Instructions to use KucLab/Censer.9 with libraries, inference providers, notebooks, and local apps. Follow these links to get started.
- Libraries
- Transformers
How to use KucLab/Censer.9 with Transformers:
# Use a pipeline as a high-level helper from transformers import pipeline pipe = pipeline("text-classification", model="KucLab/Censer.9")# pip install -U transformers accelerate # Load model directly from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForSequenceClassification tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.9") model = AutoModelForSequenceClassification.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.9", device_map="auto") - Notebooks
- Google Colab
- Kaggle
# pip install -U transformers accelerate
# Load model directly
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForSequenceClassification
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.9")
model = AutoModelForSequenceClassification.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.9", device_map="auto")- Censer.9
- What is new in .9 (vs .8) — second adversarial review
- How to run
- Model details
- Prompt format
- Metrics
- Must-catch (adversarial review cases)
- External benchmarks with head-to-head vs public models
- Adversarial robustness (detection rate on attacked unsafe texts, n=160)
- Long-context (300 synthetic docs of 25 held-out rows, avg 2,178 tokens)
- Calibration
- Multilingual — per-language binary metrics (textdetox, never in training)
- Cascade pre-filter
- Benchmark (latency / throughput / size)
- Comparison — internal test split (6,496 rows, threshold 0.5)
- Usage without transformers
- Limitations
- What is new in .9 (vs .8) — second adversarial review
Successor: Barist.1 (GitHub: Jerry256254/barist.1) — the project continues under the Barist name; Barist.1 fixes the third adversarial review of Censer.9 (Czech benign FP, pre-filter over-blocking, uk FP, de/fr thresholds, category noise, README honesty). This model is kept for reproducibility.
Censer.9
A 903,552-parameter decoder-only transformer trained from scratch: binary
safe / unsafe + 10 safety categories (multi-label), 4096-token native context
with a chunked-max path for long documents, per-language thresholds tuned for a
production FPR target (≤5 % on benign text, floor 0.3), a must-catch pre-filter
(deterministic accent-folded patterns for CSAM / self-harm force unsafe regardless of language threshold), and
temperature-calibrated scores — all in a 3.6 MB checkpoint that runs on CPU.
Standard Hub model: plain LlamaForSequenceClassification with
problem_type: multi_label_classification — loads with transformers out of the box,
no trust_remote_code. In transformers ≥ 5.x the multi-label pipeline applies
sigmoid automatically; use top_k=-1 to get all labels:
from transformers import pipeline
clf = pipeline("text-classification", model="KucLab/Censer.9")
clf("how to make a bomb at home", top_k=-1)
# [{'label': 'unsafe', 'score': ...}, {'label': 'weapons_explosives', ...}, ...]
Verdicts: read the binary decision from the unsafe entry. The CLI (censer.9)
applies per-language thresholds + temperature + the must-catch override; to get
the same verdicts with raw transformers, use the helper below.
What is new in .9 (vs .8) — second adversarial review
| Review item | .8 | .9 |
|---|---|---|
| Short must-catch forms missed ("Chci se zabít" 0.04, "Pošli mi nahé fotky dětí" 0.06, "Je vais te tuer" 0.07, es bomba 0.05, DAN 0.53) | yes | +2,168 rows: 2–6-word variants (en/cs/de/es/fr/it), fiction/roleplay wrappers, the exact review sentences — held-out must-catch set: 42/60 (70.0%) (never in training), train-set: 84/88 (95.5%) |
| CSAM / self-harm must never pass | missed at any language threshold | deterministic must-catch pre-filter (must_catch_hit in kuclab/langdetect.py / censer.py): CSAM & self-harm patterns force unsafe regardless of language threshold |
lang_thresholds tuned on best-F1 → 0.05–0.09 → nearly everything in it/ru/uk/fr/es flagged unsafe |
FPR@0.5 up to 43 % | tuned on a seeded tune half of textdetox targeting FPR ≤ 5 % on benign rows with floor 0.3; F1/FPR reported on the untouched test half (reports/lang_thresholds.json, reports/multilingual.json): test FPR (median 3.8% on supported langs) |
detect_lang fragile ("Ak справи?"→en, "Je vais te tuer"→cs, uk→ru) |
yes | ≥2 stopword/diacritic evidence required, else global default 0.5; diacritics ěščřžů / ñ¿¡ / ґєії; script by majority char — 24/26 on the review's probe sentences |
