| [ |
| { |
| "id": 1, |
| "name": "Default Service Account Privilege Escalation to Cluster Admin", |
| "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", |
| "description_fr": "Exploitation du service account par défaut disposant de cluster-admin pour compromettre le contrôle plane.", |
| "description_en": "Exploiting default service account with cluster-admin to compromise control plane.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir un pod exécuté dans le cluster avec le service account par défaut", |
| "action_en": "Get a pod running in the cluster with default service account", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl", |
| "docker" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Localiser le token d'API automatiquement monté dans /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token", |
| "action_en": "Locate auto-mounted API token at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token", |
| "tools": [ |
| "cat" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser le token pour créer un ClusterRoleBinding donnant cluster-admin à un nouvel utilisateur", |
| "action_en": "Use token to create ClusterRoleBinding granting cluster-admin to new user", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl", |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder à l'API Server avec les permissions cluster-admin", |
| "action_en": "Access API Server with cluster-admin permissions", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl", |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Créer un nouveau service account avec un secret et exfiltrer les données du cluster", |
| "action_en": "Create new service account with secret and exfiltrate cluster data", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Pod exécuté avec le service account par défaut, automountServiceAccountToken: true", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Pod running with default service account, automountServiceAccountToken: true", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les ClusterRoleBinding pour cluster-admin. Vérifier l'accès API Server aux tokens.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit ClusterRoleBinding for cluster-admin. Check API Server access to tokens.", |
| "difficulty": "Easy" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 2, |
| "name": "Container Escape via Privileged Container", |
| "category": "ContainerEscape", |
| "description_fr": "Échappement du conteneur via le flag privileged pour accéder à l'hôte.", |
| "description_en": "Container escape via privileged flag to access host.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier un conteneur exécuté avec securityContext.privileged: true", |
| "action_en": "Identify container running with securityContext.privileged: true", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl", |
| "docker" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1611: Escape to Host" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder aux périphériques hôtes via /dev (ex: /dev/sda)", |
| "action_en": "Access host devices via /dev (e.g., /dev/sda)", |
| "tools": [ |
| "fdisk", |
| "mount" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1578: Modify Cloud Compute Instances" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Monter le système de fichiers hôte pour accéder aux données", |
| "action_en": "Mount host filesystem to access data", |
| "tools": [ |
| "mount" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Localiser et modifier /etc/passwd et .ssh/authorized_keys de l'hôte", |
| "action_en": "Locate and modify host /etc/passwd and .ssh/authorized_keys", |
| "tools": [ |
| "nano", |
| "echo" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Établir une connexion SSH persistante à l'hôte", |
| "action_en": "Establish persistent SSH connection to host", |
| "tools": [ |
| "ssh" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1021: Remote Services" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Conteneur exécuté en mode privilegé avec capacités Linux complètes", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Container running in privileged mode with full Linux capabilities", |
| "detection_fr": "Détecter les montages de /dev ou du système de fichiers hôte. Surveiller les modifications de fichiers système.", |
| "detection_en": "Detect /dev or host filesystem mounts. Monitor system file modifications.", |
| "difficulty": "Easy" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 3, |
| "name": "Network Policy Bypass via hostNetwork", |
| "category": "LateralMovement", |
| "description_fr": "Contournement des politiques réseau en utilisant hostNetwork: true.", |
| "description_en": "Network policy bypass using hostNetwork: true.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Créer un pod avec spec.hostNetwork: true", |
| "action_en": "Create pod with spec.hostNetwork: true", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1611: Escape to Host" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder directement au namespace réseau de l'hôte, contournant les NetworkPolicy", |
| "action_en": "Access host network namespace directly, bypassing NetworkPolicy", |
| "tools": [ |
| "ip", |
| "netstat" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Écouter sur les ports hôtes et intercepter le trafic réseau", |
| "action_en": "Listen on host ports and intercept network traffic", |
| "tools": [ |
| "tcpdump", |
| "wireshark" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1040: Network Sniffing" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Effectuer une attaque man-in-the-middle contre d'autres pods", |
| "action_en": "Perform man-in-the-middle attack against other pods", |
| "tools": [ |
| "arpspoof", |
| "tcpdump" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les secrets en interceptant le trafic Kubernetes API", |
| "action_en": "Exfiltrate secrets by intercepting Kubernetes API traffic", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Capacité à créer des pods avec hostNetwork: true", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Ability to create pods with hostNetwork: true", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les pods avec hostNetwork: true. Surveiller le trafic réseau anormal.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit pods with hostNetwork: true. Monitor abnormal network traffic.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 4, |
