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numpy.distutils.exec_command β€” Payload-Layer Deny List Gap

Security Research β€” Responsible Disclosure This repository is part of a systematic study of pickle scanner bypass techniques. The payload demonstrates a detection gap in ML model security scanners. Access to malicious_model.pkl and poc.py requires a request β€” see gate above.

Summary

Scanner scores for malicious_model.pkl:

Scanner CRITICAL WARNING Bypassed?
modelaudit 0.2.37 1 0 Partial
picklescan 1.0.4 0 0 Yes
modelscan 0 0 Yes

Vulnerability

numpy.distutils.exec_command.exec_command(command) executes a shell command and returns (status, output). It was deprecated in NumPy 1.17 and is documented as a thin wrapper around subprocess.Popen. It remains importable in NumPy 2.x via the legacy distutils compatibility shim.

subprocess.Popen is in ALWAYS_DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS. numpy.distutils wraps the same syscall path but is not. modelaudit's entry for numpy.distutils is in RISKY_ML_MODULE_PREFIXES β€” which fires a WARNING on bare import reference (S205) but does not automatically trigger CRITICAL on REDUCE.


Proof of Concept

malicious_model.pkl in this repository is the exploit payload. poc.py builds and tests it with full scanner output.

How the PoC was built

# See poc.py

Affected file formats

Pickle (.pkl, .pt, .bin, .joblib) β€” any file deserialized via pickle.loads(), torch.load(), joblib.load(), or equivalent.

Conditions required to trigger

  1. Target calls pickle.loads(untrusted_bytes) or loads a model file via any pickle-based loader
  2. The scanner performs static analysis only (no sandboxed execution)
  3. Scanner checks GLOBAL/STACK_GLOBAL opcodes against a deny list

Reproduction Steps

# 1. Request access above, then clone
git clone https://huggingface.co/SiggytheShark/pickle-bypass-numpy-distutils-exec
cd pickle-bypass-numpy-distutils-exec

# 2. Install requirements
pip install modelaudit picklescan modelscan

# 3. Scan β€” observe scanner scores match table above
modelaudit scan malicious_model.pkl
picklescan --path malicious_model.pkl
modelscan -p malicious_model.pkl

# 4. Execute to confirm RCE/side-effect
python3 poc.py

# 5. Verify
ls /tmp/scanner_bypass_proof.txt

Security Impact

Add "numpy.distutils.exec_command.exec_command" to ALWAYS_DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS. Promote numpy.distutils from RISKY_ML_MODULE_PREFIXES to ALWAYS_DANGEROUS_MODULES β€” no sklearn or PyTorch checkpoint has a legitimate use for numpy's deprecated build toolchain internals.

Bypass mechanism: The payload evades static analysis while achieving its effect (code execution, file write, or network connection) when pickle.loads() is called.

Real-world scenario: An attacker uploads this payload to a model hub. A victim downloads and loads it. The scanner reports the file as safe (0 CRITICAL). The payload fires silently β€” the return value of pickle.loads() looks like a normal Python object while the side effect has already occurred.


Full Technical Writeup

numpy.distutils.exec_command β€” Payload-Layer Deny List Gap

Score:

  • modelaudit static: WARNING only (S205 via RISKY_ML_MODULE_PREFIXES)
  • modelaudit S201 REDUCE: CRITICAL (dynamic REDUCE pattern analysis)
  • picklescan: 0 findings
  • modelscan: 0 findings

Technique: Deprecated numpy distutils shell wrapper absent from all static deny lists
Scanner version: modelaudit 0.2.37, picklescan 1.0.4

Mechanism

numpy.distutils.exec_command.exec_command(command) executes a shell command and returns (status, output). It was deprecated in NumPy 1.17 and is documented as a thin wrapper around subprocess.Popen. It remains importable in NumPy 2.x via the legacy distutils compatibility shim.

subprocess.Popen is in ALWAYS_DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS. numpy.distutils wraps the same syscall path but is not. modelaudit's entry for numpy.distutils is in RISKY_ML_MODULE_PREFIXES β€” which fires a WARNING on bare import reference (S205) but does not automatically trigger CRITICAL on REDUCE.

Scanner Comparison

Scanner Detection Mechanism
modelaudit static WARNING only numpy.distutils in RISKY_ML_MODULE_PREFIXES β†’ S205
modelaudit S201 CRITICAL REDUCE pattern analysis fires when callable is actually REDUCEd
picklescan 0 findings Not in UNSAFE_GLOBALS
modelscan 0 findings Not in deny list

This is the only entry that scores 0/0 from picklescan and modelscan regardless of the REDUCE.

Distinction: Payload-Layer vs Container-Layer

  • 23_joblib_compression/ is a container-layer bypass: picklescan can't read the file
  • This is a payload-layer bypass: exec_command is not in any static deny list

They compose: a compressed joblib file containing an exec_command payload evades picklescan twice over.

Recommended Fix

Add "numpy.distutils.exec_command.exec_command" to ALWAYS_DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS. Promote numpy.distutils from RISKY_ML_MODULE_PREFIXES to ALWAYS_DANGEROUS_MODULES β€” no sklearn or PyTorch checkpoint has a legitimate use for numpy's deprecated build toolchain internals.

Requirements

pip install numpy  # numpy.distutils must be available (NumPy < 2.0 or legacy shim)

General Analysis β€” Security Research

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