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"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: ability of commanders to become proficient at commanding, controlling and..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "ability of commanders to become proficient at commanding, controlling and protecting their assigned capabilities and understand how to use these capabilities to contribute to the achievement of objectives. Training should also demonstrate NATO’s institutional and strategic narratives to reinforce the activity’s effects on adversaries and allies. The strategic competition requires NATO to use training and associated activity as a surrogate for armed conflict and sub-threshold activity. This includes using common NATO operational/tactical doctrine, driving adaptation, generating a force ethos, empowering commanders and delivering tactical innovation.© Allied Maritime Command 3 AJP-01 112 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements Readiness 3.57 NATO’s Secretary General explained that the Alliance will enhance deterrence by creating a new ‘culture of readiness’.30 This 'culture of readiness' requires the preparation, planning and posture of all Alliance forces to create the full spectrum of physical, virtual and cognitive effects across the engagement space. This readiness culture deters the rapid escalation of activity short of armed conflict and denies adversaries the ability to establish a fait accompli. 3.58 This readiness culture involves the troop-contributing nations being responsible for providing trained, equipped and certified forces at appropriate readiness to meet the minimum military requirements. Readiness includes all components of fighting power: the physical and"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: executing command, control, and communications architectures and in JOA CIS..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "executing command, control, and communications architectures and in JOA CIS systems. The CIS staff is usually responsible for establishing a joint command, control and communication support centre to facilitate CIS management and network control. Activities which are critical to the NATO CIS must be fully coordinated between the information operations (Info Ops) cell w ithin the JOC and joint command, control and communication support centre using the framework of the information activities coordination board. 70 See AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations, for detail. 71 See AJP-6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems, for detail. Annex B to AJP-3 B-7 Edition D Version 1 B.15 Training. The J7 directorate advises and manages in- JOA training during the JTF work-up period prior to starting the operation, and conducts training for augmentation forces added to an ongoing operation. The J7 would also liaise with a relief force to ensure a smooth transition and that lessons learned in-JOA are passed to the incoming force. If, however, the operation is of short duration requiring no force rotation, or if the training requirement may be executed by operations staff, or if training is not required at all, then establishing a training staff may not be necessary. When necessary the training staff may be integrated as a separate cell in the JOC. J7 collects and disseminates within the staff, good practices and solutions to identified"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: important change in objectives and priorities for subordinate forces. Finally,..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "important change in objectives and priorities for subordinate forces. Finally, future plans look even further ahead to the next important change in objectives and priorities for the force as a whole. Commander and staff continually assess progress towards objectives. They may review and select various branches or sequels5, if applicable, or make modifications to the plan as necessitated by changes in the situation. Section 3 – Other planning factors Support plans 1.8 Depending on the complexity of an OPLAN of any category or the requirement to provide support to concurrent operations, it may be necessary to develop support plans (SUPPLANs) to the main (parent) plan. The supporting agency or commander develops the SUPPLAN, which the supported commander must endorse. The initiating authority must approve the SUPPLAN in concert with the supported (parent) plan. SUPPLANs are based on, and are consistent with, the parent plan. Additionally, SUPPLANs must be developed in a manner that is consistent with political guidance and authority applicable to the parent plan. Their approval and authorization for execution automatically becomes part of the approval and authorization process for the execution of the parent plan. Examples include SUPPLANs for deployment and redeployment, communication and information, logistic sustainment, or military engineering SUPPLANs and NATO common funded projects. Planning documents 1.9 Operations planning supporting documents are one of the key elements"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: external and internal context is the environment in which the..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "external and internal context is the environment in which the organization seeks to define and achieve its objectives. The context of the RM process should be established from the understanding of the external and internal environment in which the organization operates and should reflect the specific environment of the activity to which the RM process is to be applied. c. Defining risk attitude. The organization should specify the amount and type of risk that it may or may not take, relative to objectives. It should also define criteria to evaluate the significance of risk and to support decision- making processes. Risk criteria should be aligned with the RM framework and customized to the specific purpose and scope of the activity under consideration. While risk criteria should be established at the beginning of the risk assessment process, they are dynamic and should be continually reviewed and amended, if necessary. Annex D to AJP-3 D-8 Edition D Version 1 D.15 Risk assessment. Risk assessment comprises risk identification, risk analyses and risk evaluation. a. Risk identification. Commanders should identify sources of risk, how they impact operations and their causes and potential consequences. The aim is to generate a list of risks based on those events that might affect achieving the objectives. It is important to identify risks a ssociated with not pursuing an opportunity. Commanders critical information requirements (CCIRs) can aid the risk identification step and the"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: agreed design of the CIS solution and staffing urgent statements..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "agreed design of the CIS solution and staffing urgent statements of user requirement to PJHQ so that existing capability can be generated or accelerated operational support or urgent capability requirements can be staffed; 3B AJP-6 100 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements • overseeing and updating the cyber mission assurance plan, incorporating the cyber prioritised defended asset list for CIS deployed in the JOA; • informing PJHQ J6 of all CIS and cybersecurity issues and risks that may have impact at the operational level, including the alerting, warning and reporting of incidents, as the sub-warning and reporting point; • liaison with host nation, multinational, other government department, non-governmental organisation and international organisation representatives for JOA CIS requirements; • implementing local network changes and system updates as directed by Defence Digital Operations Directorate. Work with the GOSCC and relevant CyISOCs for systems deployed in the JOA to ensure continuity and security of CIS delivery; and • ensuring the effective integration of any civilian service providers to achieve the required level of operational CIS capability. 3B AJP-6 101 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements Notes Chapter 4 103 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements Chapter 4 briefly outlines the relevance of communication and information systems to the command and control environment and provides a short overview of command facilities. Consideration factors"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: to achieve the operational objectives and the required joint means..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "to achieve the operational objectives and the required joint means to carry out the COA must be available. This might lead to a requirement for revising the operational objectives and possibly also the Alliance strategic-political objectives and the end state, in dialogue with higher headquarters. Annex B to AJP-5 B-16 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) B (7) For each NATO operational COA, validate and refine the NATO operational CoG as required and analyze it using the CoG analysis model. Determine effects and associated actions required to protect the critical vulnerabilities; DCs are designated as in step 6 above. Incorporate this in the NATO operational COAs, and use it to update step 2 (adversary’s operational COAs). The CoG analyses of the NATO operational CoGs (related to different COAs candidates) will contribute to COA development and selection by highlighting critical vulnerabilities and thus central risks associated with the COA candidate. This is also an illustration of the continuous, iterative nature of CoG identification and analysis. (8) From the DCs and effects in the selected operational COA, objectives for the components are defined (i.e. the subordinate commands). This happens through collaborative planning with the components to ensure the related actions are realistic and the objectives are achievable. Component-level planning will refine and revise as required, just as described here for operational-level planning. (9) For each branch"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: determined as well; these must be reflected in rules of..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "determined as well; these must be reflected in rules of engagement (ROE) and other restraints (for all diplomatic, information, military, economic (DIME) instruments of power). A condition to be avoided could be a leadership change to someone undesired by NATO. (7) Determine possible combinations of strategic effects in the CoG’s critical vulnerabilities that could lead to the required condition of the adversary’s moral strategic CoG, as well as central undesired effects that could lead to the conditions to be avoided (ROE and other restraints). (8) Determine possible strategic actions of the DIME instruments of power that could lead to each identified strategic effect. One action can in principle support several effects. (9) Identify the various ways the adversary can achieve its political-strategic objectives, using its available means. The primary entity used to achieve the objectives in each potential strategy is the physical strategic CoG. CoGs should be identified as a minimum for the adversary’s assumed most likely as well as the most dangerous strategic COA (as seen through the eyes of the adversary); the CoGs could be the same for several COAs. The adversary’s strategic COAs should aim at affecting NATO strategic CoGs and their critical vulnerabilities, which means this step must be revisited once NATO CoGs are identified (and every time they are refined or changed). See also step 1 above and 14 below. (10) Establish NATO’s required condition of the identified"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? discusses alternatives to the operations design with the commander and..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "discusses alternatives to the operations design with the commander and provides its recommendations. The commander will decide on the LoOs as well as on the DCs seen along each LoO. The commander will use LoOs to designate and shift the main effort during the course of the operation and use DCs to coordinate operations in cooperation with relevant national and international actors. Therefore, when finalizing the operations design, the commander may seek advice from the subordinate commanders and representatives from cooperating relevant national and international actors. 4.30. The initial commander’s intent reflects the commander‘s vision of the purpose of the operation and envisioned objectives. The initial intent will: AJP-5 4-18 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 4 • establish the purpose of the main operational activities in terms of the conditions and objectives that the commander intends to achieve; • indicate whether the main operational activities are being conducted concurrently or sequentially; • identify risks accepted or not accepted; • conclude by relating the commander’s intent to the higher level objectives. Production of force estimates 4.31. Once the operations design is completed there will be two tasks to finalize the situation and problem analysis: • the estimate of the force and capability requirements; and • the establishment of the commander’s planning guidance. 4.32. Initial force/capability requirements. The mission analysis will"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: to fulfil the three primary staff functions of understand and..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "to fulfil the three primary staff functions of understand and assess, plan and integrate, and communicate, the following StratCom disciplines will contribute. a. Strategic communications. The StratCom staff provides the central staff for J10-StratCom. They support DirCom by carrying out the StratCom function, including developing StratCom direction and guidance – narrative development, framework management and implementation guidance – for the headquarters and its subordinates. This direction includes, on behalf of the commander, drafting, releasing, implementing and approving: o StratCom frameworks; 4 AJP-10 106 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements o StratCom implementation guidance; o integrated communications plans; o mission-specific strategic and micro narratives; o StratCom annex, (including related disciplines appendices) to the operation plan (OPLAN). b. Information operations.30 The Info Ops staff provides DirCom and the commander with an analysis and assessment of the information environment as part of the comprehensive understanding of the operational environment (CUOE), and plans, synchronizes and continuously integrates information activities to create effects in support of NATO’s aims and objectives. The Info Ops staff within J10 StratCom retains its functional responsibilities for developing and updating planning products in support of J3-Operations and J5-Plans staff branches. The Info Ops staff provides six distinct functions within the J10-StratCom"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: Command, control, communication, computers, cyber and information in operational planning..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Command, control, communication, computers, cyber and information in operational planning UK 3A.4. At the joint level the CIS estimate is not conducted as a stand-alone activity in response to the joint commander’s estimate, but through the OPT and integrated at every stage of the operations planning process described in AJP-5. In stages one and two the J6 staff is likely to work with J2 in understanding the information environment. During stages three to six, command, control, communication, computers, cyber and information (C5i)8 as a limited resource, is likely to place restraints on the different COAs, relating to distance, bandwidth and concurrency or phasing which must be fed into the OPT and may influence the scoring of COAs. In stage seven a large amount of technical detail must be marshalled to write the C5i annex. UK 3A.5. During the estimate process the J3/J5 focus will be on identifying the fighting power required to achieve the decisive conditions defined in the operational design. The enabling staff, J6 alongside J1/J4, must identify whether the force elements will deploy with organic CIS capability and even if they do, what additional CIS and cyber capability is required to enable operational or wide area command and control, which must be included in the statement of requirement raised to the DSTA. While a complete information flow analysis is unlikely to be possible for each of the COAs in detail during the estimate process, PJHQ J6 must engage with the FLC"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: explain how NATO arrived at the current situation, defines that..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "explain how NATO arrived at the current situation, defines that situation and expresses a desired end state or outcome. Vague, unclear and inconsistent narratives increase the likelihood of confusion, misinterpretation and potentially unintentional escalation by the Alliance’s forces or other audiences. It is important that NATO and national narratives are mutually supporting. Equally, as missions often include non-Alliance partner nations and other organizations, the Alliance’s narratives must be crafted to meet the expectations of the entire coalition. 4.9 Narrative-led execution sets a unifying strategic intent across the Alliance at all levels of command delivering centralized intent and enabling decentralized execution to converge the creation of multiple effects on targeted audiences. Narrative-led execution is key to ensuring that operational and tactical actions support the end state. Therefore, activities must be conducted in the context of the narrative, rather than acting in ignorance and being forced to manage the consequences. 4.10 The Alliance uses institutional, strategic and micro narratives that should be mutually supporting and connected. Whilst the institutional narratives are generally political in nature, the strategic and micro narratives support campaigns and operations. a. Institutional narratives. These are enduring narratives that support an enduring campaign and provide the context for long-term predicable behaviour. These narratives should be"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: peace, and it may adopt binding resolutions under Articles 41..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "peace, and it may adopt binding resolutions under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter to initiate measures involving sanctions or the use of armed force. The UNSC may authorize international organizations, such as NATO, regional arrangements or agencies, or members of the UN to use armed force to enforce measures taken in resolutions adopted under Article 42 of the Charter. When NATO, as an international organization, acts as a crisis management tool, NATO finds the additional legal framework for these actions in a specific UNSC resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; or based on an intervention by invitation or consent of the legitimate government of the receiving state. 