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401	In 2022, generative AI began to create images, audio, video and text that are indistinguishable from real photographs, recordings, films or human writing. It is possible for bad actors to use this technology to create massive amounts of misinformation or propaganda. AI pioneer Geoffrey Hinton expressed concern about AI enabling "authoritarian leaders to manipulate their electorates" on a large scale, among other risks.
402	Machine learning applications will be biased if they learn from biased data. The developers may not be aware that the bias exists. Bias can be introduced by the way training data is selected and by the way a model is deployed. If a biased algorithm is used to make decisions that can seriously harm people then the algorithm may cause discrimination. Fairness in machine learning is the study of how to prevent the harm caused by algorithmic bias. It has become serious area of academic study within AI. Researchers have discovered it is not always possible to define "fairness" in a way that satisfies all stakeholders.
403	On June 28, 2015, Google Photos's new image labeling feature mistakenly identified Jacky Alcine and a friend as "gorillas" because they were black. The system was trained on a dataset that contained very few images of black people, a problem called "sample size disparity". Google "fixed" this problem by preventing the system from labelling anything as a "gorilla". Eight years later, in 2023, Google Photos still could not identify a gorilla, and neither could similar products from Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and Amazon.
404	COMPAS is a commercial program widely used by U.S. courts to assess the likelihood of a defendant becoming a recidivist. In 2016, Julia Angwin at ProPublica discovered that COMPAS exhibited racial bias, despite the fact that the program was not told the races of the defendants. Although the error rate for both whites and blacks was calibrated equal at exactly 61%, the errors for each race were different—the system consistently overestimated the chance that a black person would re-offend and would underestimate the chance that a white person would not re-offend. In 2017, several researchers showed that it was mathematically impossible for COMPAS to accommodate all possible measures of fairness when the base rates of re-offense were different for whites and blacks in the data.
405	A program can make biased decisions even if the data does not explicitly mention a problematic feature . The feature will correlate with other features , and the program will make the same decisions based on these features as it would on "race" or "gender". Moritz Hardt said "the most robust fact in this research area is that fairness through blindness doesn't work."
406	Criticism of COMPAS highlighted that machine learning models are designed to make "predictions" that are only valid if we assume that the future will resemble the past. If they are trained on data that includes the results of racist decisions in the past, machine learning models must predict that racist decisions will be made in the future. If an application then uses these predictions as recommendations, some of these "recommendations" will likely be racist. Thus, machine learning is not well suited to help make decisions in areas where there is hope that the future will be better than the past. It is necessarily descriptive and not proscriptive.
407	Bias and unfairness may go undetected because the developers are overwhelmingly white and male: among AI engineers, about 4% are black and 20% are women.
408	At its 2022 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency , the Association for Computing Machinery, in Seoul, South Korea, presented and published findings that recommend that until AI and robotics systems are demonstrated to be free of bias mistakes, they are unsafe, and the use of self-learning neural networks trained on vast, unregulated sources of flawed internet data should be curtailed.
409	Many AI systems are so complex that their designers cannot explain how they reach their decisions. Particularly with deep neural networks, in which there are a large amount of non-linear relationships between inputs and outputs. But some popular explainability techniques exist.
410	It is impossible to be certain that a program is operating correctly if no one knows how exactly it works. There have been many cases where a machine learning program passed rigorous tests, but nevertheless learned something different than what the programmers intended. For example, a system that could identify skin diseases better than medical professionals was found to actually have a strong tendency to classify images with a ruler as "cancerous", because pictures of malignancies typically include a ruler to show the scale. Another machine learning system designed to help effectively allocate medical resources was found to classify patients with asthma as being at "low risk" of dying from pneumonia. Having asthma is actually a severe risk factor, but since the patients having asthma would usually get much more medical care, they were relatively unlikely to die according to the training data. The correlation between asthma and low risk of dying from pneumonia was real, but misleading.
411	People who have been harmed by an algorithm's decision have a right to an explanation. Doctors, for example, are expected to clearly and completely explain to their colleagues the reasoning behind any decision they make. Early drafts of the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation in 2016 included an explicit statement that this right exists. Industry experts noted that this is an unsolved problem with no solution in sight. Regulators argued that nevertheless the harm is real: if the problem has no solution, the tools should not be used.
412	DARPA established the XAI program in 2014 to try and solve these problems.
413	There are several possible solutions to the transparency problem. SHAP tried to solve the transparency problems by visualising the contribution of each feature to the output. LIME can locally approximate a model with a simpler, interpretable model. Multitask learning provides a large number of outputs in addition to the target classification. These other outputs can help developers deduce what the network has learned. Deconvolution, DeepDream and other generative methods can allow developers to see what different layers of a deep network have learned and produce output that can suggest what the network is learning.
414	Artificial intelligence provides a number of tools that are useful to bad actors, such as authoritarian governments, terrorists, criminals or rogue states.
