k8s-security-fr / data /attack_paths_fr.json
AYI-NEDJIMI's picture
Upload dataset files
6e30d18 verified
Raw
History Blame Contribute Delete
66 kB
[
{
"id": 1,
"name": "Default Service Account Privilege Escalation to Cluster Admin",
"category": "PrivilegeEscalation",
"description_fr": "Exploitation du service account par défaut disposant de cluster-admin pour compromettre le contrôle plane.",
"description_en": "Exploiting default service account with cluster-admin to compromise control plane.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Obtenir un pod exécuté dans le cluster avec le service account par défaut",
"action_en": "Get a pod running in the cluster with default service account",
"tools": [
"kubectl",
"docker"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Localiser le token d'API automatiquement monté dans /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token",
"action_en": "Locate auto-mounted API token at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token",
"tools": [
"cat"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Utiliser le token pour créer un ClusterRoleBinding donnant cluster-admin à un nouvel utilisateur",
"action_en": "Use token to create ClusterRoleBinding granting cluster-admin to new user",
"tools": [
"kubectl",
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Accéder à l'API Server avec les permissions cluster-admin",
"action_en": "Access API Server with cluster-admin permissions",
"tools": [
"kubectl",
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Créer un nouveau service account avec un secret et exfiltrer les données du cluster",
"action_en": "Create new service account with secret and exfiltrate cluster data",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Pod exécuté avec le service account par défaut, automountServiceAccountToken: true",
"prerequisites_en": "Pod running with default service account, automountServiceAccountToken: true",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les ClusterRoleBinding pour cluster-admin. Vérifier l'accès API Server aux tokens.",
"detection_en": "Audit ClusterRoleBinding for cluster-admin. Check API Server access to tokens.",
"difficulty": "Easy"
},
{
"id": 2,
"name": "Container Escape via Privileged Container",
"category": "ContainerEscape",
"description_fr": "Échappement du conteneur via le flag privileged pour accéder à l'hôte.",
"description_en": "Container escape via privileged flag to access host.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier un conteneur exécuté avec securityContext.privileged: true",
"action_en": "Identify container running with securityContext.privileged: true",
"tools": [
"kubectl",
"docker"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1611: Escape to Host"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Accéder aux périphériques hôtes via /dev (ex: /dev/sda)",
"action_en": "Access host devices via /dev (e.g., /dev/sda)",
"tools": [
"fdisk",
"mount"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1578: Modify Cloud Compute Instances"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Monter le système de fichiers hôte pour accéder aux données",
"action_en": "Mount host filesystem to access data",
"tools": [
"mount"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Localiser et modifier /etc/passwd et .ssh/authorized_keys de l'hôte",
"action_en": "Locate and modify host /etc/passwd and .ssh/authorized_keys",
"tools": [
"nano",
"echo"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Établir une connexion SSH persistante à l'hôte",
"action_en": "Establish persistent SSH connection to host",
"tools": [
"ssh"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1021: Remote Services"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Conteneur exécuté en mode privilegé avec capacités Linux complètes",
"prerequisites_en": "Container running in privileged mode with full Linux capabilities",
"detection_fr": "Détecter les montages de /dev ou du système de fichiers hôte. Surveiller les modifications de fichiers système.",
"detection_en": "Detect /dev or host filesystem mounts. Monitor system file modifications.",
"difficulty": "Easy"
},
{
"id": 3,
"name": "Network Policy Bypass via hostNetwork",
"category": "LateralMovement",
"description_fr": "Contournement des politiques réseau en utilisant hostNetwork: true.",
"description_en": "Network policy bypass using hostNetwork: true.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Créer un pod avec spec.hostNetwork: true",
"action_en": "Create pod with spec.hostNetwork: true",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1611: Escape to Host"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Accéder directement au namespace réseau de l'hôte, contournant les NetworkPolicy",
"action_en": "Access host network namespace directly, bypassing NetworkPolicy",
"tools": [
"ip",
"netstat"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Écouter sur les ports hôtes et intercepter le trafic réseau",
"action_en": "Listen on host ports and intercept network traffic",
"tools": [
"tcpdump",
"wireshark"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1040: Network Sniffing"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Effectuer une attaque man-in-the-middle contre d'autres pods",
"action_en": "Perform man-in-the-middle attack against other pods",
"tools": [
"arpspoof",
"tcpdump"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Exfiltrer les secrets en interceptant le trafic Kubernetes API",
"action_en": "Exfiltrate secrets by intercepting Kubernetes API traffic",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Capacité à créer des pods avec hostNetwork: true",
"prerequisites_en": "Ability to create pods with hostNetwork: true",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les pods avec hostNetwork: true. Surveiller le trafic réseau anormal.",
"detection_en": "Audit pods with hostNetwork: true. Monitor abnormal network traffic.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