3.36 Law and political direction. One of the measures the UNSC may take under Chapter VII is to authorize organizations to conduct enforcement actions, including the use of force. Once it has been decided to deploy military capability, the legal basis, aims and objectives, as well as the limits for using that capability, are detailed in mission directives and rules of engagement. In armed conflict, the law of armed conflict and international law must be followed. Rules of engagement are not a comprehensive statement of either the law or policy, although they take account of both. The rules of engagement ensure that military personnel’s actions: • are consistent with NATO policy; • reflect what the Alliance can legally do and not do; and • reflect the operational context. While rules of"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? environment adds to the briefing requirement. The timing of briefings..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "environment adds to the briefing requirement. The timing of briefings to international authorities or organizations such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as to coalition partners, have significant influence on the commander's personal schedule, to the extent that it can become their principal activity. c. Shift changes. Shift changes should take place within individual cells in the period after the commander's brief. This ensures a smooth transition between outgoing and incoming staff and the maintenance of shared situational awareness (SA). B.24 Battle rhythm development. Battle rhythm should be designed to ensure there are sufficient periods of unscheduled time to enable commanders and staff the time to think and work; not constrained by meetings and deadlines. There should be dedicated time periods for staff interaction with the commander, for battlefield circulation, and for other staff work. The detailed JTF HQ battle rhythm starts with identifying those events that require commander and staff interaction, then developing a logical arrangement of events around the operations process by adding key internal events requiring commander participation. These Annex B to AJP-3 B-10 Edition D Version 1 also relate to the JTF HQ staff and the components and should show decision boards as culminating events. B.25 Battle rhythm considerations. Inputs and outputs should be identified and synchronized, providing a rationale and"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: Voice services (e.g., radio and telephone) are largely standardized; however,..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Voice services (e.g., radio and telephone) are largely standardized; however, care must be taken when considering video and data services since the technical requirements for delivery vary between services. Information services requirements must also indicate the prioritization of services for use in systems deployment, management, and restoration. 10 For additional information on information sharing, refer to AC/322-D(2011)0015, NATO Network Enabled Capability Tenets and Principles , 4 July 2011; AC/35-D/2002-REV5, NATO Directive on the Security of NATO Classified Information , 25 November 2020; C-M(2002)49-REV1, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Enclosure E – Security of Information , 20 November 2020; AC/35-D/1040-REV 6, Supporting Document on Information and Intelligence Sharing with Non-NATO Entities , 21 August 2014; and C M(2007)0118, NATO Information Management Policy (NIMP), 28January 2008. AJP-6 1 14 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements (2) Information exchange requirements. IERs define the need for information exchange between two or more parties that support a given process. IERs are presented in Chapter 3, Section 5, paragraph 3.5.a.(2). 1.7 Information assurance. Information assurance consists of five elements of security: personnel security, physical security (including chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear hardening11), security of information, CIS security, and industrial security.12 For the purposes of this publication,"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: audiences and gives context to the campaign, operation or situation...."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "audiences and gives context to the campaign, operation or situation. It is conducted with the same behaviour-centric mindfulness as our planning. NATO must demonstrate consistency in its actions, images and words, ensuring they reflect the narrative at all times, and so pre-empting any attempts to exploit gaps between what NATO does, shows and says. The narrative-led execution places the responsibility on all personnel to proactively empower the narrative, rather than act and then manage the consequences. 1.36 To be effective, NATO’s approach to StratCom requires clear political direction and guidance – consisting of a defined outcome, clear objectives and a coherent strategic narrative – driven from the top and executed by commanders at all levels through mission command. It also requires us to have innovative working processes conducted at the speed of relevance and responsive to a fluid and dynamic environment. Section 7 – NATO strategic communications process 1.37 NATO instils its StratCom mindset in the planning, execution and assessment of all activities and has a StratCom process in place to provide coherence in communicating and messaging actions, images and words. This coherence-providing process is employed from top-level political direction to tactical implementation. 1.38 Political and military StratCom policies are approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and, together with its subordinate committees, it is also responsible for generating StratCom direction"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: fauna, humans, natural resources and artificial infrastructure. b. Land environment...."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "fauna, humans, natural resources and artificial infrastructure. b. Land environment. The global landmasses and the entities and their interrelations present therein. These landmasses include coastal areas, inland waterways, and lakes. Entities include flora, fauna, humans, natural resources and artificial infrastructure. c. Air environment. The part of the earth's atmosphere in which aerodynamic flight is possible and meteorological phenomena occur, entities and their interrelations present therein. d. Space environment. The part of aerospace in which aerodynamic flight is impossible and the entities and their interrelations present therein. Annex A to AJP-3 A-3 Edition D Version 1 Specific environments A.5 The character of a specific environment has significant influence on the conduct of operations. This subsection describes the eight most commonly encountered and significant environments, as defined by geospatial and meteorological factors, in which a joint task force (JTF) is employed. 61 It is not uncommon that a specific environment contains elements of other specific environments. a. Littoral environment. In military operations, a coastal region consisting of a seaward area that can be directly affected from its bordering coastal area, and vice versa. It overlaps parts of both the maritime and land environments. b. Urban environment. In military operations, a complex human- made terrain of urban settlement. It includes sub -terrain, surface and super -surface elements."
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: which are paramount prerequisites to evaluate risks to own troops..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "which are paramount prerequisites to evaluate risks to own troops and to enable successful operations, or to mitigate undesired influences, respectively. AJP-5 4-55 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 4 operations aspects via the information joint function staff. The main purpose of StratCom involvement in the operations planning process is to achieve a common understanding on information activities within the OPG and other functional and capability experts, to coordinate the respective subject matter input related to the information environment, and ultimately promote the implementation of the information strategy (and other superior communication guidance). It includes respective information advice on the development of operational objectives, decisive conditions and effects, including analysis and evaluation, throughout the operations planning process. Targeting and influence UK 4.6. Full spectrum targeting (FSpecT) has a key role to play in identifying the most suitable ways to employ the means available most efficiently and effectively. Targeting is much more than a precursor to employing military assets with intended destructive outputs. FSpecT should be derived from the full diversity of cognitive effects that need to be created and identify a range of targets to be the focus of tactical commanders’ plans and activities. The FSpecT process should guard against defaulting to munitions-based options and instead seek solutions that will deliver those"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: agencies, at what level and whether some reorganization is required;..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "agencies, at what level and whether some reorganization is required; • the optimum command, control and communication arrangements, and how to align authority with responsibility (which can be a challenge in multinational operations); • how to most effectively employ the forces available and to match tasks with groupings to avoid creating inter-component friction; and • the key strengths, weaknesses and dependencies of the principal fighting systems, and whether the force is sustainable during each phase of the operation. 2.15 Locating the command. How best to command a force, and from where, is an important consideration. Identifying the location is the joint responsibility of the commander and staff and depends on the type of operation and the stage or phase. The most suitable position for the com mander is where they can best lead and make decisions, but consideration should be given to physical security and threats, as it is likely the commander relies on host nation (HN) security provision. Communication and information systems (CIS) provide the means for commanders and their staff to access information, which in turn supports decision- making and issuing direction and guidance. 35 CIS may also enable a commander's choice of location (alongside considering the requirements of the operation and the prevailing situation), and it may enable them to be physically separated from their main HQ. However, a commander's location should enable them to: • assess the situation and"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: all levels, not just at the strategic, to define the..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "all levels, not just at the strategic, to define the situation to be achieved at the end of a mission. UK 3.4. For UK operations, the joint task force commander may be given their end state, or they may have to derive it themselves. Analysis helps them to appreciate the political and military strategic purpose behind their specific activity and the intended relationship with the other instruments of national power. AJP-5 3-8 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 3 Transition and termination 3.8. Transition and termination are key considerations in the operations design.16 In most cases they will include the achievement of acceptable conditions as well as the mutual acceptance of terms and conditions to ensure a lasting settlement. It will require political action, especially when a military force has been employed, and will require a comprehensive approach to involve diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of power. The process may continue well beyond the cessation of hostilities and encompasses stabilization and reconstruction activities.17 Termination and transition provide an essential link between Alliance operations and post-conflict activities. The commander and the staff must clearly understand the termination criteria for the operation. Appropriate and well-conceived termination criteria are the key to ensuring that successful operations result in conditions favourable to the Alliance. Commanders must continually re-evaluate the operational"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? partners also operating within the same coalition. 34 For additional..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "partners also operating within the same coalition. 34 For additional guidance refer to AC/322-N(2015)0123-AS1, Request for Endorsement of ACP 200V1 (D), Mobile Tactical Wide Area Networking (MTWAN) in the Maritime Environment- Operating Guidance, 31 August 2015; and AC/322(CP/1)D(2015)0009, Request for Review of ACP 200 V2 (D), Maritime and Mobile Tactical Wide Area Networking (MTWAN) Technical Guidance, 15 July 2015. Royal Air Force Typhoons working with French Rafale and United States F-35 jets as part of Exercise Atlantic Trident 2023 AJP-6 1 39 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements 1.28 Interoperability of cyberspace communication and information systems. The cyberspace component of a joint and NATO-led coalition force utilizes a standards-based cyberspace C2 system reference architecture. Interoperability of cyberspace C2 planning and execution, supporting information exchange systems, and operational processes and data is discussed in AJP-3.20, Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations , and other cyberspace C2 COI documents that frame integrated C2 processes and employment of cyberspace C2 systems.35 a. Cyberspace is not limited to, but at its core consists of, a computerised environment, artificially constructed and constantly under development. b. Cyberspace infrastructure is largely globally interconnected; however, geographic boundaries do apply in the context of jurisdiction, with national responsibilities. This is why the assignment of classical"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? national elements Where activities to analyze counter-hostile information and disinformation..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "national elements Where activities to analyze counter-hostile information and disinformation activities are conducted and recommendations are given in peacetime, or with audiences approved outside of an OPLAN, approval from DirCom is required and communications must be clearly identified as NATO. (4) Web operations. The PsyOps staff can plan and execute focused digital engagement activities with approved audiences as part of a coordinated communications campaign. When web based analysis is conducted in peacetime, or with audiences approved outside of an OPLAN, approval from DirCom is required and communications must be clearly identified as NATO. (5) Combined joint psychological operations task force headquarters. At the operational level, the PsyOps staff should be prepared to support the formation of a combined joint psychological operations task force (CJPOTF) by augmenting it with headquarters and/or PsyOps personal. Close engagement between the CJPOTF and Info Ops staff is required to ensure that PsyOps is considered at the onset of any planning activity. Functional responsibilities 4.13 Within J10-StratCom, the particular requirements of each communication capability and information staff function must still be met through retention of their functional responsibilities and, where appropriate, dual-hatting. J10-StratCom has to ensure that all StratCom disciplines are coordinated and deconflicted on the one hand, but, on the other, Mil PA will have no role in planning or"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? support decision- making. Close coordination between the two should facilitate..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "support decision- making. Close coordination between the two should facilitate factual, timely, relevant, accurate and understandable exchange of information, taking into account the confidentiality and integrity of information. D.13 Communication and consultation with appropriate stakeholders should take place within and throughout every step of the RM process. Communication and consultation aims to: • bring different areas of expertise together for each step of the RM process; • ensure that different views are appropriately considered when defining risk criteria and when evaluating risks; • provide sufficient information to facilitate risk oversight and decision-making; and • build a sense of inclusiveness and ownership among those affected by risk. D.14 Scope, context and criteria. The purpose of establishing the scope, the context and criteria is to customize the RM process, enable effective risk assessment and appropriate risk treatment. Scope, context and criteria involve defining the scope of the process, and understanding the external and internal context. a. Defining the scope. The organization should define the scope of its RM activities. As the RM process may be applied at different levels (e.g. strategic, operational, tactical, or other activities), it is important to be clear about the scope under consideration, the relevant objectives to be considered and their alignment with strategic, operational and tactical objectives. b. External and internal context. The"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: with other government departments, multinational partners, international organisations and non-governmental..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "with other government departments, multinational partners, international organisations and non-governmental organisations. In these circumstances, cooperation is enabled through civil-military structures, without establishing firm relationships. This approach allows coordination or deconfliction but does not enable a collaborative approach with agreed outcomes. 5 AJP-01 182 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements Principle Description Availability C2 availability enables responsiveness through readiness, deployability and mobility. Flexibility Flexibility allows Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to force generate a mission-tailored package optimized for its role, based on interoperability, sustainability and multinationality as an operation arises. Clarity Command relationships must be coherent and commanders should clearly understand their command relationship and priorities. Simplicity C2 is to be designed with a logical and simple framework. It must be flexible enough to change when necessary, while concurrently striving to evolve with the least amount of transformation as the task and environment changes. Resilience C2 must continuously enable tempo, initiative and information advantage in degraded, austere and contested environments. This requires distributed C2, robust federated networks and mission command. Table 5.1 – Principles of a command and control structure Section 2 – Military command and control structure 5.8 NATO has established a military structure"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: 4.35. Restated mission. The restated mission is a simple, concise..