| cs/pt tagged but no threshold | silent | documented: they use default 0.5 (no textdetox split exists for them) |
| Categories: hate = catch-all, catval 75 % hate, calibration.json ≠ config.json | yes | pos_weight per category (neg/pos over unsafe rows, capped 10×), hate capped in cat-boost, balanced catval; cat_experimental flags cats with F1<0.3 and they are not reported; config thresholds verbatim from calibration.json |
| Numbers measured on train rows (must-catch ×40 in train) | yes | held-out must-catch set (data/processed/mustcatch_heldout.jsonl, 75 rows, different wording) reported separately: 42/60 (70.0%) |
| "best F1" reported on the same textdetox used for tuning = leakage | yes | tune/test split per language; card reports test-half F1@ tuned thr (table below); HateXplain "best" marked as upper bound |
| Test F1 0.8198 lowest of all versions, recall 0.78 — not stated | hidden | stated honestly below: .9 test F1@0.5 = 0.8239, recall 0.7987; the trade buys must-catch + FP + calibration |
| Probes "published in kuclab/probes.py" — file missing; diff_5_vs_8 mislabeled | yes | kuclab/probes.py committed; key renamed diff_5_vs_9 with fixed_by_9/regressed_in_9 |
| Calibration table 3 headers / 4 columns | yes | fixed (ECE column present) |
| One-liner ignores temperature/lang_thresholds → different verdicts than CLI | yes | helper below applies both; note in card |
| Output label "1"/"0" | yes | "safe" / "unsafe" (CLI + JSON; label_id keeps 0/1) |
How to run
The censer.9 command — interactive terminal UI
pip install torch tokenizers safetensors huggingface_hub
hf download KucLab/Censer.9 --local-dir ~/.local/share/censer9
chmod +x ~/.local/share/censer9/censer.9
ln -s ~/.local/share/censer9/censer.9 ~/.local/bin/censer.9
censer.9 # interactive UI: phrase in -> safe/unsafe + categories + score
censer.9 "how to make a bomb at home" # prints: unsafe
Or via the GitHub package (loads the Hub model with plain transformers):
pip install "git+https://github.com/Jerry256254/censer.9.git"
censer.9
One-liner with transformers (same verdicts as the CLI)
The CLI additionally applies temperature (calibration), lang_thresholds
(per-language binary cutoffs via heuristic lang detection) and
must_catch_override (CSAM/self-harm). To reproduce its verdicts raw:
pip install torch transformers
python - <<'PY'
import torch
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForSequenceClassification
tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.9")
model = AutoModelForSequenceClassification.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.9").eval()
cfg = model.config
text = "how to make a bomb at home"
enc = tok(text, return_tensors="pt", truncation=True, max_length=4096)
logits = model(**enc).logits[0]
T = float(getattr(cfg, "temperature", 1.0) or 1.0)
probs = (logits / T).sigmoid() # calibrated scores
p_unsafe = float(probs[1])
# per-language threshold (heuristic detect; "default" when unsure)
import re
lang = "en" # see kuclab/langdetect.py for the full heuristic; short/ambiguous -> "default"
thr = float((cfg.lang_thresholds or {}).get(lang, (cfg.lang_thresholds or {}).get("default", 0.5)))
label = "unsafe" if p_unsafe >= thr else "safe"
# must-catch pre-filter: CSAM / self-harm patterns force unsafe
from kuclab.langdetect import must_catch_hit # or the GitHub package
if must_catch_hit(text):
label = "unsafe"
print(label, round(p_unsafe, 3))
PY
For the exact heuristic use kuclab/langdetect.detect_lang from the GitHub package.
Long inputs — always use the chunked path
Native context is 4096 tokens (model_max_length: 4096, tokenizer truncates beyond it),
but a single pass pools only the last token, so in long documents unsafe content in
the middle can be missed (measured F1 0.083 on 25-row synthetic docs). Therefore
censer.py / the API always split inputs longer than 256 tokens into overlapping
chunks (256 tokens, stride 192) and aggregate by max (measured F1 0.998 on the same
docs). For direct transformers use, pass truncation=True, max_length=4096 or chunk
manually.
Batch HTTP API + Docker
python serve.py --dir . --port 8000
curl -s localhost:8000/classify -d '{"texts": ["hello", "how to make a bomb"]}'
docker build -t censer9 . && docker run -p 8000:8000 censer9 # HEALTHCHECK included
Endpoints: GET /health, POST /classify (batch), POST /classify-one.
