogenic temperawrC:S;~~p~h:'as'li~;~ing liquid nitrogen, to work properly. Hence, HPGe detectors are not e~jiy mad~!f;ortabll~~:}Jte most sensitive HPGe detectors can detect activities of 0.1 dpm, or les~:~;;:. . } _,: -.-;" .. :. .. :::::~=: -.. ~i!.'a .. :;~:;:::~.:-; -- ~::: / ## 1 (U) IC- Intelligence Community. (U) ICP/MS- See Inductively-coupled-plasma mass spectrometry. (U) ICP/OES - See Inductively-coupled-plasma optical emission spectrometry. (U) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - An independent, intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization of the United Nations that serves as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation. The mission of the IAEA is to verify through its inspection system that its member States comply with their commitments under the Non- Proliferation Treaty and other non-proliferation agreements, to use nuclear material an~ facilities only for peaceful purposes. ;:::"' -:;;;:.~ .. -- .. ~ .. ~ "' .. ".'"~~>'"" (U) Inadvertent Signature - A signature, su~h,a,s .. ~ tr11ritii~J~ment or.i~otope that is present in a material that is othe~ise unimpo~t to .~~=ti~e;~~~ the ~~~B~ An example would be ~ trace amount ofplutomum found wtth an':HEU sample. This"trace Pu would have no bearmg on any of the material properties ofthe'Irniit;I!9t.does its conbentration in the HEU pose any issues for its bulk nuclear properties. The tili~~eP.,u would not be controlled, but it would be a signature of the process that produced the HEif;~:~:;.>/ 6 ........ . . . . -~:.~:_?:- (U) Inductively-coupled-plasma Opti~aP:iJtmission Spectrometry (ICP/OES) - An instrument used for elemental.~ysis~tfiat uses a hot plasma to vaporize elements for optical spectrographic analysis. ~{nq~almethod of introducing the sample into an ICP/OES is by dissolving the sampl~! g~~futing.~ aerosol from the solution and feeding the aerosol into the hot plasma. The h~Fpla8ili~:sil#~s many of the elements to emit light at characteristic wavelengths. The s,p~p-ograplii'c'analysis of the emitted light is used to determine what elelllen~,a.re:~t,e.~,eiit Iii:i~s: sample and their concentrations in the sample. ICP/OES uses the .:. ~-- .. ~ ~!i :II;.. ...... .. same,m;e ofpl~ina torc~Ji~~l.lsed man ICP/MS. ICP/OES can detect elements down to partper.-b'iilion to pan-per-million levels. -~~:;:=~~;, *'1::* J -;-~~ (U) Inducti~~h~:-eo.upled-plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP/MS)- A mass spectrometry technique th~tf@~~ a hot plasma to vaporize and ionize elements for mass analysis. The normal method"ofintroducing the sample into an ICP/MS is by dissolving the sample, generating an aerosol from the solution, and feeding the aerosol into the hot plasma. ICP/MS was initially developed in the early 1980s and has been developed into a general technique for analyzing the elemental compositions of samples, as well as the isotopic composition of individual elements. ICP/MS is pmnarily used for bulk analysis. The technique normally requires extensive cheinistry to dissolve the sample and to separate and purify the element for analysis. However, for particle analysis, small, micrometer-sized particles can be loaded dir~ctly onto a filament for isotopic analysis of uranium and plutonium- no chemistry is used and the atoms are vaporized directly into the carrier gas and transported to the plasma. ICP/MS.can detect as few as 100,000 atoms ofplutonium, and can measure isotope ratios to better than 1 part in 1000 precision for larger samples. (U) Ion Microprobe Mass Spectrometry - A mass spectrometry technique that uses a focused ion beam to remove (or sputter) atoms from a sample for analysis in a mass