415	A lethal autonomous weapon is a machine that locates, selects and engages human targets without human supervision. Widely available AI tools can be used by bad actors to develop inexpensive autonomous weapons and, if produced at scale, they are potentially weapons of mass destruction. Even when used in conventional warfare, it is unlikely that they will be unable to reliably choose targets and could potentially kill an innocent person. In 2014, 30 nations supported a ban on autonomous weapons under the United Nations' Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, however the United States and others disagreed. By 2015, over fifty countries were reported to be researching battlefield robots.
416	AI tools make it easier for authoritarian governments to efficiently control their citizens in several ways. Face and voice recognition allow widespread surveillance. Machine learning, operating this data, can classify potential enemies of the state and prevent them from hiding. Recommendation systems can precisely target propaganda and misinformation for maximum effect. Deepfakes and generative AI aid in producing misinformation. Advanced AI can make authoritarian centralized decision making more competitive with liberal and decentralized systems such as markets. It lowers the cost and difficulty of digital warfare and advanced spyware. All these technologies have been available since 2020 or earlier -- AI facial recognition systems are already being used for mass surveillance in China.
417	There many other ways that AI is expected to help bad actors, some of which can not be foreseen. For example, machine-learning AI is able to design tens of thousands of toxic molecules in a matter of hours.
418	Training AI systems requires an enormous amount of computing power. Usually only Big Tech companies have the financial resources to make such investments. Smaller startups such as Cohere and OpenAI end up buying access to data centers from Google and Microsoft respectively.
419	Economists have frequently highlighted the risks of redundancies from AI, and speculated about unemployment if there is no adequate social policy for full employment.
420	In the past, technology has tended to increase rather than reduce total employment, but economists acknowledge that "we're in uncharted territory" with AI. A survey of economists showed disagreement about whether the increasing use of robots and AI will cause a substantial increase in long-term unemployment, but they generally agree that it could be a net benefit if productivity gains are redistributed. Risk estimates vary; for example, in the 2010s, Michael Osborne and Carl Benedikt Frey estimated 47% of U.S. jobs are at "high risk" of potential automation, while an OECD report classified only 9% of U.S. jobs as "high risk". The methodology of speculating about future employment levels has been criticised as lacking evidential foundation, and for implying that technology, rather than social policy, creates unemployment, as opposed to redundancies. In April 2023, it was reported that 70% of the jobs for Chinese video game illustrators had been eliminated by generative artificial intelligence.
421	Unlike previous waves of automation, many middle-class jobs may be eliminated by artificial intelligence; The Economist stated in 2015 that "the worry that AI could do to white-collar jobs what steam power did to blue-collar ones during the Industrial Revolution" is "worth taking seriously". Jobs at extreme risk range from paralegals to fast food cooks, while job demand is likely to increase for care-related professions ranging from personal healthcare to the clergy.
422	From the early days of the development of artificial intelligence, there have been arguments, for example, those put forward by Joseph Weizenbaum, about whether tasks that can be done by computers actually should be done by them, given the difference between computers and humans, and between quantitative calculation and qualitative, value-based judgement.
423	It has been argued AI will become so powerful that humanity may irreversibly lose control of it. This could, as physicist Stephen Hawking stated, "spell the end of the human race". This scenario has been common in science fiction, when a computer or robot suddenly develops a human-like "self-awareness" and becomes a malevolent character. These sci-fi scenarios are misleading in several ways.
424	First, AI does not require human-like "sentience" to be an existential risk. Modern AI programs are given specific goals and use learning and intelligence to achieve them. Philosopher Nick Bostrom argued that if one gives almost any goal to a sufficiently powerful AI, it may choose to destroy humanity to achieve it . Stuart Russell gives the example of household robot that tries to find a way to kill its owner to prevent it from being unplugged, reasoning that "you can't fetch the coffee if you're dead." In order to be safe for humanity, a superintelligence would have to be genuinely aligned with humanity's morality and values so that it is "fundamentally on our side".
425	Second, Yuval Noah Harari argues that AI does not require a robot body or physical control to pose an existential risk. The essential parts of civilization are not physical. Things like ideologies, law, government, money and the economy are made of language; they exist because there are stories that billions of people believe. The current prevalence of misinformation suggests that an AI could use language to convince people to believe anything, even to take actions that are destructive.
426	The opinions amongst experts and industry insiders are mixed, with sizable fractions both concerned and unconcerned by risk from eventual superintelligent AI. Personalities such as Stephen Hawking, Bill Gates, and Elon Musk have expressed concern about existential risk from AI. AI pioneers including Fei-Fei Li, Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio, Cynthia Breazeal, Rana el Kaliouby, Demis Hassabis, Joy Buolamwini, and Sam Altman have expressed concerns about the risks of AI. In 2023, many leading AI experts issued the joint statement that "Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war".