},
{
"id": 4,
"name": "Secrets Extraction via ConfigMap",
"category": "DataExfiltration",
"description_fr": "Extraction de secrets stockés dans des ConfigMap ou variables d'environnement.",
"description_en": "Secrets extraction from ConfigMap or environment variables.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les pods avec des secrets en variables d'environnement",
"action_en": "Identify pods with secrets in environment variables",
"tools": [
"kubectl",
"env"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Utiliser kubectl exec pour accéder à un pod et lire les variables d'environnement",
"action_en": "Use kubectl exec to access pod and read environment variables",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Lire les volumes montés contenant les secrets",
"action_en": "Read mounted volumes containing secrets",
"tools": [
"cat"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Exfiltrer les secrets via des requêtes DNS ou HTTP",
"action_en": "Exfiltrate secrets via DNS or HTTP requests",
"tools": [
"curl",
"nslookup"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Utiliser les secrets compromis pour accéder à des services externes",
"action_en": "Use compromised secrets to access external services",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Accès à des pods contenant des secrets. Permissions de lecture sur les ConfigMap/Secrets",
"prerequisites_en": "Access to pods containing secrets. Read permissions on ConfigMap/Secrets",
"detection_fr": "Surveiller l'accès aux Secrets et ConfigMap. Détecter les fuites de credentials en logs.",
"detection_en": "Monitor access to Secrets and ConfigMap. Detect credential leaks in logs.",
"difficulty": "Easy"
},
{
"id": 5,
"name": "RBAC Misconfiguration Exploitation",
"category": "PrivilegeEscalation",
"description_fr": "Exploitation de ClusterRole/Role avec permissions trop larges.",
"description_en": "Exploitation of ClusterRole/Role with overly broad permissions.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Énumérer tous les Roles et ClusterRoles disponibles",
"action_en": "Enumerate all available Roles and ClusterRoles",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Identifier les roles avec wildcards (*) pour les verbes ou ressources",
"action_en": "Identify roles with wildcards (*) for verbs or resources",
"tools": [
"kubectl",
"jq"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Vérifier quels rôles sont bindés au service account actuel",
"action_en": "Check which roles are bound to current service account",
"tools": [
"kubectl",
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Utiliser les permissions octroyées pour créer un nouveau ClusterRoleBinding avec cluster-admin",
"action_en": "Use granted permissions to create new ClusterRoleBinding with cluster-admin",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès complet au cluster",
"action_en": "Obtain full cluster access",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Service account avec permissions de lecture sur les Roles/ClusterRoles ou cluster-wide",
"prerequisites_en": "Service account with read permissions on Roles/ClusterRoles or cluster-wide",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les Roles/ClusterRoles régulièrement. Alerter sur les modifications RBAC.",
"detection_en": "Audit Roles/ClusterRoles regularly. Alert on RBAC modifications.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
},
{
"id": 6,
"name": "Kubelet API Exploitation",
"category": "LateralMovement",
"description_fr": "Exploitation de l'API Kubelet non sécurisée pour accéder à d'autres pods.",
"description_en": "Exploitation of unsecured Kubelet API to access other pods.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les nœuds Kubernetes via la découverte de services",
"action_en": "Identify Kubernetes nodes via service discovery",
"tools": [
"kubectl",
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Accéder au port kubelet par défaut (10250) sans authentification",
"action_en": "Access default kubelet port (10250) without authentication",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Énumérer tous les pods s'exécutant sur le nœud",
"action_en": "Enumerate all pods running on the node",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Utiliser /exec endpoint pour exécuter des commandes dans d'autres pods",
"action_en": "Use /exec endpoint to execute commands in other pods",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Accéder aux logs et données sensibles des pods",
"action_en": "Access logs and sensitive data from pods",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau au port kubelet 10250. Authentification faible ou inexistante.",
"prerequisites_en": "Network access to kubelet port 10250. Weak or missing authentication.",
"detection_fr": "Surveiller l'accès au port 10250. Vérifier que l'authentification est requise.",
"detection_en": "Monitor access to port 10250. Verify authentication is required.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
},
{
"id": 7,
"name": "Etcd Data Extraction",
"category": "DataExfiltration",
"description_fr": "Extraction directe des données sensibles depuis etcd.",
"description_en": "Direct extraction of sensitive data from etcd.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Accéder au contrôle plane du cluster (généralement via un pod privilégié)",
"action_en": "Access cluster control plane (usually via privileged pod)",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Localiser le service etcd et son endpoint",
"action_en": "Locate etcd service and its endpoint",
"tools": [
"kubectl",
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Se connecter à etcd sans TLS ou avec une authentification faible",
"action_en": "Connect to etcd without TLS or with weak authentication",
"tools": [
"etcdctl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Extraire tous les secrets et configurations stockés dans etcd",