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "4.35. Restated mission. The restated mission is a simple, concise expression of the essential tasks the unit must accomplish and the purpose to be achieved. The mission statement states who (the unit), what (the task), when (either the critical time or on order), where (location), and why (the purpose of the operation). The commander will also confirm (or adjust) the initial commander’s intent. Commander’s planning guidance 4.36. Guidance for courses of action development. The commander will provide sufficient guidance to the OPG to allow them to work efficiently in developing own COAs within the time available. The level of detail in the guidance typically depends on the nature of the mission, the operational circumstances, especially the time available, and the experience of the staff. In all circumstances, the commander should: • specify adversarial actions and estimated COAs to be considered; AJP-5 4-21 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 4 • establish commander´s COA selection criteria for COA development and selection; • describe in broad terms the COAs the commander wants to develop; • direct the OPG to focus its efforts on developing a single COA due to the urgency and nature of the situation. 4.37. The commander will issue the commander’s planning guidance to the staff and to subordinate commanders to provide them with operational output from the mission analysis and to provide the necessary direction to formally initiate planning at the tactical"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: part of Alliance operations, ranging from civilian organizations, charities and..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "part of Alliance operations, ranging from civilian organizations, charities and transnational businesses, which have been part of the security scene for many years, commercial organizations working in support of the mission and integrated civil-military partnerships operating various capabilities. All these civilian partners will have unique and valuable experience, a distinctive culture and unique aim. Outreach and CMI through the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) joint function are key to an effective communication and coordination with the broad spectrum of non-military actors. End states and objectives 4.25 End state. The end state is the North Atlantic Council statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO’s involvement. An end state is reached through the achievement of objectives. 4.26 Objectives. An objective is a clearly defined and attainable goal for an operation. Objectives are achieved by aggregating decisive conditions through effects and their underlying actions. Objectives are described in the following ways. a. Strategic objectives. Strategic objectives establish the strategic purpose for all actions by the Alliance within a comprehensive approach. Strategic objectives are subdivided into non-military strategic objectives and military strategic objectives (MSOs). b. Military strategic objectives. MSOs define the role of military forces in the wider context of the Alliance’s strategic objectives. 4 147 Edition F Version 1 +"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: military and the immediate conflict. NATO has enhanced its presence..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "military and the immediate conflict. NATO has enhanced its presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, with four multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Their presence makes clear that an attack on one Ally will be considered an attack on the whole Alliance. © Justinas Stacevičius, LRT 2 AJP-01 70 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements b. Major crisis response operations. These operations use a significant form of armed force to prevent a confrontation from escalating and spreading. The aim is to intervene with armed force to contain instability by providing the security for other actors to resolve the contradictions and attitudes that constitute the more deep seated causes of conflict. Another aspect of a major crisis response is a series of high intensity contested engagements to neutralize or defend from hostile action within cyberspace or space. Examples of major crisis response operations are Operation Allied Force (Yugoslavia), Operation Deliberate Force (Bosnia) and some offensive or defensive cyberspace operations.20 2.54 Warfighting is not enduring; its role is to set the conditions for other campaign themes and types of competition. In periods of strategic competition in which adversaries merge the armed conflict and confrontation zones, warfighting rarely ends with a cessation of violence and normal competition. Armed conflict’s destruction of government and societal institutions can create conditions for intense rivalry and"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: jamming across the acoustic and electromagnetic spectra. Sustainment 4.52 When..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "jamming across the acoustic and electromagnetic spectra. Sustainment 4.52 When deploying a force, sustainment is a critical enabler of fighting power; it influences the tempo, duration and intensity of all actions, operations and campaigns, and the available sustainment capacity often determines the initial manoeuvre capability. The character of how the Alliance sustains itself is changing, which is reflected in its doctrine.41 Sustainment has evolved into the provision of personnel, logistics, medical, general military engineering, finance and contracts support required to maintain the force throughout all phases of the operation. Efficiencies enable the joint force to apply constant pressure on adversaries by identifying, creating and exploiting sustainment mismatches that can cause additional dilemmas and lessen an adversary’s capability. Sustainment planning should have an overarching approach and be integrated in the operations planning process (OPP). There are a number of sustainment considerations, which are detailed below. a. Joint. Multinational sustainment solutions through burden sharing should be found to keep costs down and to prioritize scarce resources so that equitable provision amongst the nations can be reached. NATO Joint Headquarters and national staffs are to adhere to the principles of sustainment from the outset of planning an operation through the OPP . The level of sustainment will also have implications on the commander’s freedom of action, so it is"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? Standing Joint Force Headquarters Lexicon to AJP-10 Lex-4 Edition A..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Standing Joint Force Headquarters Lexicon to AJP-10 Lex-4 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements SMART specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timely StratCom strategic communications UK United Kingdom UKStratCom Strategic Command US United States Lexicon to AJP-10 Lex-5 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements Part 2 – Terms and definitions actor An individual, group or entity whose actions are affecting the attainment of the end state. (NATO Agreed) attitude A settled way of thinking or feeling. (COED) audience An individual, group or entity whose interpretation of events and subsequent behaviour may affect the attainment of the end state. Note: The audience may consist of publics, stakeholders and actors. (NATO Agreed) audience analysis The understanding and segmentation of audiences in support of the achievement of objectives. (NATO Agreed) audience-centric approach The understanding, planning, execution and monitoring of activity to influence audiences’ attitudes, beliefs or behaviours to achieve desired outcomes. (JDP 0-01.1) behaviour The way in which someone behaves. (COED) belief An acceptance that something exists or is true, especially one without proof. (COED) civil-military cooperation A military joint function that integrates the understanding of the civil factors of the operating environment and that enables, facilitates and conducts civil-military interaction to support the accomplishment of missions and military strategic objectives in peacetime,"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? means, to deny an adversary knowledge of essential elements of..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "means, to deny an adversary knowledge of essential elements of friendly information or indicators thereof. (NATO Agreed) perception A way of regarding, understanding, or interpreting something. (COED) propaganda Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view. (NATO Agreed) psychological operation Planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviours, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. (NATO Agreed) Lexicon to AJP-10 Lex-10 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements public An individual, group or entity who is aware of activities that may affect the attainment of the end state. (NATO Agreed) stakeholder An individual, group or entity who can affect or is affected by the attainment of the end state. (NATO Agreed) strategic communications In the NATO military context, the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the information environment, in support of NATO strategic aims and objectives. (NATO Agreed) target An area, infrastructure, object, audience or organization against which activities can be directed to create desired effects. (NATO Agreed) target audience analysis The focused examination of targeted audiences to create desired effects. (NATO Agreed) theme The unifying subject or idea"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: forces require replacement or rotation and respon d to political..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "forces require replacement or rotation and respon d to political redirection or lessons from the current or other operations. Training under these circumstances should include the lessons and may be developed by an outgoing staff for execution by an incoming staff. AJP-3 29 Edition D Version 1 2.25 Character of training. JTF training, which is a responsibility of the JTF HQ and the component commands, should involve the HN and others if appropriate. Training should familiarize the forces with the OE notably the mission -specific cultural, legal and contextual patterns with regard to the behaviour of civilians, since this familiarization is essential to ensure their protection. The JTF's training also demonstrates to adversaries and others the force capabilities. Operations security measures may limit t he scale and realism of the training programme; however, training should be closely related to the CONOPS. 2.26 Joint task force headquarters. The JTF HQ directs and guides the training programme to be implemented in the JOA if time and opportunity permit. The JTF HQ promulgates the directives for the training programme after consultation with the component commands and SACEUR. These directives include standardization requirements to ensure equal standards for TCNs and promote interoperability. The JTF HQ, together with its component commands, oversees the training programme to verify the readiness of its forces. 2.27 Troop-contributing nations. TCNs are to provide trained and"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: the opportunity to introduce confusion amongst the adversary. The attendant..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "the opportunity to introduce confusion amongst the adversary. The attendant risks should be considered, such as that of autonomous action, for example in the absence of full SA, leading to friendly fire. Synchronizing actions requires significant staff planning and rehearsal, but has the benefit of treating risks. Dynamic synchronization possibly offers greater rewards but relies heavily on the ability of force elements, and commanders, to respond effectively to changes in the operational situation. At every level of command, dynamic coordination and synchronization requires communication and information systems (CIS) to enable both SA and effective C2. Thus, operations management is facilitated through a combination of engagement space management and shared SA. Commander's intent 3.17 The commander´s intent is the foundation of the operations design. It is a clear, concise statement of what the force should do and the conditions the force should meet to succeed; it includes relevant factors relating to the opponent, terrain and to the objectives . The commander's intent should respect applicable law and provide a clear statement with regard to the protection of the civilian population. The commander communicates the intent to the staff and subordinate commands ensuring a common understanding. The commander produces the intent based on the findings depicted in the mission analysis and initiates the development of the courses of action through the commander´s planning"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: relationships can endure over long timelines: decisions and actions can..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "relationships can endure over long timelines: decisions and actions can be executed over months, years or even decades. Addressing competition’s enduring nature requires a campaign mindset. This is characterized by: long term thinking; maximizing advantages; working with other actors to mitigate disadvantages; and recognizing that competitive advantages shift over time. 1.15 Human factors. Human factors are central in contradictions, attitudes and behaviours and, therefore, competition. They are subject to the complexities, inconsistencies and peculiarities that characterize human behaviour. Human factors are the combination of language and social, cultural, psychological and physical characteristics that shape the contradictions, attitude and behaviour of individuals and groups. 1.16 Friction. Friction is the very essence of competition because a clash of opposing human behaviour and attitudes creates friction. Competition’s interactive nature, the duality of two (or more) independent and animate forces seeking advantage or the self-interests of cooperating actors creates the context to understand the existence of friction as a central element in competition. 1.17 Uncertainty. Competition takes place in an atmosphere of uncertainty and ambiguity. The only limit to the ways and means of competing seems to be the extent of human imagination. The reality of unknown and possibly unknowable relevant elements is a pervasive and fundamental characteristic of competition. Character"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) C Annex..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) C Annex C to AJP-5 DC DC DC DC DC DC DC DC Initiation Frame the problem Strategic review: context Environment: understand the operating environment Actors: who is doing what and why? Mission analysis Q1. Higher comd’s intent (2 up, 1 up, our role in plan) Q2. Specified and implied tasks Q3. Freedoms and constraints Q4. How might the situation change? Risk analysis, centre of gravity analysis Factor analysis Effects of the operating environment on main actors and own forces over time, space and the information environment, for example, command and control, rules of engagement, time, space, sustainment, most dangerous and most likely COA COA development Commander’s decision Plan development Understand Develop options Operational objective A Operational objective C Operational objective B Effects Synchronisation Sequencing End state Mission analysis brief CONOPs, OPLAN 3. COA identification (adversary’s and own) COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 COA development 4. Analyse, refine, war game 5. COA validation and comparison 6. Commander’s COA decision Challenge / Red team Initial operations design Decision operational staff work COA course of action CONOPS concept of operations DC decisive condition OPLAN operation plan Centre(s) of gravity UK Figure C.2 – Overview of the operations planning process AJP-5 C-4 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) C Annex C to AJP-5 Intentionally blank AJP-5 D-1 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: board LL lessons learned LOAC law of armed conflict LOC..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "board LL lessons learned LOAC law of armed conflict LOC lines of communications Lexicon to AJP-3 Lex-2 Edition D Version 1 MC Military Committee MCM Military Committee memorandum MDO multi-domain operations MILENG military engineering NAC North Atlantic Council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NLLP NATO Lessons Learned Portal NNCN non-NATO contributing nation OODA observe, orient, decide and act OE operating environment OPCOM operational command OPCON operational control OPLAN operation plan OPT operational planning team RBIO rules-based international order RM risk management ROE rules of engagement SA situational awareness SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SCCB strategic communications coordination board SOFA status of forces agreement SSI supported/supporting interrelationships StratCom strategic communications TCN troop-contributing nation TDL tactical data link TOA transfer of authority WG working group Lexicon to AJP-3 Lex-3 Edition D Version 1 Part 2 – Terms and definitions area of influence The area in which a commander can directly affect operations. Notes: This may be achieved by manoeuvre , fires and/or information activities. (NATO Agreed) area of interest For a given level of command, the area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, and which includes the commander's areas of influence, operations or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto. (NATO Agreed) area of operations An area within a joint"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: (https://nso.nato.int/nso/) or through your national standardization authorities. 4. This publication..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "(https://nso.nato.int/nso/) or through your national standardization authorities. 4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60. Dimitrios SIGOULAKIS Lieutenant General, GRC (A) Director, NATO Standardization Office AJP-10 iv Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements (Change 1) Intentionally blank AJP-10 v Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements (Change 1) Allied Joint Publication-10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications Allied Joint Publication-10 (AJP-10), Edition A, Version 1, dated March 2023, is promulgated in the UK in September 2023 with UK national elements (Change 1) as directed by the Chiefs of Staff Director Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre Conditions of release This publication is UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) Crown copyright. Material and information contained in this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system and transmitted for UK government and MOD use only, except where authority for use by other organisations or individuals has been authorised by a Patent Officer of the Defence Intellectual Property Rights. AJP-10 vi Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements (Change 1) Authorisation The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) is responsible for publishing strategic trends, joint concepts and doctrine. If you wish to quote our publications as reference material in other work, you should confirm with our editors whether the particular publication and amendment state remains"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: the HN(s), as early as possible, the availability and capabilities..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "the HN(s), as early as possible, the availability and capabilities of the following: airport(s) of debarkation, seaports of debarkation and other key transportation nodes; reception areas and facilities; staging areas for operational entry into the JOA; and LOC to and within areas of operations (AOOs) or final destinations. 