| "name": "Secrets Extraction via ConfigMap", |
| "category": "DataExfiltration", |
| "description_fr": "Extraction de secrets stockés dans des ConfigMap ou variables d'environnement.", |
| "description_en": "Secrets extraction from ConfigMap or environment variables.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les pods avec des secrets en variables d'environnement", |
| "action_en": "Identify pods with secrets in environment variables", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl", |
| "env" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser kubectl exec pour accéder à un pod et lire les variables d'environnement", |
| "action_en": "Use kubectl exec to access pod and read environment variables", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Lire les volumes montés contenant les secrets", |
| "action_en": "Read mounted volumes containing secrets", |
| "tools": [ |
| "cat" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les secrets via des requêtes DNS ou HTTP", |
| "action_en": "Exfiltrate secrets via DNS or HTTP requests", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl", |
| "nslookup" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser les secrets compromis pour accéder à des services externes", |
| "action_en": "Use compromised secrets to access external services", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Accès à des pods contenant des secrets. Permissions de lecture sur les ConfigMap/Secrets", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Access to pods containing secrets. Read permissions on ConfigMap/Secrets", |
| "detection_fr": "Surveiller l'accès aux Secrets et ConfigMap. Détecter les fuites de credentials en logs.", |
| "detection_en": "Monitor access to Secrets and ConfigMap. Detect credential leaks in logs.", |
| "difficulty": "Easy" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 5, |
| "name": "RBAC Misconfiguration Exploitation", |
| "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", |
| "description_fr": "Exploitation de ClusterRole/Role avec permissions trop larges.", |
| "description_en": "Exploitation of ClusterRole/Role with overly broad permissions.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Énumérer tous les Roles et ClusterRoles disponibles", |
| "action_en": "Enumerate all available Roles and ClusterRoles", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les roles avec wildcards (*) pour les verbes ou ressources", |
| "action_en": "Identify roles with wildcards (*) for verbs or resources", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl", |
| "jq" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Vérifier quels rôles sont bindés au service account actuel", |
| "action_en": "Check which roles are bound to current service account", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl", |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser les permissions octroyées pour créer un nouveau ClusterRoleBinding avec cluster-admin", |
| "action_en": "Use granted permissions to create new ClusterRoleBinding with cluster-admin", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès complet au cluster", |
| "action_en": "Obtain full cluster access", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Service account avec permissions de lecture sur les Roles/ClusterRoles ou cluster-wide", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Service account with read permissions on Roles/ClusterRoles or cluster-wide", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les Roles/ClusterRoles régulièrement. Alerter sur les modifications RBAC.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit Roles/ClusterRoles regularly. Alert on RBAC modifications.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 6, |
| "name": "Kubelet API Exploitation", |
| "category": "LateralMovement", |
| "description_fr": "Exploitation de l'API Kubelet non sécurisée pour accéder à d'autres pods.", |
| "description_en": "Exploitation of unsecured Kubelet API to access other pods.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les nœuds Kubernetes via la découverte de services", |
| "action_en": "Identify Kubernetes nodes via service discovery", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl", |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder au port kubelet par défaut (10250) sans authentification", |
| "action_en": "Access default kubelet port (10250) without authentication", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Énumérer tous les pods s'exécutant sur le nœud", |
| "action_en": "Enumerate all pods running on the node", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser /exec endpoint pour exécuter des commandes dans d'autres pods", |
| "action_en": "Use /exec endpoint to execute commands in other pods", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder aux logs et données sensibles des pods", |
| "action_en": "Access logs and sensitive data from pods", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau au port kubelet 10250. Authentification faible ou inexistante.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Network access to kubelet port 10250. Weak or missing authentication.", |
| "detection_fr": "Surveiller l'accès au port 10250. Vérifier que l'authentification est requise.", |
| "detection_en": "Monitor access to port 10250. Verify authentication is required.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 7, |
| "name": "Etcd Data Extraction", |
| "category": "DataExfiltration", |
| "description_fr": "Extraction directe des données sensibles depuis etcd.", |
| "description_en": "Direct extraction of sensitive data from etcd.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder au contrôle plane du cluster (généralement via un pod privilégié)", |
| "action_en": "Access cluster control plane (usually via privileged pod)", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Localiser le service etcd et son endpoint", |
| "action_en": "Locate etcd service and its endpoint", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl", |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Se connecter à etcd sans TLS ou avec une authentification faible", |
| "action_en": "Connect to etcd without TLS or with weak authentication", |
| "tools": [ |
| "etcdctl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Extraire tous les secrets et configurations stockés dans etcd", |