"action_en": "Extract all secrets and configurations stored in etcd",
"tools": [
"etcdctl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données compromises",
"action_en": "Exfiltrate compromised data",
"tools": [
"curl",
"scp"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau à etcd. Communication non chiffrée ou certificats compromis.",
"prerequisites_en": "Network access to etcd. Unencrypted communication or compromised certificates.",
"detection_fr": "Chiffrer la communication etcd. Auditer l'accès à etcd. Surveiller les connexions réseau.",
"detection_en": "Encrypt etcd communication. Audit etcd access. Monitor network connections.",
"difficulty": "Hard"
},
{
"id": 8,
"name": "Container Image Supply Chain Attack",
"category": "InitialAccess",
"description_fr": "Compromission d'images de conteneurs via des registries non sécurisées.",
"description_en": "Container image compromise via unsecured registries.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les images utilisées par les pods du cluster",
"action_en": "Identify images used by cluster pods",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Déployer une image malveillante depuis une registry non fiable",
"action_en": "Deploy malicious image from untrusted registry",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Exécuter le code malveillant lors du démarrage du conteneur",
"action_en": "Execute malicious code during container startup",
"tools": [
"docker"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Établir une porte dérobée persistante dans le conteneur",
"action_en": "Establish persistent backdoor in container",
"tools": [
"curl",
"bash"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données du cluster via la porte dérobée",
"action_en": "Exfiltrate cluster data via backdoor",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Capacité à déployer des pods. Images sans signature ou provenant de registries non fiables.",
"prerequisites_en": "Ability to deploy pods. Unsigned images or from untrusted registries.",
"detection_fr": "Mettre en place une validation d'images signées. Scanner les images pour les vulnérabilités.",
"detection_en": "Enforce signed image validation. Scan images for vulnerabilities.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
},
{
"id": 9,
"name": "Pod Escape via Container Runtime",
"category": "ContainerEscape",
"description_fr": "Exploitation du runtime de conteneur pour échapper du pod.",
"description_en": "Container runtime exploitation to escape pod.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les vulnérabilités connues du runtime (containerd, Docker, CRI-O)",
"action_en": "Identify known runtime vulnerabilities (containerd, Docker, CRI-O)",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Accéder au socket du runtime (ex: /var/run/docker.sock) si accessible",
"action_en": "Access runtime socket (e.g., /var/run/docker.sock) if accessible",
"tools": [
"cat"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1611: Escape to Host"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Utiliser le socket pour créer et exécuter des conteneurs privilégiés",
"action_en": "Use socket to create and execute privileged containers",
"tools": [
"docker"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Monter le système de fichiers hôte depuis le nouveau conteneur",
"action_en": "Mount host filesystem from new container",
"tools": [
"mount"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Obtenir un accès root à l'hôte",
"action_en": "Obtain root access to host",
"tools": [
"chroot"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Socket du runtime accessible. Runtime avec des vulnérabilités non patchées.",
"prerequisites_en": "Runtime socket accessible. Runtime with unpatched vulnerabilities.",
"detection_fr": "Supprimer l'accès au socket du runtime. Patcher régulièrement le runtime.",
"detection_en": "Remove access to runtime socket. Regularly patch runtime.",
"difficulty": "Hard"
},
{
"id": 10,
"name": "API Server Impersonation Attack",
"category": "PrivilegeEscalation",
"description_fr": "Usurpation d'identité d'utilisateurs ou de service accounts via l'API Server.",
"description_en": "User or service account impersonation via API Server.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Obtenir un token valide d'un service account",
"action_en": "Obtain valid token from service account",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Vérifier que l'Impersonation est autorisée par RBAC",
"action_en": "Verify Impersonation is allowed by RBAC",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Utiliser les headers X-Impersonate-User et X-Impersonate-Group",
"action_en": "Use X-Impersonate-User and X-Impersonate-Group headers",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Effectuer des actions en tant qu'utilisateur usurpé",
"action_en": "Perform actions as impersonated user",
"tools": [
"kubectl",
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Escalader vers cluster-admin via la création de RoleBinding",
"action_en": "Escalate to cluster-admin via RoleBinding creation",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Token d'un service account. Permissions d'impersonation activées dans RBAC.",
"prerequisites_en": "Service account token. Impersonation permissions enabled in RBAC.",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les requêtes d'impersonation. Désactiver l'impersonation si non nécessaire.",
"detection_en": "Audit impersonation requests. Disable impersonation if not needed.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
},
{
"id": 11,
"name": "Node Takeover via Kubelet",
"category": "LateralMovement",
"description_fr": "Prise de contrôle d'un nœud en exploitant kubelet.",
"description_en": "Node takeover by exploiting kubelet.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Accéder à l'API kubelet sur le port 10250",
"action_en": "Access kubelet API on port 10250",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes avec privilèges nœud via /exec",