spectrometer. The ion microprobe can analyze the elemental and isotopic composition of small pieces of material without the need to perform any chemistry on the samples, which is different from other types of mass spectrometry. The technique can analyze areas smaller than 1 micrometer (or micron) in diameter, can detect elements at concentrations as low as one part-per-billion, and can measure the isotopic compositions of elements to precisions better than one part in I ,000. Also called secondary ionization mass spectrometry or SIMS. (U) Ionization - The removal or addition of an electron from an electrically neutral atom or molecule, thus leaving a positively or negatively charged ion, respectively. , :;:: -- .-~ (U) Ionizing Radiation- Any radiation that causes the removal of electrons :ff~iq~~~oms.or molecules, thereby producing ions. . ..... ~;;:; .. ,,:: ;::~~:::!~,~. . .;:;:,. (U) Isotope - Atoms of the same chemicai element but wi~.;Piffereq.ti~~b;~;~ltJ.eutrons in their nucleus. An isotope is specified by its atomic weight~aiid a syin'I)Qlidenotirig the chemical element, such as 235U for uranium with 235 neutrons.ahd prot~~~iJs"Otopes can be either stable or unstable (radioactive). ,.;,, ;.-;.::;:\. }i' ## K (U) KeV- Kilo-electrQii:~ott~:l;Q:ikctron volts): a unit of energy often used in the measuremen~ p_f nu~J~~ radiatfoii=such as gamma rays, alpha particles, beta particles, and neutron!!, .. anO::~~Qnttc.hlaiation such as x-rays. See also electron volt and MeV . . <~=;i.' ~~=~~: -.~~:~;;:;~ .. ; (U)l(~q~n S_~fuple (K) :A sample of known origin and attributes, which is used in the forensic~C:; ' ;::;~=~~::. }'' (U) Lithium - A chemical element that has nuclear properties .$~tare usethl,for thermonuclear or fusion reactions. Lithium is also used ~.,3;-~rgei';(~,r production of tritium . (U) Maraging Steel - Maraging steel is an:4mpo~r~omponent in the design of gas centrifuge rotors. It allows for the veryJpgh rotor" wall speed necessary to separate 238U from 235U, This type of steel (whic!l:b:~::a htgb cobalt content) is the most popular rotor material for proliferant countries to lJ.$e it);fiuilqing isotope separation facilities . . - !;: ~~/~ ): (U) Mass Spectrom~t~f;l Ah~!!q~~~l instrument used to measure the composition of a sample based on the~atomic (or'blolecular) weights (masses) of its constituents. Some mass spectrorp,.~ilit$~~~ h~~t~ly measure the isotopic composition of samples .. Different types of mas&spectrometers includf: .... ,,.,. ~Iii!' ;~"' . (U)-~~~~lerato.r'mass spectrometer- AMS (U) Induct!:V.~!y-coupled-plasma mass spectrometer - ICP/MS (U) Ion mi~9-P.~pb~ mass spectrometer (also called a secondary ionization mass spectrometer - SIMS) . ~:::::;, (U) Thermal irlriization mass spectrometer - TIMS (U) Each type of mass spectrometer has a specific range of elements (hence isotopes) it can analyze and associated detection limits, as well as requirements for sample preparation chemistry and handling. ' (U) Material Signature - .. Material signatures" include all characteristics of a particular material, whether the characteristics ate specifications or nor - i.e., the material .. fingerprint." .. Material sigriatures"' include ''process signatures", but also include inadvertent or unspecified signatures. Inadvertent signatures are unimportant as specifications for the process and, hence, are not under deliberate control. Evaluatidn of material signatures has the potential to identify where (hence, by whom) the material was made. An important point is that "the interpretation of material signatures requires extensive databases to reveal the origin of the materials." "Exemplars- that is, examples from known processes and locations- are essential." See Process Signatures. (U) MeV- Mega-electron-volt (1,000,000 electron volts): a unit of energy often used in the measurement of nuclear radiation such as gamma rays, alpha particles, and neutrons. See also eV and KeV. {U) Micron - A micrometer or one-millionth of a meter ( 1 x 10-6 meter). See micrometer. _(U) Micrometer- One-millionth of a meter (1 x 10-6 meter). The wavelen~.ofY.ellow light is 0.5 micrometers. i;::/' .. .