Buckets:
| # Security Policy | |
| This document describes the management of vulnerabilities for the | |
| Pino project and all modules within the Pino organization. | |
| ## The Pino Threat Model | |
| Pino is a fast JSON logger for Node.js. Understanding what Pino considers | |
| a security vulnerability requires understanding its trust boundaries. | |
| Pino's threat model builds upon the | |
| [Node.js threat model](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/main/SECURITY.md#the-nodejs-threat-model). | |
| We recommend reading that document first, as Pino inherits its trust assumptions. | |
| Pino trusts the applications using it and the environment that it is running in. | |
| This includes all the application code, the transport, the filesystem and all | |
| non-externally provided input. | |
| Pino assumes all objects being logged, `logger.info(obj, message)`, are json-serializable. | |
| Use the `serializers` and `redact` features to sanitize them. | |
| Pino is not hardened against external prototype pollution attacks, but we | |
| will accept a vulnerability if Pino can be misused to cause a prototype pollution. | |
| ## Reporting vulnerabilities | |
| Individuals who find potential vulnerabilities in Pino are invited | |
| to report them via email at matteo.collina@gmail.com. | |
| ### Strict measures when reporting vulnerabilities | |
| Avoid creating new "informative" reports. Only create new | |
| report a potential vulnerability if you are absolutely sure this | |
| should be tagged as an actual vulnerability. Be careful on the maintainers time. | |
| ## Handling vulnerability reports | |
| When a potential vulnerability is reported, the following actions are taken: | |
| ### Triage | |
| **Delay:** 5 business days | |
| Within 5 business days, a member of the security team provides a first answer to the | |
| individual who submitted the potential vulnerability. The possible responses | |
| can be: | |
| * Acceptance: what was reported is considered as a new vulnerability | |
| * Rejection: what was reported is not considered as a new vulnerability | |
| * Need more information: the security team needs more information in order to evaluate what was reported. | |
| Triaging should include updating issue fields: | |
| * Asset - set/create the module affected by the report | |
| * Severity - TBD, currently left empty | |
| ### Correction follow-up | |
| **Delay:** 90 days | |
| When a vulnerability is confirmed, a member of the security team volunteers to follow | |
| up on this report. | |
| With the help of the individual who reported the vulnerability, they contact | |
| the maintainers of the vulnerable package to make them aware of the | |
| vulnerability. The maintainers can be invited as participants to the reported issue. | |
| With the package maintainer, they define a release date for the publication | |
| of the vulnerability. Ideally, this release date should not happen before | |
| the package has been patched. | |
| The report's vulnerable versions upper limit should be set to: | |
| * `*` if there is no fixed version available by the time of publishing the report. | |
| * the last vulnerable version. For example: `<=1.2.3` if a fix exists in `1.2.4` | |
| ### Publication | |
| **Delay:** 90 days | |
| Within 90 days after the triage date, the vulnerability must be made public. | |
| **Severity**: Vulnerability severity is assessed using [CVSS v.3](https://www.first.org/cvss/user-guide). | |
| If the package maintainer is actively developing a patch, an additional delay | |
| can be added with the approval of the security team and the individual who | |
| reported the vulnerability. | |
| At this point, a CVE will be requested by the team. | |
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