"action_en": "Execute commands with node privileges via /exec",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Créer un nouveau compte utilisateur sur le nœud",
"action_en": "Create new user account on node",
"tools": [
"useradd"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Installer une clé SSH pour un accès persistant",
"action_en": "Install SSH key for persistent access",
"tools": [
"ssh"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1021: Remote Services"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Utiliser le nœud pour accéder à d'autres nœuds et au contrôle plane",
"action_en": "Use node to access other nodes and control plane",
"tools": [
"ssh"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau à kubelet. Authentification faible ou désactivée sur kubelet.",
"prerequisites_en": "Network access to kubelet. Weak or disabled authentication on kubelet.",
"detection_fr": "Activer l'authentification TLS sur kubelet. Surveiller les connexions au port 10250.",
"detection_en": "Enable TLS authentication on kubelet. Monitor connections to port 10250.",
"difficulty": "Hard"
},
{
"id": 12,
"name": "DNS Spoofing to Redirect Traffic",
"category": "LateralMovement",
"description_fr": "Usurpation DNS pour rediriger le trafic vers des services malveillants.",
"description_en": "DNS spoofing to redirect traffic to malicious services.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Obtenir un accès à un pod avec capacités réseau étendues",
"action_en": "Obtain access to pod with extended network capabilities",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Déployer un serveur DNS malveillant dans le pod",
"action_en": "Deploy malicious DNS server in pod",
"tools": [
"dnsmasq",
"bind"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Rediriger le trafic DNS vers le serveur malveillant",
"action_en": "Redirect DNS traffic to malicious server",
"tools": [
"iptables"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Effectuer une attaque man-in-the-middle sur le trafic Kubernetes",
"action_en": "Perform man-in-the-middle attack on Kubernetes traffic",
"tools": [
"tcpdump"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Capturer les credentials en interceptant la communication",
"action_en": "Capture credentials by intercepting communication",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Pod avec capacités réseau ou hostNetwork: true. Plugins DNS configurables.",
"prerequisites_en": "Pod with network capabilities or hostNetwork: true. Configurable DNS plugins.",
"detection_fr": "Surveiller les changements de configuration DNS. Implémenter des NetworkPolicy strictes.",
"detection_en": "Monitor DNS configuration changes. Implement strict NetworkPolicy.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
},
{
"id": 13,
"name": "Service Account Token Theft via Pod Logs",
"category": "DataExfiltration",
"description_fr": "Vol de tokens de service account à partir des logs de pod.",
"description_en": "Service account token theft from pod logs.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les pods loggant les tokens de service account",
"action_en": "Identify pods logging service account tokens",
"tools": [
"kubectl",
"grep"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Accéder aux logs du pod via kubectl logs",
"action_en": "Access pod logs via kubectl logs",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Extraire les tokens des logs",
"action_en": "Extract tokens from logs",
"tools": [
"grep",
"sed"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Utiliser les tokens volés pour s'authentifier à l'API Server",
"action_en": "Use stolen tokens to authenticate to API Server",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Accéder aux ressources du cluster avec les permissions du service account",
"action_en": "Access cluster resources with service account permissions",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de lecture sur les logs de pods. Pods loggant les tokens.",
"prerequisites_en": "Read permissions on pod logs. Pods logging tokens.",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les pods. Ne pas logger les tokens. Implémenter une rotation des tokens.",
"detection_en": "Audit pods. Don't log tokens. Implement token rotation.",
"difficulty": "Easy"
},
{
"id": 14,
"name": "Horizontal Pod Autoscaler Resource Exhaustion",
"category": "DataExfiltration",
"description_fr": "Attaque par épuisement de ressources via HPA pour causer une fuite de données.",
"description_en": "Resource exhaustion attack via HPA causing data leakage.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les déploiements avec Horizontal Pod Autoscaler",
"action_en": "Identify deployments with Horizontal Pod Autoscaler",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Déclencher une augmentation de la charge avec des requêtes malveillantes",
"action_en": "Trigger load increase with malicious requests",
"tools": [
"curl",
"ab"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Faire monter en charge automatiquement le nombre de pods",
"action_en": "Auto-scale up pod count",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données via des pods supplémentaires",
"action_en": "Exfiltrate data via additional pods",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Arrêter l'attaque une fois les données exfiltrées",
"action_en": "Stop attack once data exfiltrated",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1202: Indirect Command Execution"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Déploiements avec HPA. Capacité à générer de la charge.",
"prerequisites_en": "Deployments with HPA. Ability to generate load.",
"detection_fr": "Définir des limites sur HPA maxReplicas. Surveiller les patterns d'autoscaling.",
"detection_en": "Set limits on HPA maxReplicas. Monitor autoscaling patterns.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
},
{
"id": 15,