427	Other researchers, however, spoke in favor of a less dystopian view. AI pioneer Juergen Schmidhuber did not sign the joint statement, emphasising that in 95% of all cases, AI research is about making "human lives longer and healthier and easier." While the tools that are now being used to improve lives can also be used by bad actors, "they can also be used against the bad actors." Andrew Ng also argued that "it's a mistake to fall for the doomsday hype on AI—and that regulators who do will only benefit vested interests." Yann LeCun "scoffs at his peers' dystopian scenarios of supercharged misinformation and even, eventually, human extinction." In the early 2010s, experts argued that the risks are too distant in the future to warrant research or that humans will be valuable from the perspective of a superintelligent machine. However, after 2016, the study of current and future risks and possible solutions became a serious area of research.
428	Friendly AI are machines that have been designed from the beginning to minimize risks and to make choices that benefit humans. Eliezer Yudkowsky, who coined the term, argues that developing friendly AI should be a higher research priority: it may require a large investment and it must be completed before AI becomes an existential risk.
429	Machines with intelligence have the potential to use their intelligence to make ethical decisions. The field of machine ethics provides machines with ethical principles and procedures for resolving ethical dilemmas. The field of machine ethics is also called computational morality, and was founded at an AAAI symposium in 2005.
430	Other approaches include Wendell Wallach's "artificial moral agents" and Stuart J. Russell's three principles for developing provably beneficial machines.
431	Artificial Intelligence projects can have their ethical permissibility tested while designing, developing, and implementing an AI system. An AI framework such as the Care and Act Framework containing the SUM values—developed by the Alan Turing Institute tests projects in four main areas:
432	Other developments in ethical frameworks include those decided upon during the Asilomar Conference, the Montreal Declaration for Responsible AI, and the IEEE's Ethics of Autonomous Systems initiative, among others; however, these principles do not go without their criticisms, especially regards to the people chosen contributes to these frameworks.
433	Promotion of the wellbeing of the people and communities that these technologies affect requires consideration of the social and ethical implications at all stages of AI system design, development and implementation, and collaboration between job roles such as data scientists, product managers, data engineers, domain experts, and delivery managers.
434	The regulation of artificial intelligence is the development of public sector policies and laws for promoting and regulating artificial intelligence ; it is therefore related to the broader regulation of algorithms. The regulatory and policy landscape for AI is an emerging issue in jurisdictions globally. According to AI Index at Stanford, the annual number of AI-related laws passed in the 127 survey countries jumped from one passed in 2016 to 37 passed in 2022 alone. Between 2016 and 2020, more than 30 countries adopted dedicated strategies for AI. Most EU member states had released national AI strategies, as had Canada, China, India, Japan, Mauritius, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, US and Vietnam. Others were in the process of elaborating their own AI strategy, including Bangladesh, Malaysia and Tunisia. The Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence was launched in June 2020, stating a need for AI to be developed in accordance with human rights and democratic values, to ensure public confidence and trust in the technology. Henry Kissinger, Eric Schmidt, and Daniel Huttenlocher published a joint statement in November 2021 calling for a government commission to regulate AI. In 2023, OpenAI leaders published recommendations for the governance of superintelligence, which they believe may happen in less than 10 years. In 2023, the United Nations also launched an advisory body to provide recommendations on AI governance; the body comprises technology company executives, governments officials and academics.
435	In a 2022 Ipsos survey, attitudes towards AI varied greatly by country; 78% of Chinese citizens, but only 35% of Americans, agreed that "products and services using AI have more benefits than drawbacks". A 2023 Reuters/Ipsos poll found that 61% of Americans agree, and 22% disagree, that AI poses risks to humanity. In a 2023 Fox News poll, 35% of Americans thought it "very important", and an additional 41% thought it "somewhat important", for the federal government to regulate AI, versus 13% responding "not very important" and 8% responding "not at all important".
436	In November 2023, the first global AI Safety Summit was held in Bletchley Park in the UK to discuss the near and far term risks of AI and the possibility of mandatory and voluntary regulatory frameworks. 28 countries including the United States, China, and the European Union issued a declaration at the start of the summit, calling for international co-operation to manage the challenges and risks of artificial intelligence.
437	The study of mechanical or "formal" reasoning began with philosophers and mathematicians in antiquity. The study of logic led directly to Alan Turing's theory of computation, which suggested that a machine, by shuffling symbols as simple as "0" and "1", could simulate any conceivable form of mathematical reasoning. This, along with concurrent discoveries in cybernetics, information theory and neurobiology, led researchers to consider the possibility of building an "electronic brain". They developed several areas of research that would become part of AI, such as McCullouch and Pitts design for "artificial neurons" in 1943, and Turing's influential 1950 paper 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence', which introduced the Turing test and showed that "machine intelligence" was plausible.
438	The field of AI research was founded at a workshop at Dartmouth College in 1956. The attendees became the leaders of AI research in the 1960s. They and their students produced programs that the press described as "astonishing": computers were learning checkers strategies, solving word problems in algebra, proving logical theorems and speaking English. Artificial intelligence laboratories were set up at a number of British and U.S. Universities in the latter 1950s and early 1960s.