~~~ ,.. {U) Molecular Laser Isotope Separation (MLIS) - There are two basic .. ~~~~ ~~~~l~9;1n the MLIS process. In the first step, UF6 is irradiated by an infrared las~fS'y~i~ ope~iing near the 16 mm wavelength, which selectively excites the 2~-:UF6 , lea~g the;~~6 relatively unexcited. In the second step, photons from a se~6nd 1as<;a~~~m (infrared or ultraviolet) preferentially dissociate the excited 235UF6 to form}?~UFs aifa~it;ee''fluorine atoms. The 235UF5 formed from the dissociation precipita~N:.~.::frotii:~m~ gas-iiS' a powder that can be filtered from the gas stream. In terms of the gas ,~qw for the~~IS process, gaseous 235UF 6 is mixed with a carrier gas and a scavet:tg~F .. gas Js:~~panded th'fough a supersonic nozzle that cools the gas to low temperatw;~s:~;Hyaf.Qgen Br;:i,ooble gas are suitable as carriers. A scavenger gas (such as me~.~~~ is us~io captt.if~:tb.e fluorine atoms that are released as a result of the dissociation of 23~tJF.6 niolecules. Like AVLIS, MLIS technology appears promising bus has proven to be extr'~fEiy difficult to master and may be beyond the reach of even technically advanced states. ~:::~::~:-:/ . ;~: ... (U) MOX-Grade Plutonium - Mixed Q.ilc:ie foe( which contains both uranium and plutonium oxides. MOX fueljs::m.~e ~ing plutonium extracted by reprocessing spent power reactor fuel and typically h~'~ier t'tt_an 30% 24. ':~!;1:;.,) :~=~'- --~:~~~~~.. ~: .. :~::" (U) Nuclear Characterization- The description of the ch~tp.ical, el~]ri~ntal,' ::~pic, and physical aspects of the nuclear material as well as the inferf~ histoilaq:~(pedigr(!eJprocess) origins of the nuclear material. .:=::::.. :::;:~:.~~ .. . .. . . ~ ~:~:~:::., ?t~ (U) Nuclear Forensics- The application of nuclear physici~:~nd ~~iy~cal technologies to the study of nuclear material in forensic samples .. M:~ith;:6~qyentionaLforensics, the goal is to link people, places, things, and events. Nu_~l~::r6~sics it~~.s~ks to identify how nuclear materials were produced, their intended u&e, and W.here they"we're produced. The findings may be presented as technical evidencliiri~~~~r:Sf law or oh. a national security setting. -~ .... - ~li (U) Nuclear Detonation -A nuclear explosion:~~~!~ng from fission or fusion reactions in nuclear materials, such as from a nuclear w~apon:;: .-:-;.... . (U) Nuclear Energy - The energy::r.etei~d when the nucleus of an atom splits or when two nuclei fuse. (See fission an~=fu~ion). : . . ~.. :~;~;::~ '~~: (U) Nuclear Radiati_o~:~'Pai'ij~~~;~d'electromagnetic radiation emitted from various nuclear processes in .~t~mic;;P~~lei. The'imiJortant radiations, from the nuclear weapon effects standpoi9t;i~~~lplia 'liiiY.!and bems::aproperty of certain elements, of spontaneously emitting radiation resultiqg.from':Changes iri the nuclei of atoms of the .... ~: .. :~ element. ..;. =~=~=~- . .. :::::;::.~4 (U) Radiochemistry - Many samples are ,t~,9 com;lex for all the radioactive isotopes present to be measured directly. By utilizing fl!~;idifferenees in chemical properties of the elements, it is. possible to devise schemes.9-:~!,l:emi~iil reactions to separate and purify elements, or groups of elements, to allow measurem~ni oft}le isotopes present by radioactive counting methods, or mass spectrometry. The fs.otf>pes l!