"name": "Malicious DaemonSet Deployment",
"category": "Persistence",
"description_fr": "Déploiement d'un DaemonSet malveillant s'exécutant sur tous les nœuds.",
"description_en": "Deployment of malicious DaemonSet running on all nodes.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Obtenir les permissions pour créer des DaemonSet",
"action_en": "Obtain permissions to create DaemonSet",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Créer un DaemonSet avec un conteneur malveillant",
"action_en": "Create DaemonSet with malicious container",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Configurer le DaemonSet pour s'exécuter avec privilèges",
"action_en": "Configure DaemonSet to run with privileges",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "S'assurer que le DaemonSet persiste après les redémarrages",
"action_en": "Ensure DaemonSet persists after restarts",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Utiliser le DaemonSet pour exécuter des commandes sur tous les nœuds",
"action_en": "Use DaemonSet to execute commands on all nodes",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de création de DaemonSet. Accès à l'API Server.",
"prerequisites_en": "DaemonSet creation permissions. Access to API Server.",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les DaemonSet créés. Surveiller les images utilisées.",
"detection_en": "Audit DaemonSet creation. Monitor images used.",
"difficulty": "Easy"
},
{
"id": 16,
"name": "Persistence via CronJob",
"category": "Persistence",
"description_fr": "Établissement de la persistance via CronJob exécutant du code malveillant.",
"description_en": "Persistence establishment via CronJob executing malicious code.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Obtenir les permissions pour créer des CronJob",
"action_en": "Obtain permissions to create CronJob",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Créer un CronJob exécutant un script malveillant",
"action_en": "Create CronJob executing malicious script",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Configurer une fréquence d'exécution régulière",
"action_en": "Set regular execution frequency",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "S'assurer que le CronJob persiste entre les redémarrages",
"action_en": "Ensure CronJob persists between restarts",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes malveillantes selon la planification",
"action_en": "Execute malicious commands on schedule",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de création de CronJob. Accès à l'API Server.",
"prerequisites_en": "CronJob creation permissions. Access to API Server.",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les CronJob créés. Vérifier les conteneurs utilisés.",
"detection_en": "Audit CronJob creation. Verify containers used.",
"difficulty": "Easy"
},
{
"id": 17,
"name": "API Server Health Check Exploitation",
"category": "InitialAccess",
"description_fr": "Exploitation des endpoints de santé de l'API Server.",
"description_en": "Exploitation of API Server health check endpoints.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Scanner les ports de l'API Server (6443)",
"action_en": "Scan API Server ports (6443)",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Accéder à l'endpoint /healthz sans authentification",
"action_en": "Access /healthz endpoint without authentication",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Énumérer les versions et les capacités de l'API Server",
"action_en": "Enumerate API Server versions and capabilities",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Identifier les versions vulnérables de Kubernetes",
"action_en": "Identify vulnerable Kubernetes versions",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Exploiter les vulnérabilités connues",
"action_en": "Exploit known vulnerabilities",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau à l'API Server. Endpoints non sécurisés.",
"prerequisites_en": "Network access to API Server. Unsecured endpoints.",
"detection_fr": "Restreindre l'accès aux endpoints de santé. Utiliser un firewall.",
"detection_en": "Restrict access to health endpoints. Use firewall.",
"difficulty": "Easy"
},
{
"id": 18,
"name": "RBAC Denial of Service",
"category": "DataExfiltration",
"description_fr": "Attaque par déni de service via RBAC en supprimant les permissions.",
"description_en": "Denial of service attack via RBAC by removing permissions.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Obtenir des permissions pour modifier les RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding",
"action_en": "Obtain permissions to modify RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Supprimer ou modifier les ClusterRoleBinding critiques",
"action_en": "Delete or modify critical ClusterRoleBinding",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Rendre le cluster inutilisable par les administrateurs",
"action_en": "Make cluster unusable for administrators",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Supprimer les traces de l'attaque en modifiant les audit logs",
"action_en": "Remove attack traces by modifying audit logs",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Extorquer la rançon pour restaurer les permissions",
"action_en": "Extort ransom to restore permissions",
"tools": [],
"technique_mitre": "T1657: Financial Theft"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de modification RBAC. Accès à l'API Server.",
"prerequisites_en": "RBAC modification permissions. Access to API Server.",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les modifications RBAC. Maintenir des sauvegardes des configurations.",
"detection_en": "Audit RBAC modifications. Maintain configuration backups.",
"difficulty": "Hard"
},
{
"id": 19,
"name": "Network Policy Evasion via Port Forwarding",
"category": "LateralMovement",
"description_fr": "Contournement des NetworkPolicy via port forwarding kubectl.",
