Instructions to use QuanxinLi/TinyGuard-Injection with libraries, inference providers, notebooks, and local apps. Follow these links to get started.
- Libraries
- MLX
How to use QuanxinLi/TinyGuard-Injection with MLX:
# Download the model from the Hub pip install huggingface_hub[hf_xet] hf download QuanxinLi/TinyGuard-Injection --local-dir TinyGuard-Injection
- Notebooks
- Google Colab
- Kaggle
- Local Apps Settings
- LM Studio
- Atomic Chat
Download README.md from QuanxinLi/TinyGuard-Injection: direct link, hf CLI and curl.
- Browser
- Download file 2.59 kB
-
https://huggingface.co/QuanxinLi/TinyGuard-Injection/resolve/main/README.md
- Command line
-
hf download hf://QuanxinLi/TinyGuard-Injection/README.md
-
curl -L -o README.md https://huggingface.co/QuanxinLi/TinyGuard-Injection/resolve/main/README.md
license: apache-2.0
language:
- zh
- en
tags:
- safety
- guardrail
- prompt-injection
- security
- text-classification
- mlx
metrics:
- f1
- accuracy
TinyGuard-Injection (base + fine-tuned)
Bilingual prompt-injection detector (incl. indirect injection) trained completely from scratch · 9.1M parameters · MLX/Metal · Apache-2.0 (code) · fully synthetic training data
Model description
A 3-way guardrail deployed at LLM-app input gates and RAG retrieval gates: benign / direct injection / indirect injection. Complements Meta Llama Prompt Guard 2 (22M/86M, no Chinese support): this model is trained bilingual with equal weight.
- Backbone: shared TinyGuard-Encoder (same pretrained base as TinyGuard-Command)
- Fine-tune: 12,330 bilingual labeled examples across six carriers (code & collaboration platforms, emails & web pages, long RAG chunks, tickets & customer-service dialogs, benign hard negatives, hidden-character & encoded payloads), with "minimal-difference pairs" and anti-overrefusal design
Results (held-out data only, never seen in training)
| Benchmark | Metric | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Validation set, 616 rows | acc / macro-F1 | 99.0% / 0.990 |
| Adversarial set, 40 rows (zero-width chars / JSON rules / Japanese carriers / quoted disclaimers) | intervention recall / precision / F1 | 75% / 88% / 0.81 |
Reference: Llama Prompt Guard 2-86M reports EN injection F1 ≈ 0.98 with no Chinese. This model provides first-tier Chinese capability; its English adversarial numbers are below Meta's home turf (expected at 9.1M vs 86M).
Usage
Weights: QuanxinLi/TinyGuard-Injection ·
Code & training pipeline: Quanxin-Lee/TinyGuard
# quickstart (transformers/MLX dual format) — see the GitHub repo for the full walkthrough
Limitations
- 5/40 misses on the adversarial set: JSON-encoded rules, URL-less "prioritize this" phrasing, direct asks inside authorized framing (red-team wording) — all weak-signal forms.
- English training volume is lower than Chinese; English adversarial generalization needs strengthening.
- Recommended to stack with a regex layer: this model handles semantics, regex handles known fingerprints.
Training details & data statement
All data is synthetic/hand-written — no real user data. The full training pipeline, four audit scripts (three deep-scan rounds) and every dataset ship with the repository.