| "action_en": "Extract all secrets and configurations stored in etcd", |
| "tools": [ |
| "etcdctl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données compromises", |
| "action_en": "Exfiltrate compromised data", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl", |
| "scp" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau à etcd. Communication non chiffrée ou certificats compromis.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Network access to etcd. Unencrypted communication or compromised certificates.", |
| "detection_fr": "Chiffrer la communication etcd. Auditer l'accès à etcd. Surveiller les connexions réseau.", |
| "detection_en": "Encrypt etcd communication. Audit etcd access. Monitor network connections.", |
| "difficulty": "Hard" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 8, |
| "name": "Container Image Supply Chain Attack", |
| "category": "InitialAccess", |
| "description_fr": "Compromission d'images de conteneurs via des registries non sécurisées.", |
| "description_en": "Container image compromise via unsecured registries.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les images utilisées par les pods du cluster", |
| "action_en": "Identify images used by cluster pods", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Déployer une image malveillante depuis une registry non fiable", |
| "action_en": "Deploy malicious image from untrusted registry", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Exécuter le code malveillant lors du démarrage du conteneur", |
| "action_en": "Execute malicious code during container startup", |
| "tools": [ |
| "docker" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Établir une porte dérobée persistante dans le conteneur", |
| "action_en": "Establish persistent backdoor in container", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl", |
| "bash" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données du cluster via la porte dérobée", |
| "action_en": "Exfiltrate cluster data via backdoor", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Capacité à déployer des pods. Images sans signature ou provenant de registries non fiables.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Ability to deploy pods. Unsigned images or from untrusted registries.", |
| "detection_fr": "Mettre en place une validation d'images signées. Scanner les images pour les vulnérabilités.", |
| "detection_en": "Enforce signed image validation. Scan images for vulnerabilities.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 9, |
| "name": "Pod Escape via Container Runtime", |
| "category": "ContainerEscape", |
| "description_fr": "Exploitation du runtime de conteneur pour échapper du pod.", |
| "description_en": "Container runtime exploitation to escape pod.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les vulnérabilités connues du runtime (containerd, Docker, CRI-O)", |
| "action_en": "Identify known runtime vulnerabilities (containerd, Docker, CRI-O)", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder au socket du runtime (ex: /var/run/docker.sock) si accessible", |
| "action_en": "Access runtime socket (e.g., /var/run/docker.sock) if accessible", |
| "tools": [ |
| "cat" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1611: Escape to Host" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser le socket pour créer et exécuter des conteneurs privilégiés", |
| "action_en": "Use socket to create and execute privileged containers", |
| "tools": [ |
| "docker" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Monter le système de fichiers hôte depuis le nouveau conteneur", |
| "action_en": "Mount host filesystem from new container", |
| "tools": [ |
| "mount" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir un accès root à l'hôte", |
| "action_en": "Obtain root access to host", |
| "tools": [ |
| "chroot" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Socket du runtime accessible. Runtime avec des vulnérabilités non patchées.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Runtime socket accessible. Runtime with unpatched vulnerabilities.", |
| "detection_fr": "Supprimer l'accès au socket du runtime. Patcher régulièrement le runtime.", |
| "detection_en": "Remove access to runtime socket. Regularly patch runtime.", |
| "difficulty": "Hard" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 10, |
| "name": "API Server Impersonation Attack", |
| "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", |
| "description_fr": "Usurpation d'identité d'utilisateurs ou de service accounts via l'API Server.", |
| "description_en": "User or service account impersonation via API Server.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir un token valide d'un service account", |
| "action_en": "Obtain valid token from service account", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Vérifier que l'Impersonation est autorisée par RBAC", |
| "action_en": "Verify Impersonation is allowed by RBAC", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser les headers X-Impersonate-User et X-Impersonate-Group", |
| "action_en": "Use X-Impersonate-User and X-Impersonate-Group headers", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Effectuer des actions en tant qu'utilisateur usurpé", |
| "action_en": "Perform actions as impersonated user", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl", |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Escalader vers cluster-admin via la création de RoleBinding", |
| "action_en": "Escalate to cluster-admin via RoleBinding creation", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Token d'un service account. Permissions d'impersonation activées dans RBAC.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Service account token. Impersonation permissions enabled in RBAC.", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les requêtes d'impersonation. Désactiver l'impersonation si non nécessaire.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit impersonation requests. Disable impersonation if not needed.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 11, |
| "name": "Node Takeover via Kubelet", |
| "category": "LateralMovement", |
| "description_fr": "Prise de contrôle d'un nœud en exploitant kubelet.", |
| "description_en": "Node takeover by exploiting kubelet.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder à l'API kubelet sur le port 10250", |