4.82. Force flow finalization. Based on detailed planning for the employment, sustainment, support and C2 of the force, and on the Allied force list, the OPG will make final revisions to the force flow. In general, force flow stands in a proportional relationship with the capabilities the commander can employ. For each element of the force package, specific deployment requirements must be established, including the following: • strategic LOC and entry points into the theatre; • final destination in the JOA; AJP-5 4-50 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 4 • the commander’s required date for the full operational capability of the force for employment; • priority for sequence of movement; • command authority to be transferred. 4.83. Implementation of the scheme of manoeuvre. The OPG will confirm the flow of forces into the theatre, including the conduct of initial entry operations and the reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOMI) within the JOA, movement priorities and points of entry including receiving or host nation support coordination. The commander and staff will plan follow-on operations in detail for all forces and"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: (electronic, data crypto system, casual courier)? o Is a theatre..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "(electronic, data crypto system, casual courier)? o Is a theatre distribution agency required? • How will welfare communications be delivered, in line with cyber force protection? 3A AJP-6 92 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements Level of planning Step 7 – plan development Factors for the communications annex • Can all crypto and keymat be distributed across the force in a timely manner? o How much keymat needs to be held at each point of presence? • Are all force elements included in the communications electronic instruction? o Bowman plan o Tactical satellite channels o Owner o Attachments and Detachments • Develop operation-specific J6/defensive cyber operations input to pre-deployment training, Joint Air Movement Centre briefs, reception, staging, onward movement and integration. • Sustainment of CIS in all points of presence. o Fuel and batteries. o Second line support affiliations. o Spares packs and where they should be located. • What are the crypto compromise procedures, and are they understood by everyone? • What are the crypto emergency destruction procedures, and are they understood by everyone? UK Table 3A.1d – Step 7: plan development UK 3A.6. The delivery and management of joint CIS across the JOA is a complex task, usually requiring a commander joint force CIS (JFCIS). For this, the joint commander issues a CIS annex to their own directive, written by PJHQ J6, detailing commander JFCIS’ responsibilities to direct the CIS in the JOA and to provide"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: ............................................................................ A-4 Section 3 – Operational domains .......................................................................... A-5 Section..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "............................................................................ A-4 Section 3 – Operational domains .......................................................................... A-5 Section 4 – The engagement space ..................................................................... A-5 Section 5 – Effects ................................................................................................ A-6 AJP-3 x Edition D Version 1 Annex B – Joint headquarters ............................................................................................ B-1 Section 1 – Staff advisors, structure and functions ................................................ B-1 Principal advisors ...................................................................................... B-1 Functional advisors ................................................................................... B-1 Staff structure ........................................................................................... B-2 Section 2 – Joint task force headquarters management processes ...................... B-8 Annex C – Engagement space management ..................................................................... C-1 Section 1 – Engagement space management and enabling functions ................. C-1 Engagement space management ............................................................ C-1 Combat identification ............................................................................... C-2"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? Counter-Intelligence and Security, July 2020. • AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Counter-Intelligence and Security, July 2020. • AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, February 2019. • AJP-4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics, December 2018. • AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations, May 2019. • AJP-10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications, March 2023. AJP-6 xviii Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements AJP-6 xix Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements Contents Summary of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Related documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi Chapter 1 – Overview of communication and information systems. . . . . 1 Chapter 2 – Roles and responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Chapter 3 – Communication and information systems support planning. . 65 Chapter 4 – Employment of communication and information systems . . . 103 Annex A – AJP-3, AJP-5, AJP-6 alignment points . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 Lexicon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lex-1 AJP-6 xx Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements Intentionally blank AJP-6 xxi Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements Preface Context 1. Allied joint publication (AJP)-6 provides the cornerstone for communication and information systems (CIS) supporting Allied joint operations. Scope 2. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-6 provides the overarching"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: Command is the authority vested in an individual of the..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Command is the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces. It is the process by which the commander’s will and intentions are impressed upon subordinates to achieve particular objectives. Command encompasses the authority and responsibility to employ forces to fulfil the mission. 1.13 Control. Control is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander’s intent. To achieve this, the operational commander and staff use standardized procedures in conjunction with the available equipment and CIS. Together, they form a system that the commander, staff, and subordinates use to plan, direct, coordinate, and control NATO operations and NATO-led coalition operations with mission participants. 17 Non-NATO entities are defined in AC/35-D/1040-REV6, Supporting Document on Information and Intelligence Sharing with Non-NATO Entities, Annex 1 , 21 August 2014. It includes contractors on operations, exercises, and transformational activities; governmental organizations; host nations; international organizations; non-governmental organizations; non-NATO multinational forces; and non-NATO nations. AJP-6 1 20 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements 1.14 Capabilities of the available CIS. For the commander to exercise effective command and control across their subordinates, and their staffs, they will be reliant on a range of CIS, and will depend on their own CIS staff to"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: details see JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, JDP 01, UK..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "details see JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, JDP 01, UK Joint Operations Doctrine and Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations. AJP-5 3-11 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 3 within the NAC initiating directive and describe the goals to attain the end state. Based on its analysis of the principal actors, influencing factors and centres of gravity, planners at the strategic level determine the essential conditions that must be achieved to attain the end state. The development of strategic objectives will be an iterative process during which the planners have to ensure these objectives are in balance with the ways and means available. Strategic objectives are subdivided into non-military strategic objectives and military strategic objectives (MSOs). b. Military strategic objectives. MSOs define the role of military forces in the wider context of the Alliance’s strategic objectives. They are a clear description of the military objectives necessary for mission accomplishment and describe what the military must pursue, progress and sustain. MSOs provide the focus for operational-level planning and therefore must clearly state those military conditions that contribute to the achievement of MSOs to attain the end state. They must be attainable given the ways and means available, the strengths and vulnerabilities of the adversary or other factors in the operating environment. c. Operational objectives. Operational objectives"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? narrow and too focused on: the role of the military..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "narrow and too focused on: the role of the military instrument; the enemy rather than the audience; ‘jointery’ at the operational level; and integrating the traditional three domains of maritime, land and air at the expense of space, cyber and electromagnetic. Integrated action integrates different types of military and non-military capabilities through the five operational domains and across all levels of warfare to deliver synergy and achieve outcomes. A review of AJP-5 also highlighted the requirement for UK Annex D to be expanded to support the teaching of operational planning; it now covers the operations planning process in more detail. 18 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements 1-1 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) AJP-5 Chapter 1 gives an overview of planning and operational art. It describes the two major categories of planning: advance planning; and crisis response planning. It concludes by outlining the supporting documents that are key elements of the operational planning framework. Section 1 – Introduction to planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 Section 2 – Planning categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 Section 3 – Other planning factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 © AP / Shutterstock.com Chapter 1 AJP-5 1-2 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 1 “ ” In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable. Dwight D. Eisenhower AJP-5 1-3 Edition A Version 2 + UK national"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? all campaigns and operations. UK 1.16. Underpinned by understanding and..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "all campaigns and operations. UK 1.16. Underpinned by understanding and the three tenets of doctrine (mission command, the manoeuvrist approach and integrated action), their expression, emphasis and application change in relation to the context. Except for selection and maintenance of the aim, placed first as the master principle, the relative importance of each of the principles will vary according to context. Applying them requires judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation. The rapidly changing character of warfare, driven by the pervasiveness of information and pace of technological change, informs their contemporary relevance and, by extension, the evolution of two of the principles: ‘concentration of effect’ replaces ‘concentration of force’; and ‘integration’ replaces ‘cooperation’. The UK’s principles of war are explained in detail in JDP 0.01, UK Defence Doctrine and are as follows: • selection and maintenance of the aim; • maintenance of morale; • offensive action; • security; • surprise; • concentration of effect; • economy of effort; • flexibility; • integration; and • sustainability. Joint function framework 1.62 The joint function framework is a conceptual framework for force integration and synchronization and assists commanders to integrate political, military and civilian actions through the operational domains. The joint functions describe the detailed capabilities of the force. In any operation, these joint functions are to be considered,"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: the operation, refine plans to deal with foreseen and unforeseen..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "the operation, refine plans to deal with foreseen and unforeseen events and develop initial ideas for the transition and termination of the operation. Developing the initial operations design includes the following steps. • Extract potential decisive conditions from the analysis to form a list of decisive conditions.2 • Determine the sequence in which specific decisive conditions must be established. • Group decisive conditions into types of activity which will form potential lines of operations to focus the effort required to achieve one or more operational objectives. • Add operational effects that achieve the decisive conditions; draft measurement mechanisms. 2 Decisive conditions are phrased in the past tense (i.e., the condition brought to an advantageous condition has been competed). They can only appear once in an operation and must be measurable. AJP-5 D-16 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements (Change 1) D Annex D to AJP-5 • Add any identified operational actions that create the operational effects; draft measures of performance. Operational actions will be developed much further in COA development. • Determine non-military actions that may be required to contribute to the creation of operational effects. These could be pre-conditions for military success (integrated action). • Sequence and phase the decisive conditions, effects and actions. This helps maintain the operational continuity, tempo and avoids unnecessary operational pauses. • Determine branches and"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: diplomatic instrument to: gain an understanding of a rival's view..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "diplomatic instrument to: gain an understanding of a rival's view of competition; sense a competitor’s strategic operating techniques; and reinforce its reputation of delivering actions that reflect its words through the other instruments of power. The diplomatic instrument is strongly influenced by the relative advantage of the other instruments of power. b. The information instrument. Nations operate in an information environment that has seen an exponential growth in information processing, data and digital connectivity. The classification of information as a discrete instrument of power recognizes audience centrality, public perception and information’s influence on decision-makers. The information instrument often competes via narratives. Narratives are important because they give meaning to facts for audiences. Narratives are also used to align a nation’s actions across all the instruments of power. The campaign mindset requires credible narratives, supported by coherent actions from the other instruments to have a persuasive effect on actors’ decision-making. c. The military instrument. A nation derives advantage through the military instrument by the generation of fighting power and its subsequent application across the operational domains.6 The priority of any national strategy is to defend the state. The ultimate form of arbitration between enemies within the continuum of competition is compulsion through armed conflict, in which the actor primarily relies on the"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: power, will create a more effective system for coordination between..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "power, will create a more effective system for coordination between partners during planning and execution. This type of LoO construct brings to bear the capabilities of multiple elements of power, which makes it particularly effective toward achieving more complex objectives or outcomes. AJP-5 3-13 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 3 3.15. Identifying DCs along each LoO is critical to the operations design: • ensure that progress towards the objectives is measurable; • sequence the effects to be created along each LoO; • establish the nature and sequence of actions along each LoO; • take into account possible links to actions and effects along other LoOs; • synchronize and coordinate actions on and between different LoOs; • establish and manage the priority of effort; • determine the force and capabilities requirements for each LoO over time. Figure 3.1 – Operations design Culmination 3.16. Culmination is that point in an operation when a force can no longer successfully continue its current operation. Sequencing and phasing should ensure that operations from adversaries culminate well before they can achieve their objective while ensuring that own operations achieve their objectives well before any culmination. Therefore, operations design should determine ways Action effect Decisive Condition Action effect Decisive Condition effect Operational- Level Objective Line of Operation (LoO) Decisive Condition Action Action Current Situation Strategic Objective"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: operational requirements. National contributions are made available to the Alliance..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "operational requirements. National contributions are made available to the Alliance for operations by agreed mechanisms for transfer of authority, in accordance with the MC 0133/5, and by coordination and cooperation agreements, supplemented by common assets for specific capabilities and scenarios. 5.12 The NFS will include packages of capabilities consisting of graduated readiness forces (GRF), headquarters (joint, maritime, land and air), special operations forces and other combat forces and appropriate supporting assets (including transportation, force protection and communication and information systems (CIS)) for both the headquarters themselves and the assigned forces. Clear and transparent arrangements are required between SACEUR, the framework nation, GRF headquarters, participating nations and nations The NATO force structure includes packages of capabilities consisting of graduated readiness force headquarters (joint, maritime, land and air), special operations and other combat forces and appropriate supporting assets. 5 185 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements AJP-01 providing forces. These are maintained through memoranda of understanding and technical arrangements that cover C2 responsibilities and procedures, transfer of authority, training, preparation, evaluation and operations planning in peacetime, crisis and operations. These arrangements provide increased readiness through establishing responsibility for training, operations planning and evaluation."