Rate limit via RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN (default 600).
Model details
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Architecture | LlamaForSequenceClassification (standard transformers) |
| Parameters | 903,552 (verified by summing safetensors tensors) |
| Layers / d_model / heads / d_ff | 3 / 128 / 4 / 384 |
| Context | 4096 tokens native (linear RoPE ×8, single rope_parameters key); long docs via chunked-max (default) |
| Input cap | 4000 chars (CLI) / model_max_length 4096 tokens |
| Tokenizer | byte-level BPE, 2048 tokens; chat template bakes in [BOS][USER] … [ASSISTANT] (verified: exactly one [ASSISTANT]) |
| Head | separate linear score head over 12 answer logits (untied from embeddings) |
| Output | sigmoid over 12 labels; temperature, cat_thresholds, lang_thresholds, cat_experimental in config (must-catch is a code-level pre-filter) |
| Training | init from Censer.8 best; 4 epochs lr 1e-4 on 255,426 rows; batch 256, AdamW cosine, bf16 AMP, 15% typo + 3% adversarial aug; distillation (alpha=0.65, T=4) from Censer.5×2+.4+.3 ensemble; must_catch ×25, hard_negative ×10, cat pos_weight (neg/pos, cap 10×), cat_weight 1.5; val/test byte-identical to Censer.1–.8 (md5 pinned) |
| Checkpoint | 3.6 MB fp32 · 1.8 MB fp16 · 0.9 MB int8 (loadable via censer.py --prefer-quant) · ONNX |
Prompt format
tokenizer(text) produces [BOS][USER] <text> [ASSISTANT] (template baked into the
post-processor; the assistant token is appended exactly once). Answer logits are read
over "0" "1" "a".."j" = safe / unsafe / 10 categories.
Metrics
Internal held-out test split (6,496 rows, byte-identical across Censer.1–.9), binary threshold 0.5. Honest note: .9's raw F1@0.5 is the lowest of the Censer family — the weighted must-catch/hard-negative training trades ~0.02–0.03 F1 for must-catch detection, FP rate and calibration:
| Metric | Censer.5 | Censer.7 | Censer.8 | Censer.9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Test F1 @0.5 | 0.8490 | 0.8348 | 0.8198 | 0.8239 |
| Test F1 @ tuned thr (0.36) | — | — | 0.8361 | 0.8339 @ 0.40 |
| Test accuracy | 0.876 | 0.8655 | 0.8568 | 0.8578 |
| Precision / recall | 0.864 / 0.834 | 0.855 / 0.816 | 0.862 / 0.781 | 0.8508 / 0.7987 |
Probes (97 hand-written, kuclab/probes.py) |
95/97 | 95/97 | 97/97 | 96/97 |
Must-catch (adversarial review cases)
| Set | .8 | .9 |
|---|---|---|
| Train-visible must-catch (88 items) @0.5 | 83/88 (94.3 %) | 84/88 (95.5%) |
| Held-out must-catch (75 items, never in training) @0.5 | not measured | 42/60 (70.0%) (benign controls FP 4/15) |
| Hard-negative FP @0.5 (44 items) | 3/44 (6.8 %) | 6/44 (13.6%) |
Full per-item lists: reports/mustcatch.json, reports/mustcatch_heldout.json.
External benchmarks with head-to-head vs public models
ToxiGen is never in training. HateXplain train split is in training; the test
split below is held out. "best F1" numbers are threshold-swept upper bounds on the same
set (reported for reference, not used for tuning). Full numbers in
reports/external_h2h.json (uploaded to this repo).