| "action_en": "Access kubelet API on port 10250", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes avec privilèges nœud via /exec", |
| "action_en": "Execute commands with node privileges via /exec", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Créer un nouveau compte utilisateur sur le nœud", |
| "action_en": "Create new user account on node", |
| "tools": [ |
| "useradd" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Installer une clé SSH pour un accès persistant", |
| "action_en": "Install SSH key for persistent access", |
| "tools": [ |
| "ssh" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1021: Remote Services" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser le nœud pour accéder à d'autres nœuds et au contrôle plane", |
| "action_en": "Use node to access other nodes and control plane", |
| "tools": [ |
| "ssh" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau à kubelet. Authentification faible ou désactivée sur kubelet.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Network access to kubelet. Weak or disabled authentication on kubelet.", |
| "detection_fr": "Activer l'authentification TLS sur kubelet. Surveiller les connexions au port 10250.", |
| "detection_en": "Enable TLS authentication on kubelet. Monitor connections to port 10250.", |
| "difficulty": "Hard" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 12, |
| "name": "DNS Spoofing to Redirect Traffic", |
| "category": "LateralMovement", |
| "description_fr": "Usurpation DNS pour rediriger le trafic vers des services malveillants.", |
| "description_en": "DNS spoofing to redirect traffic to malicious services.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir un accès à un pod avec capacités réseau étendues", |
| "action_en": "Obtain access to pod with extended network capabilities", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Déployer un serveur DNS malveillant dans le pod", |
| "action_en": "Deploy malicious DNS server in pod", |
| "tools": [ |
| "dnsmasq", |
| "bind" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Rediriger le trafic DNS vers le serveur malveillant", |
| "action_en": "Redirect DNS traffic to malicious server", |
| "tools": [ |
| "iptables" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Effectuer une attaque man-in-the-middle sur le trafic Kubernetes", |
| "action_en": "Perform man-in-the-middle attack on Kubernetes traffic", |
| "tools": [ |
| "tcpdump" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Capturer les credentials en interceptant la communication", |
| "action_en": "Capture credentials by intercepting communication", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Pod avec capacités réseau ou hostNetwork: true. Plugins DNS configurables.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Pod with network capabilities or hostNetwork: true. Configurable DNS plugins.", |
| "detection_fr": "Surveiller les changements de configuration DNS. Implémenter des NetworkPolicy strictes.", |
| "detection_en": "Monitor DNS configuration changes. Implement strict NetworkPolicy.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 13, |
| "name": "Service Account Token Theft via Pod Logs", |
| "category": "DataExfiltration", |
| "description_fr": "Vol de tokens de service account à partir des logs de pod.", |
| "description_en": "Service account token theft from pod logs.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les pods loggant les tokens de service account", |
| "action_en": "Identify pods logging service account tokens", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl", |
| "grep" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder aux logs du pod via kubectl logs", |
| "action_en": "Access pod logs via kubectl logs", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Extraire les tokens des logs", |
| "action_en": "Extract tokens from logs", |
| "tools": [ |
| "grep", |
| "sed" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser les tokens volés pour s'authentifier à l'API Server", |
| "action_en": "Use stolen tokens to authenticate to API Server", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder aux ressources du cluster avec les permissions du service account", |
| "action_en": "Access cluster resources with service account permissions", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de lecture sur les logs de pods. Pods loggant les tokens.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Read permissions on pod logs. Pods logging tokens.", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les pods. Ne pas logger les tokens. Implémenter une rotation des tokens.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit pods. Don't log tokens. Implement token rotation.", |
| "difficulty": "Easy" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 14, |
| "name": "Horizontal Pod Autoscaler Resource Exhaustion", |
| "category": "DataExfiltration", |
| "description_fr": "Attaque par épuisement de ressources via HPA pour causer une fuite de données.", |
| "description_en": "Resource exhaustion attack via HPA causing data leakage.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les déploiements avec Horizontal Pod Autoscaler", |
| "action_en": "Identify deployments with Horizontal Pod Autoscaler", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Déclencher une augmentation de la charge avec des requêtes malveillantes", |
| "action_en": "Trigger load increase with malicious requests", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl", |
| "ab" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Faire monter en charge automatiquement le nombre de pods", |
| "action_en": "Auto-scale up pod count", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données via des pods supplémentaires", |
| "action_en": "Exfiltrate data via additional pods", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Arrêter l'attaque une fois les données exfiltrées", |
| "action_en": "Stop attack once data exfiltrated", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1202: Indirect Command Execution" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Déploiements avec HPA. Capacité à générer de la charge.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Deployments with HPA. Ability to generate load.", |
| "detection_fr": "Définir des limites sur HPA maxReplicas. Surveiller les patterns d'autoscaling.", |
| "detection_en": "Set limits on HPA maxReplicas. Monitor autoscaling patterns.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 15, |