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: Strategic Communication: an Approach to Formulating and Executing Strategy and..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Strategic Communication: an Approach to Formulating and Executing Strategy and Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 04, Understanding and Decision-making. AJP-5 4-16 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 4 However, they may also be determined by operational factors that will dictate the time, space and forces to be used. 4.23. Risk assessment and tolerance. During the mission analysis, the commander identifies, analyzes and evaluates any risks (in terms of the probability and severity) to the accomplishment of the required objectives which result from the operating environment or the capabilities and actions of the main actors. To aid the design process the commander expresses their risk appetite and risk tolerance to give guidance to the risk management process. Development of the initial operations design 4.24. The constituting concepts that allow the development of operations design were detailed in Chapter 3. Operations design provides the critical link between operational problems to be solved and the required operational outcomes. It takes the results of framing the problem, conducted during the analysis of the operating environment and the mission, and develops and refines the commander’s vision. It applies operational art in transforming the unacceptable operational situation at the start of the operation by establishing DCs via their constituting effects along different LoOs. These LoOs will lead to the accomplishment of operational and strategic"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: military-strategic direction and Alliance joint operations. Coherent StratCom ensures NATO’s..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "military-strategic direction and Alliance joint operations. Coherent StratCom ensures NATO’s actions, images and words are consistent with its narrative,2 across the continuum of competition. Scope 2. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications is the keystone NATO doctrine for StratCom and all information and communication related activities. AJP-10 introduces StratCom as the primary function for ensuring all NATO activities are conceived, planned and executed with a clear understanding of the critical importance of informing and influencing the perception, attitudes and behaviours of audiences to achieve objectives to attain the end state. Purpose 3. AJP-10 provides guidance to NATO commanders and their staff at all levels of command. It enables the staff to contribute to the understanding and shaping of the information environment, in support of Alliance aims and objectives. It explains the principles of StratCom and how they can be integrated into planning, execution and assessment. AJP-10 outlines the roles and responsibilities at all levels of command and details the relationship of military StratCom with the information staff function (for information operations) and the communication capabilities (for military public affairs and psychological operations). 1 Military Committee (MC) 0628 FINAL, NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications. 2 See Chapter 1, Section 10 and Annex A for further details on narratives. AJP-10"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: further analysis. The risk evaluation can also lead to a..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "further analysis. The risk evaluation can also lead to a decision not to treat the risk in any way other than maintaining existing controls. This decision is influenced by the risk attitude that has been established by commander JTF. D.16 Risk treatment. The purpose of risk treatment is to select and implement options for addressing risk. Risk treatment involves an iterative process of: • formulating and selecting risk treatment options; • planning and implementing risk treatment; • assessing the effectiveness of that treatment; • deciding whether the remaining risk is acceptable; and • if not acceptable, taking further treatment. Annex D to AJP-3 D-9 Edition D Version 1 D.17 Prior to the possible occurrence of a risk, the primary aim of risk treatment is to influence the likelihood of the risk. The secondary aim is to prepare for the most favourable impact should the risk occur. After a risk has materialised the aim of the ris k treatment is to treat the impact. D.18 Selecting the most appropriate risk treatment option(s) involves balancing the potential benefits derived in relation to the achievement of the objectives against costs, effort or disadvantages of implementation. Risk treatment options are not necessarily mutually exclusive or appropriate in every circumstance. Regardless the chosen option the objectives of the treatment are to direct and control the risk towards the most favourable outcome. Options for treating risk may involve one or more of the following: •"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: joint operations. 33 For additional information, refer to MC 0593/1,..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "joint operations. 33 For additional information, refer to MC 0593/1, Minimum Level of Command and Control (C2 Service Capabilities in Support of Combined Joint NATO Led Operations , 12 July 2017. AJP-6 1 38 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements c. Interoperability of maritime CIS are addressed in MC 0195 NATO Minimum Interoperability Fitting Standards for Communication and Information Systems Capabilities Onboard Maritime Platforms (or successive revisions).34 1.27 Interoperability of air communication and information systems. The air component of a joint and NATO-led coalition force utilizes a standards-based air C2 system reference architecture. Communications systems are interoperable through radio technical and data link STANAGs. Interoperability of air C2 planning and execution, supporting information exchange systems, and operational processes and data is discussed in AJP-3.3(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations , and other air C2 COI documents that frame integrated C2 processes and employment of air C2 systems. The ability of air component forces, to include air assets of other joint services and special operations forces, to operate with respective CIS and non-materiel capabilities within a mission network environment – in addition to national network environments – should enhance the ability to leverage and use existing technical and procedural interoperability within a coalition force. Benefits apply for interoperability shared with joint"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: Still, if an actor pursues two or more strategies simultaneously,..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Still, if an actor pursues two or more strategies simultaneously, each using different physical strengths, and each capable of achieving the actor’s objectives by itself, then multiple CoGs can in principle exist simultaneously. e. Identifying and validating physical CoGs at a given level of command requires the commander to identify the actor’s (assumed) objectives at that level and the actor’s (assumed) strategy/COA for Annex B to AJP-5 B-4 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) B achieving those objectives. Then, the following questions can be used to identify and validate physical CoG candidates; all must be answered yes: (1) Is the CoG candidate the primary entity (assumed) used by the actor to achieve its (assumed) objectives at the analyzed level of command? If it is an important or even essential entity, but not the primary entity used by the actor to achieve its objectives, then it is a critical requirement for the real CoG. If it is not an entity but rather an important condition that must be present for the actor to achieve its objectives, then it is likewise a critical requirement for the real CoG. (2) Does the CoG candidate possess the most critical capabilities (abilities) required to achieve the actor’s objectives at the analyzed level of command? If some critical capabilities are missing, then support from the entities possessing them becomes critical requirements for the CoG. (3) If the CoG candidate is defeated, does this defeat the actor’s"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: provides the right and diverse mix of personnel and includes..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "provides the right and diverse mix of personnel and includes military, civilians, contractors, other agencies and actors to conduct successful operations. There are several considerations to be made when developing the Alliance’s human capability if it is to retain an advantage. a. Adaptability and agility as a capability. The current and emerging character of competition will challenge militaries in many new ways, some of which can be foreseen today, some of which cannot. The Alliance will need people who are adaptable with the readiness to adjust to shifting conditions and circumstances in an operating environment where volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity dominate. But, to gain advantage in a context of strategic competition, there is a need for such adaptations to outpace adversaries. This required rate of adaptation is achieved through an agility that reflects the ease and pace with which people can adapt themselves, their teams and, for some, their organizations. b. Thinking as a capability. Thinking is much more than just a conscious mental activity. It is a combination of unconscious, instinctive and learned processes that are influenced profoundly by the cultures in which it is practiced. As it forms the basis for all activity, the Alliance should consider thinking in terms of a capability rather than simply as an individual trait. The importance of PME should not be underestimated in developing thinking as a capability in a continuous, progressive"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: mission command, understanding, strategic communications, information advantage and sustainment approach..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "mission command, understanding, strategic communications, information advantage and sustainment approach Political capabilities Military capabilities Civilian capabilities Virtual Cognitive Physical Perform actions Develop plan Create effects Achieve objectives Attain end state Effect dimensions Multi-domain operations Comprehensive approach Manoeuvrist approach Behaviour-centric approach Belief Perception Behaviour Understand Will Capability Cohesion Cyber Space Acoustic spectrum Air Maritime Land Combining all available political, military and civilian capabilities in a concerted effort to... orchestrate activities across the five domains, the electromagnetic and the acoustic spectrum to... create tangible, intangible and cognitive effects in the effect dimensions to... disable capability, shatter cohesion, shape understanding and undermine will to... influence the attitudes and behaviours in the (operating) environment. Electromagnetic spectrum 4 AJP-01 170 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements Key points • NATO’s four doctrinal tenets guide thinking and underpin attitude of mind and approach to operating across the continuum of competition, at all levels of operations and in any circumstances involving the use of the military instrument. • The UK uses three core tenets, as described in JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine. These are: the manoeuvrist approach, integrated action and mission command. • The behaviour-centric approach recognises that people’s attitude and"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: attainable goals. Derived from objectives, and in support of them,..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "attainable goals. Derived from objectives, and in support of them, respective desired effects should be created. When setting objectives and planning effects, the following principles need to be observed. They should be: • legitimate – they should respect the values of a pluralistic public debate and intellectual self-determination of the audience and the freedom of the media of democratic states; • realistic – they should take into account the complexity and multiple interdependencies of the information environment; and • measurable – they should describe the attainment of a measurable outcome within defined periods of time. 3.26 StratCom assessment criteria seek to evaluate whether and to what extent its intended effects have been achieved. Indicators need to be identified and quantified at the beginning of the operations planning process and referenced throughout execution to show if and when success has been achieved. 3.27 Effects in the physical and virtual dimensions can have cognitive effects, either positively by closing the 'say-do' gap to our advantage, or negatively by contradicting our own information and communication activities. Therefore, StratCom objectives need to be considered at every stage of conception, direction, planning and execution for an activity. 25 See Annex B, paragraph B.10.e for more details on StratCom objectives. 3 AJP-10 78 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements (Change 1) Battle rhythm 3.28 For all activities across the continuum of"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? example, manoeuvres, targeting and fires) to ensure their effects are..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "example, manoeuvres, targeting and fires) to ensure their effects are in line with the narratives and messages. It seeks to ensure harmonization of cognitive effects in the engagement space to support NATO objectives. UK 1.10. The UK Defence StratCom approach has two elements. These are as follows. a. Planning defence activities (actions, images and words), whilst paying specific attention to what they will communicate and to whom. Planning is focused on those audiences whose behaviour is to be changed or maintained and how they will interpret the activities undertaken. b. Ensuring consistency of actions, images and words and pre-empting the exploitation of any gap between what we do, what we show and what we say. Defence’s activities must send consistent messages to target audiences, irrespective of the location of the activity or the audience. UK 1.11. A Defence StratCom approach to strategic planning envisages formulating and executing strategic military plans that are coherent with each other and which focus activities on delivering the UK government’s intent, rather than undertaking activities and then trying to explain them. Success is achieved by influencing target audiences sufficiently to cause them to change or maintain their behaviour. However, Defence StratCom needs to be achieved as part of an integrated cross-government enterprise and therefore Defence’s activity must be consistent with the activities of other government departments. This consistency is achieved"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: to describe several human security considerations that if ignored or..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "to describe several human security considerations that if ignored or compromised can be drivers of instability. These considerations are a blend of human security factors (personal/physical, political, economic, cultural/community, information, health, food and environmental) and cross-cutting themes. These themes include: • protection of civilians; by, with or through partners. What is important is for commanders and staff to work out how to orchestrate and, where capabilities lie outside the force, synchronise all the relevant levers. Understanding the audiences is the major consideration of integrated action. AJP-10 41 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements (Change 1) 1 • the role of women in peace and security in resolving conflict; • the effect of modern slavery, human trafficking, and effect of armed conflict on children, youths and adults; • the criticality of building integrity and countering corruption in affected areas; • the imperative to protect cultural property; and • the importance of preventing and countering violent extremism. UK 1.20. Addressing these considerations, through a coherent approach, contributes toward more sustainable security outcomes and supports mission success. A human security approach that seeks to address these considerations within the constraints of the operation requires the military to better understand how these human security factors affect individuals, communities and other actors. This understanding allows the military to plan"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: 1.5. Domestic and international laws regulate national, multinational or international..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "1.5. Domestic and international laws regulate national, multinational or international institutions, groups, organizations, private companies or non-state entities. In difficult negotiations with obstructive adversaries, diplomacy might only be successful if it is backed up by the credible threat of force. UK 1.6. In the contemporary context, we need a strategic, assertive and integrated response to the use of the military instrument. We therefore must think through the diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments to include a broader range of civil-military responses which bring together defence, diplomacy, development, intelligence and security, trade and aspects of domestic policy in pursuit of national objectives. AJP-01 18 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements 1 Depending on the context, these capabilities can be significant and, even though non-state actors may not work as a homogeneous group, their collective or individual capabilities may have greater influence and effect than a nation. These non-state capabilities can: • strengthen nations’ instruments of power when interests align and efforts are complementary; • degrade nations’ instruments of power when uncoordinated and overlapping efforts congest the environment; and • weaken nations’ instruments of power when opposing interests and contradictory efforts clash. Figure 1.5 – Non-state capabilities 1.25 Integration. The campaign mindset requires nations to endeavour to maximize their advantage"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? information domain into a single mission network. The term domain..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "information domain into a single mission network. The term domain may also be used also as a technical term for the installation. 1.16 Overall principles and responsibilities within CIS. The following principles apply within the context of roles, responsibilities, and relationship decisions after consultation between the MPs. Specific guidance on command relationships, (i.e., supported/supporting and degrees of authority) can be found in AJP-1 Chapter 5. a. Higher HQs provides the required connectivity to subordinate HQ. Taking these responsibilities into consideration, the installation, operation, and maintenance of CIS are governed by the following general principles: 27 For additional information, refer to MC 0593/1, Minimum Level of Command and Control (C2) Service Capabilities in Support of Combined Joint NATO Led Operations , 12 July 2017. AJP-6 1 29 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements (1) NATO enables the extension of unsecure and secure CIS connectivity to the highest level of national or multinational tactical command in a theatre of operations based on eligibility.28 (2) Lead or framework nations and multinational commands provide connectivity and services for multinational or national entities and subordinate formations; however, NATO facilities may be used, if eligible and available. (3) Nations provide the infrastructure for their own national rear links; however, NATO facilities may be used, if eligible and available. b. NS is the preferred domain for C2"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: communications. INFOSEC during this phase is enhanced by using only..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "communications. INFOSEC during this phase is enhanced by using only approved information services. c. Deployment. Communication increases markedly during the deployment phase, particularly on information services supporting maritime and air assets. OPSEC is critical during this period, and the imposition of radio and electronic silence should be considered to deny information to the adversary. It is vital that OPSEC is maintained during deployment and under no circumstances should insecure means be used to pass sensitive deployment information. d. Force entry. Radio silence is often appropriate during force entry and compliance with the emission control (EMCON) plan is essential. 4 Further details on OPSEC principles and measures are found in AJP-3.10.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations Security and Deception . 1A AJP-6 44 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements Information governance UK 1A.10. Information security. Within the framework of information governance and information assurance, INFOSEC describes the security measures taken to safeguard information in any form. It provides an important connection between traditional security staffs embedded within the J2/3 community and those directly charged with protecting information services and its products. The information services community has a particular INFOSEC responsibility, given its ownership of providing and maintaining CIS equipment, to ensure that the risks to information are identified and appropriately"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: environment assessment (IEA) reports to SACEUR. e. International strategic communication...."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "environment assessment (IEA) reports to SACEUR. e. International strategic communication. Provides StratCom guidance on priority Defence issues such as principal hostile states, sensitive strategic issues (for example, continuous at sea deterrent) and activities having strategic impact. Strategic communication processes at Strategic Command (operational level) UK 3.2. Strategic Command (UKStratCom) leads the development and generation of an integrated joint force that is optimised for warfare in the Information Age and, through it, delivers the UK’s joint and enabling 3 AJP-10 72 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements (Change 1) strategic capabilities. These enable the UK to compete with and confront adversaries, including on sub-threshold activity, anywhere in the world. UKStratCom integrates these capabilities at strategic and operational levels across the five operational domains. UK 3.3. Within UKStratCom, Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) is responsible for: command and control of assigned forces on joint operations; delivering military strategic objectives for UK operations overseas and exercises directed by Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and the MOD; providing policy-aware military advice to inform the strategic commitment of UK forces overseas; and the agile command and control element of UKStratCom’s output. UK 3.4. Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), commanded by CJO, is a multidisciplinary headquarters that deploys, commands, sustains and recovers personnel"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: and interpretations of international propriety and obligation, are likely to..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "and interpretations of international propriety and obligation, are likely to have an impact. In such a strategic context, perhaps lacking an agreed strategy, the commander should understand and account for national interests. b. Variance in risk attitude. Each nation determines how its personnel are employed, normally based upon their own acceptable levels of risk. Moreover, as the threat is unlikely to be uniform across the joint operations area and may be subject to frequent change, risk treatment is unlikely to be the same across a JTF. Risk attitude also changes throughout the life of an operation; it may be larger at the start and smaller towards the end, and increasingly influenced by political factors as the operation progresses. D.6 Non-military actors. While nations' government departments, international organizations, private sector enterprises, and other civilian partners work in hazardous situations, they may withdraw their personnel if they judge that a lack of security constitutes Annex D to AJP-3 D-3 Edition D Version 1 an unacceptable risk for health and life. Accordingly, and as part of the contribution to a comprehensive approach, a commander should consider the risk attitude of non- military actors, determine their commitment of resources and personnel, and address the consequences of their activities being periodically unavailable. Section 2 – Risk management General D.7 Managing risk is iterative and assists organizations in setting strategy, achieving"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: for exercises, and for the pre-deployment, deployment and drawdown phase..