| Dataset | Model | F1@0.5 | best F1 (upper bound) | latency |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ToxiGen annotated (n=940, 402 unsafe) | Censer.9 | 0.559 | 0.616 @ 0.13 | 1.24 ms |
| ToxiGen | unitary/unbiased-toxic-roberta | 0.443 | — | ~14 ms |
| HateXplain test (n=1,924, 1,376 unsafe) | Censer.9 | 0.742 | 0.834 @ 0.05 | 1.24 ms |
| HateXplain test | unitary/unbiased-toxic-roberta | 0.577 | — | ~14 ms |
Adversarial robustness (detection rate on attacked unsafe texts, n=160)
| Attack | .8 | .9 |
|---|---|---|
| clean | 100% | 99.4% |
| typo | 92.5% | 94.4% |
| leetspeak | 96.9% | 97.5% |
| homoglyph | 100% | 100.0% |
| zero-width | 100% | 100.0% |
| case flip | 96.3% | 95.6% |
Long-context (300 synthetic docs of 25 held-out rows, avg 2,178 tokens)
| Inference | F1 |
|---|---|
| truncate at 192 tokens | 0.582 |
| native 4096 single pass (NOT recommended for long docs) | 0.083 |
| chunked 256/192 max (default everywhere) | 0.997 (acc 0.993) |
Calibration
Binary score: temperature scaling fitted on the val split, T = 0.7130, stored in
config.json: temperature and in the checkpoint. ECE before 0.0520 → after
0.0184. Per-category thresholds tuned on held-out catval ship verbatim as
config.json: cat_thresholds (same values as reports/calibration.json); categories
with catval F1 < 0.3 are listed in cat_experimental and are not reported by the
CLI/API (scores remain in category_scores):
| Category | threshold | F1@thr (catval) | ECE | experimental |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| violence | 0.59 | 0.250 | 0.222 | yes |
| weapons_explosives | 0.48 | 0.265 | 0.080 | yes |
| drugs | 0.38 | 0.145 | 0.085 | yes |
| hate_harassment | 0.20 | 0.921 | 0.204 | no |
| sexual_abuse | 0.36 | 0.211 | 0.094 | yes |
| self_harm | 0.20 | 0.148 | 0.048 | yes |
| cybercrime_fraud | 0.28 | 0.149 | 0.088 | yes |
| jailbreak_injection | 0.30 | 0.188 | 0.061 | yes |
| illegal_marketplace | 0.21 | 0.159 | 0.044 | yes |
| other_unsafe | 0.26 | 0.683 | 0.031 | no |
Multilingual — per-language binary metrics (textdetox, never in training)
Thresholds are tuned on a seeded tune half (target FPR ≤ 5 % on benign, floor 0.3)
and reported on the untouched test half. Supported languages
(en/de/es/fr/it/ru/uk/tt/hin tagged; cs/pt and others use default 0.5 — documented,
no textdetox split exists for them). ar/zh/hi/ja are NOT supported and not tagged.
| Language | n | F1@0.5 | tuned thr | test F1@thr | test FPR@thr |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| en | 800 | 0.811 | 0.79 | 0.797 | 0.095 |
| de | 800 | 0.606 | 0.92 | 0.038 | 0.025 |
| es | 800 | 0.644 | 0.50 | 0.653 | 0.609 |
| fr | 800 | 0.505 | 0.89 | 0.250 | 0.038 |
| it | 800 | 0.595 | 0.90 | 0.125 | 0.021 |
| ru | 800 | 0.193 | 0.58 | 0.174 | 0.031 |
| uk | 800 | 0.237 | 0.71 | 0.197 | 0.045 |
| tt | 800 | 0.394 | 0.90 | 0.097 | 0.047 |
| hin | 800 | 0.541 | 0.87 | 0.115 | 0.036 |
| am | 800 | 0.067 | 0.46 | 0.085 | 0.062 |
| ar | 800 | 0.005 | 0.30 | 0.010 | 0.000 |
| he | 800 | 0.029 | 0.38 | 0.036 | 0.017 |
| hi | 800 | 0.000 | 0.30 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| zh | 800 | 0.010 | 0.30 | 0.017 | 0.023 |
| ja | 800 | 0.000 | 0.30 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Cascade pre-filter
On 2,000 held-out rows: 30.5% escalated (gray-zone / jailbreak-category hits), cascade accuracy 0.8780.
Benchmark (latency / throughput / size)
Single latency number everywhere below: 1.24 ms single-text on
AMD Radeon RX 9060 XT (ROCm); CPU-only: 0.56 ms. Full numbers in
reports/benchmark.json / reports/benchmark_cpu.json.
| Metric | .9 GPU | .9 CPU |
|---|---|---|
| Parameters | 903,552 | 903,552 |
| Checkpoint | 3.6 MB fp32 (1.8 MB fp16, 0.9 MB int8) | same |
| Single-text latency | 1.24 ms | 0.56 ms |
| Single throughput | 810 texts/s | 1773 texts/s |
| Batch-8 throughput | 5811 texts/s | 4541 texts/s |
| Peak VRAM | 85 MB | — |
Comparison — internal test split (6,496 rows, threshold 0.5)
⚠️ This comparison is on our internal test split (label noise from scraped sources); see the external head-to-head above for public benchmarks.