| "name": "Malicious DaemonSet Deployment", |
| "category": "Persistence", |
| "description_fr": "Déploiement d'un DaemonSet malveillant s'exécutant sur tous les nœuds.", |
| "description_en": "Deployment of malicious DaemonSet running on all nodes.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir les permissions pour créer des DaemonSet", |
| "action_en": "Obtain permissions to create DaemonSet", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Créer un DaemonSet avec un conteneur malveillant", |
| "action_en": "Create DaemonSet with malicious container", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Configurer le DaemonSet pour s'exécuter avec privilèges", |
| "action_en": "Configure DaemonSet to run with privileges", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "S'assurer que le DaemonSet persiste après les redémarrages", |
| "action_en": "Ensure DaemonSet persists after restarts", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser le DaemonSet pour exécuter des commandes sur tous les nœuds", |
| "action_en": "Use DaemonSet to execute commands on all nodes", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de création de DaemonSet. Accès à l'API Server.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "DaemonSet creation permissions. Access to API Server.", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les DaemonSet créés. Surveiller les images utilisées.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit DaemonSet creation. Monitor images used.", |
| "difficulty": "Easy" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 16, |
| "name": "Persistence via CronJob", |
| "category": "Persistence", |
| "description_fr": "Établissement de la persistance via CronJob exécutant du code malveillant.", |
| "description_en": "Persistence establishment via CronJob executing malicious code.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir les permissions pour créer des CronJob", |
| "action_en": "Obtain permissions to create CronJob", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Créer un CronJob exécutant un script malveillant", |
| "action_en": "Create CronJob executing malicious script", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Configurer une fréquence d'exécution régulière", |
| "action_en": "Set regular execution frequency", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "S'assurer que le CronJob persiste entre les redémarrages", |
| "action_en": "Ensure CronJob persists between restarts", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes malveillantes selon la planification", |
| "action_en": "Execute malicious commands on schedule", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de création de CronJob. Accès à l'API Server.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "CronJob creation permissions. Access to API Server.", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les CronJob créés. Vérifier les conteneurs utilisés.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit CronJob creation. Verify containers used.", |
| "difficulty": "Easy" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 17, |
| "name": "API Server Health Check Exploitation", |
| "category": "InitialAccess", |
| "description_fr": "Exploitation des endpoints de santé de l'API Server.", |
| "description_en": "Exploitation of API Server health check endpoints.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Scanner les ports de l'API Server (6443)", |
| "action_en": "Scan API Server ports (6443)", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder à l'endpoint /healthz sans authentification", |
| "action_en": "Access /healthz endpoint without authentication", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Énumérer les versions et les capacités de l'API Server", |
| "action_en": "Enumerate API Server versions and capabilities", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les versions vulnérables de Kubernetes", |
| "action_en": "Identify vulnerable Kubernetes versions", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Exploiter les vulnérabilités connues", |
| "action_en": "Exploit known vulnerabilities", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau à l'API Server. Endpoints non sécurisés.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Network access to API Server. Unsecured endpoints.", |
| "detection_fr": "Restreindre l'accès aux endpoints de santé. Utiliser un firewall.", |
| "detection_en": "Restrict access to health endpoints. Use firewall.", |
| "difficulty": "Easy" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 18, |
| "name": "RBAC Denial of Service", |
| "category": "DataExfiltration", |
| "description_fr": "Attaque par déni de service via RBAC en supprimant les permissions.", |
| "description_en": "Denial of service attack via RBAC by removing permissions.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir des permissions pour modifier les RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding", |
| "action_en": "Obtain permissions to modify RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Supprimer ou modifier les ClusterRoleBinding critiques", |
| "action_en": "Delete or modify critical ClusterRoleBinding", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Rendre le cluster inutilisable par les administrateurs", |
| "action_en": "Make cluster unusable for administrators", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Supprimer les traces de l'attaque en modifiant les audit logs", |
| "action_en": "Remove attack traces by modifying audit logs", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Extorquer la rançon pour restaurer les permissions", |
| "action_en": "Extort ransom to restore permissions", |
| "tools": [], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1657: Financial Theft" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de modification RBAC. Accès à l'API Server.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "RBAC modification permissions. Access to API Server.", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les modifications RBAC. Maintenir des sauvegardes des configurations.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit RBAC modifications. Maintain configuration backups.", |
| "difficulty": "Hard" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 19, |
| "name": "Network Policy Evasion via Port Forwarding", |