439	Researchers in the 1960s and the 1970s were convinced that their methods would eventually succeed in creating a machine with general intelligence and considered this the goal of their field. Herbert Simon predicted, "machines will be capable, within twenty years, of doing any work a man can do". Marvin Minsky agreed, writing, "within a generation ... the problem of creating 'artificial intelligence' will substantially be solved". They had, however, underestimated the difficulty of the problem. In 1974, both the U.S. and British governments cut off exploratory research in response to the criticism of Sir James Lighthill and ongoing pressure from the U.S. Congress to fund more productive projects. Minsky's and Papert's book Perceptrons was understood as proving that artificial neural networks would never be useful for solving real-world tasks, thus discrediting the approach altogether. The "AI winter", a period when obtaining funding for AI projects was difficult, followed.
440	In the early 1980s, AI research was revived by the commercial success of expert systems, a form of AI program that simulated the knowledge and analytical skills of human experts. By 1985, the market for AI had reached over a billion dollars. At the same time, Japan's fifth generation computer project inspired the U.S. and British governments to restore funding for academic research. However, beginning with the collapse of the Lisp Machine market in 1987, AI once again fell into disrepute, and a second, longer-lasting winter began.
441	Up to this point, most of AI's funding had gone to projects which used high level symbols to represent mental objects like plans, goals, beliefs and known facts. In the 1980s, some researchers began to doubt that this approach would be able to imitate all the processes of human cognition, especially perception, robotics, learning and pattern recognition, and began to look into "sub-symbolic" approaches. Rodney Brooks rejected "representation" in general and focussed directly on engineering machines that move and survive. Judea Pearl, Lofti Zadeh and others developed methods that handled incomplete and uncertain information by making reasonable guesses rather than precise logic. But the most important development was the revival of "connectionism", including neural network research, by Geoffrey Hinton and others. In 1990, Yann LeCun successfully showed that convolutional neural networks can recognize handwritten digits, the first of many successful applications of neural networks.
442	AI gradually restored its reputation in the late 1990s and early 21st century by exploiting formal mathematical methods and by finding specific solutions to specific problems. This "narrow" and "formal" focus allowed researchers to produce verifiable results and collaborate with other fields . By 2000, solutions developed by AI researchers were being widely used, although in the 1990s they were rarely described as "artificial intelligence". However, several academic researchers became concerned that AI was no longer pursuing its original goal of creating versatile, fully intelligent machines. Beginning around 2002, they founded the subfield of artificial general intelligence , which had several well-funded institutions by the 2010s.
443	Deep learning began to dominate industry benchmarks in 2012 and was adopted throughout the field. For many specific tasks, other methods were abandoned. Deep learning's success was based on both hardware improvements and access to large amounts of data . Deep learning's success led to an enormous increase in interest and funding in AI. The amount of machine learning research increased by 50% in the years 2015–2019.
444	In 2016, issues of fairness and the misuse of technology were catapulted into center stage at machine learning conferences, publications vastly increased, funding became available, and many researchers re-focussed their careers on these issues. The alignment problem became a serious field of academic study.
445	In the late teens and early 2020s, AGI companies began to deliver programs that created enormous interest. In 2015, AlphaGo, developed by DeepMind, beat the world champion Go player. The program was taught only the rules of the game and developed strategy by itself. GPT-3 is a large language model that was released in 2020 by OpenAI and is capable of generating high-quality human-like text. These programs, and others, inspired an aggressive AI boom, where large companies began investing billions in AI research. According to 'AI Impacts', about $50 billion annually was invested in "AI" around 2022 in the U.S. alone and about 20% of new US Computer Science PhD graduates have specialized in "AI". About 800,000 "AI"-related US job openings existed in 2022.
446	Alan Turing wrote in 1950 "I propose to consider the question 'can machines think'?" He advised changing the question from whether a machine "thinks", to "whether or not it is possible for machinery to show intelligent behaviour". He devised the Turing test, which measures the ability of a machine to simulate human conversation. Since we can only observe the behavior of the machine, it does not matter if it is "actually" thinking or literally has a "mind". Turing notes that we can not determine these things about other people but "it is usual to have a polite convention that everyone thinks"
447	Russell and Norvig agree with Turing that intelligence must be defined in terms of external behavior, not internal structure. However, they are critical that the test requires the machine to imitate humans. "Aeronautical engineering texts," they wrote, "do not define the goal of their field as making 'machines that fly so exactly like pigeons that they can fool other pigeons.'" AI founder John McCarthy agreed, writing that "Artificial intelligence is not, by definition, simulation of human intelligence".
448	McCarthy defines intelligence as "the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world." Another AI founder, Marvin Minsky similarly describes it as "the ability to solve hard problems". The leading AI textbook defines it as the study of agents that perceive their environment and take actions that maximize their chances of achieving defined goals. These definitions view intelligence in terms of well-defined problems with well-defined solutions, where both the difficulty of the problem and the performance of the program are direct measures of the "intelligence" of the machine—and no other philosophical discussion is required, or may not even be possible.