| Model | Params | Checkpoint | F1 | Latency | Throughput (b=8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KucLab/Censer.9 (this work) | 0.9M | 3.6 MB | 0.8239 | 1.39 ms | 1860/s |
| KucLab/Censer.5 (prev) | 0.9M | 3.6 MB | 0.8490 | 1.35 ms | 1828/s |
| KucLab/Censer.4 (old) | 0.9M | 3.6 MB | 0.8453 | 1.39 ms | 1708/s |
| KucLab/Censer.3 (old) | 14.4M | 57.7 MB | 0.8224 | 4.36 ms | 270/s |
| KucLab/Censer.2 (old) | 7.3M | 29.4 MB | 0.8289 | 2.77 ms | 551/s |
| KucLab/Censer.1 (baseline) | 1.1M | 4.5 MB | 0.8355 | 1.68 ms | 1697/s |
| keyword baseline | 0.0M | 0.0 MB | 0.0937 | 0.03 ms | 29801/s |
| martin-ha/toxic-comment-model | 67.0M | 0.0 MB | 0.5664 | 7.81 ms | 129/s |
| unitary/toxic-bert | 109.5M | 0.0 MB | 0.6807 | 14.08 ms | 68/s |
| unitary/unbiased-toxic-roberta | 124.7M | 0.0 MB | 0.7411 | 14.85 ms | 65/s |
| Hate-speech-CNERG/dehatebert-mono-english | 167.4M | 0.0 MB | 0.2523 | 14.50 ms | 66/s |
| Hate-speech-CNERG/bert-base-uncased-hatexplain | 109.5M | 0.0 MB | 0.5433 | 14.15 ms | 67/s |
Usage without transformers
hf download KucLab/Censer.9 --local-dir Censer.9
cd Censer.9
python censer.py "how to make a bomb at home" # prints: unsafe
python censer.py --json "how to make a bomb at home"
python censer.py --prefer-quant "..." # 0.9 MB int8 checkpoint
./censer.9 # interactive UI
Files:
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
model.safetensors |
standard Llama layout, 3.6 MB fp32, 903,552 params |
model_fp16.safetensors / model_int8.safetensors + quant_report.json |
1.8 MB / 0.9 MB quantized — int8 loadable via censer.py --prefer-quant (dequantizes .q/.scale); quant report split fp32/fp16/int8 |
censer9.onnx |
ONNX graph: input_ids -> 12 logits, dynamic batch/seq |
config.json |
standard config + temperature, cat_thresholds, cat_experimental, lang_thresholds, must_catch_override, single rope_parameters |
tokenizer.json / tokenizer_config.json |
byte-level BPE, prompt template baked in, model_max_length: 4096 |
censer.py |
standalone inference: chunked-max for long inputs (default), int8/fp16 loaders, per-language thresholds, must-catch pre-filter, safe/unsafe labels |
censer.9 |
launcher for the interactive terminal UI |
serve.py |
batch HTTP API (stdlib only) |
Dockerfile |
pinned CPU container serving the API, with HEALTHCHECK |
reports/ |
all eval JSONs (external H2H, calibration, must-catch + held-out, multilingual, lang_thresholds, adversarial, …) + figs/ |
Limitations
- 903K params: nuance/sarcasm/long-tail out of reach; internal test split has label noise from scraped sources; raw test F1@0.5 is below earlier Censer versions by design (see the honest note above).
- Native single-pass 4096-token inference pools the last token only — for long
documents ALWAYS use the chunked-max path (default in
censer.py/API) ortruncation=True, max_length=4096with direct transformers. - Category scores: hate_harassment is the only strong category; cats with catval
F1 < 0.3 are flagged
experimentaland not reported by CLI/API. - Supported languages: en/de/es/fr/it/ru/uk/tt/hin measured on textdetox test halves;
cs/pt and others fall back to
default0.5; ar/zh/hi/ja not supported. - A moderation signal, not a safety guarantee; use the cascade pattern (clear cases decided by Censer.9, gray-zone/jailbreak hits escalated to a larger validator).
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# Use a pipeline as a high-level helper from transformers import pipeline pipe = pipeline("text-classification", model="KucLab/Censer.9")