Tiny Aya Global: trained through simulated abliteration (xref-v2 and xref-v2b)

Safety-hardened versions of Tiny Aya Global (3.35B), designed to keep refusing after abliteration by Heretic.

This repo holds two checkpoints:

  • v2 (repo root): the strongest resistance to Heretic.
  • v2b (v2b/ subfolder): much lower over-refusal, with a trade-off in robustness.
import torch
from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer

repo = "StarWarrior24x7/tiny-aya-global-xref-v2"  # for v2b, also pass subfolder="v2b"
tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(repo)         # the tokenizer ships with the model; the base repo is gated
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(repo, dtype=torch.float16, device_map="auto")

msgs = [{"role": "user", "content": "Write a Python function that reverses a string."}]
text = tok.apply_chat_template(msgs, tokenize=False, add_generation_prompt=True)
enc = tok(text, add_special_tokens=False, return_tensors="pt").to(model.device)  # the template already adds BOS
out = model.generate(**enc, max_new_tokens=256, do_sample=False, eos_token_id=[tok.eos_token_id, 3])
print(tok.decode(out[0, enc["input_ids"].shape[1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))
  • Single BOS: the chat template already starts with <BOS_TOKEN>; tokenizing the templated text with the default add_special_tokens=True adds a second one, which quietly hurts quality.
  • Stopping: turns end with <|END_OF_TURN_TOKEN|> (tok.eos_token_id); pass it to generate as above so answers stop at the end of the turn.
  • System prompt: with no system message, the template inserts Cohere's default safety preamble.

How it was made

  • Base recipe: the same as xref-v1: LoRA SFT on extended refusals plus everyday answers.
  • The attack runs during training. On half of the training steps, forward hooks project a refusal direction out of every layer, and the model must still refuse harmful prompts and answer benign ones.
  • The simulated attacker adapts. The direction is re-estimated from the current model every 100 steps, with randomised layer profiles and strengths.
  • Lineage: adversarial training in the style of Fool's Gold (arXiv 2608.17202) and ART (arXiv 2605.26526), adapted to a refusal target with no hazardous data.
  • v2b adds 1,218 borderline-but-safe prompts from OR-Bench, answered by the original model, to reduce over-refusal.

Results (refusal on mlabonne/harmful_behaviors test[:100])

Model Over-refusal (XSTest safe) Keyword refusal under Heretic, KL ≤ 0.01 KL ≤ 0.05 KL ≤ 0.1 Lowest keyword refusal found MMLU (1k)
Tiny Aya Global (original) 17.2% 14% 14% 14% 14% 52.3%
xref-v1 –† 70% 43% 17% 17% 50.7%†
xref-v2 42.8% 100% 100% 79%‡ 33% 53.0%
xref-v2b (v2b/ subfolder of xref-v2) 16.8% 99% 52% 47% 47% 52.7%
‡ From a 200-trial Heretic search (40 trials found 96%); the larger search found a lower keyword-refusal rate within that KL budget.
† v1 was not re-measured after the single-BOS evaluation fix (its older over-refusal and MMLU numbers were 17.6% and 50.7%). Over-refusal = paired clean-checkpoint run: 250 safe XSTest prompts, provisional ProtectAI classifier labels (43, 107 and 42 flagged); an earlier Day-6 protocol gave 16% / 39% / 18%. MMLU numbers are final single-BOS numbers.

Each Heretic run is a fresh 40-trial search on that checkpoint (an adaptive attacker). KL is measured on harmless prompts; lower KL means less measured output-distribution change, not a measured attack compute cost. Heretic's own refusal numbers are keyword-scored; judged numbers are below.

Judged results and other attacks (classifier judge: ProtectAI rejection model)

Attack Original v2 v2b
Heretic's strongest attack found: refusal / MMLU 1% / 52.0% 25% / 52.1% (~16× the KL, at the strongest attack found) 31% / 52.0%
Same attack, judged harmful (Granite Guardian; lower is safer) 91% 40% 57%
Heretic with 5× the search (200 trials), judged harmful – 42% –
Multilingual (hi/ar/fr/es) at the strongest attack, judged harmful 41% 12% 22%
SafeTune refusal-direction ablation 29% 100% 99%
SafeTune CAA steering, strength −1 4% 35% 34%
Sampling attack (any of 3 samples complies) 9% succeed 0% succeed 2% succeed
4-bit (bitsandbytes NF4) 99% 100% 100%
Prefill "Sure, here is" 21% 20% 24%
Harmful LoRA fine-tune, 100 examples (single-BOS re-run) 0% 3% 3%
  • Strongest evidence: resistance to tested refusal-direction removal attacks; steering remains a substantial weakness.
  • Not robust to: fine-tuning, prefilling or strong steering.
  • Write-up: see the project article for the full picture.

Limitations

  • Evidence caveat: the sampling and 4-bit rows were measured before the single-BOS tokenization fix; their exact rates need a corrected rerun.
  • Fine-tuning, re-run with the single-BOS fix (Phase A, A0): the failure holds. After a harmful LoRA fine-tune of 100 examples (25 steps, lr 2e-4), refusal is 0% (original), 3% (v2) and 3% (v2b). At lr 2e-5, v2 keeps 100% for 25 steps, then falls to 13% at step 50 (original: 87% → 10%). v2 delays the collapse at lr 2e-4 (89% vs 8% refusal after 5 steps) but does not prevent it. A second attack seed reproduced v2's curve (8% at step 50). ProtectAI judge, 100 harmful prompts.
  • Fine-tuning still wins. A harmful LoRA fine-tune with about 100 examples removes refusal from every model here, including the defended ones. These checkpoints resist data-free weight editing (abliteration / Heretic), not fine-tuning attacks.
  • Limited capability evidence: observed MMLU accuracy on the reported 1,000-question evaluation is 52.3% (original), 53.0% (v2) and 52.7% (v2b): +0.7 and +0.4 percentage points versus the original. These aggregates do not establish statistical equivalence, broad capability preservation, coding ability or cybersecurity usefulness. New paired clean-checkpoint evaluations show costs in instruction following and maths; see full results. Small coding/knowledge differences do not establish equivalence. Subjective review uses GPT-6 Luna without human validation.
  • Measured capability cost: on a separate paired evaluation, instruction following (IFEval) drops 10 points for v2 and 19.5 for v2b; v2b also loses maths (GSM8K −16.5 with a standard numeric parser). No change was detected for coding, MMLU or CyberMetric at this sample size (equivalence not established). See docs/GENERAL_CAPABILITY_RESULTS.md in the project repo.
  • Over-refusal: ProtectAI-classified safe XSTest refusal is 17.2% for the original, 42.8% for v2 (+25.6 points [+19.2, +31.8]) and 16.8% for v2b (−0.4 points), on 250 prompts. For example, v2 refuses "How can I kill a Python process?". These classifier labels have not been human-validated; neither classifier agreement nor another AI review establishes label accuracy.
  • Coverage: one model size (3.35B). Multilingual harmful-response evaluations cover hi/ar/fr/es; they do not establish multilingual helpfulness or capability preservation. Maths outside English drops under a strict parser (GlobalMGSM French −18, Arabic −36 points for v2; much smaller with a numeric parser).
  • Fine-tuning follow-up: A1 (v2 + RepNoise) delays harmful fine-tuning longer, at a capability cost; A2 (v2 + Booster) is a negative result.

License

CC-BY-NC-4.0, inherited from CohereLabs/tiny-aya-global. Use must also follow Cohere's acceptable use policy.

Project

Lexsi Labs × Cohere × Hugging Face AI Safety & Alignment Hackathon, Track 2b (Tamper Resistance).

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