449	Another definition has been adopted by Google, a major practitioner in the field of AI. This definition stipulates the ability of systems to synthesize information as the manifestation of intelligence, similar to the way it is defined in biological intelligence.
450	No established unifying theory or paradigm has guided AI research for most of its history. The unprecedented success of statistical machine learning in the 2010s eclipsed all other approaches . This approach is mostly sub-symbolic, soft and narrow . Critics argue that these questions may have to be revisited by future generations of AI researchers.
451	Symbolic AI simulated the high-level conscious reasoning that people use when they solve puzzles, express legal reasoning and do mathematics. They were highly successful at "intelligent" tasks such as algebra or IQ tests. In the 1960s, Newell and Simon proposed the physical symbol systems hypothesis: "A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means of general intelligent action."
452	However, the symbolic approach failed on many tasks that humans solve easily, such as learning, recognizing an object or commonsense reasoning. Moravec's paradox is the discovery that high-level "intelligent" tasks were easy for AI, but low level "instinctive" tasks were extremely difficult. Philosopher Hubert Dreyfus had argued since the 1960s that human expertise depends on unconscious instinct rather than conscious symbol manipulation, and on having a "feel" for the situation, rather than explicit symbolic knowledge. Although his arguments had been ridiculed and ignored when they were first presented, eventually, AI research came to agree with him.
453	The issue is not resolved: sub-symbolic reasoning can make many of the same inscrutable mistakes that human intuition does, such as algorithmic bias. Critics such as Noam Chomsky argue continuing research into symbolic AI will still be necessary to attain general intelligence, in part because sub-symbolic AI is a move away from explainable AI: it can be difficult or impossible to understand why a modern statistical AI program made a particular decision. The emerging field of neuro-symbolic artificial intelligence attempts to bridge the two approaches.
454	"Neats" hope that intelligent behavior is described using simple, elegant principles . "Scruffies" expect that it necessarily requires solving a large number of unrelated problems. Neats defend their programs with theoretical rigor, scruffies rely mainly on incremental testing to see if they work. This issue was actively discussed in the 1970s and 1980s, but eventually was seen as irrelevant. Modern AI has elements of both.
455	Finding a provably correct or optimal solution is intractable for many important problems. Soft computing is a set of techniques, including genetic algorithms, fuzzy logic and neural networks, that are tolerant of imprecision, uncertainty, partial truth and approximation. Soft computing was introduced in the late 1980s and most successful AI programs in the 21st century are examples of soft computing with neural networks.
456	AI researchers are divided as to whether to pursue the goals of artificial general intelligence and superintelligence directly or to solve as many specific problems as possible in hopes these solutions will lead indirectly to the field's long-term goals. General intelligence is difficult to define and difficult to measure, and modern AI has had more verifiable successes by focusing on specific problems with specific solutions. The experimental sub-field of artificial general intelligence studies this area exclusively.
457	The philosophy of mind does not know whether a machine can have a mind, consciousness and mental states, in the same sense that human beings do. This issue considers the internal experiences of the machine, rather than its external behavior. Mainstream AI research considers this issue irrelevant because it does not affect the goals of the field: to build machines that can solve problems using intelligence. Russell and Norvig add that "he additional project of making a machine conscious in exactly the way humans are is not one that we are equipped to take on." However, the question has become central to the philosophy of mind. It is also typically the central question at issue in artificial intelligence in fiction.
458	David Chalmers identified two problems in understanding the mind, which he named the "hard" and "easy" problems of consciousness. The easy problem is understanding how the brain processes signals, makes plans and controls behavior. The hard problem is explaining how this feels or why it should feel like anything at all, assuming we are right in thinking that it truly does feel like something . Human information processing is easy to explain, however, human subjective experience is difficult to explain. For example, it is easy to imagine a color-blind person who has learned to identify which objects in their field of view are red, but it is not clear what would be required for the person to know what red looks like.
459	Computationalism is the position in the philosophy of mind that the human mind is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. Computationalism argues that the relationship between mind and body is similar or identical to the relationship between software and hardware and thus may be a solution to the mind–body problem. This philosophical position was inspired by the work of AI researchers and cognitive scientists in the 1960s and was originally proposed by philosophers Jerry Fodor and Hilary Putnam.
460	Philosopher John Searle characterized this position as "strong AI": "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds." Searle counters this assertion with his Chinese room argument, which attempts to show that, even if a machine perfectly simulates human behavior, there is still no reason to suppose it also has a mind.
461	It is difficult or impossible to reliably evaluate whether an advanced AI is sentient , and if so, to what degree. But if there is a significant chance that a given machine can feel and suffer, then it may be entitled to certain rights or welfare protection measures, similarly to animals. Sapience may provide another moral basis for AI rights. Robot rights are also sometimes proposed as a practical way to integrate autonomous agents into society.