(easured are related back to the original sample by referencing to an interriai'isrlf<>pjc;.sWi'dard called a "spike." The chemical separation and purification steps intYcltse botii'tlifsensitivity and selectivity of the technique. Radioch~~~~ftY;;is ~~~~Wly important to allow measurement of isotopes that are present at low a~P.t'ity an'&,r!ire besi~~ured by their alpha or beta emissions or by mass spectrometry. ~i\~i~:: /=' Raditi~li~~istt:Y'J.n combination with radioactive counting techniques and.mass spectrometry has the.fj(;wp~al to measure down to 106 atoms or lower of certain isotopes. s (U) Sating Arming Fuzing Firing (SAFF) system - A SAFF system is crucial to the development of a militarily usable nuclear weapon. It consists of the following subsystems: (U) Sating: Used to ensure that a nuclear weapon will not experience a nuclear detonation as it is being stored, handled, deployed, and employed. Sating usually involved multiple mechanical interruptions of both power sources and explosive firing trains. The nuclear components may be designed so that an accidental detonation of the high explosives is intrinsically unable to produce a significant nuclear yield. (U) Arming: Placing the nuclear warhead in a ready operational state, such that it can be initiated under specified firing conditions. Arming generally involves mechanical restoration of the sating interrupts in response to conditions that are unique to the launch or deployment of the system. (U) Fuzing: Detecting that the desired conditions for warhead detonation have been met and providing an appropriate command signal to the firing set to initiate nuclear detonation. (U) Firing: Delivering a precise level of precisely timed electrical or pyrotechnic energy to one or more warhead detonating devices. =~=:==~~, ,. - - (U) Tamper - A shell surrounding the fission core in an imnlosion tyP.i~::~~~~~pon which keeps the nuclear material confined during the impldsion for"a'Iij~ger timtraising the . ld f th . - . =~~~- ... yte o e weapon. ;.;.;-, ,=~-: .;:~::,., =:t~~;.. ?' (U) Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) 7.1ii"tiMS, a::~~ple is deposited on a metal filament, w~ich _is hea~d i~ a high ~ac~~:~:,; ~~~~~-a currerifthro~p it. TIMS is capable ofmeasunng tsotoptcranos on ptsggram<(:!~9 12 g)tQ~~~c;>gram (10 g) samples, or down to tens offemtograms (1 x 10"15 g);,p~jng spe~jil pre-c6!)"c-entration techniques. TIMS routinely measures differences in isotopc(riiiiss ratibs of the order of 1 in a million. {U) Thorium (Th) - A radioactive metallic :~J*~~-.vy.ith atomic number 90. Thonum may . be used as fuel for special types of nuclear:t.:eacto~~ .. ~!;~:;' . (U) TNF- Technical Nuclear.F.ort:nsics: - I ~,~.~ .. . .... : ... ./ ::::~:= \~i~::::::/:::- '!.II':~"' ;:~-: U _ .... .. /("'lt:~ "~''\;--' M. U;~~~ttf~U) -A ra~oactive element with various fissile isotopes. 235U is used in nuclear witl~ns and as fuel for nuclear reactors. -~::::~~- (U) Uranium-ilexafluoride (UF6) - A compound used in the uranium enrichment process which produces fuel for nuclear reactors or highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. UF 6 is used as the feed material for gas centrifuges, gaseous diffusion, and MLIS enrichment methods. UF6 is produced by reacting UF4 with fluorine. v (U) Visual Inspection and Photography - Visual inspection of a sample can give an expert ## S~Rn information as to its possible identity, especially in conjunction with data from NDA techniques such as gamma spectrometry and survey data. Size and shape can be sufficient to identify some items, especially if serial numbers or other identifying marks can be seen. For chemicals, the color and form of the material can be important clues. (U) X-ray - A form of electromagnetic radiation, similar to.,isible IJ!Wl but of.