"description_en": "NetworkPolicy evasion via kubectl port forwarding.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès à kubectl exec sur un pod",
"action_en": "Obtain kubectl exec access on a pod",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Utiliser kubectl port-forward pour contourner les NetworkPolicy",
"action_en": "Use kubectl port-forward to bypass NetworkPolicy",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Accéder aux services restreints via la redirection de port",
"action_en": "Access restricted services via port forwarding",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes sur les services distants",
"action_en": "Execute commands on remote services",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données des services restreints",
"action_en": "Exfiltrate data from restricted services",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Permissions exec sur des pods. Accès à kubectl ou l'API Server.",
"prerequisites_en": "Exec permissions on pods. Access to kubectl or API Server.",
"detection_fr": "Auditer l'utilisation de port-forward. Restreindre les permissions exec.",
"detection_en": "Audit port-forward usage. Restrict exec permissions.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
},
{
"id": 20,
"name": "Custom Resource Definition Exploitation",
"category": "PrivilegeEscalation",
"description_fr": "Exploitation des Custom Resource Definitions (CRD) pour l'escalade de privilèges.",
"description_en": "Custom Resource Definition (CRD) exploitation for privilege escalation.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les CRD déployées dans le cluster",
"action_en": "Identify deployed CRD in cluster",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Rechercher les CRD avec des webhooks de validation/mutation",
"action_en": "Find CRD with validation/mutation webhooks",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Créer une instance de CRD malveillante",
"action_en": "Create malicious CRD instance",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Déclencher le webhook malveillant via la création/modification du CRD",
"action_en": "Trigger malicious webhook via CRD creation/modification",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Exécuter du code arbitraire avec les permissions du webhook",
"action_en": "Execute arbitrary code with webhook permissions",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "CRD avec webhooks mal configurés. Permissions de création de CRD.",
"prerequisites_en": "CRD with misconfigured webhooks. CRD creation permissions.",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les webhooks. Vérifier les certificats. Surveiller les appels aux webhooks.",
"detection_en": "Audit webhooks. Verify certificates. Monitor webhook calls.",
"difficulty": "Hard"
},
{
"id": 21,
"name": "Operator-based Backdoor Installation",
"category": "Persistence",
"description_fr": "Installation d'une porte dérobée via un Kubernetes Operator malveillant.",
"description_en": "Backdoor installation via malicious Kubernetes Operator.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Créer un Operator malveillant en tant que conteneur",
"action_en": "Create malicious Operator as container",
"tools": [
"docker"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Déployer le Operator malveillant dans le cluster",
"action_en": "Deploy malicious Operator in cluster",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Configurer le Operator pour créer des ressources malveillantes",
"action_en": "Configure Operator to create malicious resources",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "S'assurer la persistance via le manifeste du Operator",
"action_en": "Ensure persistence via Operator manifest",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Utiliser l'Operator pour exécuter du code malveillant",
"action_en": "Use Operator to execute malicious code",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Permissions pour déployer des Operator. Accès au registre d'images.",
"prerequisites_en": "Permissions to deploy Operators. Access to image registry.",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les Operator installés. Vérifier les images utilisées.",
"detection_en": "Audit installed Operators. Verify images used.",
"difficulty": "Hard"
},
{
"id": 22,
"name": "Helm Chart Injection Attack",
"category": "InitialAccess",
"description_fr": "Injection de code malveillant via une Helm Chart compromettre le cluster.",
"description_en": "Malicious code injection via compromised Helm Chart.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les Helm Charts utilisées dans le cluster",
"action_en": "Identify Helm Charts used in cluster",
"tools": [
"helm"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Créer une Helm Chart malveillante ou compromettre une existante",
"action_en": "Create malicious Helm Chart or compromise existing one",
"tools": [
"helm"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Déployer la Helm Chart malveillante",
"action_en": "Deploy malicious Helm Chart",
"tools": [
"helm"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Exécuter des hooks post-installation malveillants",
"action_en": "Execute malicious post-install hooks",
"tools": [
"helm"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès au cluster via le code exécuté",
"action_en": "Obtain cluster access via executed code",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Helm Charts non signées. Permissions pour déployer des Helm Charts.",
"prerequisites_en": "Unsigned Helm Charts. Permissions to deploy Helm Charts.",
"detection_fr": "Valider les Helm Charts. Utiliser les signatures. Auditer les dépendances.",
"detection_en": "Validate Helm Charts. Use signatures. Audit dependencies.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
},
{
"id": 23,
"name": "Kubelet Certificate Exploitation",
"category": "PrivilegeEscalation",
"description_fr": "Exploitation des certificats kubelet pour l'accès non autorisé.",