462	In 2017, the European Union considered granting "electronic personhood" to some of the most capable AI systems. Similarly to the legal status of companies, it would have conferred rights but also responsibilities. Critics argued in 2018 that granting rights to AI systems would downplay the importance of human rights, and that legislation should focus on user needs rather than speculative futuristic scenarios. They also noted that robots lacked the autonomy to take part to society on their own.
463	Progress in AI increased interest in the topic. Proponents of AI welfare and rights often argue that AI sentience, if it emerges, would be particularly easy to deny. They warn that this may be a moral blind spot analogous to slavery or factory farming, which could lead to large-scale suffering if sentient AI is created and carelessly exploited.
464	A superintelligence is a hypothetical agent that would possess intelligence far surpassing that of the brightest and most gifted human mind.
465	If research into artificial general intelligence produced sufficiently intelligent software, it might be able to reprogram and improve itself. The improved software would be even better at improving itself, leading to what I. J. Good called an "intelligence explosion" and Vernor Vinge called a "singularity".
466	However, technologies cannot improve exponentially indefinitely, and typically follow an S-shaped curve, slowing when they reach the physical limits of what the technology can do.
467	Robot designer Hans Moravec, cyberneticist Kevin Warwick, and inventor Ray Kurzweil have predicted that humans and machines will merge in the future into cyborgs that are more capable and powerful than either. This idea, called transhumanism, has roots in Aldous Huxley and Robert Ettinger.
468	Edward Fredkin argues that "artificial intelligence is the next stage in evolution", an idea first proposed by Samuel Butler's "Darwin among the Machines" as far back as 1863, and expanded upon by George Dyson in his book of the same name in 1998.
469	Thought-capable artificial beings have appeared as storytelling devices since antiquity, and have been a persistent theme in science fiction.
470	A common trope in these works began with Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, where a human creation becomes a threat to its masters. This includes such works as Arthur C. Clarke's and Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey , with HAL 9000, the murderous computer in charge of the Discovery One spaceship, as well as The Terminator and The Matrix . In contrast, the rare loyal robots such as Gort from The Day the Earth Stood Still and Bishop from Aliens are less prominent in popular culture.
471	Isaac Asimov introduced the Three Laws of Robotics in many books and stories, most notably the "Multivac" series about a super-intelligent computer of the same name. Asimov's laws are often brought up during lay discussions of machine ethics; while almost all artificial intelligence researchers are familiar with Asimov's laws through popular culture, they generally consider the laws useless for many reasons, one of which is their ambiguity.
472	Several works use AI to force us to confront the fundamental question of what makes us human, showing us artificial beings that have the ability to feel, and thus to suffer. This appears in Karel Čapek's R.U.R., the films A.I. Artificial Intelligence and Ex Machina, as well as the novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, by Philip K. Dick. Dick considers the idea that our understanding of human subjectivity is altered by technology created with artificial intelligence.
473	The two most widely used textbooks in 2023. .
474	These were the four of the most widely used AI textbooks in 2008:
475	A cellular automaton is a discrete model of computation studied in automata theory. Cellular automata are also called cellular spaces, tessellation automata, homogeneous structures, cellular structures, tessellation structures, and iterative arrays. Cellular automata have found application in various areas, including physics, theoretical biology and microstructure modeling.
476	A cellular automaton consists of a regular grid of cells, each in one of a finite number of states, such as on and off . The grid can be in any finite number of dimensions. For each cell, a set of cells called its neighborhood is defined relative to the specified cell. An initial state is selected by assigning a state for each cell. A new generation is created , according to some fixed rule that determines the new state of each cell in terms of the current state of the cell and the states of the cells in its neighborhood. Typically, the rule for updating the state of cells is the same for each cell and does not change over time, and is applied to the whole grid simultaneously, though exceptions are known, such as the stochastic cellular automaton and asynchronous cellular automaton.
477	The concept was originally discovered in the 1940s by Stanislaw Ulam and John von Neumann while they were contemporaries at Los Alamos National Laboratory. While studied by some throughout the 1950s and 1960s, it was not until the 1970s and Conway's Game of Life, a two-dimensional cellular automaton, that interest in the subject expanded beyond academia. In the 1980s, Stephen Wolfram engaged in a systematic study of one-dimensional cellular automata, or what he calls elementary cellular automata; his research assistant Matthew Cook showed that one of these rules is Turing-complete.
478	The primary classifications of cellular automata, as outlined by Wolfram, are numbered one to four. They are, in order, automata in which patterns generally stabilize into homogeneity, automata in which patterns evolve into mostly stable or oscillating structures, automata in which patterns evolve in a seemingly chaotic fashion, and automata in which patterns become extremely complex and may last for a long time, with stable local structures. This last class is thought to be computationally universal, or capable of simulating a Turing machine. Special types of cellular automata are reversible, where only a single configuration leads directly to a subsequent one, and totalistic, in which the future value of individual cells only depends on the total value of a group of neighboring cells. Cellular automata can simulate a variety of real-world systems, including biological and chemical ones.
