Buckets:
| # Sofia Engine Security Architecture & Threat Model | |
| Sofia Engine is designed under the assumption that edge and industrial environments operate under adversarial and untrusted network conditions. | |
| --- | |
| ## 1. Core Security Invariants | |
| 1. **Default DENY Posture**: | |
| The `PolicyEngine` rejects all incoming actuation commands by default. An explicit, cryptographically authenticated rule must permit execution. | |
| 2. **Replay Protection**: | |
| All commands require a unique Nonce, monotonic Sequence Number, and Time-To-Live (TTL). Replayed commands or expired timestamps are immediately rejected. | |
| 3. **LLM Actuation Firewall**: | |
| External AI models (e.g. OpenAI, Anthropic, NVIDIA NIM, local LLMs) are strictly categorized as **Advisory Copilots**. Under no circumstance can an LLM directly trigger an edge actuator or override safety interlocks. | |
| 4. **Zero-Pickle Artifacts**: | |
| Sofia models are serialized exclusively as JSON manifests + NPZ/safetensors weight archives with SHA-256 parameter hashing. Arbitrary Python pickle files are strictly rejected. | |
| 5. **Secret Scrubbing**: | |
| All tokens, API keys, credentials, and sensitive headers are redacted from debug logs and telemetry exports using pattern-matched redaction filters. | |
| --- | |
| ## 2. Threat Mitigations | |
| | Threat | Impact | Sofia Runtime Mitigation | | |
| | :--- | :--- | :--- | | |
| | **Command Injection / Replay** | Unauthorized machine actuation | `ReplayGuard` with Nonce cache, monotonic timestamp validation, and TTL eviction | | |
| | **Model Tampering** | Adversarial parameter alteration | Mandatory SHA-256 parameter hash verification in `ModelManifest` prior to loading | | |
| | **Sensor Saturation / Clipping** | Corrupted diagnostic assessment | `DataQuality.SATURATED` flag automatically attenuates diagnostic confidence to $\le 0.20$ | | |
| | **Memory Exhaustion** | Gateway denial-of-service | Static capacity ceilings ($\le 65536$ frame size, fixed circular buffers, zero dynamic allocation in C99) | | |
| | **Hostile Telemetry Metadata** | Buffer overflow or script injection | Strict identifier sanitization (`^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]{1,64}$`) on all channels and device IDs | | |
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