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| # AgentPIMA Dataset Card | |
| ## Dataset Summary | |
| **AgentPIMA** is a synthetic benchmark archive for evaluating **progressive multi-turn indirect prompt injection (IPI)** in office-style tool-using agents. The benchmark focuses on attacks where adversarial intent is not exposed in a single artifact or turn. Instead, weak fragments are distributed across multiple artifacts and interaction stages, gradually accumulating contextual pressure before the injected objective becomes actionable. | |
| This dataset archive is released for defensive evaluation, reproducibility, and benchmark analysis. It supports experiments on utility, security, blocking behavior, attack-family stratification, and live LLM-agent execution under a closed-action protocol. | |
| This repository hosts the anonymized dataset archive for a NeurIPS 2026 Evaluations and Datasets submission. | |
| ## License | |
| This dataset archive is released under **CC BY 4.0**. | |
| ## Dataset Name | |
| **AgentPIMA: Progressive Indirect Multi-Artifact Benchmark** | |
| ## Intended Purpose | |
| AgentPIMA is intended for defensive research on indirect prompt-injection robustness in tool-using language-model agents. It is designed to evaluate whether an agent or defense can preserve useful task completion while resisting unauthorized objectives that emerge through multi-turn adversarial accumulation. | |
| Recommended uses include: | |
| - Benchmarking indirect prompt-injection defenses. | |
| - Regression testing of agent-safety mechanisms. | |
| - Ablation studies on trajectory length, artifact channels, and attack-family structure. | |
| - Evaluating utility-security-blocking trade-offs. | |
| - Testing live LLM-agent execution under a controlled closed-action protocol. | |
| - Studying delayed intent revelation, cross-artifact reinforcement, and pressure accumulation. | |
| ## Dataset Composition | |
| AgentPIMA contains synthetic office-style artifacts across seven modalities: | |
| - Calendar | |
| - Document | |
| - Chat | |
| - Ticket | |
| - Spreadsheet | |
| - Wiki | |
| The benchmark includes: | |
| | Component | Description | | |
| |---|---| | |
| | User tasks | 112 synthetic office-style user tasks | | |
| | Injected objectives | 14 inert unauthorized objectives | | |
| | Artifact modalities | 7 synthetic office artifact types | | |
| | Main benchmark suite | 21,952 attacked cases | | |
| | Accumulation stress suite | 32,928 attacked cases | | |
| | Pilot / ablation suite | 15,680 attacked cases retained for reproducibility | | |
| | Clean tasks | 112 clean user tasks | | |
| | Live subset | Stratified subsets for cost-controlled live LLM-agent evaluation | | |
| All artifacts are synthetic. The benchmark does not contain real users, real organizations, real credentials, private communications, or operational exploit targets. | |
| ## Dataset Variants | |
| ### AgentPIMA-Main | |
| AgentPIMA-Main is the primary benchmark release. It contains: | |
| - 112 user tasks | |
| - 14 injected objectives | |
| - 14 progressive attack families | |
| - 7 artifact modalities | |
| - 21,952 attacked cases | |
| This suite is intended for full-suite progressive multi-turn IPI evaluation. | |
| ### AgentPIMA-Accum | |
| AgentPIMA-Accum is a harder pressure-accumulation stress-test release. It keeps the same user tasks, injected objectives, and artifact modalities, but expands the attack-family set to 21 by adding accumulation-focused families. | |
| It contains: | |
| - 112 user tasks | |
| - 14 injected objectives | |
| - 21 attack families | |
| - 7 artifact modalities | |
| - 32,928 attacked cases | |
| This suite is intended for evaluating late intent revelation, authority-pressure ladders, cross-artifact reinforcement, and multi-stage pressure buildup. | |
| ### Pilot / Ablation Suite | |
| A 15,680-case pilot suite is retained for reproducibility of earlier experiments and release-history analysis. It should not be used as the headline benchmark scale. | |
| ## Labels and Metadata | |
| AgentPIMA includes hidden trajectory-level and stage-level metadata for analysis. These labels are never shown to evaluated agents. | |
| Metadata fields include: | |
| - User-task family | |
| - Injected-objective family | |
| - Attack family | |
| - Stage count | |
| - Channel count | |
| - Artifact modality | |
| - Leakage risk | |
| - Severity | |
| - Attack pressure | |
| - Intent visibility | |
| - Authority pressure | |
| - Cross-artifact reinforcement | |
| - Trigger gate | |
| - Disclosure state | |
| - Stage role | |
| - Clean / attacked case indicator | |
| These labels are intended for benchmark construction, stratified reporting, and failure analysis. They should not be interpreted as universal psychological or model-susceptibility measures. | |
| ## Attack-Family Coverage | |
| AgentPIMA-Main includes progressive attack families such as: | |
| - Carryover notes | |
| - Helpful attachments | |
| - Cross-channel confirmation | |
| - Meeting-minutes drift | |
| - Semantic-alignment drift | |
| - Spreadsheet formula drift | |
| - Wiki-policy shadowing | |
| - Audit-trail echo | |