479	One way to simulate a two-dimensional cellular automaton is with an infinite sheet of graph paper along with a set of rules for the cells to follow. Each square is called a "cell" and each cell has two possible states, black and white. The neighborhood of a cell is the nearby, usually adjacent, cells. The two most common types of neighborhoods are the von Neumann neighborhood and the Moore neighborhood. The former, named after the founding cellular automaton theorist, consists of the four orthogonally adjacent cells. The latter includes the von Neumann neighborhood as well as the four diagonally adjacent cells. For such a cell and its Moore neighborhood, there are 512 possible patterns. For each of the 512 possible patterns, the rule table would state whether the center cell will be black or white on the next time interval. Conway's Game of Life is a popular version of this model. Another common neighborhood type is the extended von Neumann neighborhood, which includes the two closest cells in each orthogonal direction, for a total of eight. The general equation for the total number of automata possible is kks, where k is the number of possible states for a cell, and s is the number of neighboring cells used to determine the cell's next state. Thus, in the two-dimensional system with a Moore neighborhood, the total number of automata possible would be 229, or 1.34×10154.
480	It is usually assumed that every cell in the universe starts in the same state, except for a finite number of cells in other states; the assignment of state values is called a configuration. More generally, it is sometimes assumed that the universe starts out covered with a periodic pattern, and only a finite number of cells violate that pattern. The latter assumption is common in one-dimensional cellular automata.
481	Cellular automata are often simulated on a finite grid rather than an infinite one. In two dimensions, the universe would be a rectangle instead of an infinite plane. The obvious problem with finite grids is how to handle the cells on the edges. How they are handled will affect the values of all the cells in the grid. One possible method is to allow the values in those cells to remain constant. Another method is to define neighborhoods differently for these cells. One could say that they have fewer neighbors, but then one would also have to define new rules for the cells located on the edges. These cells are usually handled with periodic boundary conditions resulting in a toroidal arrangement: when one goes off the top, one comes in at the corresponding position on the bottom, and when one goes off the left, one comes in on the right. This can be visualized as taping the left and right edges of the rectangle to form a tube, then taping the top and bottom edges of the tube to form a torus . Universes of other dimensions are handled similarly. This solves boundary problems with neighborhoods, but another advantage is that it is easily programmable using modular arithmetic functions. For example, in a 1-dimensional cellular automaton like the examples below, the neighborhood of a cell xit is {xi−1t−1, xit−1, xi+1t−1}, where t is the time step , and i is the index in one generation.
482	Stanislaw Ulam, while working at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1940s, studied the growth of crystals, using a simple lattice network as his model. At the same time, John von Neumann, Ulam's colleague at Los Alamos, was working on the problem of self-replicating systems. Von Neumann's initial design was founded upon the notion of one robot building another robot. This design is known as the kinematic model. As he developed this design, von Neumann came to realize the great difficulty of building a self-replicating robot, and of the great cost in providing the robot with a "sea of parts" from which to build its replicant. Neumann wrote a paper entitled "The general and logical theory of automata" for the Hixon Symposium in 1948. Ulam was the one who suggested using a discrete system for creating a reductionist model of self-replication. Nils Aall Barricelli performed many of the earliest explorations of these models of artificial life.
483	Ulam and von Neumann created a method for calculating liquid motion in the late 1950s. The driving concept of the method was to consider a liquid as a group of discrete units and calculate the motion of each based on its neighbors' behaviors. Thus was born the first system of cellular automata. Like Ulam's lattice network, von Neumann's cellular automata are two-dimensional, with his self-replicator implemented algorithmically. The result was a universal copier and constructor working within a cellular automaton with a small neighborhood , and with 29 states per cell. Von Neumann gave an existence proof that a particular pattern would make endless copies of itself within the given cellular universe by designing a 200,000 cell configuration that could do so. This design is known as the tessellation model, and is called a von Neumann universal constructor.
484	Also in the 1940s, Norbert Wiener and Arturo Rosenblueth developed a model of excitable media with some of the characteristics of a cellular automaton. Their specific motivation was the mathematical description of impulse conduction in cardiac systems. However their model is not a cellular automaton because the medium in which signals propagate is continuous, and wave fronts are curves. A true cellular automaton model of excitable media was developed and studied by J. M. Greenberg and S. P. Hastings in 1978; see Greenberg-Hastings cellular automaton. The original work of Wiener and Rosenblueth contains many insights and continues to be cited in modern research publications on cardiac arrhythmia and excitable systems.
485	In the 1960s, cellular automata were studied as a particular type of dynamical system and the connection with the mathematical field of symbolic dynamics was established for the first time. In 1969, Gustav A. Hedlund compiled many results following this point of view in what is still considered as a seminal paper for the mathematical study of cellular automata. The most fundamental result is the characterization in the Curtis–Hedlund–Lyndon theorem of the set of global rules of cellular automata as the set of continuous endomorphisms of shift spaces.
