# The Efficient Utilization Of Open Source Information

Samuel R. Baty A-2, Intelligence & Systems Analysis August 11, 2016
UNCLASSIFIED
LA-UR-16-26273

## Primary Considerations

- Open source information consists of a vast set of
information from a variety of sources.
- World news - Unclassified documents and reports - Maps and Satellite imagery - Patents, scientific papers etc.
- Not only does the quantity of open source
information pose a problem, the *quality* of such information can hinder efforts.
- Usually difficult to verify

## The Method Of Solving Problems

- In many cases, limitations in content prevents
analysts from finding an exact answer to a question.
- One important problem solving strategy is to bound
a system's capability or technologies.
- By using additional valuable information, more
refined bounds can be built, allowing for more
precise estimates.
- Two example problems are found in examinations
of Iran and North Korea

## Case Study: Iran

- Consider the Iranian space program.
- Iran has demonstrated a satellite launch capability
using the domestically produced Safir rocket family.
- Given the success of Safir launches, could Iran
utilize or modify existing satellite launch vehicles (SLVs) into ICBMs?
- What are key factors to consider when analyzing a
ballistic missile?
- Size of deliverable
- Range
- Using these parameters, a v for the missile
system can be defined for a given mass.
- What is a good estimate for the mass of a reentry
vehicle (RV)?
- How can we arrive at that estimation?
Selection of US RVs (L to R: Mk 6, Mk 12a, Mk 21). Not great analogies for a first Iranian RV (3,4,5).

UNCLASSIFIED

- We can estimate materials and sub-systems, using
relatively small (in volume) US systems.
- Safing, arming, fuzing, firing (SAFF) - Special nuclear material - High explosives - RV shell - plastics/foams/etc. - Others?
- Using these, and weighting by volume, a lower
mass bound was estimated at 740-1150 lbs.
- Minuteman III throw weight is ~2400 lbs
UNCLASSIFIED
Minuteman III with 3 Mk 12a RVs (6)

- Using this mass, a Safir system does not have the
required v needed to reach necessary apogee to be considered an ICBM.
- A comparison with western missiles of the same
capability yields a bounded estimate (in time) of
when Iran could have a nuclear capable ICBM.

## Case Study: North Korea

- Consider the naval capabilities of the DPRK.
- How long would it take for the DPRK to successfully
develop a reliable SLBM capability?
NK-11 Missile ejection and estimate of Sinpo-Class SSB (7,8).

UNCLASSIFIED

- In similar fashion to the Iran case, what does the
DPRK need to achieve its goal?
- A nuclear weapon. (Deliverable/miniaturized) - Reliable SLBM system - SSB(N) - Supporting technology for SLBMs and SSB(N)s
- How long would it take for the DPRK to successfully
develop a reliable SLBM capability?
- North Korea has made some fairly substantial
claims...
- Claim of "Hydrogen Bomb" test, Jan 2016 (BBC). - Claim of being about to fully "cope with America
with nuclear weapons at any time" (CNN).
- North Korean rhetoric alone will not provide an
accurate understanding of capabilities.
- Important to consider that posturing can be geared
both for domestic propaganda or foreign
intimidation.
- Reality: Primarily using maps and satellite imagery
as the source of information:
- ~ One Sinpo Class submarine (assumed
operational)
- Testing of SLBMs initially only platform based.
- Check through tracking tech transfers (Golf II, R-27)
- Similarly to the Iran case, a comparison to Western
development provides a minimum bound for the time needed to have a credible SLBM capability.
- What is the difference between a "usable"
capability and a "reliable" capability?
- SSBNs, instead of SSBs, allow for a more flexible
deterrent for several reasons
- Quiet - Long(er) deployment times - Longer effective range
- However, all of the required infrastructure for a
naval nuclear reactor is certainly not trivial.
- The domestic production timeframe on an SSBN
class likely exceeds a decade.

## Conclusions

- The huge breadth and depth of open source
information can complicate an analysis, especially because open information has no guarantee of
accuracy
- Open source information can provide key insights
either directly or indirectly:
- Looking at supporting factors (flow of scientists,
products and waste from mines, government budgets, etc.)
- Direct factors (statements, tests, deployments)

## Conclusions (Cont.)

- Fundamentally, it is the independent verification of
information that allows for a more complete picture to be formed.
- Overlapping sources allow for more precise bounds
on times, weights, temperatures, yields or other
issues of interest in order to determine capability.
- Ultimately, a "good" answer almost never comes
from an individual, but rather requires the utilization of a wide range of skill sets held by a team of people.

## Picture And Graph Credits

1.
http://www.spacelaunchreport.com/slr2015q1.html
2.
http://www.spaceflight101.net/irans-safir-rocket-successfully-launches-fajr-satelliteinto-orbit.html
3.
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/threads/agni-v-missile-test-launch.33457/page-
20
4.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Titan_II_Reentry_Vehicle_and_Warhead_C
asing_%288562940163%29.jpg
5.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGM-118_Peacekeeper
6.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/NC/mirv/mirv.html
7.
http://www.hisutton.com/Analysis%20- %20Sinpo%20Class%20Ballistic%20Missile%20Sub.html
8.
http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/an-overview-ofnorth-korea-s-ballistic-missiles
9.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golf-class_submarine

## Additional References

A.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699
B.
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/15/asia/north-korea-nuclear-program/