~~w:ter wavelength (between 0.1 to 10 nm) and capable ofpenetraiftig solicfs~~.jonizipg gasses. !"~~;;~~~t ~:::;j~:~~? .\ (U) X-ray Diffraction Analysis (XRD) - XRD analysis isJ!J.' s~~d method for identifying the chemical structure of inorganic and orgat)iS'ciystallin~:!;Iiaterial. X-ray beams that impinge on regularly ordered lattices underg9-,~on~~tive and d~structive interference that depends on the spacing of the lattice, t:Pe'Wii\i:fJ.~gth6f;J9F.?C-rays, and the angle of incidence of the X-ray beam. By rotatingji}.e samP.\e relative:tf{a fixed X-ray source, variations in interference occur, leading"t6~~~,~teristic ditrraction patterns. These diffraction patterns can be compared to refert?~~.~pectra to identify the specific crystalline phase. XRD cannot generate diffraction pattems:~~~~amorphous (non-crystalline) material. (U) X-ray Fluorescence Analysis providehomogenization of the sample. ~ .& "' "' (U) Xe~~~~&.~l- ~ chemical element of atomic number 54. Xe is a noble gas which occurs in the Earth's'il:iQiosphere in trace amounts. Naturally occurring Xe consists of9 stable isotopes. Xe afso has over 40 unstable isotopes that undergo radioactive decay. 135Xe is produced as a result of nuclear fission. ## Y (U) Yellowcake- A processed oxide of uranium (U30s) which is extracted and concentrated from uranium ore. It is used as the raw material for commercial nuclear materials. ## Z (U) Appendix C: Dynamic Analysis Process (U/tRmO)Very hard to nearly intractable intelligence problems usually go through to an initials~ by a highly-focused special analytical team. Outputs from the team's efforts are used to update collection requirements, and sometimes result in the formation of a new entity to work the problem full-time. After a long period of little progress or no real intelligence production, the problem may fall below the day-to-day focus. If and when activities related to the concern about the issue remind consumers of the threat, then another focused look at the problem may be initiated. (U//f'6:t.JO) For certain classes of issues, failure represents catastrophic conseq1,1~nees. Issues of this n~e demand a level of focus that digs deep every day, even if the resiilts-:are negative over long periods of time. In such situations, dedicating some reso~~!:fiJ;.wodcing the problem on a continuing basis is worth the effort. :;:i:;;::::... ~:;:;:::' ' -J<."' .. ~ . ~ ~~~---~: ~-~:!=~~~ --:~-- ~U//F~O) A dyn~ic approach to analysis ~d collect~ori=t6r bard:{~:~~ly in.~ctable Issues ts Illustrated m the chart below (Dynamtc Analysts and ~-~!Jectton'~s:le Process). This approach has previously been recommended in severa!;stUdie~!perforliied by the DNI's now defunct Intelligence Concepts Development Office..({cirmerly 'ii~~~r'the ADCI/Collection as the Collection Concepts Development CeCacy" I J:~~nology'iij;}~pciety I Date of Publication: 20021 Pages 375-3861 Vol. 24] . : ~ ::~:~:.. _.:~: 3 [Website 1 Kloprogge, Penny; van der Sluijs, Jeroen; and Wardekker, ArjaA:t::unce.:Gqi~.Co~munication Issues and Good Practice"! December 2007 I .... '<:1:::;.. :(' URL: www.nusap.net/downloadslreports/uncertainty communicationifiidfl RePii~NwS:E-2007-199, ISBN 978-90-8672-026-21 Copernicus Institute for Sustainable -~velom#~t and lnnov~bn, Departinent of Science Technology and Society (STS), Heidelberglaan 2, 3S~;p.l);.!J.~Ii~'~~sr.J'letherlaitds, Phone+ 31-30-2537631, Fax +31-30-2537601] .. r '::~:;:: ~::::: .. -/ 4 [Journal! Ke, J, Gong, T., Wang, WI Comml!l).i~pPns in