| # Security Notes |
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| HVCE v4 includes password-based authenticated encryption, but it is a reference implementation, not a professionally audited security product. |
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| ## Password mode |
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| The archive encrypts the private manifest and payload together. File names and directory structure are not visible without the password. |
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| Primitive stack: |
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| ```text |
| PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 -> 64 bytes |
| 32-byte key 1 -> ChaCha20 stream encryption |
| 32-byte key 2 -> HMAC-SHA256 authentication |
| ``` |
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| Default KDF iterations: `300000`. |
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| Use: |
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| ```bash |
| python hvce.py compress folder secure.hvce --ask-password --recovery-percent 10 |
| python hvce.py extract secure.hvce restored --ask-password |
| ``` |
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| ## Why symmetric-only is used |
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| The v4 “post-quantum” security stance avoids RSA/ECC public-key wrapping in the archive format. Symmetric 256-bit keys retain a large margin against generic quantum search, assuming strong passwords and sufficient KDF work. |
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| ## Threat model |
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| Provides: |
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| - confidentiality against attackers without the password; |
| - filename and metadata privacy when encrypted; |
| - tamper detection before decryption; |
| - extraction verification with SHA-256; |
| - recovery against limited storage corruption when recovery records are present. |
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| Does not provide: |
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| - protection from weak passwords; |
| - protection from malware on the machine that captures passwords; |
| - deniable encryption; |
| - independently audited cryptographic assurance; |
| - legal/compliance certification. |
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| ## Recommended use |
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| For important personal archives, use: |
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| ```bash |
| python hvce.py compress input output.secure.hvce --profile balanced --ask-password --recovery-percent 10 |
| ``` |
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| Keep at least one external backup. Recovery records are not a substitute for backups. |
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