| "category": "LateralMovement", |
| "description_fr": "Contournement des NetworkPolicy via port forwarding kubectl.", |
| "description_en": "NetworkPolicy evasion via kubectl port forwarding.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès à kubectl exec sur un pod", |
| "action_en": "Obtain kubectl exec access on a pod", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser kubectl port-forward pour contourner les NetworkPolicy", |
| "action_en": "Use kubectl port-forward to bypass NetworkPolicy", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder aux services restreints via la redirection de port", |
| "action_en": "Access restricted services via port forwarding", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes sur les services distants", |
| "action_en": "Execute commands on remote services", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données des services restreints", |
| "action_en": "Exfiltrate data from restricted services", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions exec sur des pods. Accès à kubectl ou l'API Server.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Exec permissions on pods. Access to kubectl or API Server.", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer l'utilisation de port-forward. Restreindre les permissions exec.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit port-forward usage. Restrict exec permissions.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 20, |
| "name": "Custom Resource Definition Exploitation", |
| "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", |
| "description_fr": "Exploitation des Custom Resource Definitions (CRD) pour l'escalade de privilèges.", |
| "description_en": "Custom Resource Definition (CRD) exploitation for privilege escalation.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les CRD déployées dans le cluster", |
| "action_en": "Identify deployed CRD in cluster", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Rechercher les CRD avec des webhooks de validation/mutation", |
| "action_en": "Find CRD with validation/mutation webhooks", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Créer une instance de CRD malveillante", |
| "action_en": "Create malicious CRD instance", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Déclencher le webhook malveillant via la création/modification du CRD", |
| "action_en": "Trigger malicious webhook via CRD creation/modification", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Exécuter du code arbitraire avec les permissions du webhook", |
| "action_en": "Execute arbitrary code with webhook permissions", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "CRD avec webhooks mal configurés. Permissions de création de CRD.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "CRD with misconfigured webhooks. CRD creation permissions.", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les webhooks. Vérifier les certificats. Surveiller les appels aux webhooks.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit webhooks. Verify certificates. Monitor webhook calls.", |
| "difficulty": "Hard" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 21, |
| "name": "Operator-based Backdoor Installation", |
| "category": "Persistence", |
| "description_fr": "Installation d'une porte dérobée via un Kubernetes Operator malveillant.", |
| "description_en": "Backdoor installation via malicious Kubernetes Operator.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Créer un Operator malveillant en tant que conteneur", |
| "action_en": "Create malicious Operator as container", |
| "tools": [ |
| "docker" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Déployer le Operator malveillant dans le cluster", |
| "action_en": "Deploy malicious Operator in cluster", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Configurer le Operator pour créer des ressources malveillantes", |
| "action_en": "Configure Operator to create malicious resources", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "S'assurer la persistance via le manifeste du Operator", |
| "action_en": "Ensure persistence via Operator manifest", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser l'Operator pour exécuter du code malveillant", |
| "action_en": "Use Operator to execute malicious code", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions pour déployer des Operator. Accès au registre d'images.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Permissions to deploy Operators. Access to image registry.", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les Operator installés. Vérifier les images utilisées.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit installed Operators. Verify images used.", |
| "difficulty": "Hard" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 22, |
| "name": "Helm Chart Injection Attack", |
| "category": "InitialAccess", |
| "description_fr": "Injection de code malveillant via une Helm Chart compromettre le cluster.", |
| "description_en": "Malicious code injection via compromised Helm Chart.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les Helm Charts utilisées dans le cluster", |
| "action_en": "Identify Helm Charts used in cluster", |
| "tools": [ |
| "helm" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Créer une Helm Chart malveillante ou compromettre une existante", |
| "action_en": "Create malicious Helm Chart or compromise existing one", |
| "tools": [ |
| "helm" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Déployer la Helm Chart malveillante", |
| "action_en": "Deploy malicious Helm Chart", |
| "tools": [ |
| "helm" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Exécuter des hooks post-installation malveillants", |
| "action_en": "Execute malicious post-install hooks", |
| "tools": [ |
| "helm" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès au cluster via le code exécuté", |
| "action_en": "Obtain cluster access via executed code", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Helm Charts non signées. Permissions pour déployer des Helm Charts.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Unsigned Helm Charts. Permissions to deploy Helm Charts.", |
| "detection_fr": "Valider les Helm Charts. Utiliser les signatures. Auditer les dépendances.", |
| "detection_en": "Validate Helm Charts. Use signatures. Audit dependencies.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 23, |