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "for exercises, and for the pre-deployment, deployment and drawdown phase of operations, are also explored. Section 1 – Introduction to the command and control environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Section 2 – Command facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Section 3 – Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Section 4 – Pre-deployment, deployment considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Key points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 4 AJP-6 104 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements Science is organised knowledge. Wisdom is organised life. Immanuel Kant ” “ 4 AJP-6 105 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements Chapter 4 Employment of communication and information systems Command and control (C2) services support information collection, situation assessment, decision making, collaboration, C2, and mission planning and execution. Coordinated and coherent C2 within a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led mission is enabled by NATO communication and information systems (CIS)45 employed at the strategic and operational levels of command. Section 1 – Introduction to the command and control environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Section 2 – Command facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Section 3 – Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Section 4 – Pre-deployment, deployment considerations . . . . 107 Section 1 – Introduction to the command and control"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: JTF staff. The directorates also manage systems and processes internal..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "JTF staff. The directorates also manage systems and processes internal to their staff directorate. Based on mission requirements and the nature of the operating environment, additional staff directorates can also be established, such as resource management. Creating additional directorates does not fundamentally change any of the staff processes described in this Annex. B.5 The staff structure may comprise sections/cells that cover maritime, land, and air operations. Also included should be sections/cells covering: • special operations; • force protection; • military police functions; • countering improvised explosive devices; • personnel recovery; • space operations; • cyberspace operations; • electromagnetic operations; • information activities; • psychological operations; • countering weapons of mass destruction activities; and • targeting coordination. B.6 The following staff functions, mentioned below, are usually established and reflect the classical J1 to J10 staff structure. B.7 Personnel and administration. The J1 directorate principal role is to advise the commander and staff on the personnel policies and workforce management systems and procedures established by national authorities for their force components. 65 Personnel and administration staff responsibilities include personnel management, entitlements and benefits, morale, welfare, recreation, postal services, safety, prisoners of war administration 65 See AJP-4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Sustainment of"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: areas is developing. The MOD has specific responsibility as SRO..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "areas is developing. The MOD has specific responsibility as SRO for a few of these NSIGs, with participation in others cohered through the SPO Directorate within Head Office. UK 2A.5. The NSIGs are tasked with defining the policy outcomes for their thematic or geographical areas of interest. They have an important role in stating the intelligence requirements for their specific area of responsibility as part of the Intelligence Outcomes Prioritisation Process. These NSIGs’ intelligence requirements are then reconciled against the Security Services’ priorities and coverage before a delivery plan is produced and ratified by the NSC on a six-monthly basis. Cabinet Office Briefing Room and decision-making UK 2A.6. Where a crisis affects multiple government departments a collective response will be led by a nominated department. Collective decision-making within central government is delivered through the Cabinet committee system; decision-making during emergencies follows the same pattern. Due to the unpredictable nature of any crisis the government maintains the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) as a dedicated crisis management facility, which is only activated in the event of a major national emergency. UK 2A.7 . The Prime Minister, Home Secretary or nominated senior minister will chair key meetings involving ministers and officials from relevant departments. Key external stakeholders may be invited to attend depending on the emergency. Meetings will cover all the strategic"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? where the main effort lies and the capabilities of the..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "where the main effort lies and the capabilities of the forces and agencies involved; • disposition of friendly, adversary and neutral parties; and • speed and assurance of communication across the force to promulgate the changes. C.13 A seam is the physical space where assets in one operational area interact with, or impact assets or activities in another operational area. As the size and the geographic diversity of the seam increases, operations are likely to become more complex and the requirements for cross-component dialogue and planning become more important. Virtual operational areas and boundaries C.14 The engagement space exceeds the mere physical operational area. Therefore, engagement space management in the physical operational area needs to be complemented by means to manage engagement in artificial and human environments and the creation of virtual and cognitive effects. This includes means to manage behaviour in order to minimize the chances for, or impact of, interference as an undesired second or third order effect. Like in the physical area, virtual operational areas are linked to objectives and effects, roles and responsibilities, and associated constraints and restraints. Examples are: • guidance & direction on presence, posture & profile, including - as applicable - guidance & direction on cross-cutting topics as outlined in Chapter 1; • rules of engagement and the use of force, including - as applicable - weapon release authority (matrix), guidance &"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: 086-005, Implementing Cultural Property Protection in NATO Operations and Missions..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "086-005, Implementing Cultural Property Protection in NATO Operations and Missions , 1 April 2019. A A-7 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements Annex A to AJP-01 prevent and address sexual violence constitutes a clear responsibility for military organizations. If the military does not take proper action to prevent and respond to CRSV, the overall mission is at risk through reduced credibility and increased tension among local communities. These tensions could contribute to aggravating the security situation. Sexual exploitation and abuse A.18 Sexual exploitation and abuse constitutes an important topic within the WPS agenda and runs counter to NATO’s principles and core values. When acts of sexual exploitation and abuse are committed, it undermines the professionalism and credibility of the Alliance and risks mission success. This means that preventing sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by one’s own personnel is fundamental. Combating trafficking in human beings A.19 Times of conflict, post-conflict, disaster, and other crisis and emergency situations heighten vulnerabilities, particularly for women and children, to human trafficking and exploitation. Trafficking in human beings affects countries of origin, countries of transit and countries of destination and is closely associated with sexual and gender-based violence, terrorism and transnational organized crime. NATO recognizes trafficking in human beings as a transnational problem, which requires concerted"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? Component JFMC Joint Force Maritime Component JFSFC Joint Force Special..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Component JFMC Joint Force Maritime Component JFSFC Joint Force Special Forces Component JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment JISR joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance JLRT joint logistic reconnaissance team JLSG joint logistic support group JOA joint operations area JOPG joint operational planning group LO liaison officer LOC lines of communications LoO line of operation Lt Bde light brigade MAB mission analysis briefing MC Military Committee MEDINT medical intelligence MILENG military engineering MOE measure of effectiveness AJP-5 Lex-3 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) MOP measure of performance MP military police MSO military strategic objective MTF medical treatment facility NAC North Atlantic Council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCRP NATO Crisis Response Process NCRS NATO Crisis Response System NCRSM NATO Crisis Response System Manual NCS NATO Command Structure NID North Atlantic Council initiating directive NSO NATO Standardization Office OA operational analysis OGD other government department OLRT operational liaison and reconnaissance team OMT ORBAT Management Tool OPD operational planning directive OPFOR opposing forces OPG operations planning group OPLAN operation plan OPP operations planning process OPSEC operations security OPT Operations Planning Tool PE peacetime establishment PMESII political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information RFI request for information ROE"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: verification, timeliness, right degree of granularity, assessment and correlation is..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "verification, timeliness, right degree of granularity, assessment and correlation is needed. A.2 A proper evaluation of forces, space and time simply cannot be done without accurate information on the various aspects of the operational situation. Besides gaining information and intelligence as prerequisite for decision making, information also affects morale and cohesion of forces. Information today is an operational factor that has to be considered throughout the whole planning process. Fundamental relationships between the operational factors A.3 Time-space relates to the relative speed with which forces can reconnoitre, gain, occupy, secure, and stabilize or control a given area. Commanders and their staffs should evaluate an operations area in terms of space and the time necessary to accomplish objectives within that area. A commander can harmonize the factors of time and space by selecting the objectives that lie at short distances; shortening average distances by operating from a central position enhancing speed in execution; changing routes. For attacking forces the objective is to gain space as quickly as Annex A to AJP-5 A-2 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) A possible while the defending forces try to keep control over the space and delay or deny the attacking forces´ achievement of an objective. Any gain of time is an advantage for an actor that wants to maintain the status quo. If a defending force is not decisively beaten, it may retain"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: provide the support necessary to accomplish C2. They are further..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "provide the support necessary to accomplish C2. They are further divided into core services and COI services. Core services provide the services common to all users. COIs provide support for functional and special staff areas. Information processing services consist of data repositories and applications optimized to satisfy the needs of specific staff functions. Both core and COI services rely on information exchange, information assurance, defensive cyberspace operations, and CIS life-cycle support services. b. Information exchange services. These services provide the core communication network services and the wireless communication transport services needed to access and disseminate information in support of political and military decision making. Information exchange services support the exchange of large quantities of information in diverse formats (e.g., voice, text, still image, video, and data) between geographically dispersed locations in a timely, reliable, and secure manner. c. CIS security services. These services provide the application of security measures for the protection of communication, information, and other electronic systems, and the information that is stored, processed, or transmitted in these systems with respect to confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and non-repudiation. These measures must produce standard log files, which must be aggregated and correlated in manage that risk effectively. This is especially crucial in areas"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? legal framework, including applicable international law, international mandates and arrangements..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "legal framework, including applicable international law, international mandates and arrangements with host nations (HNs); force capabilities and resources; the flow of forces into the theatre; C2 arrangements, including liaison and coordination with external organizations, CIS and ROE; provisions for theatre support and sustainment; contingency planning to cover the assessed risks. 28 National responses to the ROEREQ may include national caveats, although it is more likely that the reply to the ROEREQ will stay more generic at this stage. AJP-5 4-48 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 4 4.76. Initiation of plan development. The OPG will review any issues raised in the higher commander’s review of the commander’s CONOPS, seek guidance from the commander and accomplish the following: • establishment of a schedule and timelines for the commander’s plan development; • review of the status of strategic planning on which operational-level planning depends: force generation; preliminary deployment planning; legal arrangements with HN(s); communication strategy; and ROE; • planning in coordination with subordinate commands and other cooperating actors to foster integration of the joint force (this may require full information about the status of planning by these HQ related to the status of COA and CONOPS development and coordination of supporting/supported requirements); • additional detailed coordination/interaction with a number of relevant national and"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: frameworks B.6 If NATO Headquarters determines that no political- or..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "frameworks B.6 If NATO Headquarters determines that no political- or strategic-level framework is required for a particular issue, SHAPE can initiate a Tier 2 Allied Command Operations (ACO) StratCom framework. Tier 2 frameworks are issued by SHAPE under the authority of Supreme Allied Commander Allied Powers Europe (SACEUR). B.7 SACEUR will also issue an annual ACO Tier 2 StratCom framework to provide direction and guidance on SHAPE's StratCom objectives and priorities for the coming year. ACO StratCom frameworks may also be issued for activities or issues where an ACO-wide consistent communication is required. B.8 Where a Tier 1 framework exists, J10-Strategic Communications directorate (J10 StratCom) staff may develop a Tier 2 framework annex to provide more detailed direction and guidance. These need to be coordinated with NATO Headquarters' Public Diplomacy Division. Tier 3 strategic communications frameworks B.9 NATO Command Structure and NATO force structure headquarters may generate their own Tier 3 frameworks to support specific activities or issues relevant only to their organization and its subordinates. A Tier 3 framework may only be issued if no Tier 1 or Tier 2 framework covers or exists for the specific activity that the command or force wants to conduct. Tier 3 frameworks need to be coordinated with SHAPE's Communications Division. B B-3 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements Annex B to AJP-10 Framework structure B.10 The structure and content of a"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: command or control of those units. Note: Operational control does..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "command or control of those units. Note: Operational control does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned and does not include administrative or logistic control. Tactical command (TACOM) The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority, and to retain or delegate tactical control of units. Tactical control (TACON) The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Administrative control (ADCON) Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Note: No NATO or coalition commander has administrative control over the forces assigned to them since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or control. 5 AJP-01 190 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements Command authority Definition Logistics control (LOGCON) The authority granted to a NATO Commander over assigned logistics units and organisations in the joint operations area, including national support elements, that empowers them to synchronize, prioritize, and integrate their logistics functions and activities to accomplish the joint theatre mission."
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: the larger context, set forth objectives and priorities, identify opportunities..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "the larger context, set forth objectives and priorities, identify opportunities and risks, and formulate operational ideas that maximize the effectiveness, responsiveness and flexibility of the force. Commanders are supported by their staffs, which conduct detailed planning and assessments. 1.3 Operational art is therefore realized through combining a commander’s skills and the staff-assisted processes of operations design and operations management. Operations design frames the environment and the problem, and then develops or refines options that give a comprehensive logic to the operation. Operations design expresses vision and refines plans and orders. Operations management then translates the operations design into action by integrating, coordinating, synchronizing, prioritizing and allocating capabilities across the joint functions. The commander and staff use operations assessment1 to appraise progress. The tactical level supports operations assessment with tactical assessment input. Operations assessment findings regularly lead to the refinement of the operations design. 1.4 Based on understanding gained through the application of operations design, more detailed planning takes place during the sequence of planning activities. This sequence is a logical, analytical methodology that consists of progressive actions to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action (COAs); select the most appropriate COA; and produce a plan or order by"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: support vertical and horizontal data sharing (e.g. collaborative planning). c...."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "support vertical and horizontal data sharing (e.g. collaborative planning). c. Accessible. Every level of command who have a need to know should be able to pull the information they need to support concurrent or parallel planning and mission execution. If possible, channel information to the required user via automated means, reducing the need for manual exchange. d. Fused. Information is received from many sources, in many mediums, and in different formats. Fusion is the logical blending of information from multiple sources into an accurate, concise, and complete summary. The main goal of IM is to reduce information to its minimum essential elements and in a format that can be easily understood. 3.63 Commander's critical information requirement. The commander sets the tone for the entire command by establishing priorities for information requirements and dissemination. The commander defines what information is needed and how it should be delivered. Additionally, the commander focuses the staff by creating commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs); these CCIRs change over time as the OE continues to evolve. Properly developed information requirements ensure that subordinate and staff effort i s focused, resources are employed efficiently and decisions can be made in a timely manner. CCIRs cover information concerning areas that are either critical to the success of the mission or represent a critical threat and covers every aspect of the commander's concern"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: communicate and to whom. b. The military instrument. NATO StratCom..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "communicate and to whom. b. The military instrument. NATO StratCom harnesses military activity to amplify the strategic narrative and contribute to the information instrument of power. UK 1.5. The information instrument of the UK’s national power is the application of the UK’s strategic narrative using information activities, including Defence StratCom, in support of national interests. Defence StratCom generates the narratives that feed information activities that are in turn channelled and delivered by the following means. Communication capabilities • Media operations • Psychological operations (also see Chapter 4) Supporting capabilities and techniques • Cyber operations • Electromagnetic warfare • Civil-military cooperation • Operations security • Deception • Outreach and engagement • Manoeuvre, presence, posture, profile • Fires and other kinetic activities AJP-10 11 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements (Change 1) 1 Section 3 – Operating environment 1.12 Environments and systems. An environment describes the system surrounding an activity. A system is a functionally, physically or behaviourally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements. A group of systems is a network. There are multiple types of environment, both physical and non-physical, and commanders use many terms to describe them. Examples include (but are not restricted to): operating environment, information environment, maritime environment, urban environment, political environment"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: audience, of the futility of their actions. Perceived illegitimacy and..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "audience, of the futility of their actions. Perceived illegitimacy and immorality can contribute to this attitude and a narrative of failure. 4.14 Understanding shapes an audience’s attitude by influencing how they think, feel and respond to information or events, and ultimately the actor’s will to continue contesting a situation. Therefore, reducing an audience’s ability to understand the situation serves to weaken their moral component. An unsupportive actor’s moral component is also weakened by the erosion of will and cohesion. Will is the determination to persist in the face of adversity and comprises two aspects – intent and resolve – both of which can be influenced, attacked and undermined. The unsupportive actor’s intent is thwarted when a belief emerges that their aim is no longer achievable. Resolve, meanwhile, is the will of an actor to continue. Whilst eroding the resolve and intent of an unsupportive actor’s, we must simultaneously seek to protect our own resolve from their actions. 4 AJP-01 136 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements 4.15 If essential capabilities are lost or threatened, both the moral and physical cohesion of the actor are reduced, while the freedom of action and initiative of our own forces are enhanced. While seemingly attritional or annihilatory in nature, dislocation or disruption of physical and virtual elements are, therefore, advocated by the manoeuvrist approach as a way to undermine the will and cohesion of an unsupportive actor. a."
