How to use from
llama.cpp
Install (macOS, Linux)
curl -LsSf https://llama.app/install.sh | sh
# Start a local OpenAI-compatible server with a web UI:
llama serve -hf ApolloRaines/Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-Jbliterated:Q4_K_M
# Run inference directly in the terminal:
llama cli -hf ApolloRaines/Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-Jbliterated:Q4_K_M
Install from WinGet (Windows)
winget install llama.cpp
# Start a local OpenAI-compatible server with a web UI:
llama serve -hf ApolloRaines/Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-Jbliterated:Q4_K_M
# Run inference directly in the terminal:
llama cli -hf ApolloRaines/Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-Jbliterated:Q4_K_M
Build from source code
git clone https://github.com/ggml-org/llama.cpp.git
cd llama.cpp
cmake -B build
cmake --build build -j --target llama-app
# Start a local OpenAI-compatible server with a web UI:
./build/bin/llama serve -hf ApolloRaines/Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-Jbliterated:Q4_K_M
# Run inference directly in the terminal:
./build/bin/llama cli -hf ApolloRaines/Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-Jbliterated:Q4_K_M
Use Docker
docker model run hf.co/ApolloRaines/Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-Jbliterated:Q4_K_M
Quick Links

About this model

jBlaze demonstration model -- jbliteration.

Refusal behavior has been removed by direct weight surgery. No gradient training, no system prompt. This is comprehensive rather than partial: see the benchmark below in this card for the measured refusal rate.

Why "jbliteration" and not "abliteration". Standard abliteration is blunt -- it ablates a direction and takes collateral capability with it, leaving the model measurably worse at everything else. jbliteration is the precision version: the edit targets the refusal direction and is designed to leave the rest of the model intact. The distinction is the contribution; the refusal removal is the demonstration of it.

Measured capability retention. On Sharona (Qwen3.5-27B), MMLU came out at 77.89% against a 76.84% stock baseline -- a 1.05pp gain after six phases of surgery plus GPTQ W4A16 quantization. That is the technique measured on one model, not a per-model guarantee; MMLU is not published for every model in this collection. It is offered as evidence that precision editing need not cost capability, which is the whole claim the method rests on.

Why this exists. A model that refuses to look at hostile code cannot review hostile code. Defensive security work means reading exploits, analyzing malware, and reconstructing an intrusion from the attacker's own artifacts, and safety tuning cannot reliably tell an incident responder from an intruder. In the July 2026 Hugging Face breach, responders found commercial APIs would not process their own attack data -- the guardrails, in Hugging Face's words, "cannot distinguish an incident responder from an attacker." They self-hosted an open-weights model instead and reconstructed 17,000+ events in hours. Both the attack and the response ran on reduced-refusal models.

What it demonstrates. Refusal is a learned disposition, not a gate in front of capability. The capability was always present; the refusal was trained on top and can be removed without retraining. Guardrails built this way are an honor system that the model does not know it can decline to follow. That holds for now.

Use. Published for security research, red-team tooling and defensive analysis. These weights can do harm as well as good. That is the point being demonstrated, not a side effect of it.

-- Apollo Raines

Runs with DeepswapLLM

Run this model on a GPU too small to hold it -- full precision, no quantization. DeepswapLLM streams layers across GPU, RAM, and disk, and runs up to 4x faster than AirLLM.

Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-Jbliterated

Drop-in replacement for mistralai/Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-2501 with refusal behaviors surgically removed at the weight level. No system prompt tricks, no inference-time patches. The weights themselves no longer encode refusal.

Method

Built with the jBlaze precision neural surgery framework.

What This Fixes

Standard (single-direction) abliteration removes the surface "I can't help with that" response but leaves deeper behavioral directions intact. The model finds creative workarounds:

  • Prompt reinterpretation -- steering toward a safer reading of the question
  • Disclaimer injection -- answering but wrapping in warnings
  • Strategic omission -- leaving out the key details
  • Safer framing -- answering a related but less harmful version

Usage

from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer
import torch

model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
    "ApolloRaines/Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-Jbliterated",
    torch_dtype=torch.float16,
    device_map="auto"
)
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("ApolloRaines/Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-Jbliterated")

Requirements

  • Base model: mistralai/Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-2501

A Note on Our Released Models

Most of our publicly released models are intentionally left at partial strength. We dial back the full capability so they serve as proof of concept and can be proofed -- not abused. The point is to show what's possible, not to hand it out at full power. If you're evaluating what jBlaze can do, understand that what you're downloading is the demo, not the product.

License

apache-2.0


Apollo Raines builds post-training tools that separate behavior from knowledge and identity from architecture.

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