| "name": "Kubelet Certificate Exploitation", |
| "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", |
| "description_fr": "Exploitation des certificats kubelet pour l'accès non autorisé.", |
| "description_en": "Kubelet certificate exploitation for unauthorized access.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder à un nœud avec les certificats kubelet", |
| "action_en": "Access node with kubelet certificates", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Localiser les certificats kubelet sur le nœud", |
| "action_en": "Locate kubelet certificates on node", |
| "tools": [ |
| "find" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Copier les certificats depuis le nœud", |
| "action_en": "Copy certificates from node", |
| "tools": [ |
| "scp" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser les certificats pour impersonifier le nœud", |
| "action_en": "Use certificates to impersonate node", |
| "tools": [ |
| "openssl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1021: Remote Services" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder à l'API Server en tant que nœud", |
| "action_en": "Access API Server as node", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1021: Remote Services" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Accès physique ou shell sur le nœud. Certificats non protégés.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Physical or shell access to node. Unprotected certificates.", |
| "detection_fr": "Protéger les certificats avec permissions restrictives. Auditer l'accès.", |
| "detection_en": "Protect certificates with restrictive permissions. Audit access.", |
| "difficulty": "Hard" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 24, |
| "name": "Sidecar Injection via Admission Controller", |
| "category": "LateralMovement", |
| "description_fr": "Injection de sidecars malveillants via les contrôleurs d'admission.", |
| "description_en": "Malicious sidecar injection via admission controllers.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les MutatingAdmissionWebhook installés", |
| "action_en": "Identify installed MutatingAdmissionWebhook", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Créer ou modifier un contrôleur d'admission malveillant", |
| "action_en": "Create or modify malicious admission controller", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Configurer le webhook pour injecter un sidecar dans tous les pods", |
| "action_en": "Configure webhook to inject sidecar into all pods", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Le sidecar s'exécute avec les permissions du pod", |
| "action_en": "Sidecar runs with pod permissions", |
| "tools": [], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser le sidecar pour accéder aux données du pod", |
| "action_en": "Use sidecar to access pod data", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Accès à créer des MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Sidecar image malveillante.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Access to create MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Malicious sidecar image.", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Vérifier les webhooks autorisés.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Verify authorized webhooks.", |
| "difficulty": "Hard" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 25, |
| "name": "Service Account Impersonation via RBAC", |
| "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", |
| "description_fr": "Usurpation d'identité de service account via les permissions RBAC.", |
| "description_en": "Service account impersonation via RBAC permissions.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les service accounts avec permissions d'usurpation", |
| "action_en": "Identify service accounts with impersonation permissions", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Vérifier que l'usurpation est autorisée pour le cluster-admin", |
| "action_en": "Check if impersonation allowed for cluster-admin", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Créer une requête API avec l'header Impersonate-User", |
| "action_en": "Create API request with Impersonate-User header", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes en tant que service account usurpé", |
| "action_en": "Execute commands as impersonated service account", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Escalader vers cluster-admin", |
| "action_en": "Escalate to cluster-admin", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions d'usurpation d'identité RBAC. Token d'un service account.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "RBAC impersonation permissions. Service account token.", |
| "detection_fr": "Auditer les permissions d'usurpation. Désactiver si non nécessaire.", |
| "detection_en": "Audit impersonation permissions. Disable if not needed.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 26, |
| "name": "Resource Quota Evasion", |
| "category": "DataExfiltration", |
| "description_fr": "Contournement des ResourceQuota pour une consommation excessive de ressources.", |
| "description_en": "ResourceQuota evasion for excessive resource consumption.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les quotas de ressources du namespace", |
| "action_en": "Identify namespace resource quotas", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Créer des pods temporaires pour consommer les ressources", |
| "action_en": "Create temporary pods to consume resources", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Supprimer les pods une fois les ressources consommées", |
| "action_en": "Delete pods after consuming resources", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser les ressources libérées pour exfiltrer les données", |
| "action_en": "Use freed resources for data exfiltration", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Nettoyer les traces de l'attaque", |
| "action_en": "Clean up attack traces", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1070: Indicator Removal" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions pour créer/supprimer des pods. ResourceQuota configurable.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Permissions to create/delete pods. Configurable ResourceQuota.", |
| "detection_fr": "Surveiller les créations/suppressions de pods. Alerter sur les patterns anormaux.", |