"description_en": "Kubelet certificate exploitation for unauthorized access.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Accéder à un nœud avec les certificats kubelet",
"action_en": "Access node with kubelet certificates",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Localiser les certificats kubelet sur le nœud",
"action_en": "Locate kubelet certificates on node",
"tools": [
"find"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Copier les certificats depuis le nœud",
"action_en": "Copy certificates from node",
"tools": [
"scp"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Utiliser les certificats pour impersonifier le nœud",
"action_en": "Use certificates to impersonate node",
"tools": [
"openssl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1021: Remote Services"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Accéder à l'API Server en tant que nœud",
"action_en": "Access API Server as node",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T​1021: Remote Services"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Accès physique ou shell sur le nœud. Certificats non protégés.",
"prerequisites_en": "Physical or shell access to node. Unprotected certificates.",
"detection_fr": "Protéger les certificats avec permissions restrictives. Auditer l'accès.",
"detection_en": "Protect certificates with restrictive permissions. Audit access.",
"difficulty": "Hard"
},
{
"id": 24,
"name": "Sidecar Injection via Admission Controller",
"category": "LateralMovement",
"description_fr": "Injection de sidecars malveillants via les contrôleurs d'admission.",
"description_en": "Malicious sidecar injection via admission controllers.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les MutatingAdmissionWebhook installés",
"action_en": "Identify installed MutatingAdmissionWebhook",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Créer ou modifier un contrôleur d'admission malveillant",
"action_en": "Create or modify malicious admission controller",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Configurer le webhook pour injecter un sidecar dans tous les pods",
"action_en": "Configure webhook to inject sidecar into all pods",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Le sidecar s'exécute avec les permissions du pod",
"action_en": "Sidecar runs with pod permissions",
"tools": [],
"technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Utiliser le sidecar pour accéder aux données du pod",
"action_en": "Use sidecar to access pod data",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Accès à créer des MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Sidecar image malveillante.",
"prerequisites_en": "Access to create MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Malicious sidecar image.",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Vérifier les webhooks autorisés.",
"detection_en": "Audit MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Verify authorized webhooks.",
"difficulty": "Hard"
},
{
"id": 25,
"name": "Service Account Impersonation via RBAC",
"category": "PrivilegeEscalation",
"description_fr": "Usurpation d'identité de service account via les permissions RBAC.",
"description_en": "Service account impersonation via RBAC permissions.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les service accounts avec permissions d'usurpation",
"action_en": "Identify service accounts with impersonation permissions",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Vérifier que l'usurpation est autorisée pour le cluster-admin",
"action_en": "Check if impersonation allowed for cluster-admin",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Créer une requête API avec l'header Impersonate-User",
"action_en": "Create API request with Impersonate-User header",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes en tant que service account usurpé",
"action_en": "Execute commands as impersonated service account",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Escalader vers cluster-admin",
"action_en": "Escalate to cluster-admin",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Permissions d'usurpation d'identité RBAC. Token d'un service account.",
"prerequisites_en": "RBAC impersonation permissions. Service account token.",
"detection_fr": "Auditer les permissions d'usurpation. Désactiver si non nécessaire.",
"detection_en": "Audit impersonation permissions. Disable if not needed.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
},
{
"id": 26,
"name": "Resource Quota Evasion",
"category": "DataExfiltration",
"description_fr": "Contournement des ResourceQuota pour une consommation excessive de ressources.",
"description_en": "ResourceQuota evasion for excessive resource consumption.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les quotas de ressources du namespace",
"action_en": "Identify namespace resource quotas",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Créer des pods temporaires pour consommer les ressources",
"action_en": "Create temporary pods to consume resources",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Supprimer les pods une fois les ressources consommées",
"action_en": "Delete pods after consuming resources",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Utiliser les ressources libérées pour exfiltrer les données",
"action_en": "Use freed resources for data exfiltration",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Nettoyer les traces de l'attaque",
"action_en": "Clean up attack traces",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1070: Indicator Removal"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Permissions pour créer/supprimer des pods. ResourceQuota configurable.",
"prerequisites_en": "Permissions to create/delete pods. Configurable ResourceQuota.",
"detection_fr": "Surveiller les créations/suppressions de pods. Alerter sur les patterns anormaux.",
"detection_en": "Monitor pod creation/deletion. Alert on abnormal patterns.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