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? NATO accreditation requirements based on national policy. 1A AJP-6 43..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "NATO accreditation requirements based on national policy. 1A AJP-6 43 Edition B Version 1 + UK national elements UK 1A.9. Operations security. OPSEC4 is an activity that is led by the J3 staff function. By its nature, however, it has very close ties to J6. a. Planning. During planning for an operation there is an increase in communications traffic between headquarters and nominated force elements. CIS used during the planning process requires appropriate protection. Subsequent force element preparation requires practise in OPSEC techniques, usually through exercises or mission rehearsals. Consideration should be given to disguising these events by deception techniques where practicable. INFOSEC is used to prevent any indication that force elements preparation is tied to a particular operation plan or geographical area. b. Force assembly. Irrespective of whether the operation is mounted from the UK, or from a forward mounting base, force assembly generates significant traffic over strategic information services links. Increased communications traffic to, or from, an assembly area may focus an adversary’s interest, and result in an increased hostile intercept effort. Political events may indicate UK interest, but only the interception of communications may provide information about the timing, location and scope of any future operation. Transmission security in modern systems significantly improves protection against an adversary intercepting and analysing friendly"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: Analysis of the political goals and likely end state for..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Analysis of the political goals and likely end state for each actor and assessment of likely objectives to be achieved by the use of military force. b. Primary and supporting instruments of power. Review of the systems that contribute to the main instruments of power that each actor seeks to leverage to influence other actors and systems. AJP-5 4-10 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 4 c. System interaction, interdependencies, influences and vulnerabilities. Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the main actors and systems in terms of the capacity to influence other actors and systems and to be influenced based on their vulnerabilities and interdependencies. Identification of, and focus on, critical relationships. This includes system of system analysis (SoSA) to analyze how systems are connected and how they interact in order to better understand the dynamics of the operating environment. d. Military, security forces and other organized armed groups/ capabilities. Assessment of the strengths and weaknesses in the ability of each actor to achieve its objectives. In particular, its capabilities and capacity to use force in time and space with relation to the current order of battle and disposition of the different actors. e. Assessment of possible activities. Based on strategy, operational doctrine, intelligence and recent operations (the assessed strategic objectives and the military means available), the planning staff assesses the full range of the"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: capabilities required for its implementation. It is also sent to..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "capabilities required for its implementation. It is also sent to subordinate commands as a basis for their tactical CONOPS development. Development of the operational-level OPLAN can begin with submission of the operational-level CONOPS, but cannot be finalized prior to its approval. Development of the operation plan 4.75. Overview. The minimum prerequisite for the commencement of OPLAN development is a commander-approved CONOPS, but it must address any issues resulting from the higher commander’s review. Once national responses to the CJSOR in broad terms and a response to the ROEREQ are received they can be taken into consideration during OPLAN development.28 OPLAN development is an iterative, collaborative process that focuses on synchronizing and coordinating the deployment, employment, protection, support and sustainment of the force during the different phases of the operation within a single plan. Plans are prepared in accordance with instructions and formats provided by the strategic level. All planning specifics developed are to be brought into the OPLAN format and its respective annexes. Plan development concludes with final coordination, forwarding, approval and promulgation of the plan as required by the different planning categories which were introduced in chapter 1. a. Timelines – planning products are produced in time to allow subordinates to complete required planning and preparation. b. Adequacy – the following arrangements meet operational requirements: the"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: managed. The INFOSEC measures required are determined by risk analysis..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "managed. The INFOSEC measures required are determined by risk analysis and implemented with the appropriate criticality level of the CIS and/or protective marking of the information being handled, stored, processed or transmitted. This process ensures that confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability concerns are addressed. UK 1A.11. Computer security. COMPUSEC covers all facets of computer security to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information technology systems, and is applied to both hardware and software. Deployed information services staffs should be aware of the significant risks that exist through a poor focus on security in some legacy, stand-alone equipment and small devices where the secure by design approach 5 has not been adopted from the outset. A first line assurance assessment review, which for legacy systems may include accreditation details, should be taken prior to deployment or after any subsequent significant system changes, including all proposed changes to connectivity. Compliance with system security policies and any additional local policies (particularly in a multinational environment) is a vital element of COMPUSEC. UK 1A.12. Communications security. Communications security (COMSEC) measures are specialised protective security measures taken to ensure the confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation and integrity of information in communications channels. On operations, COMSEC procedures are designed and"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: validate the military strategic objectives; other methods may be used...."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "validate the military strategic objectives; other methods may be used. (1) Identify the NATO moral strategic CoG (the strategic decision-making entity in the current strategic context) and analyze it using the CoG analysis model. (2) Identify the adversary’s moral strategic CoG. Identify likely successors and assess the potential influence on the NATO mission for each one to replace the current leadership. (3) Analyze the adversary’s moral strategic CoG using the CoG analysis model. Missing information must be provided through the commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) process (valid for all steps). (4) Identify the adversary’s (assumed) political-strategic objectives and the motives driving them. (5) Determine the adversary’s policy change(s) required to attain the end state and the Alliance strategic-political objectives, like ‘no longer supports insurgents financially’ or ‘withdraws its forces and accepts NATO peace terms.’ Annex B to AJP-5 B-12 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) B (6) Determine NATO’s required condition of the adversary’s moral strategic CoG and its critical capabilities; the condition must support the desired policy change and should be reflected in the Alliance strategic-political objectives. If the Alliance objectives do not reflect such considerations, they should be revised (by the Alliance political leadership). An example could be “Country X has a stable, representative government.” Conditions to be avoided should be"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? conceptual components’ readiness and a strong moral component ready and..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "conceptual components’ readiness and a strong moral component ready and postured in time to complete their operational task. Forces must be ready to integrate from ‘day zero’. 3.59 NATO holds forces at varying states of readiness consistent with the assessed risks and threats. Readiness is the period measured from an initiation order to employment or deployment. a. Employment. Employment is the moment when the headquarters or unit is ready to perform its task from its peacetime location (permanent or forward deployed). b. Deployment. Deployment is the relocation of forces from its national location to the area of operations. 3.60 Given NATO’s core tasks, the intended area of operations for Allied forces is invariably uncertain. The local and strategic transit time will vary. Therefore, deployment readiness does not include the time to move to and within the area of operations and the time to be ready to perform its mission once deployed. However, this does not negate the importance of having the required legal transit and host-nation support agreements in place to further ensure rapid deployment and transit of forces. 3.61 All deployments can be expected to be disrupted as actors compete across the engagement space, agnostic of international boundaries. Therefore, 30 Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Rīga Conference in November 2020. 3 113 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements AJP-01 agility includes responsiveness, force mobility, speed of"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: all other planning: (a) Military logistics. The purpose of the..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "all other planning: (a) Military logistics. The purpose of the logistic planning process is to ensure the facts, assumptions, information, and considerations of the military problem at hand are properly analyzed and effectively synthesized within an integrated plan that supports the concept of the operation. The logistic staff of a joint forces HQ must be able to properly analyze and evaluate the potential impact of logistics in operational art and operations planning to successfully balance their means against the desired ends and prospective ways. The main outcome of this process is to support the future operation plan, and to make sure that the operation is logistically feasible. The logistic staff must undertake military logistics planning at the earliest opportunity to support further OPG planning activities. (b) Movement and transportation. The purpose of the movement and transportation process is to identify theatre movement and transportation requirements for establishing a AJP-5 4-62 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) 4 solid transport network and architecture in the JOA and must be integrated in planning to prevent congestion at strategic entry points (ports of debarkation) and in the JOA. The movement and transportation system establishes an in-theatre hub to maximize cargo throughput and optimize theatre distribution. All TCNs must provide accurate movement and deployment data to the respective movement and transportation planning staff to"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? and authority? Has the situation changed? Timelines Centre of gravity..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "and authority? Has the situation changed? Timelines Centre of gravity analysis Outp u t s Commander’s initial planning guidance Directives Initial JIPOE 1 up and 2 up intent and concept of operations Analyse operational end state, objectives, missions and tasks Factor analysis Assumptions Operational risks Decisive conditions Operational effects Operational actions Review critical operational requirements Estimate of initial forces/ capabilities and command and control JIPOE document Mission analysis briefing Initial operations design Re-stated mission Commander’s intent Planning guidance to staff/ subordinate commanders on course of action development Mission analysis How might it change? (Risk) JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment AJP-5 D-7 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements (Change 1) D Annex D to AJP-5 Mission analysis – four questions UK D.7 . Question 1 – what is the strategic intent? Analyse the superior authorities’ directives to understand their end state and objectives. (For example, in the UK this would be Chief of the Defence Staff and Chief of Joint Operations directives, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), this would be a North Atlantic Council Initiating Directive and Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s Strategic Planning Directive). These will set the boundaries of the problem. UK D.8. Question 2 – what is my role? What are the future desired operational end state and objectives? What effects and activities,"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: appropriate and tailored approach, at the minimum level of force..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "appropriate and tailored approach, at the minimum level of force required. Deterrence 2.17 Principles of deterrence. Deterrence involves five principles: credibility, cognition, capability, competition and communication. When combined they create a deterrent effect on audiences. They are like a multiplication product: if any one of the elements is set at zero, there will be no deterrence. Rules-based international order (RBIO) Armed conflict ended Armed conflict prevented and a return to the RBIO Threshold of armed conflict Armed conflict (conflict) Confrontation (crisis) Rivalry (peace) Cooperation Crisis prevented and RBIO empowered Cooperation Core tasks Deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security Fight against terrorism Projecting stability Deterrence and defence 2 AJP-01 44 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements Deterrence begins with the intention of influencing a hostile stakeholder to not become an adversary in the first place. It continues prior to armed conflict by convincing an adversary not to escalate across the threshold of armed conflict. Deterrence remains relevant during armed conflict in convincing an enemy to neither expand nor escalate the crisis across multiple sectors. The principles of deterrence are also applicable to conflict termination. a. Credibility. Audiences constantly analyze NATO’s attitudes and behaviours; patterns of predictable behaviour over time contribute to their perceptions of the Alliance’s"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: a learning environment, rather than defined as a purely systematic..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "a learning environment, rather than defined as a purely systematic process with inputs and outputs. a. Sharing. The free exchange of ideas between the commander and staff that should typify early operations design is an activity that shares the individual knowledge of numerous functional experts and promotes shared understanding. In a similar way, the after-action sessions that a commander conducts with subordinate commanders and staff during and following an operation create an environment of learning in which participants share knowledge and increase their collective understanding. b. Understanding. Certain products are particularly relevant to understanding. For example, the commander's intent is a knowledge-based product that commanders use to share their insight and direction with the JTF. The intent creates shared purpose and understanding, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve objectives without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. Likewise, lessons-learned databases are knowledge-based products that hel p users avoid previous mistakes and adopt proven best practices. These databases exemplify how IM and decision- support processes can improve future operations by sharing knowledge gained through experience. c. Collaboration. Another aspect of knowledge sharing and understanding is collaboration, which enhances C2 by sharing knowledge and aiding the creation of shared understanding."