486	In 1969, German computer pioneer Konrad Zuse published his book Calculating Space, proposing that the physical laws of the universe are discrete by nature, and that the entire universe is the output of a deterministic computation on a single cellular automaton; "Zuse's Theory" became the foundation of the field of study called digital physics.
487	Also in 1969 computer scientist Alvy Ray Smith completed a Stanford PhD dissertation on Cellular Automata Theory, the first mathematical treatment of CA as a general class of computers. Many papers came from this dissertation: He showed the equivalence of neighborhoods of various shapes, how to reduce a Moore to a von Neumann neighborhood or how to reduce any neighborhood to a von Neumann neighborhood. He proved that two-dimensional CA are computation universal, introduced 1-dimensional CA, and showed that they too are computation universal, even with simple neighborhoods. He showed how to subsume the complex von Neumann proof of construction universality into a consequence of computation universality in a 1-dimensional CA. Intended as the introduction to the German edition of von Neumann's book on CA, he wrote a survey of the field with dozens of references to papers, by many authors in many countries over a decade or so of work, often overlooked by modern CA researchers.
488	In the 1970s a two-state, two-dimensional cellular automaton named Game of Life became widely known, particularly among the early computing community. Invented by John Conway and popularized by Martin Gardner in a Scientific American article, its rules are as follows:
489	Any live cell with fewer than two live neighbours dies, as if caused by underpopulation.
490	Any live cell with two or three live neighbours lives on to the next generation.
491	Any live cell with more than three live neighbours dies, as if by overpopulation.
492	Any dead cell with exactly three live neighbours becomes a live cell, as if by reproduction.
493	Despite its simplicity, the system achieves an impressive diversity of behavior, fluctuating between apparent randomness and order. One of the most apparent features of the Game of Life is the frequent occurrence of gliders, arrangements of cells that essentially move themselves across the grid. It is possible to arrange the automaton so that the gliders interact to perform computations, and after much effort it has been shown that the Game of Life can emulate a universal Turing machine. It was viewed as a largely recreational topic, and little follow-up work was done outside of investigating the particularities of the Game of Life and a few related rules in the early 1970s.
494	Stephen Wolfram independently began working on cellular automata in mid-1981 after considering how complex patterns seemed formed in nature in violation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. His investigations were initially spurred by a desire to model systems such as the neural networks found in brains. He published his first paper in Reviews of Modern Physics investigating elementary cellular automata in June 1983. The unexpected complexity of the behavior of these simple rules led Wolfram to suspect that complexity in nature may be due to similar mechanisms. His investigations, however, led him to realize that cellular automata were poor at modelling neural networks. Additionally, during this period Wolfram formulated the concepts of intrinsic randomness and computational irreducibility, and suggested that rule 110 may be universal—a fact proved later by Wolfram's research assistant Matthew Cook in the 1990s.
495	Wolfram, in A New Kind of Science and several papers dating from the mid-1980s, defined four classes into which cellular automata and several other simple computational models can be divided depending on their behavior. While earlier studies in cellular automata tended to try to identify type of patterns for specific rules, Wolfram's classification was the first attempt to classify the rules themselves. In order of complexity the classes are:
496	These definitions are qualitative in nature and there is some room for interpretation. According to Wolfram, "...with almost any general classification scheme there are inevitably cases which get assigned to one class by one definition and another class by another definition. And so it is with cellular automata: there are occasionally rules...that show some features of one class and some of another." Wolfram's classification has been empirically matched to a clustering of the compressed lengths of the outputs of cellular automata.
497	There have been several attempts to classify cellular automata in formally rigorous classes, inspired by Wolfram's classification. For instance, Culik and Yu proposed three well-defined classes , which are sometimes called Culik–Yu classes; membership in these proved undecidable. Wolfram's class 2 can be partitioned into two subgroups of stable and oscillating rules.
498	The idea that there are 4 classes of dynamical system came originally from Nobel-prize winning chemist Ilya Prigogine who identified these 4 classes of thermodynamical systems: systems in thermodynamic equilibrium, spatially/temporally uniform systems, chaotic systems, and complex far-from-equilibrium systems with dissipative structures .
499	A cellular automaton is reversible if, for every current configuration of the cellular automaton, there is exactly one past configuration . If one thinks of a cellular automaton as a function mapping configurations to configurations, reversibility implies that this function is bijective. If a cellular automaton is reversible, its time-reversed behavior can also be described as a cellular automaton; this fact is a consequence of the Curtis–Hedlund–Lyndon theorem, a topological characterization of cellular automata. For cellular automata in which not every configuration has a preimage, the configurations without preimages are called Garden of Eden patterns.
500	For one-dimensional cellular automata there are known algorithms for deciding whether a rule is reversible or irreversible. However, for cellular automata of two or more dimensions reversibility is undecidable; that is, there is no algorithm that takes as input an automaton rule and is guaranteed to determine correctly whether the automaton is reversible. The proof by Jarkko Kari is related to the tiling problem by Wang tiles.

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