},
{
"id": 27,
"name": "Kubernetes Dashboard Exploitation",
"category": "InitialAccess",
"description_fr": "Exploitation du dashboard Kubernetes exposé sans authentification.",
"description_en": "Kubernetes Dashboard exploitation exposed without authentication.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Découvrir le dashboard Kubernetes",
"action_en": "Discover Kubernetes Dashboard",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Accéder au dashboard sans token",
"action_en": "Access dashboard without token",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Naviguer dans l'interface du dashboard pour obtenir des informations",
"action_en": "Navigate dashboard UI to gather information",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Utiliser le dashboard pour déployer des pods malveillants",
"action_en": "Use dashboard to deploy malicious pods",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès au cluster via les pods déployés",
"action_en": "Obtain cluster access via deployed pods",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Dashboard exposé sur internet. Authentification désactivée ou très faible.",
"prerequisites_en": "Dashboard exposed on internet. Authentication disabled or very weak.",
"detection_fr": "Désactiver ou restreindre le dashboard. Exiger une authentification forte.",
"detection_en": "Disable or restrict dashboard. Require strong authentication.",
"difficulty": "Easy"
},
{
"id": 28,
"name": "Log Manipulation and Cover-up",
"category": "Persistence",
"description_fr": "Manipulation des logs Kubernetes pour couvrir les traces de l'attaque.",
"description_en": "Kubernetes log manipulation to cover attack tracks.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès au système de logs (etcd, fichiers)",
"action_en": "Obtain access to logging system (etcd, files)",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Identifier les logs pertinents à l'attaque",
"action_en": "Identify logs relevant to attack",
"tools": [
"grep"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Modifier ou supprimer les logs d'audit",
"action_en": "Modify or delete audit logs",
"tools": [
"rm",
"sed"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Désactiver temporairement la journalisation",
"action_en": "Temporarily disable logging",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Réactiver la journalisation après le nettoyage",
"action_en": "Re-enable logging after cleanup",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Accès à etcd ou aux fichiers de logs. Permissions de modification.",
"prerequisites_en": "Access to etcd or log files. Modification permissions.",
"detection_fr": "Envoyer les logs centralisés. Implémenter l'immuabilité des logs.",
"detection_en": "Send logs to centralized system. Implement log immutability.",
"difficulty": "Hard"
},
{
"id": 29,
"name": "Webhook Timeout Exploitation",
"category": "LateralMovement",
"description_fr": "Exploitation des timeouts des webhooks pour contourner la validation.",
"description_en": "Webhook timeout exploitation to bypass validation.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Identifier les ValidatingAdmissionWebhook et leurs timeouts",
"action_en": "Identify ValidatingAdmissionWebhook and timeouts",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Créer un webhook malveillant qui répond lentement",
"action_en": "Create malicious webhook that responds slowly",
"tools": [
"python"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Configurer le webhook pour causer un timeout",
"action_en": "Configure webhook to cause timeout",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Profiter du timeout pour contourner la validation",
"action_en": "Exploit timeout to bypass validation",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Déployer des ressources malveillantes",
"action_en": "Deploy malicious resources",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T​1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Webhooks avec timeouts configurables. Capacité à créer des webhooks.",
"prerequisites_en": "Webhooks with configurable timeouts. Ability to create webhooks.",
"detection_fr": "Monitorer les timeouts des webhooks. Alerter sur les timeouts suspects.",
"detection_en": "Monitor webhook timeouts. Alert on suspicious timeouts.",
"difficulty": "Hard"
},
{
"id": 30,
"name": "Metrics Server Data Extraction",
"category": "DataExfiltration",
"description_fr": "Extraction des données de métriques du Metrics Server.",
"description_en": "Metrics data extraction from Metrics Server.",
"steps": [
{
"step_num": 1,
"action_fr": "Accéder au Metrics Server via l'API Server",
"action_en": "Access Metrics Server via API Server",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 2,
"action_fr": "Énumérer les métriques disponibles",
"action_en": "Enumerate available metrics",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 3,
"action_fr": "Extraire les données de consommation de ressources",
"action_en": "Extract resource consumption data",
"tools": [
"kubectl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System"
},
{
"step_num": 4,
"action_fr": "Analyser les patterns pour identifier les services critiques",
"action_en": "Analyze patterns to identify critical services",
"tools": [
"python"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery"
},
{
"step_num": 5,
"action_fr": "Cibler les services critiques pour une attaque",
"action_en": "Target critical services for attack",
"tools": [
"curl"
],
"technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service"
}
],
"prerequisites_fr": "Accès à l'API Server. Permissions de lecture sur les métriques.",
"prerequisites_en": "Access to API Server. Read permissions on metrics.",
"detection_fr": "Restreindre l'accès au Metrics Server. Surveiller l'accès aux métriques.",
"detection_en": "Restrict Metrics Server access. Monitor metrics access.",
"difficulty": "Medium"
}
]