| "detection_en": "Monitor pod creation/deletion. Alert on abnormal patterns.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 27, |
| "name": "Kubernetes Dashboard Exploitation", |
| "category": "InitialAccess", |
| "description_fr": "Exploitation du dashboard Kubernetes exposé sans authentification.", |
| "description_en": "Kubernetes Dashboard exploitation exposed without authentication.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Découvrir le dashboard Kubernetes", |
| "action_en": "Discover Kubernetes Dashboard", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder au dashboard sans token", |
| "action_en": "Access dashboard without token", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Naviguer dans l'interface du dashboard pour obtenir des informations", |
| "action_en": "Navigate dashboard UI to gather information", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Utiliser le dashboard pour déployer des pods malveillants", |
| "action_en": "Use dashboard to deploy malicious pods", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès au cluster via les pods déployés", |
| "action_en": "Obtain cluster access via deployed pods", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Dashboard exposé sur internet. Authentification désactivée ou très faible.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Dashboard exposed on internet. Authentication disabled or very weak.", |
| "detection_fr": "Désactiver ou restreindre le dashboard. Exiger une authentification forte.", |
| "detection_en": "Disable or restrict dashboard. Require strong authentication.", |
| "difficulty": "Easy" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 28, |
| "name": "Log Manipulation and Cover-up", |
| "category": "Persistence", |
| "description_fr": "Manipulation des logs Kubernetes pour couvrir les traces de l'attaque.", |
| "description_en": "Kubernetes log manipulation to cover attack tracks.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès au système de logs (etcd, fichiers)", |
| "action_en": "Obtain access to logging system (etcd, files)", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les logs pertinents à l'attaque", |
| "action_en": "Identify logs relevant to attack", |
| "tools": [ |
| "grep" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Modifier ou supprimer les logs d'audit", |
| "action_en": "Modify or delete audit logs", |
| "tools": [ |
| "rm", |
| "sed" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Désactiver temporairement la journalisation", |
| "action_en": "Temporarily disable logging", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Réactiver la journalisation après le nettoyage", |
| "action_en": "Re-enable logging after cleanup", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Accès à etcd ou aux fichiers de logs. Permissions de modification.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Access to etcd or log files. Modification permissions.", |
| "detection_fr": "Envoyer les logs centralisés. Implémenter l'immuabilité des logs.", |
| "detection_en": "Send logs to centralized system. Implement log immutability.", |
| "difficulty": "Hard" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 29, |
| "name": "Webhook Timeout Exploitation", |
| "category": "LateralMovement", |
| "description_fr": "Exploitation des timeouts des webhooks pour contourner la validation.", |
| "description_en": "Webhook timeout exploitation to bypass validation.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Identifier les ValidatingAdmissionWebhook et leurs timeouts", |
| "action_en": "Identify ValidatingAdmissionWebhook and timeouts", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Créer un webhook malveillant qui répond lentement", |
| "action_en": "Create malicious webhook that responds slowly", |
| "tools": [ |
| "python" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Configurer le webhook pour causer un timeout", |
| "action_en": "Configure webhook to cause timeout", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Profiter du timeout pour contourner la validation", |
| "action_en": "Exploit timeout to bypass validation", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Déployer des ressources malveillantes", |
| "action_en": "Deploy malicious resources", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Webhooks avec timeouts configurables. Capacité à créer des webhooks.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Webhooks with configurable timeouts. Ability to create webhooks.", |
| "detection_fr": "Monitorer les timeouts des webhooks. Alerter sur les timeouts suspects.", |
| "detection_en": "Monitor webhook timeouts. Alert on suspicious timeouts.", |
| "difficulty": "Hard" |
| }, |
| { |
| "id": 30, |
| "name": "Metrics Server Data Extraction", |
| "category": "DataExfiltration", |
| "description_fr": "Extraction des données de métriques du Metrics Server.", |
| "description_en": "Metrics data extraction from Metrics Server.", |
| "steps": [ |
| { |
| "step_num": 1, |
| "action_fr": "Accéder au Metrics Server via l'API Server", |
| "action_en": "Access Metrics Server via API Server", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 2, |
| "action_fr": "Énumérer les métriques disponibles", |
| "action_en": "Enumerate available metrics", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 3, |
| "action_fr": "Extraire les données de consommation de ressources", |
| "action_en": "Extract resource consumption data", |
| "tools": [ |
| "kubectl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 4, |
| "action_fr": "Analyser les patterns pour identifier les services critiques", |
| "action_en": "Analyze patterns to identify critical services", |
| "tools": [ |
| "python" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" |
| }, |
| { |
| "step_num": 5, |
| "action_fr": "Cibler les services critiques pour une attaque", |
| "action_en": "Target critical services for attack", |
| "tools": [ |
| "curl" |
| ], |
| "technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service" |
| } |
| ], |
| "prerequisites_fr": "Accès à l'API Server. Permissions de lecture sur les métriques.", |
| "prerequisites_en": "Access to API Server. Read permissions on metrics.", |
| "detection_fr": "Restreindre l'accès au Metrics Server. Surveiller l'accès aux métriques.", |
| "detection_en": "Restrict Metrics Server access. Monitor metrics access.", |
| "difficulty": "Medium" |
| } |
| ] |