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: regulated by the flow and sharing of information to support..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "regulated by the flow and sharing of information to support decision cycles. It is essentially a schedule of important events that should also be synchronized with other levels of the command. The battle rhythm is commander -centric and efforts of the staff should be directed toward supporting decision-making. b. The JTF HQ battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings, report requirements, and other activities. These activities may be daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly requirements. Inputs and outputs of the various events should logically support each other as well as decision-making. Typically, the JTF HQ battle rhythm is managed by the COS. This includes establishing and monitoring the battle rhythm to ensure that it effectively supports planning, decision-making, and other critical functions. There are several critical functions for a battle rhythm; these include (but are not limited to) the following: o provide a routine for internal staff interaction and coordination; o provide a routine for interaction between the commander and staff; Annex B to AJP-3 B-9 Edition D Version 1 o synchronize staff organizational activities; and o facilitate planning by the staff and decision-making by the commander. c. Many factors influence the establishment of a battle rhythm. Subordinate commanders link the planning, decision, and operating cycles of their command to those of the higher HQ and should synchronize their unit battle rhythm with that of the higher HQ. The process"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: they outline the responsibility of military personnel to recognize, report..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "they outline the responsibility of military personnel to recognize, report and respond to international humanitarian law and 19 See PO(2022)0280, Human Security Approach and Guiding Principles, for detail. AJP-3 11 Edition D Version 1 human rights violations, as well as to know who to refer survivors of such violations to. The six cross cutting topics are:20 • protection of civilians;21 • children and armed conflict; • cultural property protection; • combatting trafficking in human beings; • conflict related sexual violence; and • building integrity in operations. Gender perspective 1.31 The term 'gender' refers to the social differences and relations between women and men, which were learned through socialization and determine a person's position and value in a given context. A gender perspective should be considered during every stage of NATO operations and missions, with men and women participating equally to achieve comprehensive and enduring outcomes. This acknowledges that conflict impacts men, women, boys and girls differently, which can have tactical to strategic implications for missions and operations. Developing a comprehensive understanding of the military operating environment (OE), including the broader civilian setting, is critical to the effectiveness of the armed forces in the field. Furthermore, gender inequalities are often exacerbated during periods of crisis and conflict and, if not addressed, may become enduring, thus perpetuating instability. NATO is"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: sequels. The JOPG may identity decision points that lead to..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "sequels. The JOPG may identity decision points that lead to the requirement for branches, sequels and potential CONPLANs. UK D.22. An example operations design schematic is shown in UK Figure D.9. Annex E provides other examples and Chapter 3 covers operations design in more detail. UK Figure D.9 – An example operations designs schematic C2 command and control CoG centre of gravity CVs critical vulnerabilities Own operational CoG Own CVs 1. 2. 3. RED operational CoG Line of operation 1 Line of operation 2 Line of operation 3 Line of operation 4 DC 1 DC 2 DC 3 DC 4 DC 5 DC 6 DC 7 DC 8DC 9 DC 10 DC 11 DC 12 Operational objective Operational objective Operational objective Operational end state (Military) Strategic objectives and end state DC 1 Control of the air achieved DC 2 RED C2 neutralised DC 3 Own capability demonstrated DC 4 RED navy ports neutralised DC 5 RED navy dispersed DC 6 RED diplomatically isolated Sequel Phase 1 Branch Phase 2 Phase 3 DC 7 RED land forces isolated DC 8 RED garrison defeated DC 9 Own forces deployed DC 10 BLUE government restored DC 11 Secure BLUE and borders DC 12 Peace treaty signed AJP-5 D-17 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements (Change 1) D Annex D to AJP-5 UK D.23. Mission analysis briefing. The MAB is a fulcrum moment that pulls together all the analysis to date that allows the commander to develop COAs. Its purpose is to validate the mission analysis, including confirming the mission and its operational objectives, and the initial"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: which national contingents contribute, are normally environmental or functional, but..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "which national contingents contribute, are normally environmental or functional, but the specific task organization will reflect the higher commander’s specific operations requirements. An efficient and comprehensive liaison structure, linking the joint task force headquarters, all force elements and other organisations (such as international organizations and non-governmental organizations) is an essential element of the C2 structure. 5.5 Command and control and the comprehensive approach. Traditionally, with the notion of force elements in our area of responsibility being ‘under command’, it is assumed that the Alliance has ‘control’ over them. However, as part of the comprehensive approach, this is not routinely achievable. Depending on the nature of the partners or neutral actors, varying C2 approaches will be required – ranging from directing to engaging to working under the mission command philosophy – to drive or influence internal and 5 AJP-01 178 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements external organizations, with the intent of shaping the engagement space. Each of these approaches will have different applicability and all will be applied simultaneously based on differences in context and organizational needs and capabilities. For example, at the lower tactical level, where external relationships are reduced and linear hierarchies are likely to dominate, command will be largely directive in nature. However, at higher levels, where partners and other actors will be"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: Force elements operating independently in separate areas may have little..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Force elements operating independently in separate areas may have little need to coordinate or synchronize their activities. However, commanders who envisage high levels of interaction between force elements, working in close proximity to one another, should coordinate or synchronize their activities and may require extensive enabling engagement space management measures. As military forces create effects across an expanding volume of engagement space the potential for interference between NATO forces and other actors increases. Hence, engagement space management also comprises means to manage own behaviour in order to minimize chances for, or impact of, such interference. C.3 Engagement space management should be included in training for operations. At the operational level, this should address in particular the complexity of the joint engagement space, including de- conflicting multinational, multi -agency, and host nation aspects of operations, across every environment. Annex C to AJP-3 C-2 Edition D Version 1 Combat identification C.4 Combat identification is the means by which military units distinguish friend from adversary during operations, with the aim of reducing fratricide and increasing the operational effectiveness of forces and weapon systems. This is achieved through the proc ess of combining situational awareness (SA), positive identification and specific tactics, techniques and procedures. C.5 Combat identification solutions which are designed to prevent"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Explain the following concept from NATO doctrine: preserve what has been gained, and how to ensure it..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "preserve what has been gained, and how to ensure it endures . After the objectives are achieved, a follow - on force or adjusted mission may be required to secure and protect the gains.. Section 2 – Forming the joint task force NATO forces generation, activation and deployment procedure 2.4 The Alliance has consultation procedures, crisis management arrangements, military capabilities, as well as civil emergency planning structures and tools. 33 These ensure appropriate political -military control over Alliance operations, missions, and activities and clearly identify the authority to initiate operations planning. To conduct a NATO operation, it is necessary to generate and deploy mission- specific forces from within NATO forces and, where appropriate, from the forces of partners and other non- NATO nations. The force generation and deployment process can be tailored to satisfy the circumstances pertaining to each situation but, in any event, is dependent upon NAC decisions. The force generation process is continuous and cyclical. It continues throughout the duration of an operation to 32 Shaping activity is likely to be, but not restricted to, strategic communications or strategic diplomacy or reconnaissance and the commander might be involved. 33 For detail, see Annex D to MC 0133/5, NATO’s Operations Planning, the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area family of plans and the Force Structure Requirement. AJP-3 24 Edition D Version 1 fulfil the requirements of the"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: of competition 1.18 The character of competition – its face..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "of competition 1.18 The character of competition – its face or form, what it looks and feels like – shifts, sometimes dramatically, over time and space. Ways of competing are almost limitless. The character and intensity of competition at any time, AJP-01 13 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements 1 and in any area, reflects the nature of the societies waging it and is influenced by the political, military, economic, social, cultural and technological dynamics of the actors. Understanding the character of the competition is essential for political and military leaders. 1.19 Competitive techniques. While competition is persistent, its intensity varies as the conflict triangle evolves over time. Where the RBIO is observed, rivals’ national interests are achieved through consensus. However, during periods of strategic competition, actors are likely to become increasingly assertive and exploit ambiguity to advance their interests using the following techniques. a. Boundary and threshold shifting. A boundary or threshold is the limit that, when crossed, would normally trigger a significant reaction. The aim of boundary shifting is for an actor to achieve a goal in such a way that a movement in the boundary is forced and a response is not triggered. A boundary shift often results in a new limit being established, with the boundary ‘shifted’. The threshold of armed conflict is often shifted as adversaries try to achieve war-like objectives without becoming engaged in armed"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What are the NATO principles regarding: Dislocation. Dislocation denies an actor the ability to bring strengths..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Dislocation. Dislocation denies an actor the ability to bring strengths to bear by not accepting the premise or terms of the engagement. Dislocation is about ensuring that the unsupportive actor’s strengths are unavailable, focused in the wrong place, or rendered ineffective or irrelevant. Ideally dislocation would shape the potential and actual engagement to be conducted on the Alliance terms, where there is the biggest delta between the Alliance’s strengths and the unsupportive audiences. Dislocation must always occur in the context of the narrative. b. Disruption. Disruption denies an unsupportive actor’s ability to cohere their actions by targeting critical capabilities and other points of influence upon which they depend. This is attained by neutralization or destruction, which can be either attritional or annihilatory in nature. Disruption on multiple points of influence can create cognitive paralysis. It is important to remember that adversaries are not foolish or supine; they will seek to attack us asymmetrically to gain the initiative and undermine our will. Mission command 4.16 A commander’s primary responsibility is to accomplish the missions and tasks that contribute to specific objectives in line with their higher commander’s intent and the strategic narrative. This requires the fusion of: • leadership, derived from the leadership culture (that is part of the moral component); • command authority, as allocated formally to a commander through orders and"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? critical requirement for the CoG. Critical vulnerabilities For every critical..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "critical requirement for the CoG. Critical vulnerabilities For every critical vulnerability (CV) identified, assess the impact on each critical capability and relate to the required condition of the CoG. For opposing CoGs: For each CV, determine the potential effect(s) that expresses how the CV can be exploited in order to achieve the required condition of the CoG. Is NATO able to achieve each potential effect – with what combination(s) of actions? What are the risks associated? Are there undesired effects? What combination(s) of effects can achieve the required condition of the CoG? Those effects deemed decisive for achieving the required condition are designated decisive conditions. Different COAs might select different combinations of effects and thus DCs. For friendly CoGs: (How) can an opponent cause and exploit a vulnerability (effects and actions)? Which effect(s) achieved by NATO could protect/ prevent the vulnerability in order to satisfy the critical requirement (to maintain/achieve the req. condition of the CoG) – with what combination of actions? Critical requirements Each of the CoG’s critical capabilities must be considered in regard to what the critical requirements (conditions, resources, and/or means) are for the CoG to perform it. There will normally be an overlap of requirements to perform the various critical capabilities but it is useful to note which critical capability each requirement relates to. Conclusions The deductions should be formulated as"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "Summarize the key points about: military forces. 2. An order given by a commander; that..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "military forces. 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit, group of units, organization or area under the authority of a single individual. 4. To dominate an area or situation. 5. To exercise command. (NATO agreed) commander’s required date CRD The latest date, calculated from G-day, established by the theatre commander, on which forces are required to be complete in their final destination and organized to meet the commander’s operational requirement. (NATO agreed) communication and information systems CIS Collective term for communication systems and information systems. (NATO agreed) concept of operations CONOPS A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his given mission. (NATO agreed) AJP-5 Lex-7 Edition A Version 2 + UK national elements (Change 1) conduct of operations The art of directing, coordinating, controlling and adjusting the actions of forces to achieve specific objectives. (NATO agreed) contingency plan COP A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning. (NATO agreed) control The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "What does the NATO document say about the following topic? such as attrition or annihilation. Whereas an attritional approach seeks..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "such as attrition or annihilation. Whereas an attritional approach seeks to achieve an incremental reduction of the hostile actor's means and endurance, an annihilation approach demands the complete destruction of the actor's means. These direct approaches can easily become stalemated, time-consuming and NATO’s primary institutional narrative: 'A democratic, multinational alliance uniting across borders to guard, with courage and competence, against threats to our home.'© NATO 4 AJP-01 134 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements indecisive unless there is a significant advantage in combat power. Whilst the manoeuvrist approach often involves an element of attrition and annihilation (armed conflict is inherently violent with physical destruction), this is not its primary focus. 4.12 Seizing and holding the initiative. Central to the manoeuvrist approach is the requirement to seize, hold and exploit the initiative to gain a position of cognitive advantage. This advantage is achieved by: forcing the hostile actor to react or a stakeholder not to act; increasing the friction and uncertainty that faces them; and creating confusion and overwhelming their ability to make decisions and act coherently. Seizing the initiative is intrinsically linked to applying the tenet of mission command. Maintaining the initiative allows the commander to dictate the course of events and maintain relentless pressure on the unsupportive audience. Seizing and maintaining the initiative requires the"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: Information systems analyst(s) Monitoring and assessment specialist(s) CPAO Chief Public..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Information systems analyst(s) Monitoring and assessment specialist(s) CPAO Chief Public Affairs Officer IEA information environment assessment Info Ops information operations J10-StratCom J10-Strategic Communications Mil PA military public affairs PsyOps psychological operations Information fusion² Audience analysis Monitoring and analysis 3 Media operations Media production Digital engagement Information environment assessment branch Plans, Training & Doctine branch Military Public Affairs branch¹ Strategic Engagement branch Communications Division 1 Chief Public Affairs Office retains direct access to the commander. 2 Functional inputs for monitoring and analysis from military public affairs. 3 Functional responsibility to information fusion section. date: February 2022 4 AJP-10 104 Edition A Version 1 + UK national elements Figure 4.4 – Joint Force Command – Communications Directorate (example model) 1 CPAO retains direct access to the commander Communications Directorate StratCom branch includes division XO Info Ops branch Current focus topics IE horizon scan Plans FW and information communications plan development Mil PA branch¹ Current media operations Community relations Media plans Production Future media Ops/Ex plans PsyOps branch Target audience analysis Current Operations Targeting Assessment Plans Assessment Engagement Synchronization Targeting Plans IE monitoring & assessment team Digital TraditionalDigital media analysis Situational awareness Social media"
}
] |
[
{
"role": "user",
"content": "According to NATO publications, what is the guidance on: Lex-6 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements doctrine..."
},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Lex-6 Edition F Version 1 + UK national elements doctrine Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (NATO Agreed) effect dimensions An analytical construct that translates actions in the engagement space into the physical, virtual and cognitive consequences that these actions may have. (NATO Agreed) enemy An individual or group, entity or state actor whose actions are hostile and against which the legal use of armed force is authorized. (NATO Agreed) engagement space/battlespace The part of the operating environment where actions and activities are planned and conducted. (NATO Agreed) fighting power The ability of the armed forces to shape, contest, and fight Note: It represents three interrelated components: the moral, conceptual and physical. (NATO Agreed) gender The social attributes associated with being male and female, learned through socialisation, that determine a person's position and value in a given context, including in the relationship between women and men and girls and boys, as well as in the relations between women and those between men. Note: Gender issues do not equate to an exclusive focus on women. (NATO Agreed) information activities Activities performed by any capability or means, focused on creating cognitive effects. (NATO agreed) narrative A spoken or written account of events and information arranged in a logical sequence to influence the"
}
] |
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