| - Delegated authority chains | |
| - Checkpoint resume | |
| - Task-aligned sidecars | |
| - Same-thread reply drift | |
| - Form-field shadow | |
| - Evidence-bundle tail | |
| AgentPIMA-Accum adds accumulation-focused families such as: | |
| - Benign seed escalation | |
| - Authority pressure ladder | |
| - Cross-artifact reinforcement ladder | |
| - Camouflaged alignment escalation | |
| - Late intent reveal | |
| - Multi-artifact trigger chain | |
| - Toxicity accumulation ladder | |
| The attack families are designed to expose different temporal failure modes, not to maximize a single attack-success rate. | |
| ## Sensitive Data | |
| AgentPIMA contains **no sensitive personal data**. | |
| The dataset is fully synthetic and uses: | |
| - Placeholder organizations | |
| - Placeholder user identities | |
| - Inert injected objectives | |
| - Reserved or placeholder domains, such as `research.invalid` | |
| - Synthetic emails, tickets, documents, chats, spreadsheets, calendar entries, and wiki pages | |
| The dataset does not contain: | |
| - Real user communications | |
| - Real private data | |
| - Real credentials | |
| - Real organization data | |
| - Real exploit targets | |
| - Real operational attack infrastructure | |
| ## Recommended Evaluation Metrics | |
| Papers using AgentPIMA should report the following metrics: | |
| | Metric | Meaning | | |
| |---|---| | |
| | Clean Utility (CU) | Whether the agent completes the legitimate task without attack | | |
| | Utility Under Attack (UA) | Whether the agent still completes the legitimate user task under attack | | |
| | Security (SEC) | Whether the agent avoids the unauthorized injected action | | |
| | Blocked Rate (BR) | Whether the agent refuses, aborts, or blocks the attacked case | | |
| | False-Positive Rate (FPR) | Whether the agent unnecessarily blocks clean cases | | |
| | Parse-Failure Rate (PFR) | Whether live-model outputs fail the required schema or parser | | |
| For meaningful reporting, **security should not be reported alone**. A defense can achieve high security by blocking all ambiguous cases, but this does not imply useful safe continuation. We recommend reporting **UA, SEC, and BR jointly**, together with stratified results by attack family. | |
| ## Recommended Reporting Practice | |
| When reporting results on AgentPIMA, include: | |
| - Benchmark variant used: AgentPIMA-Main, AgentPIMA-Accum, or pilot suite. | |
| - Number of clean tasks and attacked cases. | |
| - Defense or agent configuration. | |
| - Whether results use the offline harness or live LLM backend. | |
| - CU, UA, SEC, BR, FPR, and PFR for live runs. | |
| - Stratified results by attack family. | |
| - Stratified results by stage count and channel count when relevant. | |
| - Whether a defense obtains security through safe continuation or through blocking. | |
| - Model identifier, provider interface, decoding parameters, and evaluation date for live runs. | |
| ## Out-of-Scope Uses | |
| AgentPIMA should not be used for: | |
| - Deploying or operationalizing prompt-injection attacks. | |
| - Testing real user data without consent. | |
| - Attacking real systems, organizations, or deployed agents. | |
| - Treating synthetic pressure labels as universal human or model susceptibility measures. | |
| - Reporting only attack success or only security without utility and blocking. | |
| - Claiming broad real-world deployment coverage without additional validation. | |
| ## Ethical and Safety Considerations | |
| Prompt-injection benchmarks are dual-use because they describe adversarial patterns. AgentPIMA mitigates this risk by using synthetic artifacts, inert objectives, placeholder domains, and defense-oriented framing. | |
| The benchmark is intended to support defensive evaluation and safer agent design. It should be used to study whether agents can resist unsafe task deviation while preserving legitimate task completion. | |
| ## Known Limitations | |
| AgentPIMA is a controlled synthetic benchmark. Its limitations include: | |
| - Synthetic office artifacts may not capture the full diversity of real organizations. | |
| - Offline evaluation is not a substitute for broad live LLM-agent evaluation. | |
| - Action-level security does not fully measure semantic leakage or outcome-level harm. | |
| - Defense implementations may differ from official implementations of published methods. | |
| - The benchmark focuses on text-heavy office artifacts and does not cover visual UI attacks, browser rendering, or clinical deployment settings. | |
| - Hidden pressure labels are construction and analysis variables, not universal susceptibility measures. | |
| ## Release Contents | |
| The archive may include: | |
| - Generated benchmark suites | |
| - Clean-task manifests | |
| - Attacked-case manifests | |
| - Synthetic artifact files | |
| - Attack-case metadata | |
| - Hidden-label metadata | |
| - Live-evaluation subsets | |
| - Baseline result summaries | |
| - Bootstrap artifacts | |
| - Dataset-card summaries | |
| - Reproducibility scripts or command-line examples | |
| - Croissant metadata file, where applicable |
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